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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by yoshi m lutfi on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by yoshi m lutfi on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@yoshimlutfi?source=rss-98c09340b46e------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by yoshi m lutfi on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yoshimlutfi?source=rss-98c09340b46e------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 19:26:16 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Easy Account Take Over, Fake Authentication?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yoshimlutfi/fake-authentication-4074340a1ddd?source=rss-98c09340b46e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4074340a1ddd</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[yoshi m lutfi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2025 05:22:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-05T11:08:43.472Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/792/1*QKYT_X_Sfr7aGK6QVBxfdQ.png" /><figcaption>Fake Authentication</figcaption></figure><p>Hmmmm, maybe you’re wondering what fake authentication is and whether it exists as a term in application security. Before you ask ChatGPT or Google it, I’ll be upfront — this is just a term I personally use when encountering an application with inadequate or weak authentication mechanisms.</p><p>So, what do I mean by fake authentication? I’m referring to an authentication mechanism (usually found in mobile applications) where the result of authentication does not produce something that cannot be reproduced by the tester.</p><p>Hmmmm, that sounds a bit complicated.</p><p>Simply put, fake authentication occurs when the authentication process does not generate a session/token that is used for subsequent processes to access information within the application. Typically, when authentication is successful — such as using a username and password — rather than providing a session ID or token, the application only returns user-related information. This user information is then used for subsequent requests to access application resources.</p><p>For example, after logging in successfully, the application responds with a success status code and returns user details such as user ID, name, role, and other information about the logged-in user. This data is often stored in the application’s internal storage for handling future requests.</p><h3>Key characteristics of fake authentication:</h3><ol><li>No session/token is issued upon successful login.</li><li>Each request after login requires a key parameter related to the authenticated user, such as a username or user ID.</li></ol><p>As a result, this mechanism is highly vulnerable to authentication bypass, account takeover, and privilege escalation by modifying server responses or performing parameter tampering.</p><p>Here are some example screenshots of fake authentication:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ET8LO5gzyQIMnYEEGcWEIQ.png" /><figcaption>Rcode for unsuccessful login</figcaption></figure><p>From the request above, it can be seen that there is an Rcode parameter indicating whether the authentication was successful or not. By changing the Rcode to 100 (success code), the subsequent request uses the username parameter to request user details instead of providing a session or token.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Lqr7J7Jw91KJ2V263S48xw.png" /><figcaption>change Rcode to 100 for successful message to mobile app</figcaption></figure><p>after changing Rcode the next request was collecting user data from username provided as seen in the screenshot below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HludpmvHKIjrsHEA_atN3w.png" /><figcaption>Next request use the username for requesting user details</figcaption></figure><p>Since the username consists of 8-digit numbers generated sequentially by the system, it makes account takeover (logging in as another user) much easier.</p><p>You might be wondering — why modify the response to perform an account takeover and retrieve user information? Shouldn’t modifying the username in the request be enough to access another user’s information (IDOR)?</p><p>The answer lies in the request, which includes a signature header named token (ironically named, since it’s not a real authentication token, see the pict 1). This header initially misled me during testing because I assumed it was responsible for authenticated users and preventing IDOR.</p><p>Vulnerabilities don’t exist just because of skilled penetration testers but also due to a lack of awareness from the developers.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4074340a1ddd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[SQL Injection in The HTTP Custom Header]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/sql-injection-in-the-http-custom-header-fd117ba1435e?source=rss-98c09340b46e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fd117ba1435e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sql-injection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybsersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[api-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[yoshi m lutfi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Jun 2023 12:51:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-20T11:11:51.386Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It has been a long time since my last write-up. in this short write up I wanna share my last year&#39;s findings about SQL Injection that I found in the custom HTTP header request.</p><p>So, I was doing my API penetration testing for a target. let&#39;s say redacted.com and after successful login, the request has one more HTTP header in the request, User header, and the value is a username that login to the application.</p><pre>POST /abcd/abcd<br>Authorization: token<br>Host: redacted.com<br>User: user.abc<br>Postman-Token: token<br>...<br><br>{body request}</pre><p>Now, I try to change the username for IDOR possibility but the server validates it by giving a message with a 500 internal error code and an error message that cannot get this API access.