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            <title><![CDATA[Western Alliance (WAL)’s Evident Accounting Malpractices & Market Regulator’s Silence: A Green…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@zatoichigo/western-alliance-wal-s-evident-accounting-malpractices-market-regulator-s-silence-a-green-298f23dd0d21?source=rss-55e56e198102------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[market-regulation]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zatoichigo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Aug 2023 15:06:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-30T17:20:21.401Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Western Alliance (WAL)’s Evident Accounting Malpractices &amp; Market Regulator’s Silence: A Green Light for Future Corporate Misconduct?</strong></h3><h4>I. Overview</h4><p>More than a month ago, I posted an article here on Medium to disclose the fraudulent accounting activities committed by Western Alliance Bancorporation (WAL), with the title of “<em>Strategy of Fraudulent Accounting and Data Fabrication — — Isn’t It a Smart Move to Fight against Stressed Situation?</em>” (accessible through the link <a href="https://medium.com/@zatoichigo/strategy-of-fraudulent-accounting-and-data-fabrication-isnt-it-a-smart-move-to-fight-against-34e8e5cf744d">https://medium.com/@zatoichigo/strategy-of-fraudulent-accounting-and-data-fabrication-isnt-it-a-smart-move-to-fight-against-34e8e5cf744d</a>). WAL’s fraudulent activities included but were not limited to fraudulent fair value estimation of the loans transferred from held-for-investment (HFI) to held-for-sale (HFS), false statement on growth of core deposits, camouflaged figure of efficiency ratio, comparison with peer banks using distorted data, etc. I also highlighted that the lack of reaction from market regulators, specifically, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), may encourage such fraudulent accounting activities and consequently bring in negative effect to the integrity of financial market.</p><p>In my previous article, I stated that because of WAL’s extremely distorted financial metrics reported in 10-Q of Q1 (which turned a deep negative net income into a positive one), to keep concealing the loss from loan dispositions during Q2, WAL was set to present more fraudulent financial figures. More recently, WAL has presented updated financial metrics of Q2 through the press release and the financial statement. Correspondingly, in the article here, I will present and analyze some representative updated accounting fraud cases contributed by WAL, mainly on the fair value estimation of loans HFS and deposit balance reporting.</p><p>Disclosing the fraudulent activities of a struggling mid-sized regional bank is a minor issue to the broader financial market. Nevertheless, from the research perspective, I believe a thorough exhibition of such fraudulent cases is meaningful to a scope far beyond the specific company. More importantly, it is worth noting that due to the inaction of the market regulators, mainly the SEC, a sharply increasing number of companies may initiate a strategic change in the pursuit of presenting misleading and fraudulent metrics in the coming future. This is because with other conditions being equal/unconsidered, honest companies are substantially handicapped when competing with unregulated dishonest peers. This is a seriously alarming and worrisome situation that deserves more attention from a broader audience including government agencies.</p><h4><strong>II.</strong> <strong>WAL’s Fraud on Fair Value Estimation of Loans HFS</strong></h4><p>Western Alliance Bancorporation (WAL) recently released the 10-Q of Q2, 2023. The new information sheds further light on the previous allegations, providing more substantial evidence to support claims of WAL’s fraudulent accounting, specifically regarding the fair value estimation of the $5.9 billion loans WAL transferred from HFI to HFS at the end of Q1.</p><p><strong>II-1. Facts</strong></p><p>WAL stated the loan disposition outcome in the 10-Q (Pages 19 and 30), as shown in Exhibit 1 below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*a0-M_xSxGAwpG0pwnB3gKw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 1</strong>. Statements regarding loan dispositions, from Pages 19 and 30, 10-Q of Q2, 2023.</p><p><strong>II-2. Anatomy of The Trick</strong></p><p>From these statements, it is evident that the loans WAL disposed of during Q2, with a carrying value of $3.5 billion, were sold for $2.6 billion. This discrepancy further proves the fraudulent nature of the fair value estimation on the $5.9 billion loans transferred during Q1, as detailed in my previous reports (also see Appendix 1).</p><p>As explained in my previous article, WAL committed accounting fraud with the $5.9 billion loans transferred from HFI to HFS by:</p><p>1. Incorrectly classifying the fair value estimation of these loans as Level 2 instead of Level 3, since these loans were not salable in active markets and the estimation was not based on observable inputs.</p><p>2. Overestimating the value, making it equal to the carrying amount ($5.9 billion), instead of a reasonable estimation that should be below $4.6 billion at Level 3.</p><p>The 10-Q of Q2 supports my prior analysis, as explained in my previous article, the data showed that the final sale price of these loans, if salable at all, would be significantly below $4.6 billion. As WAL disclosed earlier, half of these loans were sold for $2.3 billion (Slide 8, Q1’s earnings call, 8-K filed on 04/18/2023, Slide 8, Q2’s investor update, 8-K filed on 05/16/2023, also see Exhibit 6 of my previous article). Of the rest, only a small portion were sold with a deep discount, most remained unsold, and some were transferred back to loans HFI. WAL attributed the transferring back to “<em>a change in management’s intentions</em>” (Page 19, 10-Q of Q2, see Exhibit 1 above). Given WAL’s ongoing efforts to reduce borrowings (Slide 4, Q2’s earnings call, 8-K filed on 07/18/2023), this change likely resulted from a lack of other options, <em>i.e.</em>, these loans are unsalable in the foreseeable future. Additionally, $1.8 billion remains to be sold. Exhibit 2 below summarizes the disposition process of these $5.9 billion loans.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DUl1axinXv8vHvwLkJOIvw.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 2</strong>. Data are from WAL’s earnings call of Q1 and the investor update, earnings call, and 10-Q of Q2.</p><p>As my previous report pointed out and elaborated, the fraudulent fair value reported by WAL has rendered most of their financial metrics invalid. This is because, as required by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the lesser of amortized cost and fair value should be reported for loans HFS on the balance sheet.</p><p>It is important to note that this fraudulent activity, like most others committed by WAL, was straightforward and thus not difficult to understand after being pointed out. It was, however, overlooked by the market regulators. Such a lack of regulation will cause, or most likely have already caused, far-reaching negative consequences to the integrity of the broader financial market.