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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by B on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Identity at Coinbase: Welcoming the Distributed Systems team]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-coinbase-blog/identity-at-coinbase-welcoming-the-distributed-systems-team-d929dd64de2e?source=rss-18cb18e3e063------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d929dd64de2e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[B]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Aug 2018 17:06:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-04T05:58:16.579Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BmCaFjl_WZDECOOMDiiUeQ.png" /></figure><p>There was a time, not too long ago, where our identities existed solely offline. Over the past 20 years, though, this has fundamentally shifted as a result of technological advances like the internet. Many people born today may find themselves defined entirely by their online identities. Their time, relationships, habits, the work they do, the things they own and their relationships with other people are steadily becoming more digital.</p><p>One of the reasons a lot of technologists who are thinking about digital identities are drawn to crypto, and specifically why I wanted to join Coinbase, is because blockchains can offer new answers to the question: how can technology empower individuals to have control of their identities and feel safe while experiencing and accomplishing more online?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xOq34N6589PGj_j3F88Nkg.png" /></figure><p>With its introduction to the world, <a href="https://www.coinbase.com/price/bitcoin">Bitcoin</a> ushered in a new way to prove that you own something — using a blockchain — and created the first digital objects that can’t be copied. When you download music or read a news article, the publishers don’t lose their copy, and when you send an email, a copy stays in the “Sent” folder of your mailbox. The magic of bitcoin is that when you send one, you can’t keep it too. That obviously changes what it means to own things on the internet (“my bitcoins” feels really different than “my iTunes songs”), but it also gives us a peek into the other ways that identity is going to transform over the next few years.</p><p>Think about how this applies to something like a Social Security number. Every time you want to prove who you are with your SSN, you need to give away a copy of it. That copy has exactly the same power as the original, so when there’s a data breach with copies of your data it puts your identity at risk. A decentralized identity will let you prove that you own an identity, or that you have a relationship with the Social Security Administration, without making a copy of that identity. If you stretch your imagination a little further, you can imagine this applying to your photos, social media posts, and maybe one day your passport too.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PHOm6nnablkQ3ry88CPzkw.png" /></figure><p>As we continue our work to bring <a href="https://www.coinbase.com/price">cryptocurrency</a> into the mainstream and help create an open financial system, it’s important that we continue to find new and innovative ways of validating and verifying identity. Blockchain technology that powers cryptocurrencies offers a new way to let us all be “verified” everywhere we go on the internet, feeling safer about our interactions with others and opening the door to the experiences that require trust. We’ll need to be deliberate about how and where we apply this technology. We’re going to have new questions to answer about anonymity, privacy, and how permanent the different pieces of our identity should be. But ultimately, decentralizing online identities will transform our relationship with technology.</p><p>I’m pleased to announce the Distributed Systems team is joining Coinbase to help us work on this opportunity. Distributed Systems is an incredibly thoughtful team that has been working on decentralized identity solutions. With their work on the Clear Protocol and GraphQL, Nikhil, Alex, and the rest of the team have gotten their hands dirty in the technical detail of using blockchains to improve how identities mesh with digital products. We believe decentralized identity systems represent a transformative shift in our relationship with technology, and we can’t wait to work on these opportunities together at Coinbase.</p><p>I look forward to sharing more about the way we’re thinking about blockchain and identity in the future. But first: welcome Distributed Systems!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d929dd64de2e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-coinbase-blog/identity-at-coinbase-welcoming-the-distributed-systems-team-d929dd64de2e">Identity at Coinbase: Welcoming the Distributed Systems team</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-coinbase-blog">The Coinbase Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The post-SS7 future of 2FA]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@y/the-post-ss7-future-of-2fa-d655bcd8c31e?source=rss-18cb18e3e063------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d655bcd8c31e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[two-factor-authentication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[B]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 May 2017 17:15:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-16T17:58:04.409Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MLB47Eh4BesNhkDl-d5acQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Two weeks ago, German newspaper <a href="http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/it-sicherheit-schwachstelle-im-mobilfunknetz-kriminelle-hacker-raeumen-konten-leer-1.3486504">The Süddeutsche Zeitung reported</a> that attackers had used vulnerabilities in the SS7 network (part of the infrastructure that makes phone calls work, even when you’re roaming) to drain the bank accounts of their victims. The SS7 vulnerabilities have been public for years and were even demonstrated on 60 Minutes last summer. Now, they’ve been exploited in the wild to intercept two-factor authentication (2FA) codes and break into a bank.</p><p>Since the report, there has been a fresh wave of news about the problems of using SMS for security, and calling for the end of SMS-based 2FA. But while the security problems are both very real and important, SMS-based 2FA isn’t going anywhere soon and that’s a good thing.</p><p>Last year the National Institute of Standards and Technology said it would no longer recommend solutions that used SMS. This also created a press cycle about the downfall of SMS-based 2FA, but actually created a spike of new support for SMS-based 2FA, notably including <a href="https://www.wired.com/2017/03/instagram-two-factor-authentication-now-turn/">Instagram</a>.</p><p>There are other forms of 2FA that are much more secure than SMS, but security isn’t a single-solution problem. SMS plays the important role of being the easiest form of 2FA to set up, which is why it is also the most widely adopted. Instead of giving a few people bodyguards, it’s like giving most people an extra lock on their door. We shouldn’t ask how to get rid of SMS-based 2FA, we should instead be asking what we need to do to protect the people who are already using it.</p><h3>Start with SMS, then push further</h3><p>Account security isn’t defined by a single moment, it’s something that requires consideration of the whole lifetime of an account and the spectrum of potential protections. SMS-based 2FA is stronger than passwords alone and there are more secure forms of 2FA like TOTP (Time-based One Time Passwords) and Push (<a href="https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6361026?hl=en">Google Prompt</a>, <a href="https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/enterprisemobility/2017/04/18/no-password-phone-sign-in-for-microsoft-accounts/">Microsoft Authenticator</a>, <a href="https://login.yahoo.com/accountkey/setup">Yahoo Account Key</a>, <a href="https://www.twilio.com/two-factor-authentication/features/onetouch">Authy OneTouch</a>). Adding SMS-based 2FA should just be the first step in the journey of protecting customers.