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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Zega Ras-Work on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Zega Ras-Work on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Zega Ras-Work on Medium</title>
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        <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 11:32:37 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Workforce of the Future: Climate Change and Employment]]></title>
            <link>https://zegaandenet.medium.com/the-workforce-of-the-future-climate-change-and-employment-af85c99e4020?source=rss-ad146f3b8646------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[future]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[employment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[careers]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zega Ras-Work]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 08 Feb 2024 21:03:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-08T21:03:48.835Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7xBMID_mhJB6jyMuKox-dQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: Solar Workforce Development | Department of Energy</figcaption></figure><p>Climate change is not only a biophysical problem, but it is a “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wicked_problem">wicked problem</a>”. It is an issue of immense complexity, with interconnected social, economic, and cultural issues that require transformative and wide-ranging solutions that will require our collective efforts to address. This provides opportunities for employment–even President Biden has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ifp9UtoxA3Q">said</a> “when I think climate change, I think jobs”.</p><p>But how do we normally think about “climate jobs”? How is that changing? What will the future look like for people working to mitigate and adapt climate change?</p><p><strong>Clean Energy Jobs and the “Workforce Bottleneck”</strong></p><p>To begin, often when we talk about climate change, we talk about energy. That’s common for emissions reduction, but also for employment. With major recent legislation like the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), there has been a major federal push for clean energy development, which includes cultivating a skilled workforce. The IIJA funds workforce development, including apprenticeship, pre-apprenticeship, and on-the-job training programs in sectors like transportation and public infrastructure, while the IRA offers significant tax incentives to employers who pay prevailing wages and hire registered apprentices for eligible renewable energy projects.</p><p>According to a Deloitte <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-industry-outlook.html">report</a>, clean energy jobs have surged by 10% over the past two years, representing 3.3 million positions, mainly in energy efficiency and renewable generation. Projections highlight wind turbine service technicians and solar photovoltaic installers as the fastest-growing occupations from 2022 through 2032. Despite the growth, workforce shortages loom, with a current half-a-million workforce shortage in the construction sector. While US green job postings grew 20% in 2022, green talent only grew 8.4%, revealing a growing skills gap.</p><p>This is particularly true for emerging subsectors like clean hydrogen, where there are skill gaps in essential roles relating to electrical engineering, manufacturing processes, computer science, tooling, mechanical engineering, automation, and machining. Generative AI is also reshaping workforce needs, especially in solar and wind power generation, where engineering professionals will need to apply AI-powered technologies to administrative and automated construction work. Tech startup founders have <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2023/09/20/american-climate-corps-climatetech-labor/">publicly lamented</a> the labor shortfall to meet in-demand jobs in the energy and electrification sectors.</p><p>These represent important challenges that can be addressed by cross-collaboration between educational institutions, governments, and firms. However, this to me is a narrow view of climate jobs and their challenges. While policymakers and investors are primarily focused on improving technical skills in the workforce, there are other issues beyond the construction of clean energy infrastructure that can be addressed by a new generation of climate professionals.</p><p><strong>A Broader Framework for Climate Jobs</strong></p><p>If climate change is indeed a wicked problem, being connected to every aspect of human life–food production, water resources, human health, biodiversity, infrastructure, energy, and more–new jobs and new roles across every sector will be necessary. It is in this context that the Biden administration created the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/20/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-launches-american-climate-corps-to-train-young-people-in-clean-energy-conservation-and-climate-resilience-skills-create-good-paying-jobs-and-tackle-the-clima/">American Climate Corps initiative</a> in September 2023 to train young people in clean energy, conservation, and climate resilience skills through paid service opportunities. Projects that participants will work include “restoring coastal wetlands to protect communities from storm surges and flooding, deploying clean energy, managing forests to improve health and prevent catastrophic wildfires, implementing energy efficient solutions to cut energy bills for hardworking families, and more.” The initiative, supported by federal departments and agencies, will provide pathways to high-quality employment in the public and private sectors, with no prior experience required for most positions.</p><p>While a commendable effort, the program aims to create just 20,000 jobs. This is substantial, but the program does not meet the scale of the Civilian Conservation Corps launched by President Franklin Roosevelt during the Great Depression–which employed 300,000 people at 1,400 camps across the country–that inspired it. Though some have lambasted the program as “<a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/2023/10/05/opinion/climate-crisis-american-climate-corps-biden/">weak</a>”, the program can and should be viewed as a positive start toward increasing employment that explicitly focuses on addressing climate change and expanding how we think about climate jobs. Indeed, while our focus should be on mitigating climate change, the reality is that we are <a href="https://nca2023.globalchange.gov/">already experiencing the effects of a changing climate</a> and adapting infrastructure and livelihoods is an important priority as well.</p><p>We should think about how to mobilize private sector and civil society resources toward the oft forgotten work of community resilience coordinators, disaster risk reduction experts, climate educators and many more. In my own career, as someone interested in renewable energy finance, I am intrigued by the concept of envisioning a more extensive array of climate investments, exploring programs driven by alternative funding models. I was inspired by a conversation I had with a Climate and Society alum at M2X, a venture backed start-up founded by Bill Gates’s Breakthrough Energy Ventures that is commercializing a novel gas-to-liquids system to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from methane flaring and venting. We discussed how innovative public investment vehicles, such as Small Business Innovation Research grants, can be reimagined or expanded to support trailblazing technological ventures and ecological initiatives. Our impact on climate change will be limited by how we can imagine our workforce’s skills and contributions to a response to climate change.</p><p><strong>Looking Forward</strong></p><p>In the kaleidoscopic landscape of tomorrow’s climate jobs, professionals might emerge as eco-visionaries sculpting a sustainable world with their diverse talents. Picture pollution alchemists that transform waste into renewable resources through cutting-edge biotechnologies, or climate choreographers orchestrating urban green spaces to harmonize with nature’s rhythms. Imagine eco-architects crafting buildings that breathe, adapt, and generate their energy, while ocean stewards nurture marine ecosystems with innovative aquaculture methods. From eco-culinary artists creating sustainable meals to eco-psychologists nurturing resilience in a climate-challenged psyche, every individual might make their unique contribution to our climate future.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=af85c99e4020" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Between Science and Policy: Becoming a Climate Change Professional]]></title>
            <link>https://zegaandenet.medium.com/between-science-and-activism-becoming-a-climate-change-professional-cc8173230348?source=rss-ad146f3b8646------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[columbia-university]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[activism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zega Ras-Work]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Feb 2024 21:02:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-03T04:41:23.750Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fRe-uaNFmMsffQI6RcKr1A.png" /><figcaption>Low Library seen from the front lawn at Columbia University (Photo: Office of the Secretary)</figcaption></figure><h3>Returning to Medium</h3><p>Hello! It has been a while since I’ve written on this site. If you’re new here, welcome!</p><p>My last article here was a <a href="https://medium.com/@zegaandenet/how-gerd-can-transform-power-provision-in-the-nile-basin-weaspire-aa20bb4d1343">repost</a> from <a href="https://www.weaspire.info/how-gerd-can-transform-power-provision-in-the-nile-basin/">WeAspire</a>, when I wrote about the potential for an integrated East African energy market, in the summer of 2021. So much has changed since then. I got to travel as an adult in a re-opened world following the pandemic, begin studies in anthropology to complement my economics and environmental sciences backgrounds, and I developed a deeper sense of faith. I took on some incredible professional opportunities, including working as an intern on Capitol Hill with the Senate Committee for Energy and Natural Resources. In my coursework, I worked on incredible projects that led me to meet my personal heroes, including Dr. Robert Bullard, the father of environmental justice. Finally, in May 2023, I had the privilege of graduating from Georgetown University!</p><p>After a summer of traveling, time with family and close friends, I returned to the U.S. to begin a new adventure. I moved to New York City to begin a masters in the Climate and Society program at Columbia University’s recently inaugurated Climate School. If you’ve read this blog or talked to me, you’ll understand that climate change has been deeply important to me. I grew up in Ethiopia, where <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/27/climate/horn-of-africa-somalia-drought.html">drought and famine</a> are deeply intertwined with our recent history and renewable energy (namely the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-gerd-dam-a-potential-boon-for-all-experts-say/a-65254058">largest hydroelectric dam in Africa</a>) is viewed as the path to the country’s economic future. In my coursework at Columbia, I’ve gotten the chance to tackle topics like climate change mitigation and adaptation, atmospheric sciences, energy systems, sustainable development, quantitative analysis, as well as ESG and green investment principles, and more. Climate and Society has given me the flexibility to define my academic experience beyond its core curriculum, and it has been an enriching journey thus far.</p><h3>What is the Climate and Society program?</h3><p>In this blog, I want to explore what this life choice has meant for me. <a href="https://climatesociety.ei.columbia.edu/">Climate and Society</a> is “interdisciplinary” and is at the “nexus of social science, climate science, and public policy”, and trains graduates to understand and address “the impacts of climate change and climate variability on society and the environment”. But what does that mean? Climate science? Policy?</p><p>A lot of people ask whether I am becoming a climate scientist. I have studied the fundamental physical processes that govern the climate system and how to interpret climate information like forecasts and observational maps. However, this does not make me an atmospheric scientist; part of the program’s aim is to teach us the skills to “translate” climate information — precipitation forecasts, climate models and projections, risk assessments, meteorological warnings , etc. — into actionable insights that empower decisionmakers to respond accordingly.</p><p>Others have asked, once I graduate, does that make me a climate activist? Is this just a policy advocacy program? I don’t think one needs a degree to become an activist of any type. Gatekeeping and elitism in these spaces sort of defeats the purpose, right? Living in DC, I found myself in activist circles long before I thought of applying to grad school. I had gotten involved with national climate activist groups in my freshman year of college in 2019, when Greta Thunberg was TIME Magazine’s <a href="https://time.com/person-of-the-year-2019-greta-thunberg/">Person of the Year</a>, and later on engaged with local environmental action networks in DC as a junior returning from lockdown. While C+S does offer classes on climate change law and policy that facilitate a move in the direction of policy advocacy, it really is up to the student what path they want to take.</p><h3>Is Science “Diluted” or Complemented by Activism?</h3><p>I suppose the big question then is: when I’m thinking about climate change, am I impartially following the science? Or am I being an activist? What emerging narratives are important in science and activism and how can the two complement each other? These questions came up in my Applications for Climate and Society course, where we were visited by renowned climate activist <a href="https://www.lung.org/clean-air/stand-up-for-clean-air/climate-activist-advisors/alexandria-villasenor">Alexandria Villaseñor</a>, founder of Earth Uprising International, and climatologist <a href="https://www.giss.nasa.gov/staff/gschmidt/">Dr. Gavin Schmidt</a>, the Director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, for a panel on these topics.</p><p>Their points of view, naturally, are very different. When Dr. Schmidt entered the world of climatology, he was driven by scientific curiosity; when Ms. Villaseñor came into activism, she was driven by her physical experience of climate change — getting respiratory illness from the historically devastating 2020 wildfires in California. Villaseñor believes in the political importance of scientific information, especially as a weapon against misinformation, even characterizing it as a “movement”, while Schmidt was clear that he believes science is a useful tool but not an inherently political activity. Indeed, he and many of his scientist colleagues in the public domain have experienced climate denialism from bad faith actors who have accused them of political partisanship.