</p><h4><strong>III.</strong> <strong>Problems on Balances of Brokered Deposits (Including Reciprocal Deposits) and Core Deposits</strong></h4><p>As presented by FDIC (“<em>Study on Core Deposits and Brokered Deposits</em>” published in 2011 and 2017 with updated statistical analysis), also referring to my previous article, deposits can be divided into core and brokered deposits, and brokered deposits are recognized to be riskier and more unstable compared to core deposits. Brokered deposits can be further divided into (brokered) reciprocal deposits and brokered non-reciprocal deposits. Reciprocal deposits, albeit riskier than core deposits, are generally considered safer than brokered non-reciprocal deposits. Therefore, ranked by the degree of risk as recognized by FDIC, it is:</p><p>Brokered Non-reciprocal Deposits &gt; (Brokered) Reciprocal Deposits &gt; Core Deposits</p><p><strong>III-1. The Law</strong></p><p>As regulated by 12 U.S.C. § 1831f(i), for well capitalized and well rated institutions, reciprocal deposits up to the lesser of $5 billion or 20% of the total liability can be exempted from being reported as brokered deposits (the specific United States Code can be found from the link here, provided by the U.S. Government: <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2021-title12/pdf/USCODE-2021-title12-chap16-sec1831f.pdf">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2021-title12/pdf/USCODE-2021-title12-chap16-sec1831f.pdf</a>, also refer to the Code of Federal Regulation, Title 12, Part 337, <em>Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices</em>, accessible from here: <a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-III/subchapter-B/part-337">https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-III/subchapter-B/part-337</a> ).</p><p>The exemption rule was incorporated into the U.S. Code following the pass of <em>Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act</em> (Public Law No. 115–117, effective on 05/24/2018), of which Section 202 specified the exemption rule for reciprocal deposits. This rule has been widely appreciated by commercial banks, as a reduced versus non-reduced reported brokered deposit balance matters significantly in various aspects, such as a lower versus higher insurance premium paid to FDIC, a better versus lower rating score under FDIC’s assessment system, etc.</p><p>Meanwhile, as regulated by the law, in order to taking advantage of the general capped exempt, the institution needs to be well capitalized and well rated, otherwise there is a special cap (i.e., “<em>the average of the total amount of reciprocal deposits held by the agent institution on the last day of each of the 4 calendar quarters preceding the calendar quarter in which the agent institution was found not to have a composite condition of outstanding or good or was determined to be not well capitalized</em>”) to be used (see 12 U.S.C. § 1831f(i)(2)(A)(iii)). As FDIC further elaborated on this issue, cited in the followings, which are from a published final rule of FDIC, published at Federal Register, with the title “<em>Limited Exception for a Capped Amount of Reciprocal Deposits From Treatment as Brokered Deposits</em>” (Publication Date: 02/04/2019, Document Citation: 84 FR 1346, Page 1349, accessible from website of Federal Register, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/04/2018-28137/limited-exception-for-a-capped-amount-of-reciprocal-deposits-from-treatment-as-brokered-deposits">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/04/2018-28137/limited-exception-for-a-capped-amount-of-reciprocal-deposits-from-treatment-as-brokered-deposits</a>):</p><blockquote>“<em>For example, an institution that is well capitalized but no longer well rated could continue to be an agent institution if it holds reciprocal time deposits that it received prior to its rating downgrade until those time deposits mature or roll off, but would no longer be an agent institution if it renewed or rolled over such deposits and doing so caused the total amount of reciprocal deposits to exceed the special cap. In this case, once the institution receives reciprocal deposits in excess of its special cap, it is no longer an agent institution. If an institution is not an agent institution, all of its reciprocal deposits should be reported as brokered deposits</em>.”</blockquote><p><strong>III-2. Facts</strong></p><p>At the end of Q1, WAL reported brokered deposits of $8.1 billion, which included reciprocal deposits of $3.0 billion, with additional reciprocal deposits of $5 billion exempted from being treated as brokered deposits (10-Q of Q1, Pages 29, 76, and 80).</p><p>In contrast, at the end of Q2, WAL reported brokered deposits of $18.2 billion, which included reciprocal deposits of $11.4 billion, and no reciprocal deposits were exempted from being treated as brokered deposits (10-Q of Q2, Pages 33, 80, and 84, also see Appendix 2 for contrast of full texts).</p><p><strong>III-3. Anatomy of the Fraud</strong></p><p>Given WAL’s reported brokered deposit balance and the unusual zero-exemption for reciprocal deposits of Q2, there are three possible scenarios as listed below, followed by interpretations:</p><p><strong>·</strong> <strong><em>Scenario No. 1</em></strong>: WAL is entitled to exempt reciprocal deposits of up to $5 billion from brokered deposits. In other words, it would be legal for WAL to report brokered deposits of $13.3 billion instead of $18.3 billion, but the company chose not to do so. (Extremely unlikely)</p><p>· <strong><em>Scenario No. 2</em></strong>: WAL did exempt reciprocal deposits of $5 billion from brokered deposits, and thus underreported the balance of reciprocal deposits. In other words, WAL had reciprocal deposits of 16.4 billion, but mistakenly reported the balance as 11.4 billion. (Unlikely but not impossible)</p><p>· <strong><em>Scenario No. 3</em></strong>: WAL has lost the legal basis of exempting reciprocal deposits from being treated as brokered deposits. (Most likely)</p><p>Scenario No. 1 is very unlikely because there should be no motivation for WAL, or any other bank, to report a higher balance of brokered deposits while reporting a lower balance is permitted by law.</p><p>Scenario No. 2 is also unlikely because this would be an error that could be easily spotted, and thus the risk of getting caught would significantly outweigh the potential benefit. Nonetheless, considering the undisguised fraud committed by WAL on reporting the fair value of loans HFS (see Section II above), this scenario is not entirely impossible.