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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Matthew Haywood on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Matthew Haywood on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Matthew Haywood on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Drivechains — potential issues as they relate to Bitcoin]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@wintercooled/drivechains-potential-issues-as-they-relate-to-bitcoin-54a79ceb5442?source=rss-2b334f28421c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[drivechain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin-mining]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Haywood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2023 08:18:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-13T08:46:59.739Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Drivechains — potential issues as they relate to Bitcoin</h3><p>An overview of some possible issues with drivechains (a shorthand term for BIP300/BIP301) that may impact the Bitcoin network itself. These run counter to the argument that drivechains are ‘opt-in’ and that Bitcoin users that do not want to use them are unaffected by their activation.</p><p>I would like to thank Peter Todd for the discussions I have had with him on the topic and his valuable ideas and insights. Peter has published his analysis of drivechains <a href="https://petertodd.org/2023/drivechains">here</a>.</p><p>I have not focused on the mechanics of drivechains themselves, rather how they may impact Bitcoin.</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>The ideas presented within this post are just high level ideas and are not accompanied by mathematical justifications. Indeed, the use of mathematical equations to “prove” that drivechains will not impact Bitcoin ignore the effects of human behaviour, unknown incentives, long term competitive advantages, seemingly irrational actions and the like. Experience tells us that it is not safe to assume you know and can model the behaviour of a large number of people. The desire to only activate Segwit as a hard fork but not as a soft fork springs to mind as an example of this, possibly the byproduct of a hidden competitive advantage. “Very unlikely to happen” is a phrase that has been used to argue against some forms of the issues raised in this post, but “very unlikely” may well still be too likely for most Bitcoiners who have wealth stored in the network.</p><p>Up front, I’m not saying that all these issues will happen and there may be many that can be satisfactorily answered by the proposers. My concern is that valid criticisms are not being acknowledged, understood, or addressed in enough detail and that the impression being generated is that the only criticism to drivechains is the misguided shouting of “No altcoins on Bitcoin!”. It’s certainly helpful for the promoters of drivechains that this is happening as it is easy to point at and label as the singular criticism and imply it is not one that should concern anyone. “Damn maxis!” etc.</p><p>If I say “drivechains” I am using shorthand for Paul’s sidechains proposal via BIP300/BIP301 (Hashrate escrows/blind merged mining). I also use 6 months as the peg out time period whereas in some cases I believe it can be configured to be less, for example I have seen 3 months stated in some documentation.</p><p>The post is a collection of notes, so pardon any poor grammar and lack of full references. More details can be provided on any item if needed.</p><blockquote>I have asked Paul some of the questions contained within this post <a href="https://twitter.com/wintercooled/status/1697524053685235796">here</a> but at the time of writing have not yet had responses. It’s also quite possible he has answered some of them in the past but “go listen to my 5 hour talk” (an actual suggestion during one of his Twitter Spaces sessions) is not a valid response in my opinion.</blockquote><h3>Possible ways it can impact Bitcoin</h3><h4>The potential for theft, remedied by Bitcoin UASF is part and parcel of the drivechain offering</h4><p>This is perhaps the most common argument against the claim that drivechains are “opt-in” and do not affect Bitcoin users who do not use drivechains. The drivechain FAQ does address this but it makes assumptions up front about the incentives of miners and then builds everything else on top of that:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TDkBaELsGjznYwni" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.truthcoin.info/blog/drivechain/#drivechains-security">https://www.truthcoin.info/blog/drivechain/#drivechains-security</a></figcaption></figure><p>So the basis is that miners will act “just selfishly enough”… but what if they don’t stick to that, rather hopeful, assumption?!</p><p><strong>Theft from one drivechain means cheap BTC for miners</strong></p><p>What if a collection of miners decides they want to crash the 1:1 peg and devalue BTC on all drivechains by performing a theft from one drivechain? The breaking of trust in the 1:1 peg is realised, the users try to flee the drivechains and use the only viable route out en-masse, the swap providers, who do not want to take up drivechain BTC in 1:1 to mainchain BTC because of the risks now very much apparent. Miners could be the counterparty on swap services though — accepting (say) 3 DCBTC for every 1 BTC they swap. After they have accumulated many DCBTC they can then safely and “honestly” peg them out of the drivechain at a 1:1 rate, knowing that the people who control the peg out process that allows this are themselves. The panicked drivechain users are back in Bitcoin with less BTC than they had on the drivechain. <strong>There are many ways this panic could be created, not just via theft.</strong> Deliberate bugs introduced to drivechain code the miners created or sponsored, threats of splitting a drivechain’s blockchain etc.</p><p>If a pool does try a theft and promises to split the proceeds with their pool users — well, who would turn that down? This could occur if the drivechain is not generating enough fees and many other potential issues with the drivechain economics and codebase security itself. The theft itself can only be proven by those running a node on the drivechain, but how likely is that to happen?</p><p><strong>Theft prevention via UASF</strong></p><p>The comeback is to soft fork the theft transaction out on the Bitcoin chain, which impacts Bitcoin users.</p><p>What incentivizes miners to do anything now or in the future cannot be known, so best to keep it within the bounds currently set out in Bitcoin. Yes they like to make money but they may play a game where they take a hit now for profit later (breaking some of Paul’s models) or perhaps they have inside knowledge they use to prevent exit from a drivechain for later financial gain, or any number of unknowable situations that end up being valid in their eyes at the time but not in anyone else’s.</p><p>And if you don’t fancy the idea of miners doing this just out of greed and dishonesty then how about some government body in the US trying to stop miners from pegging out from a side chain of processing its transactions because they have been told not to.</p><p>The “theft being obvious and signalled for 6 months” argument assumes that there are people who are validating the sidechain itself other than the miners attempting the theft. How can you point to a proof of theft and tell others to look at it if you have no proof? Drivechain miners running nodes on the drivechain might block new attempts to connect to sync the blockchain if they don’t want people to have proof of a theft. It seems unlikely drivechain users will be encouraged to run drivechain nodes — after all this is touted as a way to onboard the masses.</p><p>And so a soft fork on Bitcoin is the last stand for these users to try and get their funds back. Bitcoin soft forks, or any type of chain split is not good for Bitcoin, it undermines the perception of stability and finality of transfers. <strong>Anything that puts a honeypot up and has a final defence of “soft fork Bitcoin” is very risky I would say and not “opt-in” at all.</strong> Drivechain users would be opting in other Bitcoin users to their own gamble.</p><p>​​Ruben SomSomsen <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/BitcoinDiscussion/comments/odiuro/comment/h40xmn7/">commented</a> (amongst others) on this topic 2 years ago at time of writing:</p><p><em>“…if the actual [Bitcoin] economic majority wants to prevent an invalid peg-out [theft transaction], this won’t lead to a permanent [Bitcoin] fork, but with a significant non-majority it could.” … “[Bitcoin] users are motivated to take an active stance against invalid peg-outs, and that’s concerning, as it turns Bitcoin consensus from passive and (relatively) certain to active and uncertain.”</em></p><p>The risks are known and yet still the “opt-in” line is used to try and ignore the fact that a change to the Bitcoin protocol via soft forks like this <em>will</em> place risk on Bitcoin itself.</p><h4>Adds economic weight to one side of a contentious Bitcoin hard fork</h4><p>Imagine the risk of a new version of the New York Agreement but this time the miners in support of it can hold drivechain Bitcoin hostage.</p><p>Those with BTC in drivechains would certainly voice their support of the miner side of the hard fork if miners said they would only release drivechain escrow on the Bitcoin fork they support and not the alternative. There would be ways around this on the other fork I guess, but this is far from an ideal power to place in the hands of miners.</p><h4>A drivechain hardfork doubles the drivechain BTC supply</h4><p>In the event of a hard fork on a drivechain, the BTC in the drivechain will effectively be doubled. The peg can only allow out as much as went in and so who determines which of the hard fork’s gets to peg out back to Bitcoin? This allows miners to effectively decide the fate of the forks on the drivechain and could possibly lead to ‘fork wars’ on the Bitcoin main chain as competing drivechain hard fork supporters try to soft fork out what they see as invalid withdrawals from the “lesser” drivechain chain.</p><h4>What if there is a Bitcoin soft fork to remove drivechains after people have already sent BTC to them?