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        <title><![CDATA[Arkose Labs - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Arkose Labs is bankrupting the business model of fraudsters. - Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/arkoselabs?source=rss----79279a1c1953---4</link>
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            <title>Arkose Labs - Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arkoselabs?source=rss----79279a1c1953---4</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 18:30:53 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[PayPal Makes Strategic Investment in Arkose Labs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arkoselabs/paypal-makes-strategic-investment-in-arkose-labs-908517da3df3?source=rss----79279a1c1953---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/908517da3df3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[paypal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fraud]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[funding]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ecommerce]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Gosschalk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Nov 2018 11:46:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-11-26T00:47:40.412Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*InXVXpNMnVP48N-xJXAAeg.png" /></figure><p>Today we announced a strategic investment from <a href="http://www.paypal.com/">PayPal</a> on the main stage at the FS-ISAC Fall Summit — a moment in our timeline that is significant for several reasons:</p><ol><li><strong>Validation:</strong> It signals to our customers, the industry and any future competitors, that we are not only committed to helping organizations combat the growing online fraud epidemic, but we have the confidence, support and backing of major industry players. When it comes to e-commerce, PayPal is the grandfather and titan of the industry. Their team has recognized the power of the Arkose Labs solution and we are thrilled to have their support. They join <a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180905005117/en/Arkose-Labs-Empowers-Enterprises-Stop-Online-Fraud">US Venture Partners </a>in their financial and strategic backing of Arkose Labs.</li><li><strong>Momentum:</strong> We continue to work with leading global brands in a multitude of verticals globally — from online communities and marketplaces to travel, banking, social media, gaming, and more . We empower them with the tools they need to prevent fraudulent account creation and abuse. Customers including <a href="https://www.ea.com/">Electronic Arts</a>, <a href="https://www.singaporeair.com/">Singapore Airlines</a>, <a href="https://www.roblox.com/">Roblox</a>, and <a href="https://www.kik.com/">Kik</a> have all demonstrated their commitment to their customer’s privacy and security online.</li><li><strong>Strength:</strong> Arkose Labs remains the only solution provider to offer a 100% Service Level Agreement (SLA) that includes a money-back guarantee for customers in the event our solution does not prevent an automated attack. We put our money where our mouth is, plain and simple.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*w1bSPXY3GogQXI4DSB3ldw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Kevin Gosschalk announcing PayPal’s investment at the FS-ISAC Fall Summit.</figcaption></figure><p>Today’s news is gratifying to all of us on the Arkose Labs team — we have come a long way in the last two years. The journey is exciting, and we are poised to solve the challenges of online fraud and abuse which our customers are facing head-on. Please visit today’s <a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20181114005152/en/Arkose-Labs-Announces-Strategic-Investment-PayPal">news announcement</a> for more information on this major milestone for Arkose Labs.</p><h4><strong><em>Visit </em></strong><a href="http://bit.ly/arkoselabs"><strong><em>ArkoseLabs.com</em></strong></a></h4><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=908517da3df3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs/paypal-makes-strategic-investment-in-arkose-labs-908517da3df3">PayPal Makes Strategic Investment in Arkose Labs</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs">Arkose Labs</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Playing with Humanity: Verification in Understanding]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arkoselabs/playing-with-humanity-verification-in-understanding-df3d70dab487?source=rss----79279a1c1953---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/df3d70dab487</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[machine-vision]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[machine-learning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[humanity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bots]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Gosschalk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Feb 2018 21:22:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-16T00:02:39.013Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*Z1i2_kb1RSU65pu0p0wFQg.jpeg" /></figure><p>One of my favourite games is chess. I am fascinated by the tactics and strategy needed to out-plan your opponent. Naturally, chess is the kind of game we associate with intelligence because it’s about identifying and predicting variables. Chess is logical. It can be programmed. A chess master must always think several moves ahead. So, when <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Blue_versus_Garry_Kasparov"><em>Deep Blue</em></a> — a chess-playing computer — beat grandmaster Garry Kasparov in 1997, it was a sign that computer intelligence had reached a new peak.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/417/1*T3J6PEdv2yfYdRWL3B1cNg.png" /><figcaption>© Roger Celestin/Newscom</figcaption></figure><p>To say that <em>Deep Blue</em> was intelligent, at least in the same way as Kasparov, is to misunderstand intelligence. There is no reason to believe that <em>Deep Blue</em> has any understanding of chess at all. Much in the same way that an ATM has no knowledge of what a bank is. Your computer doesn’t ‘know’ all your contacts because you keep a file of them, and the bot that beat you in buying concert tickets wasn’t excited to secure such sought-after seats.</p><p>Consider John Searle’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TryOC83PH1g">Chinese Room</a> experiment. A man sits in a room with a book that provides English translations of Chinese symbols. Then, a piece of paper is slipped under the door containing Chinese symbols. Using the book, the man translates the page of symbols into English and slips the paper back under the door. The system facilitates the translation of Chinese into English, but it cannot be said that the man ‘knows’ Chinese. In a similar way, this demonstrates how a computer can output correct information without having any understanding of what it is doing.