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            <title><![CDATA[Is Cryptocurrency Property?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/chainlex/is-cryptocurrency-property-496822cd7984?source=rss----5e229924faf0---4</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Wen Qin]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 06 Aug 2023 09:15:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-11T02:50:20.594Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>Special thanks to Guang-Yi, Legal Counsel at the Ethereum Foundation, for feedback and review. All views expressed are mine.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ti2_pqKJTKYwpIRH9eMYJg.png" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>This is an interesting question for all (potential and actual) cryptocurrency owners. (Fun fact: the rate of cryptocurrency ownership in Singapore was 19% in 2022, slightly higher than the global average of 15%).<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> Whether cryptocurrency should be considered a form of personal property is important as it affects the remedies that a cryptocurrency owner is entitled to — and the legal risks that potential investors should consider before dabbling in cryptocurrency trading. For example, if cryptocurrency does not constitute personal property, they cannot be part of an insolvency estate subject to distribution to creditors; in divorce proceedings, they cannot constitute matrimonial assets subject to distribution to the former spouses, and trusts cannot be created over them.</p><p>The short answer is yes: if you go to court in Singapore, cryptocurrency can be classified as a form of personal property. Most recently, the High Court in <em>ByBit Fintech Limited v Ho Kai Xin &amp; Ors </em><a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> ruled that cryptoassets were choses in action, one of two existing categories of personal property, and were capable of being enforced in court. Some may say this decision was long-coming: most researchers already agreed that the decision in <em>CLM v CLN</em><a href="#_ftn3"><strong><em>[3]</em></strong></a><em> </em>(HC) has aligned Singapore’s decision with that of the UK’s in <em>National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth </em><a href="#_ftn4"><strong><em>[4]</em></strong></a><em> </em>— that cryptocurrency constitutes personal property as it is definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third parties, and has some degree of permanence or stability (<em>“Ainsworth Criteria”)</em>.</p><p>This conclusion is also supported by the UK Law Commission in its Final Report,<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> albeit with different reasoning. Essentially, the UK Law Commission proposes that cryptocurrency should form a third category of personal property (separate from choses in possession and choses in action),<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> while Jeyaretnam J in <em>ByBit </em>reasons that the category of choses in action has and can include a diversity of incorporeal property, and that cryptocurrency “has in principle an incorporeal right of property recognisable by the common law as a thing in action and so enforceable in court”. <a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a></p><p>We set out the details and consequences of these legal decisions below.</p><h3><strong><em>1. High Court in ByBit</em></strong></h3><p>In <em>ByBit, </em>the defendant was an employee of the plaintiff company with sole access to Excel files containing ByBit’s employee payment details. She manipulated these files, which caused ByBit to transfer 4,209,720 USDT into crypto-wallets controlled by her. ByBit sought a declaration that the defendant held both the USDT and fiat currency on trust for ByBit. The question whether crypto assets were a form of personal property arose because a trust cannot be created over crypto assets if they were not.</p><p>In addressing the argument on whether crypto assets should be classified as choses in action despite not being rights enforceable by action, Jeyaretnam J’s reasoning mirrors that of Justice Lee in <em>Janesh v Unknown Person </em>in the latter’s analysis of the position supporting the inclusion.<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a> Both judges find authority in Holdsworth,<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a> which highlights that the term “chose in action”, though initially encompassing all rights which were enforceable by action, was later expanded to cover “documents such as bonds, which evidenced or proved the existence of such rights of action”. This later led to the inclusion to other incorporeal rights of property, such as bills of lading and policies of insurance.</p><p>As such, given the “diversity of incorporeal property that has been classed as things in action”, crypto assets constituted a chose in action and thus personal property, thereby fulfilling the <em>dictum </em>in <em>Colonial Bank </em>that only choses in action or choses in possession are recognised as property. <a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a></p><p>In reaching this conclusion, Jeyaretnam J also relied on a consultation paper by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), <a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a> which he believes supports the view that it is legally possible to hold digital assets. He also referred to the Order 22 of the Rules of Court 2021, which includes “cryptocurrency or other digital currency” in the definition of “movable property”, and thus expressly cryptocurrency as a form of property capable of being the subject matter of an enforcement order.</p><h3><strong><em>2. What are the legal challenges to this position?</em></strong></h3><p>Despite the ByBit decision, the position may not be as clear-cut as it seems. There are still a few lingering questions surrounding its reasoning, namely:</p><ol><li>Can cryptocurrency truly constitute a chose in action in circumstances where it clearly does not embody a right enforceable by action — the very definition of a chose in action?</li><li>Must cryptocurrency even fall within one of the <em>Colonial Bank v Whinney categories of personal property i.e. choses in action or choses in possession?