</p><p>In other areas, their perspectives converged; both agreed that values are deeply important to scientific and activist endeavors and that climate scientists are not simply “objective examiners” of the world but have a role in being vocal about the best available research that is, even if it can be politically contentious. Fundamentally, they agreed that there is an urgent need for science literacy in public policy and activism.</p><p>This discussion was compelling. The aspect that was missing to me was another area of the overlap between science and activism: the political and social forces that influence scientific research, including how research questions are constructed or what populations are studied. How research gets funded, for example, is also determined by political processes. On a global scale, the distribution of resources for scientific research is grossly unequal. This is deeply relevant to how we understand and monitor climate change; <a href="https://e360.yale.edu/features/africa-weather-stations-climate-change">for instance</a>, the U.S. and the E.U. have 636 weather radar stations serving a combined population of 1.1 billion people, while Africa has just 37 for a population of 1.2 billion, which are unevenly distributed across the continent (compromising the quality of the data across spatial and temporal scales). Many of these stations need repairs, and the number of stations in operation decreases as maintenance costs accumulate.</p><p>Thus, the societal and economic conditions of the continent, which cannot be divorced from political and historical injustices, necessarily limit national meteorological agencies’ access to historical data and their ability to monitor and forecast the regional climate system. As these countries face serious climate hazards in a warming world, this information will be critical for policymakers to use and access. Thus, in instances like this, there certainly is a need for scientists and activists to call for justice, both for the quality of the data on our global climate system and saving human lives with science.</p><h3>Moving Forward as a Climate Change Professional</h3><p>As I continue my journey in Climate and Society, I hope to continue to ask these kinds of questions in hopes that we can use scientific information for the public good. To me, being a professional focused on climate change transcends defined, limited categories that silo disciplinary knowledge, especially as we confront the interdisciplinary challenges of climate change.</p><p>Thank you for reading this far. I plan to write weekly blogs like this one to share my thoughts on a number of topics relating to climate change, energy, environmentalism, technology, and agriculture.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cc8173230348" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How GERD can transform power provision in the Nile Basin — weASPiRE]]></title>
            <link>https://zegaandenet.medium.com/how-gerd-can-transform-power-provision-in-the-nile-basin-weaspire-aa20bb4d1343?source=rss-ad146f3b8646------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[power]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investment]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zega Ras-Work]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 24 Aug 2021 23:01:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-09-09T17:36:28.686Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>How GERD can transform power provision in the Nile Basin — weASPiRE</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M9_6RrGM1Stx80mHawA-3A.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.weaspire.info/how-gerd-can-transform-power-provision-in-the-nile-basin/"><em>https://www.weaspire.info</em></a><em> on August 24, 2021.</em></p><p>A wind of change is blowing through the Nile Basin. After a decade of construction, Ethiopia <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210719-ethiopia-reaches-second-year-target-for-filling-disputed-nile-mega-dam">completed</a> its second filling of its Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on July 19, 2021 allowing it to begin generating power in <a href="https://twitter.com/dw_amharic/status/1435988572377649153?s=20">October</a> of this year. Doing so has tensed relations with downstream riparians Sudan and Egypt, who have expressed concerns over their water security. The countries’ dispute over the Nile waters is underpinned by an inequitable water sharing status quo (explained very clearly <a href="https://www.weaspire.info/the-elephant-in-the-room-what-is-behind-the-stalled-gerd-negotiation-and-how-should-it-move-forward/">here</a> by scientist and water management expert Dr Tirusew Asefa) that allocates no water for Ethiopia or other upstream riparian states. These tensions take <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/egypt-and-ethiopia-clash-over-nile-river-dam-as-water-scarcity-looms-world-wide-11625925602">center stage</a> in discussions on interstate relationships in the Nile Basin, often overshadowing the opportunities for cooperation brought by GERD. Beyond the well-known benefits of the dam to downstream countries​​-including flow and sediment control resulting in increased irrigation and hydropower production, flood mitigation, and reduced evaporation loss and enhanced water storage-GERD could transform not just Ethiopia’s power sector, but that of the broader region. Ethiopia’s dam presents the most substantial opportunity for electricity-based cooperation between Nile Basin countries.</p><p>Once it meets domestic energy demand, Ethiopia will be able to trade excess generated power with its neighbors through the <a href="https://eappool.org/">East Africa Power Pool (EAPP)</a> project, an interconnection of eleven countries’ electricity grids in Eastern Africa, including Egypt and Sudan. While the intergovernmental MOU to establish EAPP was signed in 2005, electricity trading has been low, despite Ethiopia <a href="https://www.trade.gov/knowledge-product/ethiopia-energy">exporting</a> power to Djibouti, Sudan, and Kenya. GERD can significantly scale up existing regional electricity trade and create new partnerships. In the short to medium term, Ethiopia can increase power exports to Sudan which, in turn, can export to Egypt, and both can take advantage of needed, cheap hydroelectricity. In the long term, as new energy projects develop, GERD and EAPP can bring a vibrant cross-border electricity market to life, lifting hundreds of millions of Africans out of poverty.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/685/1*WO9p-lNrR3WvCpxlgX6QhA.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Map of EAPP (source: <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-08275-7/figures/1">Sridharan et. al</a>)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Ending Energy Poverty in Sudan<br></strong>Sudan’s incentives for using integrated electricity are clear. Only <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?locations=SD">54 percent</a> of the country’s 43 million residents have access to electricity, and its demand for power will increase significantly as it ramps up <a href="https://suna-news.net/read?id=715134">production</a> in agriculture and industrial manufacturing. Sudan has also already <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/energy/data/iea-world-energy-statistics-and-balances/world-energy-balances_data-00512-en">established</a> interconnectors with a capacity of 200 megawatts (MW) to import electricity from Ethiopia and may seek to do more in the future. In June 2019, the country’s <a href="https://ewsdata.rightsindevelopment.org/files/documents/40/WB-P175040.pdf">total available power capacity</a> was just 2,800 MW to service a peak demand of 3,800 MW, leaving a deficit of 1,000 MW. This forced the country to ration power which continued through 2020 and this year, with load shedding (electricity generation not meeting demand) and fuel shortages contributing to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-prime-minister-warns-risk-chaos-civil-war-2021-06-15/">political dissatisfaction and instability</a>.</p><p>Further, it is expected that in an integrated power market, the supply increase from GERD would <a href="https://hess.copernicus.org/articles/19/2275/2015/hess-19-2275-2015.pdf">drive down</a> electricity prices, Ethiopia can sell electricity to Sudan at just $0.04 per kilowatt-hour (kWh), half the normal price of electricity in Sudan. Indeed, importing electricity from Ethiopia at a low price per kWh could support rural electrification, irrigation, and displace fossil fuels which are more <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2718596/sudan-starts-2021-500-increase-electricity-prices">expensive</a> after the country repealed its fuel subsidies. It may have the ability to pay for these imports using its newfound <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/7/16/sudan-gets-14bn-in-debt-relief-from-paris-club">$14 billion in debt relief</a> from international creditors. Power trade offers Sudan a chance at lifting itself out of energy poverty and into an industrialized future.</p><p><strong>Clean Energy &amp; Energy Security in Egypt<br></strong>On the other hand, Egypt’s need for cheap hydropower is less obvious but still very relevant. Since 2016, 100 percent of the 100 million residents of the ancient nation have had access to electricity. According to the latest annual Egyptian Electricity Holding Company (EEHC) <a href="http://www.moee.gov.eg/english_new/EEHC_Rep/2018-2019en.pdf">report</a>, Egypt had a total installed capacity of 58 gigawatts (GW) connected to the national grid and generated 199,834 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of energy in 2019. The nation consumed 151,908 GWh, making it the single largest electricity user among EAPP member states. Egypt, unlike Ethiopia and Sudan, does not have an energy poverty problem.</p><p>However, Egypt faces significant challenges in its electricity sector that integration and hydropower can help address. To begin, according to EEHC, over 90 percent of Egypt’s generated power comes from thermal sources (oil and natural gas), while only 6 percent and 2 percent come from hydropower and other renewables respectively, since the High Aswan Dam (HAD) mostly serves as a flood protection and irrigation dam rather than a hydroelectric plant. Egypt has also been a <a href="https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/EGY">net importer of oil</a> since 2011, with an increasing deficit between its consumption and production.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/583/1*PrDV_3VVcy41MgJSiW7Cww.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Egypt oil production and consumption (Source: <a href="https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/EGY">Energy Information Administration</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Given that oil makes up <a href="https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2020-full-report.pdf">38 percent</a> of its consumed energy, the country’s power mix exposes it to global oil supply shocks and rising prices following the pandemic’s global economic effects. In fact, in April, Egypt’s oil ministry was forced to <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/business/energy/2021/04/23/Egypt-oil-ministry-raises-domestic-fuel-prices-for-first-time-since-subsidy-reform">increase</a> domestic fuel prices according to international market movements for the first time in two years and since lowering them under pressure from <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1564106/business-economy">popular protests</a> in 2019.</p><p>Additionally, 54 percent of the country’s energy consumption comes from natural gas, which it produces domestically, threatening its <a href="https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Egypt%20First/Egyptian%20INDC.pdf">decarbonization commitments</a> for the Paris Agreement. Indeed, Egypt’s CO2 <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41207-020-00184-w">emissions</a> reached 250 million tons in 2018, placing it among the thirty highest emitters in the world in terms of energy-related emissions. An estimated 40 percent of those emissions came from its electricity generation sector. In order for Egypt to meet its <a href="https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2018/Oct/IRENA_Outlook_Egypt_2018_En.pdf">goal</a> of having renewables comprise 20 percent of its electricity mix by 2022 and 42 percent by 2035, cooperation with Ethiopia and other EAPP states will be critical.</p><p><strong>The Opportunity for an Ethiopia-Sudan-Egypt Interconnection<br></strong> Ethiopia is naturally endowed with massive hydropower potential, making it a major contributor to regional electricity trade. It’s important to note that the GERD’s deeper and narrower reservoir loses just 1.7 billion cubic meters (BCM) annually to evaporation compared to that of HAD which loses 12 BCM per year. This is worth noting because less volume of water lost to evaporation means more water can produce useful work. Moreover, it is expected that as global temperatures rise due to climate change, water consumption will increase, so the burden of hydropower generation will shift toward GERD, whose reservoir will minimize evaporative losses, rather than HAD.</p><p>An August 2020 <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S097308262030243X?casa_token=fi_scWqSG6gAAAAA:JoxcoNQviMBy7CP8RokzXZ10bi5s__TB0tAf07J8TOxl3Y8jVu0XMY1V3-_aojIbst7Npk3l8w#f0015">model</a> found that a 3 GW Ethiopia-Sudan-Egypt interconnection could allow Egypt and Sudan to deploy additional intermittent renewable energy such as wind power and solar photovoltaics (PV), while also increasing their energy imports from Ethiopia’s dam to phase out fossil fuels and meet increasing energy demand at lower costs. The integration of wind and PV with hydropower in the three countries could also allow for cross-border electricity trade that is optimized for the seasonal <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-021-00799-5#Sec3">complementarity</a> of intermittent renewables and hydropower in the region.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*P8plXGs_QeT9LfjUZ09Yzg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Map of planned and modelled interconnections, including 3 GW interconnection capacity between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt (Source: <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S097308262030243X?casa_token=fi_scWqSG6gAAAAA:JoxcoNQviMBy7CP8RokzXZ10bi5s__TB0tAf07J8TOxl3Y8jVu0XMY1V3-_aojIbst7Npk3l8w#f0015">Remy and Chattopadhyay 2020</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Overall, trading electricity can boost economic integration and electrification in the three countries. This could establish a foundation for infrastructure development, legal and regulatory coordination, stronger political relationships, as well as enhanced institutional and technical capacity in the region, fully embracing the spirit of Pan-African cooperation.