</h4><p>I haven’t thought too much about how this would come about from a technical standpoint but it doesn’t seem impossible. What happens to the funds in the escrow then? What if nobody was running a node on the drivechain apart from miners who now have access to all the funds and no longer the fees from the drivechain? There will possibly be no valid record of who deserves what allocation of BTC. This may result in campaigns to have funds released on Bitcoin and another potential Bitcoin soft fork.</p><h4>The Bitcoin brand can be tainted by association</h4><p>There are already people who think “Bitcoin was hacked” when an exchange is hacked, if there is theft from or on a drivechain then the association with Bitcoin could lead the wider public (the ones that drivechains claim to cater to for onboarding) to assume the position that Bitcoin itself is not secure.</p><h4>Changes can add unknown future issues</h4><p>Unintended consequences cannot be known upfront regardless of how much scrutiny a proposal has. We already have recently added changes to Bitcoin that we have yet to fully make use of so why rush this in so soon after? Segwit and Taproot were debated and thought through much more than drivechains but still brought about unintended consequences (ordinals for example). Why add another possible source of this so soon after?</p><h4>Fee sniping becomes more likely</h4><p>The likelihood of fee sniping to take the claimed “security budget solving” fees from drivechains (mining to re-organise so a miner can take a block where the fees were high enough to warrant the risks associated with lost work) increases, especially as the Bitcoin block subsidy decreases. Having the fees paid on an external chain affect Bitcoin’s own block production is far from ideal.</p><h4>Impact on Bitcoin consensus and activation processes</h4><p>There are also risks to Bitcoin’s change process, not just the blockchain itself.</p><p>Why is this now being presented as urgent with talk of miner activation incoming? Why are they not launching a bip8 signal/flag process or something? Why are they not trying to build consensus first? If they get miners to activate without user consensus it sets a dangerous precedent for future soft forks. “Fire first and deal with any backlash (URSF)” is not a sound way to make changes to Bitcoin.</p><p>David Bailey claims that he has been talking to miners and they say (to put it more politely) that they will activate in a hasty way, regardless of the general sentiment of Bitcoin users.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*QhXbNBO4iXApn5gA" /><figcaption><a href="https://twitter.com/DavidFBailey/status/1697630522657091900">https://twitter.com/DavidFBailey/status/1697630522657091900</a></figcaption></figure><p>Discussions have been ongoing for many years, it is true, but fundamental issues with incentive skews on Bitcoin have not been addressed. The lack of support is not just because of people not liking altcoins, which is what some proponents have implied. The idea of a decentralised, trustless, two way peg is great, perhaps this is just not the way to do it and the right way way may not present itself for many years, if at all. So be it, there is no do-over in Bitcoin.</p><h4>Other common or interesting points</h4><p>Mike Tidwell has <a href="https://twitter.com/miketwenty1/status/1696943794321588383">a thread</a> where he collects interesting takes on potential issues with drivechains. The thread is active and being added to so refer to the source for an up to date list. Some of the points raised by others there have already been covered in this post but it is worth noting them for a wider view on how they may come about or what impact they may have.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*lwpebl5BtctvQQEQ" /></figure><p>These cover items Mike has labelled: “No one wants it”, “Elsewhere first”, “Stratum v2 first”, “The unpeggining”, “Insufficient fees won’t secure”, “Adoption is dangerous”, “Key-signing federation is superior”, “The BMM fallacy”, “Doesn’t kill alts”.</p><p>Paul has responded to one or two at the time of writing.</p><h3>Decentralised, trustless 2WP — fact or fiction?</h3><h4>Trusted custodians</h4><p>The proposal’s own website suggests that, due to the limited peg out capacity, the users would likely opt for a custodial swap service or exchange use:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*VLo_XJKPoIDBvQ_T" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.drivechain.info/faq/index.html">https://www.drivechain.info/faq/index.html</a></figcaption></figure><p>If you want a Monero like drivechain for a transaction you wish to make, why not just use Monero right now via an existing swap service and swap back to Bitcoin after you have used the feature you wanted?</p><p>Liquidity Swap services like the ones mentioned in the above image will need to rebalance the sides of their swaps and so how many of the 20,000 outputs will be available for normal people to use? It may also be financially beneficial for such services to pay the fees to take up all those outputs for themselves, leaving drivechain users with little options beyond paying service providers to get out. As for atomic swaps, finding someone who happens to want in at the same time and for the same amount will not be easy, especially if there is a “panic” flow of users trying to leave all at once. So if you don’t like the idea of Bitgo being the custodian of WBTC then why would you like drivechains which, baring some person to person coincidence of wants atomic swaps, will likely end up relying on such custodians for drivechains?</p><h4>The peg will not remain priced 1:1</h4><p>It is very easy to think up multiple scenarios where the lack of exit capacity (20,000 outputs every 6 months for example) and possible panic scenarios causes a swap service to re-price the drivechain BTC lower than mainchain BTC.</p><h4>Creating drivechains is unlikely to be open to everyone as advertised</h4><p>As “zndtoshi” <a href="https://twitter.com/zndtoshi/status/1696945331810771269">points out</a> (refer to Tweet for further details):</p><p><em>“BIP300 requires 90% of the miners to vote in favor for a new sidechain to be enabled. This also means that 10% can veto a new sidechain proposal.</em></p><p><em>Drivechain proponents assume that miners will behave in a good way, while in reality they have no guarantee for this.</em></p><p><em>It’s possible…</em></p><p><em>..that miners could take advantage of this power to veto and expect benefits.”</em></p><h3>Overselling, misrepresenting, or not correcting the mistakes of others</h3><p>The way in which some issues raised have been ignored or “hand waved” away has caused me to dig deeper into them. The lack of adversarial thinking was what led me to create this post. The main website for the drivechains proposal is of concern as it does not acknowledge issues with enough consideration for Bitcoin which, it seems to me, is perhaps treated as a vehicle to deliver the prosper’s own prediction market project.</p><h4>Bitcoin (the asset) does not make a drivechain secure or less risky just because it is pegged into it</h4><p>Just because a drivechain uses pegged bitcoin on it doesn’t remove bugs, potential scams or malicious actors not constrained by the network effect accrued by Bitcoin over the years. The risk is that the peg to Bitcoin may well enable the creator of any drivechain to sell it as being “safe because it’s pegged to Bitcoin, it’s a Bitcoin layer 2, not an alt coin”.</p><p>It absolutely won’t make “Bitcoin twitter” an “everyone is happy”, contention-free environment. Just because the “we want more privacy” people have a drivechain with Monero-like properties doesn’t mean that’s them done and happy, they’d then likely point to their drivechain and say “see, works fine, let’s add it to the main chain, then we can all benefit and I can stop having to peg out when I want to pay someone in a normal bitcoin address”. But a drivechain testnet is not the same thing as the bitcoin main chain. There is zero chance this will end disputes and may even provide “evidence” that sparks more.</p><h4>Implying double spends are the same thing as drivechain escrow theft</h4><p>There is a big difference between a 51% attack double spend on Bitcoin and a theft from a drivechain’s escrow fund. The two are presented as the same by drivechain proponents in order to dismiss concerns over the magnitude of potential escrow theft along the lines of “well miners can already steal using a 51% attack in Bitcoin so the same thing that stops them doing that will stop them stealing from the drivechain”.</p><h4>Apparent lack of awareness of pre-existing issues raised</h4><p>Worrying to me is that the issues Shinobi raised on the 1st sept Spaces discussion were not understood by Paul despite them being repeated 5–6 times. This was not a new issue that was being raised either (fees from drivechains can centralise mining). <a href="https://twitter.com/miketwenty1">Michael Tidwell</a>, who stepped in to act as a ‘moderator’ in this part, understood the point being made and explained it to Paul in different terms. Paul still did not acknowledge the issue, instead changing the context or saying he didn’t see what the issue was. Not getting it or, less charitably, pretending not to get it in order to avoid addressing it, are both worrying in equal measure!</p><h4>Fear/greed based or dishonest framing</h4><p><a href="https://twitter.com/LayerTwoLabs/status/1664032295056191488">https://twitter.com/LayerTwoLabs/status/1664032295056191488</a></p><p>The above tweet from the proposer’s LayerTwoLabs account mentions:</p><p><em>“100% of the value of many utility tokens such as monero, ethereum, and others may begin to be absorbed by Bitcoin…”</em></p><p><em>“Aside from huge price appreciation of #Bitcoin…”</em></p><p><em>“solving the security budget problem…”</em></p><p><em>“more on-chain onboarding […] (instead of scaling via trusted/custodial services)…”</em></p><p><em>“Drivechain relies on the same or similar assumptions on which Bitcoin was designed”</em></p><p><em>“Bitcoin needs Drivechain or similar, or there may eventually be a flippening, loss of network effects, insufficient fee-based security, and other major problems for Bitcoin.”</em></p><p>All I can picture is a fragmented market where BTC moves out of the main market to disconnected islands of lesser liquidity. I can’t pay for some socks in bitcoin because I moved half my bitcoin to a Monero-like drivechain and the rest to an EVM based drivechain.</p><h4>“Proving” incentives using spreadsheets</h4><p>The <a href="https://www.drivechain.info/faq/index.html">drivechain FAQs</a> are vague and assume everything can be represented by a figure in a cell in a spreadsheet. Vague answers, blunt assurances, or relying on spreadsheet maths is not very convincing to me. Human emotions, incentives and drivers cannot be represented by a number in a spreadsheet.