</em><a href="#_ftn12"><strong><em>[12]</em></strong></a></li></ol><h3><strong><em>3. Can cryptocurrency truly constitute a chose in action in circumstances where it clearly does not embody a right enforceable by action — the very definition of a chose in action?</em></strong></h3><p><em>#View 1: No, it does not</em></p><p>The High Court in <em>Janesh v Unknown Person</em><a href="#_ftn13"><strong><em>[13]</em></strong></a><em> </em>noted that this problem was canvassed by the English High Court in <em>AA v Persons Unknown who demanded bitcoin on 10th and 11th October 2019</em>.<em> </em>(“AA”). <a href="#_ftn14">[14]</a></p><p>The answer from the English High Court is no; cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin do not constitute either choses in possession or choses in action :</p><p>“[Bitcoin and other crypto currencies] are not choses in possession because they are virtual, they are not tangible, they cannot be possessed. They are not choses in action because they do not embody any right capable of being enforced by action”.<a href="#_ftn15">[15]</a></p><p>A pictorial diagram of this statement is as such.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/794/1*63eUSN2IbJ3vSf_3kYdzjA.png" /></figure><p><em>Figure 1 — Traditional position: Where choses in action only refer to rights capable of being enforced by action</em>. <a href="#_ftn16">[16]</a></p><p><em>#View 2: Yes, it does</em></p><p>Those in support of cryptocurrency may be comforted by the English High Court’s approval of the reasoning by the UK Jurisdictional Task Force’s legal statement on cryptocurrency and smart contracts (“The Legal Statement”),<a href="#_ftn17">[17]</a> which supports the view that parties do not need to apply <em>Colonial Bank</em>. The Legal Statement made the following important points:</p><ol><li>It is unclear if Lord Fry in Colonial Bank intended that an intangible thing would not constitute property if it is not a thing in action;</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/794/1*kWj-dZNz6O2wZN-gmpU2wA.png" /></figure><p><em>Figure 2 — Legal Statement: A logical corollary that Lord Fry did not intend?</em><a href="#_ftn18">[18]</a></p><ol><li>His statement should not be regarded as part of the reasoning leading to his decision and so binding on other cases. The question before him was whether <em>shares </em>in particular things in action for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act were, and not whether they were property; and</li><li>On appeal, Lord Fry’s judgment was upheld on the basis that the class of things in action could be extended to all intangible property (in other words, that things in action are a residual class of all things not in possession), rather than on the basis that the class of intangible property should be restricted to rights that could be claimed or enforced by action.<a href="#_ftn19">[19]</a></li></ol><p>The Court in <em>AA</em> thus accepted that cryptocurrency constitutes property as they fulfil the <em>Ainsworth </em>criteria and cited <em>B2C2 v Quoine</em><a href="#_ftn20"><strong><em>[20]</em></strong></a><em> </em>for support. <a href="#_ftn21">[21]</a></p><p>It should be noted that High Court in <em>ByBit </em>did not address these arguments made in <em>AA </em>and by the UK Jurisdictional Taskforce.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/794/1*J8_aSQbblxlgSpGwAyCUaQ.png" /></figure><p><em>Figure 3 — The High Court in ByBit: Crypto currency constitutes a chose in action.</em><a href="#_ftn22">[22]</a></p><p>For starters, legal practitioners in Singapore are likely to point out that the Legal Statement has no legal effect and has not been considered by the Court of Appeal in Singapore.</p><p>One might be more alarmed that Lee Sieu Kin J in <em>Janesh v Unknown Person </em>appears to affirm the proposition that the criteria in <em>Colonial Bank </em>can be applied “if choses in action and intangible things are co-extensive”.<em> </em><a href="#_ftn23"><strong><em>[23]</em></strong></a> He helpfully outlines Professor Kelvin Low’s disagreement with the UK Legal Statement in “Bitcoins as Property: Welcome Clarity?” (2020) 136 Law Quarterly Review.</p><p>Recall the third point that the UK Legal Statement made above:</p><p>“Lord Fry’s judgment was upheld on the basis that the <em>class of things in action could be extended to all intangible property</em> (in other words, that things in action are a residual class of all things not in possession), rather <em>than on the basis that the class of intangible property should be restricted to rights that could be claimed or enforced by action</em>.”<a href="#_ftn24">[24]</a></p><p>As explained by Justice Lee and Professor Kelvin Low, the problem is basically this:</p><p>● If A = class of things in action could be extended to all intangible property; and</p><p>● B = Intangible property should be restricted to rights that could be claimed or enforced by action,</p><p>● Then A = B, which makes no sense.<a href="#_ftn25">[25]</a></p><p>Here, a diagram may be apt.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/794/1*zA7xjB8W1sfbKWoUkvLaCA.png" /></figure><p><em>Figure 4: Legend. </em><a href="#_ftn26">[26]</a></p><p>Grey represents rights that can be enforced in action; white represents choses in action; and the dotted circle represents intangible things.</p><p><strong>If choses only refer to rights capable of being enforced by action</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/794/1*mWqjLpDGVhk7B_fnA-LnIQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/794/1*30vwWfBtf2-NfELpIgMLqg.png" /></figure><p><em>Figure 5: If choses only refer to rights capable of being enforced by action.</em><a href="#_ftn27">[27]</a></p><p>In the scenario where choses in action only refer to rights capable of being enforced in action, the grey and the white will always overlap (as represented by the grey lines filling the white circle). As such, even if ‘choses of action’ can be extended to intangible property, this has the same effect as statement B — in both A and B, all three categories (choses of action, rights that can be enforced in action, and intangible things) overlap.