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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Yakov Feygin on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Yakov Feygin on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Yakov Feygin on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[There has been an awakening. Have you felt it? Signaling and Expert Politics.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yfeygin/there-has-been-an-awakening-have-you-felt-it-signaling-and-expert-politics-f285bf809630?source=rss-38ce8ffb8850------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Yakov Feygin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 31 Mar 2018 16:00:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-31T16:00:39.529Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I know last time I promised to write about transitions of power and economic reforms. It is coming, I promise. However, I want to highlight a <a href="http://intersectionproject.eu/article/russia-world/learning-right-lessons-too-late">piece</a> by <a href="https://twitter.com/LincolnPigman">Lincoln Pigman</a>, a talented young writer on Russian foreign policy in Intersections. Pigman argues that the Russian foreign policy making community—its own “blob”—is starting to learn the lessons of 2014–2018 and beginning to recon with the fact that Russian muscular foreign policy has left it largely isolated, devoid of soft power, and, often, advancing the very outcomes they wanted to prevent.</p><p>What follows is not a criticism of the argument—in fact, Pigman recognizes much of what is to follow. First, I would emphasize that the Russian “blob” is far more diffuse and weird than its counterparts in other countries. The problem is that we Western analysts tend to speak to and recognize our own counterparts and have far less information about —or even a good language to talk about— “the crazies” whose publications are often, by secret and are associated with the intelligence agencies and who do not talk to Western analysts (but might talk to fellow conspiracy theorists). In what seems to be a lifetime ago, <a href="https://twitter.com/alexhazanov">Alex Hazanov</a> and I <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/08/02/russia-hacked-our-election-because-the-spies-took-over/?utm_term=.b96524da768b">pointed out</a> that the institutional competition between the intelligence agencies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) not only drives policy but has a historically driven field of ideas around each institution. As Pigman and others point out, MID is increasingly marginalized with rumors that Sergei Lavrov may be retiring soon swirling around Telegram. As well, Pigman points out that at least some of these figures have had these views earlier but had been silent for the past few years.</p><p>So what do we make about the flurry of activity from the more liberal (I’ll use this for shorthand though I don’t think this is the proper term) “mezhdunarodniki?” I think what Pigman’s piece really points us toward is the importance of timing and signaling in Russia’s politics of expertise. Policy experts in Russia, as everywhere, have an instinctual grasp of reading domestic political tealeaves to see where the “Overton window” is. I would argue that in Russia, this is even more the case since the Soviet legacy in governance was to quite consciously control that window. Thus, Russian (and as I learned yesterday, Chinese) specialists have a culture formed by reading the proclamations of the latest Party Congress or Central Committee Plenum. As I argue in my dissertation, and am arguing in <em>Building a Ruin, </em>these types of ideological documents actually had a real impact on steering not only the deliberations of academic and government experts but setting the agendas of government agencies. In fact, we can even see how some specialists would emphasize certain elements of their thought more than others, or would fade to academic work and re-emerge, as currents of Party decisions both formal and informal shifted.</p><p>What does this say about modern Russia and its community of experts? Since 1991, the Party institutions have disappeared. Sure there are proclamations by Putin or other state officials but they are not as programatic as the old Party institutions have been and the “power vertical” has become deinstitutionalized anyway. This leads to the other system of conveyance that had significant influence on Soviet politics—rumor and personal connections. In recent years, this system has actually been fueled by the internet with Telegram becoming a constant presence on the phones of Russia watchers and Russian political leaders. One thing that the sudden re-evaluation of Russian foreign policy by the Mezhdunarodniki might mean is that the elite in Moscow is starting to feel that there might be an opening in the wake of the elections. Something is changing and more and more elites are starting to feel it. The question is if this is false hope (most likely) or a real destabilization of the field of Russian politics?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f285bf809630" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Putin 4.0 and Navalny’s Theory of Politics]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yfeygin/putin-4-0-and-navalnys-theory-of-politics-8128a3984fe7?source=rss-38ce8ffb8850------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[navalny]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[putin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Yakov Feygin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Mar 2018 19:29:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-28T19:29:22.677Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, nerds and ships at sea or whoever reads this blog—just as I thought events would overtake the direction I wanted to take this project. As I am typing, there are mass vigils across Russia to mark deaths of at least 64 people, the majority of which were children, (protesters claim this number is too small) in a horrific fire in a mall in the Kuznetsk town of Kemerovo. Initial reports are that fire exits were blocked and alarms turned off. Kemerovo is an industrial town in the “provinces”—the kind of place that was supposed to be at the heart of Putin’s new coalition once after the protest of 2012, he abandoned his old base of upwardly mobile urban professionals. Yet, just a week after Putin’s re-election as the president flew to lay flowers and visit some victims in the hospital (a task he reportedly did with some reticence) thousands gathered to demand answers from the authorities calling for a real death count and screaming at officials about corruption, at times calling for Putin himself to address the protest.