</p><p>Are we any different? Is there reason to believe that humans are not akin to sophisticated computers, who mimic understanding but don’t really ‘know’ anything? I believe there is an answer to this, and it can be found in an unlikely source: CAPTCHA.</p><p>CAPTCHAs are a modern-day Turing test. The Turing test was devised in 1950 by Alan Turing as a way of testing a computer for human-like qualities. Now, we use them to identify humans in online environments. But the question of what separates a human from a computer isn’t just about intelligence. Raw information doesn’t identify humanity any more than Searle’s Chinese Room. I will forever be beaten in chess by my phone because it has far more information about chess than I ever will. Therefore, if a CAPTCHA only checks for a sufficient level of information, a computer will always be able to beat the test. But, my phone will never <em>play</em> chess, because to play requires more than just information.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/302/1*2aGUnzJ0li3-OlZgIleAaQ.gif" /><figcaption>FunCaptcha Game: Roll the Ball</figcaption></figure><p>On the surface, FunCaptcha may appear to operate like other CAPTCHAs: complete a quick task to verify you are a legitimate user. However, those tasks are generally grounded in identification — What is 2+2? What is this word? How many cars are in this photo? When you examine FunCaptcha more closely, you’ll find it operates very differently: <em>play</em> a quick game. Now, the game itself is undeniably simple for humans, and yet completely enigmatic for computers. It doesn’t test an ability to regurgitate information, as in the Chinese Room experiment. It tests a sophisticated understanding of an object within a certain context.</p><p>In one game, FunCaptcha asks the user to rotate an image of a 3D model until it is the ‘right’ way up. Each image is generated in real-time from the 3D model with the angle, lighting, texture, and other key variables randomly manipulated. Consider a horse is a shown. As a human, I can identify a horse immediately, or at very least, understand how a four-legged animal should look when standing. A computer, however, ‘sees’ things differently. For a computer to identify the image as a horse, it needs other similar images of horses to compare it to. It needs a database, much like the book of symbols in the Chinese Room. Except, by design, no image is presented in FunCaptcha the same way twice. In fact, each 3D model — of which there are endless supply — creates millions of unique combinations of the same image.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/470/1*o1aQAKaTvoJulf5ZnGK6yw.png" /><figcaption>Each 3D model creates millions of unique images</figcaption></figure><p>The success of this approach highlights a human quality that is yet to be replicated in a computer. It’s a kind of human understanding that goes beyond a database of collected and curated information. It demonstrates how humans process and understand the world as we ‘see’ it, but computers cannot. A computer collects a visual input, identifies similarities to other inputs, and then <em>declares</em> what it ‘knows’. Whereas a human can see, and <em>understand</em>, what they know.</p><p>How, then, does play factor in?</p><p>Let’s revisit chess. Computers can be programmed to beat even the most talented human opponents, and yet never actually <em>play</em> chess. Play is an attitude, or a way of understanding something. People have any number of reasons for participating in an activity — “I get paid to do it”, “I need to do it to survive” or “I do it for someone” are common explanations. But playful activities are different. We generally only play games, build sand castles, or dance, because we want to. There is some fundamental value that we have found in these specific activities that compels us to act. This intrinsic self-motivation is the playful attitude made manifest. In the absence of a playful attitude, we can engage in the activity of chess, building sand castles, or dancing…but it’s likely that we would simply give up without any other reason to complete them. Certainly, if dancing was the only way to deactivate a bomb, there would be a discrete reason to do it.</p><p>In that scenario, a person would not be <em>playing</em>. The playful attitude — and the activity that is made possible by it — are two different things. A computer, however, would continue to engage in that activity. It’s not motivated to complete the activity based on some love for it, or a desire to win. It keeps going because it is programmed to do so.</p><p>Now, CAPTCHA is by no means an autotelic activity. It is an interstice between our motivation and the associated payoff. An interstice that was traditionally designed to obfuscate information from computers; ultimately at the expense of human understanding. We saw this interstice as an opportunity to appeal to users’ playful, and uniquely human, <em>understanding</em>.</p><p>Understanding that transcends rule-based data and taps into how humans process the world. After all, “Whoever wants to understand much must play much.” — Gottfried Benn</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=df3d70dab487" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs/playing-with-humanity-verification-in-understanding-df3d70dab487">Playing with Humanity: Verification in Understanding</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs">Arkose Labs</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Bilk Road: Verification Routes in Mainland China]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arkoselabs/the-bilk-road-verification-routes-in-mainland-china-1dcb9dce0e14?source=rss----79279a1c1953---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1dcb9dce0e14</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[verification]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[authentication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[great-firewall]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[captcha]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Gosschalk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 11 Jan 2018 02:10:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-16T03:38:10.998Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wptkSFHU6e9STxnSUxw0HA.png" /></figure><p>The Silk Road stretched from China to Europe. It connected vastly different cultures from Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, through a network of trade routes that lasted centuries. These trade routes were highly lucrative and gave rise to products like silk, paper, and gunpowder. And like every source of profit, they were the target of many attacks. Today, the Internet is our Silk Road. It connects us to the global economy, and bridges the geographical divide between people around the world. But just like its forerunner, the routes we take remain under constant attack.