</p><p><strong>If choses refer to more than rights capable of being enforced by action</strong></p><p>Both Justice Lee and Professor Kelvin Low allude to the proposition that choses in action can extend beyond rights that can be enforced in action and that this must be the case to prevent the effect as stated above. <a href="#_ftn28">[28]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/794/1*7-zBYGzUDe0uXFWeQ1kUoQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/794/1*iUAyVvFOW6yHCMAhrqiDlA.png" /></figure><p><em>Figure 6: If choses refer to more than rights capable of being enforced by action.</em><a href="#_ftn29">[29]</a></p><p>In this diagram, the white portion representing chose of action is larger than the grey representing rights capable of being enforced by action. When we apply the Legal Statement’s statement that the class of chose of action can be extended to intangible things, this results in <strong>choses of action</strong> being co-extensive with <strong>intangible things</strong>, which is different from saying that intangible things are limited to rights that can be enforced in action (which is also narrower than choses of action).</p><ol><li>Must cryptocurrency even fall within one of the <em>Colonial Bank v Whinney</em> categories of personal property i.e. choses in action or choses in possession?</li></ol><p>The answer from UK Law Commission would be no. Their suggestion to recognise a third category reflects a recognition of cryptoassets as personal property and a reluctance to extend the definition of choses in action:</p><p>“… some digital assets are neither things in possession nor things in action but are nonetheless capable of being things to which personal property rights can relate and that this is the existing position at law.”<a href="#_ftn30">[30]</a></p><p>The next question is then whether legislation or common law would be better placed to effect that position. The UK Law Commission suggests that legislation should confirm the common law position (that digital assets are neither things in possession nor things in action but are capable of being things to which personal property rights can relate), but that common law is the better vehicle to determine what falls within the third category as specifying these matters in statute may lead to an under-inclusion or over-inclusion of assets and reduce certainty in the law.</p><p>Differing views to this position exist — as pointed out by Adel Zaid Hamzah in “Recognising Cryptocurrencies as Property? — CLM v CLN”,<a href="#_ftn31">[31]</a> the legislature is more well-equipped with resources and may be better able to come out with a comprehensive system that regulates and protects crypto-owners. Furthermore, as demonstrated above, there are still substantive issues of situating cryptocurrencies within traditional common law property principles. Thus, it may be apt for the legislature to provide some guidance.</p><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>Even though the High Court in <em>ByBit seems to have</em> given us a definitive answer to whether cryptocurrency constitutes personal property, lingering questions remain over Jeyaretnam J’s reasoning and the relevant questions the Court did not address. The question whether cryptocurrencies constitute personal property has profound downstream consequences that many may not be aware of. For example, if they do not constitute personal property, they cannot be part of an insolvency estate subject to distribution to creditors, they cannot constitute matrimonial assets subject to distribution to the former spouses in divorce proceedings, trusts cannot be created over them, and they cannot be willed to others. These significant consequences require Courts and lawmakers around the world to carefully consider the question whether cryptocurrencies can and should be considered a form of personal property.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Statista, “Ownership of cryptocurrencies in Singapore as of November 2022”, by coin (1 March 2023) &lt;<a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1294071/singapore-cryptocurrency-ownership-by-coin/">https://www.statista.com/statistics/1294071/singapore-cryptocurrency-ownership-by-coin/</a>&gt; (accessed 1 May 2023)</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <em>ByBit Fintech Limited v Ho Kai Xin &amp; Others </em>[2023] SGHC 199 (<em>“ByBit Fintech”</em>) at [4].</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <em>CLM v CLN </em>[2022] SGHC 46 (“<em>CLM v CLN</em>”).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> <em>National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth </em>[1965] AC 1175 at 1248.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> UK Law Commission, <em>Digital Assets: Final Report</em> (Law Com No 412, 2023) (“<em>Digital Assets</em>”).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> <em>Digital Assets, supra </em>n 5, p 43.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> <em>ByBit Fintech, supra </em>n 2, at [36].</p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> <em>Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”)</em> [2022] SGHC 264 (“<em>Janesh v Unknown Person</em>”) at [68].</p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> W.S. Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of ‘Choses’ in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33(8) Harvard Law Review 997. See <em>Janesh v Unknown Person</em>, <em>supra </em>n 8, at [64] and <em>ByBit Fintech, supra</em> n 2, at [34].</p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> <em>Colonial Bank v Whinney </em>30 Ch.D. (<em>“Colonial Bank”</em>) at 286.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> Monetary Authority of Singapore, “Response to Public Consultation on Proposed Regulatory Measures for Digital Payment Token Services”, &lt;<a href="https://www.mas.gov.sg/publications/consultations/2022/consultation-paper-on-proposed-regulatory-measures-for-digital-payment-token-services">https://www.mas.gov.sg/publications/consultations/2022/consultation-paper-on-proposed-regulatory-measures-for-digital-payment-token-services</a>&gt; (accessed 6 August 2023).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> <em>Colonial Bank</em>, <em>supra</em> n 10.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> <em>Janesh v Unknown Person, supra </em>n 8, at [60].</p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a> <em>AA v Persons Unknown who demanded bitcoin on 10th and 11th October 2019 and ors </em>[2019] EWHC3556 (Comm) (<em>“AA</em>”) at [60].</p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a> <em>AA, supra </em>n 15, at [55].