</p><p><strong>What Lies Ahead<br></strong>GERD marks the genesis of a new order in the Nile Basin, not just in terms of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/08/05/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/">water utilization</a>, but also electrical integration, trade, and economic development. The main incentive for African states to pool power is to increase electricity generation while mitigating future greenhouse gas emissions and ensure grid reliability, with lower capital and operational costs. EAPP can also standardize power purchase agreements and increase contract transparency, therefore providing the appropriate institutional framework for an integrated East African power market.</p><p>A reliable grid requires a diversified energy mix; thus, EAPP can foster clean energy development such as PV, wind, hydro, and <a href="https://twitter.com/ZegaRasWork/status/1381065122999771140?s=20">geothermal</a>, lowering power sector emissions. Integrating markets can also expand energy demand beyond domestic markets, allowing megaprojects like GERD or Egypt’s 1650 MW Benban Solar Park to take advantage of economies of scale. Interconnections between power infrastructures can <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ke/Documents/energy-resources/ER_Power%20TL.pdf">lower</a> the overall risk and cost of capital in the sector, stimulating domestic and international investment. This is also empirically correct; the same model estimates that EAPP power trade could add as much as $18.6 billion to the East African economy and reduce CO2 emissions by 30 percent by 2030.</p><p>A major concern for EAPP, however, is hydro-climatic variability in the Nile Basin. <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-08275-7?proof=t#Abs1">Research</a> finds that major droughts induced by climate change could affect trade negatively, especially for hydro-dominant systems like Ethiopia’s. Thus, EAPP member states must create an integrated system consisting of a diversified set of power sources to safeguard the power sector from climate impacts. Cross-border electricity trade is essential to establishing this integration and efficiently distributing power to where it is most needed.</p><p>GERD heralds the emergence of a new era of electrification, development, and cooperation. Ultimately, the interplay of geopolitical conflict over water sharing and the lucrative potential for electricity exchange means that the Basin will see great change in the years to come. EAPP represents the region’s greatest opportunity to harness its natural resources for electrical and economic development, and GERD may just be the spark needed to wake it from over a decade of dormancy.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.weaspire.info/how-gerd-can-transform-power-provision-in-the-nile-basin/"><em>https://www.weaspire.info</em></a><em> on August 24, 2021.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aa20bb4d1343" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Can we balance Africa’s electricity needs with global decarbonization? — On the Record]]></title>
            <link>https://zegaandenet.medium.com/can-we-balance-africas-electricity-needs-with-global-decarbonization-on-the-record-71ed414ca249?source=rss-ad146f3b8646------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/71ed414ca249</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[renewable-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[usa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zega Ras-Work]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Apr 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-05T17:26:30.960Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Can we balance Africa’s electricity needs with global decarbonization? — On the Record</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ivkso150Xoesjp-O" /></figure><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://ontherecordgu.com/student-opinions/2021/4/28/can-we-balance-africas-electricity-needs-with-global-decarbonization"><em>https://ontherecordgu.com</em></a><em> on April 28, 2021.</em></p><p><strong>ZEGA RAS-WORK: </strong>The Biden administration will divest from fossil fuels internationally, as indicated by U.S. Climate Envoy John Kerry’s at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 27, stating that the U.S. would halt “international financing of fossil fuel projects with public money.” This has been demonstrated in the international donor community’s policy toward Africa. In March, 260 NGOs urged banks not to finance a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/africa-energy-rights/banks-urged-to-steer-clear-of-east-africa-oil-pipeline-financing-idINL3N2KZ34T?edition-redirect=in">$3.5 billion oil pipeline </a>in East Africa, because of concerns around local environmental destruction and greenhouse gas emissions. This decision prompted scholars and activists from the continent to ask: what alternatives are western donors, and the Biden administration in particular, offering Uganda, Tanzania and other nations to generate electric power and stimulate their economies?</p><p>In this case, the NGOs had no answer. This is significant because, of the <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/sdg7-data-and-projections/access-to-electricity">770 million people without electricity access </a>around the world, 75 percent live in Africa, a share that has risen over recent years. The problem of how to factor the basic electricity needs of developing countries, particularly in Africa, into climate change mitigation goals represents a conspicuous gap in U.S. foreign policy and in the global energy transition discussion more broadly. This issue has engendered divergent perspectives; some have <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-07-31/solar-and-mobile-technology-will-fuel-africa-s-future-economy">argued</a> that solar power, given its falling costs, independence from the grid and job creation potential, can significantly electrify Africa without simultaneously increasing carbon emissions. Others maintain that the west’s policy of rejecting fossil fuel projects in Africa is <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1980339/bidens-plan-to-eliminate-fossil-fuels-wont-work-in-africa/">counterproductive </a>, because African states will opt for “dirty” fuels with worse health and environmental impacts like coal if prevented from using “cleaner” natural gas for electrification. These views aren’t mutually exclusive; renewable energy has a significant role in the future of Africa, but U.S. foreign policy should not attempt to force African nations to adopt renewables at an unprecedented scale, before they have the capacity and resources to do so.</p><p>When Joe Biden took office in January, his Defense Department officially recognized climate change as a <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2021/01/27/climate-change-is-now-a-national-security-priority-for-the-pentagon/">threat to national security </a>. The administration has signaled that international climate financing will play a major role in its foreign policy response to the climate crisis, having released the first ever <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/22/executive-summary-u-s-international-climate-finance-plan/">International Climate Finance Plan </a>on April 22. Among other commitments, the plan states that “Departments and agencies will seek to end international investments in and support for carbon-intensive fossil fuel-based energy projects.” This follows actions taken by U.S. allies in Europe, whose development finance institutions have <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50427873">begun divesting </a>from fossil fuels internationally. However, policy experts believe that an indiscriminate ban on fossil fuels in Africa could <a href="https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/541554-economic-growth-in-africa-will-not-be-achieved-by-a?rl=1">hurt</a> regional economic development and electrification, and even stifle the continent’s efforts to adapt to climate change.</p><p>It is true that solar power can drive African development. There are 70 countries with <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/466331592817725242/global-photovoltaic-power-potential-by-country">excellent conditions </a>for solar photovoltaic (PV) power generation (in terms of kilowatt hours per installed kilowatt peak) the vast majority of which are African. This potential is already starting to be explored; 2020 saw <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/fintech-solar-startups-kept-funding-232944113.html?guccounter=1&amp;guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&amp;guce_referrer_sig=AQAAANw4YsTKRJ-hap0gAG_F198D3YwC0yFbDlkyyiIZ79HsI09BgbWQigaJm-oCJZ7PkdiTMd70tVeIIK8onmvHMvc7YUD-U3GB8OoIhi_cQKRC2sj8pDNdDOUxDLPWQsNH-Rczrhj_jsuqYJSvIePEBob254D4AjAlnYgf-a3-nCvu">$1.3 billion</a> of venture capital invested in African tech startups, matching a record set in 2019, with a significant amount going to solar startups. Despite this, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/africa-energy-climate/africas-leap-to-clean-energy-seen-needing-policy-change-investment-idUKL8N2JM3T3">massive under-investment </a>is holding Africa’s clean energy transition back, and the continent needs climate finance from rich nations to take advantage of its electricity potential. Without this funding, African countries have turned toward fossil fuels, which are often naturally abundant within their own borders. Climate-smart policy would finance clean energy development in Africa, an example being the <a href="https://www.afrik21.africa/en/ghana-accra-and-bern-to-cooperate-on-green-technologies-and-clean-energy/">historic</a> deal between Ghana and Switzerland to finance green technology such as solar PV and clean cookstoves through private sector partnerships. Indeed, a key component of the new International Climate Finance Plan is increasing investments in clean energy abroad, through public and private finance.</p><p>There are some important limitations to this solution though, however. Some of the most important aspects of ending energy poverty have less to do with generation but rather involve improving the grid, expanding energy storage and fixing utilities firms. There is also the question of how to proceed with “transition fuels” like natural gas, which are cheaper and less environmentally harmful than fuels like coal and wood. Utilities companies in Africa are making net losses, which impacts their ability to provide consumers power; a 2016 World Bank <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25091">study</a> of 39 African nations found that only Uganda and Seychelles have utilities that recovered their capital and operational costs. There are many reasons for the financial woes of Africa’s utilities sector, including volatility in oil prices, but a relevant one is the intermittency of renewables. For example, in Kenya, large scale projects like the 310 megawatt (MW) Lake Turkana wind farm and 50 MW Garissa solar PV farm have put <a href="https://www.energyforgrowth.org/blog/our-latest-thoughts-on-kenyas-power-sector-challenges/">massive strain </a>on the power grid, which has driven up the costs of managing the grid to respond to these fluctuations and compromised the reliability of electricity.</p><p>These issues require targeted investments into transmission and grid management technology, support for utilities and most importantly <a href="https://www.esi-africa.com/industry-sectors/future-energy/op-ed-energy-storage-will-boost-africas-energy-transformation/">energy storage </a>, where there is currently a significant market gap. Until African development can reliably depend on renewable energy, there will likely be a role for gas-to-power projects to act as a transition to a clean energy future, which the U.S. should support. Indeed, Power Africa, the US Agency for International Development (USAID)’s initiative for electrification in Africa has <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica/annualreport">funded and partnered</a> with African countries to build gas-fired plants, such as the new 450 MW power plant in Mozambique, and develop critical electricity infrastructure. USAID is also working with the African Development Bank to finance 343 kilometers of transmission lines to connect grids in the northern, central, and southern regions of Angola, addressing a major supply gap and increasing electricity access. While countries desperately need more power, the infrastructure needs to be developed in order to support it, and this is especially true for renewables.</p><p>As agencies like USAID and the U.S. Development Finance Corporation release the specifics of their climate finance strategies, in line with Biden’s Climate Finance Plan, they should also support natural gas development in low-emission energy-poor countries, which are disproportionately concentrated in Africa. Experts <a href="https://www.energyforgrowth.org/blog/what-happens-to-global-emissions-if-africa-triples-down-on-natural-gas-for-power/">believe</a> that, even under extreme scenarios, natural gas power would not substantially increase the continent’s share of global carbon emissions and could replace more carbon-intensive fuels like wood that are widely used across the continent for cooking and other purposes. Additionally, if U.S. development finance institutions ban financing for natural gas as a transition fuel entirely, Africa may be incentivized to turn toward China, which is financing <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/05/07/asia-pacific/china-alone-africa-dirty-coal/">several dirty coal plants in Africa</a>, or Russia, which is <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/blogs/oil/071720-insight-from-moscow-russia-strengthens-african-ties-in-energy-and-raw-materials">investing in Africa’s oil sector</a>. In other words, providing finance for some natural gas development would be more effective at lowering Africa’s carbon emissions than a blanket ban on fossil fuels, which would be detrimental to long term U.S. foreign policy objectives.</p><p>Further, the U.S. should increase investments in off-grid solar, as part of the administration’s commitment to scale up green technology financing. This would transform the lives of people in countries with unreliable or non-existent grids and even allow factories to generate power independently as well. With a <a href="https://www.lazard.com/media/451086/lazards-levelized-cost-of-energy-version-130-vf.pdf">90 percent reduction</a> in the cost of solar over the last decade, and the Department of Energy <a href="https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-announces-goal-cut-solar-costs-more-half-2030">aiming</a> to cut solar costs by an additional 60 percent over this decade, the economic prospects of this option align comfortably with Africa’s electrification and development goals. This could function as a way to alleviate energy poverty on the continent while it develops the generation capacity and infrastructure for utility-scale renewables.</p><p>Overall, global decarbonization and African development are interconnected, and balancing priorities such as the immediate electricity needs of impoverished populations or building costly electricity infrastructure all while trying to limit carbon emissions is difficult. However, these challenges can be met using innovative technologies like off-grid solar, transition fuels like natural gas, and innovative public-private partnerships between the U.S. and Africa.</p><p><em>Zega Ras-Work is a writer interested in renewable energy, economic development and agriculture. He is a sophomore studying political economy and environmental studies in the College.</em></p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://ontherecordgu.com/student-opinions/2021/4/28/can-we-balance-africas-electricity-needs-with-global-decarbonization"><em>https://ontherecordgu.com</em></a><em> on April 28, 2021.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=71ed414ca249" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[To save the world, America needs to solve energy storage — On the Record]]></title>