</p><p>Every 2FA SMS should include a link to download an app for 2FA, which also means that apps and websites should support TOTP or Push for the users that want it.</p><p>We all need to be educated about the security options that are available to us, and there need to be processes to walk us through better protections for our accounts. We should get regular reminders of the devices and applications that are attached to our account, and recommendations on how to manage them.</p><p>SMS-based 2FA is only one part of good account security, but it’s a great first step.</p><h3>Learn the scary patterns and look out for them</h3><p>An attacker can use the SS7 vulnerabilities to intercept SMS messages, but they have to make a visible change to the victim’s account in order to do it. Whoever is sending the SMS should do an HLR (Home Location Register) Lookup and raise a red flag when an SS7 attack might be happening. Then the website you’re logging into can check in with you on another channel, like a push notification or emailed link, to make sure it’s really you.</p><p>This also works for another major SMS attack, SIM Spoofing, which can be flagged by tracking customer IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity). I’m getting too far into the weeds here, but there are clear patterns that applications sending the SMS can use to increase the security of your account when it’s likely under attack.</p><p>If companies treat SMS as a dumb pipe, they won’t notice when someone’s tampering with it. However, with good visibility into the network they’re using, SMS becomes much harder to exploit.</p><h3>Make sure the message gets to the right place every time</h3><p>I’m going to try to keep this at a high level, but there are a lot of intricacies of the different carriers and the way they handle SMS messages. For example, Verizon makes SMS messages available in a web portal, which should be disabled for anyone sending 2FA SMS. Carriers have different priorities and preferences for the way messages get sent (short codes, long codes, alpha sender IDs) and these need to be set up to make sure customers get their messages.</p><p>For 2FA, the speed and reliability of codes improve adoption of 2FA and make the process less confusing. There are a lot of different routes a message can take between the sender and when it gets to your phone. Some of those routes are slower, cheaper, and less reliable. Others are faster, more expensive, and more reliable. 2FA solutions should be using the premium routes wherever they can.</p><p>Finally, when your users are experiencing a security problem, make sure that there’s a clear person for them to contact.</p><p>No solution is 100% impenetrable. There will always be bad actors, and even the strongest security will sometimes falter against the most determined of attackers. It’s easy to get lost in our threat modeling about cryptographic systems and forget that if you slip the security guard $20 they’ll look the other way. Protecting online accounts is becoming increasingly important and difficult, and we need to be talking about the benefits and pitfalls for all of the tools we’re using to do it.</p><p>There’s no such thing as 100% secure, and the SS7 vulnerabilities are something that anyone relying on SMS should be looking for and taking into account. As a user you should use app-based 2FA anywhere that you can, and turn off SMS. For anyone thinking about implementing 2FA, however, SMS is an important tool and part of a great solution.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d655bcd8c31e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Clef is Joining Twilio!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/two-factor-authenticity/clef-is-joining-twilio-47b936cafd2e?source=rss-18cb18e3e063------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/47b936cafd2e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[B]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Mar 2017 17:12:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-10T20:00:32.430Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fembed%2F3ohzdYugEl5q1xO4zm%2Ftwitter%2Fiframe&amp;src_secure=1&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fgiphy.com%2Fgifs%2Ftest-3ohzdYugEl5q1xO4zm&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.giphy.com%2Fmedia%2F3ohzdYugEl5q1xO4zm%2Fgiphy-downsized-large.gif&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=giphy" width="435" height="244" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/4e691ece9ceea99f135a743e47eade89/href">https://medium.com/media/4e691ece9ceea99f135a743e47eade89/href</a></iframe><h3>Clef is Joining Twilio!</h3><p>The Clef team is joining Twilio. For the last four years, the Clef team has been working to build better consumer identity tools. We believe that in an increasingly mobile world, our smartphones provide the tools to bridge who we are online with the people we are offline. To make that vision a reality, we know that every developer needs to have great tools to connect with users through their smartphones, and Twilio has absolutely been a leader in building those tools. We’re excited to join Twilio and add our expertise to products that operate at a massive scale. <br> <br>We also focused on building a great company around a great security product. For us, that meant insuring that we were creating an inclusive culture that invited folks from a broad range of backgrounds to work at Clef. In the last few years, we open sourced our <a href="http://github.com/clef/handbook">Employee Handbook</a> focused on creating an inclusive workplace, participated in <a href="http://projectinclude.org/">Project Include</a>’s first batch of Startup Include, and created the <a href="http://techequity.us/">TechEquity Collaborative</a> in Oakland. It’s critical to every member of our team that we join a company that shares those values, and Twilio is one of very few companies who we think is already doing that work today. <br> <br>I’m incredibly proud of the results we’ve been able to achieve a small team. The New York Times described logging in with Clef as “<a href="https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/new-clef-plug-in-lets-you-forget-about-your-password/?_r=0">magical</a>” and there are currently more than <a href="https://wordpress.org/plugins/wpclef/">a million active installs</a> on WordPress websites. The conversation about passwordless authentication has changed drastically since we started Clef in 2013. We’ve demonstrated the power of applying design thinking to strong security tools, and I believe that it’s had a profound impact on that conversation. <br> <br>Thank you to everyone who has supported us throughout. It has been an incredible pleasure to come to work every day with the Clef team, who have built a value-driven company worth working for. We wouldn’t be here without our customers (especially some of our first cheerleaders — boom!) who have learned with us and helped us build a better product. It really is a very small Valley, and we’ve been fortunate to have incredible mentors, advisors, and investors to help guide us through every stage of building this business. Lastly, I certainly wouldn’t have been able to do this without my co-founders Mark and Jesse. There is no one who I would rather have shared this adventure with. <br> <br> B Byrne<br> CEO, Clef</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=47b936cafd2e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-authenticity/clef-is-joining-twilio-47b936cafd2e">Clef is Joining Twilio!</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-authenticity">Two Factor Authenticity</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Discontinuing Support for Clef]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/two-factor-authenticity/discontinuing-support-for-clef-6c89febef5f3?source=rss-18cb18e3e063------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6c89febef5f3</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[B]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Mar 2017 17:27:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-06T18:27:04.898Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Starting next week, we will be winding down our business and sunsetting the Clef product. Our team will be joining another company, which we’ll have more news about in the next few weeks. <br> <br><strong>The Clef product will continue operating for three months, starting today, with a final shutdown date of June 6, 2017.