</p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a> Diagram by author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a> UK Jurisdiction Taskforce, <em>Legal Statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts, </em>&lt;<a href="https://www.blockchain4europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/6.6056_JO_Cryptocurrencies_Statement_FINAL_WEB_111119-1.pdf">https://www.blockchain4europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/6.6056_JO_Cryptocurrencies_Statement_FINAL_WEB_111119-1.pdf</a>&gt; (accessed 6 August 2023)<em> </em>(“The Legal Statement”).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a> Diagram by author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a> The Legal Statement, <em>supra </em>n 17, at [74] — [77].</p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[20]</a> <em>B2C2 Ltd v Quoine Pte Ltd</em> [2019] SGHC(I) 03.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref21">[21]</a> The Legal Statement, <em>supra </em>n 12, at [58].</p><p><a href="#_ftnref22">[22]</a> Diagram by author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref23">[23]</a> <em>Janesh v Unknown Person, supra </em>n 8, at [67].</p><p><a href="#_ftnref24">[24]</a> The Legal Statement, <em>supra </em>n 17, at [76].</p><p><a href="#_ftnref25">[25]</a> <em>Janesh v Unknown Person, supra</em> n 8, at [65] — [66].</p><p><a href="#_ftnref26">[26]</a> Diagram by author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref27">[27]</a> Diagram by author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref28">[28]</a> <em>Janesh v Unknown Person, supra </em>n 8, at [67].</p><p><a href="#_ftnref29">[29]</a> Diagram by author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref30">[30]</a> <em>Digital Assets, supra </em>n 5, p 34.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref31">[31]</a> Adel Zaid Hamzah, “Recognising Cryptocurrencies as Property? — <em>CLM v CLN</em>” Singapore Journal of Legal Studies [2022] at p 477.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=496822cd7984" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/chainlex/is-cryptocurrency-property-496822cd7984">Is Cryptocurrency Property?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/chainlex">Chainlex</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[NFTs, Intellectual Property and Third Parties]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/chainlex/nfts-intellectual-property-and-third-parties-470fbb197b60?source=rss----5e229924faf0---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intellectual-property]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nft]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Reuben Yang]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2023 08:18:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-21T16:17:25.615Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>Special thanks to Guang-Yi, Legal Counsel at the Ethereum Foundation, for feedback and review. All views expressed are mine.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dqY_Cf-2h7RySZVv9wkRAg.png" /></figure><h4><strong>What are NFTs and what are my rights associated with it?</strong></h4><p>Non-fungible tokens (”NFTs”) are digital representations (tokens) of an underlying asset. For the present purposes, we shall refer to NFTs as those that point to images — think the likes of BAYCs and CryptoPunks.</p><p>Acquisition of such an NFT that points to an image, such as an NFT pointing to an image of The Last Supper, does not, <em>ipso facto</em>, grant the owner any rights over The Last Supper itself. Instead, the NFT holder merely owns the rights over the token (the right to freely sell, transfer, dispose of the NFT etc.) and for the former to happen, there has to be a legal agreement between the owner of the image — the “copyright holder” — and the NFT holder outlining the rights the NFT holder has apropos the image.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hwS-DDayWbYctori-TA8oA.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Present issues</strong></h4><p>It is improbable that the idea of entering into a legal agreement with the copyright holder would have crossed the minds of the vast majority of NFT buyers and this is unsurprising when one considers the way these agreements are often entered into. These legal agreements often take the form of terms and conditions contained within the licence issued by the NFT project and the rights of the NFT holder flow directly from these terms, assuming the NFT project themselves have the appropriate rights to begin with.</p><p>At present, these legal agreements are often “click-wrapped” or “browse-wrapped” and that inevitably casts doubt on the assent of the buyer. Assent is of especial concern for certain browse-wrap agreements where it is contained within the terms that mere use of the site the NFT project is hosted on would constitute assent. Where the agreements are “browse-wrapped”, the terms of the agreement are often contained within a link and, typically, this link is either buried deep within the NFT project’s webpage or located at an inconspicuous corner of the webpage. It is no wonder that the Ninth Circuit in <em>Berman v Freedom Financial Network</em> asserted, albeit dicta, that, under California law, click-wrap agreements (those that users have to scroll to the bottom of, and positively click on an “I accept” button) are presumptively enforceable, while browse-wrap agreements are <em>per se </em>unenforceable.</p><h4>Blue chip licences</h4><p>Crucially, I went through the terms of the licences of BAYC, MAYC, CryptoPunks and Azuki with the purpose of answering the following:</p><blockquote><em>Where rights are conferred by the copyright holder unto the NFT holder, what happens to these rights upon secondary sales? Put another way, do the licensed rights, if any, persist and bind the downstream purchasers of such NFTs?</em></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G6Y8w5e7q5KcMpCgB5LmMw.png" /></figure><p>While examining this question, various other questions arose:</p><ol><li>Is there a mechanism for the assignment of rights from the one purchaser to another?</li><li>Are subsequent purchasers privy to the aforementioned legal agreement between the NFT project and the initial purchaser?