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        <title><![CDATA[Bonothesauro - Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Deficits are Raising Interest Rates. But Other Factors are Lowering Them.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/bonothesauro/deficits-are-raising-interest-rates-but-other-factors-are-lowering-them-6d1e68776b7a?source=rss----96dfb9b63f93---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[fiscal-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[macroeconomics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fiscal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ernie Tedeschi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 08 Mar 2019 13:05:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-19T19:13:07.723Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>Long-term nominal interest rates in the US have fallen since 2001 even as federal deficits and debt have risen, in particular since the Great Recession. This has led some to question the pre-crisis conventional economic wisdom about a link between deficits and interest rates. In this blog post, I update the empirical analysis of Warnock &amp; Warnock (2009) to show that deficits and debt, both actual and expected, still have positive and statistically-significant impacts on interest rates at the margin. A one percentage point increase in the ongoing cyclically-adjusted federal deficit raises the 10-year Treasury yield by 18 basis points, and the ACM 10-year term premium by 20 basis points. Yet other factors with downward effects on yields such as growth and productivity, monetary policy, demography, and foreign demand for US Treasuries have ultimately dominated this upward fiscal effect since 2001.</blockquote><h4><strong>Introduction</strong></h4><p>In a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-01-27/whos-afraid-budget-deficits">recent <em>Foreign Policy </em>article</a>, economists Jason Furman and Larry Summers highlight an economic mystery, some might even say contradiction. Federal deficits and debt have risen substantially over the past 20 years. But interest rates, rather than rising as conventional economic theory would have predicted, have fallen.</p><p>This miss has not only sparked a deeper — and in my opinion, healthy — debate about the economic tradeoffs of deficits and debt, it has also influenced, implicitly if not explicitly, public policy already. The $1.5 trillion 2017 tax cuts. The string of increasingly-expensive bipartisan spending deals since 2014. The Green New Deal that its advocates, at least in its current drafts, propose financing entirely through deficits. Policymakers not only appear to be eschewing fiscal offsets for <strong>short-term,</strong> <strong>countercyclical </strong>policy, but also for<strong> long-term, permanent</strong> policy.</p><p>Every change in fiscal policy must be financed in some manner, even if it’s just pulling the leaves off trees and declaring them legal tender (though I wouldn’t recommend that). And each of these means of financing — whether it’s raising taxes, cutting spending, selling bonds in the open market, or simply printing money — poses tradeoffs.</p><p>By now, a decade after the Great Recession, it’s clear that the tradeoffs of deficit financing are more complex than the pre-crisis conventional thinking, at least in the way that conventional thinking was commonly understood, and that the short-run debt anxiety in the years after 2008, when the US was still so far from full employment, was in retrospect grossly misplaced.</p><p><em>But “complexity” does not mean that the tradeoffs have disappeared entirely</em>, or even that economists mismeasured them in the first place. As I hope to show in this (primarily empirical) blog post, higher deficits probably <strong>have</strong> been exerting upward pressure on interest rates this whole time, and at magnitudes consistent with the pre-crisis literature. But a multitude of other factors have <strong>also </strong>been counteracting and ultimately dominating this deficit effect over the same period.</p><h4><strong>The conventional economic story is that deficits push up interest rates, which then bear down on investment…</strong></h4><p>Let’s start in the early- to mid-2000s. In those years before the Great Recession, the conventional economic thinking was that a key tradeoff of deficit-financing a change in fiscal policy was that it would put upward pressure on long-term interest rates.<a href="#d481">¹</a> <a href="#31d7">²</a></p><p>That’s because a fall in public savings (another way of describing an increase in the federal deficit or, equivalently again, a fall in the government surplus) would have to be offset in an accounting sense by some combination of either a rise in private savings, a fall in private investment, and/or an increase in net capital inflows from foreign investors:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mwWA92hjdPxEvc2NYmeYwA.png" /></figure><p>This relationship is an accounting identity, and while <em>accounting identities are not causal models</em>, they must hold true by definition. One way to re-balance this relationship after a decline in the government’s budget would be through higher interest rates, which might increase private savings and reduce domestic investment. I should note here that it’s not the <strong>only </strong>way to balance this relationship: if, to provide one example, there were a global savings glut, and/or high demand worldwide for safe assets, then an increase in deficits might be offset by a rise in foreign capital flows into the US as hungry foreign investors snatch up the new Treasuries being issued.</p><p>Economists worry that higher interest rates would be a drag on economic activity and investment, particularly over time. Lower investment means a lower productive capacity for the economy and, therefore, slower wage growth, slower rises in consumption, and overall just a more sluggish pace in the rise in well-being over time.</p><p>And the link between the fiscal trajectory and interest rates was more than just a theory. A broad empirical literature supported this hypothesis, including<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w1970"> Feldstein (1986)</a>,<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1810224?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents"> Wachtel &amp; Young (1987)</a>, Cohen &amp; Garnier (1991),<a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/fthharver/1639.htm"> Elmendorf (1993)</a>,<a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedkpr/y2002p333-389.html"> Canzoneri et al (2002)</a>,<a href="https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/58901/310669-The-Economic-Effects-of-Long-Term-Fiscal-Discipline.PDF"> Gale &amp; Orszag (2003)</a>,<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w10681"> Engen &amp; Hubbard (2004)</a>,<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w11574"> Dai &amp; Philippon (2005)</a>, <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200312/revision/200312pap.pdf">Laubach (2003)</a>, and <a href="https://faculty.darden.virginia.edu/warnockf/papers/WarnockWarnock_Flows_and_Rates_JIMF.pdf">Warnock &amp; Warnock (2009)</a>. Some analyses like<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w10788"> Ardagna et al (2004)</a> and<a href="https://academic.oup.com/economicpolicy/article-abstract/21/47/444/2918736?redirectedFrom=PDF"> Faini (2006)</a> even attempt to exploit international variation, though this often proved difficult without the consistent and repeated projections of an independent fiscal monitor like CBO. Other analyses are less motivated by fiscal policy per se and more concerned about the dynamics of Treasury supply.<a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/666526"> Krishnamurthy &amp; Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)</a>, for example, finds that an increase in Treasury supply lowers the safety and liquidity advantages of Treasuries over AAA corporate debt (what they term the “convenience yield):</p><h4><strong>…but this story doesn’t match a quick eyeball of the recent historical data.