</p><p>For the last 20 years, most brands have used CAPTCHA as a verification gateway along the most important routes on their website — whether it be registering an account, making a transaction, or even sharing a post. They are gatekeepers who protect online spaces from being pillaged by bots. And they hold enough power to lock everyone out, and to let anything in. But, what happens if these gateways seemingly disappear?</p><p>In 1997, China implemented a country-wide firewall to combat cybercrime and promote a nationally-oriented Internet. The firewall imposed many restrictions, to varying degrees, on websites beyond China’s borders. Perhaps the most notable restriction was that placed on Google, with all Google services — encrypted or not — being blocked. Then in 2009, following its acquisition by Google, the same fatal blow was delivered to reCAPTCHA. At the time, and very much still to this day, reCAPTCHA was one of the most-used anti-bot products on the market. Consequently, any website using reCAPTCHA was rendered inaccessible to users in mainland China.</p><p>What makes this consequence particularly interesting is how it is effectively invisible to the user. For example, consider a faulty vending machine posted with a sign that reads “out of order.” It’s clear that attempting to use it will only result in lost change. But, what if the same faulty vending machine had no sign? You’d wind up sinking your cash and leave feeling frustrated, right? That’s exactly how users in China feel when they encounter a website that uses reCAPTCHA. There’s no warning or placeholder…reCAPTCHA is simply censored from the page entirely. These users don’t even know it’s meant to appear, so to them it looks like a fully-completed form — or a blank page — that keeps returning an error.</p><p>To make matters worse, brands using reCAPTCHA are often unaware of this restriction. Their websites clear smoke tests completed in uncensored regions, only to fail in the world’s second-largest economy. It’s almost inconceivable to imagine how much business is squandered because of such a simple oversight. In fact, some brands have gone so far as to eliminate CAPTCHA so their products remain accessible to users in mainland China. But, pulling the pin on human verification creates a security problem far more aggressive than accessibility. Without a frontline defence like CAPTCHA, brands leave the door wide open to bots and automated attacks.</p><p>Verification is a necessary security measure that can provide a real, and effective defence against automation. What isn’t necessary, however, is a CAPTCHA that’s plagued by high-risk vulnerabilities and impossible challenges that block human users. CAPTCHA is the most effective way to verify humanity, but it takes an exceptional approach to get it right. In contrast to reCAPTCHA, FunCaptcha remains fully accessible to users in mainland China, and accommodates them with three local dialects. Therefore, the answer to restoring the modern-day Silk Road is not to forego verification, but to be discerning in the CAPTCHA you choose.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1dcb9dce0e14" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs/the-bilk-road-verification-routes-in-mainland-china-1dcb9dce0e14">The Bilk Road: Verification Routes in Mainland China</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs">Arkose Labs</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Skill or Shill: The Black Friday Battleground]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arkoselabs/skill-or-shill-the-black-friday-battleground-947d4dba5509?source=rss----79279a1c1953---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/947d4dba5509</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ecommerce]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bots]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[captcha]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[black-friday]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Gosschalk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 15 Dec 2017 02:05:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-15T22:55:07.142Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1zhkpyAY-vXmL0VgxK32lQ.png" /></figure><h4>To find the best prices this holiday season, it pays to be anything but human.</h4><p>It’s been two weeks since the holiday shopping season kicked off. Did you manage to nab a larger-than-life OLED 4K TV in the Black Friday sales? How about the latest Apple Watch and iPad on Cyber Monday? Even if you’re hot on your mouse, chances are you’ll lose out to bots for the hottest online deals of 2017.</p><p>Black Friday is one of the biggest sales periods of the year. For some retailers, this time accounts for a quarter of their annual sales. The hottest and most exclusive deals are on offer across the United States, and increasingly around the world. This landmark event attracts millions of sales, and billions in revenue for the world’s biggest brands. So, it goes without saying that it’s also the target for millions of cyberattacks.</p><p>The biggest heists this year won’t be from a band of crooks brandishing crowbars, or weaving through a field of lasers. It will be a series of automated — and untraceable — bot attacks aimed at top-shelf brands to secure anything from personal information, to holiday bargains for resale.</p><p>The attacks, like their bounty, are equally varied. Some bots will target limited-edition sale items and buy them all before humans have the chance, only to resell them at a premium. Others will brute force gift card combinations and spend their value before they’ve even been unwrapped on Christmas day. Competitive bots will also manipulate the online market, reserving special sale items repeatedly to prevent them from being shown, and forcing customers to spend more elsewhere.</p><p>The reality is bots are squeezing customers out of the online marketplace. Bots can run through checkouts with a cart full of discounted products, while real customers are forced to digitally clamber over each other in hopes of securing just one great deal. It will come as no surprise that customers are angry, but what about brands? After all, a sale is a sale — and the profit keeps rolling in regardless if the customer is human or not. And while some brands are none the wiser…others have invested in thinly veiled initiatives, which only stop some of the abuse, to placate public outcry. So, whether these attacks are successful because of oversight or negligence — there’s good reason for brands to care.</p><p>Black Friday and Cyber Monday mark more than just the beginning of the holiday shopping season. They also indicate sales for the year to come, reward discerning customers for their patronage, and help to build trust in the brand. When bots are given free passage, brands end up footing the bill. Sales data is warped, holiday promotions become a disincentive, and customer satisfaction drops. Brands can no longer afford to be complacent in the war on bots. They must stand with their customers and provide guaranteed protection against automated attacks. Otherwise, they are complicit in bots snatching gifts from beneath their customers’ Christmas trees.