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DqXcVLPSFEKCler39g8WOw.png" /><figcaption>Error message when changing the User value</figcaption></figure><p>Because this parameter is validated it is potential also for SQL Injection, so I put basic SQL Injection to the request <strong>‘ OR 1=1- - </strong>and send the request and with ease, the server accepts the request and gives valid information. No way :D</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QFRffJrudxELmb6PwgIySA.png" /><figcaption>The request was accepted by the server</figcaption></figure><p>Okay, we got a valid SQL Injection and of course <strong>sqlmap</strong> will do the rest. But with this vulnerability, it turns out that we can also request to the server without an authorization token.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JUcshCJEEfuhckTOn4C37A.png" /><figcaption>Successful request without Authorization token</figcaption></figure><p>I hope you can take some points from my write-up, and I am sorry for being inactive for a couple of months. Have a nice day and keep learning!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fd117ba1435e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/sql-injection-in-the-http-custom-header-fd117ba1435e">SQL Injection in The HTTP Custom Header</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How I found (P2) Broken Authentication with Zero Skill of Hacking]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yoshimlutfi/how-i-found-p2-broken-authentication-with-zero-skill-of-hacking-c40b5643fe4a?source=rss-98c09340b46e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c40b5643fe4a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[yoshi m lutfi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Dec 2021 02:01:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-12-21T02:01:07.933Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is a local bounty program in my country that I recently joined,<br>I choose one of the programs and try to analyze it, this program runs on 2 platforms, as usual, web and mobile applications.</p><p>Either on the web/mobile application there is a mechanism, if we use a new browser/device to access the app then the system will send email verification to be able to use the application. Apart from being in the form of an email, the application also displays another mechanism by using a phone call verification.</p><p>I am testing the mobile application first and doing normal flow, everything went smoothly, verification using email or phone calls went well. then I thought, what if the verification using a phone call is done in a web application, how will the server validate the call? because our laptop cannot receive a call right?</p><p>Now I access the application using the web, and when a message appears that I must verify using the email sent to my email, then I choose another alternative, which is a phone call, and strangely, the application immediately verifies the user and manages to enter the dashboard without any mechanism, whatever be it a phone call or whatever.</p><p>I finally reported the bugs and my report was accepted and got a severity risk of P2 (High).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/488/1*eAGtwxIDj2b7uxqJ6C4mPA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Now they only use email verification only</figcaption></figure><p>Tips:<br>If the application can run on different platforms, explore each function of the application. then try to use each of these functions on both platforms, maybe there are some functions that have not been validated or anything that could be a security hole.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c40b5643fe4a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ByPass SSL Pinning with IP Forwarding | iptables]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/bypass-ssl-pinning-with-ip-forwarding-iptables-568171b52b62?source=rss-98c09340b46e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/568171b52b62</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mobileapplicationsecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[yoshi m lutfi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Dec 2021 09:09:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-03T14:12:11.713Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After struggling with common tools to bypass SSL pinning, because the app that I’m testing won’t show some HTTPS traffic that I try to trap.</p><p>I&#39;m using Frida as usual, it works well for another app except that I’m tested.</p><p>So, my team, “the purple team” was decided to configure a transparent proxy by using an IP Forwarding feature in our kali. I was amazed by the result it works smoothly because it does not inject any script into the app.</p><p>If you wanna try, this is what we doing to bypass SSL Pinning in the mobile application.</p><ol><li>Creating Android emulator in genymotion, I used Google Pixel (8.0 API 26) as my Android virtual device</li><li>Open virtual box, there is android Google Pixel listed in the machine list. and choose the Settings tab to configure adapter1 and adapter2 to Host-Only Adapter. please make sure the names are different (vboxnet0 for adapter 1 and vboxnet1 for Adapter2)</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/970/1*4JlUVU9Hg5BpyZAzN5Sgqw.png" /><figcaption>Google Pixel in Oracle VirtualBox Manager</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/734/1*DKuQ_PRUaHbvBPpsvj-hTg.png" /><figcaption>Adapter 1 Configuration (default)</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/734/1*nPK-do6cmdxQugk5w1SE0g.png" /><figcaption>Adapter 2 Configuration (change from NAT to Host Only)</figcaption></figure><p>If you cannot find Adapter 2 in your android virtual box machine, just go in virtual box File -&gt; Host Network Manager. and on network windows, choose to <strong>Create</strong> to make a new adapter, and don&#39;t forget to enable DHCP.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/906/1*_8xnDLpvPY8vzLKIRFoozw.png" /><figcaption>Network adapter configuration in android virtual box</figcaption></figure><p>3. Start your android emulator in Genymotion</p><p>4. Export burp certificate and install it in the android system as a Trusted certificate. (there are so many tutorials for this on the Internet).