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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Zamaneh Media on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Zamaneh Media on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Zamaneh Media on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@zamaneh?source=rss-b584c7f96a06------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Two Narratives of the January Massacre]]></title>
            <link>https://zamaneh.medium.com/two-narratives-of-the-january-massacre-4a9322ea92ab?source=rss-b584c7f96a06------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[january-massacre-in-iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[revolution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-protest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-protests-2026]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zamaneh Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 12:29:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-16T12:29:13.502Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Zamaneh Media — <a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37775/">12</a><a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37775/">February2026</a></p><p><strong><em>Two first-person accounts — from Tehran and a city in central Iran — trace what the January massacre did to bodies, families, and everyday life: fear, loss, and the thin hope that arrest means survival.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*SP6PCLD_DVUbp_go.jpg" /></figure><h3>Hopelessness After a Bloody Night</h3><p>What you are about to read is based on the account of “V.B.,” a 22-year-old student, about the January massacre of 18 Dey 1404 (January 8, 2026) in Tehran.</p><p>V.B. — “I kept looking left and right, hoping I’d see Hiva. It was like a battlefield — except the other side had military weapons and was killing unarmed people, people who had come out to protest… I felt nauseous… I got up and saw ten or twelve people running, so I started running with them. I got lost in the alleys… from far and near, you could hear gunfire…”</p><p>My father has been fighting cancer for four years. His medicines have become scarce — almost impossible to find. Yesterday, after running around all day, I went to Naser Khosrow for the second time. With sheer misery, I managed to get “Maylodoc 25 mg” on the black market — three times last month’s price.</p><p>I walked on foot from Naser Khosrow to Jomhouri, staring blankly at people. Hopelessness surged in every passerby’s face, every shopkeeper’s face — everyone. I lit a cigarette and sank into its smoke… and then I was dropped into that hellish night.</p><p>Hiva’s voice was still in my ears: “Brother, trust me — soon they’ll disappear. We’ll remain, and this beautiful city.”</p><p>Since that night, there has been no news of Hiva. And I keep praying — please God, let him have been arrested. Let him be alive.</p><p>My phone rang. My mother, hopeless on the other end, said: “What happened, my son? Did you manage to find the medicine?”<br>I said: “Yes, my dear. I’m coming home.”</p><p>I got into a taxi. An old woman sat beside me, talking on the phone: “Can it get worse than this? Meat is 1.8 million. Chicken has doubled. Oil is triple. No water, no money — and don’t even get me started on electricity and gas bills…” Her words faded in my ears. My eyes were fixed outside: on the thick, old trees along the road — trees I’ve loved for years, friends that somehow give me strength.</p><p>I drift back to high school, when Hiva and I walked this route to school and back every day. Sometimes we stopped under these trees, stared up at the highest branches, counted them one by one. Each of these trees had endless branches. And the roots — don’t even ask — pushing right up through the sidewalk. Hiva used to say: “The roots of the trees on this side of the street and the trees on that side meet underneath. Even if these are here and those are there, under the soil it’s like they’re holding hands.”</p><p>Each of these trees is over a hundred years old — older than these fascists. Back when these conscienceless clerics weren’t here, these trees were here. They’re here now. And after these criminals are gone, they’ll still remain.</p><p>I still had ten minutes of walking ahead to reach home. I lit a cigarette — and returned to the night of 18 Dey 1404 (January 8, 2026), to the unbelievable noise of the street and the nationwide protests… Hiva and the other guys and I had gone out to get one step closer to freedom.</p><p>We’d been on the street for about two hours. Everyone was there — from Mr. Mahmoud, the greengrocer at the corner, to Dash Ali the mechanic; from Mr. Mohammadi, our high school teacher, to Mr. Sanandaji, the university library’s librarian. I saw so many people. A few girls from our faculty were there too. It was unreal. The air was cold — I don’t know if it was truly cold, or if we were shivering from fear. But we warmed ourselves with cheers and chants.</p><p>I don’t know how it began — plainclothes agents and security forces started shooting. The crowd shattered. Everyone scattered. Screams vanished inside the gunfire.</p><p>I started running. For a moment I turned back and saw a few people lying on the asphalt. The gunfire grew louder and louder. I went over to one of the wounded. He was still breathing. A bullet had hit his stomach and his leg. He was bleeding. My head spun.</p><p>The shooting wouldn’t stop. A few people came and dragged the wounded person onto the sidewalk. I was in shock. My head spun and I fell. I crawled — hands and knees — until I reached the curb.</p><p>Someone grabbed my arm and flung me behind a parked car. He sat beside me and said: “You okay?” I just stared at him, stunned. He shook my shoulders: “Are you hurt?”<br>I said: “No… thanks. I’m okay.”</p><p>Then I snapped back — Hiva wasn’t there.</p><p>“Hiva… Hiva, where are you?”</p><p>I kept looking left and right, hoping I’d see him. It was like a battlefield — except the other side had military weapons and was killing unarmed people, people who had come out to protest. I felt nauseous. I got up and saw ten or twelve people running. I ran with them. I got lost in the alleys. From far and near, you could hear gunfire…</p><p>I got home. I kissed my father’s hand, put the medicines on the small table by his bed, and collapsed onto the couch.</p><p>My father swallowed one of the Maylodoc capsules and gulped down a glass of water. With trembling hands he picked up his thick glasses and a tissue and began cleaning them. With a lump in his throat he said: “These days will end too, my son…”</p><p>He burst into tears: “I don’t know why I don’t die…”</p><p>I had never seen my father this sad and wilted. He wiped his tears with the same tissue, set his glasses back on his bony nose, crumpled the tissue in his fist, and went on: “I wish this blood cancer had finished me off so I wouldn’t see these days. I wish a cancer called the Islamic Republic weren’t slaughtering our young people like this…”</p><p>He pressed the thumb of his right hand to his mouth. Biting it, staring at the wall clock, he said: “Don’t be mistaken… My illness is nothing. Our incurable illness is them. We’ve been grappling with a cancer called the Islamic Republic for forty-seven years — a tumor that grows bigger and bigger every day, eating into all of us. It spares neither the young nor the old…”</p><p>My father lay on the bed, staring at the ceiling. Without looking at me, he asked: “By the way — any news of Hiva?”</p><p>I swallowed the lump in my throat. “No… still nothing.”</p><p>Hiva is my neighbor and my classmate. We grew up together since childhood. He’s closer to me than a brother. Since that hellish night, I haven’t gone a single moment without thinking of him.</p><p>I haven’t seen Hiva since that night. His mother came to our house yesterday. I told her the story a hundred times.</p><p>I call Hiva’s mother “Auntie.” I held her hand and, slowly and carefully, I said: “No, Auntie, I swear to God — there wasn’t any shooting… I mean, we heard gunfire from far away, but where we were, there was no shooting. Suddenly the security forces arrived and attacked us with batons, and each of us ran in a different direction, and then… I don’t know what happened…”<br>I didn’t want to upset her. I didn’t want to tell her the truth. “I don’t know which way Hiva went… I don’t know how we got separated…”</p><p>Auntie is forty-five. But since the night Hiva disappeared, she has aged forty years — like an eighty-five-year-old woman. My mother says she barely sleeps. She stares at the door from night until morning. Near dawn she falls asleep — two or three hours at most.</p><p>All the world’s grief ripples across Auntie’s face. She pushed her salt-and-pepper hair away from her face. With eyes that looked like they were about to leap from their sockets, she glanced at my mother. Tears poured down and she threw herself into my mother’s arms: “We searched everywhere, sister. There’s no trace of him… I’m going insane… And at the same time I’m relieved there’s no trace. I keep saying, God willing we won’t find him these days — maybe he’s alive… because if we find him now — God forbid — we’ll find his body…”<br>Her sobbing rose and swallowed her words. “Our only comfort is that he’s not among the dead… We hope he’s been arrested!”</p><p>Today too — like other days — I escape the heavy air of the house and take refuge on the rooftop. I look at Tehran’s wilted, tearful sky. Not even a single bird flies.</p><p>These days even crying doesn’t cure the lump inside me. Wherever you look in life, it’s all tears and pain. I feel like Hiva is up there, behind those gray clouds. I don’t know…</p><p>Hiva? Brother? My playmate, my classmate — please come back… For Auntie’s sake… I’d do anything for you. Either come back, or take me with you. I miss you. I miss you — do you understand?</p><p>God willing you’ve been arrested, so at least we know you’re alive. Huh? Is that wrong to say? One day you’ll be free. We’ll be free. We’ll go again under the trees on the way to school and stare at the branches… Don’t you know, brother — we’re like trees too. Our roots are connected. Without you I’m rootless. Where are you? Come back…</p><h3>Fear as a Tool of Power, the People’s Cost</h3><p>It is 21 Dey 1404 (January 11, 2026), the day after two days of bloody demonstrations across Iran. In a city in the center of the country, everything feels uneasy and trembling — neither like ordinary days nor like turbulent nights. Something in between; sensed less through sound than through bodies. Anger still hangs in the air, along with an anxiety you can see: in people’s eyes, in brief pauses, in vendors’ lowered voices, in steps that move a little faster than usual — without any change of destination.</p><p>It is around noon. My sisters and I are walking in the city center. In the middle of this short route, a man with an unremarkable appearance approaches. In a threatening tone, he directs us toward a military vehicle. A man in his forties, wearing a simple jacket and light-colored cotton pants — like thousands of other men on the street. I ask, “Who are you?” He says: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). And we have to go with him to the base. He has no uniform, no official insignia. My sister asks, “Why? What have we done?” He says: “Your appearance is abnormal.”</p><p>Our appearance? Abnormal? What does that even mean? We must go to their headquarters because we look “different.” “Abnormal” is a stretchy word — so stretchy it can include anyone at any moment. In that instant, the issue was not only how we looked; it was this: in the streets of your own city, without committing any crime, you suddenly have to prove you are innocent. How thin the line has become between “citizen” and “suspect”!</p><p>We are stunned. My sister, who is ill, points to our car parked ahead and asks him to let us go. That moment when time shrinks and the mind looks only for an escape route. Before the soldier standing near the IRGC vehicle even approaches us, we rush toward our own car — and take refuge.</p><p>That moment, that encounter, was not only about us. It was a sign of something deeper: mutual fear — fear as a tool of power, and ordinary people as the primary ones who pay its cost. History shows that no order can build lasting security relying on fear alone. Security without trust is impossible, and trust — in an atmosphere where “abnormal” can become a crime — is the rarest capital of all.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4a9322ea92ab" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[After Khamenei: Power Scenarios in a Crisis-Ridden Iran]]></title>