</p><p>As footage of the protest in Kemerovo began to spread, it began to mobilize calls for national mourning actions. The first official to respond to these calls came from Evgeny Rozman, the oppositionist mayor of Ekaterinburg who called for a city-wide day of mourning. Next, came Alexei Navalny—the country’s most well known anti-systemic opposition leader who has deployed his network of local offices organized in the “anti-election campaign” to organize commemorative marches. The authorities played catchup and organized their own commemoration. At the moment, it looks like the opposition marches are being attended far more than the official ones.</p><p>The interesting thing to note is that this isn’t the first major fire with many young casualties caused by official corruption and incompetence in recent memory. In 2009, 156 people died in a nightclub fire in Perm. But the tragedy in Kemerovo is different and says something about the new times. The way that it has become a political issue speaks to something Russia has not had for a long time—mass politics. After the chaos of the 1990s, politics became unpopular and power became a matter of image and management. Putin is a product and master of this type of political operation. Yet, now it looks like retail politics is coming back.</p><p>This brings me to Navalny. Navalny is in my opinion the most masterful politician Russia has seen since the early 1990s. What I mean by this is that he understands retail politics and the importance of meeting people where they are to advancing a larger agenda. Moreover, he has a relatively sophisticated understanding and theory of politics. Navalny has, several times, noted the influence of Alexei Yurchak’s <em>Everything Was Forever Until it Was No More</em> on his thinking. Yurchak’s book, which is a classic of late-Soviet historiography, essentially argues that the late Soviet period was defied by a ritualization of politics that foreclosed the ability to imagine political change. Even dissent, in its “anti-political” withdrawal form, became something that the system could handle as it did not disturb the sense of inevitable reconciliation that political life was impossible.</p><p>Based on this, Navalny has been playing a game of dare with the authorities. Declaring his intention to run for president and then barred from running, he ran a campaign anyway establishing a national infrustructure to coordinate “election” rallies across the country bringing the opposition to places outside of its usual base in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Moreover, he encouraged an “anti-campaign” of not voting to bring down the turnout numbers and thus rob Putin of a veneer of legitimacy. Finally, he raised money to deploy election observers across the country including to hostile regions.</p><p>All this brought him the ire of the “systemic opposition”—especially Ksenia Sobchak, a former TV personality who ran as the liberal candidate—who Navalny repeatedly called a Kremlin stooge for participating in the sham elections. One of the best pieces of English language journalism I read on this divide is this <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21739223-vladimir-putins-election-victory-does-not-mean-there-no-hope-new-generation-rising">piece</a> in the economist by Arkady Ostrovsky who notes that the two candidates presented different strategies. Sobchak hopes to ride out Putin’s last term and offer the elite a liberal alternative once the question of succession arises that would mean the seizure of their assets and lustration. Navalny meanwhile rejects this elite politics approach and hopes to revive politics as an endeavor worth engaging in and thus break the routinization that marks Russian public life as it did in the late-Soviet era. This would allow for a radical rebuilding or Russia through a mass anti-corruption campaign, the seizure of oligarchic assets, and lustration.</p><p>The situation in Kemerovo seems to be the spark he has waited for to deploy his political machine to action. Owing to his political talent, Navalny hasn’t as of yet addressed the crowd in Pushkin Square but stood with them as a fellow mourner. This might be changing in the next few minutes or hours as it seems that the rally is turning political. However, this is a strong contrast with Putin who awkwardly visited some victims in the hospital (only a few and all of them apparently male) and laid some flowers. Retail politics is not his strong point but for Navanly it is the most natural expression of his vision.</p><p>This obviously presents a new dynamic for Putin 4.0. So far, the Putin 3.0 coalition has held via triumphal nationalism and easy credit to state industries in the context of a relatively stagnant economy. However, the question is what justice Putin can offer grieving families who instinctively understand that their children died horrifically due to rampant corruption that allowed dangerous conditions to exist in the first place. Will some fired officials be enough? How does he respond to the fact that the state was outmaneuvered by an opposition leader whose name he literally refuses to say?</p><p>But this does not mean Navalny has won, or even that he can win. The point of this project is to think about history and historiography in a policy context and of <em>Building a Ruin </em>in this process. Yurchak’s work is a work of historical anthropology resting on a linguistic analysis of his informant’s relationship to power. Following Stalin’s death, Soviet ideology is described as being “without an editor,” and reduced to empty maxims. Thus, his urban elite informants neither participate in dissent nor do they embrace official ideology instead being, as he terms it, <em>vne, </em>or outside through the embrace of personal life. Thus, Navalny can be seen as trying to force the personal to be the political by connecting the dissatisfaction Russians have with their everyday to the problems of politics and by making politics, in and of itself, something that is worth engaging in rather than treated cynically.