</p><p>Scenario No. 3 is most likely. As regulated by law (12 U.S.C. § 1831f(i)), and further interpreted by FDIC, if an institution, which has reciprocal deposit balance higher than the special cap, is not well rated any more, and it further renewed or rolled over reciprocal deposits, then this institution “<em>is not an agent institution, all of its reciprocal deposits should be reported as brokered deposits</em>” (Publication 84 FR 1346, page 1349, also see the quote block above). Banks’ ratings given by FDIC are confidential, however, if WAL’s rating did fall during Q2, then this scenario should be the real case. Furthermore, WAL’s uncollateralized fed funds credit lines decreased almost 90% during Q2. Specifically, at the end of Q1, WAL’s fed fund credit lines totaled $1484 million, resulting from available balance of $1084 million plus outstanding balance of $400 million (Pages 30 and 79 from 10-Q of Q1), whereas at the end of Q2, this number was $175 million, resulting from available balance of $175 million plus outstanding balance of $0 million (Pages 34 and 83 from 10-Q of Q2), marking a decrease of 88.2% of the borrowing capacity. If WAL lost the well-rated status during Q2, this may have partially contributed to the sharp decline of its Fed fund credit lines.</p><p>As defined by law, “<em>The term ‘reciprocal deposits’ means deposits received by an agent institution through a deposit placement network with the same maturity (if any) and in the same aggregate amount as covered deposits placed by the agent institution in other network member banks.</em>” (12 U.S.C. § 1831f(i)(2)(E)). Therefore, if WAL has lost the status of “agent institution”, then it is misleading and against the law for WAL to still refer to previously qualified reciprocal deposits as reciprocal deposits. In other words, if this is the case, then WAL made materially misleading statement in 10-Q by saying that it had reciprocal deposits of $11.4 billion, because in this situation these deposits are not reciprocal deposits as defined by the U. S. Code, and thus should be treated indifferently with other brokered deposits.</p><p>As discussed above, expect for Scenario No. 1, which is not likely, no matter if it is Scenario No. 2 or No. 3, WAL has, again, committed serious fraud in reporting its deposits balance. Additionally, in Q2’s earnings call, WAL claimed that “<em>Funding composition has grown more stable due to a reduced utilization of wholesale borrowings and a focus on core and reciprocal deposits</em>” (Slide 11, Q2’s earnings call, 8-K filed on 07/18/2023). Such a claim implied that the core deposit had grown during Q2, however, the core deposits continuingly decreased by a substantial amount across all possible scenarios. This further adds to WAL’s fraudulent activities. Specifically, at the end of Q1, the core deposit balance was $34.5 billion, resulting from $47.6 billion (total deposits) — $8.1 billion (reported brokered deposits) — $5 billion (reciprocal deposits that were exempted from brokered deposits), whereas under Scenario No. 1 and No. 3, the core deposit balance was $32.7 billion at the end of Q2, resulting from $51.0 billion (total deposits) — $18.3 billion (brokered deposits), and under Scenario No. 2, the core deposit balance would be $27.7 billion, with a further reduction of $5 billion.</p><h4><strong>IV.</strong> <strong>Other Fraudulent Activities (Efficiency Ratio as an Example)</strong></h4><p>Besides the fraudulent activities in fair value accounting and deposit balance reporting, WAL has also committed fraud across numerous other accounting fields, as elaborated in my previous article. For example, in the press release for Q2’s financial metrics, WAL reported efficiency ratio of 50.5%, with deposit costs classified as interest expense, shown in Appendix 3 (from Page 19, Exhibit 99.1, 8-K filed on 07/18/2023). Simultaneously, on Page 10 of the same press release, deposit costs were classified as non-interest expense. It is worth noting that deposits costs should always be classified as non-interest expense as all other banks do, because none of these costs were paid as interest. WAL has clearly classified deposit costs as non-interest expense in all financial statements (e.g., Pages 33 and 72 of the 10-Q of Q2, 2023, also see Appendix 4 for details). Therefore, rather than an adjusted metric, the efficiency ratio reported in the press release was only a distorted figure that cannot be justified (see Section III of my previous article for a more thorough explanation).</p><p>Across recent quarters, at least since Q3 of 2022 (see Slide 8 of the earnings call of Q3, 2022, 8-K filed on 10/20/2022), WAL has been consistent in firstly reporting a false efficiency ratio (by recognizing deposit costs as interest expense) in the press release, presumably for media coverage purpose, and then reporting the normally calculated figures of efficiency ratio (including GAAP and non-GAAP metrics) in the financial statements (10-Qs and 10-Ks), probably because the risk of getting caught is theoretically higher for fabricating figures in financial statements (although not necessarily so). More recently, WAL went even further in the misleading presentation. As pointed out in my previous article, in the investor update of Q2, 2023, WAL presented the falsely calculated efficiency ratio, while deceitfully suggesting that it was calculated using the standard practice (Slide 18 of Q2’s investor update, 8-K filed on 05/16/2023, also refer to Exhibit 13 and related texts in my previous article for more detailed explanation).</p><p>Beyond the cases shown above, there are a sizeable number of additional fraudulent accounting activities committed by the Western Alliance (please refer to my previous article for a few examples). Unfortunately, it is unrealistic to list all of them. Therefore, only a few selected cases have been presented here and in the previous article.</p><h4><strong>V.</strong> <strong>What It Tells Us</strong></h4><p>As shown by evidence, WAL started to commit accounting fraud at least numbers of quarters ago, and the fraudulent activities have become bolder and broader in the recent two quarters (Q1 and Q2 of 2023). In my previous article, I used the analogy of cheating in exams to compare with the strategy of fraudulent accounting. I will continue to use the analogy here, though it should be emphasized that this is a significantly oversimplified analogy as the harmful consequences are not comparable. In traditional closed book exams, although minor cheating behaviors, such as taking a peek at neighbors’ answering sheets, appear from time to time and are not likely to be eliminated, it is generally not expected to catch some student working on the exam while having an open textbook right next to him/her. In reality though, such open-book-cheating behaviors do occur, especially when the proctor turns a blind eye to it or signals encouragement.</p><p>In the financial market, dishonest accounting activities, including those minor ones, are not uncommon. Nevertheless, as pointed out in my previous article, given the severity and boldness, the long lasting blatant fraudulent misconduct committed by WAL should place the company as one of the leading outliers when compared to all other dishonest firms in recent decades, providing that such an analysis may be conducted at some point. What is more surprising and worrisome is the slow reaction, if any, of the market regulators, as there have not been any reactions within the public sight. WAL has been utilizing the strategy of fraudulent accounting for a while, and it has been proven to be extremely effective so far. This company will continue to use this strategy because this is a one-way path with no turning back, while the fabricated and distorted metrics are getting stacked one after another, and their fraud may continue to go unregulated. Given this backdrop, it is foreseeable that an increasing number of companies might emulate such brazen strategies. This is exactly like the case of undisguised cheating behaviors in exams going unregulated. After one student becomes audacious and shameless enough to use the highly effective open-book-cheating strategy, combined with the disappointing inaction of the proctor, who gives a green light signal, there are only two choices left for the rest students: to cheat, with zero risk, or to fall behind, as keeping honesty is destined to fall behind when others can cheat efficiently, fearlessly, and safely.