            <link>https://zamaneh.medium.com/after-khamenei-power-scenarios-in-a-crisis-ridden-iran-43efe0753b4e?source=rss-b584c7f96a06------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/43efe0753b4e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[supreme-leader]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[khamenei]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ali-rasouli]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ali-khamenei]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zamaneh Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 12:24:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-16T12:24:34.425Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Ali Rasouli — <a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37771/">12</a><a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37771/">February2026</a></p><p><strong><em>Khamenei’s exit seems inevitable, but what follows — managed continuity, secular republic, monarchy, or an unstable hybrid — depends on organization, power balances, and foreign pressure.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/0*kpad3jX21dHEo95l.jpg" /></figure><p>The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic has long since lost control of the reins. His leadership began a few months after the mass killings of summer 1367 (1988); now the twilight of his rule has become entwined with the January massacre. From one massacre to another. From one terror to another.</p><p>Ali Khamenei is not merely Ruhollah Khomeini’s successor; he is the architect of the post-war Islamic Republic. The system we know today — its institutional design, the balance of forces, security priorities, and even its economic logic — is less Khomeini’s legacy than the product of four decades of Khamenei’s continuous intervention in the smallest nuts and bolts of power. Khamenei built a government not on collective participation, but on security, control, personal loyalty, and rent-based distribution of resources; a regime in which politics was not competition, but the management of threats.</p><p>Yet this very meticulous engineering carried the seed of exhaustion within it. A system that ties everything to security inevitably reaches a point where, without violence and massacre, it can no longer protect its own survival. By gradually dissolving politics — elected institutions, social mediators, and even the traditional clergy — Khamenei built a system whose only language is force. Such a system works only as long as its force suffices; and it is precisely at this point that the post–January massacre Islamic Republic hits a dead end.</p><h3>A Society That Cries Out for the Regime’s Death</h3><p>The January massacre was not simply one more massacre after years of repression; it was the point at which even the last illusions of coexistence between state and society collapsed. The crime that unfolded in the streets was a conscious decision by a government that knew it had nothing left to lose. When a regime resorts to this level of naked violence, it is in fact admitting that its social capital has been depleted — and that it no longer has any hope of persuading people or managing discontent.</p><p>In 1404 (2025–2026), what condition is the Islamic Republic in? A worn-out, ineffective system under an aging leader — one that has lost the cognitive and ideological capacity to rebuild its pillars. The external threat and the shadow of war hang over it. Corruption has gripped it cell by cell, while society, broadly, cries out for its death. The very fact that a political system reaches a point where some people, to be rid of it, even contemplate their own and their country’s being bombed by foreign forces — or else feel indifferent to it — shows the depth of the bankruptcy that has occurred.</p><p>Sooner or later, Khamenei’s Leader’s Office will close. What has happened over the past year tells us Khamenei is a candle in the wind — and this is not something only you and I see. From the person in the inner quarters who brings him tea and food to the advisers, assistants, and military men around him, they all know the “king is breathing his last.”</p><p>The bad news for the Supreme Leader is that people in his surrounding circle have begun to weigh him on a scale of profit and loss. They ask whether keeping him on the throne of power is worth its terrifying costs. In other words: the costs of keeping the leader in place have risen so high that they may end by threatening the system itself.</p><h3>A Caricature Prophet and the Merciless Logic of Power</h3><p>The rational rule is that those who benefit materially and in status from the system — generally the leader’s trusted circle — think about the fate of their livelihood and their business on the day Khamenei is no more. And of course they think about it. It is true that Khamenei always tried to cast himself, for his supporters, in the role of a prophet or a first-rank imam. But even if you are a prophet — even if the Quran has been revealed to you — the world of meaning is still not strong enough to overcome the relations of the material world. The struggle over posts, rank, and increasing one’s share of benefit from the system is woven into the nature of the regime — whether a regime with a real prophet at its head, or a regime with a caricature prophet.</p><p>That is why the main political and security forces gathered around the current leader — forces whose actions can matter — think about “the day after Khamenei.” Over the past year, this thinking has certainly grown stronger.</p><h3>Four Actors, Four Logics</h3><p>Four forces are decisive in today’s conditions: the people and civil society, foreign power, forces inside the government, and opposition forces. Each has its own story. Their demands overlap in places and clash in others.</p><p>The people — meaning that active segment driven to the edge, whose blood stained the streets on 18 and 19 Dey 1404 (January 8 and 9, 2026) — have a clear demand: the end of the nightmare of the Islamic Republic. Anything that ends this half-century series of repression, massacre, and humiliation — and brings even a little calm and a bit of comfort — is desirable. People’s tactics in the streets, both in choosing slogans and in deciding how far to advance or retreat, depend on their assessment of the opposing side and the degree to which change seems feasible.</p><p>Iran’s protesting people did not arrive overnight at the station of “overthrowing the Islamic Republic.” Contrary to fantasies that sometimes grip professional political forces, ordinary people determine the form of protest, the target of protest, and the tactics of protest by measuring objective variables and their own material conditions. The people’s priority is always “life,” and the less costly the route to securing life, the more preferable it is.</p><p>The people are the same people who once danced for the 1376 election (1997), placed their hopes in the Sixth Parliament, and clung to the arrival of the “Imam’s prime minister”, Mir Hossein Mousavi. They once hoped for “change as far as possible at minimal cost” within the Islamic Republic’s substance and appearance. They are still the same people. If today they are prepared to sacrifice their lives to secure “life,” it is because they have lost hope in the Islamic Republic — and in the possibility of living and enduring under it.</p><p>The nightmare of the Islamic Republic has become so terrifying — has dragged life into such misery — that it even grants the previous dead end, the Shah’s rule, the chance to acquit itself.</p><h3>Peripheral Forces: Government, Opposition, and External Pressure</h3><p>Beyond the people, forces within the government — from reformists to technocrats, eulogists, IRGC men, and hardliners — are thinking about their placement in power on the day after Khamenei. These forces control the rent-based economic structure and networks of resource distribution; they seek to preserve their economic, political, and status interests in the future.</p><p>At the top of their risk list sit several scenarios: Khamenei’s absence; a U.S. and Israeli attack; nationwide protests; a fundamental upending of the system; a coup by one faction against another; the opposition and its political game; and more.</p><p>A crucial split runs through the regime’s interior: futureless ideologues who still speak the language of slogans, versus technocrats and security managers who think in the language of cost and benefit. The second group knows that the continuation of the status quo can push the whole system to the brink. That is why, more than preserving Khamenei, they focus on how to pass beyond him at the lowest possible cost.</p><p>Outside the regime, opposition forces — linked, in various ways, to the people’s general demand — push forward the program of overthrow. From republican and left groups to constitutional and absolutist monarchists, and exiled reformists, each on its own island seeks to deliver the final blow. Some seek “doping” from regional and extra-regional powers, and even defend a limited military strike. Others place their hopes in the ultimate force of the people and civil society to overcome the shaky order.</p><p>External pressure — especially U.S. and Israeli military and security threats — cannot be ignored in accelerating events. Some believe the United States and Israel will carry out regime change, and that the post-change placement of forces will therefore be shaped by them. They store their energy, invest in lobbying Washington and Tel Aviv, and hope that Netanyahu and Trump will do the job. The roots of this belief lie in the shock of 23 Khordad 1404 (June 13, 2025), when senior Islamic Republic commanders were targeted and killed. Their logic is blunt: if the military can be killed, add the politicians too, and the system is finished.</p><p>But it is not that simple. U.S. and Israeli security and political analysts will not think with this kind of excitement. Such a scenario is tied to “all-out war,” and what seems evident is that Washington is not seeking a repeat of Iraq and Afghanistan through a ground invasion that would make it an absolute ruler for a time. Certainly Washington’s — and perhaps Tel Aviv’s — role after the fall of the Islamic Republic would be significant. But it is unlikely they would arrange the entire new order down to mid-level actors. The lesson of cases like Venezuela, Syria, and even the Taliban’s return is that what matters is a “desirable and stable output,” not perfect control over the “stage arrangement.”</p><p>Step back, then, from daily quarrels over republic versus monarchy and focus on the shared denominator of the four variables — society, regime insiders, the opposition, and foreign power: fundamental change. Three forces (society, the opposition, and foreign power) demand it; one force (the regime’s interior) considers it inevitable. The conflict is over the scope and quality of that change.</p><h3>Four Plausible Futures After Khamenei</h3><p>Four political futures are imaginable — none linear, none guaranteed.</p><p>First: an Islamic Republic without Khamenei, a system that tries to preserve its security–rentier logic by changing faces and moderating tone. It might reduce tensions briefly, but it would remain extremely fragile because of lost legitimacy and institutional exhaustion.</p><p>Second and third: a secular republic, and the restoration of monarchy. Which one comes to pass depends on which force holds the agency of change. A secular republic, without rapid organization and activation of its historical institutional resources, will be pushed to the margins. A monarchy, without an institutional base inside Iran, will be forced into alliances with defecting segments of the Islamic Republic.</p><p>Fourth: the full realization of none of these, and the emergence of a contradictory, unstable hybrid — an archipelago of middling political and economic forces stitched together.</p><h3>What Is the United States Thinking?</h3><p>The effective foreign force today — the United States — prefers change at the lowest possible cost, along with drawing Iran into its circle of strategic assets. For Washington, reducing the “cost of durable change” is far more urgent than intervening in the rivalry between “king supporters” and “president supporters.” Whatever combination achieves that goal with lower cost and greater stability is preferable.</p><p>The present Iranian scene suggests that any future political order — whatever its form — will position itself on the Western front. If all contenders intend to place Iran within America’s orbit, why should Washington absolutely take one side in their internal struggle? U.S. intervention becomes necessary only when internal conflict raises Washington’s costs.</p><h3>Reza Pahlavi, Father of Modern Iran?</h3><p>Reza Pahlavi and his circle pursue two paths in parallel: monarchy, and a quasi-monarchical republic — where he is either king or the “father of modern Iran.” They will try to prolong the current emergency so they can achieve their more desired outcome: restoration of monarchy. If that fails, they have a less desired fallback: a republic under the father’s shadow.</p><p>Their weakness is the absence of an institutional foothold inside Iran — not in the sense that no one chants his name, or that supporters abroad cannot show force, but in the sense that they lack durable networks — an “institutional power” — in Iran’s civil society and economic and cultural structures.</p><p>In both scenarios, they try to compensate by recruiting defectors from the IRGC and intelligence services. A political force can defeat its rival either by relying on its own power or by putting the rival’s elements of power to use. Pahlavi’s camp has chosen the second route. Campaigns like the QR-code mobilization and calls for IRGC and intelligence personnel to join them fit this logic.</p><p>Will those forces join him? Not unless they come to see Khamenei’s departure as certain and find no broker for a survival deal other than Pahlavi. If they can negotiate directly over the future order, they will not need him as a mediator. That is why Pahlavi’s advisers fear the possibility of a “direct U.S. deal with the Islamic Republic’s second layer.”</p><h3>A Network That Wants to Build a Republic</h3><p>Republican forces in the opposition — highly fragmented, and positioned abroad against Pahlavi — also face a decisive test: what they do now will determine where they stand tomorrow. Traditionally, they have a base in civil society and the middle class. They rely on network-based organization. Horizontal organization works to a point in a period of resistance, but a period of transition requires a degree of vertical organization.</p><p>A century-long desire for freedom, and lived experience — constitutionalism, nationalization of oil, the 1979 revolution, resistance to the Islamic Republic — along with a web of institutional values rooted in the middle class, form their historical base. Whether they gain the upper hand depends on how the nightmare ends and how long the emergency lasts. If the agency of change falls outside the will of society and the institutional networks of civil society — women’s, justice-seeking, ethnic, and labor movements and struggles — then republicans may find themselves with no better place than becoming the opposition of the next order.</p><p>Their path to success is to activate their networks fast and impose their agency. Will they manage it? It is unclear. The republican “front” bears the name of a front, but so far has shown little evidence of acting like one. Relying on moral-symbolic capital without a clear political program is their Achilles’ heel. Without organization and program, their only hope is that, at the birth of a new order, events and actors — by chance or by their own profit-and-loss calculations — end up serving the republican idea.</p><p>Khamenei will go; this is nearly certain. The Islamic Republic is no longer able to reproduce itself in the old way. But the leader’s departure and the system’s erosion do not, by themselves, produce freedom. Freedom is made through organization, institutions, balance of forces, and correct decisions at the correct moment — not merely the collapse of the previous apex of power.</p><p>Iran’s riddle is here: change is unavoidable, but “positive and durable change” is neither free nor guaranteed. The force that can, in the moment before and after collapse, move beyond emergency and rebuild politics will not only change the system — it will determine the course of Iran’s history.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=43efe0753b4e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Day 46 After the Protests Began: 7,002 Dead, Repression Expands from Streets to Courts]]></title>