</strong> Everything will remain fully functional and maintained until that date, at which point the mobile apps will cease functioning and be removed from the Google Play and Apple App stores.<br> <br>If you are a current Clef user, we recommend that you begin transitioning away from Clef as a login method as soon as possible. We’ve written a guide for both API and WordPress user with instructions on making that transition <a href="http://support.getclef.com/article/136-transitioning-away-from-clef-for-two-factor-authentication">here</a>.<br> <br>If you have any questions or concerns, we are available at <a href="/service/mailto:support@getclef.com">support@getclef.com</a> to help with the transition.<br> <br> B Byrne<br> CEO, Clef</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6c89febef5f3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-authenticity/discontinuing-support-for-clef-6c89febef5f3">Discontinuing Support for Clef</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-authenticity">Two Factor Authenticity</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Death Star the Rebels Won’t Destroy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/two-factor-everything/a-death-star-the-rebels-wont-destroy-3d02d78d7f3e?source=rss-18cb18e3e063------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3d02d78d7f3e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[software-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[star-wars]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fantastic-threat-models]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[B]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Nov 2016 19:59:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-11-16T23:33:04.015Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zidTVuYz9OYZGaZ5m7JLKg.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Fourth time’s the charm</h4><p>If you’ve seen more than one Star Wars movie, you’ve probably noticed a pattern. The villains spend a lot of time and money building a massive super-weapon (Death Star I, Death Star II, and then most recently Starkiller Base) only to have it destroyed in a few minutes by those meddling Jedis. <br> <br>If you’re rooting for the Jedi and the forces of good in the universe, then this is awesome — if you’re a Sith, it probably sucks. Some amazing nerds did the math on how much the steel would cost for Death Star I (by far the smallest of the three), and it comes to about <a href="http://www.centives.net/S/2012/how-much-would-it-cost-to-build-the-death-star/">$852,000,000,000,000,000</a>. Yeah, 852,000 trillion dollars. So it’s probably worth putting some resources towards keeping that thing from getting blown up, yeah? <br> <br>Well let’s imagine we’re the Sith Death Star designers (the Geonosians led by Archduke Poggle the Lesser to be specific) and we want to build a fourth super-weapon. This time, let’s start with a threat model. Creating the threat model takes three steps:</p><ol><li>Break the super-weapon down into each of its parts</li><li>Figure out how the Rebels could attack each part</li><li>Make a strategy to defend against each attack</li></ol><h3>1. What makes a Death Star?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*LRQNKGjPZjL83C51EZlgzA.png" /></figure><p>First, we need to think about all of the different pieces that it’ll take to build a Death Star in the first place, and it’s <em>always</em> worth drawing a diagram. We need to think about how people come and go, where our weak points are, and what we depend on to keep the weapon functional. <br> <br> Our Death Star is composed of these five sections:</p><ul><li>Physical shell and body</li><li>Reactor Core</li><li>Protective Shields</li><li>Station Schematics</li><li>Storm Troopers</li></ul><p>All of these are related, so is any of them is compromised, our Death Star is probably going down.</p><blockquote>“An analysis of the plans provided by Princess Leia has demonstrated a weakness in the battle station.” ~General Dodonna</blockquote><h3>2. Check everything for weaknesses</h3><p>We’ve already messed this up three times and had tons of money and hard work obliterated, so this time let’s use a framework to make sure we’re not forgetting anything. Thankfully, some company called Microsoft from a galaxy far far away created a framework for threat modeling called STRIDE. STRIDE stands for:</p><ul><li>S — Spoofing (pretending not to be someone you’re not)</li><li>T — Tampering (modifying something you shouldn’t be able to)</li><li>R — Repudiation (denying responsibility for some action, whether you did it or not)</li><li>I — Information Disclosure (accessing information you shouldn’t have)</li><li>D — Denial of Service (preventing something from operating correctly)</li><li>E — Elevation of Privilege (gaining abilities you shouldn’t have)</li></ul><p>If we think through all of those different kinds of attacks for every component, we’re way less likely to miss something.</p><h4>Physical Shell and body</h4><p>The outside of the Death Star is pretty tough, but its large size and crew give it some vulnerabilities.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*-rFG9GogrEEnmzaVS82gCw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Spoofing</strong>: The Death Star only allows certain ships to approach, so if you’re able to take over one of their ships, you might be able to get access to the Death Star. <br><em>Tampering</em>:<strong> </strong><br><em>Repudiation</em>:<br><strong>Information Disclosure</strong>: Where is the Death Star? How big is it? These are important questions for anyone who wants to destroy it. <br><strong>Denial of Service</strong>: It would take a massive attack to destroy it, but what if the Rebels build their own Death Star ��<br><em>Elevation of Privilege</em>:</p><h3>Reactor core</h3><p>This has been the achilles heel of the Death Stars. We have <em>got</em> to do a better job protecting this darn thing.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*9in9wFJ36wunuHx8YUMMiw.png" /></figure><p><em>Spoofing:</em><strong><em> </em></strong><br><em>Tampering</em>:<strong> </strong><br><em>Repudiation</em>:<br><strong>Information Disclosure</strong>: It’s really important that the rebels not know where the reactor’s thermal exhaust shafts are, or how to get to them. We already know they will use that information if they can. <br><strong>Denial of Service</strong>: This is a highly volatile reactor, destroying it will blow up the whole Death Star<strong> </strong><br><em>Elevation of Privilege</em>:</p><h3>Protective Shields</h3><p>We use shields every time, but they keep getting through! It turns out there are a lot of ways to attack the shields.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*XSponAQoPYCMf7imHsw6RA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Spoofing</strong>: These shields let some people through, so the rebels could pretend to be those people<strong>.</strong><br><em>Tampering</em>:<strong> </strong><br><strong>Repudiation</strong>: The shields are invisible, so it could seem like they’re online when they’re actually down. <br><strong>Information Disclosure</strong>: Learning where the base that generates the shield is located is the first step to disabling the shield.<br><strong>Denial of Service</strong>: Destroy the base, take down the shield. <br><strong>Elevation of Privilege</strong>: If you take control of the base, you can turn the shield on or off</p><h3>Station Schematics</h3><p>The rebels always seem to know our weak spots. Maybe it’s because they keep getting our blueprints?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*wisyG3gSdizniAPIRQfSfw.png" /></figure><p><em>Spoofing</em>:<strong> </strong><br><em>Tampering</em>:<strong> </strong><br><em>Repudiation</em>:<br><strong>Information Disclosure</strong>: It takes millions of people to run this ship, so the crew to build it must have been huge too. That means a lot of copies of construction schematics, which keep getting into the wrong hands. <br><em>Denial of Service</em>:<strong> </strong><br><em>Elevation of Privilege</em>:</p><h3>Storm troopers</h3><p>The crew of our ship, and the ones who are supposed to protect it. Equipped with lasers, which unfortunately always miss.