</p><h3>It is certainly not urgent!</h3><p>The proposers and supporters act as if the activation of BIPS 300 and 301 by soft fork is urgent. This is perhaps due to recent funding and the associated expectations of delivery that brings about.</p><p>Some of the more prominent supporters are even displaying <a href="https://twitter.com/miketwenty1/status/1696943794321588383">tweets</a> showing that they are canvassing for miner support to activate via MASF before there is clear consensus among users.</p><p>If drivechains are so great it will be worth taking our time over and worth them clearly addressing issues and being up front and honest about any potential drawbacks. If not, the proposal will receive hostile responses, regardless of its own merits.</p><p>Trying to get bitcoiners to rally behind it to “stop Ethereum flippening Bitcoin” or that with drivechains we’d be at <a href="https://twitter.com/Truthcoin/status/1655246606147387397">$15 million a coin by now</a> is playing to the lowest human emotions of fear and greed and is not winning the author of this content over. In fact it has had the opposite effect and has made me question why such tactics are needed if the idea is as good as is claimed.</p><h3>Footnote</h3><p>I wrote most of the above in early September so some references might now be replaceable with more relevant ones and I may have missed linking to more recent thoughts on the above matters by others in the space.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=54a79ceb5442" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Better Privacy in Bitcoin with ZeroLink]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@wintercooled/better-privacy-in-bitcoin-with-zerolink-fa85e0fa2db3?source=rss-2b334f28421c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Haywood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 18 Dec 2017 18:37:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-28T09:04:42.348Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Updated 2020_09_28</p><p><em>Note: HiddenWallet went on to become </em><a href="https://wasabiwallet.io/"><em>Wasabi Wallet</em></a><em>.</em></p><h3>The Problem</h3><p>Every Bitcoin transaction is stored on a public ledger, called the Bitcoin blockchain. The Bitcoin blockchain records every transaction ever made on the network. In isolation, the use of <a href="https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Address#:~:text=A%20Bitcoin%20address%2C%20or%20simply,by%20any%20user%20of%20Bitcoin.">public addresses</a> provide a decent amount of anonymity but the existence of exchanges that enable USD, GBP, EUR etc to be swapped for Bitcoin introduces ties to real world identities. With KYC and AML compliance in place, the start and end point of every ‘government currency to Bitcoin’ and ‘Bitcoin to government currency’ exchange can be linked to the identity of real people with real bank accounts. Working outwards from those points, it is not difficult to trace transactions through the blockchain, make associations between transacting parties, and try to imply why.</p><blockquote>…the identity of the owner cannot be associated with their Bitcoin address until personal information is revealed by the owner during an exchange— bitcoin.org</blockquote><p>There are plenty of profitable companies that exists solely to track and infer ownership of Bitcoin by analysing the blockchain. These companies sell their services to exchanges, which may already hold your personal information, along with the addresses used to deposit and withdraw Bitcoin.</p><p>If this thought makes you feel uncomfortable, you may be interested in keeping your transaction history a little more private.</p><h3>But if I am doing nothing wrong, why should I care?</h3><p>You might think, “Why should I be worried if people are tracking the blockchain if I am doing nothing illegal?”. If so, would you also be comfortable saying “Why should I be worried if someone I don’t know can read all my emails if I am doing nothing illegal?”. I doubt that the majority of Bitcoin holders are using it to engage in illegal activities, but I am confident that the majority would also not want it to be publicly known how much they own, or who they have sent and received Bitcoin from, just as they would not want the whole world to have access their email inbox.</p><p>A few months before writing this, I joined in helping <a href="https://medium.com/u/34bdb6a99bc1">nopara73</a> in the development of ZeroLink — a Bitcoin privacy and fungibility framework. I saw Adam announce ZeroLink when I attended Breaking Bitcoin in Paris earlier that year. The thing that most interested me was the use of something called Chaumian CoinJoin — which is ZeroLink’s chosen mixing technique.</p><p>Mixing is a way for users to <a href="https://bitcoinmagazine.com/what-is-bitcoin/what-are-bitcoin-mixers">“obscure the ties between their Bitcoin addresses and real-world identities”</a>, allowing people to use Bitcoin more privately.</p><p>Chaumian CoinJoin is a mixing technique that prevents even the coordinator of the mix from knowing who ended up being sent which coins.</p><h3>How ZeroLink works</h3><p>ZeroLink’s Chaumian CoinJoin mixer allows people to join a mixing round by sending an amount of Bitcoin into the mix and receiving a set amount out of the mix. All participants will receive the same amount, and so it is much harder for anyone to try and determine which input became what output. Furthermore, the spending of ‘mixed’ outputs requires that the user follows certain rules, or else they will leak associations and undo the privacy gains that they just achieved.</p><p>Because of that, the ZeroLink framework also specifies that any ‘post-mix’ wallet should do all it can to warn the user that joining the resulting output of a mix with non-mixed (or even other post-mix) outputs may reduce the anonymity of the mix itself. This has all been <a href="https://github.com/nopara73/ZeroLink">detailed</a> by Adam in the presentation he did at Breaking Bitcoin and I wont repeat it all here.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q8HyRRs01cnYvPIxKw8OnA.png" /></figure><p>Instead I will try and explain how ZeroLink’s mixing technique aims to remove all knowledge of ‘who got what’, and further prevents even the co-ordinator of the mix from knowing this information.</p><h3>ZeroLink’s Mixing Technique (Chaumian CoinJoin)</h3><p>This is how it works…</p><p>The coordinator of the mix decides upon an anonymity set for the next mix. We’ll assume 100 participants for the purpose of this explanation.</p><p>Participants register for the next mix by sending an input address and a cryptographically hidden or ‘blinded’ output address to the mixer.</p><blockquote>In cryptography a <strong>blind signature</strong>, as introduced by David Chaum, is a form of digital signature in which the content of a message is disguised (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blinding_(cryptography)">blinded</a>) before it is signed. The resulting blind signature can be publicly verified against the original, unblinded message in the manner of a regular digital signature.</blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_signature">‘Blind signature’</a></blockquote><p>The mix coordinator then signs the message, including the blinded output, to say that although it does not know the address that has been blinded, it did indeed receive it from a valid mix participant. The signed and blinded output is returned to the participant who will later un-blind it, switch Tor circuit, and submit it back to the mix coordinator. The process of un-blinding does not remove the mix coordinator’s signature, yet does change the blinded output signed by the mix coordinator into an unblinded one. This way, the mix coordinator is able to verify that the output was one that it has previously signed, although it will not know who submitted it for signing originally. Magic!</p><p>Once the mix coordinator receives all the unblinded, signed outputs and the anonymity target is reached, the mix coordinator constructs a transaction using the input addresses submitted and the 100 output addresses (in this example) that it received from all mix participants. It is worth reiterating that it is impossible for the mix coordinator to know which output was submitted by which participant. Each participant receives the transaction, checks that their submitted output is one of the outputs in the list of all outputs, signs the transaction and waits for all parties to complete the process.</p><p>Once a fully signed transaction has been received and verified by the mix coordinator it is broadcast to the network. All participants are updated to let them know that the mix transaction has been broadcast. When the transaction has been accepted into a block the participants will see that there are 100 outputs of identical amount, plus perhaps some change outputs that are not classed as mixed. Nobody has a way of linking any of the provided inputs to any of those outputs.</p><p><em>It is worth noting that all important data sends from the client happen over Tor — the circuit being used is switched during different stages of submission to prevent network snooping from identifying any link between input submission and output submission.</em></p><h3>Participating in a test of ZeroLink in HiddenWallet!</h3><p>If you would like to help test ZeroLink as it is implemented in the ‘HiddenWallet’ Bitcoin wallet please see <a href="https://github.com/nopara73/HiddenWallet/blob/master/HiddenWallet.Documentation/TestingTheZeroLinkMixer.md">the guide</a> that has recently been released. This large test case aims for an anonymity set of 100 participants with a fall-back deadline of Wednesday 10pm GMT if that threshold is not met — upon when the mix will proceed with as many participants as have registered.</p><p>Please help us get to 100 participants before December the 20th — I have Christmas shopping to do and worryingly little time left as it is.