            <link>https://zamaneh.medium.com/day-46-after-the-protests-began-7-002-dead-repression-expands-from-streets-to-courts-a5f378a2cb3d?source=rss-b584c7f96a06------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a5f378a2cb3d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-protest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-protests-2026]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zamaneh Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Feb 2026 13:24:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-13T13:24:28.644Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Zamaneh Media — <a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37785/">12</a><a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37785/">February2026</a></p><p><strong><em>HRANA reports 7,002 confirmed deaths by day 46; arrests and injuries climb, release is coerced, and child-rights activists demand remembrance and accountability for killed students.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/0*caKiRGIC9sAAs9GF.jpg" /></figure><p>Based on the latest data published by the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), the media outlet of the Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRAI), by the end of the forty-sixth day since the start of the protests, the number of confirmed deaths had reached 7,002. Of these, 6,506 were recorded as “protesters,” including 216 under the age of 18. HRANA also reported the deaths of 214 government-affiliated forces and 66 people categorized as “non-protest civilians.” An additional 11,730 reported deaths remain under review (not yet verified/classified).</p><p>Over the same period, the number of civilian injured rose to 25,022, total arrests were recorded at 52,941, and 136 students were among those detained. HRANA also reported 337 cases of forced confessions and 11,051 summonses. According to the report, protests were recorded at 676 locations across 210 cities and in all 31 provinces.</p><p>In its forty-sixth-day report, HRANA highlighted three main trends: the continuation of targeted arrests, the imposition of new conditions for the release of some detainees, and an increase in international responses to the repression of protesters in Iran.</p><h3>Testimony, Memory, Resistance: Child-Rights Activists’ Statement Against the Systematic Killing of Children</h3><p>A collective statement by child-sector activists inside Iran argues that what happened to children and teenagers in the January protests cannot be explained away as “individual error” or “exceptional circumstances.” It points to recurring patterns across cities — direct gunfire at those under 18, consistent injury patterns, wide-scale arrests, beatings and violence during detention, forced confessions, and unfair trials — as evidence of an organized practice by official power structures.</p><p>Citing the Coordinating Council of Iranian Teachers’ Trade Associations, the statement says more than 200 students — “the number of students in an entire school” — have been killed in the recent protests, and insists that children must not be reduced to statistics: names and memories must be safeguarded, because memory is the precondition of justice. It calls for the immediate, unconditional release of imprisoned children; urges teachers, school administrators, education staff, civil institutions, and social activists to use professional and union capacities to defend students (including strikes and refusing cooperation with detention and case-building mechanisms); condemns any political current that deliberately pushes teenagers into deadly situations or turns them into propaganda capital; and rejects war-mongering, arguing that children are always the first victims of war — often through fear and psychological collapse even before bombs.</p><h3>Release Conditional on Attending a State Rally</h3><p>In Shahin Shahr, Isfahan, the families of at least three detainees said that despite posting bail, their loved ones’ release has been halted. According to these families, judicial authorities have made release conditional on signing a pledge requiring the individuals to attend the 22 Bahman rally (February 11, 2026), take photos and videos of their attendance, and submit them to the relevant authorities.</p><p>Families were told that if the pledge is not signed — or if its terms are not fulfilled — the individuals may be re-arrested, even though the legal process of posting bail had already been completed.</p><h3>Mass Arrests Among Teachers, Labor Activists, Political Figures, and Citizens</h3><p>As security pressure continues, at least eight teachers have been arrested in connection with the 1404 protests: Mastoureh Narimani in Ahvaz, Amir Rahimi in Azna, Sattar Zarei in Khomeini Shahr, Ali Shamayeli in Sonqor, Shervin Hamideh in Karaj, Farhad Rahmani in Takestan, Ali Imani Motlagh in Lorestan, and Masoud Kiani in Shahabad (as reported by HRANA).</p><p>Alongside the detention of 136 students, these cases indicate continuing pressure on the education sector, which remains one of the central targets of security crackdowns.</p><p>According to HRANA, arrests of citizens across several provinces have continued as well. In Bojnord, Soroush Dabir-Mansh and Khalil Rasouli; in Lahijan, Sajed Khabbazi; in Langarud, Mehdi Haghjou — a 17-year-old student; and in Rasht, Milad Didar were arrested by security forces.</p><p>In Dehdasht, Jamal Pourmandfar was arrested on 20 Dey 1404 (January 10, 2026), transferred to the city’s prison, and remains in legal limbo.</p><p>In Tehran, Mohsen Aminzadeh, a member of the Reformists’ Front, was arrested on 18 Bahman 1404 (February 7, 2026) by IRGC Intelligence agents. His lawyer said he is being held in solitary confinement and that the charges brought against him have no legal basis.</p><p>At the same time, Azar Mansouri, Ebrahim Asgharzadeh, Hossein Karroubi, and Ali Shakouri-Rad have also been arrested — suggesting an expanding crackdown to include long-standing political activists and figures.</p><p>Yaser Ahmadi-Nejad, a labor activist and dismissed worker at the National Iranian Drilling Company, was arrested on 16 Bahman 1404 (February 5, 2026) and transferred to Dehdasht Prison. He had previously acted as an independent representative of workers pursuing labor demands and had criticized contractors in the oil industry.</p><p>While the authorities have attempted to produce a single, uniform narrative of the 1404 protests and their violent repression — broadcast through state media — this narrative has found little audience beyond loyalist supporters and those with a vested interest in the regime’s survival. Censorship has cast its shadow over media and platforms more than ever; saying the wrong sentence can have severe consequences. During the 22 Bahman ceremony (February 11, 2026), a presenter on Hamoun TV said “Death to Khamenei” live on air, prompting an immediate cut of the broadcast. Afterward, the channel’s broadcast director was dismissed, the program’s operator and supervisor were suspended, and other staff were referred to a disciplinary committee.</p><h3>European Parliament Response to the Crackdown</h3><p>Internationally, the European Parliament held a session on “systematic repression, inhuman conditions, and arbitrary detentions in Iran.” Representatives discussed the intensification of repression, mass arrests, poor detention conditions, and the denial of medical care and legal access for prisoners.</p><p>A draft text presented at the session emphasized the immediate and unconditional release of protesters and political prisoners, international bodies’ access to detention centers, and accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations.</p><h3>Judiciary Statements on Protest-Related Cases</h3><p>The First Deputy Head of Iran’s judiciary said that some protest-related cases are at the investigation stage, some are in court, and some are at the appeal stage. He stressed that those who have “committed unrest” will be dealt with “without leniency.”</p><p>At the same time, the judiciary’s media center stated that cases are still under review and that no verdict has reached a final, enforceable stage.</p><h3>Iran’s Response to an Israel Hayom Report</h3><p>In response to a report by the Israeli newspaper Israel Hayom, which claimed that “thousands have been secretly executed,” the Islamic Republic’s judiciary called the report a “fabricated falsehood” and said such claims were intended to portray Iran as deceptive in negotiations.</p><p>Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, also responded by claiming that no executions have taken place in Iran after the recent protests, no judicial process has concluded, and more than 2,000 prisoners have been pardoned.</p><p>Writing on X, he said that whenever media outlets linked to Miriam Adelson push a sensational narrative, one should ask whom it serves. Adelson is an American billionaire and the owner of the Israel Hayom media group.</p><p>The newspaper had previously quoted diplomatic sources claiming that Iran had “deceived Washington twice” in negotiations aimed at preventing a U.S. military strike and in Oman talks.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a5f378a2cb3d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The IRGC: State Terrorism at the Heart of the Islamic Republic]]></title>
            <link>https://zamaneh.medium.com/the-irgc-state-terrorism-at-the-heart-of-the-islamic-republic-b0eacf953a34?source=rss-b584c7f96a06------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b0eacf953a34</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[islamic-republic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[irgc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elham-fathi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zamaneh Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Feb 2026 16:01:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-12T16:01:41.507Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Elham Fathi — <a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37750/">5</a><a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37750/">February2026</a></p><p><strong><em>The EU’s designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization recasts the Islamic Republic as a system sustained by organized violence — and opens new legal tools to challenge state terror and impunity.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/0*RORcrYF5ZUdcYhKt.jpg" /></figure><p>The European Union’s decision to formally designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a “terrorist organization” is not merely a news headline or a legal measure; it is a decisive moment in redefining how Iran’s power structure relates to the international order. Adopted by consensus among the foreign ministers of the EU’s 27 member states and announced officially by Kaja Kallas, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the decision amounts to acknowledging a fundamental reality: the Islamic Republic is not sustainable without organized violence, systematic repression, and state terrorism.</p><p>The move comes at a time when the Islamic Republic’s domestic political legitimacy has sharply eroded, and repeated social uprisings — especially following the large-scale killing of protesters — have pushed the rupture between society and the state to an irreversible point. As the backbone of this order, the IRGC is now defined as a terrorist organization not only in the language of opposition forces, but also within Europe’s formal legal framework. This shift in naming carries profound legal, economic, political, and strategic consequences.</p><p>Within this framework, Kallas explicitly placed the IRGC alongside widely recognized terrorist groups such as Hamas, al-Qaeda, and ISIS, emphasizing that the basis for the designation is not only the IRGC’s cross-border activities, but also its direct role in the bloody suppression of protesting citizens inside Iran. Politically and conceptually, this comparison marks a serious break with earlier narratives that sought to exempt the IRGC from the definition of terrorism by treating it as a “formal institution of a state.” With this position, the EU effectively defines state violence against citizens as equivalent to organized non-state terrorism, redrawing the boundary between internal repression and terrorism.</p><h3>From an ideological force to a parallel state</h3><p>The IRGC was formed in the early years after the 1979 Revolution as an ideological force to protect the newly established system. But over time — and especially after the end of the Iran–Iraq War — it began a process of transformation.</p><p>What emerged in subsequent decades was not a conventional military force, but a parallel state that monopolized military, security, economic, media, and cultural spheres. From the 1990s onward, by exploiting rent-driven privatizations, receiving major state projects without tender, and gaining control over financial and logistical institutions, the IRGC became the single largest actor in Iran’s political economy.</p><p>Its economic headquarters, subsidiary companies, foundations, and quasi-private networks effectively removed a large portion of the national economy from competitive circulation. This process did not obviously create “productive development”; it deepened an opaque economy, undermined domestic production, and expanded structural poverty. In this sense, the IRGC should be understood as a multi-layered cartel of power — an institution that simultaneously possesses the instruments of violence, capital accumulation, and ideological control. This combination has made the IRGC an actor whose survival depends on the continuation of crisis, sanctions, and repression.</p><h3>Violence as the governing logic</h3><p>Designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization implicitly consolidates the proposition that violence in the Islamic Republic is not an exception or a deviation, but the central logic of governance. Street killings of protesters, direct fire on citizens, systematic torture in detention centers, rape, forced confessions, political executions, and the repression of women and sexual and ethnic minorities are all components of a coherent apparatus of state violence.</p><p>The IRGC, in this architecture, functions as the executive arm of that violence. Its organic ties to the judiciary, the Interior Ministry, and the office of the Supreme Leader show that these crimes are not the product of individual decisions or rogue behavior; they take place within a planned political rationality.</p><p>The inclusion of officials such as the interior minister and the prosecutor general on the EU’s human rights sanctions lists is an official acknowledgment of this structural linkage. In this sense, state terrorism operates not only against citizens inside the country but also regionally and transnationally — from paramilitary networks to extraterritorial operations. Designating the IRGC defines this continuum of internal and external violence within a single framework.