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*ZLny2iRFY7OMZEHlPJ-VLw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Spoofing</strong>: These uniforms make it impossible to know who’s inside them, so it’s really easy to steal a suit and spoof your way into almost any protected area. Seriously, who designed these things?<br><em>Tampering</em>:<strong> </strong><br><em>Repudiation</em>:<br><strong>Information Disclosure</strong>: The storm troopers don’t usually know that much, but what they do know, they give up easily. <br><strong>Denial of Service</strong>: There are a lot of storm troopers, so this would take a massive army to pull off, but they are killable. <br><strong>Elevation of Privilege</strong>: Put on the suit, get the privileges.</p><h3>3. Learn from our mistakes</h3><p>The biggest security problem is fundamental for a project like this. We are building a <em>massive</em> object which will be very hard to change quickly, and millions of people are going to know about it. That means that information about the ship is bound to get out, and it’ll probably still be relevant by the time the Rebels get it. That means we need to build our newest Death Star with the mindset that all information is public, <strong>we cannot rely on security through obscurity</strong>. <br> <br>With that in mind, our primary vulnerabilities are still our reactor core and the base where we generate the protective shield. We already have tons of soldiers, but they do a terrible job of protecting our important targets. So first, we should invest in target practice for literally everyone. Seriously, we pay for millions of blasters and they’ve basically never hit one of the important targets. Second, we need uniforms that aren’t so easy to steal. How about an alarm that goes off when the suit is taken off without a commander present? Then the alarm can be turned off by any commander who has verified the identity of the person inside the suit. <br> <br>Finally, is there a way for us to use smaller thermal exhaust ports for our reactor? We can have more of them, as long as the rebels can’t fly an X-Wing into them.</p><h3>That’s a threat model</h3><p>Now we’re much better equipped to build a Death Star that’s actually worth the quadrillions of dollars that we’re going to pour into it. It only takes a minute to break anything down into its pieces, run through STRIDE for each piece, and see where the vulnerabilities are, but it makes such a huge difference. That’s why, just like version control, threat models are a tool that should be in every engineer’s toolbox. <br> <br>It doesn’t matter if you’re building a Death Star, the <a href="https://blog.instant2fa.com/how-to-build-a-wall-that-stops-white-walkers-fantastic-threat-models-ef2dfa7864a4#.p6xvva0b5">Westeros Wall</a>, or an app to share photos with friends, someone’s going to try to break what you build. It’s up to you to defend it.</p><p><em>B is the CEO and co-founder at Clef. If two-factor authentication has been in your backlog for months, but still hasn’t gotten prioritized, check out Clef’s new product </em><a href="https://instant2fa.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_campaign=death-star-ftm"><em>Instant2FA.com</em></a><em> — it’s two-factor authentication that takes minutes to integrate instead of weeks.</em></p><figure><a href="https://blog.instant2fa.com/"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cP0LmY26f6sEW0tJBrzfEQ.png" /></a></figure><figure><a href="https://instant2fa.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_campaign=death-star-ftm"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JVor0bDapeq0QFgziLosNw.png" /></a></figure><figure><a href="http://twitter.com/instant2fa"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kzUKc_qwKSNPu_2BRILXSA.png" /></a></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/725/1*prif7-04oPf8Dqo1gvSDsQ.gif" /><figcaption>If you liked this post, you should ❤ it so other people can like it too.</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3d02d78d7f3e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-everything/a-death-star-the-rebels-wont-destroy-3d02d78d7f3e">A Death Star the Rebels Won’t Destroy</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-everything">Two-Factor Everything</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Would Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) Have Saved John Podesta’s Emails?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/two-factor-everything/would-two-factor-authentication-2fa-have-saved-john-podestas-emails-1bf71880327d?source=rss-18cb18e3e063------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1bf71880327d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2016-election]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democrats]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[B]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Nov 2016 19:50:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-11-02T19:50:32.624Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Over the past several weeks, I’ve heard different versions of this question a hundred times, and every security person I follow has taken the opportunity to remind everyone to turn on two-factor auth.</p><p><strong>But, the short answer is, probably not.</strong></p><p>Two-factor authentication makes logins much safer. I work on building 2FA because it is an incredibly important security tool, and nothing here changes my full endorsement of 2FA. You should go turn on 2FA today, <em>especially for your emails</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/741/1*KDx_Bufm61n0mGbNEikohA.png" /></figure><p>But, while 2FA protects against a lot of different kinds of attack, John Podesta’s emails were compromised by a phishing attack, and it probably would have worked even if he had 2FA turned on.</p><p>We know that he was phished because<em> the email that phished his Gmail account was included in the leak</em> (talk about swagger).</p><p>In a phishing attack, the user gets an email that looks like it’s from Google, but is really from the attacker. In this case, Podesta got an email from no-reply@accounts.googlemail.com with the subject line “Someone has your password” and a link to change his password. The link goes to a web page that looks like a Google password reset form, but is actually the attacker’s website. When they type their password to log in, the form submits it to the attacker, not Google.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*q8hNiZHUXKl4edvni5O9hA.png" /><figcaption>If you’re ever suspicious of an email, always check the URLs of the email address and the links!</figcaption></figure><p>In basic phishing attacks, the attacker is sending emails with phishing links to tons of people all at once and then storing all of the passwords that they collect to sell or use later. Since 2FA codes expire, users with 2FA are protected against these attacks.</p><p>However, in a more sophisticated attack (like the one that would target a high profile person like John Podesta), an attacker can also get the target’s 2FA code and then use it to log in immediately. If they’re clever, they can also redirect their target back to the real Gmail site when they’re done and make it look like the target simply mis-typed their password.</p><p>It’s possible that John Podesta just happened to get caught by a broad, basic attack which turned into a big deal because of his status, but it’s more likely that the person who sent this email knew who they were sending it to and were capable of the more sophisticated attack. If that’s true, he still should have had 2FA turned on, but it wouldn’t have kept his email safe.</p><p>So the moral of this story is still that you should turn on 2FA for your email, but <em>also</em> that phishing is a really dangerous and effective attack.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1bf71880327d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-everything/would-two-factor-authentication-2fa-have-saved-john-podestas-emails-1bf71880327d">Would Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) Have Saved John Podesta’s Emails?