            <link>https://zegaandenet.medium.com/to-save-the-world-america-needs-to-solve-energy-storage-on-the-record-930b7dd814b7?source=rss-ad146f3b8646------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/930b7dd814b7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sustainability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[renewable-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zega Ras-Work]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 22 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-10T00:27:23.474Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>To save the world, America needs to solve energy storage — On the Record</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*SXoHEOU1Eq1G5d9Y" /></figure><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://ontherecordgu.com/student-opinions/2021/3/22/to-save-the-world-america-needs-to-solve-energy-storage"><em>https://ontherecordgu.com</em></a><em> on March 22, 2021.</em></p><p><strong>ZEGA RAS-WORK:</strong> President Biden plans to aggressively tackle climate change, mainly by electrifying the American economy. An integral part of this initiative’s success will be whether or not the United States implements grid-scale energy storage, conclusively solving one of green energy’s greatest challenges — the intermittency of wind and solar.</p><p>After successfully passing and implementing the American Rescue Plan, Joe Biden and congressional Democrats must decide on their next legislative priority. The White House has previously touted a climate-focused <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/what-could-be-in-biden-infrastructure-bill-2021-3">infrastructure bill </a>. Separately, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2021/03/10/president-bidens-second-big-bill-may-be-china-package-pushed-by-top-senate-democrat/">proposed</a> legislation to increase U.S. competitiveness against China, including boosting domestic innovation and research spending, among other measures. Whatever the next major spending bill ends up being, the U.S. needs to invest in cheap, scalable energy storage for the grid. Not only could this expedite America’s clean energy transition, but it could help expand renewable energy adoption globally.</p><p>Energy sources like solar and wind are intermittent by nature, producing excessive amounts of energy at peak times or low amounts at suboptimal times, depending on seasonal or daily cyclical changes. This differs from fossil fuels, which supply a constant output called “baseload” energy. In extreme weather events, this intermittency can become a serious liability. For example, California’s massive heat wave last summer <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/17/business/energy-environment/california-blackout-electric-grid.html">compromised </a>multiple natural gas power plants, cutting off baseload energy and slow winds meant that wind power output was low, resulting in blackouts. In order for renewables to fully replace fossil fuels, they require massive energy storage at the scale of grid infrastructure.</p><p>The concept of energy storage isn’t new; pumped storage, using electricity to pump water into an elevated reservoir and releasing it to generate hydroelectricity, has been practiced for over a century. However, for various reasons, some believe pumped storage is becoming <a href="https://theconversation.com/pumped-hydro-isnt-our-energy-future-its-our-past-146989">obsolete</a> for global use, particularly with challenges like water scarcity and scalability. Alternatively, one of the most inexpensive energy storage technologies is the lithium-ion battery (Li-ion), a Nobel prize-winning invention already being put to use to complement renewables. In 2017, Australia commissioned the world’s largest grid-linked energy storage system based on Li-ion technology called the Hornsdale Power Reserve (HPR) in South Australia. So far, HPR’s main purpose has been to make the South Australia grid more resilient with its <a href="https://www.aurecongroup.com/markets/energy/hornsdale-power-reserve-impact-study">fast frequency response </a>capabilities―its ability to quickly discharge energy to regulate grid frequencies when they deviate from a normal alternating current frequency range.</p><p>Battery storage has been advancing quickly. Over the last decade, the price of storage batteries <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-17/this-is-the-dawning-of-the-age-of-the-battery?sref=JMv1OWqN">decreased by 90 percent </a>, down to $137 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) of energy in 2020, due to increases in battery energy density from extensive R&amp;D and economies of scale from mass production. This was only made possible by the high-risk, long-term research and development <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/03/us-agency-says-has-beaten-elon-musk-gates-to-holy-grail-battery-storage">investments</a> of the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E), under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), creating new markets like electric vehicles, storage and grid services. With markets and policies transitioning toward sustainability, it is <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/Sustainability/Our%20Insights/Powering%20up%20sustainable%20energy/Powering-up-sustainable-energy.ashx">projected</a> that global demand for Li-on batteries for energy storage will grow from 7 gigawatt hours (GWh) in 2019 to 457 GWh in 2030. Coupled with the falling costs of solar and wind technology, not only will battery storage grow in the U.S., but developing nations will soon adopt renewables out of self-interest, which has already to <a href="https://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/pakistan-raises-eyebrows-dropping-plans-new-coal-p/#read">begun</a> occur.</p><p>However, while Li-ion batteries are revolutionary, they face serious challenges. There are considerable environmental justice issues in battery production. Lithium <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/lithium-batteries-environment-impact">extraction</a> involves drilling holes in the salt flats of South America and pumping out a mixture of water and minerals, which evaporates and is filtered for lithium carbonate. The process requires 500,000 gallons of water per ton of lithium, and once used up 65 percent of the water supply in Salar de Atacama, Chile. It has also contaminated soil and potable water streams, harming residents of Argentina and Chile living in proximity to lithium mines. Indeed, competing international interests in Bolivia’s lithium reserves threaten its sovereignty over natural resources within its borders.</p><p>Additionally, while we’re beginning to develop Li-ion batteries <a href="https://news.utexas.edu/2020/07/14/new-cobalt-free-lithium-ion-battery-reduces-costs-without-sacrificing-performance/">without cobalt</a>, it is still a key component of commercial batteries today. Approximately <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-sight/wp/2018/02/28/the-cost-of-cobalt/">60 percent</a> of the world’s cobalt comes from mines in the Congo, fuelled by exploitative working conditions and child labor. In Southern Congo, cobalt mining has also released uranium deposits, causing a spike in radioactivity levels in mining regions, polluting rivers and drinking water and exposing unprotected workers to raw cobalt, uniquely toxic in its metal ore form.</p><p>Furthermore, from a performance perspective, the ultimate test for any grid storage technology is its load-shifting ability: whether it can charge when renewables are providing power and discharge power when they are not. In other words, this is how surplus energy from peak times is saved to be used during suboptimal times, to stabilize the grid’s energy supply. While they are currently the best option we have, Li-ions aren’t optimized for grid-scale storage. Because lithium is the lightest metal element, has favorable electrochemical properties and has high energy density for its mass, Li-ion batteries are designed for portable electronics like smartphones and laptops and electric vehicles, rather than stationary storage. Li-ions must be able to store energy for extended periods.</p><p>However, this requirement exposes one of batteries’ weaknesses: degradation. Li-ion batteries degrade because of internal <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2542435119304210#bib1">chemical reactions </a>that diminish their ability to hold a charge over time. This would be accelerated by the strain of loading and unloading a battery storage system to stabilize a grid. Researchers are trying to address this with materials that can replace lithium, such as sodium, which some <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/aenm.202001346">experiments</a> have shown to be very durable in batteries. Sodium-ion batteries are also less <a href="https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acsenergylett.0c02181">costly</a> and less ecologically damaging to produce, due to sodium’s high natural abundance in the oceans. Scientists are also creating storage batteries that operate on <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7c07e492-41eb-4488-bc34-77b9d806ed5c">entirely different chemistries </a>such as liquid metal batteries and vanadium batteries. While some of these prototypes show better load-shifting capabilities and higher cost-savings, these technologies are in early stages and will take time to become marketable products that can be mass manufactured at a price competitive with that of lithium-ions, which continues to fall.</p><p>These challenges require Congress’ funding; the next bill must include R&amp;D funding for energy storage technology. There are still great improvements we can make in conventional <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-19991-4">lithium batteries</a> to make them more effective and cheaper. This requires funding, risk-taking and patience. The U.S. government, through public institutions like ARPA-E, is the only entity that can afford to invest in these high-risk technologies, the dividends of which we won’t reap for decades; it was the federal government that invested in new drilling technology in the 1970s that led to the shale gas revolution of the 2000s; in 2009, the DOE granted a $465 million loan to a risky electric car manufacturing startup called Tesla, now a pioneering company in energy storage and electric vehicles. The next breakthrough in storage will be publicly funded, and yet Congress has been shy to meet the moment. The DOE is severely <a href="https://itif.org/publications/2020/03/30/energy-innovation-fy-2021-budget-congress-should-lead">underfunded</a>, with federal energy R&amp;D funding falling from $10.5 billion in 1978 (inflation-adjusted) to $8 billion in 2020. If federal research investment was at the same share of GDP as in 1978, today’s annual DOE research budget would be $32 billion. Under the Trump administration, ARPA-E was largely sidelined and almost <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00348-2">abolished</a>.</p><p>With the U.S. projected to only contribute 5 percent of <a href="https://www.axios.com/america-climate-change-responsibility-637751d3-4536-405d-a39b-d211ab741d21.html">global cumulative emissions</a> over this century, and 95 percent coming from developing countries in Asia and Africa, the biggest policy impact it can have on global emissions reductions is to make decarbonization cheaper, which energy storage is central to. It is no different to how <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421518305196?via%253Dihub">American R&amp;D</a> led to massive cost reductions in solar photovoltaics, promoting the <a href="https://www.iea.org/news/global-solar-pv-market-set-for-spectacular-growth-over-next-5-years">adoption</a> of solar energy across the world.</p><p>Ultimately, cheap, scalable and environmentally sustainable energy storage will be a key component to scaling renewables up, not just in America, but around the world. The seriousness of climate change requires Mr. Biden and Congress to support America’s science institutions in reaching their innovative potential to accomplish this daunting but important breakthrough.</p><p><em>Zega Ras-Work is a writer interested in renewable energy, economic development and agriculture. He is a sophomore studying political economy and environmental studies in the College.</em></p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://ontherecordgu.com/student-opinions/2021/3/22/to-save-the-world-america-needs-to-solve-energy-storage"><em>https://ontherecordgu.com</em></a><em> on March 22, 2021.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=930b7dd814b7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Can We Feed Our Growing World?]]></title>