</strong></h4><p>But at first glance, the actual economic data seem to contradict this conventional framework.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*YnEu66KeRnQ-_AOp" /></figure><p>Way back in March 2001, when the economy peaked at the precipice of the dot com bust, the 10-year Treasury traded at 4.9%, we were running a structural surplus of 2% of GDP, publicly-held federal debt stood at 33% of GDP, and CBO was projecting the entire debt would be paid off within a decade. In other words, both the economy and the fiscal trajectory were extraordinary.</p><p>Today, as we inch ever close to another business cycle peak, the structural deficit is now 5% of GDP, debt is 76% of GDP, and CBO projects that it will reach 105% of GDP in a decade if current policies stay in place. Today’s fiscal trajectory is almost a photographic negative of the outlook from early 2001.</p><p>And yet, the 10-year Treasury now sits more than 2 percentage points <strong>lower </strong>than it did back in March 2001.</p><p>To be fair here, the pre-crisis conventional thinking on government debt was never as simple as the overly-blunt “debt is always and everywhere bad”. But it is also probably fair to say that many a public finance expert circa 2001 would have been gobsmacked had a visitor from our time gone back and told them the debt and interest rate outcomes prevailing near full employment two decades later.</p><h4><strong>The conventional story may have been wrong all along. Or maybe other factors have been pushing down interest rates.</strong></h4><p>What explains this mystery? I think that there are two possibilities.</p><p>One is that this conventional framework is wrong, full stop, and deficits and debt have <strong>no </strong>relationship at all with interest rates.</p><p>A second possibility is that fiscal policy <strong>does </strong>affect interest rates, and that rising deficits since 2001 have put upward <strong>pressure</strong> on them, but countervailing downward pressures have dominated this fiscal effect.</p><p>Long-term interest rates, after all, are influenced by a complex litany of factors. The Council of Economic Advisers in 2015 published a <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/interest_rate_report_final.pdf">helpful overview</a> of what drives long-term interest rates, drawing on both theoretical and empirical insights.</p><p>So what factors have arisen since 2001 that may have offset any possible upward interest rate pressure from growing deficits? The CEA report mentions two candidates: an aging population (<strong>demography</strong>) and<strong> slower productivity growth</strong>. Nonfarm business productivity growth was 1.0% in 2017, versus 3.1% in 2001. And as Baby Boomers have aged, the share of the US population that’s 65 or older has risen 3 percentage points over the same period.</p><p>In mainstream economic models and assumptions, lower trend productivity growth is associated with lower real interest rates because it implies lower consumption growth over time. Slowing population growth may also feed into this by reducing the incentives to invest in R&amp;D and innovation since the return to scale of new knowledge is lower, which in turn implies less adoption of productivity-enhancing innovations. An older population is also more weighted to high-saving middle-aged cohorts than high-spending younger cohorts, which puts downward pressure on interest rates. <a href="http://larrysummers.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/NABE-speech-Lawrence-H.-Summers1.pdf">Some economists see these phenomena as evidence that the US is going through a period of “secular stagnation”</a>, or persistent shortfalls of aggregate demand.</p><p>Another potential factor is<strong> foreign demand for US debt,</strong> which was already rising in 2001 and since then has grown to historically high levels, though in the last couple of years foreign demand has fallen off. Foreign investors both official and private were more prominent purchasers of our debt in the post-Great Recession debt expansion than they were in the 1980s debt expansion.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*dAQbqVs70ie5MN2T" /></figure><p>Economists <a href="http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v99y2009i2p584-88.html">Ricardo Caballero and Arvind Krishnamurthy have shown</a> that foreign demand for US Treasuries has become an important factor in our own interest rates. As growth has accelerated in emerging market economies such as China and India, financial institutions in these countries are increasingly looking to hold safe assets as leverage. Investors consider US Treasuries to be among the safest assets in the world thanks to the US’s economic largesse, its stability, and the fact that they are denominated in US dollars, the paramount world reserve currency and over which the US has sovereign control.</p><p>In other words, if there’s increasing thirst for US debt from foreign investors, that could put <em>downward </em>pressure on our interest rates. Identifying any impacts of federal debt on interest rates means it’s important to account countervailing effects from foreign demand and capital flows.</p><h4><strong>Warnock &amp; Warnock (2009) provides a simple empirical framework for a first approximation of the effects of deficits and foreign demand.</strong></h4><p>One example of an empirical framework that has already accounted for this is <a href="https://faculty.darden.virginia.edu/warnockf/papers/WarnockWarnock_Flows_and_Rates_JIMF.pdf">Warnock and Warnock (2009)</a> which lays out a simple empirical approach to estimating the joint effect of foreign capital flows and deficits. They model 10-year Treasury yields as a function of inflation and growth expectations, current policy rates, variation in rates (to capture risk), cyclically-adjusted deficits, and foreign purchases.<a href="#0a1c">³</a> They then estimate this model using ordinary least squares (OLS).</p><p>The advantages of the Warnock approach make it a good starting place for a first approximation of fiscal effects on the margin, keeping the limitations of OLS in mind here.<a href="#fbad">⁴</a></p><p>The Warnocks’ original analysis looked at monthly data from January 1984 through May 2005; in my update, I extend the analysis through December 2018. I use all the original measures from the original paper<a href="#47fd">⁵</a>, plus I also add in measures of growth in the dollar and the elderly population share:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/864/1*faayYk6Ag1GQuS-b7Mvw_Q.png" /></figure><p>Demographics will partially be captured by changes in growth expectations, but that will also reflect changes in underlying productivity, so to more fully capture the effects of aging I explicitly include changes in the elderly population share. I also include growth in the US dollar’s value to help adjust for the position of the US relative to other world economies and capture another influence on the relative favorability of US assets to foreigners that may not be fully explained by the interest rate alone.</p><h4><strong>It turns out, deficits have indeed put upward pressure on interest rates, but other factors like demography and foreign demand have more than made up for deficit effects since 2001.</strong></h4><p>The first set of results are below. As you can see, the deficit variable, <strong>cadef1</strong>, is positive and highly significant, suggesting that for every 1 percentage point increase in the structural federal deficit (relative to potential GDP), the 10-year Treasury yield rises by around 18 basis points, <em>adjusting for all other factors</em>. This is quite close to the estimates found in other studies, such as Laubach (2003), Gale &amp; Orszag (2004), and Engen &amp; Hubbard (2004).