</p><h4><strong>VI.</strong> <strong>Disclosure</strong></h4><p>I disclose that I am still holding a short position for WAL, so there is a conflict of interest. This article is for research purposes and should not be treated as financial advice. In the end, I claim full and sole responsibility for every word I put down here and my previous article.</p><h4><strong>Appendix</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2EMk_XAKzRMYo-Hpu7RpyQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Appendix 1</strong>. Tables from 10-Q of Q1 showing that for the $5.9 billion loans transferred from HFI to HFS, the carrying amount equals to $5910 million (7022 minus 1112), and the fair value equals to $5910 million (7010 minus 1100), with key metrics highlighted. <strong>A</strong> is from Page 18, <strong>B</strong> is from Page 44, and <strong>C</strong> is from Page 49.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*L02S7CKI2kTPMRbHHrqyYA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Appendix 2</strong>. Statements regarding the balances of brokered deposits and reciprocal deposits at the end of Q1 (from Pages 29 and 80, 10-Q of Q1) and that at the end of Q2 (from Pages 33 and 84, 10-Q of Q2).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M0mXwOXo7qPBmjH-7tvKrg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Appendix 3. </strong>WAL’s efficiency ratio as calculated in the press release, Exhibit 99.1, 8-K filed on 07/18/2023 (the table is from Page 19 and the notation is from Page 20).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PUluxi81OJIgSgntqcNrZQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Appendix 4. </strong>WAL’s efficiency ratio and the classification of deposit costs in the financial statements (from Page 65 and Page 72, respectively, 10-Q of Q2).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=298f23dd0d21" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Strategy of Fraudulent Accounting and Data Fabrication, Isn’t It a Smart Move to Fight against…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@zatoichigo/strategy-of-fraudulent-accounting-and-data-fabrication-isnt-it-a-smart-move-to-fight-against-34e8e5cf744d?source=rss-55e56e198102------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/34e8e5cf744d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[accounting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fraud]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[research-reports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zatoichigo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 18 Jul 2023 14:12:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-07-18T14:12:12.438Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Strategy of Fraudulent Accounting and Data Fabrication, Isn’t It a Smart Move to Fight against Stressed Situation?</strong></p><p><strong>— — — A Case Study on Western Alliance Bancorporation (WAL)</strong></p><p><strong>Summary:</strong></p><p>As the banking industry reels from the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank in March, coupled with rising interest rates since 2022, regional banks have been fighting against serious challenges such as deposit outflows, risk of commercial real estate loan defaults, and escalating unrealized losses on balance sheets. Under such a situation, the strategy of fraudulent accounting and data fabrication, albeit risky (supposedly), has come into play. This article presents an extreme example that utilizes such a strategy, the Western Alliance Bancorporation (or WAL). The article here presents some representative fraud cases committed by WAL, along with analyses in detail.</p><p>According to the evidence presented here, WAL has committed accounting fraud to such a level that has rarely been seen in recent years across publicly traded companies. Sample fraud cases presented here include:</p><blockquote><strong><em>· Intentional overestimation on fair value of the loans transferred from held-for-investment to held-for-sale, converting a loss Q1 to a profit Q1</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>· Data misinterpreting on core deposits balance (increase in claim vs decrease in real)</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>· Data Fabrication on Efficient Ratio (presenting arbitrarily calculated figure, pretending that it was generated by standard calculation)</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>· Other selected examples (comparing financial metrics of itself with peers, but using different measures)</em></strong></blockquote><p>In the end, the author concluded that the strategy of fraudulent accounting and data fabrication has been working quite effectively in fighting against tough challenges. Given the current situation of lack of regulation, one would expect that the strategy adopted by WAL may become popular soon, which will lead to a negative feedback loop among companies in competition.</p><p><strong>Main text:</strong></p><p><strong>I. Fair value issue:</strong></p><p><strong><em>I-1. Basics on Fair Value Accounting</em></strong></p><p>As noted in FASB ASC 820, fair value is the estimated transaction price for the underlying assets (or liabilities) to sell (or to pay). There are three levels (from high to low: Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3) for fair value accounting. Level 1 refers to nonadjustable quoted price. Level 2 requires observable inputs. If there is neither active market nor observable input available, then Level 3 must be used. The company is fully aware of the regulation on fair value accounting, as reflected from their explanation in the most recently filed 10-K (Page 94), cited below (Exhibit 1):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*95-1BkPihTMpYFp9q4-PMw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 1</strong>. WAL’s description of Level 2 and Level 3 fair value, from their 10-K report of 2022 (Page 94).</p><p>Fair value estimation provides an indication of the anticipated monetary exchange in a transaction involving the assets (or liabilities). The degree of accuracy varies among the different levels. According to definitions and characteristics of the three different levels of fair value estimations, as elaborated in FASB ASC 820, if the underlying asset (or liability) is estimated at Level 1, then the transaction price is expected to be exactly the same as the fair value. If estimated at Level 2, then the transaction price is expected to be the same as or very close to the fair value, with limited room for error. In contrast, if estimated at Level 3, then the transaction price is expected to lie within a considerable larger range compared to that for Level 1 and Level 2, due to inevitable errors on unobservable inputs, though the transaction is not expected to be very far off the fair value, even at Level 3. Otherwise, the initial fair value estimation would be unjustified. See Exhibit 2 below for a schematic visualization on the relationship between the fair value estimation and the expected transaction price, at each of the three levels.