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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by xlr9 on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by xlr9 on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@xlr99?source=rss-e74315684b9a------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by xlr9 on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@xlr99?source=rss-e74315684b9a------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Insufficient Session Expiration leads to Account Takeover via Password Change]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@xlr99/insufficient-session-expiration-leads-to-account-takeover-via-password-change-8ba38191df52?source=rss-e74315684b9a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[session-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[account-takeover]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[xlr9]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 23:43:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-23T23:43:31.149Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*E3Thnk_YdB-V0MAJMhWy8A.png" /></figure><p>Howdy fellers! During my recent bug hunting in VDP programs, I was analyzing a presentation platform and came across a vulnerability. At first glance, it seemed like an ordinary issue that might easily be classified as low or P4. However, once you fully understand the impact, the true danger becomes clear. In this write-up, I am going to share a session management vulnerability and show how a simple mistake in the back-end code can expose users’ accounts to complete takeover.</p><h4>Vulnerability Analysis and Discovery Method</h4><p>While searching for access control vulnerabilities on the platform, I found that on the user profile page, I could modify user data. I tried changing the account name using a token from another account, like “auth_token=abk193”, and it successfully changed the victim’s account name. Up to this point, everything was working.</p><p>I decided to analyze this token to see what it exactly consisted of. I tried to decode it to see if it stored user information that I could exploit via IDOR or something similar. After decoding it, I found that it stored user data like ID, username, and email. Unfortunately, I noticed that a part of the token was encrypted, so I couldn’t just decode it, modify the user_id, re-encode it, and use it.</p><p>So, I decided to test “Session management vulnerabilities”. I went back to changing the account name, but this time, I kept the token I used, logged out of the account, and logged back in. I tried to change the account name again, but instead of using the new active token, I replaced it with the old token I used before logging out. When I tried it, it worked and changed the account name! I realized this was an “Insufficient Session Expiration vulnerability”.</p><p>However, if I reported it in this state, it would likely be classified as an “Informative” So, I decided to try the same method, but this time on the account password change feature. I noticed the platform didn’t have any security measures like 2FA for changing the password. I repeated the same process on the password change endpoint, and when I tried using an old token after logging out, it changed the account password using the old token!</p><p>I realized this was a very dangerous vulnerability. It means an attacker could take over any account on the platform just by having an old token of the victim. The attacker could log into their own account, prepare a password change request, replace their token with the victim’s old token, and permanently take over the account. What makes this even more dangerous is that the token doesn’t have a clear expiration date. From my testing, the token remained valid for more than 24 hours!</p><p>Because of this, the severity of the vulnerability increased significantly, turning into “Insufficient Session Expiration leads to Account Takeover”, making it around High / P2. I wrote a report and submitted the vulnerability, but unfortunately, they replied and told me it was a duplicate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/981/1*KaqXtJv2y2gU2zuI5gb2MQ.png" /></figure><h4>Impact of the Vulnerability</h4><p>The impact of this vulnerability is highly critical due to a combination of two dangerous factors. First, the user’s session token never truly expires. Second, the password change feature lacks any security protections. To change the password, the system only asks for the new password and a confirmation field there is no requirement to enter the old password, and there is no 2FA or OTP verification. Because of this, it is very easy for an attacker who has an old token to log into their own account, use the stolen token in the password change request, and successfully change the victim’s password. This leads to a permanent account takeover, even if the victim clicks “Logout”, because the server still considers the old token valid. As for how an attacker could get this old token, there are many realistic ways, such as through XSS vulnerabilities. Furthermore, if an attacker manages to access the victim’s account just once on a compromised device, they can easily grab the token and use it whenever they want to completely take over the account.</p><h4>How to fix the Vulnerability</h4><p>- When a user changes their password, the server should immediately invalidate all active sessions associated with that user account, except the current one.</p><p>- When a user clicks “Logout”, the server must not only delete the token from the browser but also invalidate or blacklist it on the server side. This ensures that even if an attacker has the old token, it will no longer work.</p><p>- Session tokens should have a reasonable expiration time. A token that stays valid for 24 hours or more without any rotation is dangerous. Developers should set a short lifetime for tokens and require users to re-authenticate after that period.</p><p>- Implement an additional layer of verification (such as 2FA or email OTP) before executing critical actions like changing the password or email address. This ensures that even if a session token is stolen, the attacker cannot complete the Account Takeover without access to the user’s email or 2FA device.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*ia3sSM3W2gV2Szx_.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong>Thank you for your time.</strong></blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8ba38191df52" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How a Design Flaw Led to Full Account Takeover in a University Student Portal]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@xlr99/the-ghost-password-how-a-design-flaw-led-to-full-account-takeover-ato-52b7c1ca94fa?source=rss-e74315684b9a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[authentication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[account-takeover]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[xlr9]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Jan 2026 23:44:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-26T21:52:16.630Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*unAXdRQjTO2xn6Bi8ATq0g.png" /></figure><p><strong>Hello Guys,</strong></p><p>During the journey of learning about web vulnerabilities and during the practical application phase on real-world sites, I found a critical Account Takeover (ATO) vulnerability in a large University Student Portal.