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*V2oQccdkEJTm5uA0" /></figure><p>However, the results <em>also </em>show that other factors can more than offset the impact of higher deficits. If for example that same rise in the structural deficit were accompanied by a fully equal 1 percentage point of GDP rise in foreign purchases (<strong>foreign2g</strong>), the net result would be a <em>decrease </em>in the 10-year yield of 10 basis points, adjusting for all other factors.</p><p>Indeed, even though federal deficits have been putting upward pressure on interest rates since 2001, a litany of other changes have been lowering the 10-year, among them conventional monetary policy<a href="#686e">⁶</a>, demographic shifts, volatility, and foreign purchases.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Zvbxc-8O7GLrFuED" /></figure><h4><strong>These fiscal effects remain statistically significant, and consistent with the prior literature, when using debt instead.</strong></h4><p>There isn’t a consensus even in economic theory, let alone in economic practice, as to whether the deficit or debt is the more relevant metric for interest rates. So I respecify the model to use ongoing total publicly-held federal debt stock as a percent of GDP (<strong>phfdgdp</strong>) and federal debt held overseas by foreigners, also as a percent of (US) GDP (<strong>foreigndebtgdp</strong>), rather than the deficit and purchases flow measures.</p><p>The results below show that debt stock and foreign holdings also have statistically-significant effects in my update of the Warnock model.<a href="#5662">⁷</a> Each percentage point increase in debt-to-GDP raises the 10-year yield by 4.2 basis points, all else equal. This is close to the effect estimated in Laubach (2003) and Gale &amp; Orszag (2004). Meanwhile each percentage point increase in foreign holdings relative to US GDP lowers the 10-year by 11.2 basis points.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/659/0*lH48uedM_XB0shc6" /></figure><h4>Deficit effects on interest rates have been falling over time.</h4><p>I perform three additional alternatives analyses for robustness.</p><p>The first explores the possibility that the effect of deficits and debt on interest rates may have been changing over time. The core Warnock OLS models are not set up to answer this question, but we can modify them by running the regressions on a recursive sample; that is, keeping the sample start fixed at 1984 and gradually expanding it to the present day to see how the deficit coefficient changes.</p><p>The results below show that, indeed, the marginal effect of structural deficits on interest rates have fallen substantially over the past 25 years. Over the 1984–94 period, my modification of the Warnock approach suggests that each percentage point of debt-to-GDP raised the 10-year yield by around 65 basis points. But expanding the sample beyond the late 90s, this effect began declining until it plateaued at around 20 basis points beginning in 2010 (and then saw a temporary rise between 2011–2015). In all cases these effects are statistically significant.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/742/1*jmmMGBK7_yuNIXUOLDggUg.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Deficit effects are almost identical when using CBO fiscal expectations instead.</strong></h4><p>The second alternative analysis swaps out my monthly ongoing structural deficit measure with the five-year-ahead deficit-to-GDP projected by CBO under their current law baseline. This is the same measure used in Laubach (2003) and similar analyses. Since the 10-year is a forward-looking instrument, arguably deficit <em>expectations </em>rather than coincident deficit <em>outcomes </em>are the more germane measure of the fiscal trajectory. However, CBO only updates its projections infrequently, typically in January and August, and there are no other consistent or publicly-available fiscal forecasts over time. This severely curtails my sample to 72 months over the last 35 years. Nevertheless, as you can see below the marginal effect of deficit expectations on the 10-year is almost exactly the same as in my baseline model.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-snHyLYvALmd25xo" /></figure><h4><strong>Deficits and foreign purchases primarily affect interest rates through the ACM term premium.</strong></h4><p>Finally I go back to my original structural deficit measure and ask a different question: can we shed light on whether the deficit effect on interest rates flows through <em>policy expectations</em> (i.e. the market expects that the Fed will offset deficit-driven inflationary effects) or through the <em>term premium</em> (i.e. deficits raise the risks associated with holding longer-term securities).</p><p>Policy expectations and the term premium are unobservable concepts; one needs a term structure model to decompose the 10-year yield into these two component parts. The breakdown of Adrian, Crump, and Moench (2013, “ACM”) has the advantage of 1) being published by a reputable source (the Federal Reserve Bank of New York), 2) seeing frequent updates, 3) having a deep history going all the way back to the 1960s, and 4) being widely used by market participants and policymakers alike.</p><p>The ACM model however is far from the only approach to decomposing the yield curve, nor is it <a href="https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/12/01/2180569/whats-up-with-the-term-premium/">without its critics</a>. In the end, all this analysis can tell us definitively is how the deficit effect breaks down w<em>ithin the framework of the ACM model</em>, not how it affects the term premium in any broad, universal sense.</p><p>What the results below show is that deficits and foreign purchases <em>entirely</em> affect the 10-year through the ACM term premium (<strong>facm10tv</strong>) rather than through ACM policy expectations (<strong>rn10</strong>). Every 1 percentage point increase in the structural deficit increases the ACM term premium by 20 basis points and lowers policy expectations by 2 basis points, though the latter effect is not statistically significant. Likewise, a 1-percentage-point-of-GDP increase in foreign purchases of US Treasuries lowers the term premium by 31 basis points and raises policy expectations by a statistically insignificant 3 basis points.<a href="#7606">⁸</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*4_dBUY9zVqYYilLd" /></figure><p>Given that the Warnock approach is partial equilibrium, not dynamic, the way to interpret these results is that there are two channels by which deficits affect interest rates. The first is the <em>policy </em>channel: a fiscal impulse may put upward pressure on interest rates by raising growth expectations, inflation expectations, and/or, in a regime where a central bank operates under an inflation target, raising expectations that the central bank will offset these effects with higher policy rates. The ACM regressions do not show a significant effect of deficits on policy expectations, but since the specification adjusts for the inflation and growth expectations channels as well as the policy rate channel, the lack of a statistically significant effect from deficits is not surprising.</p><p>But the other channel is a <em>risk </em>channel. Higher deficits may heighten tail risks of negative outcomes: of higher taxation or greater spending cuts in the distant future, lower liquidity of Treasury markets, or of higher inflation or higher policy rates. There may also be a portfolio rebalancing effect that is driven by Treasury supply in the domestic market, similar to one of the mechanisms commonly theorized in the QE literature (and which would explain why foreign demand also operates exclusively through the term premium to counteract these effects). There may even be some effect from an increase in default risk stemming from higher deficits, though given that the US is a sovereign issuer in its own currency it’s not obvious this would be meaningful in magnitude.</p><h4><strong>Conclusions</strong></h4><p>So where does this analysis leave policymakers? I think there are nine major takeaways here:</p><ol><li>In terms of simple rule-of-thumb tradeoffs, the evidence suggests pre-crisis consensus was largely correct: an increase in structural budget deficits puts upward pressure on interest rates, all else equal.