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Guj1QBBzJw9n8zrceWwV6g.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 2. </strong>Schematic illustration on<strong> </strong>the relationship between expected transaction price and fair value at different levels.</p><p><strong><em>I-2. Context of WAL’s Fraudulent Accounting on Fair Value</em></strong></p><p>WAL transferred 5.9 billion loans from held for investment (HFI) to held for sale (HFS) at the end of 1Q 2023. (10-Q, Page 18). Before the transfer, the fair value of loans HFI were always estimated using Level 3, as unobservable inputs are needed to price these loans. Such a practice was applied throughout all recent financial reports (4Q 2021, 10-K Page 145; 1Q 2022, 10-Q Page 61; 2Q 2022,10-Q Page 67; 3Q 2022, 10-Q Page 68; 4Q 2022, 10-K Page 140). Upon the transfer made on March 31, 2023, however, the 5.9 billion loans were all priced using Level 2 instead of Level 3, with the price equaling the carrying value (1Q 2023, 10-Q, Page 49).</p><p>In order to use Level 2 for fair value estimation, these loans need to be <em>either</em> tradable in active markets <em>or</em> priceable using observable inputs. However, these loans do not meet such criteria. Accordingly, WAL has committed accounting fraud here, which materially changed most of the financial metrics of 1Q 2023 from negative numbers to positive numbers (i.e., converting loss to profit). Detailed analysis is presented below.</p><p><strong><em>I-3. Analysis</em></strong></p><p>Regarding the company’s loans HFS, they are classified as government-issued or guaranteed loans, including EBO and non-EBO, agency-conforming loans, and others. Among these categories, EBO loans refer to delinquent loans repurchased under the terms of the GNMA MBS programs (2022 10-K, Page 82). In all recent financial statements except for the most recent one (1Q 2023), government-issued (excluding EBO) and agency-conforming loans were valued at Level 2 as they had active markets, whereas all other loans were valued at Level 3 as they lacked active markets. In the most recent financial statement (10-Q of 1Q 2023), however, these loans were valued in a fundamentally different way, as they claimed that “<em>these transferred loans are salable into active markets</em>” (see Exhibits 3 and 4 below).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zBi_bimhgtNZJryhrmT0Bg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 3</strong>. Contrast of explanations of fair values for loans HFS, in financial statements of previous quarters (Above: from 1Q 2022 Page 56, 2Q 2022 Page 61, 3Q 2022 Page 62, and 4Q 2022 Page 135) with that in the most recent financial statement (Below: from 1Q 2023, Page 44).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JVJR0jjxMPyDemMReXVmaw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 4</strong>. Fair value estimates of WAL’s financial instruments (from 10-Q of 1Q 2023, Page 49).</p><p>The fact that WAL valued the transferred loans at Level 2 was in sharp contrast with the previous fair value accounting standard that the company had followed, as introduced above. To further illustrate the contrast, Exhibit 5 below shows the comparisons among the total carrying amount of government-issued and guaranteed (non-EBO) and agency-conforming loans, the fair value estimated at Level 2 for loans HFS, and liquid assets from loans HFS across recent quarters, using the data reported in 10-Qs and 10-Ks. Specifically, the data of government-issued or guaranteed and agency-conforming loans are from 4Q 2021 Page 109, 1Q 2022 Page 35, 2Q 2022 Page 37, 3Q 2022 Page 37, 4Q 2022 Page 105, and 1Q 2023 Page 18. The data of fair value for loans HFS are from 4Q 2021 Page 145, 1Q 2022 Page 61, 2Q 2022 Page 67, 3Q 2022 Page 68, 4Q 2022 Page 140, and 1Q 2023 Page 49. The data of liquid assets from loans HFS are from 4Q 2021 Page 59, 1Q 2022 Page 86, 2Q 2022 Page 94, 3Q 2022 Page 96, 4Q 2022 Page 55, and 1Q 2023 Page 79.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DWHOUjLDayOmZ1MleVy6mQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 5</strong>. Comparisons among government-issued or guaranteed (non-EBO) and agency conforming loans, fair value estimated at Level 2 of loans HFS, and liquid assets from loans HFS across recent quarters from 4Q 2021 to 1Q 2023 (specific locations provided in the text).</p><p>The comparison above indicates that the fair value estimation of the 5.9 billion loans transferred at Level 2 (1Q 2023) was self-contradictory. On the one hand, WAL claimed that “<em>these transferred loans are salable into active markets</em>”, on the other hand, these loans were not classified as liquid assets. Next, the asset disposition during Q2 further confirms that the 5.9 billion loans transferred were not salable into active markets.</p><p>As reported in the earnings call and investor update, filed on 4/18/2023 and 5/16/2023, respectively, among the transferred loans, about 3 billion (as measured in carrying value) were settled for sale at 2.3 billion, as the company disclosed, the loans transferred were “<em>further reduced by 0.6 billion in settled sale</em>” (Slide 8, Exhibit 99.2, 8-K filed on 04/18/2023), and the rest half were yet to be sold as of 5/16 (Exhibit 6).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7g0SWz9LdErCtlwMHtn0Rg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 6</strong>. Loan disposition subsequent to Q1. The upper is from Q1’s earnings call (Slide 8, Exhibit 99.2, 8-K, 04/18/2023). The lower is from Q2’s investor update (Slide 8, Exhibit 99.1, 8-K, 05/16/2023).</p><p>Hence, regarding the 5.9 billion transferred loans:</p><blockquote><em>·</em><strong><em> There is no active market, because otherwise all of the loans should have been contracted for sale as of mid-May, given the company’s eagerness to complete the asset disposition.</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>and</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>· The 5.9 billion fair value was not estimated based on observable inputs, because otherwise the settled sale would not deviate far from the estimated value (i.e., 3 billion vs 3 billion, instead of 2.3 billion vs 3 billion).</em></strong></blockquote><p>Accordingly, it was not justifiable for WAL to report the transferred loans at Level 2 fair value. Instead, the loans should be reported at Level 3 fair value, and the amount should not deviate far from 4.6 billion (i.e., 2.3 ∗ 2, expected settled sale price for the loans, as an extremely optimistic estimation from WAL’s standpoint).