</p><p>5. The next step is to configure what port we will use for intercepting connections from the android device to our burp proxy. I usually use the 8081 port for a mobile connection. so, in burp proxy open Proxy tab -&gt; Options -&gt; Proxy Listeners -&gt; add</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/810/1*jfzSdSb3SCs4X8YXfxdhdw.png" /><figcaption>Port Binding to 8081 and All Interfaces</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/810/1*8Y9TIgBnziHuchpnHgdmow.png" /><figcaption>Check the Support Invisible proxying checkbox</figcaption></figure><p>6. now, move to your kali, and see the IP addresses of all interfaces with ifconfig -a command, make sure there are 2 adapter names with vboxnet.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/868/1*azUMSWTzg4KX_24cPgFVlQ.png" /></figure><p>The wlan0 is an adapter for connecting to Internet, vboxnet0 and vboxnet1 are adapters from android emulator devices.</p><p>7. Let&#39;s configure our android network</p><p>Change the Wifi configuration to a static IP address I used 192.168.57.2 the default gateway and the DNS are automatically being set. (See the IP Address in vboxnet1)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/646/1*SzFhDMYNBdmtKDHK2RWhWA.png" /></figure><p>choose the SAVE button, and as usual reboot your android virtual machine before going to the next step.</p><p>8. now the interesting part. we will configure the IP forwarding rule in the Kali Linux machine.</p><p>open your terminal in kali Linux and set the IP Forwarding to 1 (true) with this command (need root privileges):</p><p>echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/813/1*un0P6efhXCC89TmGUGEv8w.png" /><figcaption>set the IP Forwarding to True</figcaption></figure><p>9. exit from the root user, and set up IP tables for 80 and 443 port connection by executing this command</p><h4>sudo iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o wlan0 -j MASQUERADE</h4><h4>sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp -i vboxnet1 — dport 80 -j REDIRECT — to-port 8081</h4><h4>sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp -i vboxnet1 — dport 443 -j REDIRECT — to-port 8081</h4><blockquote><em>You can change wlan0 to eth0 (device that used for Internet connection)</em></blockquote><p>Now you can check your HTTPS traffic from your android is intercepted to your burp proxy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-CLZnJlFK1RrAInLPiyKTg.png" /><figcaption>all http/https are intercepted</figcaption></figure><p>Ok, hope this trick can be an alternative way to bypass the SSL Pinning problem.</p><blockquote>Update: now, it is more easier to use Reflutter to bypass sslpinning for flutter based mobile application.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=568171b52b62" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/bypass-ssl-pinning-with-ip-forwarding-iptables-568171b52b62">ByPass SSL Pinning with IP Forwarding | iptables</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bypassing OTP Verification for Changing PIN in Registered Mobile Banking Account.]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/bypassing-otp-verification-for-changing-pin-in-registered-mobile-banking-account-ed92dbcaa5c7?source=rss-98c09340b46e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ed92dbcaa5c7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[yoshi m lutfi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Jul 2021 14:36:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-12-21T16:49:24.296Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Assalamu’alaikum (<em>Peace be upon you</em>)</p><p>Okay, this is my second post, reading the title is very interesting right?</p><p>I started with the mechanism of this application. My mobile number was registered in this mobile banking application and I was set up my PIN for login.</p><p>My user profile config was encrypted in the internal storage of the mobile device. Because I don’t have enough knowledge about mobile pentesting. I’m doing this test with my web app methodology that I know. :D</p><p>This is how the mobile application work:</p><ol><li>Every time the application load for the first time, it requests the back end API (api/v1/credential/status) to check the mobile banking number (mobile phone) registered in the device for the status. If the number status was OK then the server will respond like this:</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/528/1*rfOLmLsbgH2Ydqj1FhUe1w.png" /><figcaption>Response from the server when status OK.</figcaption></figure><p>(“Sukses” mean success). The request and response were encoded with base64, so can easily be decoded.</p><p>2. Then the application will pop up the input form for a PIN to log in.</p><p>3. For changing the PIN, the User will be prompted for OTP verification sent to the mobile phone number registered in that mobile banking app.</p><p>That was a normal flow for this mobile banking application. Now here is how I found (accidentally) bypassing the OTP verification mechanism for changing the PIN.</p><p><strong><em>Enumerating the status response</em></strong></p><p>Me and my team registering 4 mobile phone number to the banking system. and because I was trying to check the anti automation mechanism, my phone number was blocked. so, when I open my mobile banking app, it shows the response like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/541/1*m9CdffeUvdzi7ZhEDj_8Hw.png" /><figcaption>Blocked message from the server</figcaption></figure><p>My account was blocked and required me to go to the nearest ATM Machine to activate it again. :’D but there is an interesting in here, I got a different response from my mobile number. So, what happens if I change the phone number (in request) it is possible to enumerate the status of the phone number?</p><p>Luckily, there is no limit to use api/v1/credential/status function, so I made some payloads including all 4 numbers for testing this app to know the status. I fire up the burp intruder and I found 4 status from my payload.