</li><li>Where it is expressed in the licence that use of the website constitutes assent to the terms of the licence, can the downstream purchasers be said to have expressed assent if the transaction was concluded on secondary marketplaces?</li></ol><p>I will attempt to address these questions as I examine the individual licences below.</p><h4><strong>BAYC/MAYC</strong></h4><p>Yuga Labs, a behemoth in the NFT space, was one the pioneers in issuing IP licences that granted commercial rights to NFT holders. However, within the BAYC and MAYC licences (”the Ape Licences”) lie a contradiction pertaining to who the true copyright owner is. The following is provided in the Ape Licences:</p><ol><li>You Own the NFT. Each (Bored/Mutant) Ape is an NFT on the Ethereum blockchain. <strong>When you purchase an NFT, you own the underlying (Bored/Mutant) Ape, the Art, completely</strong> …</li><li>Personal Use. Subject to your continued compliance with these Terms, Yuga Labs LLC <strong><em>grants you</em></strong> a worldwide, royalty-free licence to use, copy, and display the purchased Art…</li><li>Commercial Use. Subject to your continued compliance with these Terms, Yuga Labs LLC <strong><em>grants you</em></strong> an unlimited, worldwide licence to use, copy, and display the purchased Art…”</li></ol><p>As mentioned above, when you purchase an NFT, you merely acquire the rights to the NFT and not the underlying asset. At first blush, it would appear that Yuga Labs intends to transfer the IP rights of the underlying asset to the purchaser of a BAYC/MAYC NFT. However, that cannot be the case as, in the subsequent paragraphs, Yuga Labs purports to grant the holder a licence to the IP of the underlying asset — one cannot grant a licence to what one does not own.</p><p>Additionally, the Ape Licences are silent on assignment of rights and on any transfer of rights from the initial purchaser to all downstream purchasers.</p><p><em>What about downstream purchasers?</em></p><p>Notwithstanding the contradiction that exist in the Ape Licence, assent, as provided in the Ape Licence, is taken to be at the point the NFT owner uses the website. However, the question of assent is made more complicated when one considers the method by which such downstream purchasers typically purchase these NFTs: these subsequent sales often conclude on secondary marketplaces and the secondary purchasers typically do not access the website at all. As such, it can hardly be said that downstream purchasers expressed assent to these terms, if they were even privy to the terms of the Ape Licences.</p><h4><strong><em>CryptoPunks</em></strong></h4><p>With Yuga Labs <a href="https://news.yuga.com/reflection-on-baycs-nft-license">announcing the release of intellectual property (”IP”) rights to CryptoPunks owners</a> much like how it did with BAYC NFTs, it ought to be outlined exactly what these rights are. In the CryptoPunks licence terms (“the Punks Licence”), cl. 1 outlines clearly the exact copyright rights that the NFT holder owns, and which are licensed to them. In cl. 13(b), it is provided that “[t]hese Terms will transfer and be binding upon and will inure to the benefit of the parties and their permitted successors and <em>assigns</em>”. While this appears to be an attempt in the Punks Licence to address the question of whether the rights in the licence terms bind downstream purchasers, it still fails in practice because, for cl. 13(b) to have effect, the NFT holder must first assign the rights to the subsequent purchaser and thus circles back to the initial question of assignment of rights.</p><p>Next, cl. 13(l) provides that “parties have agreed to contract electronically and, accordingly, electronic signatures or any other forms of acceptance permitted by law, will be given the same effect and weight as original signatures”. Notwithstanding this, it remains unclear as to (a) which point acceptance is effected if the transaction is concluded on a secondary marketplace, and (b) who the contracting parties are — initial purchaser and subsequent purchaser, Yuga Labs and initial purchaser or Yuga Labs and subsequent purchaser.</p><p>Interestingly, the following is stated in the header of the Punks Licence:</p><blockquote>“These terms (“Terms”) are a legally binding agreement by and between Yuga Labs, Inc. (“Yuga Labs”, “we” or “us”), a Delaware corporation, and <strong>any owner of a CryptoPunk NFT”</strong></blockquote><p>Ostensibly, this appears to be an attempt to sidestep the issues of privity and acceptance by imposing the terms on any and all owners of a CryptoPunk NFT and it remains an open question whether this can be accorded any weight at all.</p><h4><strong><em>Azuki</em></strong></h4><p>Azuki’s license agreement (“the Azuki Licence”) is, arguably, the most comprehensive one out of the three licences examined. Among others, it clearly delineates between the rights the NFT holder owns and those that are licensed to them and it also clearly states what constitutes acceptance. In the Azuki Licence, acceptance is taken to be the point “when you <strong>acquire</strong> an Azuki NFT” and it is also clearly expressed that an NFT holder only owns “personal property rights to the token underlying the Azuki NFT” but not the “associated artwork, brand, or other intellectual property associated with that Azuki NFT, except for the specific licensed rights set forth below” and these “specific licensed rights” are essentially the rights associated with a non-Commercial and Commercial licence.</p><p>On the issue of transfer of rights, the following is also provided in the Azuki Licence:</p><blockquote>“Transfer. <strong>The licenses granted above are non-transferrable, except that if you sell or transfer your Azuki NFT, you will no longer be granted the foregoing licenses in the Azuki NFT Art, and such license will transfer to the new owner of the Azuki NFT associated with such Azuki NFT Art.</strong> In connection with any sales, transfers or similar transactions of the Azuki NFTs, the <strong>transferee agrees that by purchasing, accepting, or otherwise acquiring the Azuki NFT, they shall be deemed to accept the terms of this License</strong>.”</blockquote><p>Here, the Azuki Licence makes an attempt to address the issue of whether the rights associated with ownership of an Azuki NFT transfer to the downstream purchasers. While this is an attempt to address the issue of transfer of rights, the question of privity remains and thus, the impasse remains unresolved.