</p><p><strong><em>I-4. More Evidence from Loans HFI</em></strong></p><p>In addition, from the perspective of fair value accounting for loans HFI, it is also apparent that the valuing of the transferred loans as such (equaling to the carrying amount) was groundless. Since 2022, as the interest rate has been increasing, the fair value of loans HFI has been decreasing as a general trend (Exhibit 7). However, in 1Q 2023’s financial statement, the fair value of the loans transferred, which were categorized as loans HFI until the last day of the quarter, suddenly rose to match the carrying amount (5.9 billion), a move only justifiable in dreams where it were 1Q 2022 instead of 2023.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4TCePjDsyy9D0PV-IVpLWA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 7. </strong>Changes of<strong> </strong>Fed funds interest rates and the fair value to carrying amount ratio of loans HFI (WAL) from 01/01/2022 to 03/31/2023. <strong>(A).</strong> Data from released Fed funds interest rates by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. <strong>(B).</strong> Data from WAL’s financial statements (10-Qs and 10-Ks). Locations are 4Q 2021 Page 145, 1Q 2022 Page 61, 2Q 2022 Page 67, 3Q 2022 Page 68, 4Q 2022 Page 140, and 1Q 2023 Page 49.</p><p>From the perspectives of loans HFS, loans HFI, and asset dispositions subsequent to Q1, above shows that WAL falsely reported the fair value of the loans transferred at Level 2, at the value of 5.9 billion, equaling to the carrying amount. The correct way is to valuing the loans at Level 3, and the correct number is estimated to be no higher than 4.6 billion, as analyzed above.</p><blockquote><strong><em>It is important to note that FASB regulations require companies to use the the lower of amortized cost and fair value for loans HFS on the balance sheet. Therefore, WAL’s fraudulent accounting is presumably motivated by a desire to hide a substantial loss of at least 1.3 billion. This manipulation greatly distorted the financial metrics reported in Q1’s statement, creating an illusion of profit where there was, in reality, a substantial loss.</em></strong></blockquote><p><strong>II. Deposit Issue</strong>:</p><p><strong><em>II — 1. Brief Overview of Brokered Deposits (Including Reciprocal Deposits)</em></strong></p><p>In the document published by Federal Register (Title: <em>Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices: Brokered Deposits and Interest Rate Restrictions</em>; Document number: 2018–28273; Publication Date: 02/06/2019), FDIC summarized characteristics and risks of brokered deposits, based on its “<em>study on core deposits and brokered deposits</em>” (initial study completed in 2011, with updated analysis and data in 2017). The summary is succinct and clear, and thus cited below (Exhibit 8) in whole paragraphs (from Page 2369 of the document):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*72hG0Aow9K6IaAwLaQrb5g.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 8. </strong>Characteristics and risks of brokered deposits, from a publication by FDIC, see details in main text.</p><p>Reciprocal deposits, belonging to brokered deposits, share the same characteristics and risks with other brokered deposits, as explicitly emphasized by FDIC in the “<em>study on core deposits and brokered deposits”</em>. Meanwhile, realizing that reciprocal deposits may be somewhat better than traditional wholesale deposits, FDIC allows a capped amount of reciprocal deposits (the lesser of 20% of the bank’s total liabilities, or 5 billions) to be exempted from brokered deposits under certain circumstances.</p><p><strong><em>II — 2. WAL’s Brokered Deposits vs Core Deposits</em></strong></p><p>In the presentation for the earnings call of 1Q 2023, WAL has presented a summary regarding the deposit change from the end of 4Q 2022 to early 2Q 2023 (Slide 3, Exhibit 99.2, 8-K filed on 04/18/2023). According to WAL’s chart, the outflow of non-core deposits contributed significantly to the total deposit outflow of Q1. The real situation, however, is exactly the opposite. As shown in Exhibit 9 below, which illustrated the deposit balance change across the quarters, core deposits dropped by 25% through Q1, whereas brokered deposits jumped significantly, by 72%. Deposit data come from 10-Ks and 10-Qs. Locations are 4Q 2021 Page 122, 1Q 2022 Page 83, 2Q 2022 Page 91, 3Q 2022 Page 93, 4Q 2022 Page 50, and 1Q 2023 Page 76.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*x1XzR5bBX4Lq8n82Q8_JWw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 9</strong>. the change of brokered deposit balance versus core deposit balance across recent quarters. Data are from WAL’s 10-Qs and 10-Ks, with specific location provided in the main text.</p><p>During Q2, WAL made a series of deposit updates from April to May, stressing the increase of total deposits balance, particularly the substantial increase of the percentage of insured deposits. The company has also claimed the growth of core deposits in the investor update of Q2 (Slide 16, Exhibit 99.1, 8-K filed on 05/16/2023; see Exhibit 10 below). Such a claim, however, is materially false.</p><p>For the serial deposit updates WAL filed from April to May, the company did not disclose the balance of core deposits and/or brokered deposits along the line. Nevertheless, the data available suggested that the core deposit balance declined continuously during the second quarter. As shown in Exhibit 10, since the start of the second quarter, the increase of total deposits was the result of the increase of insured deposits at a much larger scale. During the same time period, however, the uninsured deposit balance declined continuously, with the declining rate comparable to that during the first quarter. Because reciprocal deposits are almost always insured, and large amount of wholesale brokered deposits are also likely to be insured due to the pass-through rule, the balance of uninsured deposits is more indicative to the balance of core deposits. In other words, the vast majority of uninsured deposits outflow came from core deposits.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Hence, the data suggest that the outflow of core deposits has continued during Q2, and the outflow rate should be comparable to that during Q1. WAL’s claim on the growth of core deposits is, thus, materially false.</em></strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*i0YIDjs6vAq566C0_32DmA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 10</strong>. WAL’s false claim regarding core deposit balance change during Q2. <strong>Upper</strong>: from Slide 16, Exhibit 99.1, 8-K filed on 05/16/2023. <strong>Lower</strong>: Bar plots and line plots on deposit balance change during the time period from the beginning of the year to May. The data are from a series of press releases filed by WAL from March to May. Specifically, those are press releases published on Mar 10, Mar 17, Apr 4, Apr 18, May 3, and May 11.