</p><h3>Legal consequences inside Europe</h3><p>Placing the IRGC on the EU’s list of terrorist organizations entails a set of binding legal consequences that distinguish it from symbolic sanctions: all assets, accounts, and economic interests of the IRGC and its affiliated networks within EU jurisdiction are to be seized; any financial, technical, logistical, or service support for the IRGC becomes a criminal offense for individuals and companies and is subject to prosecution; IRGC members and operatives are barred from entering European territory and prior residencies are revoked; European police and judicial bodies are obliged to identify, detain, and cooperate on the extradition of individuals linked to the organization; and any propaganda activity or symbolic promotion in support of the IRGC is criminalized under counter-terrorism laws.</p><p>These measures structurally paralyze the IRGC’s financial, media, and political networks in Europe and reduce its ability to reproduce international legitimacy.</p><h3>A different kind of sanction — and Europe’s contradiction</h3><p>One of the most fundamental critiques of sanctions policy over past decades has been its devastating effects on people’s daily lives while simultaneously strengthening the repressive apparatus. Broad sanctions, by lowering currency value, driving inflation, and increasing unemployment, shifted the costs of crisis onto the lower classes, while also expanding opportunities for rent distribution within the power structure.</p><p>Designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization is of a different nature: it directly targets the engine of repression and accumulation. Cutting the IRGC off from Europe’s banking system, financial markets, and the SWIFT interbank messaging network strikes at the vital arteries of the security economy. If fully implemented, this policy could weaken the IRGC’s financial and operational capacity without directly transferring the burden onto society.</p><p>Yet despite the importance of this decision, EU policy is not free of contradiction. Experience shows that human rights have repeatedly been sacrificed to geopolitical calculations and economic interests. There is a risk that designating the IRGC could be reduced to a tool of diplomatic bargaining. Europe’s historical responsibility requires turning this decision into a durable, transparent, non-negotiable policy. Any exemption, exception, or back-channel negotiation would strip the measure of its radical substance.</p><h3>An opening for movements — not a substitute for them</h3><p>This decision creates new opportunities for justice-seeking movements, labor forces, the women’s movement, and progressive opposition currents. Fresh legal tools are now available to break the impunity of those responsible for repression and to challenge the regime’s influence networks. But this opportunity becomes real only if the struggle against the IRGC is not reduced to a purely security project. The issue is not the removal of a single institution, but the dismantling of an order that has made violence the logic of administering society.</p><p>A progressive politics here means moving beyond the false binary of “reform or sanctions.” The IRGC is the material embodiment of the nexus of capital, ideology, and violence. Confronting it is inseparable from the struggle for social justice, gender equality, and genuine democracy. Designating the IRGC can become a lever to deepen international solidarity with domestic movements — not a replacement for them.</p><p>The EU’s formal designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization is a belated but necessary acknowledgment of the Islamic Republic’s real nature. If accompanied by sustained political will and continuous pressure from social movements, it can become one of the turning points in weakening state terrorism in Iran. Ultimately, the IRGC is not only a terrorist organization; it is another name for an order that has taken society’s life, dignity, and future hostage. Dismantling this order is the precondition for any emancipatory and democratic project in Iran — one that will not be realized without social justice, gender equality, and an end to the political economy of repression.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b0eacf953a34" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Summoned, Detained, Beaten: A 21-Year-Old Rapper’s Testimony From Inside Iran]]></title>
            <link>https://zamaneh.medium.com/summoned-detained-beaten-a-21-year-old-rappers-testimony-from-inside-iran-91449fcb50cc?source=rss-b584c7f96a06------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/91449fcb50cc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-protest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bangard]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[amirmohammad-rajabi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-protests-2026]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zamaneh Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Feb 2026 12:47:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-12T12:47:51.342Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Zamaneh Media — <a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37742/">5</a><a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37742/">February2026</a></p><p><strong><em>A 21-year-old rapper from Astara recounts being summoned, detained, beaten, and pressured to sign forced confessions after joining the January nationwide protests.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/0*E3En7YR5pLGqfTEy.png" /></figure><p>A young composer and rap singer from Astara has provided a detailed written testimony about his participation in the January nationwide protests and what happened to him afterward in detention.</p><p>Amirmohammad Rajabi, 21, a lyricist, composer, and rap performer (known as “Bangard”) and a construction worker living in Astara County in Gilan Province, describes his presence at the protests and the sequence of events that followed.</p><p>According to his account, he attended protest gatherings in Astara on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, 17, 18, and 19 Dey 1404 (January 7, 8, and 9, 2026). He says that on Wednesday a gathering in front of the governor’s office was dispersed with tear gas. On Thursday, security forces fired pellet rounds at protesters and many were injured. On Friday — unlike the previous days — he says there were no Basij or police forces present; instead, IRGC forces arrived and fired live ammunition at protesters, leaving a number of people killed and arrested.</p><h3>Summons and arrest</h3><p>Rajabi says that on Tuesday, 30 Dey 1404 (January 20, 2026), he received a call from a number labeled “Private Number.” The caller introduced himself as an agent of the Intelligence Ministry and told him to come at 1:00 p.m. for “an official conversation,” assuring him he would return home afterward. Rajabi says he trusted this promise and went to the location.</p><p>He recounts that upon entering, officers confiscated all his personal belongings and subjected him to an intensive body search. He was immediately handcuffed and taken to a small room where, he says, ornate, high-backed sofas — what he calls “royal-style” furniture — were arranged around the room, and portraits of Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei, along with the flag of the Islamic Republic, were mounted on the wall.</p><p>In that room, he says, he was ordered to sit on a school bench facing the wall, not to turn around, and not to look around. Rajabi recounts that when he heard the door open, he instinctively turned his head — and was struck violently in the face. The blow, he says, dislocated his jaw and caused such severe pain that he could not speak. Despite this, he says, they demanded that he talk, and when he could not respond he was insulted and pressured further.</p><h3>Interrogation, beatings, and pressure to confess</h3><p>Afterward, he says, a form for recording his personal information was placed in front of him, which he filled out. Agents then demanded that he write, in detail, where he had been and what he had done on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Rajabi says he wrote everything that had happened.</p><p>He adds that interrogators then referred to a call from a number with the 0991 prefix that had contacted him on Friday night, saying the caller had reported being “hit by pellets.” Rajabi confirms that the call was from one of his friends, but says that during interrogation he refused to identify the caller and withheld the person’s name and address — denying the call altogether.</p><p>According to his testimony, after this refusal one agent grabbed him from behind by the collar of his jacket, dragged him, and caused his head to hit the ground. He was then blindfolded and taken to another room. There, he says, a second agent was present who, after hearing the interrogator’s report, said: “Throw him in the detention center — he’ll remember everything.”</p><p>Rajabi says he was held for four days and beaten daily. He emphasizes that despite physical and psychological pressure, he refused to provide information. He says interrogators threatened him, including with being charged with <em>moharebeh</em> (an Iranian legal-religious charge often translated as “enmity against God,” historically used for severe political/security offenses and punishable by death), and repeatedly used statements such as: “Do you know what your sentence is? Execution,” and “Say goodbye to life and to your mother and father.” He says they tried to force him into confessing to acts such as setting a bank on fire, making Molotov cocktails, and physically fighting officers.</p><p>He says these accusations were written out in front of him, in the interrogators’ handwriting, and he was told to sign them. Each time he refused, he says, he was met with slaps and blows.</p><p>He also describes the food in detention as “extremely limited,” saying he was given only one meal per day — no more than a piece of barbari bread about the size of his palm.</p><h3>Conditional release and family kept in the dark</h3><p>According to Rajabi, he was ultimately released, but only after being made to sign a written undertaking pledging “not to take action against the Islamic Republic” and to cooperate with security and police bodies if requested. He says he signed this undertaking “under coercion” and was then freed after his personal belongings were returned.</p><p>He stresses that throughout his detention he was not allowed to contact his family, and his family had no information about his condition. He says that after his release he learned that his parents and friends went daily to the Intelligence Office, but officials denied his detention and even denied that he was there.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=91449fcb50cc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Iran’s January Uprising: Mass Killings, Child Deaths, and a Deepening Detention Crisis]]></title>
            <link>https://zamaneh.medium.com/irans-january-uprising-mass-killings-child-deaths-and-a-deepening-detention-crisis-201212a48eb8?source=rss-b584c7f96a06------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/201212a48eb8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[protest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-protest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-protests-2026]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zamaneh Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 07 Feb 2026 14:52:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-07T14:52:09.793Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Zamaneh Media — <a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37739/">5</a><a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37739/">February2026</a></p><p><strong><em>Rights monitors report thousands killed and tens of thousands arrested in Iran’s January uprising, including over 160 children, amid forced confessions, medical intimidation, and rising execution fears.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/0*NoZ8POBk1cKhJAq9.jpg" /><figcaption><a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/AFP__20260127__MEI-IRN-Me-PISIJ-20260110-061__v2__MidRes__ProtestsInShirazIranJanuar.jpg">A protester shows a spent bullet casing during a demonstration in Shiraz, Iran, on January 10, 2026. The nationwide demonstrations, triggered in late December by anger over economic hardship in Tehrans Grand Bazaar, spread across cities with slogans turning from economic grievances to political and anti-government calls. The protests, met by a violent crackdown rights groups say killed thousands, were further shrouded by an internet blackout and severe restrictions on information, limiting reliable accounts of the crackdown. (Photo by Maria / Middle East Images via AFP)</a></figcaption></figure><p>As repression continues, HRANA (the Human Rights Activists News Agency) reported that by the end of Wednesday, 15 Bahman 1404 (February 4, 2026), the total number of deaths linked to the crackdown had reached 6,883.</p><p>HRANA’s breakdown indicates:</p><ul><li>6,445 of those killed were protesters.</li><li>164 were children under 18.</li><li>214 were government-affiliated forces, and 60 were non-protesting civilians.</li><li>11,280 additional cases remain under review.</li></ul><p>HRANA also reported 11,021 civilian injuries and described a continued pattern of lethal force and escalating securitization.</p><h3>Children in the crosshairs</h3><p>The reported child death toll has become a central marker of the uprising’s human-rights catastrophe. Alongside HRANA’s figure of 164 children killed, former political prisoner and teachers’ union activist Mohammad Habibi published the names of slain students, describing them as the residents of “five empty classrooms.” He wrote that the list had already passed 160 children — “160 names, 160 dreams, 160 stolen futures” — and warned that new names continue to appear, underscoring the scale and persistence of child casualties.</p><h3>Mass arrests, summonses, and enforced uncertainty</h3><p>HRANA reported 50,842 arrests by 15 Bahman 1404 (February 4, 2026), alongside 11,046 summonses and 307 cases of forced confessions. It also cited at least 109 student arrests.</p><p>On the ground, HRANA documented ongoing scattered and mass detentions across multiple provinces — including Tehran, Fars, Ilam, Gilan, Kermanshah, and Kurdistan — and noted continued lack of information about the whereabouts of some detainees, including several women in Tehran. In one collective case, the arrest of 265 citizens in Bandar Anzali and Langarud was reported.