            <link>https://zegaandenet.medium.com/can-we-feed-our-growing-world-601c112e966d?source=rss-ad146f3b8646------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/601c112e966d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[biotechnology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[agriculture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gmo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zega Ras-Work]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 21 Feb 2021 16:25:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-28T02:50:19.310Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>While Earth’s population grows, climate change puts pressure on food security. Genetically modified foods might be our best option.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2enEQjrpKkcx-dqdtFkIGA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Wheat fields in Gates County, North Carolina, USA. (Source: <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=72641371">Nyttend</a> — Own work, Public Domain)</figcaption></figure><p>In 1798, the English economist Thomas Malthus predicted that population growth would exceed food production. He believed the human population would expand until it reached the limit of subsistence, at which point starvation, disease, pestilence, and war would reduce the population. This dire idea is predicated on two mathematical arguments: the first is that population can grow geometrically (by a fixed annual percentage) and the second is that food supplies can only grow arithmetically (by a constant annual amount).</p><p>Since his essay was published, agricultural productivity has advanced so rapidly that his prediction was never realized. To the contrary, there are currently 7.5 billion people living on Earth and that’s projected to be 9 billion by 2050. However, this stunning growth has serious implications for global resource use. The world’s demand for food is expected to double in this same period, and many of the innovations we have previously relied on to increase grain production to meet growing demand like fertilizers, new crop varieties, pesticides, and irrigation have been used to their full potential in many countries around the world. In fact, world grain production has begun <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12571-009-0026-y">slumping</a> after grain production per person reached its maximum in the mid-1980s. We are already <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/millions-on-the-brink-of-starvation-as-the-pandemic-exacerbates-world-hunger">struggling</a> to prevent global hunger, climate change <a href="http://annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031816-044356">threatens</a> world food systems, and food demand still grows. In my view, we need to lean into scientific breakthroughs to feed tomorrow’s world, and that means embracing genetic engineering.</p><h3>Past Methods Won’t Save Us</h3><p>Traditionally we’d expand agricultural land, but soil degradation and land uses like grazing are constraining the amount of land we can cultivate. Agriculture-driven deforestation also contributes to global warming, soil erosion, and desertification which makes it harder to grow food. Irrigating arid land has also been a way to increase productivity, but water tables are <a href="https://www.earth-policy.org/books/eco/eech2_ss7">collapsing</a> on every continent due to our water withdrawals exceeding the groundwater recharge rate. Further, many rivers are drying out before reaching the sea, owing to river diversions and dams, making this option less and less available.</p><p>Modern nitrogen fertilizer, invented by German chemist <a href="https://www.sciencehistory.org/historical-profile/fritz-haber">Fritz Haber</a> in 1918 (for which he won the Nobel Prize), is one of the most important scientific breakthroughs in human history. That is not an overstatement; it allowed us to grow enough food to sustain our growing population, preventing the mass starvation and death of our great grandparents. Today, farmers in developing nations can apply fertilizers to boost yields, but industrialized countries are already using the maximum amount of fertilizers that are effective. In fact, in much of the Global North, farmers have only been able to <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-35351-1#Abs1">increase corn production</a>, which requires nitrogen almost as much as water and sunlight.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/799/1*uWPnoVBhqJC7abLtQfaA_g.jpeg" /><figcaption>A farmer applying fertilizer on a maize crop in Kenya. (Source: <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/cimmyt/9608668646"><em>B. Das / CIMMYT</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><p>However nitrogen-based fertilizers, as we’re learning, are full of problems. For example, most ammonium nitrate is lost in rainwater runoff, when its ionic bonds are broken by polar water molecules and it dissolves. The runoff flows into streams and rivers and drains into bodies of water like the Mississippi River and ends up in the Gulf of Mexico. When they reach the Gulf estuary, the nutrients augment the water’s plant growth capacity in a process called eutrophication, creating massive algal blooms. When these algae decompose they absorb much of the dissolved oxygen that fish “breathe” and other plants use. These areas of low dissolved oxygen can’t support marine life and are called “dead zones” or hypoxia. The Gulf houses the second largest dead zone on the planet. Analysis indicates that this ecosystem disaster has a <a href="https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2017/01/24/1617948114">negative</a> impact on seafood prices and fisheries in North America.</p><p>Intensive fertilizer use in global agriculture has also increased the amount of nitrogen cycling between the living world, soil, water, and the atmosphere. Specifically, it has increased the <a href="https://news.berkeley.edu/2012/04/02/fertilizer-use-responsible-for-increase-in-nitrous-oxide-in-atmosphere/">abundance</a> of nitrous oxide (N2O) in the atmosphere. This matters because N2O absorbs <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/TAR-06.pdf">300 times more heat</a> than CO2, drains stratospheric ozone that protects us from harmful ultraviolet radiation, and over its 114 year lifetime it produces a climate feedback in which warmer temperatures increase N2O emissions. This worsens climate-induced droughts, which we are supposed to resist using <em>more </em>nitrogen fertilizer. It’s a self-reinforcing cycle.</p><h3>A Cause for Hope</h3><p>This context is familiar. Much like how at the turn of last century a breakthrough saved us from food shortage, one can help us now. Many scientists <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2013/12/17/112585/why-we-will-need-genetically-modified-foods/">believe</a> that we can genetically engineer plants that produce higher yields than today’s levels. Genetic engineering generally refers to a process called transgenesis, where genes from one organism (called transgenes) are introduced into the genome of another organism to express the transgenes and exhibit new desirable features. Through transgenesis, scientists have been able to, for instance, decode food crop genomes to identify what chromosomes control the plant’s functions, and insert genes from other plants and bacteria that use nitrogen more efficiently into crop cells. The thinking is that if we can get enough nitrogen in our crops without using so much fertilizer, we can minimize our contribution to dead zones and climate change.</p><p>How has it worked? A <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-65684-9">meta-analysis</a> of 130 studies on the nitrogen use efficiency of genetically modified (GM) maize, rice, and wheat from last May found that GM crops produced much more food using much less nitrogen, showing we can grow more food while reducing environmental burdens and increasing economic gains. That has promising implications for addressing food shortages. In fact, we’re already getting starting. As of 2016, around 10 percent of the <a href="https://www.canr.msu.edu/news/global_genetically_modified_crop_acres_increase_amid_concerns">world’s agricultural land</a> (457 million acres) grows GM crops, with the United States, Brazil, India, and Argentina being the leading producers.</p><h3></h3><p>We are in a severe drought in Argentina.The pict is shows the high resilience(drought tolerance)of a Bioceres wheat variety carrying the HB4 gene (left)when compared with a traditional variety without HB4 (right). @World_Farmers @bebelm22 @NoTillBill @PaolaCampitell1 @vilellafer pic.twitter.com/AJramHtxxu</p><p>There is <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21645698.2020.1773198">compelling evidence</a> over the last two decades that genetically engineered crops have reduced global pesticide spraying by hundreds of millions of kilos and decreased greenhouse gas emissions significantly by cutting fuel use and tillage, lowering agriculture’s environmental footprint. Moreover, the National Center for Biotechnology Information <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK424536/">finds</a> positive social and economic benefits from increased yields and efficient agriculture associated with GM crop cultivation around the world.</p><p>Imagine the impact this science could have in the areas disproportionately affected by our changing climate. What could <a href="https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/09/190919142253.htm">flood-resistant crops</a> mean for Bangladesh and Louisiana? Or <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpls.2019.01676/full">drought-resistant crops</a> for the Sahel and the Levant? Beyond that, food could grow in salty soils, become more resistant to insects, and we could strengthen global food security.</p><h3>How to Move Forward</h3><p>There are some important factors to consider. To begin, there are questions about the effect of <em>Bacillus thuringiensis</em> or Bt (a natural insecticide) on specimens like monarch butterflies, insect development of immunity to natural insecticides, and gene flow from engineered plants to wild plants creating herbicide-resistant “super-weeds”. Also, while there’s virtually <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK424534/">no evidence</a> that GM foods have negative effects on human health (there actually might be indirect health benefits from reduced chemical insecticide use) more testing will be needed as new genetic biotechnologies are developed. Thus, regulatory bodies like the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), research institutions, and NGOs should place a higher share of their biotechnology research funding to risk assessment for GM crops and should be regulating transgenic organisms more sensibly.</p><p>An obstacle to addressing global food shortage is the ownership of key biotechnology methods and genetic information by an oligopoly of multinational corporations. Incidentally, the <a href="https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2018/05/perils-gmo-research-scientist-speaks/">political failure</a> of GM crops relates to negative public perceptions of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/04/why-monsanto-is-no-more/">unscrupulous</a> corporate giants. Biotech corporations have been using biotechnology for destructive agricultural practices like engineering herbicide-resistant plants to promote agrochemical applications or scaled-up industrial monoculture.</p><p>In her <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Gene_Revolution/_nrLFCfIoRUC?hl=en&amp;gbpv=0">book</a> <em>The Gene Revolution: GM Crops and Unequal Development </em>Japanese economist Sakiko Fukuda-Parr explains that in much of the world, primarily the US, agricultural R&amp;D has shifted from the government to the private sector since the 1980s. This is supported by recent <a href="https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agricultural-research-funding-in-the-public-and-private-sectors/">findings</a> at the USDA Economic Research Service. The consequence of this is that corporate giants like Monsanto, feeding on public funds, have dominated the production and commercialization of biotechnology. This fosters rent-seeking and supplies profitable crops to industrialized nations rather than useful innovations to farmers in developing nations who cannot afford their high prices and have no other biotech suppliers.</p><p>(If the environmental/socioeconomic implications of patent protections for biotechnology corporations interests you, I came across an informative Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/jpppereira16/status/1362794724898328577?s=20">thread</a> exploring the subject.)</p><p>Thus, our challenge is to democratize these technologies, expand them in the public sector, and make them widely available to smallholder farmers across the world.</p><p>Biotechnology is not a panacea for food security. We have many other challenges. Ultimately, curbing unsustainable population growth may mean increasing the wealth of the world’s poor to accelerate the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition">demographic transition</a> in the Global South.</p><p>Fundamentally, though, we need to address Malthus’ proposition all those years ago: can we feed our growing world? Any chance we have is contingent upon us embracing scientific innovation.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=601c112e966d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[After COVID-19: Africa’s Sovereign Debt Crisis and a New New International Economic Order]]></title>