</li><li>However, <em>all else may not always be equal</em>, particularly in periods where there is high foreign demand for US debt and/or high demand for safe assets in general. Over the last 20 years, this has helped blunt the effects of deficits on interest rates. By the same token, if foreign / safe asset demand dynamics subsided in the future, then structural deficits could shift to having a larger net upward effect than they have in recent years.</li><li>These deficit effects appear to have fallen substantially over the last two decades, but are still positive and statistically significant.</li><li>The upward interest rate effect from structural deficits and the countervailing downward effect from foreign purchases both appear to flow materially through term/risk premia at least as measured by the ACM model, though given that the ACM model is not the final word on term structure decompositions this is not dispositive. Still, this finding makes it more likely that the interest rate impacts of higher deficits reflect more than just policy choices by the Federal Reserve.</li><li>Other structural and cyclical factors can depress interest rates as well. In the US context, these factors have more than offset the influence of higher deficits over the last 20 years. Some examples include the aging of the population and slower productivity growth.</li><li>Policymakers may exploit the interest rate room carved out by these countervailing factors by running higher deficits, particularly as a means of financing policies designed to combat such factors as e.g. secular stagnation.</li><li>Because these structural factors are unlikely to reverse themselves suddenly, and because US interest rates are already relatively low given the state of the business cycle, deficits and debt should not be a near-term worry, nor should they impede counter-cyclical policy when the economy is far from full capacity.</li><li>However, deficit-financing still poses a tradeoff in the form of upward interest rate pressure. This has implications for investment, productivity, wages, and consumption in the long-term that policymakers ought to weigh against the specifics of the policy being financed.</li><li>These are distinct questions from many other recent fiscal policy debates; for example, whether there are states of the economy, such as when r &lt; g (interest rates are lower than the rate of economic growth), when debt-financing certain policies is more likely to be welfare-enhancing. Note though that my analysis implies that deficits and debt can be endogenous to the determination of r over the medium- to long-run. In other words, the more that policymakers exploit an r &lt; g state and deficit-finance changes in fiscal policy, the less likely it will be that the r &lt; g state persists over the medium- to long-term.</li></ol><p>[1] <a href="#c4ba">^</a> Throughout this post I will use the term “interest rates” to refer to long-term interest rates, and in particular the 10-year nominal Treasury.</p><p>[2] <a href="#c4ba">^</a> There is no consensus in economic theory on whether the deficit or the debt stock is the more relevant metric for interest rate determination. <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w6470">Elmendorf &amp; Mankiw (1999)</a> is a good overview of the conventional thinking going into the 21st century. To name but two examples, the neoclassical growth model equates the real interest rate to the marginal product of capital, so the question in that context hinges on the extent to which federal <strong>debt </strong>competes with private capital. The Keynesian IS/LM model meanwhile determines the real interest rate via the flow equilibrium of aggregate demand and supply; in that model, then, it is the <strong>deficit </strong>that affects interest rates through a shift in the IS curve. The IS/LM model is strictly-speaking a short-run model, though with stronger assumptions about inflation dynamics it is sometimes used as a longer-run framework as well. Since deficits and debt are highly correlated, particularly the expectations of each, in practice it proves difficult for an empirical model to arbitrate between these views. Some economic rubrics see the choice of policy financing as not relevant to long-term interest rates at all.</p><p>Throughout this blog post, my analysis will focus on flow measures such as the deficit</p><p>[3] <a href="#e055">^</a> The authors impose the restriction based on <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2126270">Mehra (1998)</a> that the coefficients on the 3M rate and long-run inflation expectations must sum to 1. This restriction ensures that these variables are cointegrated with the 10-year Treasury yield, which is necessary in OLS estimation since the 10-year yield is nonstationary.</p><p>[4] <a href="#22aa">^</a> The Warnock specification has advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, it’s a relatively simple specification with minimal structural assumptions, as well as independent variables that are widely-understood and interpretable. Because it uses monthly ongoing data, it doesn’t suffer from the severely limited sample sizes of approaches that rely on CBO or OMB projections, like Laubach (2003). The downside of the Warnock analysis is that theirs is not a dynamic approach and can only give us time-invariant partial equilibrium effects; the Warnock model cannot tell us, for example, how the other independent variables might react to a deficit or debt shock and how these effects net out in general equilibrium. Further work in this area should explore dynamic approaches to the question, e.g. such as by estimating a VAR model.</p><p>[5] <a href="#962f">^</a> Unlike the original Warnock paper I do not lag the structural deficit measure.</p><p>[6] <a href="#aaec">^</a> It’s also plausible that unconventional monetary policy actions such as forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases (Quantitative Easing/Tightening) have affected interest rates. Thoroughly and properly adjusting for the effects of each of these actions is a priority of future research.</p><p>[7] <a href="#6dfc">^</a> None of the results show evidence of a spurious relationship; the augmented Dickey-Fuller test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the residuals of each model are nonstationary.</p><p>[8] <a href="#e6b1">^</a> Note that the ACM decomposition is linear: the sum of the term premium and policy expectations terms equals the actual observed 10-year Treasury yield. Since I distribute the Warnock model restrictions between the term premium and policy expectations regressions, then, the sum of the coefficients on each variable across both regressions will equal the coefficients on those same variables in my original 10-year Treasury specification.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6d1e68776b7a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/bonothesauro/deficits-are-raising-interest-rates-but-other-factors-are-lowering-them-6d1e68776b7a">Deficits are Raising Interest Rates. But Other Factors are Lowering Them.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/bonothesauro">Bonothesauro</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[(Belated) CPS Microdata Day, June 2018]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/bonothesauro/belated-cps-microdata-day-june-2018-9637d049070d?source=rss----96dfb9b63f93---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9637d049070d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[unemployment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[labor-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stagnant-wages]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ernie Tedeschi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Jul 2018 20:47:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-20T21:01:31.209Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Saudações de Portugal! Apologies for the delay this month on account of my vacation. On the plus side, I have a new respect for my little 11&quot; MacBook Air for being able to handle these giant datasets (so long as I run absolutely nothing else).