</p><p><strong>III. Cheating on Efficiency Ratio:</strong></p><p>The efficiency ratio for banks is calculated as the non-interest expense divided by revenue, with a lower number generally indicating better efficiency. Across financial statements for each quarter, WAL provided two efficiency ratios. As a common practice, one was calculated based on GAAP metrics, and the other was based on non-GAAP metrics, which was referred to as the adjusted efficiency ratio. In their quarterly earnings presentations, WAL provided an alternative efficiency ratio measure, treating deposit costs as interest expense. As both the numerator and denominator are reduced by the same amount (i.e., deposit costs), this calculation yields a most favorable result (lower than the other efficiency ratios, GAAP and non-GAAP, reported in 10-Qs and 10-Ks). However, since deposit costs should not be categorized as interest expense, this arbitrary calculation method is flawed. Thus, the resulting number should not be referred to as the efficiency ratio, regardless of standard or adjusted. The company was, of course, fully aware of it. Therefore, they only presented the misleading efficiency ratio, with deposit costs treated as interest expense, in presentations to investors (e.g., earnings calls, updates, etc.), but never reported such a number in formal financial statements (i.e., 10-Qs and 10-Ks). See Exhibit 11 below for the contrast between the standard calculations for efficiency ratio, including GAAP and non-GAAP, and the arbitrary calculation that applies deposit costs as interest expense.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3MIY4Ra6C0kSHliC6qlwTQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 11</strong>. Different ways used by WAL to calculate the efficiency ratio. <strong>Upper</strong>: Standard ways to calculate the efficiency ratio. One is to use the GAAP metrics and the other is to use the non-GAAP metrics, which generates the adjusted efficiency ratio. Source: 10-Q of Q1 2023, Pages 58 and 62. <strong>Lower</strong>: the arbitrary method which treats deposit costs as interest expense, which was presented in earnings calls and other filing. Source: Press Release Page 18, Exhibit 99.1, 8-K filed on 04/18/2023.</p><p>In each formal financial statement, it was clearly stated that deposit costs belonged to non-interest expense. See Exhibit 12 below, which showed the table of non-interest expense (from 10-Q of 1Q 2023, Page 68).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CqVuF6dmLlUB7F5JcxZR2g.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 12.</strong> Evidence showing that WAL recognized deposits costs as part of non-interest expense, source location provided in the main text.</p><p>In their most recent investor update, WAL presented the misleading figure, while deceitfully claiming that the number was derived using adjusted metrics from formal financial statements (i.e., the adjusted non-interest cost divided by the adjusted revenue). Exhibit 13 below presents details of the trick.</p><blockquote><strong><em>As highlighted here, WAL tried to make investors believe that the arbitrarily calculated number (43.2% instead of 50.0%) was generated by using the non-GAAP metrics reported from the 10-Q (Pages 61–62, 10-Q of 1Q 2023).</em></strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IhxvXdSsFPLBuoftsNOhwg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 13</strong>. Evidence showing the trick played by WAL. Source: Slide 18 of the 2Q 2023 Investor Update (Exhibit 99.1 of 8-K filed on 05/16/2023). Also see the Appendix for math calculations.</p><p>Certainly, as explained in Section I of the article here, the real situation of 1Q 2023 is a loss for WAL. Accordingly, most financial metrics are negative if accounted correctly. Thus, it is financially irrelevant to discuss the efficiency ratio for WAL as the revenue is negative. <strong>This section is just to present another example showing how far the company has reached in fraudulent accounting</strong>.</p><p><strong>IV. A Couple More Fraud Cases Out of <em>who-knows-how-many</em> Committed by WAL</strong></p><p>The cases outlined above only represent a fraction of the numerous fraud instances attributed to WAL. It’s impractical to detail all such cases, given their sheer volume. Below, just to present a couple more cases.</p><p>In their investor update (Slide 11, Exhibit 99.1, 8-K filed on 05/16/2023), WAL compared the percentage of insured deposits and Loan-to-Deposit Ratio of itself with those of peers, but using different measures, as shown below in Exhibit 14. For the percentage of insured deposits, WAL used the data of itself as of 05/12, but the data of others as of 03/31. For the Loan-to-Deposit Ratio, WAL used the loans HFI to deposits ratio of itself, but the Loan-to-Deposit Ratio of peers.</p><p>By default, the Loan-to-Deposit Ratio utilizes the total loan value. Under normal circumstances, substituting loans HFI for total loans wouldn’t significantly alter the ratio, given that liquid loans (loans HFS) typically represent a minuscule fraction of total loans (e.g., &lt; 1%). However, as explained in Section I, the 5.9 billion loans that were transferred from loans HFI to loans HFS were not liquid assets. Therefore, at the very least, WAL should have used the non-liquid loans to deposits ratio for comparison if it didn’t opt for the standard Loan-to-Deposit Ratio. Accordingly, instead of what was shown in Exhibit 14-A (from Q2’s investor update: Slide 11, Exhibit 99.1, 8-K filed on 05/16/2023), the true picture should be Exhibit 14-B. The non-liquid loans to deposit ratio reached 110% for WAL, a very unsafe level, far above the ratio of any other bank (of which the total loans to deposit ratio was used, so the non-liquid loans to deposit ratio can only be lower than what is shown here).</p><p>For the percentage of insured deposits, it is common knowledge that the comparison should be conducted for the <strong><em>same date</em></strong> across all banks. If using the data of 03/31, then, WAL’s percentage of insured deposits was 68%, within the upper half among all banks (Exhibit 14-B), which is totally fine. Instead, WAL claimed that it “<em>has the highest insured deposit percentage among the top-50 largest U.S. banks</em>” (Q2’s investor update: Slide 11, Exhibit 99.1, 8-K filed on 05/16/2023), by using the data of 05/12 of itself to compare with the data of 03/31 of other banks. As discussed in Section II, a high percentage of insured deposits isn’t inherently good or bad (it’s worth noting that in this comparison, JPM has the lowest percentage of insured deposits). The percentage of insured or uninsured deposits needs to be analyzed together with its specific context. If all core deposits were gone for WAL, with only brokered deposits left, then its percentage of insured deposits would be well above 90%. Regardless though, making such a comparison — using different dates across the compared entities — makes little sense and is ethically questionable.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*B93WdN8UwcE50ulJ6-YVCQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 14. A. </strong>Misleading and unethical comparison made by WAL with data distorted. Source: Q2’s investor update: Slide 11, Exhibit 99.1, 8-K filed on 05/16/2023). <strong>B.</strong> The corrected picture showing the comparison between WAL and other banks. See the main text for details.