            <link>https://zegaandenet.medium.com/after-covid-19-africas-sovereign-debt-crisis-and-a-new-new-international-economic-order-3b1485193802?source=rss-ad146f3b8646------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3b1485193802</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[debt-relief]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[debt]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zega Ras-Work]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2021 13:34:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-06T01:17:36.848Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>After COVID-19: Africa’s Sovereign Debt Crisis and a New ‘New International Economic Order’</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*gtvS765xkhepzUfRD0GSMw.jpeg" /><figcaption>(Source: FurtherAfrica.com)</figcaption></figure><p>The COVID-19 pandemic has taken a devastating economic toll on Sub-Saharan Africa as it reels from sharp declines in global commodity prices and tourism. Regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth regressed by <a href="https://www.fitchratings.com/research/sovereigns/sub-saharan-africa-sovereigns-see-record-downgrades-in-2020-pressures-remain-27-10-2020">2.4 percent</a> in 2020, considered its <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8e057a2a-88a2-494f-81b2-a5ec91ebe4d9">worst contraction since the 1970s</a>, pushing millions into poverty and prompting credit rating downgrades. African economies enter 2021 facing an epic <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26419&amp;LangID=E">sovereign debt crisis</a>, threatening to undo decades of progress. In November 2020, Zambia, where copper sales represent <a href="https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/ZMB/textview">72 percent of its foreign exchange</a> earnings, was forced to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/23/zambia-becomes-africas-first-coronavirus-era-default-what-happens-now.html#:~:text=Zambia%20last%20week%20opted%20to,from%20CC%20to%20Restricted%20Default.">default</a> on its debt, and others may follow. In Angola, where oil makes up <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/angola/overview">one-third of its economy and 90 percent of exports</a>, the debt-to-GDP ratio rose to 130 percent in 2020. The pattern is clear. Commodity-dependent African economies face a terrible choice as the pandemic kills commodity prices: use scarce resources to fight the coronavirus or service their debt to access loans for their recovery. At the heart of this crisis is a structural weakness laid bare by COVID-19: the commodity-dependence of Africa’s economies.</p><p>The international monetary system’s contribution to this structural weakness, and subsequent global poverty and indebtedness has been the subject of much debate for decades. Following the 1973 oil crisis, developing countries sought to change the world’s economic system, consolidating their demands in the<a href="http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3201.htm"> Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order</a> (NIEO), approved by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974.</p><p>The NIEO calls for the right of every state to choose its own economic system free of interference, to improve its terms of trade by managing commodity markets; to have full control over its natural resources, and regulations for multinational corporations (MNCs) to comply with local laws and promote technology transfer; and more.</p><p>It is astonishing that, in 2021, the structure of African economies has hardly changed from how they were created in the colonial era. The current sovereign debt crisis, like those preceding, is the symptom of a global economic order that impoverishes Africa. The continent will continue to oscillate between extreme poverty and stellar growth, in an endless cycle in which it is trapped, until we change the economic system itself. And thus, as we consider the “new normal” of a post-COVID world, it is perhaps time to re-imagine what a <em>new </em>New International Economic Order could look like.</p><h3>Sovereign Debt and the Sub-Saharan African Economy</h3><p>Let us first consider the current African economic structure and its links to sovereign debt. Sub-Saharan African countries have always had relatively higher levels of sovereign debt, than other regions of the world. Much of this debt has been used to finance infrastructure projects for development, totaling over<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-10/africa-will-be-the-next-debt-explosion-after-coronavirus#:~:text=Africa%20has%20borrowed%20as%20much,of%20its%20loans%20are%20murky."> $600 billion</a> in loans since 2013. Considering countries’ debt-to-GDP ratio, trends over the past two decades reveal that little has changed, or has even worsened, in terms of countries who hold sovereign debt between one-third to upwards of 70 percent of their GDP. This precarious position makes sense when one considers the underlying reasons.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_OQuwGjHo8dY5_h-khOlYw.png" /><figcaption>(Source: Bloomberg Economics) *2020–2024 are projected.</figcaption></figure><p>In his groundbreaking <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236792693_The_Historical_Origin_of_African_Debt_Crisis">analysis</a>, economist Alemayehu Geda suggests that the conventional explanations of the origins of Africa’s debt crises, such as the 1970s oil price shocks and rising public expenditure, are insufficient. Rather, Geda posits that the African debt crisis originated from the structuring of African economies by 17th century European mercantilism until decolonization.</p><p>He observes that in West Africa, the commodity sector was beholden to Europeans, in Central and Southern Africa “adventurer companies” dominated the mining, fishing, infrastructure, and taxation sectors, and in Eastern Africa, colonial authorities rounded up land-owning peasants and urban unemployed to supply labor for settler agriculture and mineral extraction. These policies created a commodity export-dependent Africa, and the “virtual monopoly of the African trade…by Europe.” This resulted in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prebisch%E2%80%93Singer_hypothesis">unfavorable</a> terms of trade for Africa.</p><p>Moreover, 1980s protectionism against processed products in the Global North prevented Africa’s diversification out of commodities and structural adjustment programs caused declines in export revenue. Thus, the structure of the economic relationship between colonial powers and their former colonies was maintained after independence, explaining Africa’s high indebtedness by the late 1990s.</p><p>It was in this context that the London-based Jubilee 2000 campaign started a global movement for debt relief for the world’s poorest nations. Political economist Ann Pettifor later<a href="https://www.annpettifor.com/2012/12/can-africas-boom-be-sustained/"> shared</a> how the initiative won $100 billion in debt relief from the World Bank and the Paris Club for 35 nations — mainly African. Despite the 2005 Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)<a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/hipc"> supplementing</a> the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank returned with new loans for the newly fiscally stable nations. China also increased its lending in Africa, becoming its largest creditor. That is how we got here today.</p><h3>The Tentacles of Debt</h3><p>Sovereign debt has incredible power for development but is also used for exploitation and destruction. Debt’s insidious spread of influence touches many areas.</p><p>Discussions on debt focus on sovereign borrowing but overlook how trillions of dollars (that are used to service debt) are siphoned from the continent by MNCs, while creditors force African economies to open up to MNCs, creating a vicious cycle. Take our earlier example of Zambia. Recent <a href="https://issblog.nl/2020/11/25/haemorrhaging-zambia-underlying-sources-of-the-current-sovereign-debt-crisis/">research</a> from Erasmus Rotterdam University shows that since 2005, mining sector MNCs have repatriated billions of dollars of wealth from Zambia— as much as 20 percent of GDP in 2012 — through unreported profit remittances. This has crushed Zambia’s ability to service debts, forcing the nation to increase sovereign borrowing to sustain these illicit outflows. The researchers note, “[t]he argument for this economic model… has been, to put it crudely, that Africans are better off being exploited than not being exploited at all,” considering the benefits brought by MNCs.</p><p>There’s also another issue with external debt: interest. African governments spend far more on <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1848047/nigeria-kenya-ghana-spend-twice-more-debt-payment-than-health/">interest payments</a> than they do on healthcare. In private debt markets, African governments are charged <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214851515000079">2.9 percent interest</a> higher than what ratings and risk assessments support, called the “Africa Premium”, resulting in losses of an estimated additional $2.2 billion over ten years. Even with high economic growth, rating agencies <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-arent-borrowing-too-much-theyre-paying-too-much-for-debt-131053#:~:text=African%20governments%20are%20paying%20interest,sub%2DSaharan%20Africa&#39;s%20fiscal%20budgets.">don’t upgrade</a> African countries’ credit. Over the last decade, interest payments on sovereign loans in Sub-Saharan Africa <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34588/9781464816109.pdf?sequence=4&amp;isAllowed=y">increased</a> at a rate 33 percent more than that of principal payments.</p><p>Debt also brings serious environmental concerns. Sussex University <a href="https://www.sussex.ac.uk/ssrp/documents/ssrp-policy-brief-andreas-antoniades-sdgs-in-the-debt-trap-final.pdf">scientists</a> found that financial crises significantly damage African ecosystems and biodiversity, as debt incentivizes “[increased] forest product exports, illegal logging, commodity driven agriculture, and population pressures into natural and protected land”, resulting in 820,000 additional metric tons of CO2 emissions. Indeed, Angola has been pressured by China <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/29991/seeking-debt-relief-angola-opens-door-of-oilfield-holdings-to-china/">to offer it increased equity in its oil fields</a> and give the Chinese-Angolan oil venture favorable access to “discovered resource opportunities” and “undeveloped acreage” for debt relief. In other words, Angola is forced to extract more fossil fuels for its survival.</p><h3><strong>Solutions or Dead Ends?</strong></h3><p>Global efforts to address the sovereign debt crisis have failed to recognize the core structural issues. Last May, G20 countries <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/covid-19-debt-service-suspension-initiative">implemented</a> the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), a moratorium on debt payments for HIPCs to respond to the pandemic. In addition, <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5efe942ba09c523cbf9440a9/1593742380749/WP+39+-+Acker%2C+Brautigam%2C+Huang+-+Debt+Relief.pdf">China</a> has dropped $3.4 billion and restructured or refinanced $15 billion of debt for Africa over the last decade with no penalties or asset expropriation, suggesting leniency from the continent’s largest creditor.</p><p>However, debt restructuring remains <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/publication/restructuring-sovereign-debt-private-creditors-poor-countries-whats-broken">complicated</a>. Debt relief policies force legal defaults on borrowers, the IMF is pressured into bailing out private creditors over addressing poor countries’ solvency, and organizing negotiations between different creditors is difficult. There is also no mechanism to prevent future debt problems if poor countries borrow to fight COVID. Additionally, a European Network on Debt and Development <a href="https://www.eurodad.org/g20_dssi_shadow_report#:~:text=The%20report%20outlines%20how%20the,2020%20by%20all%20developing%20countries.">report</a> on the DSSI found that less than 2 percent of debt payments from developing countries due in 2020 were covered by the initiative. By the end of its term in June 2021, only 44 percent of the debt payments of DSSI-participants will be rescheduled. On top of that, the rescheduled 2020 payments of DSSI-eligible nations are due in 2022–2024, when they are already scheduled to pay $115 billion. Also, while it has been easier to negotiate with China than with private creditors, Chinese loans represent only 20 percent of Africa’s sovereign debt.</p><p>Holistic recommendations by a UN <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policy-brief-72-covid-19-and-sovereign-debt/">policy brief</a> on sovereign debt in the pandemic include expanding the debt moratorium to include private and multilateral lenders; debt write-offs for highly indebted nations; facilitating SDG investments; and the creation of a sovereign debt restructuring apparatus based on the Addis Ababa Action Agenda’s principles of a “fair, orderly, timely, and efficient” process.</p><p>Another interesting proposal is that of “debt-for-nature” swaps, which partially cancel a developing nation’s debt if it commits to conserving ecological resources within its borders, thus “swapping” the nation’s debt payments for environmental stewardship. While useful, these swaps <a href="https://search-alexanderstreet-com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/view/work/bibliographic_entity%7Cbibliographic_details%7C3967583#page/5/mode/1">do not provide a meaningful solution</a> to either the debt or climate problem. Although, debt-for-SDG swaps and debt relief are preferable to debt rescheduling and are a net positive.</p><p>Overall, these solutions, while important, do not address the heart of the issue, which is structural in nature.</p><h3>Turning a New (or Forgotten) Page</h3><p>Our ability to meaningfully address the African debt crisis isn’t in question rather it is a question of our political will. Indeed, reforming a global system where Africa was relegated to supplying raw commodities in what are well known to be structurally disadvantageous terms of trade, resulting in the continuous need for debt, was central to calls in the 1970s for a New International Economic Order. This movement preoccupied African leaders like <a href="https://newint.org/features/2019/02/11/when-stars-began-shine">Thomas Sankara</a>,<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1975/02/05/archives/developing-lands-open-trade-talks-at-dakar-senghor-calls-for-a.html"> Leopold Senghor</a>, and<a href="https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/early-days-group-77"> Julius Nyerere</a>.</p><p>What became of this initiative? In response, the U.S. Federal Reserve <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265725477_State_Rights_against_Private_Capital_The_New_International_Economic_Order_and_the_Struggle_over_Aid_Trade_and_Foreign_Investment_1962-1981">raised interest rates</a> in 1977, in effect, intensifying Africa’s debt burden. Conservative Margaret Thatcher’s election to British parliament in 1979 solidified Western powers’ opposition to the proposals. The NIEO suffered its final death blow in President Ronald Reagan’s <a href="https://academic.oup.com/dh/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/dh/dhz043/5569521?redirectedFrom=fulltext">speech</a> at the Cancún Economic Summit in 1981, where he declared that free markets and private investment, not amending the global monetary system, would herald development. This was followed by <a href="https://republic.com.ng/augustseptember-2018/africas-lost-decade/">structural adjustment</a> and Africa’s “lost decade” in the 1980s.</p><p>The idea was killed and forgotten.</p><p>Fast forward to 2021. In the wake of a raging pandemic, with the West’s economic hegemony waning and a billion-strong African population that is young and restless for change, can we imagine a new, post-COVID international economic order that addresses the root structural causes of Africa’s chronic indebtedness? Yes, and we have no choice.</p><p>What could this <em>new </em>New International Economic Order look like? It would have to address first and foremost the issue of African commodity dependence. One element would be to <a href="https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/cimem2d14_en.pdf">manage</a> volatile commodity prices, through various market and non-market mechanisms to stabilize Africa’s revenues. Another necessary element would be to <a href="http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/244551522770775674/pdf/WPS8398.pdf">eliminate</a> predatory pricing in global debt markets, currently to the detriment of African economies. Another measure would be to improve <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1921741/africa-covid-debt-crisis-worsened-by-poor-data-moodys-fitch-sp/">data collection</a> and communication to dispel risk perceptions from investors and rating agencies. Another element would involve conclusively managing illicit financial flows, to prevent the capital flight that requires Africa to take on unnecessary debt to begin with. As importantly, there is no doubt that African countries must greatly accelerate efforts to diversify their economies from commodity exports, and harness the power of innovation, to sustainably build industrial and technological capacity. This is reliant on the continent’s revenue consolidation from commodity exports, lowering structural barriers in international trade such as tariffs, and political factors.</p><p>Fundamentally, debt is about power; this agenda should be pursued under a vision to rectify the imbalance of global economic power. One that, as Kwame Nkrumah <a href="https://www.prisoncensorship.info/archive/books/Economics/Neo-Colonialism_KwameNkrumah.pdf">advocated</a>, prevents “the financial power of the developed countries being used in such a way as to impoverish the less developed.” One that restores Africa’s policy autonomy and transforms global economic institutions away from extractive debt and towards sustainable development. One that addresses past injustices and demands a future of mutually beneficial cooperation between nations.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3b1485193802" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Staying Focused on GERD in the Midst of Ethiopia’s Crises]]></title>