</p><h4>1. Long-term unemployment rose in June primarily due to a fall in people leaving long-term unemployment.</h4><p>Check out the deeper analysis <a href="https://medium.com/bonothesauro/why-did-long-term-unemployment-rise-in-june-2018-d62deaf74338">here</a> if you missed it this morning.</p><h4>2. Prime-age slack continues to fall but non-unemployment margins are still well above pre-2008 and pre-2001 levels.</h4><p>This chart shows the level, as a percent of the population, of margins of prime-age (25–54 year old) labor market slack. As you can see, unemployment has gotten back down below its 2007 lows, though not its 2000 lows yet. But the other margins of slack for prime-age workers have some room to go yet.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/842/1*ORiX4uPY6jTVuiHejxlE9Q.png" /></figure><p>The next two charts show the cumulative change in prime-age slack from the start of the 2007 and 2001 recessions, respectively, to today. I’ve excluded unemployment to keep the scale compressed and so we get a sense of how non-unemployment slack margins are behaving.</p><p>As you can see, prime-age slack is still about 1.7 percentage points of the population above its December 2007 level. The largest margin is involuntary part-time workers (and here I count any part-time worker who says they want full-time hours, regardless of whether it’s for “economic” reasons or not), followed by disability and school enrollment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/842/1*0HQ8Ui_PDSZUPvpVrtUwfQ.png" /></figure><p>Since 2001, prime-age slack is still elevated by 3 percentage points, mostly due again to the involuntary part-time and disabled workers, both of which are falling but gradually.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/842/1*qNaMy1FkIlqmAyKrxpBUcQ.png" /></figure><h4><strong>3. Median wage growth is still in the mid-3s.</strong></h4><p>Median wage growth hasn’t exploded despite wide-spread anecdotes of labor shortages in some sectors.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/842/1*QKtdyI5wVsEbSqdnpB0uZA.png" /></figure><p>In fact, when you look at a 12M moving average instead, median wage appears to have settled a bit since 2016, though a weighted version of the metric shows a bit more firmness.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/842/1*cFsXPQ60sHE3fILiCn_PZA.png" /></figure><h4>4. Median wage growth in transportation is firming but not explosive; IT may be accelerating a bit.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/842/1*0_GugXiWFCVYA3m7ztBzug.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/842/1*1SLewQiUlro6zYSl-7cCSA.png" /></figure><h4>5. Wage rigidity may have plateaued, though it is still somewhat elevated from its late-2016 trough and nowhere near pre-2008 and pre-2001 levels.</h4><p>This continues to be a baffling result from the data: why, in a period of labor market improvement, would wage rigidity be rising?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/842/1*25SqZOp8TScrVSDjcowB_w.png" /></figure><h4>6. Rigidity appears to be falling in the construction industry but rising in transportation.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/842/1*JwK7tbu8nesUEMB27oWTAQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/842/1*adH8C05rBD6qE_hmHlJKxw.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9637d049070d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/bonothesauro/belated-cps-microdata-day-june-2018-9637d049070d">(Belated) CPS Microdata Day, June 2018</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/bonothesauro">Bonothesauro</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why did long-term unemployment rise in June 2018?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/bonothesauro/why-did-long-term-unemployment-rise-in-june-2018-d62deaf74338?source=rss----96dfb9b63f93---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d62deaf74338</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[work]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[labor-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unemployment]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ernie Tedeschi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Jul 2018 11:09:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-20T11:09:52.505Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Long-term unemployment jumped by 289,000 in June 2018, bucking a mostly-steady decline since 2010. I show that this rise was statistically significant and driven entirely by a decline in outflows from long-term unemployment — particularly outflows into nonparticipation — rather than a surge in inflows into long-term unemployment. However, I caution that even a statistically-significant one-month change in the CPS is not dispositive of a sustained change in trajectory.</em></p><p>The June 2018 jobs report was generally a solid one, with payrolls growing by 213,000 — well above trend, even at this late stage in the recovery — and the labor force participation rate rising by 0.2 percentage points.</p><p>There were blemishes however. For one, average hourly wages rose 2.7% over the preceding 12 months; but with consumer prices measured by CPI rising 2.9% over this same period, that means inflation-adjusted wages actually <em>fell</em> slightly over the past year. [1]</p><p>Another negative surprise was long-term unemployment (people who say they’ve been actively looking for work for 27 weeks or more), which had been falling steadily since mid-2010 but then jumped by 289,000 on a seasonally-adjusted basis in June. One would have to go all the way back to the economic dark days of May 2010 to find month-on-month growth that high.</p><p><a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=kxx6">Number of Civilians Unemployed for 27 Weeks and Over | FRED | St. Louis Fed</a></p><p>So this raises an apparent contradiction: the US labor market is in many ways strong or improving, but long-term unemployment rose. Why?</p><h4>It may have been a one-off, but it wasn’t just statistical noise.</h4><p>The first thing to note is that the Current Population Survey (CPS) — the monthly survey of around 60,000 households that gives us the unemployment rate — can exhibit fluctuations over the short-term. We should never interpret a single month’s change as definitive signal in the CPS.</p><p>I repeat: everything you read in this post could end up being a one-off fluke that disappears in a month or two.</p><p>Now, that said, it’s also important to note that June’s rise in long-term unemployment was statistically significant, with a 95% confidence interval of +225,000–353,000.</p><p>Again, this doesn’t mean that June’s rise wasn’t caused by other one-time idiosyncratic factors, such as, say, the weather. But we <em>can</em> confidently conclude that in June, at least, the rise wasn’t simply a case of random noise.</p><h4>Long-term unemployment is like a bathtub. No, seriously.</h4><p>Let’s pretend for the rest of this post that the June 2018 rise in long-term unemployment <em>wasn’t </em>a one-off. We need a deeper autopsy of the CPS to see what drove it.</p><p>The number of people in any labor market status over time— such as long-term unemployment — can be thought of as a bathtub with multiple faucets and multiple drains. From month to month, the level of the water changes depending on the amount of <strong>outflows — </strong>how much water (how many people) drains (leaves) from the bathtub (long-term unemployment) in each of the drains (reasons for leaving long-term unemployment) — as well as <strong>inflows</strong>, or how much water is added from each of the faucets (reasons for entering long-term unemployment). Here is my crude attempt at illustrating this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*1CWlTN_Gf5F3gpI7nUQIDw.png" /></figure><p>The net change in the level of long-term unemployment is just the difference between total outflows and total inflows.