</p><ol><li>Success status</li><li>Already registered and need to set the PIN</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/521/1*vpOETXSnQtu2hvu9OcS9YQ.png" /><figcaption>response show that needs to set up a PIN</figcaption></figure><p>3. Blocked (<em>My mobile phone number :D</em>), and</p><p>4. Unregistered mobile phone number</p><p>Some of you can already guess what the next step will be, right? point number 2 is very interesting. let say it’s number 08123456789. what happens if I change my phone number to 08123456789? so I turn on the intercept and load my mobile app banking, and it comes with the request to api/v1/credential/status, I change the phone number parameter to 08123456789<em>. </em>And uupsss, the application shows up the setup PIN form. (<em>I can’t show the screenshot for this, because the identical of UI)</em>.</p><p>At this point, I think I successfully set up a new PIN for the 08123456789 mobile number. But It is not. What happened was I successfully change my own PIN but the status was still blocked.</p><p><strong>So where are the takeover possibilities?</strong></p><p>Although the probability is very small, it still could happen. If someone lost their phone and or attacker has the ability to access the device and the owner haven’t had time to block the account yet. The attacker will try to full control the device, (rooting or jailbreaking), and if the device is successfully rooted, an attacker can perform the above test.</p><p>Again the chances are very small but prevention is better than cure right?</p><p><strong>My notes:</strong></p><ul><li><em>if is any chance of doing some enumerating condition, don&#39;t miss that test.</em></li><li><em>Having a test user with multiple conditions will make the test more comprehensive.</em></li></ul><p>Okay, that&#39;s all for this time. once again, I apologize for the limited English. I hope it can be understood.</p><p>Please comment if you have a good resource about mobile penetration testing, books or websites, etc. I will be very grateful. And also I&#39;m interested in Brida, anyone already uses it for mobile pentesting especially for android app? please share with me.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ed92dbcaa5c7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/bypassing-otp-verification-for-changing-pin-in-registered-mobile-banking-account-ed92dbcaa5c7">Bypassing OTP Verification for Changing PIN in Registered Mobile Banking Account.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Account Take Over with HTTP Pollution Attack at Reset Password Functionality]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yoshimlutfi/account-take-over-with-http-pollution-attack-at-reset-password-functionality-9f683bc0bdd?source=rss-98c09340b46e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9f683bc0bdd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[yoshi m lutfi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Jul 2021 10:54:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-07-16T10:54:44.245Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>First of all, this is my first write up about finding or bug when I work as cyber security. and also I try to write this post with English, so I’m apology if my write-up so bad, or hard to understand for people who their native language are English.</p><p>Okay, I started work as cyber security in April 2018. before that, I working as a financial and IT staff in one of Bank in Indonesia.</p><p>I don’t have any experience before about hacking or pentesting. But, being a hacker is always some interesting things that I and everyone who love IT, surely one of their dreams is being a hacker. :D Luckily, their are a ton resource in Internet how to learn hacking and my daily job in my new company was learning and doing pentesting until now.</p><p>Okay, sorry for to many intermezzo.</p><p>I found this bug when I testing one of mutual funds application in early 2020. As usual endpoint for take over vulnerability is reset password functionality. let me explain how this reset password mechanism works:</p><ol><li>User request to resetting password by entering their registered email.</li><li>If email was valid, the system will send the OTP (by email) to user for confirming reset password.</li><li>The user input the OTP and if this valid the change password form show up.</li><li>After successfully changed the password, the application will directly show the dashboard.</li></ol><p>At first, in my mind I wanna login with other user email without knowing their password because when we are successfully change the password the dashboard of that user are directly show up. So, I curious what happen when I change the email user provided (loginname parameter) when confirming password change.</p><p>this is how the request packet :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/824/1*Nppfs8y4Tbj8tKd2b1d2EA.png" /><figcaption>Original Request</figcaption></figure><p>My scenario unsuccessful, it validating the email that I used. So I retrying change password and now with http pollution attack (picture 2) by adding second loginname parameter into the request. and this attack was accepted by system. And I successfully logon with victim email.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*j2iAYUg5sOqIxHrFZD5_IA.png" /><figcaption>Edited Request</figcaption></figure><p>So, I asked my friend (victim email) to trying login with his username and password he knew but he fail to login. And I asked him to trying login with my password that I used when trying to login with his email. and it works!</p><p>So, the system changes the victim’s password instead of changing my password. And I’ll trying to login to my account with my old password it still work.</p><p>I reported this vulnerability and now it have been fixed.</p><p><em>My advice:</em></p><p><em>If the application automatically showing the dashboard or main menu after user successfully change the password. Trying to attack with http pollution because we don’t know which parameter used for validating and which parameter used to load the dashboard. (my opinion) hhe..</em></p><p>Okay that is for now, next I will trying to write up about(maybe):</p><ul><li>By passing OTP Protection in mobile banking application when changing PIN functionality.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9f683bc0bdd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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