            <link>https://zegaandenet.medium.com/staying-focused-on-gerd-in-the-midst-of-ethiopias-crises-13b5a864294f?source=rss-ad146f3b8646------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/13b5a864294f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[egypt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sudan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethiopia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dam]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zega Ras-Work]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2020 17:47:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-24T21:28:00.142Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UAv7HsOxp_MS8g7p6-pkNA.jpeg" /><figcaption>A construction worker at the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. (AFP)</figcaption></figure><p>Understandably, not too many of us may be thinking about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) right now, with ongoing conflict in Tigray and elsewhere in Ethiopia, humanitarian concerns, refugee displacement, locust devastation, and the pandemic. But this is precisely the time not to lose sight of GERD. Over the past several months, negotiations between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan have re-engaged in a rather listless fashion, with little progress in sight. The stagnation of the talks, in the context of potential for rising regional tensions, gives cause for serious concern.</p><h4><strong>What has happened since July?</strong></h4><p>We all remember how Ethiopians celebrated this past July as Ethiopia completed the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/da5f2f4a48b737c06c3e38cf5258ab7f">first phase</a> of filling the GERD reservoir, impounding <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53416277">4.9 billion cubic meters (BCM)</a> of water, due to the heavy rains of this year’s <em>keremt</em>. Following this, a few notable events deserve mention. Starting in August, Sudan experienced the <a href="https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/147288/record-flooding-in-sudan">worst flooding</a> from the Nile River since 1946, inundating 100,000 homes and taking at least 100 lives in September. In early October, the United States decided to cut <a href="https://www.resilience.org/stories/2020-10-19/the-energy-bulletin-weekly-19-october-2020/">$264 million of security and development aid</a> from Ethiopia, citing “Ethiopia’s unilateral decision to fill the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam without an agreement with Egypt and Sudan.” On an October 23 call with Sudanese and Israeli leaders, outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump ominously warned that Egypt will <a href="https://twitter.com/HarunMaruf/status/1319743272663896073?s=20">“blow up that dam”</a>, in reference to GERD.</p><p>Finally, talks that had resumed between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia in early November under the sponsorship of the African Union (AU) abruptly ended after just three days on November 4, citing disagreement on <a href="https://t.co/1OWpLnRjD3?amp=1">“negotiation methodology.”</a> While Sudan wants a greater role for legal experts, Egypt seeks less AU direction in talks, and Ethiopia wants to discuss GERD in terms of a legal water-sharing agreement. Nevertheless, the countries agree on the majority of legal and technical issues, including a timetable for filling the dam under normal hydrological conditions (average or above average water flow). Egypt has already agreed to Ethiopia’s plan to test GERD’s turbines for the first two years and fill the reservoir in four years, according to a <a href="https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/143313/The-Egyptian-Foreign-Ministry-responds-to-the-Ethiopian-statement-?lang=en-us">statement</a> by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry in January.</p><h4><strong>Sticking Points in the Negotiations</strong></h4><p>However, each country has its own sticking points in the current impasse on the talks, which have yet to resume. For its part, Sudan is supportive of GERD in principle, but holds some reservations. The recent massive floods resulted from a projected 50% surge in Nile flow fluctuation over this century, induced by an increasing frequency of El Niño and La Niña events due to climate change, according to a 2017 <a href="http://nature.com/articles/nclimate3273">report</a> by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The report recommended expanding regional water storage capacity, which GERD would precisely do. This sentiment was shared by Sudan’s Irrigation Minister Yasser Abbas, who <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/09/sudan-nile-floods-egypt-ethiopia-dam-talks.html">stated in August</a>:</p><blockquote>“If the GERD was complete, Khartoum would not have suffered such a wave of floods. One of the dam’s advantages, according to a number of studies, is easing the severity of the flooding.”</blockquote><p>However, Khartoum does not approve of the filling of the dam without an agreement. As well, it is <a href="https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/90344/Sudan-urges-reaching-agreement-guaranteeing-safety-of-Roseires-Dam">concerned</a> about the impact of GERD reservoir discharges on its downstream Roseires Dam, which could be overwhelmed by mismanaged releases.</p><p>Regarding drought years, Egypt argues that when rainfall is below average, GERD has a responsibility to release its stored water to mitigate drought in Egypt’s agricultural lands. This was ostensibly the main stipulation in the <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-02/29/c_138830339.htm">U.S.-backed proposal</a> in February, which was signed by Egypt alone. However, Cairo plays a semantic game of conflating “drought” and “water shortage” to absolve itself from the responsibility of managing its water use. Water shortage implies a shared mitigation responsibility between the nations, requiring Egypt to adopt measures to conserve water. In contrast, a drought shifts full mitigation responsibility to Ethiopia. For their part, Ethiopian analysts <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/04/02/why-ethiopia-rejected-the-u-s-drafted-gerd-deal/">argue</a> that the U.S./Egypt proposal is inflexible, requiring Ethiopia to release pre-determined amounts of water from its reservoir that are not adjusted for water inflow. Additionally, the penalties under unreasonable mitigation schemes would constrain GERD’s power generation. In other words, the proposal effectively upholds the water-sharing status quo of 1959.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rukVjtxccsClt8j4xVUDcg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photograph of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and Emperor Haile Selassie I, overlooking the view of the Tissassat Falls at Lake Tana, Ethiopia — approx. 300km from the GERD site — in February 1965. (Royal Collection Trust, United Kingdom)</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Historical Roots</strong></h4><p>This clever Egyptian argument above is political. As in Ethiopia, the Nile is an issue of Egyptian patriotism. Proponents of Egypt’s “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/sudan/1929-10-01/nile-waters-agreement">historical Nile rights</a>”, such as Egyptian MP Mohamed Fouad and Adel El-Adawy of The American University in Cairo, base their opposition to GERD on the relatively unknown <a href="https://hornaffairs.com/2011/06/08/read-the-1902-ethiopia-uk-treaty-share-your-view/">Treaty of 1902</a> signed by Great Britain and the Ethiopian Empire. Egyptian scholars argue that the treaty binds Ethiopia to the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian agreement, which gives Egypt veto powers over upstream Nile projects and a designated share of Nile water flow. This rationalization is founded on Article III of the 1902 agreement which stipulates:</p><blockquote>“His Majesty the Emperor Menelik II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct, or allow to be constructed, <strong>any work</strong> <em>[emphasis added]</em> across the Blue Nile, Lake <em>[Tana]</em>, or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty’s Government <strong>and the Government of <em>[Sudan]</em></strong> <em>[emphasis added]</em>.”</blockquote><p>However, as various Ethiopian scholars have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277968597_Anglo-Ethiopian_Treaty_on_the_Nile_and_the_Tana_Dam_Concessions_A_Script_in_Legal_History_of_Ethiopia%27s_Diplomatic_Confront_1900-1956">pointed out</a>, the English translation of this agreement differs substantially from the Amharic translation that the Emperor signed, which reads:</p><blockquote>“His Majesty, King of Kings of Ethiopia, has entered into the commitment of not giving permission to any work that <strong>fully</strong> <em>[emphasis added]</em> arrests the flow of the Blue Nile, Lake <em>[Tana]</em> or the Sobat, which empty into the White Nile, without making a prior agreement with the British government.”</blockquote><p>Herein lies the origin of this conflict; there was a stark contrast in Ethiopia and Britain’s interpretation of this agreement. The Amharic version of the treaty states that only a structure that fully obstructs water flow is prohibited, while the English version prohibits <em>any</em> construction on the Nile by Ethiopia or a third party allowed by Ethiopia. Moreover, the English version names Sudan as a party to the Treaty, while the Amharic version does not. For a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/000203971404900103">number of reasons</a>, Ethiopian scholars consider this treaty defective and invalid, including that, under <a href="https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/3_2_1978.pdf">the Vienna Convention of 1978</a>, which Ethiopia and Egypt have ratified, successor states (former colonies) do not inherit the treaty rights and obligations of their predecessor states (colonial powers). Additionally, if the Treaty were binding under international law, the British government was negotiating in 1902 <a href="https://theconversation.com/colonial-era-treaties-are-to-blame-for-the-unresolved-dispute-over-ethiopias-dam-133538">on behalf of Sudan</a>, and not of Egypt.</p><h4><strong>Why Is All This Relevant?</strong></h4><p>Although Ethiopia is not signatory to either the 1929 or 1959 Nile treaties, the 1902 Treaty effectively weakened Ethiopia’s hydro-legal standing for over a century, until the unilateral development of GERD in 2011, during the Arab Spring. A dam on the Blue Nile was never supposed to exist, and yet it does. Egypt’s position is that Ethiopia should be obligated to guarantee its water shares according to the 1959 agreement. This view is anachronistic, defending a status quo that is neither equitable nor sustainable. Marina Ottaway, a respected Middle East scholar, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/egypt-and-ethiopia-curse-nile">contends</a> that Egypt should invest in its water infrastructure and improve its water use policies to reduce excessive water waste. This would significantly reduce its requirements from Ethiopia.</p><p>Tensions reached a new high following President Trump’s explosive comments, which sent shock waves within Ethiopia and around the region. More recently, BBC <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cq23pdgvgm8t/sudan?ns_mchannel=social&amp;ns_source=twitter&amp;ns_campaign=bbc_live&amp;ns_linkname=5fb22d3a49467302d61d06ce%26Sudan%20and%20Egypt%20begin%20joint%20air%20exercises%262020-11-16T08%3A27%3A02.144Z&amp;ns_fee=0&amp;pinned_post_locator=urn:asset:5619b8a5-0047-4da8-9cbf-1f5192d1a127&amp;pinned_post_asset_id=5fb22d3a49467302d61d06ce&amp;pinned_post_type=share">reported</a> that, over the weekend of November 14–15, Egypt and Sudan carried out “joint air exercises” and intend to continue air force drills until November 26. Military commanders from both countries also allegedly met in Khartoum on October 31, committing to “enhance joint military cooperation”. This follows months of unsuccessful negotiations and Ethiopia’s decision to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/5/ethiopia-bans-flights-over-new-dam-for-security-reasons">ban the airspace</a> above the dam for “security reasons”.</p><h4><strong>Where to From Here?</strong></h4><p>In my view, in the immediate, Ethiopia should dial down tensions by making important but reasonable concessions. Ethiopia should engage Sudan by committing to jointly completing the studies of the impact of GERD on the Roseires Dam and other Sudanese downstream developments. As a show of good faith, Ethiopia should map out various hydrological scenarios, specifying various water release commitments that are economically feasible and acceptable to Egypt, including in periods of extended drought.