</p><p>In the CPS, we can think of <em>inflows into</em> and <em>outflows from </em>long-term unemployment as involving three different sources or destinations:</p><ul><li><strong>Short-term unemployment, </strong>if an unemployed person passes the 27-week threshold;</li><li><strong>Employment, </strong>if an employed person becomes unemployed again and tells the government they’ve been looking for more than 27 weeks (this might happen if the worker had a temporary job); and,</li><li><strong>Nonparticipation</strong>, if people who aren’t looking for a job start actively looking again, but tell the government they’ve been looking for more than 27 weeks.</li></ul><p>As a side note: yes, every month there is a nonzero number of people who switch from being long-term unemployed to short-term unemployed. Remember, the CPS is a survey, so not all of the answers make immediate sense to those of us who can’t follow up with the respondents!</p><h4>LTU inflows have fallen but flattened in recent years; outflows continue to fall.</h4><p>BLS produces some broad month-to-month flow data from the CPS, but without the distinction between short- and long-term unemployment that we need. [2]</p><p>So for this analysis, I use the raw CPS microdata to link the same individuals from month-to-month, and then I look at what happened between May and June 2018. Since it’s difficult to adjust for seasonality with individual microdata records, I compare the results of May-June 2018 with what occurred in May-June in prior recent years. [3]</p><p>Below, I’ve graphed the May-June long-term unemployment (L) flows for each year since 2008, identified by short-term unemployment (S), employment (E), and nonparticipation (N). My notation is written as “start2finish”, so e.g. “L2E” means the outflow of workers <em>from</em> long-term unemployment <em>to </em>employment<em>.</em></p><p>One thing that’s interesting to note from the summary data right off the bat is that <em>both</em> inflows <em>and</em> outflows increased in response to the Great Recession. Overall long-term unemployment rose during those dark economic days, but below the surface of those aggregate increases was a lot of churn.</p><p>Another thing that’s interesting (and this will turn out to be key in a moment) is that while <em>inflows </em>into long-term unemployment have leveled off a bit in recent years, <em>outflows </em>from long-term unemployment (especially into employment and nonparticipation) are still falling.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*bGXyArT8EGnFsA1Bv4jKbQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*84JXGyCRZPtFTDm6WGqzZg.png" /></figure><h4>Weak outflows drove the June 2018 jump in long-term unemployment</h4><p>Using my approach outlined in footnote 3, and bearing in mind that this is a non-seasonally-adjusted number, I find an increase in long-term unemployment in June 2018 of 165,000. By contrast, I find that the average June change in long-term unemployment over the 2015–17 was a <em>fall </em>of 147,000. So the overall <em>swing</em> from the 2015–17 June average to June 2018 was about +313,000. It’s this swing that I decompose below into its component parts.</p><p>Remember that each of these metrics is expressed as June 2018 change minus average 2015–17 June change. So a negative inflow number indicates that that factor is otherwise <em>lowering</em> the growth in long-term unemployment. A negative outflow number by contrast shows an influence that is <em>accelerating </em>long-term unemployment growth.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*bbTCsNzQGagUj-z0zmri2A.png" /></figure><p>Notice first that the swing in inflows was slightly <em>negative</em>. That means that, relative to the prior three Junes, June 2018 actually saw somewhat lower inflows into long-term unemployment.</p><p>What’s particularly surprising is that this fall in inflows was driven by a fall in nonparticipants becoming long-term unemployed. When long-term unemployment rises suddenly in a strengthening labor market such as ours in 2018, one logical explanation is that people out of the labor force are now actively looking for jobs, and simply telling the government that they were actively looking this whole time.</p><p>But the analysis here shows that this isn’t the case. In fact, there were fewer people entering long-term unemployment from nonparticipation in June 2018 than in the prior three years.</p><p>What <em>did</em> drive the swing was a substantial fall in <em>outflows</em>. And the news here is not entirely bad. Almost 233,000 fewer workers gave up looking for work in June 2018 — that is, went from being long-term unemployed to nonparticipants — relative to the 2015–17 June average. One could plausibly interpret that as a sign of labor market strength rather than weakness.</p><p>But on the other hand, 115,000 fewer long-term unemployed workers found jobs in June 2018 relative to the past three Junes. That could be a warning sign to the economy that the labor market is hitting capacity constraints, though I’m skeptical of this hypothesis given the continued falls in other margins of slack such as <a href="https://t.co/Me7S8ou7Oe">disabled nonparticipants</a>.</p><p>It could alternatively be a sign that at this point the remaining long-term unemployed are just better equipped to hold out for better jobs or higher wages; the increasing frequency of positive economic news may be convincing the unemployed to be patient for a bit longer.</p><p>Or, again, June 2018 could simply be a fluke. It certainly wouldn’t be the first time the CPS gave us a head fake with one month’s worth of date.</p><p>So the most important conclusion at this point is that common economist refrain: We need more data to be sure.</p><p>[1] Consumer prices adjusted for product substitution effects — “chained CPI” — rose by 2.7% over the June 2017–June 2018 period, so even under that alternative inflation measure real average wages were flat over the last 12 months. The Federal Reserve’s preferred inflation measure — growth in the Personal Consumption Expenditure Price Index (PCEPI) — hasn’t yet been released for June; PCE inflation came in at 2.3% year-on-year in May 2018.</p><p>[2] BLS produces CPS labor market status flow table that distinguish between employment, unemployment (of any duration), and nonparticipation, as well as marginal inflows and outflows. They also produce more detailed unemployment flow tables that <em>do</em> distinguish the <em>final</em> labor market state by unemployment duration (27–52 weeks as well as 53+ weeks), but that analysis only covers workers who start out as unemployed, and the analysis does not distinguish the unemployment duration of the <em>starting </em>position.</p><p>[3] I use a matching approach similar to <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/t0247">Madrian &amp; Lefgren (1999)</a>. I narrow my sample to just those households who were present in both May and June of each year. I then use BLS’s included month-to-month longitudinal weights, but reweighted by labor force status to ensure that my narrower sample matches the labor force totals for May of each year. In June, each record simply takes their May weight. Keeping the same weight in June has the upside of allowing all inflows and outflows to be perfectly accounted for in the data. The downside is that June’s labor force totals each year end up being slightly off from the official totals. This reflects the absence of accounting for marginal inflows (e.g. 15 year olds turning 16) and marginal outflows (e.g. deaths), as well as other population changes. In June 2018, for example, the civilian noninstitutional population grew by 188,000 people. This is a first approximation of how far off the totals of my narrower sample will be in June. My judgment is that very little if any of this one month of population growth would be classified as long-term unemployed.