</p><p>However, if we follow the Yurchak model, there are several problems. For Yurchak, Perestroika led to a change in the conditions he described by calling for a critique of ideology and thus making it relevant again. Yet, as Sheila Fitzpatrick pointed out, Yurchak reduces the collapse of the USSR to a cultural feature without contesting the political or economic problems that faced the Soviet Union. In his response, Yurchak proposes that he only wishes to show what made the collapse of the “possible” rather than explaining the collapse itself (a summary of this discussion and further commentary on the book is available in Kevin Platt and Ben Nathan’s <a href="https://www.history.upenn.edu/sites/www.history.upenn.edu/files/nathans_socialist-in-form.pdf">essay</a> in <em>Ab Imperio.) </em>This interaction lets us ask, why did Soviet authorities actually decide to break the pattern of politics? The answer, I posit is that the USSR faced a self perceived crisis because it was dedicated to being an advanced economy and recognized that its steps to reaching that status were failing. This led the Soviet elite to begin taking ever more drastic steps that eventually undermined the fiscal state that underpinned the Soviet system and triggered what Steve Solnick called “The Stealing of the State.”</p><p>What this suggests is that while the challenges to the Putinist system pile up, the real problem for Putin 4.0 will be to achieve economic dynamism without damaging the fundamentals of elite agreement. The problem, as <a href="https://www.fpri.org/contributor/yuval-weber/">Yuval Weber</a> and <a href="https://carnegie.ru/commentary/75836">Konstantin Gaaze</a> point out, is that this choice is impossible. Thus, Putin 4.0 is in a tenuous place. Any action to strengthen a domestic mandate, an area he is reportedly personally not interested in compared to international relations, might set off the very opening that the opposition needs to politicize events again. Thus, it isn’t surprising that the Kremlin’s response to the protests is looking more and more ham handed with <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/politics/28/03/2018/5abb93469a79474540e247aa?from=newsfeed">Sergei Kiriyenko</a>, the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, calling them parts of “the provocation of provocation” and the Kremlin reportedly <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/politics/28/03/2018/5abb93359a7947446c4f9d39">digging in its heels</a> to not even create scape goats and show the usefulness of political protest.</p><p>For now, this might work but the question is how long will the state have the economic power to coerce and buy off its way out? If the Kremlin is finally forced to adopt an economic agenda and fractures in the elite become visible, will Navanly’s radical politics be able to surge through the gap or will we see something more like 1953–1957 when a “collective leadership” emerges to manage the problem of authoritarian transition and a “middle ground” candidate, liberal enough to give breathing room, while fundamentally economically conservative, (Nikita Khrushchev) create a coalition to take power. While I am not saying that Sobachak is that figure—she is much too unpopular—someone might be taking notes. I’ll write more on the 53 vs. 86 vs. 91 models of transition at some other point.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8128a3984fe7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[An Experiment]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yfeygin/an-experiment-bd4cca083200?source=rss-38ce8ffb8850------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soviet-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Yakov Feygin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2018 18:45:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-26T18:45:13.416Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*LKuMmrZ9Gub2XJX3XTo4rg.jpeg" /></figure><p>After much questioning and talking to friends and colleagues I have decided to launch this blog as an experiment in writing a history book that I hope carries some contemporary relevance. The book, which is tentatively <em>Building a Ruin: The International Politics of Soviet Economic Reform 1955–1992</em> (I am not married to this title and would love suggestions for a better one!), is based on my 2017 Ph.D. dissertation and will try to make a similar set of arguments albeit in a much clumsy way with significant corrections to some empirical and theoretical mistakes. It is under a tentative contract with Harvard University Press and I hope to see it out sometime in 2020.</p><p>The problem with writing a work of history while keeping a toe in the contemporary social sciences, especially economics (mostly of the heterodox variety but not exclusively so) is that as historians we are trained to avoid what I have heard one senior scholar describe as “the sin of anachronism.” There are good reasons for this. First of all, historians (and I would argue most social scientists) aren’t very good at prediction. However, what we do tend to do well is to explain the past and, more importantly, give layers of meaning to the present. Historians, especially contemporary historians engaged in political history, aren’t “archives” for political scientists that can be mined for counterfactuals and analogies but are social scientists in their own right who use narrative to explain the contours of contemporary phenomena.</p><p>Yet, as the above senior scholar argues, historical research needs to stand on its own in rigor and has to be a serious work behind it that isn’t just a commentary on the present. This isn’t to say historians can, or should be neutral. In fact, any work without a theoretical lens or editorial and interpretive angle is just an act of antiquarianism. Historians, and other social scientists, always carry an interpretation of their data. Even if that means something as simple as a test of probability for a data set.</p><p>So this blog is an experiment in resolving this tension and making points about what academic history can tell us about the present. As I go about noting things either in the manuscript or in the news that relates to topics I work on I’ll be posting short notes here. Given my work is an attempt to read Russian and Soviet history through the lens of institutionalist economics and political economy in the tradition of Hyman Minsky and Charles Kindleberger there is a lot of fodder from financial markets, to the impending choices of the Russian government in economic and political reforms (or non-choices…), to the larger question of authoritarian and illiberal political-economic systems to, yes, Russia-gate. In doing this, I am inspired by Adam Tooze (as I am in many things) who did a similar thing on his <a href="https://www.adamtooze.com/blog/">website</a> in writing his soon to be released book on contextualizing the 2008 financial crisis into history.</p><p>So let’s plow ahead.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bd4cca083200" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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