</p><p>Black Friday doesn’t need to be a battleground. Customers deserve better, and brands must deliver.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=947d4dba5509" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs/skill-or-shill-the-black-friday-battleground-947d4dba5509">Skill or Shill: The Black Friday Battleground</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs">Arkose Labs</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Automation: The Cost of Being Human]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arkoselabs/automation-the-cost-of-being-human-a0dbec4e8e13?source=rss----79279a1c1953---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a0dbec4e8e13</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[captcha]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[equifax]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[automation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bots]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Gosschalk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Nov 2017 01:52:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-15T22:57:54.119Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-4nwDFB5sLP71gaGsNU-sQ.png" /></figure><p>Cybersecurity is exploding. Beyond technical innovation and breaches that have changed the course of history — the mainstream is listening. Now more than ever, people are mindful of their online security just as the locks on their front doors. And brands are paying attention. In the fallout from catastrophic incidents like the WannaCry ransomware attack, and Equifax data breach, brands have scrambled to meet our growing demands for protection, privacy, and integrity. We demand as much as we know to. And yet, we are losing the battle with what it means to be human online.</p><p>In September, I took FunCaptcha to the floor at <a href="https://2017.appsecusa.org/">AppSec USA</a>. No one really expected to see a CAPTCHA at a respected conference for software security leaders and researchers. For most, the mere notion of CAPTCHA security is an oxymoron. While allured by our Aussie swag, it goes without question that attendees left with more than just a Tim Tam. We were met with incisive questions and vacillating scrutiny of the technology that has failed them for 20 years. This kind of inquiry gave us an opportunity to settle the score on CAPTCHA, and to transcend two decades of second-hand frustration — before we even mentioned FunCaptcha. As we drilled down on the longstanding beliefs about CAPTCHA, the question that always remained was “What difference does it make to me?” If we distil this question even further, it begs an answer that puts a value on what it means to be human in online spaces.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FcclZh-p3t04%3Ffeature%3Doembed%26showinfo%3D0%26controls%3D0&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DcclZh-p3t04&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FcclZh-p3t04%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/b4cb60cc70dd859f2e16aaec4f61d651/href">https://medium.com/media/b4cb60cc70dd859f2e16aaec4f61d651/href</a></iframe><p>The following month, I was invited to present a lightning talk for Ignite at <a href="https://conferences.oreilly.com/security/sec-ny">O’Reilly Security Conference</a>. I set out to answer the enduring questions by showing an effect CAPTCHA has on all of us. An effect that’s never been spoken about publicly, and a vulnerability that exists without us even realizing it: The Ghost Queue — a verification loophole where bots manipulate what humans can buy, and how much they pay. I gave one example where cheap airfares are reserved indefinitely by bots that never transact. These nefarious bots work for competitive airlines and/or airfare aggregators and force us to buy more profitable fares. It struck a chord in the room. How could this kind of automated abuse exist without people knowing? And more importantly, why was it still happening? I had answers for these questions too, and showed how bots exploit the same vulnerability in a range of online spaces. And what began as a 5-minute presentation turned into 2 days of conference chatter.</p><blockquote>How could this kind of automated abuse exist without people knowing?</blockquote><p>Consequently, attendees approached our booth with a new perspective. For them, we had reframed the discourse on automated abuse from the immaterial cost of bots, to the cost of simply being human. No longer was the value of online verification lost in the abstract; CAPTCHA was relevant and tethered to their wallets. They simply could not compete with bots, which possess a far superior ability than humans in online spaces. These truths opened the floor to a new kind of dialogue about CAPTCHA. Attendees wanted to understand the flaws in online verification that have failed to stop bots, and perpetuated distrust in CAPTCHA. They also held us to account, demanding more than just our word on how FunCaptcha solves this complex problem. In fact, we remain the only anti-bot service in the world to meet this demand, offering a guaranteed SLA against automated abuse.</p><p>This problem isn’t going away, and neither are we. Next up for FunCaptcha is <a href="https://insecurity.com/">INsecurity</a>, a Dark Reading conference. Join us at Booth #9, or drop by my session where I’ll be speaking more about the future of automation and abuse.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a0dbec4e8e13" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs/automation-the-cost-of-being-human-a0dbec4e8e13">Automation: The Cost of Being Human</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs">Arkose Labs</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Black Hat Recap: All Product, No Sales]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arkoselabs/black-hat-recap-all-product-no-sales-c0feb903ca8f?source=rss----79279a1c1953---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c0feb903ca8f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blackhat]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[captcha]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[facebook]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bots]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Gosschalk]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 04 Aug 2017 01:20:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-15T22:59:49.898Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bYECTYPJcnKSkQXLWDMkQg.jpeg" /></figure><h4>In 2017, FunCaptcha made its debut as an exhibitor at Black Hat — with 16 days notice and not a single salesperson.