<br>So I will share with you an analysis of a real-world authentication design flaw discovered during security research. The vulnerability demonstrates how weak authentication logic can result in critical Account Takeover risks.</p><p>Before diving into the details, it is important to understand what an Account Takeover (ATO) is. An ATO occurs when an attacker gains access to a user’s account without permission. This usually happens because of weaknesses in how login or account security is designed, such as weak passwords, predictable user IDs, missing limits on login attempts, or flaws in the authentication process.</p><p>But before I share this story with you, I want to say that all sensitive details have been anonymized for privacy and security reasons, and the focus is on analysis and remediation rather than exploitation.</p><h3>How Did I Find The Bug ?</h3><p>While analyzing the website’s behavior, I noticed that the Student Portal uses dual credentials for login like most universities, they are :</p><p><strong>- Student ID</strong></p><p><strong>- Password</strong></p><p>During the analysis, it was noticed that both the Student ID and the default password consist only of numbers. Because numeric values are easier to guess compared to complex passwords, this raised concerns about the overall security of the login process.</p><p>Because the Student ID is not treated as a secret and there were no restrictions on the number of login attempts, it became clear that an attacker could try multiple password guesses until successful. This combination makes brute-force or password guessing attacks feasible.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*R3TrypXIyaP5EV5f8WG26Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>For example,</strong> when a password consists of only five digits, the total number of possible combinations is limited. In this case, the range of possible values is from <strong>10,000</strong> to <strong>99,999</strong>, resulting in approximately <strong>90,000</strong> guesses. This limited number of possibilities significantly reduces the effort required to guess the password, especially in the absence of restrictions on login attempts.</p><p>Further analysis revealed the existence of a secondary default password in addition to the primary one. This indicates that each account is associated with two default passwords.</p><p>More importantly, even after the primary default password is changed, the secondary password remains valid and active. As a result, anyone who obtains this secondary password, by any means, can gain full access to the student’s account, leading to Account Takeover (ATO).</p><h3>Proof Of Concept</h3><p>1. Attacker obtains a valid Student ID.</p><p>2. The attacker tries to Brute Force the default password, because it consists only of numbers.</p><p>3. Even after the legitimate user changes the primary password, secondary password is still accepted.</p><p>4. Attacker successfully gains unauthorized full access to the student account.</p><pre>if login(student_id, secondary_default_password) is True:<br>      full_account_access = True</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/590/1*EtFLibV-nFlCy1UBbaiNJg.png" /></figure><h3>Root Causes of the vulnerability</h3><p><strong>1 - Lack of Rate Limiting and Weak Credential Policy</strong></p><p>The login functionality does not apply limits on repeated failed authentication attempts, such as account lockout or temporary blocking.</p><p>When combined with short, numeric-only default passwords, this significantly lowers the effort required to guess valid credentials and makes brute-force attacks feasible.</p><p><strong>2 - Persistent Secondary Credentials (“Ghost Password”)</strong></p><p>Further analysis showed that each user account is associated with two passwords:</p><ul><li>Primary Password : The password set or changed by the student.</li><li>Secondary Password : A system-generated password assigned during account creation.</li></ul><p>The issue occurs because the secondary password remains valid even after the primary password is changed. This means that anyone who obtains the secondary password can continue to access the account without the user’s knowledge, resulting in a full account takeover.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*8bYaI4uRB0dX3Hgo33sE3w.png" /></figure><h3>Impact Of The Vulnerability</h3><p><strong>Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to full account takeover of student accounts. An attacker may be able to :</strong></p><ul><li>View sensitive academic results and student records.</li><li>Modify personal information, including name, email address, phone number, password, profile image, etc.</li><li>Access connected learning platform and view courses material.</li><li>View, modify, or submit academic assignments.</li></ul><h3>Steps To Fix The Vulnerability</h3><ul><li><strong>Enforce a single password per account</strong><br>Ensure that each student account has only one valid password. Any secondary passwords should be removed.</li><li><strong>Strengthen the password policy</strong><br>Require passwords to include a mix of letters and numbers, and preferably special characters. Default passwords should follow the same rules.</li><li><strong>Implement brute-force protection</strong><br>Add rate limiting, temporary delays, and account lockout mechanisms after multiple failed login attempts.</li><li><strong>Improve bot protection</strong><br>Use modern and adaptive <strong>CAPTCHA</strong> solutions that are more effective against automated attacks.</li><li><strong>Enable Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)</strong><br>Introduce a second verification step such as <strong>OTP</strong>, authenticator apps, or email-based verification to reduce the risk of account takeover.</li><li><strong>Add additional security layers</strong><br>Consider using a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to help control request rates and block suspicious behavior.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*3LzBpn-56h5fCqPOR6yyRw.png" /></figure><blockquote>This research shows that even simple design decisions in authentication systems can have severe consequences. I hope it helps others identify and prevent similar issues in their own applications. Thank you for reading.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/539/1*ycYpM-JtcpwBaOXyygVgOg.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=52b7c1ca94fa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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