</p><h3>Detention conditions: beatings, forced confessions, and denial of medical care</h3><p>Multiple accounts point to detention as a second front of repression. HRANA cited political prisoner Heshmatollah Tabarzadi, who warned from Isfahan Central Prison about detainees with serious injuries — reportedly caused by live ammunition and shrapnel — being denied medical treatment.</p><p>In parallel, the Iran Human Rights organization warned that the post-crackdown phase has entered an “emergency” stage for detainees, with thousands at serious risk in official and unofficial detention sites. The organization reported that more than 40,000 people have been arrested in connection with the protests, with many held under the control of the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence, cut off from family and legal counsel and outside meaningful judicial oversight.</p><p>Iran Human Rights emphasized three acute threats:</p><ul><li>Death of injured detainees due to deliberate medical deprivation or torture.</li><li>Allegations of secret executions without due process (reports described as credible but still under review).</li><li>A wave of death sentences following rushed, deeply unfair trials.</li></ul><p>It also noted the systematic use of security charges such as <em>moharebeh</em> (a charge often translated as “enmity against God,” used in Iran for serious political/security accusations and potentially punishable by death), “terrorism,” and “cooperation with the enemy,” alongside widespread state broadcasting of coerced confessions.</p><h3>Militarization and information control</h3><p>Beyond arrests and killings, a wider architecture of control has taken shape. HRANA highlighted sustained internet disruptions, with many users reporting severe slowdowns and repeated disconnections. Data cited from Kentik indicated that internet traffic remained about 50% below pre-blackout levels, while a deputy communications minister acknowledged that the network had “not yet returned to normal,” describing disruptions as beyond the ministry’s control — further deepening uncertainty and limiting documentation and access to information.</p><p>In the political-security sphere, remarks by MP Esmail Kowsari drew attention after he said the Supreme National Security Council decided that police, Basij, and the IRGC would enter the field “armed” to “neutralize” the protests — comments that, set against casualty and detention figures, reinforced fears of further escalation.</p><h3>Society’s response: teachers, doctors, artists, and child-rights advocates</h3><p>Reactions have widened across professional and cultural spheres:</p><ul><li>In education and civil society, Habibi’s publication of students’ names framed the child death toll as an assault on the right to life and education, insisting that the victims would not be forgotten and that demands for justice remain alive.</li><li>In the medical sphere, Iran’s Supreme Council of the Medical System issued a statement warning about threats and pressure on healthcare workers and calling for their protection — reflecting growing concern that treating injured protesters is being obstructed or criminalized.</li><li>In child rights advocacy, the Komak Network and more than 20 civil and labor organizations issued a formal letter to the head of Iran’s Prisons Organization demanding the immediate and unconditional release of detainees under 18, especially students. Citing Iran’s own child- and juvenile-procedure laws, the signatories argued that detention in punitive environments can cause irreversible psychological, social, and educational harm. The network also announced readiness to provide psychosocial support, social-work services, legal counseling, and pro bono legal representation after release. Copies of the letter were sent to multiple state bodies, and follow-ups reportedly continue.</li><li>In the cultural sphere, the Fajr Film Festival became a site of public tension and visible dissent, including objections by prominent figures and publicized refusals to participate, signaling how cultural institutions are being pulled into the wider social rupture created by the crackdown.</li></ul><p>Across these developments, the pattern is consistent: lethal street repression has been followed by mass detention, coercive confession practices, medical intimidation, and heightened fears of executions — while public resistance expands among teachers, child-rights defenders, medical bodies, and cultural figures, even as internet disruption constrains visibility and documentation.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=201212a48eb8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Under Threat, At the Table: Has Trump Dropped the Strike Option?]]></title>
            <link>https://zamaneh.medium.com/under-threat-at-the-table-has-trump-dropped-the-strike-option-8196d2f2f140?source=rss-b584c7f96a06------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8196d2f2f140</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ali-rasouli]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iranvsusa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zamaneh Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Feb 2026 13:38:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-06T13:38:55.500Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Ali Rasouli — <a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37746/">5</a><a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37746/">February2026</a></p><p><strong><em>Amid heightened U.S. military buildup, Tehran signals possible talks. The author argues Trump hasn’t retreated — pressure and diplomacy move together, while Iran negotiates from unprecedented weakness.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/0*rtVUow6z9xocWNmM.jpg" /></figure><p>In days when the U.S. military posture around Iran has reached its broadest level in recent years, signs of diplomatic movement between Tehran and Washington have appeared at the same time — signs that have once again brought a key question to the center of political and media debate: Has Donald Trump backed away from the option of a military strike on the Islamic Republic, or are these moves merely part of a maximum-pressure strategy designed to impose a security agreement?</p><p>The first serious spark for these speculations was Ali Larijani’s post on X last Friday. Larijani said, after traveling to Moscow and meeting Vladimir Putin, that the frameworks for negotiating with the United States had been set. He wrote this in response to reports that were announcing the start of a U.S. military attack “this hour or the next.”</p><p>But the second report suggesting this diplomatic track was real came from a source that is usually the last place one would expect such news: Tasnim News Agency, affiliated with the IRGC. On Monday, 13 Bahman 1404 (February 2, 2026), citing “an informed source,” Tasnim wrote that negotiations between Iran and the United States — at the level of senior officials — might begin in the coming days. According to the source, while the time and place have not been finalized, the potential talks would be held between Abbas Araghchi and Steve Witkoff, Donald Trump’s special envoy.</p><p>Almost simultaneously, Esmail Baghaei, the Islamic Republic’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, spoke — more cautiously than Tasnim — of reviewing “various diplomatic paths.” He said Tehran is examining the details of messages exchanged through regional countries and hopes these channels will “reach concrete results in the coming days.”</p><p>Araghchi also said on Sunday, in an interview with CNN, that “rebuilding trust” is necessary, emphasizing that for meaningful negotiations Iran must first move beyond a state of deep distrust.</p><p>On the other side, Donald Trump, responding to journalists, said Iran is “seriously talking to us.”</p><h3>Negotiation Under the Shadow of an Aircraft Carrier</h3><p>These diplomatic signals, however, are not unfolding in a vacuum. Over the past weeks, Washington has reinforced its forces in the Middle East in an unusually expansive way. The dispatch of the aircraft carrier <em>Abraham Lincoln</em>, the deployment of fighter jets, refueling aircraft, air-defense systems, and Israel’s heightened state of readiness all paint a clear picture of the level of tension.</p><p>Trump himself has repeatedly stressed that “time is running out” and that if no agreement is reached, the military option will be used. Even after Ali Khamenei’s stark warning on Sunday, 12 Bahman 1404 (February 1, 2026) — that any attack on Iran would lead to a regional war — Trump said: “I hope we reach a deal. If not, we’ll see what happens.”</p><p>This simultaneity of negotiation and threat is not unusual. It is diplomacy under the shadow of force.</p><h3>America’s Conditions: Negotiation or Surrender?</h3><p>In recent days, various outlets have reported four core U.S. conditions for any negotiation or agreement with the Islamic Republic — conditions repeatedly raised after the 12-day war:</p><p>First: the complete handover of the stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium;<br>Second: dismantling the enrichment program, or at least a total halt;<br>Third: reducing range and limiting the number of ballistic missiles;<br>Fourth: ending support for proxy groups in the region.</p><p>Some outlets and political figures have also spoken of a fifth condition: recognizing Israel. Yet under current circumstances this seems so far-fetched that it appears more like an additional pressure lever — meant to guarantee the realization of the four main conditions.</p><p>From Washington’s vantage point, the message is clear: Tehran is not in a position to bargain, nor can it demand meaningful reciprocal concessions. Put simply, it has no option but to accept the conditions or face military consequences. Even if there is no strike, time is not on the Islamic Republic’s side. The economic and security crisis — in all its dimensions — has tightened around the regime’s throat so severely that, absent a remedy and a fundamental shift, even the “possibility of war” could have consequences on the scale of war itself. What consequence? The collapse of the Islamic Republic.</p><p>In this dire situation, Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, and Russia have begun efforts to open a diplomatic channel between Tehran and Washington. Turkey has even proposed hosting direct Iran–U.S. talks in Ankara, and media close to the IRGC have written about the possibility of such a meeting taking place.</p><p>That IRGC-affiliated outlets are now leading the way in publishing news of a meeting reflects how profoundly conditions have changed. Until a few months ago, these media and IRGC-linked figures either treated “negotiating with the Great Satan” as a taboo, or — at best — insisted that any talks must be “indirect,” framed as a way to prove to “West-worshippers” that America is not negotiable. But tensions have risen so high that even defenders of confrontation have acknowledged the need to test the negotiating track.</p><h3>Iran, More Empty-Handed Than Ever</h3><p>But the main question is: what does the negotiating table look like for the Islamic Republic? The short answer: disastrous.</p><p>Iran’s nuclear program has effectively been halted after U.S. and Israeli attacks in the 12-day war of Khordad and Tir 1404 (May 22–July 22, 2025), even though Tehran has not officially accepted its shutdown. The Islamic Republic’s proxy forces in Iraq and Lebanon are in their weakest position in recent years. Syria is no longer in Tehran’s hands, and the ring of military and political pressure around Yemen’s Houthis tightens day by day.</p><p>More important than all of this, the Islamic Republic — through the killing of protesters in Dey 1404 (December 22, 2025–January 20, 2026) — has also lost the last remnants of any possibility of even a relative coexistence with Iranian society. For a large part of society, the system of guardianship (velayat) has neither the capacity to govern the country, nor moral and political legitimacy, nor even a minimal potential for reform. A widespread perception has formed that the Islamic Republic, to survive, will resort to any level of violence and crime.</p><p>This profound shift in society’s outlook has had major political consequences. Regardless of what you and I think about a military strike, we face a complex situation: some things have become as clear as day, yet disagreements over the route out are deep.</p><p>A segment of Iranians — inside the country and in the diaspora — have concluded that a foreign military strike, despite all the catastrophes it would bring, may be the only way to end the cycle of crime. Another segment has fallen silent, but is certain that the Islamic Republic’s continuation will produce catastrophes greater than January massacre. A large portion of those opposed to a military strike also describe the Islamic Republic as a criminal regime that must be dismantled — though by relying on the internal capacities of Iran’s transformation-seeking society.</p><p>In contrast, a group of supporters of the Islamic Republic — both in religious form and in the non-religious “Axis of Resistance” form — defend the regime with an apocalyptic outlook. They argue that if this regime and Ali Khamenei are gone, the world will end. One claims Iran will be partitioned and imperialism will tear out the throat of the entire world after the defeat of Khamenei and his regime; another claims that satanic forces will dominate the property and honor of Iranians.</p><h3>Negotiation — for What?</h3><p>Under these conditions, what is negotiation supposed to achieve for the Islamic Republic, other than the common saying that “moving from one pillar to another brings relief”?</p><p>Negotiating with empty hands — over the very components that constitute the foundations of the security power of a system facing an existential crisis — what outcome can it have? If, to avert war, the Islamic Republic makes its missile, nuclear, and proxy capabilities “negotiable,” what will remain so that a few months later it will not once again face a military buildup around it?</p><p>From Trump’s perspective, the answer is clear: Tehran is not in a position to ask for anything beyond “not being attacked.” We do not know exactly what assessment Khamenei has of himself and his system. But there is one big “if”: if, given the intensity of current crises, Tehran has accepted Trump’s narrative of events, then negotiation might temporarily alter the war equation.