</h4><p>It’s difficult to imagine a conference as big as Black Hat without the stunt hacking that generally comes with such a high-profile security event. Whether it be chatter about phishing attempts on the Trump administration, hijacking the hotel’s wireless connection, or compromising the automated teller machine in the lobby — the antics of Black Hat’s hacker contingent are hard to separate from the security innovations that debut to the world there.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/744/1*q3MpWlV1cLGNiLqbilUgdw.png" /></figure><p>In his keynote address, Facebook CSO, Alex Stamos, called for change — prompting the great minds before him to champion real-world security problems — and to leave behind uninspired stunt hacks and zero days. An appeal that resonated through the show, and aligned seamlessly with the values that underpin FunCaptcha.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/744/1*ngnPJXgAkLNNHHfH0rZY2w.png" /></figure><p>The business hall was dressed in value; elaborate booths matched only by their compelling salespeople. Accordingly, there was much commentary from attendees on discerning the value of the sale, versus the value of the product. We had the same discussion before embarking on the road to Black Hat 2017, and ultimately we made the choice to transform a sales pitch into a bespoke workshop delivered by key talent from our product team. In fact, there wasn’t a single salesperson at our booth, and much to the delight of those who stopped by — no technical question went unanswered. Although, a lot of our guests left questioning the CAPTCHAs that are meant to secure the most important parts of their website.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/744/1*Wnn_Z7BRiXDtHFS5TMewfQ.png" /></figure><p>The road to Black Hat 2017 was short for FunCaptcha. 16-days-short, actually. We were offered a last-minute opportunity, and I just couldn’t pass up sharing the incredible work my team has done over the last 4 years. The kind of work Alex Stamos called for in his keynote — a solution to a real-world security problem. And with no online problem larger in scale than automated abuse, FunCaptcha demonstrated itself to be a standout product in front of the world’s leading InfoSec decision-makers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/744/1*--ZAhHqVwFfdT0GMyPmTzQ.png" /></figure><p>Our unique Aussie swag — like Tim Tams and Vegemite — certainly created buzz across the business hall, but it was the compelling truth behind our product that resonated most with attendees. We listened to passionate accounts from those who had suffered at the hands of reCAPTCHA, and heard defeat from those resigned to the belief that CAPTCHA simply doesn’t work. Narratives that have permeated the CAPTCHA discourse since its inception. We joined these conversations first with the ‘why’ — why hasn’t CAPTCHA worked? We unpacked 20 years of CAPTCHA to highlight the security flaws that have failed to stop bots, and carelessly blocked humans. With this insight, we then proved the ‘how’ — how we avoided these flaws and built an elegant solution to a very difficult problem. A problem that continues to evolve and isn’t going away — just as FunCaptcha remains the world’s only managed CAPTCHA service that responds to threats within a guaranteed automation SLA.</p><p>For us, that’s what made Black Hat a knockout for FunCaptcha.</p><p><strong>All product, no sales.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c0feb903ca8f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs/black-hat-recap-all-product-no-sales-c0feb903ca8f">Black Hat Recap: All Product, No Sales</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs">Arkose Labs</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[FunCaptcha: Security Verification for People of All Abilities]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arkoselabs/funcaptcha-security-verification-for-people-of-all-abilities-c2f9a0ba73df?source=rss----79279a1c1953---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c2f9a0ba73df</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[web-accessibility]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wcag]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[captcha]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bots]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[accessibility]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Arkose Labs]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Oct 2016 06:19:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-15T16:56:54.874Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Arkose Enforce: Security Verification for People of All Abilities</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NJEFSuxbljUJL8hBntfFEw.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>The principal barrier against automated abuse and spam are CAPTCHAs. They are the custodian of every website and app, deputed to tell human users and spammers apart.</strong><br><br>The most common type of CAPTCHA challenges the user to type an obscured sequence of letters or digits that appear on the screen or to discern abstracted images in a grid. For some, an encounter with a CAPTCHA is frustrating because everyday work is slowed down by distorted words that are difficult to read. However, to the diverse group of users who rely on assistive technology, this rudimentary user-identification procedure is chronically inaccessible. The Internet is a place for everyone, and yet many of its corners remain closed to the very people it intends to serve.</p><p>People of varied abilities, such as those with vision impairment or reduced fine motor skills, can face many difficulties when trying to complete seemingly straightforward tasks — like signing up to a new website, sending a message to a loved one, or buying tickets to a favorite band. These tasks rely on a CAPTCHA to prevent abuse, but they also rely on technology and challenges that cannot be overcome by people of varied abilities. For example, many common CAPTCHAs do not provide a text alternative for their controls, which prevents vision-impaired users from using screen readers to proceed. Additionally, users with reduced fine motor skills may not possess the dexterity needed to type an arduous sequence of letters. At this moment, people of varied abilities are often given few fall-back options and are forced to abandon their task.<br><br>Now, as the world becomes increasingly more connected, it is both our privilege and duty to ensure that all people are given equal opportunity to be a part of the online community. Arkose Enforce is committed to providing these opportunities; championing accessibility support to position FunCaptcha as the most accessible CAPTCHA available on the market, in line with Section 508 Standards.</p><p><strong>Accessibility Support in Arkose Enforce</strong></p><p><strong><em>Arkose Enforce controls include a text alternative:</em> </strong>This allows instructions and controls to be read by screen readers.