</p><p>As talks resume very soon, the three countries need to jointly agree on a robust dispute resolution mechanism. At present, Egypt favors non-African, arbitration-based processes, while Sudan and Ethiopia consider an AU-led approach to be more appropriate, with Ethiopia preferring mediation and Sudan preferring arbitration. Ethiopia also believes that this issue, too, must be negotiated on the basis of a legal water allocation regime. African economic and legal experts <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/08/05/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/">assert</a> that such an equitable legal regime exists: the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), a framework devised by riparian member states of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) to distribute water equitably among the Nile basin states. Sudan and Egypt should be encouraged to sign and ratify the CFA, allowing the NBI’s Council of Ministers to mediate disputes (satisfying Ethiopia and Sudan’s preference for African-led resolutions), and if consensus cannot be reached, the countries would be bound to legal arbitration (to Egypt and Sudan’s preference).</p><p>As for technical water-allocation solutions, water science researcher Mekdelawit Deribe brilliantly <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/06/11/the-grand-nile-basin-renaissance-plan/">devises</a> a number of options for the basin, assuming water is redistributed based on the 2015 <a href="https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Final_Nile_Agreement_23_March_2015.pdf">Declaration of Principles </a>signed by the three countries. A few are physical water trade — pricing and trading surplus water, similar to emissions trading schemes in Europe; virtual water trade — exchanging water-based products like crops and hydropower; and exploring different water sources in the form of groundwater, wastewater reuse for irrigation, and building desalination plants, among others. Additionally, a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2090447920302148">study</a> from Egypt this year showed that simply modernizing to drip and sprinkler irrigation systems and cultivating less water-intensive crops could save 44% more water for Egypt.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*e9Fsu82j7XrD6CA34NAAlQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile river in the Benishangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia, on July 12, 2020. (Maxar Technologies via AP)</figcaption></figure><p>Resolving these outstanding diplomatic issues matters not just for GERD, but for setting a precedent for water allocation models in the region for years to come. Innovative thinking and cooperation will become increasingly important as the Nile basin population doubles to 1 billion by 2050 and climate change intensifies water scarcity. Most importantly, GERD’s gains are <a href="https://t.co/lgN0VkZVfe?amp=1">shared</a>: fewer floods in Sudan, less evaporation than in the Aswan High Dam, drought mitigation for Egypt, and affordable clean energy for all. To avoid a “water war”, Ethiopia should make the appropriate concessions. However, to exercise its right to the Nile waters, it should also make reasonable demands of its downstream counterparts.</p><p>Keeping international attention on GERD will be difficult with the <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-11-17/abiy-ahmed-ethiopia-peace-swift-war-too">current narrative</a> dominating Ethiopia-related headlines around the world. With humanitarian disasters, widespread conflict, devastating locust infestations, the pandemic, there are other urgent and grave concerns. Nonetheless, as Ethiopians, we cannot afford to lose focus on GERD. The future of Ethiopia is at stake. This is our dam.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=13b5a864294f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[More Than A Dam: Sharing in the Future of Ethiopia]]></title>
            <link>https://zegaandenet.medium.com/more-than-a-dam-sharing-in-the-future-of-ethiopia-99cd7e5a465f?source=rss-ad146f3b8646------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/99cd7e5a465f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[egypt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethiopia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Zega Ras-Work]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2020 22:31:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-12T16:35:19.939Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1DRHYomhnE37snZZpSwKXw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) standing proudly on the Blue Nile, in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region of Ethiopia (Photo credit — GIOIA FORSTER/ALAMY)</figcaption></figure><p>Eight years ago, my grandparents held their fiftieth anniversary celebration in the historic Taitu Hotel in the old Piassa section of Addis Ababa, the very same place they were married. I recall the nostalgic <em>tezeta</em> melodies, the delicious platters of <em>injera </em>and <em>wot</em>, and the great hall full of friends and family. That day, my grandparents proudly announced that, in honor of the occasion, they had purchased each of their seven grandchildren a Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) bond.</p><p>I was twelve at the time and did not know anything about this <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2014/financing-africa%E2%80%99s-massive-projects">$4.8 billion</a> hydro-electric dam which Ethiopia began building in 2011, entirely self-financed, on the Nile River. But my grandparents’ passion was not lost on me. They shared that this dam was a piece of our nation’s history, a bold venture in carbon-free energy and economic development. These bonds were our shares in the future of Ethiopia and perhaps the most important legacy they could pass on to us.</p><p>I am now in university in the United States and have thought a lot about what the GERD means to Ethiopia and to me. Over the past few years, Ethiopia’s progress toward completing the dam has been fraught with internal corruption, delays, and increasing geopolitical turmoil. The GERD will be the largest dam on the African continent, designed to generate <a href="https://www.export.gov/apex/article2?id=Ethiopia-Energy">6450 MW (6.4 GW) of clean energy</a>, a capacity increase of <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica/ethiopia">270%</a> over current levels, in a country where <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/249971573762529445/pdf/Ethiopias-Energy-Sector-Transformation.pdf">over 60 million Ethiopians do not have access to electricity</a>. That is twice the population of Ghana, or the combined population of California and New York, or the population of France.</p><p>Most Ethiopians are forced to burn firewood and charcoal to meet basic energy needs, which causes thousands of deaths annually from indoor air pollution, and burns to children. Further, rural Ethiopian women walk hours for fuelwood, carrying up to 35 kilograms of wood on their backs, sacrificing safety, health, and childcare. Moreover, the GERD is the cornerstone for Ethiopia’s emerging power industry, and Ethiopia’s goal of becoming a middle-income country depends on transitioning to manufacturing, which is power-intensive. Beyond this, GERD enables Ethiopia to become a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-energy/ethiopia-to-step-up-role-as-regional-clean-power-exporter-idUSKBN0NY1EK20150513">regional energy exporter</a>, providing power to neighboring Kenya, South Sudan, and Djibouti, as well as Egypt. Experts estimate that annual export revenues could be <a href="https://jwafs.mit.edu/sites/default/files/imce/publications/GERD_Report.pdf">approximately $1 billion</a>, significantly boosting desperately needed foreign exchange.</p><p>Yet today, this project has become the subject of international controversy. Because Egypt relies on the Nile for 95% of its water consumption, Cairo has adamantly opposed the construction of the GERD, invoking the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/04/28/the-limits-of-the-new-nile-agreement/">Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1929</a>. This treaty, on which Ethiopia was never consulted despite the fact that it supplies 84% of the Nile’s tributary water flow, grants Egypt authority over all dam construction projects on the Nile. According to this colonial era agreement and its 1959 successor, upstream countries need Egypt’s permission to develop the Nile waters.</p><p>As Ethiopia has started filling the dam, geopolitical tensions remain high. It comes as no surprise that Arab League states support Egypt. However, the aggressive role that the United States has recently played in the negotiations is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/trump-resolve-egypt-ethiopia-nile-dam-dispute-200423122833640.html">disturbingly disingenuous</a>. In November 2019, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20191007-egypt-ethiopia-nile-river-dam-mediating">sought assistance</a> from the United States to arbitrate between the parties. The White House and Department of Treasury organized tripartite meetings between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan in December 2019. Despite repeated attempts, including recently with the African Union, the negotiations continue to be unsuccessful, with Ethiopia reiterating on July 14, 2020 that <a href="https://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/press-release-on-the-tripartite-negotiation-on-the-gerd/">“trilateral negotiation and commitment to reach a mutually beneficial outcome is the only avenue.”</a></p><p>However, other Nile basin states recognize that they will benefit from GERD. In May 2010, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda signed the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) to create a mechanism for the equitable and fair use of Nile waters. The highly seasonal nature of the Nile water flows, discharging primarily from June to September, can cause heavy flooding. The GERD will avoid excessive sedimentation, and ensuing costly silt removal, and stabilize river flow to improve navigation, irrigation, and downstream hydropower generation. This will primarily benefit Sudan, a signatory to the 1959 postcolonial revision of the 1929 agreement with Egypt after Sudan’s independence, which was initially averse to GERD, but has since <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/271-bridging-gap-nile-waters-dispute">shown support,</a> though inconsistent, for Ethiopia upon understanding the benefits.</p><p>The current tension with Egypt seems unnecessary in that Egypt <em>itself</em> will also benefit greatly from the GERD. With its potential 74 billion cubic meters of water storage capacity, GERD would actually help <em>increase</em> Egypt’s water flow capacity in dry years. The GERD’s ability to store and conserve water, with one-fourth the evaporation loss compared to water storage in Egypt’s hotter climate, is useful to Egypt because GERD will generate more and cheaper power than Aswan High Dam (AHD) and increased water from GERD will enrich the underground water reservoir of Aswan. Additionally, a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2090447917300837">study</a> by Egyptian engineers at Zagazig University identifies several irrigation efficiency strategies that Egypt can deploy to save water in an amount that will exceed losses from the GERD. Egypt and Ethiopia are able to and should <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02508060.2016.1177698">coordinate</a> the operation of AHD and GERD and manage the GERD reservoir to address the water needs of Egypt during prolonged drought, and generate electricity at capacity.</p><p>Ethiopia has the right to sustainably and responsibly develop the Nile water flows for the betterment of its people. It is also clear that GERD will benefit Ethiopia’s neighbors. Ethiopia has been willing to engage in good faith negotiations, offering to fill the GERD reservoir over four to seven years, rather than in three years, in order to mitigate any adverse effects. All Nile Basin states, notably Egypt and Sudan, should <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/07/25/while-egypt-struggles-ethiopia-builds-over-the-blue-nile-controversies-and-the-way-forward/">sign and ratify the CFA</a>, and establish the Nile and its tributaries as “common property.”</p><p>To date, geopolitical concerns have discouraged financial institutions such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank from financing the GERD. Ethiopia has relied on domestic sources to finance the dam through the issuance of GERD bonds, from its domestic banks, businesses, citizens, and the Ethiopian diaspora. These efforts have met reluctance by some in the diaspora concerned by the project’s perceived corruption, mismanagement, and lack of transparency. This is a valid concern given the 2018 scandal in which the government-owned military engineering corporation METEC, which had the dam contract, was discovered to have embezzled millions of dollars from the project. Given examples of other poorly executed projects such as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jan/13/ethiopia-gibe-iii-dam-kenya">Gibe III Dam</a> on the Omo River, perhaps it would be in everyone’s best interest if Egypt were directly involved in the GERD’s construction. This would break the controversy preventing international financing and open the way for greater international cooperation and oversight.</p><p>I consider it imperative that all Ethiopians demonstrate their support for GERD through purchasing bonds, which are the project’s primary funding source. These bonds are readily available through the Development Bank of Ethiopia and Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, with a semiannual interest rate of 5.5 up to 8 percent, depending on the maturity. These bonds are offered exclusively to Ethiopian nationals and the Ethiopian diaspora and they earn revenue tax-free with returns substantially higher than normal savings in Ethiopia.</p><p>Beyond the numbers, purchasing bonds is an investment in something far more important. It is a nation defying history and global hegemonic powers to freely pursue its interests. It is courageous leaders choosing development over compliance, builders toiling for our future, and light for millions living in darkness. It is about my grandparents, who have poured their heart into this country that they love. And it is the story of my generation and what we will do with this legacy that we must now uphold.</p><p>I am convinced that the economic and political future of Ethiopia rests with the fate of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. That future is under direct threat from those who would deny Ethiopia the use of its own resources. This moment in history calls on all Ethiopians to embrace the differences in our cultures and affirm our common destiny. GERD bonds are a collective promotion of our shared interests and an advancement of our economic and social development. Let there be no question that the legacy of so many brave Ethiopians who gave their lives to shape the day we are in, and the bright future of so many young Ethiopians that this dam ensures, demand our financial and patriotic commitment to seeing this dam built and operational.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=99cd7e5a465f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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