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-everything">Two-Factor Everything</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How to Build a Wall That Stops White Walkers—Fantastic Threat Models]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/two-factor-everything/how-to-build-a-wall-that-stops-white-walkers-fantastic-threat-models-ef2dfa7864a4?source=rss-18cb18e3e063------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ef2dfa7864a4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[television]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fantastic-threat-models]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-of-thrones]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[B]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 31 Oct 2016 19:55:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-10-31T19:55:58.357Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Kg7fMqoDAu2PdJb8maKZqQ.png" /></figure><h4>Protecting the Seven Kingdoms from a giant horde of magic ice zombies</h4><p><em>WARNING: LOTS OF GAME OF THRONES SPOILERS</em><br> <br>Eight thousand years before that incredible moment when Tyrion smacked Joffrey’s smug little face in Winterfell, Brandon the Builder created the Wall a few hundred miles north. The Wall was built to protect Westeros from the super creepy White Walkers and its construction finally ended the Long Night. All of the plotting and killing and… romancing that happens in Game of Thrones is possible because of that wall — <em>thankfully</em> someone thought about how to make it secure. <br> <br>A wall that doesn’t keep out White Walkers is pointless, so the first step Brandon must have taken in building the wall was to develop a threat model. A threat model is a structured analysis of the security of anything you build.<br> <br>Imagine you’re Brandon the Builder and that you’re building the Wall. Creating the threat model takes three steps:</p><ol><li>Break the Wall down into each of its parts</li><li>Figure out how the White Walkers could attack each part</li><li>Make a strategy to defend against each attack</li></ol><h3>1. What Does it Take to Build a Wall That Strong?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*Bt69OKKHegjvl7jgDm1Xww.png" /></figure><p>First we need to break the Wall into its parts, and it’s <em>always</em> worth drawing a diagram. Think about all of the entry and exit points — where are people coming in and where do they go out? What other things do they depend on to keep working? Are they storing anything valuable? Where? <br> <br>Let’s work with these five sections:</p><ul><li><strong>300 miles of rock and ice 700 feet tall</strong></li><li><strong>Tunnels</strong> through the Wall with massive gates</li><li><strong>Weapons</strong> on the top of the Wall (trebuchets, catapults, cranes, a scythe)</li><li><strong>19 Castles</strong> south of the Wall (only three are occupied</li><li><strong>The Sworn Brothers of the Night’s Watch</strong> (aka Crows)</li></ul><p>All of these components are related, but they each serve a critical part in keeping the White Walkers out. If the White Walkers break any of them, it won’t matter who’s sitting on the Iron throne, everybody’s going to die.</p><h3>2. Testing the Defenses with STRIDE</h3><p>Now that we’ve broken the Wall down into its pieces, we want to see how the White Walkers could mess with each one. Again, they’re going to eat everyone if we miss one, so it pays to be thorough. Thankfully, someone (Microsoft) created a mnemonic for thinking about security threats: STRIDE. STRIDE stands for:</p><ul><li><strong>S — Spoofing</strong> (pretending not to be someone you’re not)</li><li><strong>T — Tampering</strong> (modifying something you shouldn’t be able to)</li><li><strong>R — Repudiation</strong> (denying responsibility for some action, whether you did it or not)</li><li><strong>I — Information Disclosure</strong> (accessing information you shouldn’t have)</li><li><strong>D — Denial of Service</strong> (preventing something from operating correctly)</li><li><strong>E — Elevation of Privilege</strong> (gaining abilities you shouldn’t have)</li></ul><p>This should help us think through the different angles the White Walkers might take. With a methodology in mind, we can apply it to each part of the Wall. Let’s start with the physical wall itself.</p><h4>300 miles of rock and ice 700 feet tall</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*hHfhsEqDDW5ICPS5q7bkrA.png" /></figure><p><em>Spoofing</em>:<strong> </strong>The Wall in no way cares who you pretend to be.<br><em>Tampering</em>:<strong> </strong>Modifying this Wall is only likely to crush you with falling ice and rock.<br><em>Repudiation</em><strong>:</strong> If you break the Wall, we’re going to know it was you.<br><em>Information Disclosure</em>: The Wall is big, what else do you want to know? <br><strong>Denial of Service — Vulnerability: </strong>Legends say that there is a horn called the Horn of Winter (or the Horn of Joramun), and that if someone blows into the horn, the entire Wall will collapse. That’s pretty much the only way to stop the Wall from working, but it’s one hell of a vulnerability. <br><em>Elevation of Privilege</em>: No one has any privileges with the Wall.</p><h4>Tunnels</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*yKlncVhQRRHAPpeSFWATyw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Spoofing — Vulnerability:</strong> The Crows control access to the tunnels, so you’d need to convince them that you’re a Crow (say, by wearing a black cloak? it’s a long shot) to get access to the tunnels. The Wights spoof their way through the tunnel by seeming/being dead, so if you can come back from the dead, that’s a trick that we know has worked before. <br><strong>Tampering—Vulnerability: </strong>The gates that protect the tunnels are 4 inch thick rolled steel, but apparently they can be broken. This is supposed to be super hard, but Mag the Mighty did it on his own. Granted, he’s a giant but still, damn.<br><em>Repudiation</em>: Nope. <br><em>Information Disclosure</em>:<em> </em>The tunnels don’t know anything. <br><em>Denial of Service:</em> This wouldn’t be a very good way to get through the Wall (in fact, filling the tunnel with rocks and ice is a built in <em>defense). </em><br><strong>Elevation of Privilege — Vulnerability: </strong>If you makes it through a tunnel, it’s pretty much game over because they can take over the access controls of the tunnel and let in the rest of their army.</p><h4>Weapons</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*6QSjtjjtzda3VG7Ub_usRw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Spoofing—Vulnerability</strong><em>: </em>You can get the Crows to waste their ammo on a dummy, they’re pretty well stocked, but eventually this could take the weapons offline.<br><strong>Tampering—Vulnerability: </strong>The weapons are on the top of the Wall, but if you can reach them (warging, giants firing bows, climbers) then you can take them offline.<br><em>Repudiation</em>:<em> </em>The weapons don’t care what you did or didn’t do. <br><strong>Information Disclosure — Vulnerability: </strong>You could figure out where the weapons are located by warging into a bird to help prepare for an attack. <br><strong>Denial of Service — Vulnerability: </strong>In one episode, when the Wall is under attack, the Crows release a giant scythe connected to the Wall with a chain. It swings in an arc and kills a group of climbers in its path. However, the scythe is slow to reset, so an attacker could intentionally trigger the scythe (by sacrificing climbers or by faking it out somehow), and then climb past it before it can be reloaded. <br><strong>Elevation of Privilege — Vulnerability: </strong>If you take control of the weapons and point them south, the battle will turn very quickly.</p><h4>Nineteen Castles</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*TE_IT90wiLwXRYb_6yDo7w.png" /></figure><p><em>Spoofing</em>: It’s possible that you can spoof your way into the castle from the south, but a White Walker would have to take the tunnels and we already covered spoofing those. <br><em>Tampering</em>:<em> </em>Only 3 of the 19 castles are occupied, so you could mess with or destroy the other 16 if you could get to them. Again, you’d basically have to come from the south. <br><em>Repudiation</em>: Hm, don’t think so. <br><strong>Information Disclosure — Vulnerability: </strong>The castles receive messages via ravens that could be intercepted, especially by a warg. <br><em>Denial of Service</em>: Cutting off supplies to a castle from the south would keep it from functioning for defenses. <br><em>Elevation of Privilege</em>: If you take a castle, including one of the empty ones, your position becomes much harder to attack. Again, this isn’t that useful to White Walkers.