</p><p><strong><em>Arkose Enforce provides an audio alternative:</em> </strong>This allows users with vision impairment to complete verification by listening to a sound file.</p><p><strong><em>Arkose Enforce does not require JavaScript:</em> </strong>This ensures all content and functionality are both accessible to and controllable by, assistive technology.</p><p><strong><em>Arkose Enforce does not require any additional apps or plugins to be completed: </em></strong>This means the normal functionality is natively available to the user agent (browser) on-the-spot.</p><p><strong><em>Arkose Enforce is navigable without a pointing device:</em> </strong>This allows controls to be tabbed through on desktop, as well as touched on mobile.</p><p><strong><em>Arkose Enforce does not use repetitive navigation links:</em> </strong>This ensures instructions and controls are placed in their focus order, and users begin at the main content.</p><p>We will always strive to ensure the verification experience of Arkose Enforce remains accessible to people of all abilities. We’re also mindful that accessibility standards can be challenging to get right for everyone, so we’ll be paying close attention to feedback from our diverse group of users. If you’d like to suggest an improvement or request additional support, we’d love to hear from you.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c2f9a0ba73df" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs/funcaptcha-security-verification-for-people-of-all-abilities-c2f9a0ba73df">FunCaptcha: Security Verification for People of All Abilities</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs">Arkose Labs</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[You’re Going Too Fast: Pokémon Go Exposes Flaw in AR Game Defenses]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arkoselabs/to-the-pokelimit-youre-going-too-fast-in-pokemon-go-exposes-flaw-in-ar-game-defenses-69b5ba695f2f?source=rss----79279a1c1953---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/69b5ba695f2f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pokémon-go]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[captcha]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bots]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gaming]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Ford]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 10 Aug 2016 04:41:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-15T23:07:18.933Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ksrlcJf6_KmJ8okoifsZcw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Today people have started seeing this message in Pokemon Go: “You’re going too fast! Pokemon Go should not be played while driving”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/392/1*4RENted15JmUYFU49tDW-Q.png" /></figure><p>This matches a prediction we made previously, that as Niantic tries to limit the damage done by bots, they will start to monitor and challenge users who have a particular suspicious behavior pattern. But in the play experience of us and others, this appears as a false positive: we were playing the game normally. It’s impossible to draw a sharp line like this without mis-categorizing either bots or humans. This illustrates the point made in our earlier post about how game developers need to use FunCaptcha techniques to avoid the binary separation of users into totally permitted and totally prohibited, filling in the gap between those extremes with FunCaptcha. Niantic briefly stopped bots by encrypting its API. However, as we predicted, unfortunately this brought only temporary relief and now the bots are back. This <a href="http://arstechnica.com/gaming/2016/08/anti-cheat-technology-stopped-pokemon-go-hackers-for-four-days/">Ars Technica article</a> has a good summary of that.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=69b5ba695f2f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs/to-the-pokelimit-youre-going-too-fast-in-pokemon-go-exposes-flaw-in-ar-game-defenses-69b5ba695f2f">You’re Going Too Fast: Pokémon Go Exposes Flaw in AR Game Defenses</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs">Arkose Labs</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[PokéPocalypse: Stopping Bots on Pokémon Go]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arkoselabs/stopping-pokepocalypse-save-pokemon-go-with-funcaptcha-techniques-e5a8e3741eaf?source=rss----79279a1c1953---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e5a8e3741eaf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pokémon-go]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bots]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pokemon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[captcha]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gaming]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Ford]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Aug 2016 11:48:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-15T23:11:52.431Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IWP87eew2exVrl2kwMPTdA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Previously, we broke the news that hackers have rigged the game Pokemon Go to allow thousands of software “bots” to play the game automatically.</p><h4>How many Pokemon Go bots are here, and how do they work?</h4><p>Sites that point to bot installers:<br><a href="http://hackaday.com/2016/07/26/pokemon-go-bot-edition/">http://hackaday.com/2016/07/26/pokemon-go-bot-edition/<br></a><a href="https://github.com/PokemonGoF/PokemonGo-Bot">https://github.com/PokemonGoF/PokemonGo-Bot<br></a><a href="http://necrobot.net/">http://necrobot.net/</a></p><p>Videos showing bot software from install to run:<br><a href="https://youtu.be/iqx4NRNkeVc">https://youtu.be/iqx4NRNkeVc<br></a><a href="https://youtu.be/3bdAdVXNKDE">https://youtu.be/3bdAdVXNKDE<br></a>Bonus: <a href="https://youtu.be/NG3tNCUvXH8?t=4m22s">This guy has a super charming accent!</a></p><p>Discussion groups devoted to botting:<br><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/pokemongobotting/">https://www.reddit.com/r/pokemongobotting/<br></a><a href="http://www.ownedcore.com/forums/pokemon-go/pokemon-go-hacks-cheats/">http://www.ownedcore.com/forums/pokemon-go/pokemon-go-hacks-cheats/<br></a><a href="http://hackforums.net/forumdisplay.php?fid=358">http://hackforums.net/forumdisplay.php?fid=358</a></p><h4>When should a FunCaptcha appear in the game?</h4><p>This <a href="https://blog.bugcrowd.com/big-bugs-podcast-episode-hacking-pokemon-go">analysis by leading application testing company BugCrowd</a> puts a finger on it: “<em>Trading is going to have a huge impact due to bots. Maybe implement level requirement so Niantic has a data threshold to ban bots.</em>” We extend this idea by saying that FunCaptcha should appear in the gray area between tolerance and the banning threshold.