</p><p>There is also an “empirical if”: if Khamenei — as we know him — insists on his own reading, he may still hold a view similar to what he expressed in Dey 1396 (December 22, 2017–January 20, 2018) about the United States and Donald Trump:</p><p>Reagan was more of an actor than this current individual (Trump) — stronger and, of course, more rational — and he in fact acted against the Iranian people and shot down our passenger aircraft. Yet now he is being questioned at the gate of divine punishment, while the Islamic Republic continues to grow and advance with greater authority. This path will continue under the current U.S. president (Donald Trump) as well, and their longing to see the Islamic Republic removed or weakened will remain unfulfilled. Some American officials, with outward flexibility — covering their iron hand with a velvet glove — managed at one point to distract some of us, but they were quickly exposed, and today the reality of America’s corrupt intentions toward Islam and the Islamic Republic has become fully clear.</p><p>The “Islamic Republic of 2017” was in a fundamentally different situation from the “Islamic Republic of 2026,” but its leader is known for not acknowledging error and not backing down in moments of crisis. Have the blows of recent years and the decline of the Islamic Republic’s power transformed Khamenei? Unlikely.</p><p>If Khamenei’s view has not changed, then the arrangement on the Islamic Republic’s side is clear.</p><p>This leaves the American side — and the question: has Trump backed off? The evidence suggests no. What we see today is not retreat, but the simultaneous use of two classic tools of U.S. foreign policy: maximum military pressure and the opening of a narrow diplomatic window.</p><p>On the Islamic Republic’s side, even this level of tactical backing down (if it can be called that at all) has had no precedent under Ali Khamenei’s leadership. Perhaps the Supreme Leader’s reading of the current position could make the impossible possible. But even then, the riddle of “the day after” remains unanswered: If we give these things and a few weeks or months later they come after us again, then what? If we trade these things but remain trapped under sanctions and economic suffocation, then what? If we surrender these things but the people pour back into the streets, then what?</p><p>The Islamic Republic today is in a situation where its choices have been reduced to two options: hard confrontation or unconditional surrender. Is there a third way? For now, no sign of such a third way is visible on the horizon.</p><p>Negotiation may buy time, but it does not appear capable of solving, in any fundamental way, the multi-variable equation of “legitimacy, security, and survival” for the “Islamic Republic of Khamenei.” From this perspective, it seems Trump has not backed off — he has simply not pulled the trigger yet.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8196d2f2f140" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Violence, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Narratives in Iran’s Protests]]></title>
            <link>https://zamaneh.medium.com/violence-ambiguity-and-the-engineering-of-narratives-in-irans-protests-2d832ff6a48d?source=rss-b584c7f96a06------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2d832ff6a48d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-protest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[helia-rahbari]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-protests-2026]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zamaneh Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Feb 2026 11:07:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-05T11:07:53.165Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Helia Rahbari — <a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37730/">4</a><a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37730/">February2026</a></p><p>Edward Said, in his book Orientalism, examines the decisive role of narratives in structures of power. In his view — particularly in the realm of media — power belongs to those who are able to impose their own narrative as the dominant one. In the age of media wars, social networks, artificial intelligence, and fake accounts, narratives are abundant while truth is scarce. An avalanche of images, statistics, and conflicting stories increasingly blurs the line between reality and propaganda, making the task of discerning truth more difficult for the public than ever before.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/0*w2N_b5ct6KFVi7nt.jpg" /></figure><p>Edward Said, in his book Orientalism, examines the decisive role of narratives in structures of power. In his view — particularly in the realm of media — power belongs to those who are able to impose their own narrative as the dominant one. In the age of media wars, social networks, artificial intelligence, and fake accounts, narratives are abundant while truth is scarce. An avalanche of images, statistics, and conflicting stories increasingly blurs the line between reality and propaganda, making the task of discerning truth more difficult for the public than ever before.</p><p>Images and reports emerging from Iran point to an unprecedented level of violence and repression. The scenes are shocking, the number of casualties is high, and access to verified information grows more difficult by the day. Under such conditions, not only is the exact number of victims unclear, but the persistence of this ambiguity appears deliberate and may remain unresolved for a long time.</p><p>The Iranian authorities describe the protests as “engineered” and the product of U.S. and Mossad interference — an accusation that has been repeatedly and casually leveled against political opponents over the past forty-seven years. At the same time, vastly different figures regarding the number of those killed circulate in media outlets and across social networks. The government has published the names of fewer than three thousand people in official newspapers, a figure that does not correspond with field observations or eyewitness testimonies coming from inside Iran. In contrast, various individuals and groups cite much higher numbers, ranging from 12,000 to as many as 500,000.</p><p>This statistical ambiguity has itself become a new battlefield of competing narratives. Some of these figures are used as tools to justify a potential U.S. or Israeli military attack on Iran. Arguments frequently seen on social media claim that “the Islamic Republic killed more of its own citizens in two days than Israel killed in Gaza in two years; therefore, the cost of an Israeli or American military strike is lower than the cost of the Islamic Republic’s survival.” Such claims are not only statistically false and logically fallacious — given that Israel has killed far more people than it officially acknowledges and is actively erasing the traces of what amounts to genocide — but they also demonstrate how internal repression is repurposed to prepare public opinion for foreign intervention.</p><p>In this context, the role of major Persian-language media outlets based outside Iran has become highly controversial. Media organizations such as Iran International and BBC Persian have been accused of selectively amplifying certain slogans to portray an exaggerated level of popularity for Reza Pahlavi — who maintains close relations with Israel and has openly called for military action against Iran. This narrative does not align with field data or independent research.</p><p>In an analytical report, the French newspaper Le Figaro examined coordinated online networks and highlighted the role of fake accounts and organized digital operations</p><p>in promoting specific political figures within the Iranian opposition. Many of these accounts were created in 2023, remained dormant, and became active only in 2025 with the onset of protests. The report shows how mass, synchronized reposting produces a distorted image of popular support. Another Le Figaro report, drawing on research by Social Forensics, identifies thousands of fake accounts and AI-generated activities used to boost Reza Pahlavi’s visibility on social media, including more than 4,765 active fake accounts and manipulated datasets. These findings align with a Haaretz investigation published in October 2025, which revealed that Israel has been waging an influence campaign portraying Reza Pahlavi as a popular leader inside Iran.</p><p>This article does not aim to provide definitive answers regarding the exact number of those killed or the true extent of Reza Pahlavi’s popularity. Pahlavi is a 67-year-old man who has lived in exile for forty-seven years and is the son of a monarch who was forced out of Iran once during the nationalization of the oil industry in 1953 and again in 1979 following the revolution. From a legal standpoint, he does not hold the title of “prince,” as the constitution that designated his father as king and him as crown prince was abolished in the 1979 referendum, rendering all royal titles legally void.</p><p>Establishing the truth is the responsibility of time and independent fact-finding commissions. What is crucial in the meantime is to grasp the complexity of the situation in Iran. On one hand, there is an authoritarian regime that has made ordinary life nearly impossible for millions through political repression, runaway</p><p>inflation, and destructive economic policies. In response to legitimate protests, the state has reacted brutally, killing thousands of civilians and detaining tens of thousands more. On the other hand, there are clear signs and growing evidence of foreign intervention, particularly by Israel, trying to manipulate these protests.</p><p>This dual reality underscores a tragic paradox: while Iranians are risking their lives to demand basic rights and freedoms, their struggle is being exploited by external powers seeking to advance geopolitical objectives. Any attempt to understand the situation without recognizing both the domestic repression and the external manipulation risks oversimplifying the crisis. It is a conflict where authoritarian brutality, legitimate dissent, and international interference intersect, creating a web of violence, propaganda, and uncertainty</p><p>What can we do? Human rights estimates indicate that prior to the latest wave of protests, tens of thousands of political prisoners were already held in Iranian prisons, and that an additional 20,000 people have been arrested during the recent crackdown. These individuals face torture, forced confessions, and even execution. Experience has shown that publicizing the names of prisoners can save lives. Figures such as Varisheh Moradi, Pakhshan Azizi, Alireza Jalali, Toomaj Salehi, Saman Yasin, Sepideh Gholian, Narges Mohammadi, Sharifeh Mohammadi, Farhad Meysami, Hossein Ronaghi, Arash Sadeghi, and Reza Shahabi were</p><p>spared execution or disappearance largely due to sustained public and media pressure.</p><p>If there is only one thing that you can do for the people of Iran, it is this: be the voice of detainees and political prisoners.</p><p>References:</p><p>. Le Figaro — <a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/?page_id=37731">Analysis on coordinated digital influence operations related to Iran</a></p><p>. Haaretz — <a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/?page_id=37732">The Israeli Influence Operation in Iran Pushing to Reinstate the Shah Monarchy</a> (October 2025)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2d832ff6a48d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why the Islamic Republic of Iran Has Not Collapsed?]]></title>
            <link>https://zamaneh.medium.com/why-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-has-not-collapsed-180e47e9cb59?source=rss-b584c7f96a06------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/180e47e9cb59</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-protests-2026]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[revolution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[islamic-republic-of-iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-protest]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zamaneh Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Feb 2026 16:18:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-04T16:18:55.780Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Sepehre Baba — <a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37727/">1</a><a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37727/">February2026</a></p><p><strong><em>The Islamic Republic survives through ideological coalition-building, disciplined crisis management, propaganda, and coercion, exploiting religious authority and social fragmentation to outlast repeated shocks, protests, and sanctions.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/0*XQMolt2dw_RDqW3Z.jpg" /></figure><p>Since its official establishment on February 11, 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has repeatedly been on the brink of collapse. During the first 50 days before the referendum, the country experienced three internal conflicts in three regions (Kurds, Arabs in Khuzestan, and Turkmens). The first nationwide protests occurred prior to the April 1, 1979 referendum, led by women opposing mandatory hijab. From June 1999 to January 2026, Iran experienced seven major nationwide protests, three of which brought the country close to governmental collapse. The country has endured severe economic crises. To better understand the severity, based on field estimates, a basic service worker in the United States earns approximately $2,500 per month, while an Iranian worker performing harder and longer tasks earns no more than $200 per month. Over these years, Iran has fought two wars and faces the potential of a third. It has also endured more than 30 years of harsh sanctions, yet the Islamic Republic remains the primary governing authority.</p><p>So, why has the Iranian government survived these 47 years?</p><p>Any of the crises experienced by the Islamic Republic over these 47 years — if experienced by other countries — would likely have led to governmental collapse much earlier. For example, according to official government data, food inflation in Iran reached approximately 49% and 57%, while during Egypt’s 2011 revolution, food inflation was 11.7%, and in Libya during the same year, it was 15.4%. In other words, the Islamic Republic has survived severe sanctions, two wars, more than seven nationwide protests, and serious economic crises.</p><p>This article attempts to answer this question through the analysis of behavioral and cognitive patterns across three historical periods, based on the culture and habits of the Iranian people. It should be noted that this article is written inside Iran, relying on real data, direct observations, and limited access to international news due to restricted internet.