</p><h4>The Sworn Brothers of the Night’s Watch</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*cHG_oSDzYQ6rLidOzfXcdg.png" /></figure><p><em>Spoofing</em>: These dudes are all criminals or hiding from something, so if you’re human it would be pretty easy to infiltrate their ranks (this was Cersei’s plan to kill Jon Snow with Osney Kettleblack in the books). If you’re a White Walker, it’s way less easy because you’re creepy and white and have horns and glowing eyes and look like an ice lizard. <br><strong>Tampering — Vulnerability: </strong>Hm, this covers wounding a crow, which the White Walkers can definitely do if they get close enough. <br><strong>Repudiation — Vulnerability: </strong>The Crows lack trust, so repudiation could be a deadly strategy against them. If you are able to successfully carry out an attack and then avoid blame for it, you can turn the Crows against each other. <br><strong>Information Disclosure — Vulnerability: </strong>The Crows are pretty tough, but they’re human and the White Walkers are pretty twisted, so they probably have ways to make a Crow talk. <br><strong>Denial of Service — Vulnerability: </strong>Sowing discord can totally ruin the Crows. A little politicking and the infighting makes them completely vulnerable to an attack. <br><strong>Elevation of Privilege — Vulnerability: </strong>If you can infiltrate the Crows, you can get access to the weapons and the gate controls.</p><h3>3. Patching the holes</h3><p>This breakdown shows three major flaws in the Wall’s defenses.</p><ol><li>The Horn of Winter totally owns it</li><li>The Tunnels can be breached by giants</li><li>The Sworn Brothers of the Night’s Watch are flawed humans who can be exploited in a bunch of different ways.</li></ol><p>Then, there are a second tier of vulnerabilities like wargs being able to intercept messages from ravens or determine the placement of weapons. Those are a lot less critical fixes for now.</p><p>First things first, we should prioritize finding and destroying that horn, because it’s most likely to result in catastrophic failure (a horn that was probably fake was found and destroyed in the books, but only because the wildlings were threatening to use it — the Crows should have been proactive about finding it themselves). The Tunnels already have the self-destruct defense where they get filled in, but can we get some stronger doors on the tunnels? Someone should look into that and figure out how much it would cost. Then, in order to address the Crows being humans, we need more structure for their order. They keep getting distracted with human things instead of focusing on ice-demon things, so lets increase the ratio of maesters to warriors to make sure they’re staying focused on the right enemy. Also, new recruits (and we should be getting way more new recruits) should go through their training in less important castles so they’re less likely to mess the whole thing up. Also, how about some terrifying White Walker murals in the castles? Yeah, that would probably help.</p><p>If we could get all of that done, the Crows could feel a lot better about the Wall’s chances against the growing army of icy undead.</p><h3>Go forth and threat model</h3><p>And that’s how Brandon the Builder would threat model the Wall he built. Break it into pieces, think about how each piece can be attacked, then prioritize the flaws and get to fixing them. The term “threat model” sounds like it requires a bunch of special training, but in reality it’s a simple process that everyone should be doing it all the time. Just like version control, it should be in the toolbox of every developer. With practice, it gets easier and more natural, though some structure like STRIDE helps keep us honest and makes sure we don’t get sloppy.<br> <br>So far, the Wall has been good enough to protect the Seven Kingdoms. With a quick analysis, however, we can see that it’s far from perfect, and there’s more to do if the Crows want to avoid becoming White Walker lunch.</p><p>Of course, if the White Walkers get a dragon, all bets are off…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/693/1*JeuSKO4cNWkwq-4tydJtsw.png" /><figcaption>This poster isn’t real, but George RR Martin would totally pull something like this.</figcaption></figure><p><em>B is the CEO and co-founder at Clef. If two-factor authentication has been in your backlog for months, but still hasn’t gotten prioritized, check out Clef’s new product </em><a href="http://instant2fa.com/"><em>Instant2FA.com </em></a><em>— it’s two-factor authentication that takes minutes to integrate instead of weeks.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ef2dfa7864a4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-everything/how-to-build-a-wall-that-stops-white-walkers-fantastic-threat-models-ef2dfa7864a4">How to Build a Wall That Stops White Walkers—Fantastic Threat Models</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-everything">Two-Factor Everything</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is a DDoS and why was Twitter down all day?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/two-factor-everything/what-is-a-ddos-and-why-was-twitter-down-all-day-863741950577?source=rss-18cb18e3e063------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/863741950577</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[twitter]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[breaking-news]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[B]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 21 Oct 2016 23:24:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-10-22T00:16:43.628Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A big chunk of the internet was down today, which you probably noticed (unless someone printed this Medium post out for you). I just saw this hilarious image of Fox News anchors trying to explain what happened and figured that there might be a lot of confused people today — if you’re one of those people, I’m here to help!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qKuk3qKC8lBSWljCnGOEvw.png" /></figure><p>Here’s the top line, jargon-filled explanation of what happened: <strong>someone used a DDoS attack to take down a popular DNS host </strong>called<strong> </strong>Dyn to shut down a lot of websites all at once. Now, let’s break that down.</p><h4>What’s a DNS host?</h4><p>DNS stands for Domain Name System, and it’s like the address book in your phone. When you want to call someone, you only need to remember their name, not their phone number. Well websites (and every computer on the internet) have a phone number called an IP Address, and a DNS host is where your computer looks up that phone number when you type the website’s name into your browser. Have you ever dropped your phone in the toilet and lost all of your phone numbers? That’s exactly what it’s like when a DNS goes down.</p><p>In this case, the DNS host was a company called Dyn, and it was used by a bunch of big Internet companies, including Twitter.</p><h4>Well how does a DDoS take a DNS host down?</h4><p>DDoS stands for Distributed Denial of Service, and it basically means that someone has lots of computers (like, hundreds of thousands of them) all trying to access the same website at the same time to overwhelm it and shut it down.</p><p>You should think of a DDoS attack like sinking a ship by putting holes in it. The crew is ready to bail out a certain amount of water, so in order to sink the ship (take the website down) the attacker needs to be able to fill faster than they can bail.</p><p>To take down a big, well prepared website like a major DNS host, you need to put <em>a lot </em>of holes in the ship — which is why the Internet doesn’t go down every day.</p><h4>Well who did this and how did they do it?</h4><p>We’re still not sure who did this and we might not ever know. Figuring out who carried out an attack (called Threat Attribution in the infosec world) is really hard. There are a lot of theories flying around, and at least one hacker group has already claimed responsibility, but it’s worth letting the dust settle before you take any of that at face value.