</p><p>For example, keep a running suspicion score per user. Raise the score when a time slice contains a highly implausible gain in XP, items, captures, wins, or the like. Drain the score over time so merely lucky players don’t remain suspicious. When the suspicion score crosses a threshold, and the user is not in the middle of something, and there has not been a challenge shown for a while, then show a single FunCaptcha challenge. If it is solved, suspicion is lowered. If not, suspicion is raised. Only when suspicion continues to climb should the user be suspended or banned.</p><p>The data threshold is simple and objective, but it can risk being accidentally too strict. This is okay because the consequent challenge is a minor inconvenience to a small number of super-high-performing players — far better than a sharp binary division of users between allowed and banned, which causes problems no matter where that line gets drawn. If the challenge is successfully solved, the developer has feedback that maybe the threshold was too strict, and needs a bit more tuning.</p><p>A user (or for that matter, a very tame bot) advancing at anywhere close to the speed of a normal user would never see the challenge.</p><h4>Everyone hates CAPTCHAs, why is this not end of conversation?</h4><p>Bad old CAPTCHAs are everywhere, but the new techniques demonstrated by FunCaptcha show real progress. We have proven that legitimate users can solve a well-made challenge, in seconds, with a 99% success rate, in a playful and appealing way.</p><h4>Online games have always had bots, so why worry?</h4><p>So what is the difference between bots in Pokemon Go and bots in many other games? We all know bots have been around a long time. For example, MMOs have long endured bots automatically “farming” in-game advancement. Why is Pokemon Go really different? Other games survived bots, so why panic about Pokemon Go and other AR games on the way?</p><p>This is the first big game that has new gaps between what the server can possibly know about its players, and what its players are actually doing as input. Exploiting that gap, bots do more damage while being harder to detect. This is for a few key reasons that differ between, for example, an MMO bot and a Pokemon Go bot.</p><p>MMO botPokemon Go botGapSpeed that the avatar can possibly move through the world is known to the server, and everyone pretty much moves at this maximum.Speed that the avatar (a real human) can possibly move through the (real) world is high, but everyone almost always moves well below this maximum.A Pokemon Go bot moving at a speed much faster than an average human gets a big advantage… but can’t be outright banned, because it still <em>might actually be</em> a human.An avatar always has to be realtime connected to the server, and as it moves, every bit of its movement is tracked on the server.An avatar (a real human) can disconnect from the server (the app is off) and later reappear far away, plausibly after flying or driving there.How large a jump, done how often, is enough to ban? What algorithm can effectively make a binary division between allowed and banned?When an avatar has obstacles (mountains, buildings, walls, etc) preventing it from directly reaching resources, all obstacles are known to the server.The avatar usually has a lot of obstacles (cars, crosswalks, buildings) slowing it down that the server does not know about. But the avatar might <em>not</em> have those obstacles, and can’t be blamed for moving at a brisk walk from one point directly to another and gathering the resource.Another binary division can go very wrong. How efficient can an avatar be at gathering before a ban? What if a ban hits someone lucky enough to be free of obstacles for a while?<br>These gaps are much larger for Pokemon Go and the coming wave of AR games than it has been for any other popular digital game ever made. A Pokemon Go bot can (and does) advance many times more quickly than nearly any human player, but can’t be banned in case it <em>actually is</em> a dedicated human. This means the impact both of the abuse, and of misfired ways of stopping the abuse, is vastly larger than any other game has suffered.</p><h4>Won’t hackers make their bots operate at a speed just below the activity threshold?</h4><p>The measures described here will limit the bots to a tiny fraction of their current speed, making the impact on the game economy and competition minimal.</p><p>Also, in the process of finding the threshold, a lot of hackers will slip over it, get challenged, fail to solve it, and get suspended or banned. The risk gets much higher and the reward much lower — that is victory when dealing with automated abuse.</p><h4>Won’t hackers keep an eye on their bots and solve challenges manually?</h4><p>If the bot is advancing superhumanly fast, and therefore gets a challenge once in a while, a human operator of the bot who is watching out can indeed solve it manually and keep the bot going. However this costs a bit of the most irreducible thing on the Internet: human attention. That user could not run multiple high-speed bots 24/7 as is presently the case. A speed bump won’t stop a bike, but it sure will mess up a rocket car.</p><h4>How can FunCaptcha techniques adapt to fit smoothly into Pokemon Go?</h4><p>FunCaptcha poses challenges that tap into innate human powers of visual recognition, but are impractical for computer programs to solve. This can be as simple as turning an image the right way up, or as complex as proprietary techniques we are developing for a wide variety of systems. The challenge built into Pokemon Go may hardly appear to be a CAPTCHA at all — it will be just another brief, fun activity players do for a reward.</p><h4>Bot writers are saying they won’t write bots that fight in gyms, so the damage won’t be that bad…</h4><p>This voluntary self-limitation won’t last. <a href="http://www.ownedcore.com/forums/pokemon-go/pokemon-go-hacks-cheats/567616-when-we-gonna-get-gym-fighting-gym-maintaining-bot.html">This thread </a>is a good example of how a downward spiral of reasoning leads to that next inevitable step. UPDATE: As predicted, <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/TheSilphRoad/comments/4vrnw3/psa_if_you_use_a_bot_to_hold_multiple_gyms/">it’s probably happening now</a>.</p><h4>It is too late to save Pokemon Go?</h4><p>No! Present bot activity levels are nothing compared to what will build up over time, so immediate action will stop the worst damage. Also, as the game is expanded, it will add new resources, new currencies, and new pillars and tiers of the advancement economy. These will be free of the stain of today’s bot abuse, if it is stopped now.</p><p>Besides, this discussion is not just about the first, revolutionary game in this genre. Sequels will come. Other games will follow the stunning success of Pokemon Go. Working on bot-reducing measures now will stop the rot from spreading.