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fa85e0fa2db3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[All roads lead to Segwit — Segwit2x, BIP 91 Segsignal and UASF]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@wintercooled/segwit2x-segsignal-and-the-uasf-all-roads-lead-to-segwit-d66fedf7fba?source=rss-2b334f28421c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d66fedf7fba</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[segwit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uasf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[segwit2x]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Haywood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Jul 2017 05:57:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-26T08:45:08.306Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have written <a href="https://medium.com/@wintercooled/the-road-to-segwit-activation-uasf-segwit2x-and-segwit-signalling-explained-2ff00488b7cb">previously</a> about Segwit2x, UASF and the road to Segwit activation. Since publication of that article bit 4 has locked in and BIP 91 ‘Segsignal’ has also been spoken of as an independent activation method.</p><p>So we currently have three proposals for activating Segwit on Bitcoin — Segwit2x, BIP 91 Segsignal and BIP 148 UASF. The first two are intended only for use by miners and the third is primarily being run by users.</p><p>We’ll take a look at each one in turn and show they all use a very similar approach to achieving their shared goal. We’ll also look at the differences between them and see what effects they can have on one another.</p><p>Let’s take a look at the activation method of Segwit itself first so we know exactly what they are hoping to achieve. Then we’ll take a look at how each solution goes about trying to hit the historically elusive target of activating Segwit on Bitcoin.</p><h3>Activating Segwit</h3><p>Segwit activation falls under the control of <a href="https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0009.mediawiki">BIP 9</a> — a method of deploying multiple backwards compatible soft forks in parallel. Segwit’s BIP 9 deployment demands that 95% or more of blocks signal readiness for Segwit in a 2016 block period. In order to signal readiness for Segwit a miner sets bit 1 in the <em>nVersion </em>field of each block that they mine. These bit 1 ‘flags’ are what BIP 9 looks for when it calculates if 95% of the blocks in any given period are signalling readiness or not.</p><p>Segwit’s BIP 9 deployment consists of 26 periods of 2016 blocks. These periods are aligned with Bitcoin’s difficulty re-targeting periods. As blocks are produced on average at the rate of 1 every 10 minutes the periods should each be around 2 weeks long. We are currently in <a href="http://segwit.co/">period 19</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/483/1*Oe8y_E4bP_rEqIda2pkoxQ.png" /></figure><p>Regardless of how many blocks signal for Segwit activation during the period that we are currently in there are not enough blocks left to reach 95% signalling. The next possible period for it to reach 95% is period 20 — which spans from block 477792 to block 479808.</p><p>If signalling reaches 95% in period 20 Segwit will move to the LOCKED_IN status at the start of period 21. From this point on — and as we move through the 2016 block ‘locked in’ period — the activation of Segwit on the Bitcoin network would be <a href="https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0009.mediawiki">inevitable</a>.</p><p>There is nothing Segwit2x, Segsignal or UASF can do to change the rules of Segwit’s BIP 9 deployment but there is a clever, and fairly coercive, way that they can try and ensure that there is a chain where 100% of the blocks signal for Segwit. This can be achieved even though miner support for Segwit has traditionally hovered around the 30% mark since its deployment.</p><h3>The BIP 148 UASF approach</h3><p>The UASF (BIP 148) approach to achieving a chain where 100% of blocks signal support for Segwit is relatively straight forward.</p><p>On August 1st and if Segwit itself is not already at the status of locked-in or activated, any node running the BIP 148 code will begin orphaning blocks that do not signal for Segwit using bit 1. The first block to not signal using bit 1 after the UASF code activates will cause a chain split. The non-UASF chain — with its mix of Segwit signalling and non-signalling blocks — will diverge from the UASF’s ‘Segwit signalling only’ chain.</p><p>Miners running BIP 148 will add to the chain, extending it with blocks that all count towards BIP 9’s 95% activation threshold. It will have created a chain where 100% of the blocks signal readiness for Segwit.</p><blockquote>It is because of the fact that non-mining nodes largely enforce the BIP 148 consensus rules that the solution is named ‘User Activated Soft Fork’. BIP 148 essentially puts the users of the Bitcoin network in control of activation.</blockquote><p>As things currently stand UASF nodes will activate on August 1st and there will not be a chain split. The UASF nodes will start enforcing their ‘all blocks must signal Segwit’ rule. As the existing main chain is currently conforming to this rule UASF nodes will follow it without incident.</p><p>Should the signalling we are currently seeing stop for whatever reason the risk of a chain split on August 1st becomes a possibility again.</p><h3>The Segwit2x approach</h3><p>Segwit2x attempts to create the very same type of chain as the UASF solution by doing the exact same thing — orphaning blocks that do not signal for Segwit using bit 1. The differences come about in the way that Segwit2x is activated. In the UASF code a simple activation date is used. With Segwit2x a more complex method is used.</p><p>In order to activate, Segwit2x relied on miner signalling in a similar fashion to the BIP 9 signalling for the activation of Segwit itself.</p><blockquote>Segwit2x itself is already active on the Bitcoin network and is being run exclusively by miners. There is no need, and no point, in users running it.</blockquote><p>Segwit2x required that at least 80% of blocks over a short <a href="https://github.com/btc1/bitcoin/pull/21/files">336</a> block period signalled bit 4. Signalling was due to start on July 21st as per the Segwit2x Working Group’s <a href="https://segwit2x.github.io/">charter</a>. Miners actually began signalling on bit 4 several days in advance of this date — likely compelled to do so by the existence of the UASF’s ‘set in stone’ August 1st activation date and the desire to avoid a potential chain split. From the point at which bit 4 lock in was reached, miners have been able to stop signalling bit 4. Everything is now dependant on the production of blocks that signal for the activation of Segwit on bit 1. Bit 4 itself is now redundant.</p><p>Today — and as of block number 477120 — any miner running Segwit2x will signal bit 1 and reject blocks that do not signal using that bit. Other miners that are signalling bit 1 will add to the chain, extending it with blocks that all count towards BIP 9’s 95% activation threshold. It will have created a chain where 100% of the blocks signal readiness for Segwit.</p><p>Segwit2x isn’t just trying to activate Segwit though.</p><p>Segwit2x is the name given to the proposal created to accomplish the goals of the <a href="https://medium.com/@DCGco/bitcoin-scaling-agreement-at-consensus-2017-133521fe9a77">New York Agreement</a>. The code itself is held in the ‘btc1’ <a href="https://github.com/btc1">repository</a> and had been developed under the stewardship of Jeff Garzik.</p><p>The Segwit2x project has two stated goals:</p><ol><li>To activate Segwit (which we have covered above).</li><li>To bring about a hard fork that increases the base block size to 2 MB three months after the activation of Segwit.</li></ol><p>In order to meet these objectives two existing BIPs have been applied on top of the Core Reference client base code of btc1 — James Hilliard’s BIP 91 ‘Segsignal’ and Jeff Garzik’s own BIP 102 hard fork proposal. The first of these is responsible for the activation of Segwit and the latter controls the mechanisms of the planned hard fork. Neither of these BIPs are present in any release of the Core reference client.</p><p>It is relatively trivial to apply the BIP 91 Segsignal code to an existing node in order to achieve the first goal without requiring code to follow through and action the second. It is this approach of patching a Core node with BIP 91 in order to activate Segwit that we will look at next.</p><h3>The BIP 91 Segsignal approach</h3><p>When I last wrote about the path towards Segwit activation BIP 91 itself was not being widely spoken about within the general community. Since bit 4 signalling locked in and then activated, BIP 91 has been referenced as much as, if not more than, Segwit2x itself.</p><p>So why is BIP 91 itself the focus of so much attention? Whilst it makes good political sense for those who oppose Segwit2x’s proposed hard fork to talk of BIP 91 in isolation, there are some sound reasons as to why breaking Segwit2x down into the two stages of its constituent parts makes sense.</p><p>As we have seen — the Segsignal code has itself been implemented within Segwit2x in order to achieve a chain with 100% of blocks signalling for Segwit. It should therefore come as no surprise to learn that when it comes to Segwit activation Segwit2x and Segsignal are indistinguishable from each other.</p><blockquote>The bit 4 signalling we have seen has led to the orphaning of blocks by potentially two different proposals — Segwit2x and BIP 91 Segsignal.</blockquote><p>There is no publicly verifiable way to tell if any given miner is running the full ‘Segwit + hard fork’ Segwit2x proposal or just BIP 91 Segsignal.</p><p>Herein lies a problem for the signatories of the New York Agreement.</p><h3>False signalling for the Segwit2x Hard Fork?</h3><p>Whether a miner runs either Segwit2x or Segsignal isn’t that important when it comes down to the activation of Segwit (as they both do the same thing) but it has wider implications when you consider support for the proposed Segwit2x hard fork.</p><blockquote>BIP 91 does nothing to enforce a hard fork — that part of Segwit2x is handled by its BIP 102 implementation, which currently emits no publicly detectable deployment data and so its support is impossible to measure.</blockquote><p>The activation of Segwit looks like a safe bet at this current point in time, whereas the potentially false signalling by some miners for Segwit2x and their implied support for the hard fork element (by using bit 4 and Segsignal) throws doubt upon the commitment of some miners to actually follow through with the hard fork.</p><p>Obviously this is more of a concern to those supporting Segwit2x for its hard fork feature than to those preferring Segwit activation alone.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/656/1*wtdYSXvQ8wcsx7Dm-aAmVw.png" /></figure><h3>What next?