</p><p>But while we don’t know who did it, we do know how they did it. Attacks of this scale are almost always carried out by botnets. A botnet is like a zombie army of computers — a virus spreads and silently infects all of the computers. Then, when the attacker wants to do something, they activate the virus and order all of the infected computers to attack the same target.</p><h4>I can’t live without Twitter! Is this going to keep happening?</h4><p>Lately there have been <a href="https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/krebsonsecurity-hit-with-record-ddos/">several huge DDoS attacks</a> which indicate that more attacks like this could keep happening. However, an attack of this size is really hard to pull off, and once it happens, we can build up defenses to keep the same person from doing the same thing again. Today was a wake-up call for internet companies that we’ve centralized a lot of the internet’s infrastructure and made it easier to knock down a lot of big companies at once.</p><p>If you have other questions about what happened today, tweet me at <a href="http://twitter.com/iamb">@iamb</a>.</p><p><em>B is the CEO and co-founder at Clef. If two-factor authentication has been in your backlog for months, but still hasn’t gotten prioritized, check out Clef’s new product </em><a href="http://instant2fa.com/"><em>Instant2FA.com</em></a><em> — it’s two-factor authentication that takes minutes to integrate instead of weeks.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/725/1*prif7-04oPf8Dqo1gvSDsQ.gif" /><figcaption>Did you enjoy this post? Click the ❤ below to recommend it to other interested readers!</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=863741950577" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-everything/what-is-a-ddos-and-why-was-twitter-down-all-day-863741950577">What is a DDoS and why was Twitter down all day?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-everything">Two-Factor Everything</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How to protect your account when SMS is the only 2FA option]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/two-factor-everything/how-to-prevent-sms-2fa-account-takeover-d7218e727cfc?source=rss-18cb18e3e063------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d7218e727cfc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[software-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[B]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Oct 2016 18:58:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-10-21T19:45:04.366Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2GrjJ5v03OFy0w0SMfgHmw.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>Recently there have been a </em><a href="https://tech.vijayp.ca/adding-a-phone-number-to-your-google-account-can-make-it-less-secure-f1cc7280ff6a#.j0l6xk2eb"><em>few</em></a><em> </em><a href="https://medium.com/the-coinbase-blog/on-phone-numbers-and-identity-423db8577e58#.6s046ikgh"><em>posts</em></a><em> talking about how accounts protected with SMS 2FA were taken over. This is a step-by-step guide to protect accounts that offer only SMS 2FA.</em></p><p>This summer the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), <a href="https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/08/nist_is_no_long.html">deprecated SMS-based two-factor authentication</a> in their Digital Authentication Guideline. If, like me, you pay attention to security and authentication, that wasn’t very surprising — SMS-based 2FA is weak. Your text messages are always intercepted by your mobile carrier, which means they’re easy to social engineer.</p><h4>Who cares?</h4><p>Security researchers have been warning about this kind of attack for as long as anyone’s been using text messages to authenticate. But websites and users have recently adopted it in much greater numbers and there have been a few high-profile breaches in the wild.</p><p>First, Black Lives Matter activist, Deray McKesson, <a href="https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/06/14/deray-mckessons-twitter-account-hacked-with-just-his-name-and-four-digits/">had his Twitter account taken over</a> through Verizon. Even though Twitter had enabled app-based 2FA (which isn’t an option anymore), they always fell back on SMS.</p><p>Then, Coinbase was attacked by someone who was able to <a href="https://medium.com/the-coinbase-blog/on-phone-numbers-and-identity-423db8577e58#.6s046ikgh">take over an employee’s phone</a>. The attacker was able to take over several personal accounts, including Facebook, and send messages to the CEO and other employees asking them to transfer Bitcoin and reset passwords.</p><h4>Harden SMS when it’s your only 2FA option</h4><p>You should always opt for U2F or TOTP-based 2FA. For websites that don’t support them, avoid using your carrier-based phone number for 2FA.</p><p>Here’s how to harden SMS when it’s your only 2FA option:</p><ol><li>Set up a new Google account, NOT the one you use for email or anything else, and make sure you turn on TOTP or push-notification 2FA for this account.</li><li>Create a Google Voice number on this new account, and use that number to receive your two-factor authentication codes.</li><li>DO NOT forward the codes to your normal phone number or email address. Instead, you should download the Google Voice app for your phone and use that to receive the messages (on iOS the app is super old and ugly, but we don’t need it to be pretty).</li></ol><p>You could also set up a number up with Twilio or Tropo, but neither supports TOTP or U2F. I’ve tried a half dozen other SMS-receiving apps outside of Google Authenticator, but none of them support two-factor auth at all.</p><h4>Conclusions and disclaimer</h4><p>Despite its flaws, SMS-based two-factor authentication is still better than passwords alone, and it probably isn’t going anywhere soon. You should always opt for two-factor auth based on the new U2F standard or even the older TOTP standard whenever you can, but if you need to harden the security on an account that only offers SMS protection, this is a great way to do it.</p><p><em>B is the CEO and co-founder at </em><a href="http://getclef.com/"><em>Clef</em></a><em>. If two-factor authentication has been in your backlog for months, but still hasn’t gotten prioritized, check out Clef’s new product </em><a href="https://instant2fa.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral"><em>Instant2FA.com</em></a><em> — it’s two-factor authentication that takes minutes to integrate instead of weeks.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/725/1*prif7-04oPf8Dqo1gvSDsQ.gif" /><figcaption>Did you enjoy this post? Click the ❤ below to recommend it to other interested readers!</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d7218e727cfc" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-everything/how-to-prevent-sms-2fa-account-takeover-d7218e727cfc">How to protect your account when SMS is the only 2FA option</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-everything">Two-Factor Everything</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Phone is Mightier than the Sword: Proving Who You Are in Life After Camelot]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/two-factor-everything/the-phone-is-mightier-than-the-sword-proving-who-you-are-in-life-after-camelot-b709889d8ee0?source=rss-18cb18e3e063------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b709889d8ee0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[web-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[software-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[two-factor-authentication]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[B]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 Oct 2016 17:39:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-10-07T18:45:10.458Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>No one knew who King Arthur was until he pulled the sword out of the stone. The king before him had died without an heir, so it wasn’t Arthur’s name or his parentage that set him apart. He didn’t earn the title in a contest, or set himself apart in combat. Arthur was just like any other little boy, but (spoilers!) once he got the sword everyone immediately knew that he was their king. Arthur proved he should be king by possessing something that only a king could have.