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e5a8e3741eaf" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs/stopping-pokepocalypse-save-pokemon-go-with-funcaptcha-techniques-e5a8e3741eaf">PokéPocalypse: Stopping Bots on Pokémon Go</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs">Arkose Labs</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Pokémon Go Ruined by Cheating Bots]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/arkoselabs/pokemon-go-ruined-by-cheating-bots-b970c5e8f24b?source=rss----79279a1c1953---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b970c5e8f24b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[captcha]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nintendo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bots]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pokémon-go]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pokemon]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Ford]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 Jul 2016 00:56:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-15T23:15:07.651Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FY7_dYOIftEL3hctJinGfg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Hackers have rigged the game Pokemon Go to allow thousands of software “bots” to <a href="http://hackaday.com/2016/07/26/pokemon-go-bot-edition/">play the game automatically</a>. Instead of walking around catching Pokemon and items, lazy hackers scoop them up without getting out of bed. In the past few days this has been getting a lot of attention from <a href="http://www.polygon.com/2016/7/27/12295344/Pokemon-go-bots-cheats-niantic">gaming site Polygon</a>, popular site <a href="http://motherboard.vice.com/read/pokmon-go-cheating-gps">Vice</a>, tech site <a href="http://arstechnica.com/gaming/2016/07/the-tireless-automated-bots-that-want-to-play-pokemon-go-for-you/">Ars Technica</a>, and more.</p><p><strong>UPDATE</strong>: <a href="http://www.polygon.com/2016/8/4/12376886/pokemon-go-bots-cheats-gps-spoofs">Polygon spoke with us about Pokémon Go bots ruining the game, and how our unique CAPTCHA can stop them with visual puzzles that blend into normal gameplay.</a>We propose that Pokemon Go should embed a simple, playful CAPTCHA to catch cheater bots while leaving real players unaffected. CAPTCHA is any kind of digital activity that only humans can complete, to distinguish between people and programs. FunCaptcha protects major game and social sites and apps against millions of bot attacks per day.</p><h4>Will I have to solve a CAPTCHA as I play Pokemon Go?</h4><p>No you won’t. FunCaptcha would pop up in the game only for players who are beyond the upper limit of how fast a human could possibly be progressing. This is a fuzzy line, and super-devoted players should not get banned on a whim, so the gray area gets filled by FunCaptcha. Even if a hugely successful real player has a great day and sees a FunCaptcha, he or she will be able to solve it in seconds, having a bit of fun doing it, and even get a little in-game reward for their trouble, like getting a bonus PokeStop.</p><h4>Won’t hackers make their bots operate at a speed just below the activity threshold you set?</h4><p>We have learned a lot about hacking over the years and see this as a victory, not a problem. Even if hackers stay just on the safe side of the line, that will limit the bots to a fraction of 1% of their current speed, making the impact on the game economy and competition minimal. To give up because hackers are slowed instead of stopped is like saying, “Some marathon runners buy really expensive sneakers to give them an edge, so let’s scrap all the rules and let runners wear rocket skates.”</p><p>Also, in the process of finding the threshold, a lot of hackers will slip over it, get challenged with a FunCaptcha, fail to solve it, and get suspended or banned. The risk gets much higher and the reward much lower — that is victory when dealing with automated abuse.</p><h4>It is so easy to see how to turn a Pokemon the right way up — why can’t a bot do it?</h4><p>The human brain has amazing powers of pattern recognition. What you find very easy (like seeing that this is a Pikachu and you know which way to stand it upright) is hard for a software program. It’s not impossible, but the kind of work and intelligence it takes to write and train a program to recognize Pokemon is much better spent on an activity far more profitable than Pokemon Go abuse. These are PhD-level challenges, and need more than a fast-food wage to justify the work.</p><p>By protecting thousands of sites and apps, our development team has overcome all kinds of challenges. Some of the things we know about how to complicate “machine vision” attacks are secrets we can’t share here. For proof, witness the years of attacks we have overcome.</p><h4>Why say that competing at gyms the main goal in the game, over catching Pokemon?</h4><p>We hear from many players who feel their interest waning because gyms are hopeless. Every gym we try leaves us with no XP and no effect on the big battle. Lately we are playing less because we think, what’s the point? Without a reason to even try a battle, we don’t get to see our beloved little creatures do what they are made to do.</p><p>After all, the original Pokemon show had at least one battle in every 30-minute episode. The Pokemon card game was all about fighting. The Pokemon games on the Nintendo GameBoy had battle after battle. The generation who grew up with Pokemon battled a lot in every kind of game so far. Now, it seems like nobody we know ever gets to win at any battle, and we are all getting disheartened.</p><p>Another way to think about it is how many of Pokemon Go’s game assets and features have to do with fighting. Tap a Pokemon in the game and see nothing but stats that have something to do with winning battles: hit points, attack type, combat power, and how much candy and stardust you need to make those stats better. Nearly all the animations and detail of a Pokemon can only be seen during a battle. Most of the things you get while walking around are about battle — including the Pokemon you catch that are weaker versions of what you already have. When you run out of room, you transfer them to the Professor… why? To get the item that makes your lead Pokemon more powerful. To give up on battling “cuts the game loop” that makes the rest of the game feel worthwhile.</p><h4>Why so serious? It’s just a game.</h4><p>We want to help Niantic address this problem before the world’s most successful app has its bubble popped. It’s too great a game to be ruined by lazy hackers, especially when the solution is already at hand.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b970c5e8f24b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs/pokemon-go-ruined-by-cheating-bots-b970c5e8f24b">Pokémon Go Ruined by Cheating Bots</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/arkoselabs">Arkose Labs</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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