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d62deaf74338" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/bonothesauro/why-did-long-term-unemployment-rise-in-june-2018-d62deaf74338">Why did long-term unemployment rise in June 2018?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/bonothesauro">Bonothesauro</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why has the US fallen behind the UK in labor force participation?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/bonothesauro/why-has-the-us-fallen-behind-the-uk-in-labor-force-participation-3775b29b625?source=rss----96dfb9b63f93---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3775b29b625</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[uk-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[labor-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[labour-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[us-economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ernie Tedeschi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Feb 2018 13:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-23T13:01:01.489Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Americans once seemed to hold an unstoppable labor market advantage over their cousins across the pond, but no longer. Prime-age women and health / disability differences appear to be key drivers.</h4><p>Having gone their separate ways for more than 240 years now, it is no surprise that the United States and the United Kingdom as nations have grown ever more distinct.</p><p>But the US and the UK still share much in common: linguistically, culturally, and politically (and that was even before Meghan Markle’s engagement to Prince Harry).</p><p>And the two also bear some economic similarities. Both nations print their own currency, both of which serve as world reserve currencies. Monetary policy in both countries is controlled by respected and politically-independent central banks. Both have a substantial immigrant population share — 14.2% in the US and 13.1% in the UK according to 2015 UN data — which of course is a major factor fueling contemporary politics in both nations. And both countries have relatively high shares of the population with college degrees — 44% in the US and 42% in the UK according to 2014 OECD data.</p><p>But these very similarities only punctuate an economic mystery: <em>why has the US fallen behind the UK in labor force participation?</em></p><h3>A twenty year mystery.</h3><p>The US enjoyed a large advantage in overall labor force participation — the share of the adult population holding or actively seeking a job — over the UK as late as the end of the 1990s. Over the four quarters ending in 1998 Q2, the participation rate was 4.7 percentage points higher in the US.</p><p>But then the US premium began falling: by 2013, it disappeared entirely, and today, participation in the UK is 0.7 percentage points higher than in the US overall.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2FJ6VP4%2F1%2F&amp;src=%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2FJ6VP4%2F1%2F&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=dwcdn" width="650" height="550" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/f574e1a28bb1b126dc0eda6e4b36d7b6/href">https://medium.com/media/f574e1a28bb1b126dc0eda6e4b36d7b6/href</a></iframe><p>What explains this 5.4 point swing, from a 4.7 percentage point advantage to a 0.7 percentage point disadvantage?</p><h3><strong>The UK avoided the 2001 recession.</strong></h3><p>Part of the growing US-UK wedge is explained by the 2001 recession, which struck the US but mostly avoided the UK. US participation fell by a percentage point in response to that recession through 2004. Afterwards, even as the US economy recovered, participation stayed flat rather than return to its pre-2001 peak. The UK has essentially undergone one fewer recession than the US has over the last 20 years, and the importance of that fact is critical.</p><p>But business cycle differences alone cannot explain all of the wedge, because the 2008 recession hit both the US and UK hard. Yet US participation fell by more than 3 percentage points thereafter and did not start growing again until 2015. By contrast, UK participation fell by less than 1, and then in 2012 began recovering. UK participation fully recovered to its pre-crisis peak by 2016.</p><h3>Half of the shift since 1998 is explained by faster US aging.</h3><p>A large portion of the wedge is due to the relative aging of both countries’ populations. Through 2015, the US enjoyed a demographic advantage over the UK when it came to participation, primarily because people in their prime working years (generally considered 25–54 years old) were a larger share of the US adult population for most of that time.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2FgrWgf%2F1%2F&amp;src=%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2FgrWgf%2F1%2F&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=dwcdn" width="650" height="550" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/fa7927642f4a5e6be288aeb989bbc858/href">https://medium.com/media/fa7927642f4a5e6be288aeb989bbc858/href</a></iframe><p>As the first chart shows, if the US population looked more like the UK’s in terms of the age and sex distribution of the population, then US participation would have been 2 ½ percentage points lower on average in the late 1990s.</p><p>But while both populations have aged over the past 25 years, the US has aged faster, so that now the 25–54 share of the population is lower in the US than in the UK. The US demographic advantage eroded and then flipped to a disadvantage. Today, a US population that mirrored UK demography would see a 0.2 percentage points <em>higher </em>participation rate.</p><p>All told, the reversal of the US aging premium explains half of the 5.4 percentage point swing since 1998 Q2.</p><h3>Today, health / disability is a far bigger reason for nonparticipation in the US than in the UK. Retirement is far smaller.</h3><p>Aging, however, does not explain the entire US-UK wedge. To shed light on the rest, we can use data from both countries to compare the reasons why people say they are not looking for work.</p><p>The UK and the US are not perfect controls for one another, but the two nations produce labor market data that is often conceptually compatible. The Current Population Survey (CPS) in the US and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) in the UK both classify labor force nonparticipants by almost exactly the same categories of reasons: retirement, school enrollment, health / disability, taking care of home / family, or other. Both surveys also ask all nonparticipants, regardless of their stated reason, if they want a job; we label them here as “discouraged” workers. Because of this compatibility, we get a broad sense of what driving the US-UK wedge by directly comparing each country’s rates of nonparticipation by these reasons.</p><p>Looking at the most recent data, US participation was 0.7 percentage points lower in 2017 Q3 than in the UK. Only around 0.2 percentage points of this can be explained by demographic differences. Once we control from these differences, there are three major factors driving the current wedge. The largest by far is health &amp; disability: American adults had a near-3 percentage point higher rate of nonparticipation due to short- or long-term health issues than British adults. American adults are also more likely to be out of the labor force due to home / family care, by almost 2 percentage points, and school enrollment, by almost 1 percentage point.</p><p>Notably, though, there are still factors that favor US participation. US adults are 3 percentage points less likely to be nonparticipants due to retirement; this is reflected too in the US’s consistent and significant lead over the UK in the participation rate among adults 55 and older. The US also has a lower share of adults out of the workforce due to discouragement — not looking but wanting a job.