</p><h4><strong><em>Thoughts</em></strong></h4><p>It appears that in order for the issues canvassed above to be resolved, there is a great need for a mechanism for the terms of the agreement to “travel” together with the NFT and one such way might be to encode these terms in the metadata of each NFT.</p><p>Until such a mechanism is established and adopted by NFT projects, NFT purchasers should pay special attention to the terms of the license agreement if they are aware of the existence of one. If they are not aware of said existence, then it is advisable that purchasers should either seek it out or contact the NFT project to ask for a copy of it. This way, NFT purchasers can know exactly what rights they have and not be at risk of unlawfully using any intellectual property.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=470fbb197b60" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/chainlex/nfts-intellectual-property-and-third-parties-470fbb197b60">NFTs, Intellectual Property and Third Parties</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/chainlex">Chainlex</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A short overview of Smart Contracts and the Law]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/chainlex/a-short-overview-of-smart-contracts-76f966026e53?source=rss----5e229924faf0---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/76f966026e53</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[singapore-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[smart-contracts]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency-legality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cross-border-dispute]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rachael Ang]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Apr 2023 06:09:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-14T09:51:18.280Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K2fuaptLoeitkOt2GfEv0w.png" /></figure><h4>There has been substantial legal discourse around the topic of smart contracts versus legal contracts. This is an aggregation of the existing academic literature on the topic, particularly in relation to the following key questions:</h4><blockquote><strong>1. What are smart contracts?</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>2. What are the limitations of smart contracts?</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>3. Are smart contracts legally binding contracts?</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>4. How are cross-border smart contracts disputes adjudicated?</strong></blockquote><p><em>Special thanks to Guang-Yi, Legal Counsel at the Ethereum Foundation, for feedback and review. All views expressed are mine.</em></p><p><strong>I. What are smart contracts?</strong></p><p>Computer scientist and polymath Nick Szabo, who coined the term “smart contract”, defined it as a “computerised transaction protocol that executes the terms of a contract”. Smart contracts are deemed “smart” because they are arguably more functional than traditional legal contracts. However, this does not mean that these contracts are <em>smart</em> <em>enough</em> to replace traditional contracts, even if they exist and function on a blockchain.</p><p>A blockchain-based smart contract is a protocol encoded on a blockchain that automatically executes a predetermined set of actions once a set of conditions is fulfilled. In a way, traditional contractual clauses in the form “if X then Y” can be translated into programming languages (code) and embedded into smart contracts that can enforce them automatically. This automatic function of smart contracts minimises the need for trusted intermediaries between parties (e.g. procurement officials, institutions, or legal experts).</p><p><strong>II. What are the limitations of smart contracts?</strong></p><p>Smart contracts are unable to make decisions that require subjective assessment. For instance, it is difficult to imagine how a smart contract would determine whether one party has discharged its obligation to carry out “commercially reasonable endeavours” or to take “reasonable care”. While oracles may feed the smart contract with information external to the blockchain, this is not a satisfactory solution given that oracles are incapable of making these subjective assessments either. Ultimately, a venue or channel for dispute resolution is still required for subjective determinations or value judgements relating to the terms of a contract.</p><p><strong>III. Are smart contracts legally binding contracts?</strong></p><p>A “smart contract” is not necessarily a validly enforceable legal contract. Just as different jurisdictions have different requirements for what constitutes a validly enforceable legal contract, the same applies to smart contracts. For now, the traditional requirements for a legally binding contract are still what governs whether a smart contract will be valid in a court of law. For example, under the common law, three elements need to be fulfilled before a smart contract is considered legally enforceable: (a) the transaction must involve an exchange of promises made with an intention to create legal relations; (b) transaction is supported by consideration; (c) formality requirements in some cases. Some academics posit that the problem with smart contracts lies mainly with the fulfilment of formality requirements. For example, some contracts are required to be in writing and signed by the parties. The question is then whether a smart contract written in code and signed by the parties’ digital signatures suffices.</p><p><strong>IV. How are cross-border smart contract disputes adjudicated?</strong></p><p>Besides the legal validity of smart contracts, of interest to people who use smart contracts would be whether any dispute that arises in relation to their smart contract activities could be adjudicated by their local courts. This is especially where the opposing party to a smart contract-related dispute is usually a pseudonymous or anonymous individual from a different jurisdiction. After all, one of the core value propositions of a blockchain is to allow individuals to transact pseudonymously and permissionlessly across borders.