</p><h3>Ideological Roots of the 1979 Revolution</h3><p>To understand this, one must examine Ayatollah Khomeini’s strategy as early as 1964. At that time, Iran was recognized as an economically developing country under a constitutional monarchy and free-market system. In such systems, economic inequality naturally arises: large groups of people who are left behind economically perceive this as injustice, which creates fertile ground for socialist ideas. Khomeini, leading a revolutionary movement, faced two main challenges: the entrenched economic development and the powerful military.</p><p>Leftist ideology alone could not challenge Iran’s strong economic system, especially as groups like the Tudeh Party (intellectual left) and the Mo’tadelion (classical left) had largely failed. To advance an Islamist agenda, Khomeini needed mass support. The most effective strategy was to combine leftist ideas appealing to the economically marginalized with Islamic ideas capable of attracting the middle and upper classes, who still maintained religious and cultural ties dating back to previous eras, such as the Qajar period.</p><p>Regarding military power, Khomeini could leverage the armed leftist groups — the Mojahedin-e Khalq (founded April 1970) and the Fedaiyan-e Khalq (founded December 1970) — which initially acted independently but ultimately contributed to the success of the 1979 revolution.</p><p>As a result, a powerful tool emerged: the combination of religious ideology with militant leftist tactics. Khomeini’s support base consisted of three main groups:</p><p>· The economically marginalized</p><p>· The middle and upper classes with strong religious beliefs</p><p>· The indifferent or “grey” population, who aligned with Khomeini out of fear of militant groups</p><p>Between February 11 and April 1, 1979, these three groups, under the religious leadership of Morteza Motahhari and guidance from Bazargan, were able to neutralize women’s protests over the compulsory hijab, even before any government program had been announced.</p><h3>Religious Beliefs in Iran</h3><p>Religion has deep roots in Iran, with organized religious practice spanning over 3,000 years. Religious norms have long served as a red line for human rights activities, from ancient dynasties to modern governments. Iran was the first country to officially adopt a single religion even before the invention of writing, granting religious leaders a prominent role in governance. Religious authorities had voting rights in parliament, and from 628 CE onward, following the Arab conquest, the religious system gradually adopted Islam.</p><p>Over approximately 1,400 years, the intensity of religious orthodoxy has fluctuated. Periods like the Safavid and Qajar eras were more radical, while others, like the Zand dynasty, were less strict. Nonetheless, religious belief has always been present.</p><p>This historical religious foundation underpinned Khomeini’s “silent strategy” to counter the capitalism of ths Shah era: combining an exaggerated religious authority — granting sanctity and divine legitimacy to leaders — with radical leftist ideas.</p><h3>Iran After the 1979 Revolution</h3><p>Immediately after the revolution, in 1980, the Combatant Clergy Association was established. A second, non-clerical party — the Mojahedin-e Enghelab — served as a secondary mechanism to address potential failures of the clerical party. In 1999, this party evolved into the Reformist Party. Other parties outside this ideology, such as the Mardomsalari Party founded by Mostafa Kavakebian, were unable to gain power.</p><p>Examining the commonalities among parties during this period, terms such as “Mujahid,” “fighter,” “cleric,” “Islam,” and “revolution” dominate, reflecting the shared philosophy: the blending of strict religious interpretation with radical leftist principles.</p><h3>Crisis Management in the Islamic Republic</h3><p>This ideological framework has shaped Iran’s strategies for handling crises:</p><p>1. Financial crises (inflation, sanctions, price shocks)</p><p>Islamic teachings emphasize modesty and frugality. In times of hardship, religious leaders encourage reduced consumption, substitution of staple grains, fewer daily meals, or low-cost goods instead of modern alternatives. Historical precedent shows this approach has been repeatedly employed.</p><p>2. Political crises</p><p>From the outset, slogans such as “We are the oppressed of the world” or “Revolution of the barefoot” framed the political narrative. Anti-Western sentiment, especially anti-Americanism, has concentrated public opinion around government objectives. Promises of becoming a global power or achieving development distract from internal political pressures. Propaganda and media control have been central to political success. (External influences — such as the 2006 European economic crisis or shifts in US-China economic power — have had an effect).</p><p>3. Social crises</p><p>In all Iranian protests, only the 2026 nationwide protests prominently demanded regime change, while prior demonstrations mostly sought cultural or economic reforms. The 2022 protests focused on mandatory hijab laws, while 2019 protests concerned fuel prices and economic reforms. Government suppression — via official forces like the IRGC and informal militias such as Basij — along with fear of arrest or harm, and tactics to exhaust protesters, have historically quelled unrest. For example, in 2009 and 2022, protests gradually dissipated after months of persistence.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The combination of leftist tactics and religious authority — emphasizing decisions as divinely sanctioned and beyond challenge — has been a dominant strategy for governing the Iranian populace, which has experienced modern development yet suffered severe economic decline. Clerics have intervened when needed to direct crises and pacify the public, while political leaders (essentially clerics in suits) have subtly manipulated social structures. When these mechanisms failed, armed forces intervened.</p><p>Looking forward, strategies to challenge this resilient system appear to follow two main scenarios:</p><p>1. Eroding ethical legitimacy through highlighting the human costs of repression — a scenario already underway.</p><p>2. External military-economic pressure from a superior power — a scenario that, at the time of writing, seems increasingly imminent</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=180e47e9cb59" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Iran’s Political Capitalism and the Western Left’s Hesitation: How a Revolt Gets Filtered Through…]]></title>
            <link>https://zamaneh.medium.com/irans-political-capitalism-and-the-western-left-s-hesitation-how-a-revolt-gets-filtered-through-7cdca7b50e8a?source=rss-b584c7f96a06------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7cdca7b50e8a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[capitalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sepehr-haghighi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran-protest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[change]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zamaneh Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Feb 2026 18:02:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-03T18:02:03.364Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Iran’s Political Capitalism and the Western Left’s Hesitation: How a Revolt Gets Filtered Through Ideology</h3><p>by Sepehr Haghighi — <a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37714/">30</a><a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/37714/">January2026</a></p><p><strong><em>Iran’s “political capitalism” fuses sovereignty and accumulation, fueling recurring revolts. Sanctions and repression create epistemic fog, while campism and “no-lever” activism mute Western-left solidarity and misrecognize uprising agency.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/0*V1Zl1tVvVvsS_ZRm.jpg" /><figcaption><a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/AFP__20260127__MEI-IRN-Me-PISIJ-20260109-009__v2__MidRes__ProtestsInShirazIranJanuar.jpg">A protester flashes a victory sign in front of a fire during a demonstration in Shiraz, Iran, on January 9, 2026. The nationwide demonstrations, triggered in late December by anger over economic hardship in Tehrans Grand Bazaar, spread across cities with slogans turning from economic grievances to political and anti-government calls. The protests, met by a violent crackdown rights groups say killed thousands, were further shrouded by an internet blackout and severe restrictions on information, limiting reliable accounts of the crackdown. (Photo by Maria / Middle East Images via AFP)</a></figcaption></figure><p>Iran’s recurring waves of revolt are often narrated as a sequence of disconnected “crises”: an economic shock here, a cultural flashpoint there, an outbreak of anger that then “subsides.” That framing misses continuity. Over decades, Iranians have lived inside a political-economic order in which power is not merely political but also a precondition of accumulation, security, and social survival. When a coercive-ideological state collides with rising precarity, the result is not a single uprising but a repeated pattern of protest, lethal repression, exhaustion, reorganization, and renewed protest. This essay treats political economy as necessary background but its main focus is a second puzzle: why some campist currents within the anglophone left have been cautious, muted, or ambivalent in the face of mass repression.</p><h3>Power-first accumulation, rent, sanctions, and crisis as patronage</h3><p>A useful starting point is the nature of Iran’s political economy. Iran is not simply a capitalist society with an authoritarian state, nor merely a “corrupt economy.” It is closer to what theorists describe as political capitalism: an accumulation regime in which access to wealth, investment security, and market privilege is structurally subordinate to proximity to sovereignty and coercion. In this kind of system, accumulation does not reliably generate power; power generates accumulation. Mehrdad Vahabi’s work is especially useful here because it treats coercion and protection not as external “distortions” of the economy but as constitutive mechanisms through which resources are appropriated and coordinated — what he frames as “Islamic political capitalism” in contemporary Iran (Vahabi, 2017, 2022).</p><p>Rentier dynamics are at the core of this system. Oil and other rents loosen the state’s dependence on society and make coercion a more viable substitute for consent than in tax-dependent states, even while everyday livelihoods deteriorate. In the current protest wave, Amnesty’s reporting situates the initial eruption on 28 December 2025 in a sharp currency collapse, inflation, and worsening living conditions, describing how quickly economic grievance can become direct anti-regime revolt (Amnesty International, 2026).</p><p>Sanctions then interact with this structure in ways that moralistic Western debates often flatten. Whatever one thinks of the stated foreign-policy rationale for sanctions, the political economy of sanctions tends to expand opacity, scarcity, and arbitrage. When formal trade and finance narrow, “bypass” channels become more valuable; actors with institutional cover, coercive protection, or intelligence access are structurally advantaged in exploiting them. Under those conditions, crisis management can become patronage. Scarcity is not only endured, it is administered — and administration becomes an opportunity for rent extraction by connected networks. A single, specific policy detail (“one-to-one” exchange rules, etc.) is not required for this logic to hold; what matters is that controlled access to hard currency, import permissions, and protected logistics becomes the terrain where political proximity converts into material advantage.</p><p>Finally, repression and information control are not add-ons; they are part of how the system survives legitimacy shocks. Human Rights Watch has documented how the current wave’s nationwide internet blackout has concealed the scale of killing and mass detention, precisely by degrading documentation and communication (Human Rights Watch, 2026a). UN briefings have similarly stressed the need for independent investigations into killings and warned about escalation dynamics around the protests (United Nations, 2026; United Nations Office at Geneva, 2026). The key point for what follows is that repression is not only violence; it is also epistemic control — a managed uncertainty environment.</p><p>That is the backdrop. The question is how this reality becomes selectively recognized — or not — by parts of the Western left.</p><h3>What’s already “in circulation” about the left’s hesitation</h3><p>A number of explanations have already been articulated by journalists and left writers.</p><p>One is campism: a form of anti-imperialism that collapses politics into a single axis where Western power is always the primary agent and non-Western regimes are treated mainly as reactive. In that template, popular struggles against non-Western authoritarian states can become suspect unless they can be re-coded as anti-Western resistance. Beckerman’s reporting describes how this can slide into insinuations that protests are essentially foreign-authored “regime change” operations rather than endogenous revolt (Beckerman, 2026).</p><p>A second is fear of war instrumentalization. Given Iraq and Libya, many left actors are wary of any discourse that might be folded into interventionist agendas. UN briefings during the current crisis — explicitly referencing escalation risk — make that concern intelligible (United Nations Office at Geneva, 2026; United Nations, 2026). But intelligible fear can still function as a rationale for non-engagement: a shift from “oppose intervention” (a coherent stance) to “avoid speaking about mass repression” (a consequential choice).</p><p>A third is issue-ecosystem competition, especially in the shadow of Gaza. Beckerman reports a rationale that functions like a practical shortcut. Here, activists mobilize where there is a clear domestic policy lever (e.g., arms transfers), whereas Iran is treated as already “covered” by sanctions, leaving “no lever” and therefore no campaign (Beckerman, 2026). This is where the critique can move beyond hypocrisy: it points to a structural change in what “internationalism” becomes in practice.</p><p>Lastly, a fourth is repression-induced organizational fragmentation, meaning that the uprising is often encountered abroad through disproportionately visible diaspora actors and geopolitically legible branding. This can make the revolt easier to misrecognize as “right-wing” or as “regime-change theater” — and therefore easier for some anti-imperialists to treat as “contaminated” and withdraw from (Beckerman, 2026).