</h3><p>If miners stick to the New York Agreement it is likely that we will see Segwit activating in accordance with the original BIP 9 deployment criteria towards the end of August… albeit in a very round about manner.</p><p>This isn’t the way every subsequent soft fork will work. The activation of Segwit has become a tale of politics and complicated signalling processes over what should have been a simple method of activation.</p><p>There is little doubt that future soft forks will use a different deployment method than BIP 9.</p><blockquote>We can be sure that this will not be the last battle that is fought over protocol changes to Bitcoin.</blockquote><p>In many ways resistance to change is one of Bitcoin’s strongest features and the debates surrounding the activation of Segwit are testament to its resilience to base layer changes.</p><p>With Segwit comes a fix to the transaction malleability bug and with that the enabling of ‘second layer’ solutions like the much talked-about Lightning Network.</p><p>These layer two solutions open the path for ‘off chain’ scaling and features that all build on top of a stable base protocol layer.</p><p>The proposed Segwit2x hard fork three months after Segwit activates is already a matter of some contention and it remains to be seen if the miners that support it follow through with it.</p><p>The hard fork’s close proximity to the activation of Segwit will not provide much time to observe the effects of Segwit’s own capacity increase before the proposed second capacity increase is scheduled to be introduced to the network.</p><p>Time will tell but the task of convincing the majority of the community to update their nodes to a non-Core implementation within three months of Segwit in order to follow a hard fork that may not even be required is significant.</p><p><a href="https://bravenewcoin.com/news/all-roads-lead-to-segwit/"><em>This article was originally posted on Brave New Coin</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d66fedf7fba" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Explaining the Segwit2x Hard Fork and Bitmain’s UAHF]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@wintercooled/explaining-the-segwit2x-hard-fork-and-bitmains-uahf-f4bf93926252?source=rss-2b334f28421c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f4bf93926252</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[segwit2x]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uasf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[segwit]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Haywood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 06 Jul 2017 14:00:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-08-18T16:48:10.717Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Discussion within the Bitcoin community is starting to shift from the activation of Segwit to focusing on the potential likelihood of future hard forks.</p><blockquote>There are two main hard fork proposals that attract attention—The New York Agreement’s Segwit2x and Bitmain’s own UAHF.</blockquote><p>We’ll take a look at each in turn, examining the activation logic and the challenges each one has to overcome in order to meet their sponsor’s goals. When looking at each proposal we will work on the basis that the criteria needed to bring about each hard fork will play out in line with their initialisation logic. This will be done in order to keep the subject as simple as possible.</p><p><em>We won’t look at the activation of Segwit itself as I covered last week in ‘</em><a href="https://medium.com/@wintercooled/the-road-to-segwit-activation-uasf-segwit2x-and-segwit-signalling-explained-2ff00488b7cb"><em>The Road to Segwit Activation — UASF, Segwit2x and Segwit Signalling Explained</em></a><em>’. Neither will we look at the compatibility of the UASF and Segwit2x which has also been covered in “</em><a href="https://medium.com/@wintercooled/explaining-segwit2x-and-bip-148-uasf-compatibility-39ca7e3296ed"><em>Explaining Segwit2X and BIP 148 (UASF) compatibility</em></a><em>”. Knowledge of the subject matter within those articles is not necessary in order to follow along but they do provide some background to the triggers that will be used to initiate each hard fork.</em></p><h3>The Segwit2x Hard Fork</h3><p>Segwit2x was created as a way for the supporters of the ‘<a href="https://medium.com/@DCGco/bitcoin-scaling-agreement-at-consensus-2017-133521fe9a77">New York Agreement</a>’ to realise their combined objectives of activating Segwit and then shortly afterwards bringing about a base block size increase by way of a hard fork. Segwit2x has a scheduled hard fork date set to occur about 90 days after Segwit activates on Bitcoin.</p><p>As it <a href="https://github.com/btc1">currently stands</a> — any miners running the Segwit2x code 90 days after Segwit activates on the Bitcoin network can mine and accept blocks that have a base block size over 1 MB, thus breaking existing consensus rules and causing a hard fork of the protocol. The hard fork logic itself is inherited from BIP 102.</p><p>The logic that governs when the hard fork will actually occur is more specifically: 144 * 90 (which is 12,960) blocks after Segwit activation. The average number of blocks produced each day being 144 (1 every 10 minutes) and 90 being the number of days after Segwit activates that they have chosen to hard fork on.</p><p>It is worth noting that it doesn’t matter to the <a href="https://github.com/btc1/bitcoin/pull/50">Segwit2x code</a> how Segwit has been activated, it will start the 12,960 block countdown regardless. Changes to ensure that this logic is tied to the actual activation of Segwit2x itself have been <a href="https://github.com/btc1/bitcoin/pull/58">submitted</a> to the Segwit2x code repository but were rejected as they were deemed to be “outside the scope of Segwit2x group”.</p><p>Approximately 90 days after Segwit has activated a group of miners will agree to try and mine a specific block that is over 1 MB in size. They will have to make a deliberate effort to do this and if there are not enough pending transactions to make a block greater than 1 MB in size the miners will collude to <a href="https://github.com/btc1/bitcoin/issues/29">manufacture</a> enough to ensure that a block can be made of sufficient size to cause a hard fork. The lack of a sufficient quantity of transactions to make a block over 1 MB in size seems unlikely when looking at the size of current blocks but remember that the hard fork is set to come about 90 days after the activation of Segwit, which itself increases the capacity of blocks.</p><blockquote>It would be ironic if transactions had to be manufactured by miners in order to push the block size over 1 MB and bring about a hard fork after Segwit activates on the Bitcoin network. The justification for the hard fork itself would be further questioned.</blockquote><p>The logic within the Segwit2x code will look for the presence of that specific ‘bigger than 1 MB’ block in order to validate and protect the chain from being wiped out in the future. If the block 12,960 blocks after Segwit activates does not have a base block size greater than 1 MB in size the Segwit2x code <a href="https://github.com/btc1/bitcoin/pull/50/files">rejects it as an invalid block</a>. In this sense the block can be referred to as a ‘magic block’ as it is bestowed special meaning by the code, much like a ‘magic number’ is in programming.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*P8d-9X3af2d-aMqshp55IQ.png" /><figcaption>Segwit2x code to reject the block 12,960 after Segwit activates if it is less than or equal to the legacy (1 MB) block size</figcaption></figure><p>This ‘magic block’ check is needed because although the mining of a block that is greater than 1 MB in size will create a hard forked chain, nodes that follow that chain’s consensus rules will still sees blocks under 1 MB in size as valid. If at some point the legacy (1 MB max base block size) chain were extended to be the more worked-on chain* the nodes that initially accepted the hard forked chain would re-organise their history of the blockchain to respect the greater worked on chain. If this happened then the hard fork chain would be wiped out by the legacy chain. The check for the magic blocks presence prevents this. No ‘replay protection’ has yet been added to the Segwit2x code to prevent the possibility of transactions appearing on both chains. * <em>Sometimes ‘longest’ is used to refer to the most worked on chain.</em></p><blockquote>In order for any hard fork to be considered ‘activated’ it must be accepted as valid by nodes on the Bitcoin network. Without this validation a hard fork chain is effectively a privately mined chain which miners alone accept as valid.</blockquote><p>Unless every block created thereafter follows the Segwit2x consensus rules the creation of the ‘magic’ block will bring about the existence of two incompatible chains. Nodes that do not alter their consensus rules to allow for the Segwit2x hard fork will remain on the legacy Bitcoin chain — which by then will have Segwit.</p><p>The task of first persuading every exchange, wallet provider and private node to update to Segwit2x compatibility and then ensuring this happens within 90 days is a huge and surely insurmountable challenge for advocates of Segwit2x. A chain split between the two incompatible versions of the protocol is inevitable.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/697/1*b7My7KFSGSZcDdnOr88iAA.png" /><figcaption>The Segwit2x hard fork timeline</figcaption></figure><h3>Bitmain’s UAHF</h3><p>On June 14th the mining company Bitmain <a href="https://blog.bitmain.com/en/uahf-contingency-plan-uasf-bip148/">announced</a> in a blog post what that they refer to as a “contingency plan against BIP 148 (UASF)”. It involves hard forking the Bitcoin protocol to create a ‘big block’ chain that is unaffected by wipe out risk from the UASF chain.</p><p>If by August 1st Segwit2x has not already activated and miners are still mining blocks that do not signal for the activation of Segwit then UASF nodes will begin orphaning such blocks and a chain split will occur.</p><p>Despite Bitmain outlining many times in their post why they believe the UASF will be unsuccessful they also go on to state that “the chain reorg risk is more significant than imaged”. As such they have declared that 12 hours and 20 minutes after the UASF supporting nodes activate they will force a hard fork of the chain. They then intend to privately mine on this chain (using an unspecified percentage of their hash power) until the UASF chain “gains significant support from the mining industry”. If that is the case then Bitmain intend to “ignore short-term economic incentives” and publicly release their hard fork chain onto the network whilst continuing to mine upon it.