</p><p>The pseudonymity or anonymity of the opposing party is no barrier to the formal adjudication of a dispute in court proceedings. For instance, in the UK, in <em>AA v Persons Unknown</em> [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm), the court granted a proprietary injunction over bitcoin which was paid as ransom payment in circumstances where the defendant was an unknown person. Similarly, in Singapore, in <em>CLM v CLN</em> [2022] SGHC 46, which concerned the theft of cryptocurrency assets, the SGHC held that there is nothing in our Rules of Court 2021 that requires that a defendant be specifically named. Thus, it held that the Singapore courts have jurisdiction to grant interim orders against anonymous defendants.</p><p>With regards to the cross-border aspect of smart contract disputes, there appears to be two ways to approach this.</p><p>On one hand, such disputes might involve a conflict of laws issue where the courts have to decide whether they are the appropriate forum to hear the case. For instance, in a Singapore case — <em>Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) </em>[2022] SGHC 264, the court was faced with the issue of whether it was the appropriate forum to hear a case concerning a plaintiff’s stolen NFT in circumstances where this occurred through the defendant triggering the smart contract between them. The court ultimately held that sufficient nexus with Singapore was established given that the plaintiff was in Singapore and conducted his business in Singapore.</p><p>On the other hand, some academics have opined that such disputes can be resolved “on the blockchain” without recourse to the courts. An example would be through online dispute resolution platforms like Kleros which embed oracles into smart contracts. In such instances, should parties disagree on the fulfillment of a certain obligation, the parties can trigger the oracle and a decision on this dispute can be made by Kleros’ jurors. Maxime Chevalier has even opined that there is <em>no need at all</em> for the court’s interference and instead a “blockchain arbitral legal order” should emerge.</p><p><strong>V. Conclusion</strong></p><p>Legal discourse on smart contracts and their analogy to traditional legal contracts have been substantial. For now, there is something to be said for the view that smart contracts are neither smart nor contracts; they are unable to encode more than straightforward “if X then Y” logic and there usually is no counter-party to a smart contract.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=76f966026e53" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/chainlex/a-short-overview-of-smart-contracts-76f966026e53">A short overview of Smart Contracts and the Law</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/chainlex">Chainlex</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Legality of Tornado Cash Sanctions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/chainlex/legality-of-tornado-cash-sanctions-242d98fc3585?source=rss----5e229924faf0---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/242d98fc3585</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tornado-cash-sanctions]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gerald Koh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Mar 2023 06:54:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-27T07:22:28.465Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>Special thanks to Guang-Yi, Legal Counsel at the Ethereum Foundation, for feedback and review. All views expressed are mine.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*j4gv3i396h-jDVeFnI6VhA.png" /></figure><p><em>This article summarises the state of research and literature in relation to the Tornado Cash sanctions, and its associated criticisms to date.</em></p><h3>Introduction to Tornado Cash</h3><p>Tornado Cash is an open source, decentralised, non-custodial privacy protocol. It is also known as a cryptocurrency mixer that operates on the Ethereum blockchain and indiscriminately facilitates anonymous transactions by obfuscating their origin, destination, and counterparties. It does this by allowing users to deposit and withdraw their ERC-20 tokens and ETH via transactions concluded by smart contracts, with completely different addresses, thereby enhancing transaction privacy between their deposit and withdrawal addresses.</p><h3>Use cases of Tornado Cash</h3><p>Tornado Cash has many real-life use cases including (but not limited to the following):</p><ol><li>Asset Management: Tornado Cash can be used to manage and transfer assets in a confidential manner, making it useful for individuals or organisations managing large amounts of assets.</li><li>Privacy-Preserving Payments: Tornado Cash can be useful for individuals who want to avoid the prying eyes of governments, corporations, or other third parties. An example would be where a Russian citizen is seeking to donate to the Ukrainian relief efforts but fears that such a transaction would cause him to be blacklisted by the Russian Federation. Tornado Cash would serve to anonymise his donations, circumventing such retaliation from his government.</li><li>Illegal Activities (eg. Money laundering): Tornado Cash’s distinctive feature of using smart contracts to anonymise transactions of its users has been relied on by many criminals to obfuscate the trail of funds generated from their illicit activities, in a bid to avoid detection from the relevant authorities. The sanctions to be discussed below were prompted because the Tornado Cash had allegedly, according to a <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0916">press release</a>, been “used to launder more than $7 billion worth of virtual currency since its creation in 2019”, which includes, more recently, “over $455 million stolen by the Lazarus Group, a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) state-sponsored hacking group that was sanctioned by the U.S. in 2019, in the largest known virtual currency heist to date”.</li></ol><h3>What do the Tornado Cash sanctions mean?</h3><p>OFAC elaborated that Tornado Cash is a “person” subject to designation under Executive Order 13,694 and Executive Order 13,722, because those orders define “person” to include an “entity”, which is defined as a “partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organisation”. As explained in <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/1095">FAQ 1095</a>, Tornado Cash’s organisational structure consists of: “(1) its founders and other associated developers, who together launched the Tornado Cash mixing service, developed new Tornado Cash mixing service features, created the Tornado Cash Decentralised Autonomous Organization (DAO), and actively promoted the platform’s popularity in an attempt to increase its user base; and (2) the Tornado Cash DAO, which is responsible for voting on and implementing new features created by the developers.” On this basis, OFAC has proceeded to add twenty-eight immutable smart contract addresses to the SDN list.