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2Fc1Xl9%2F1%2F&amp;src=%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2Fc1Xl9%2F1%2F&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=dwcdn" width="650" height="450" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/dd15710f4d866bbb0af7b719871a3ff3/href">https://medium.com/media/dd15710f4d866bbb0af7b719871a3ff3/href</a></iframe><h3>Health / disability also explains most of the nondemographic swing since 1998.</h3><p>This helps explain the current wedge, but a different way to parse the data is to account for the entire 5.4 percentage point swing since early 1998.</p><p>We already know that shifts in the age &amp; sex composition of the two countries’ adult populations explain half of this shift. Of the other half, health / disability is the single largest remaining factor, accounting for 2.1 percentage points of the swing (Note that these survey categories are self-reported by respondents; they do not necessarily indicate that respondents receive disability benefits in either country, such as SSDI or SSI in the US, though many do).</p><p>And although discouraged nonparticipation is still lower in level terms in the US, since 1998 this US advantage has tapered, which explains 1.2 percentage points of the swing since then.</p><p>As in our earlier snapshot of 2017 Q3, retirement nonparticipation is a positive factor for the US-UK wedge since 1998, otherwise raising the US participation advantage by 1.2 percentage points, though this has come down since its peak in 2012.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2FAZLp1%2F1%2F&amp;src=%2F%2Fdatawrapper.dwcdn.net%2FAZLp1%2F1%2F&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=dwcdn" width="650" height="650" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/6f971c71564cd5fe93d25983384471e3/href">https://medium.com/media/6f971c71564cd5fe93d25983384471e3/href</a></iframe><h3>Women overwhelmingly drove the decline in the US participation advantage relative to the UK.</h3><p>Breaking down the cumulative swing further by age and sex cohorts, a few more striking details emerge. The fall in US retirement nonparticipation relative to the UK, for example, has been entirely driven by men. Older men were the biggest contributors to the health / disability factor, but prime-age women were a bigger contributor than prime-age men. Moreover, differences in US and UK participation due to home / family care was just as large a driver among prime-age women as the health disability factor was, and discouraged prime-age women were an even bigger drag. Differences in female participation in fact accounted for 2.1 points of the nondemographic swing, versus 0.6 points from men.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ETzUj1M3ADaXCMQ8blWI8w.png" /></figure><h3>US and UK nonparticipation has generally followed similar trajectories… except for health / disability.</h3><p>Comparing levels of nonparticipation between the US and UK shows that for most of these factors that have been a drag on the US-UK wedge, the US and the UK have seen the same general trajectory of change since the 1990s, but the US advantage has shrunk or its disadvantages grown. For example, nonparticipation due to school enrollment has grown in both countries, but a bit faster in the US. By contrast, home / family nonparticipation has fallen in both countries since the 1990s, but the pace of decline has been shallower in the US.</p><p>The clear outlier here is health and disability, where the US and the UK have followed opposite trajectories. In the 1990s, UK nonparticipation due to health / disability was 4 percentage points while in the US it was 4 ½ — not dramatically higher. But since then the US rate has risen to 6 and the UK rate fallen to 3.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uq5sWzY94a2SDaF8y-t0aA.png" /></figure><h3><strong>No silver bullet explanation, but some hypotheses.</strong></h3><p>Despite their similarities, the US and the UK have deep differences in both culture and policy that are far too complex to do justice to here. Nevertheless, some key factors are worth considering.</p><p>On disability, the UK has introduced changes to its disability system several times over the last 20 years, including in 1999, 2004, and 2013. Many of these changes were specifically designed to transition recipients into work where possible. Unlike US Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI), the UK’s core disability benefit — the Personal Independence Payment (PIP) — is universal and not means-tested, so on its own it does not discourage recipients to work. However, other UK disability programs such as Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) do have income limitations similar to their American counterparts.</p><p>Another possibility is the difference in the two countries’ health care systems. The UK’s universal health system has less inequality of access than the US system, and along several metrics the UK has <a href="http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2015/oct/us-health-care-from-a-global-perspective">better health outcomes</a> than the US. It may therefore be more effective at managing work-debilitating ailments than the American system. And while opioid <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/world/europe/uk-fentanyl-opioid-addiction.html">abuse is high in the UK relative to the rest of Europe, </a>the UK has avoided the sheer magnitude of the US opioid crisis.</p><p>That prime-age women have driven most of the shift since 1998 raises the possibility that a key culprit may be differences in family policy, such as paid parental leave. Mothers in the UK are entitled to up to 39 weeks of paid leave after the birth of a child, with some additional time offered to fathers and in the form of unpaid leave. The United States meanwhile is <a href="https://www.oecd.org/els/soc/PF2_1_Parental_leave_systems.pdf">alone among advanced economies in not having a national system for paid parental leave</a>. Prior research on international differences in women’s labor force participation found that <a href="http://ftp.iza.org/dp7140.pdf">between a quarter and a third of the relative US weakness</a> since the 1990s was due to the US falling behind in family-friendly policies.</p><p>A more recent focus in analysis of US labor force participation has been the employment effects of <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w18054">increased import competition from China</a>, especially since its ascension to the World Trade Organization in 2001. The share of UK imports from China has also risen over this time, but at 7.2% is only half of the US import share from China. The UK does far more trade with the EU, though these relationship will change post-Brexit.</p><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>The US, once comfortably ahead of the UK in labor force participation, has lost all of its ground since the late 1990s. Much of this shift is just due to diverging patterns in US and UK demography. But health and disability is a large driver of the shrinking wedge, as well as discouragement and home / family care among prime-age women. Meanwhile, elderly participation continues to run much higher in the US, with rates of nonparticipation due to retirement far lower in the US.</p><p>There are a broad array of possible explanations for these divergences, including differences in health, disability, and family support systems as well as different macroeconomic dynamics. As policymakers in the US continue to look for ways to encourage participation to recover back to its pre-crisis levels, such differences between the US and other countries will prove instructive.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3775b29b625" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/bonothesauro/why-has-the-us-fallen-behind-the-uk-in-labor-force-participation-3775b29b625">Why has the US fallen behind the UK in labor force participation?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/bonothesauro">Bonothesauro</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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