</p><blockquote>To clarify —one of the conditions under which Bitmain’s privately mined hard fork chain will be made public is if the UASF chain *has* significant support from other miners.</blockquote><p>The privately mined chain will initially allow blocks of up to 8 MB in size, although they claim this will be self-limited to 2 MB upon activation. The <a href="https://blog.bitmain.com/en/uahf-contingency-plan-uasf-bip148/">road map</a> for the UAHF targets a block size of 16 MB two years after activation. As with Segwit2x, the code that handles this fork will also include a ‘magic block’ check that ensures there is no wipe-out risk should the UASF chain extend beyond the hard fork chain.</p><p>The UAHF proposal has a <a href="https://github.com/Bitcoin-UAHF/spec/blob/master/uahf-technical-spec.md">reference client</a> that they have made available for exchange and wallet operators so that they may implement the code should they wish to follow the Bitmain chain once it is released to the network.</p><p>As with Segwit2x — in order for any hard fork to be activated it must be accepted as valid by nodes on the Bitcoin network.</p><p>Having one company with control over the production of the majority of mining hardware, hash rate and also the client needed to transact on a chain that was initially privately mined has sparked strong reactions among many community members.</p><p>Of course all this is irrelevant if Segwit2x is already orphaning blocks that do not signal Segwit by August 1st when UASF activates.</p><blockquote>If Bitmain and other miners sincerely plan to activate Segwit via Segwit2x signalling — as they have implied with their support of the ‘New York Agreement’ — the need for their aggressive ‘UASF contingency plan’ seems obsolete upon inception. Its publication has therefore drawn many to assume that Bitmain may not follow through with Segwit2x as stated.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/664/1*KTlxujmo4y-CGP9f0XrjvA.png" /><figcaption>The UAHF timeline</figcaption></figure><h3>The Role of Nodes in a Hard Fork</h3><p>For either hard fork to succeed the proposing sponsors must convince those who currently run Core compatible nodes to abandon their existing client and to switch to running a consensus breaking version that they have developed outside of the Core repository and <a href="https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Segwit_support">without the support</a> of the majority of currently active Core contributors.</p><p>If they fail to do this they will create a chain that does not have the support and backing of the majority of Bitcoin’s users. It is those users that bring value to Bitcoin as they exchange their FIAT currency for Bitcoin and pay for their transactions to be processed and time-stamped by miners by including fees.</p><p>If the legacy chain continues to be mined upon by some miners and is supported by the majority of nodes and users then either hard fork attempt will simply result in the creation of an ‘alt-coin’.</p><p>The supporters of the hard fork may well try and refer to their alt-coin as Bitcoin but ultimately it will be the community that judge, label and place a value on it by their decision to follow the hard fork or not.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f4bf93926252" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Road to Segwit Activation — UASF, Segwit2x and Segwit Signalling Explained]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@wintercooled/the-road-to-segwit-activation-uasf-segwit2x-and-segwit-signalling-explained-2ff00488b7cb?source=rss-2b334f28421c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2ff00488b7cb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[segwit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[segwit2x]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uasf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nya]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Haywood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Jun 2017 13:27:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-28T07:48:40.155Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As opposed as the supporters of each solution may be, UASF BIP 148 and Segwit2x are essentially trying to do the same thing — activate Segwit BIP 141 on Bitcoin in accordance with its BIP 9 deployment.</p><p><em>Edit: I have subsequently </em><a href="https://medium.com/@wintercooled/segwit2x-segsignal-and-the-uasf-all-roads-lead-to-segwit-d66fedf7fba"><em>published an article</em></a><em> that also examines BIP 91 ‘Segsignal’ in this context and contains updates since bit 4 activated. It is perhaps more relevant than this one is now.</em></p><p><em>We’ll ignore the hard fork aspect of Segwit2x in this article and focus on the common goal of activating Segwit, taking a look at the two fundamentally similar approaches.</em></p><p>Let’s take a look at the activation method of Segwit itself first so we know exactly what they are hoping to achieve. Then we’ll take a look at how each activation solution goes about trying to hit that historically elusive target.</p><h3>The shared goal — Segwit activation under BIP 9</h3><p>Segwit (BIP 141) was deployed on October 27th 2016 with the release of Bitcoin Core version <a href="https://bitcoin.org/en/release/v0.13.1">0.13.1</a>.</p><p>Segwit activation falls under the control of <a href="https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0009.mediawiki">BIP 9</a> — a method of deploying multiple backwards compatible soft forks in parallel. Segwit’s BIP 9 deployment demands that 95% or more of blocks signal readiness for Segwit in a 2016 block period. In order to signal readiness for Segwit a miner sets bit 1 in the <em>nVersion </em>field of each block that they mine. These bit 1 ‘flags’ are what BIP 9 looks for when it calculates if 95% of the blocks in any given period are signalling readiness for Segwit.</p><p>Segwit has <a href="http://segwit.co/#">26</a> of these periods during which it can move to the status of LOCKED_IN. Each period is defined as the 2016 block Bitcoin difficulty re-target period. We are currently in period 17 so neither solution we’ll look at has time on its side.</p><p>If LOCKED_IN is reached within that time frame then 2016 blocks later it will move to a status of ACTIVE and every Bitcoin Core node since 0.13.1 (and other witness capable clients) will see Segwit as activated.</p><p>If LOCKED_IN is not reached within that time frame it will move to a status of FAILED and it will then be eligible for redeployment.</p><p>There is nothing either solution can do to change this but there is a clever, and fairly coercive, way that they can try and ensure that there is a chain where 100% of the blocks signal for Segwit. This can be achieved even though miner support for Segwit has traditionally hovered around the 30% mark since its deployment.</p><h3>UASF chain — 100% of blocks signalling for Segwit</h3><p>The UASF (BIP 148) approach to achieving a chain where 100% of blocks signal support for Segwit is relatively simple.</p><p>On August 1st if Segwit itself is not already at the status of locked-in or activated, any node running the BIP 148 code will begin orphaning blocks that do not signal for Segwit using bit 1. The first block to not signal using bit 1 after the UASF code activates will cause a chain split. The non-UASF (or ‘legacy’) chain — with its mix of Segwit signalling and non-signalling blocks — will diverge from the UASF ‘Segwit signalling only’ chain.</p><blockquote>It is because of the fact that nodes enforce the BIP 148 consensus rules that the solution is named ‘User Activated Soft Fork’. BIP 148 essentially puts the users of the Bitcoin network in control of its activation.</blockquote><p>Miners running BIP 148 will add to the chain, extending it with blocks that all count towards BIP 9’s 95% activation threshold. It will have created a chain where 100% of the blocks signal readiness for Segwit.</p><h3>Segwit2x chain — 100% blocks signalling for Segwit</h3><p>Segwit2x attempts to create the very same type of chain as the UASF solution by doing the exact same thing — orphaning blocks that do not signal for Segwit using bit 1. The differences come about in the way the solution itself is activated.</p><p>In the UASF code a simple activation date is used. With Segwit2x a more complex method is used. Miners initially show their intent to support the solution (as is occurring at the present time) and then on July 21st they need to actually begin signalling for its activation.</p><p>Miners show their intent to support the ‘<a href="https://medium.com/@DCGco/bitcoin-scaling-agreement-at-consensus-2017-133521fe9a77">New York Agreement</a>’ — the meeting where Segwit2x was conceived — by adding ‘NYA’ in the coinbase text of any blocks that they mine. This in itself does nothing to trigger anything within the Segwit2x code and is intended purely to be a publicly visible show of intended support.</p><p>The actual signalling for the activation of Segwit2x is due to begin on <a href="https://segwit2x.github.io/">July 21st</a>. In a similar fashion to the BIP 9 signalling for the activation of Segwit itself, a version bit is used to activate Segwit2x. In order for Segwit2x to activate it requires that at least 80% of blocks over a short <a href="https://github.com/btc1/bitcoin/pull/21/files">336</a> block period signal bit 4. There should be between 3 and 4 of these short periods between July 21st and August 1st. As the last period needs to be the LOCKED_IN period, there will be 2–3 actual periods where the 80% threshold can be met. The very existence of the UASF and its ‘set in stone’ activation date has undoubtedly been the driving force behind Segwit2x’s recent <a href="https://github.com/btc1/bitcoin/pull/21">reduced confirmation window</a> update.</p><p><em>It is worth noting that Segwit2x itself does not set bit 4 — this will be done independently by the miners as part of their mining workflow in line with</em><a href="https://bitcoincore.org/en/2016/06/08/version-bits-miners-faq/#when-should-miners-set-bits"><em> existing guidelines</em></a><em>. Coordinating the design, implementation, build, testing and deployment of Segwit2x in accordance with its aggressive project timeline is a sizeable task in itself and falls under the remit of the </em><a href="https://segwit2x.github.io/"><em>Segwit2x Working Group</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>Once miners start running Segwit2x on the main chain it will look for the bit 4 ‘flag’, measure signalling against the 80% threshold and respond accordingly.