</p><p>Also in the investor update filed on 05/16 (Slide 20, Exhibit 99.1, 8-K), WAL compared its own ROAA (Return on Average Assets) and ROATCE (Return on Average Tangible Common Equity) metrics with the average of its peers, as shown below in Exhibit 15. However, WAL used the non-GAAP measures of itself to compare with the GAAP measures of peers, which is apparently false. This is like comparing apples with oranges. When all companies are compared using the same standard, the GAAP metrics, then the corrected positions of WAL are marked with red dots in the graphs of ROAA and ROATCE (see Exhibit 15 below).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hvH_0W0cBgDbFAFUfMXCyg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Exhibit 15. </strong>Comparison of ROAA and ROATCE between WAL and its peers, with the corrected position of WAL marked with red dots. The original comparison was made using non-GAAP metric of WAL and GAAP metrics of other banks (see the main text for details). Note that the author only corrected the data of 1Q23 for WAL. The author did not verify the data for previous years, and thus has no comments regarding whether the data for WAL in previous years, as presented in the original graph, were correct or not. Source: The graphs are from 2Q’s investor update (Slide 20, Exhibit 99.1, 8-K filed on 05/16/2023). The table is from 10-Q of 1Q 2023 (Page 59).</p><p><strong>V. Concluding Remarks and Prospects</strong></p><p>The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank in March marked the start of the regional bank crisis. Several months have elapsed since then, and from a stock price perspective, regional banks performed admirably last month. Is the crisis over? It certainly doesn’t appear to be. The Fed has been continuously raising the interest rate and more hikes ahead are expected. Normally a higher rate is a good thing for a bank because it often lifts the net interest margin, on the assumption that the bank can keep deposits at a lower interest rate. However, that is not the case for those mid-sized regional banks in the current climate. A recent article from Bloomberg, “<em>Hot Money” Is Piling Up at Banks and It’s Starting to Take a Toll</em> (Written by Surane, Lin and Benhamou, published on Jun 28th), has presented a nice analysis on the fierce deposit competition among regional banks. More recently, as those big banks have increased their interest rates for deposits, it only becomes more difficult for mid-sized regional banks to keep their deposits while maintaining the net interest margin at an acceptable level.</p><p>Meanwhile, the combination of remote work culture and the up-going interest rates hit the market of commercial real estate really hard. There have already been many good analyses/articles on this topic, so no need to repeat them here. It has been widely expected that some kind of commercial real estate crisis will come. It is not a question of if, but a question of when. For regional banks such as WAL, which conducts a significant portion of its business in commercial real estate, this is unwelcome news.</p><p>Although the situation is tough, if WAL could’ve focused on strategic asset disposition and acted earlier, the company would’ve been in a much better situation. Regrettably, WAL opted for a different strategy — one of fraudulent accounting and data fabrication. This is a one-way path with no turning back. As Sir Walter Scott said, “<em>Oh, what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive</em>!” Next, WAL will report its earnings for Q2. The company needs more sophisticated data fabrication tricks and creative financial metrics adjustments to conceal the loss from asset disposition, which they hid from Q1, and thus they will have to hide again. More and more eye-opening frauds by WAL are coming. As disruptive as they will be to the market, a positive side is that those upcoming frauds will continue to make solid contributions to research and education as fresh and live examples.</p><p>WAL, with its consistent engagement in fraudulent accounting, is certainly an extreme outlier from a statistical perspective. Most, if not all, other regional banks do not manage their business this way. Facing similarly stressful situations, instead of getting busy playing with numbers, most small-to-mid-sized banks focused on strategic change to better deal with the challenges. For instance, since the beginning of the year, PacWest Bancorp (PACW) has begun downsizing its operations, and recognizing losses by disposing assets instead of watching the unrealized losses expanding. Throughout the crisis, PACW has maintained transparency concerning asset sales, an increase in brokered deposits, and so forth. Interestingly, honesty doesn’t seem to be rewarded. In contrast, fraudulent practices appear to be rewarded, at least for the moment.</p><p>An apt analogy for this phenomenon would be cheating in exams. From the sole purpose of acquiring higher scores, cheating is unquestionably a more efficient way compared to hard studying. This is why cheating just cannot be eliminated. To minimize the occurrence of cheating, a common strategy for the regulators is to lift the punishment, so potential cheaters have to think more about the risks before committing cheating. In contrast, if the regulators just do not care, then more and more cheating will come out, and eventually exams will turn into a competition of cheating.</p><p>Similarly, in financial markets, if regulators choose to ignore fraudulent practices, it’s foreseeable that an increasing number of companies will engage in fraud, fostering an environment of unfair competition. This is especially true in stressed circumstances. Given the current situation, will more regional banks, apart from WAL, begin shifting their strategy towards fraudulent accounting and data fabrication? Frankly, I don’t have the answer. Ideally, more qualified individuals and institutions, like the responsible regulators, are supposed to address this question.</p><p><strong>Appendix</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UHmkfkLaAkxBv4f9ppDeNg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Appendix 1. </strong>Calculation of efficiency ratio, showing how the GAAP and non-GAAP efficiency ratios were generated, and which metrics were used as variables. Source of the tables: 10-Q of 1Q 2023, Pages 61 and 62.</p><p><strong>Disclosure</strong></p><p>As shown here, the primary purpose of this article is for research, education, and to contribute to improved market regulation. As it presents alleged fraudulent activities by WAL, a currently trading company, the information contained herein may negatively impact WAL’s stock price. In the interest of full transparency, I disclose that I am holding a fistful of puts, in the pursuit of a better market tomorrow, beyond a fistful of dollars.</p><p>The data used are all publicly accessible, and the analyses are transparent and straightforward. There is no intent to defame or distort any fact related to WAL, and I accept full responsibility for the statements made in this article. If necessary, I am willing to disclose my identity. In the end, please note that investing in the stock market always carries risk, and one should consult with a financial advisor before making any investment decisions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=34e8e5cf744d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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