</p><p>These are real dynamics, and they explain a lot. But listed separately, they can miss how they reinforce one another — especially under conditions of epistemic fog and representational capture.</p><h3>A synthesis mechanism</h3><p>The effort in this essay is to synthesize how those reasons can become a system — how silence (or constrained speech) emerges as an output of interlocking political-economic and discursive conditions.</p><h3>Representation rents: a political economy of narration</h3><p>First, there is a political economy of attention and representation that parallels the political economy of accumulation inside Iran. Just as insiders can control economic access through coercive proximity, external narration can be dominated by those with media access, institutional networks, and recognizable geopolitical branding. When the default international “window” onto an uprising is produced through highly visible diaspora factions — especially factions that appear legible to Western media as hawkish, monarchist, or aligned with conservative geopolitical projects — the revolt becomes easier for outsiders to misrecognize as “right-wing,” or as “regime-change theater.”</p><p>What matters here is not only optics but structure. Some of the most visible diaspora projects do not merely oppose the existing political-capitalist order; they can end up mirroring its underlying disposition toward power and “order” — a preference for top-down solutions, elite brokerage, security-first governance, and a politics that treats society as an object to be managed rather than a collective agent to be organized. In that sense, the difference can look like a change of personnel or symbolism while the deeper logic — politics as access, protection, and gatekeeping — remains compatible with the very political-capitalist pattern the uprising is resisting (Vahabi, 2022). This is one reason the representational problem is not superficial: when external “representatives” reproduce familiar power habits, it becomes easier for outsiders to conflate the revolt itself with a mere rotation of elites rather than a rupture from the coercive accumulation regime that produced the revolt in the first place. (Beckerman, 2026).</p><h3>Epistemic fog: when uncertainty rewards priors</h3><p>Second, sanctions and repression create an epistemic environment that amplifies ideological filtering. Sanctions expand non-transparency and incentivize evasion channels; repression expands blackout conditions, fear, and documentary scarcity. Together, they degrade verification and increase the payoff to pre-existing priors. If one already interprets non-Western dissent through a foreign-orchestration script, a foggy information environment can make that prior easier to sustain because fewer credible signals penetrate the blackout.</p><p>Here the internal political-capitalist dynamics (scarcity, patronage, coercion) and the external discursive dynamics (conspiratorial framing, fear of war instrumentalization) are not separate tracks. They can be mutually enabling. Human Rights Watch’s reporting on the internet blackout emphasizes that communications restrictions have concealed the true scale of atrocities; that concealment is not only a human-rights emergency, it is also an epistemic condition that lets ideological templates do more work than evidence (Human Rights Watch, 2026a; Human Rights Watch, 2026b). The result is a politics of interpretation where “uncertainty” does not necessarily lead to careful solidarity; it can lead to suspicion and withdrawal.</p><p>A related (and under-discussed) element is the way institutional caution can unintentionally reinforce depoliticization. When international bodies emphasize verification constraints — and they must — they also shape the signal environment for activists who treat institutional language as the threshold of “what’s real.” UN briefings stressing independent investigation and warning against escalation are crucial, but in a polarized attention economy they can be received not as a call to solidarity under uncertainty, but as permission to postpone moral clarity until a perfect evidentiary moment arrives (United Nations, 2026; United Nations Office at Geneva, 2026). That postponement is itself one political effect of repression.</p><h3>Domesticated internationalism: solidarity as domestic lobbying</h3><p>Third, the “policy lever” logic is not only a pragmatic excuse; it signals a domestication of internationalism. In this mode, solidarity is treated less as a principled commitment to people facing repression and more as a form of domestic lobbying: you mobilize when your own state has an obvious, immediate role and when there is a clean demand that can be translated into pressure. Beckerman reports this rationale in the Iran case as well — an argument that because Western states already sanction Iran, there is no additional “ask,” and therefore no campaign (Beckerman, 2026). The shift here is clear. Attention is organized less by the question “who is being shot, jailed, disappeared?” and more by “what can I demand from my polity this week?”</p><p>The additional point is that this does not merely reduce mobilization; it can normalize silence by turning punitive state policy into a substitute for solidarity. If sanctions are treated as the default “action,” activists can retreat into the idea that “something is already being done,” even as sanctions and repression together deepen non-transparency and scarcity — and even as blackout conditions make accountability harder. In that sense, the “no lever” posture can fold into the broader misrecognition problem. Rather than amplifying an endogenous revolt against a coercive political-capitalist order, attention is redirected toward a pre-existing policy posture that is politically difficult to question and easily absorbed into an interventionist frame. The result is a paradox. The same sanctions posture that is supposed to be “doing something” can become a rationale for not doing the one thing solidarity can do under repression — publicly align with victims and amplify their agency.</p><h3>The “color revolution” framing: beyond silence</h3><p>Beyond silence, there is a more corrosive move: recoding Iranian revolt as a “color revolution.” This is not merely hesitation; it is active delegitimation. It turns mass dissent into an externally authored script and treats repression as a defensive reaction to foreign manipulation. Left Renewal’s critiques of campist responses to the current protests describe this move: the reflex to label revolt as “color revolution” rather than confront it as politics from below produced by material crisis and state violence (Chapel, 2026; Shahabi, 2026).</p><p>This framing matters because it can invert responsibility. It doesn’t only fail to speak; it speaks in a way that denies agency to the uprising and converges with the regime’s narrative of “foreign instigators.” Also, it is not an idiosyncratic idea confined to one subculture. Portraying protests as “color revolutions” orchestrated from abroad is a widely documented disinformation trope used to delegitimize popular movements. EUvsDisinfo has catalogued this recurring narrative across contexts — protests are framed as Western-provoked “color revolutions” in order to erase local grievances and pre-shape the information space against dissent (EUvsDisinfo, 2020).</p><p>The crucial logical point is that opportunistic endorsement by hawks does not imply authorship. The fact that external actors may try to instrumentalize an uprising does not make the uprising a puppet show. Treating opportunism as proof of orchestration is precisely how ideological templates override reality.</p><h3>What the synthesis adds, and why it matters</h3><p>Put together, the mechanism looks like this: representational capture makes the revolt look geopolitically “owned”; epistemic fog makes evidence harder to stabilize; domesticated internationalism deprioritizes struggles without clean domestic levers; and the “color revolution” trope offers a ready-made exit ramp that converts uncertainty into dismissal. Under those conditions, silence is not only hypocrisy. It is an emergent output of an attention economy operating under epistemic fog, where narrative loyalty substitutes for inquiry, and where reality is pressured to conform to the story the ecosystem already knows how to tell.</p><p>Here, the problem is not only “bad faith,” but a patterned misrecognition in which parts of the left adapt complex realities to pre-existing narratives because the alternative — holding two thoughts at once, opposing imperial intervention while recognizing revolt against non-Western tyranny — demands more analytical and political work than the template encourages. Under epistemic fog and representational noise, those templates become default settings. They don’t merely interpret events, they decide in advance what kinds of agency can be recognized as legitimate.</p><p>A practical implication follows: if representational capture, epistemic fog, and “no-lever” reasoning jointly weaken solidarity, then the most durable counter is not a better slogan but stronger rooted intermediary institutions — civil-society networks that can corroborate claims under blackout conditions, preserve evidence, and widen the range of credible voices shaping the international “window” onto events. That kind of infrastructure reduces fog, resists the slide into domestic-lobbying internationalism by giving solidarity a transnational organizational form and bargaining power, and dilutes representational rents by making it harder for any single diaspora branding project to stand in for a heterogeneous revolt (Human Rights Watch, 2026; Center for Human Rights in Iran, 2026; Sabet, 2026).</p><p>A principled alternative is not complicated, but it is demanding: oppose intervention and collective punishment while insisting on solidarity with revolt from below; refuse regime apologetics without feeding Islamophobic discourse; reject diaspora capture without letting diaspora visibility nullify the agency of millions. The ethical and analytical task is synthesis — precisely the thing campism tends to resist.</p><h3>References:</h3><p>Amnesty International. (2026, January 8). Iran: Deaths and injuries rise amid authorities’ renewed cycle of protest bloodshed. Amnesty International. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/01/iran-deaths-injuries-authorities-protest-bloodshed/">https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/01/iran-deaths-injuries-authorities-protest-bloodshed/</a></p><p>Beckerman, G. (2026, January 16). The silence of the left on Iran. The Atlantic. <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/01/the-iranians-who-feel-betrayed-by-the-left/685644/">https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/2026/01/the-iranians-who-feel-betrayed-by-the-left/685644/</a></p><p>Center for Human Rights in Iran. (2026, January 12). Exclusive interview: Physician treating protesters in Iran describes mass casualties, overwhelmed hospitals. Center for Human Rights in Iran. <a href="https://iranhumanrights.org/2026/01/exclusive-interview-physician-treating-protesters-in-iran-describes-mass-casualties-overwhelmed-hospitals/">https://iranhumanrights.org/2026/01/exclusive-interview-physician-treating-protesters-in-iran-describes-mass-casualties-overwhelmed-hospitals/</a></p><p>Chapel, D. (2026, January 8). How the British left dismisses Iran’s uprising: The campist playbook. Left Renewal. <a href="https://leftrenewal.org/articles-en/chapel-campist-playbook/">https://leftrenewal.org/articles-en/chapel-campist-playbook/</a></p><p>EUvsDisinfo. (2020, August 20). Colour revolutions everywhere: Pro-Kremlin media covers popular protests. EUvsDisinfo. <a href="https://euvsdisinfo.eu/colour-revolutions-everywhere-pro-kremlin-media-covers-popular-protests/">https://euvsdisinfo.eu/colour-revolutions-everywhere-pro-kremlin-media-covers-popular-protests/</a></p><p>Human Rights Watch. (2026, January 12). Iran’s internet blackout concealing atrocities. Human Rights Watch. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/01/12/irans-internet-blackout-concealing-atrocities">https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/01/12/irans-internet-blackout-concealing-atrocities</a></p><p>Human Rights Watch. (2026, January 16). Iran: Growing evidence of countrywide massacres. Human Rights Watch. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/01/16/iran-growing-evidence-of-countrywide-massacres">https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/01/16/iran-growing-evidence-of-countrywide-massacres</a></p><p>Sabet, S. [@Sima_Sabet]. (2026, January 24). [Persian-language post referencing a clinician-linked discussion of casualty signals under blackout conditions]. X. <a href="https://x.com/Sima_Sabet/status/2015180188116545581">https://x.com/Sima_Sabet/status/2015180188116545581</a></p><p>Shahabi, S. (2026, January). Iran’s uprisings: Social roots, not security fantasies. Left Renewal. <a href="https://leftrenewal.org/articles-en/shahabi-irans-uprisings-social-roots/">https://leftrenewal.org/articles-en/shahabi-irans-uprisings-social-roots/</a></p><p>United Nations. (2026, January 15). Security Council LIVE: UN raises alarm over deadly Iran protests and “possible military strikes”. United Nations. <a href="https://www.un.org/en/security-council-live-ambassadors-due-meet-emergency-session-iran">https://www.un.org/en/security-council-live-ambassadors-due-meet-emergency-session-iran</a></p><p>United Nations Office at Geneva. (2026, January 15). Iran: UN urges “maximum restraint” to avert more death, wider escalation. United Nations Office at Geneva. <a href="https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2026/01/114887/iran-un-urges-maximum-restraint-avert-more-death-wider-escalation">https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2026/01/114887/iran-un-urges-maximum-restraint-avert-more-death-wider-escalation</a></p><p>Vahabi, M. (2017). Coercive state, resisting society, political and economic development in Iran (CEPN Working Paper №2017–17). Centre d’Économie de l’Université de Paris Nord. <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/p/upn/wpaper/2017-17.html">https://ideas.repec.org/p/upn/wpaper/2017-17.html</a></p><p>Vahabi, M. (2022). Destructive coordination, Anfal and Islamic political capitalism: A new reading of contemporary Iran. Springer.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7cdca7b50e8a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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