</p><p>Once activated, the Segwit2x code will follow the exact same logic as the UASF code, in that it will start orphaning blocks that do not signal for Segwit using bit 1.</p><blockquote>Because the signalling is done purely by miners in the blocks they create, users and nodes will simply follow the longest valid chain as normal. Users do not need to run the Segwit2x code.</blockquote><p>Miners running Segwit2x will add to the chain, extending it with blocks that all count towards BIP 9’s 95% activation threshold. It will have created a chain where 100% of the blocks signal readiness for Segwit.</p><h3>Comparing the two approaches</h3><p>There are many scenarios that play out as we get closer to August 1st, and many more after that, but for the purpose of this article we have shown how both the UASF and Segwit2x solutions take largely the same approach to activating Segwit.</p><p>Once certain criteria are met, be that an activation date or a threshold being reached, they both enforce the orphaning of blocks that do not signal Segwit readiness by setting bit 1. This creates a chain with 100% bit 1 signalling, exceeding the goal of BIP 9’s 95% and activating Segwit.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/809/1*9PGe756Vv1y9B_aoyQQbWg.png" /><figcaption>Regarding Segwit activation only — hard fork aspect of Segwit2x omitted. Similarities in blue.</figcaption></figure><p>Last week I published an article <a href="https://medium.com/@wintercooled/explaining-segwit2x-and-bip-148-uasf-compatibility-39ca7e3296ed">Explaining Segwit2x and BIP 148 (UASF) compatibility</a> that explained how both solutions can be compatible. I’d suggest reading that for an in depth view but in essence — if Segwit2x is already orphaning non-Segwit signalling blocks by the time the UASF activates on August 1st there will be no chain split. Both solutions can happily follow the same ‘Segwit signalling only’ chain.</p><h3>So will we soon see Segwit on Bitcoin?</h3><p>It appears that the Bitcoin community has accepted the activation of Segwit as inevitable now. Whether it gets activated by Segwit2x or the UASF remains to be seen. Although Segwit2x has recently hit its ‘Alpha Milestone’ phase nothing is guaranteed and so UASF supporters remain cautious and will continue to support their solution until Segwit is active on Bitcoin.</p><p>It has also been suggested that it is possible that the signalling of Segwit via bit 1 alone may reach 95% as miners ready themselves for the avoidance of a chain split. However, as Segwit2x will also include code that enforces a hard fork to a larger block size (3 months after the activation of Segwit), it seems unlikely that Segwit prior to Segwit2x activation — and without the bundled hard fork contingency — will be permitted. Time will tell.</p><p>From the point of view of the thousands of existing Segwit ready nodes out there it won’t matter which solution’s supporters get to claim credit for its activation. They will simply see that Segwit BIP 141 has been activated by meeting the threshold set out by BIP 9. For the Bitcoin community itself, the debate and power plays that have plagued the activation of Segwit have already changed the landscape and will likely redefine how deployments are approached in the future.</p><p><em>I have subsequently </em><a href="https://medium.com/@wintercooled/segwit2x-segsignal-and-the-uasf-all-roads-lead-to-segwit-d66fedf7fba"><em>published an article</em></a><em> that also examines BIP 91 ‘Segsignal’ and contains updates since bit 4 activated.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2ff00488b7cb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Explaining Segwit2X and BIP 148 (UASF) compatibility]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@wintercooled/explaining-segwit2x-and-bip-148-uasf-compatibility-39ca7e3296ed?source=rss-2b334f28421c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/39ca7e3296ed</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[uasf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[segwit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nya]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[segwit2x]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Haywood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Jun 2017 11:34:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-13T15:46:17.038Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Explaining compatibility between the Segwit activation of the <a href="https://github.com/btc1/bitcoin">current</a> Segwit2X code and BIP 148 UASF.</p><p>Please note — the Hard Fork element of Segwit2X is not compatible with UASF or with any Core release. This explains the activation of Segwit (BIP 141 via BIP 9 activation) primarily.</p><h3>Background</h3><p>Segwit (BIP 141) was released under the activation method of BIP 9.</p><p>Bip 9 requires that 95% of blocks be produced with a flag set to signal that miners are ready for it in order to activate BIP 141. Currently about 30% of blocks mined are signalling for Segwit like this.</p><p>Bitcoin Core nodes v0.13.1 or later are Segwit-ready and are waiting for BIP 9 to trigger and activate it. So the majority of Bitcoin nodes are now ready and waiting but the miners are not signalling in great enough numbers to actually activate it.</p><p>If 95% of the blocks produced signalled Sewgit before the end of its activation period (November 16th 2017) it would activate on all Segwit ready nodes after a short lock in period. Bitcoin would have Segwit. As direct miner activation through BIP 9 signalling is not going to happen looking at the current state of play there are two other ways proposed to activate it…</p><p>Both still use BIP 9 (so that the existing nodes out there see it) but with a few changes to bring about how that 95% is achieved.</p><h3>UASF (BIP 148)</h3><p>As of August 1st (and if Segwit is not already either locked-in or activated) nodes that run BIP 148 will not accept any blocks that don’t signal Segwit. This will cause a chain split if there are still blocks being mined that do not signal Segwit.</p><p>Non-148 nodes will extend the chain that includes non-Segwit signalling blocks as well as those signalling for it. BIP 148 nodes will only extend the chain with blocks that signal Segwit. Worth noting that they will only accept blocks built on top of their chain and not the same Segwit signalling blocks the other chain accepts… but that discussion is beyond the scope of this article.</p><p>With every block on its chain signalling Segwit the BIP 148 (UASF) chain will have 100% of blocks signalling BIP 9 activation of Segwit — over the 95% needed by the BIP 9 rules and so Segwit activates on the BIP 148 chain if there is enough hash power behind it to reach the activation threshold before November 16th.</p><h3>Segwit2X</h3><p>This tries a similar trick but first relies on 80% of miners saying they are ready and support it.</p><p>Here another signalling bit is used first (bit 4) before the actual Segwit BIP 9 bit 1 comes into play. The Segwit2X code run by miners sets out that once 80% of blocks that they mine are signalling using bit 4 they (the 80+%) will then orphan any blocks that don’t signal Segwit on bit 1 under the BIP 9 rule.</p><p>The net result is that 100% of blocks they mine are then signalling Segwit on bit 1 and BIP 9’s 95% activation threshold is triggered. Because this activates Segwit under BIP 9 all existing Segwit ready nodes then get Segwit.</p><p>If Segwit is activated on the main chain like this then <em>all</em> existing Segwit ready nodes will see that Segwit has been enabled — not just the nodes running Segwit2X. You do not have to change your node from your Core or UASF node to benefit from this.</p><h3>BIP 148 (UASF) and Segwit2X compatibility</h3><p>When people talk about Segwit2X being BIP 148 (UASF) compatible it means that they expect Segwit2X to have already triggered the ‘everyone must mine Segwit signalling blocks’ rule so that either:</p><p>(1) Segwit is either locked-in or already active (and bip 148 won’t trigger the orphaning of non-Segwit signalling blocks at all) or</p><p>(2) Every block is already signalling Segwit and preparing for its lock in period to finish and make Segwit live — and so BIP 148 may well activate but because every block is already signalling Segwit the lack of non-Segwit-signalling blocks being mined does not lead to a chain split.</p><p>Point (1) is highly dependant on when miners start running Segwit2X on July 21st as stated here: <a href="https://segwit2x.github.io/">https://segwit2x.github.io/</a>… as is point (2) but it is less urgent.</p><h3>Segwit2X Hard Fork</h3><p>This is defined (<a href="https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-segwit2x/2017-June/000002.html">here</a> and <a href="https://github.com/btc1/bitcoin/pull/11/files">here</a>) as happening about 3 months after the activation of Segwit.</p><p>It will only be enforced by the nodes running Segwit2X. If the miners who have agreed to run Segwit2X keep running it that will include them… and anyone else who then makes the choice to follow the Hard Fork. If you do not change your node from Core or UASF you will not follow the Segwit2X activated Hard Fork.</p><p>Segwit2X doesn’t mean UASF is no longer needed</p><p>Segwit2X is yet to be run by any miners on the main network. They might not run it at all or might start running it too late to avoid a chain split. They might not signal in sufficient numbers to trigger the 80% Segwit2X bit 4 threshold. There are likely other scenarios.</p><p>UASF support is still needed to make sure that Segwit2X delivers what the UASF is focused upon. If you are a UASF supporter you should not stop supporting UASF until Segwit has been activated on Bitcoin.</p><h3>Summary</h3><ul><li>The UASF efforts must continue to make sure that Segwit2X sticks to its current aims. If it doesn’t then the mining of non-Segwit signalling blocks after August 1st will split the network.</li><li>You don’t need to change your node (Core of UASF) to benefit from Segwit if Segwit2X activates it.</li><li>Segwit2X will be run by miners once is has come out of the ‘Apha Milestone’ testing phase. It is planned to be ready to be run live on July 21st. You will only need to run a variant of it at a later date <em>if</em> you support a hard fork 3 months after Segwit has activated.