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IYreDIZljNqakewI0y28kg.jpeg" /></figure><p>When we’re talking about security, possession is one of the three possible “factors” you can use to prove who you are:</p><ul><li>Something you <em>know</em>, like a password</li><li><strong>Something you <em>have</em>, like a magic sword</strong></li><li>Something you <em>are</em>, like your fingerprint</li></ul><p>Unfortunately, we can’t all depend on magic swords to help us log in, so most computers check something you’re more likely to have, like your phone. Then the question is, how does the computer know when you have your phone? <br> <br>There are three methods to check your phone when you’re logging in: text messages, exploding codes, and push notifications. Even though they’re all trying to prove the same thing, they use different methods to do it, that each come with trade-offs. There are also dedicated products not discussed here that wrap similar technology into smaller computers and fit on your keychain or in your USB drive — they look different, but the underlying fundamentals are the same.</p><h3>Text Messages (SMS)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/250/1*lwli1qyFcJ5Y5BqYDHZNHw.png" /></figure><p>Text messages are probably the most commonly used form of this second factor because they’re really easy to set up, but they also provide the lowest level of security. To use text messages, the website just needs to ask for your phone number. Then, every time you log in, they generate a random password and send it to you in a text message. You just need to type that password to prove that you got the text and have possession of your phone. Easy!<br> <br>Unfortunately, text messages aren’t that hard to intercept. Your mobile carrier always gets a copy of your text messages before you do, and then they send it to whichever phone they think is yours. An attack can trick them into sending the text messages to a different phone, or compromise their systems and read the text messages while they’re en route. There have been two high-profile attacks like this recently, the first to Black Lives Matter activist, <a href="https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/06/14/deray-mckessons-twitter-account-hacked-with-just-his-name-and-four-digits/">Deray Mckesson</a>, and the second to <a href="https://medium.com/the-coinbase-blog/on-phone-numbers-and-identity-423db8577e58#.u1taapzh3">an employee at Bitcoin company Coinbase</a>, and it’s incredibly hard to recover from.<br> <br>Text messages are also relatively expensive for websites with big user bases, because the cost-per-login is much higher for sending an SMS than for sending exploding codes or push notifications.</p><h3>Exploding Codes (TOTP)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/250/1*b5A3P9GIqAhM4DFsR1Ccjg.png" /></figure><p>Exploding codes are time-based codes that change every 30 seconds, like the exploding messages that self-destruct in Inspector Gadget. They’re a little bit harder to set up because they you have to download an app on your phone. These codes are based on a standard called Time-based One Time Password (TOTP). Once you’ve set the app up, you can open it up any time to get a login code.<br> <br>Exploding codes are more secure than text messages because the website doesn’t need to send one every time you want to log in. Instead, the codes are based on a shared <em>seed</em> that’s stored on your phone and on the website’s server. A seed is a secret random number, and the app combines the seed with the current time to generate a new exploding code every 30 seconds. Because the server also knows the seed and the time, it can prove that you’ve had a phone with the right seed sometime in the last 30 seconds. <br> <br>Exploding codes are more secure than text messages, but attackers can still compromise them. The server and the phone both need to keep a copy of the same seed, so if someone breaches the server, they can get access to the seeds and then generate the TOTP codes themselves whenever they want, without getting ahold of your phone.</p><h3>Push Notifications (Asymmetric Public Key Cryptography)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/250/1*fAd-8SXUugZeifPGXG-m-g.png" /></figure><p>Push notifications skip the codes, and you just need to tap a button to confirm that you have your phone. You still have to download an app, but setup is a little bit easier because you don’t need to sync a seed with the server. <br> <br>The user experience is simpler, but the technology powering them is much more complex. Instead of using seeds, push notifications are based on <em>asymmetric public key cryptography</em>. That means that instead of one, shared seed, there are two different secrets — a public key and a private key. The public key can always verify that a message comes from the private key, but not the other way around. That means that the private key can live on your phone, the public key can live on the website’s server, and that when you confirm the push notification, your phone can send the server a message that could only have come from you.</p><p>Using push notifications is more secure than exploding codes for a few reasons:</p><ol><li>If an attacker steals the seed, they can use it recreate your same exploding codes. However, if they steal the public key, they can only confirm that messages came from you, not create fake messages.</li><li>The push notifications happen “out of band,” which means that they’re being confirmed through a different channel than your username and password. If an attacker intercepts your keystrokes or web traffic, they can intercept your password and your codes (text message or exploding). If you’re using push notifications, they would only get your password unless they were intercepting messages from your phone too.</li></ol><h3>How Can I Know It’s Really You?</h3><p>Possession factors add a lot to internet security because most attackers aren’t located in the same place (or even the same country) as the people they’re attacking. That makes it really hard for them to steal a physical item. Passwords live on a server that someone can break into from anywhere with an Internet connection. Your phone only exists in the material world and is very expensive to track and take.<br> <br>Still, it would be even better if we could prove we had something without sending secrets that attackers can intercept or steal. Even if no one gets our phones, our mobile carriers sometimes give up our text messages, companies lose databases full of seeds, and malware can even steal the private keys on our phones if we download the wrong apps. <br> <br>And that’s what makes two-factor authentication important. Breaking one factor isn’t easy, but breaking two different factors drastically increases the challenge. When the next big breach includes your username, a second factor on your phone can keep you safe. <br> <br>Text messages, exploding codes, and push notifications each come with trade-offs, but we don’t have magic swords yet, so whichever version a website offers, you should turn it on.</p><p><em>B is the CEO and co-founder at </em><a href="http://getclef.com/"><em>Clef</em></a><em>. If two-factor authentication has been in your backlog for months, but still hasn’t gotten prioritized, check out Clef’s new product </em><a href="https://instant2fa.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral"><em>Instant2FA.com</em></a><em> — it’s two-factor authentication that takes minutes to integrate instead of weeks.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/725/1*prif7-04oPf8Dqo1gvSDsQ.gif" /><figcaption>Did you enjoy this post? Click the ❤ below to recommend it to other interested readers!</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b709889d8ee0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-everything/the-phone-is-mightier-than-the-sword-proving-who-you-are-in-life-after-camelot-b709889d8ee0">The Phone is Mightier than the Sword: Proving Who You Are in Life After Camelot</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/two-factor-everything">Two-Factor Everything</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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