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=39ca7e3296ed" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Setting up a Raspberry Pi running Raspbian as a Bitcoin UASF BIP 148 node — compiling from source…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@wintercooled/setting-up-a-raspberry-pi-running-raspbian-as-a-bitcoin-uasf-bip-148-node-compiling-from-source-2d583ea675e5?source=rss-2b334f28421c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2d583ea675e5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[uasf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[raspberry-pi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bip-148]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[raspnode]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Haywood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 21 May 2017 18:54:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-21T07:00:18.099Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Setting up a Raspberry Pi running Raspbian as a Bitcoin UASF BIP 148 node — compiling from source code.</h3><p>The User Activated Soft Fork (BIP 148) depends on the support of users. By running a UASF BIP 148 node you can support the drive to activate SegWit on Bitcoin!</p><p><em>If you are running Ubuntu on your Pi and not Raspbian — please follow </em><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/6c6atu/how_to_install_uasf_03_on_raspberry_pi_with_ubuntu/"><em>this guide</em></a><em> instead.</em></p><p><em>If you already have a raspberry Pi set up as a Bitcoin node and compiled from source you can skip to the ‘Updating an existing Pi Bitcoin node to run UASF BIP 148’ section.</em></p><h3><strong>Setting up a Pi that is not already set up as a Bitcoin node</strong></h3><p>Firstly — thank you for helping UASF to bring SegWit to Bitcoin!</p><p>There is already a very good guide by the Raspnode project that we will use as the baseline for our set up. You just need to follow that guide and amend the sections as outlined below and you will have a Bitcoin node running UASF BIP 148.</p><p>Start by follow the instructions on the Raspnode guide here:</p><p><a href="http://raspnode.com/diyBitcoin.html">http://raspnode.com/diyBitcoin.html</a></p><p>When you get to the <strong>INSTALLING BITCOIN</strong> step and the code section below…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SQt5estu22eoaQluiSZrfg.png" /><figcaption>You only need to change the second line where the git clone command is issued</figcaption></figure><p>…you need to replace the command on the second line that reads:</p><blockquote>git clone -b 0.13 https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin.git</blockquote><p>With</p><blockquote>git clone https://github.com/UASF/bitcoin.git -b 0.14-BIP148</blockquote><p>That will pull the latest UASF BIP 148 code branch (UASF-Segwit:1.0) from the github repository onto your machine [based upon Core 0.14.2 at the time of this edit — 18th June 2017]. Every other line of code in the above section must remain as it is, you are only changing the second line. After that you can return to the steps in that section of the Raspnode guide.</p><p>When you get to the <strong>CONFIGURE AND RUN BITCOIN CORE</strong> step and the code section below…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WOs2xOPyWxQxWiTayJlEOw.png" /><figcaption>You will also be adding a few more config settings to make your node run smoothly — this change has nothing to do with running the UASF code but is recommended for general Bitcoin node stability on the Pi</figcaption></figure><p>…you can also add the following config settings when you are instructed to add the <em>rpcuser</em> and <em>rpcpassword</em> settings to help improve the stability of your Bitcoin Pi node. These have nothing to do with running the UASF BIP 148 code itself and are recommended for general Bitcoin node stability on the Pi as they reduce the memory used by the node and make it more responsive:</p><blockquote>dbcache=100<br>maxorphantx=10<br>maxmempool=50</blockquote><p><em>You can further improve the performance of you node by following the steps in the ‘Some additional notes on increasing Bitcoin node performance on the Pi’ section below after you have completed setting you node up.</em></p><p>Once you have added the extra configuration settings above to the bitcoin.conf file you can carry on following the Raspnode guide until the end… and that’s it!</p><p>You should now have a Bitcoin UASF BIP 148 node running on your Raspberry Pi!</p><p>You should now go to <a href="https://bitnodes.21.co/">https://bitnodes.21.co/</a> and click the ‘CHECK NODE’ button to see how your node appears to other nodes on the network. If it says that your node is unreachable then please go to the ‘Setting up your node to accept incoming connections’ section. <strong>This is important as it lets your node contribute to the network and adds to the UASF support on node statistics.</strong></p><h3>Setting up your node to accept incoming connections</h3><p>It is important to make sure that your node is accepting incoming connections over port 8333 if you want to contribute to the network and add support to the UASF node statistics.</p><p>Go to <a href="https://bitnodes.21.co/">https://bitnodes.21.co/</a> and click the ‘CHECK NODE’ button. If it appears as below all is well, your node is set up perfectly and counting towards UASF BIP 148 support!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/268/1*ARTNyVjlabHzk-RopKorLg.png" /><figcaption>Positive response of an incoming connection test</figcaption></figure><p>The latest build will show as Satoshi:0.14.2/UASF-Segwit:1.0(BIP148).</p><p>If you receive the following message your node is not accepting incoming connections and you will have to follow the steps below to correct this.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/116/1*ARkIbon3wLE00Nrw88IAlg.png" /><figcaption>Negative response for an incoming connection test</figcaption></figure><p>To resolve this the easiest thing to do is to enable UPnP port forwarding in your bitcoin node. You can do this via the GUI by going into Settings/Options/Network and ticking the ‘Map port using UPnP’ check box. It is worth toggling this option if you have recently rebooted your router as they may forget UPnP requests after reboot.</p><p>If that still does not give you a positive response to the incoming connection test then you will have to either enable UPnP on your router (and then toggle the UPnP option in your node) or set up a firewall rule to enable port 8333 forwarding to your Pi. How you do this is dependant on your make and model of router and you may have to search for instructions of how to do this online if it isn’t immediately obvious.</p><h3>Updating an existing Pi Bitcoin node to run UASF BIP 148</h3><p>If this applies to you and you originally compiled your node from source it is even easier for you to support the UASF to bring SegWit to Bitcoin!</p><p>Follow the instructions on the Raspnode guide (<a href="http://raspnode.com/diyBitcoin.html">http://raspnode.com/diyBitcoin.html</a>) starting at the <strong>INSTALLING BITCOIN</strong> step and the code section below…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SQt5estu22eoaQluiSZrfg.png" /><figcaption>You need to start at line two and amend it to point to the BIP 148 branch</figcaption></figure><p>…you need to open a terminal window, change directory to bin (cd ~/bin) and <em>start at the second line</em>, replacing the command:</p><blockquote>git clone -b 0.13 <a href="https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin.git">https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin.git</a></blockquote><p>With</p><blockquote>git clone <a href="https://github.com/UASF/bitcoin.git">https://github.com/UASF/bitcoin.git</a> -b 0.14-BIP148</blockquote><p>That will pull the latest UASF BIP 148 code branch (UASF-Segwit:1.0) from the github repository onto your machine. Run the third and forth lines as they are with no changes.</p><p>Then follow all subsequent steps in the INSTALLING BITCOIN section which will make and install the source code you pulled above and replace your existing installation with a UASF BIP 148 one! You will need to follow the steps that are relevant for your existing node — so if you have compiled your existing node to run with a GUI you must do the same here to avoid missing dependancy issues.</p><p>That’s it!</p><p>You should now have a Bitcoin UASF BIP 148 node running on your Raspberry Pi!</p><p>You should now go to <a href="https://bitnodes.21.co/">https://bitnodes.21.co/</a> and click the ‘CHECK NODE’ button to see how your node appears to other nodes on the network. If it says that your node is unreachable then please go to the ‘Setting up your node to accept incoming connections’ section. <strong>This is important as it lets your node contribute to the network and adds to the UASF support on node statistics.</strong></p><h3>Some additional notes on increasing Bitcoin node performance on the Pi</h3><p>If you have no need to run GPU intensive applications (such as games) on your Pi you can also increase the memory available to general applications (such as your Bitcoin node) by changing the default GPU memory allocation from 64MB to 16MB. This frees up memory and leaves enough RAM available for the GPU to handle most desktop applications. To do this you just need to go into the Performance tab within the Raspberry Pi Configuration Tool:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/486/1*76SpIWhh89S2wIlhM4Ehag.png" /><figcaption>For an added performance boost to your node you can adjust the GPU Memory down from the default 64MB to 16MB</figcaption></figure><p>You can further improve the stability of your Bitcoin Pi node by adding the following config settings to bitcoin.conf. These have nothing to do with running the UASF BIP 148 code itself and are recommended for general Bitcoin node stability on the Pi as they reduce the memory used by the node and make it more responsive:</p><blockquote>dbcache=100<br>maxorphantx=10<br>maxmempool=50</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/320/1*rJFIUyTdVOU_iSo0fcZIZg.jpeg" /></figure><p>For further information on the UASF BIP 148 in general please visit <a href="http://www.uasf.co/">http://www.uasf.co/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2d583ea675e5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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