</p><p>As a result of the imposed sanctions, United States persons (including legal persons such as any form of partnership, limited liability corporation, etc.) are disallowed from using Tornado Cash. This means that (1) no new or existing users (subject to U.S. jurisdiction) of Tornado Cash are allowed to use its mixing services; (2) existing users (subject to U.S. jurisdiction) who have funds that have yet to have been withdrawn are banned from withdrawing such funds, unless authorised by a general or specific licence issued by OFAC or are exempt.</p><h3>What is the pushback?</h3><h4>OFAC’s designation exceeds its statutory authority and is not in accordance with the law</h4><p>As explained above, OFAC’s statutory authority is to designate “persons” and “entities” onto the SDN list. It is perhaps questionable whether Tornado Cash is an “entity” in circumstances where Tornado Cash is simply a decentralised, open-source series of smart contracts on a public blockchain that cannot be removed or controlled by anyone.</p><p>It is also an open question whether the founders and developers of Tornado Cash, together with the Tornado Cash DAO which can loosely be described as the blockchain addresses holding the governance token, can collectively be considered an “entity”, whether incorporated or not.</p><p>Further, and perhaps most significantly, it is curious that OFAC has deemed Tornado Cash’s founders, developers, and DAO to be an “entity” but has not sanctioned any of them; certain smart contract addresses have been sanctioned instead.</p><p>There is therefore an argument that OFAC has acted <em>ultra vires</em> by designating something else other than a “person” or “entity” onto the SDN list.</p><h4>OFAC’s designation is unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution</h4><p>Criminalisation of the use of Tornado Cash purportedly violates the constitutional rights of Tornado Cash users who need it to protect their private associations. As explained in <em>Joseph Van Loon v Department Of The Treasury</em>, “by providing a certain degree of privacy, Tornado Cash allows [U.S. persons] to engage in important, socially valuable speech.” First, U.S. persons are unable to develop code related to Tornado Cash to facilitate improved uses of Tornado Cash and the Ethereum network. This is very much aligned to the oft-cited case of <em>Bernstein v Department of Justice</em>, where the court held that regulatory restrictions on an individual’s ability to publish encryption source code was a violation of the First Amendment, or in other words, software source code is speech protected by the First Amendment. Second, U.S. persons are unable to utilise Tornado Cash to further their future business ventures, which themselves will engage in socially valuable speech. Third, speech includes donations to controversial, political, and social matters (such as Vitalik’s use of Tornado Cash to donate to Ukraine’s relief efforts). Owing to these reasons, the Treasury has allegedly violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.</p><h4>OFAC’s designation is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution</h4><p>U.S. persons are forbidden from accessing their rightful cryptocurrency ever since the sanctions have been imposed. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that “due process of law” be part of any proceeding that denies a citizen “life, liberty or property” and requires the government to compensate citizens when it takes private property for public use. As users of Tornado Cash did not receive any process prior to that deprivation of their property, these sanctions are highly unjustified.</p><h3>OFAC’s designation has resulted in involuntary criminal liability</h3><p>As explained in <em>Coin Center v Yellen Et Al</em>, OFAC failed to consider how the criminalisation of the receipt of assets through the use of Tornado Cash would subject people to criminal liability without voluntary action on their own part. Otherwise known as “dusting attacks”, many victims who have received Tornado Cash-tainted digital assets in small amounts (0.01 ETH) from unknown sources are taken to have effectively transacted with sanctioned persons — this effect dangerously subjects many to criminal liability, although it might have been through no fault of their own.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Days after the sanctions were announced, Alexey Perstev, a developer of Tornado Cash was apprehended on grounds that to date we are still unclear of. These series of events have set a terrifying precedent for open-source code and their associated developers. Until we have a concluded ruling on the legality of the sanctions, it is still unclear thus far whether they were indeed legal or not.</p><h3>Bibliography</h3><p><strong>What is Tornado Cash?</strong></p><p>● <a href="https://learn.bybit.com/defi/what-is-tornado-cash/">Bybit Learn</a>: Tornado Cash: How It’s Stirring Up a Storm in the Crypto World</p><p>● <a href="https://www.coingecko.com/learn/what-is-tornado-cash-and-how-does-it-work">Josiah Makori</a>: What Is Tornado Cash And How Does It Work?</p><p>● <a href="https://www.coincenter.org/education/advanced-topics/how-does-tornado-cash-work/">Alex Wade, Michael Lewellen, Peter Van Valkenburgh</a>: How does Tornado Cash work?</p><p><strong>U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Press Releases</strong></p><p>● Sanctions update as of 08/08/2022 -<br><a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220808">https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220808</a></p><p>● Press release on 08/08/2022 -<br><a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0916">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0916</a></p><p><strong>U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY FAQs</strong></p><p><em>FAQs for Tornado Cash</em></p><p>● <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/1076">FAQ 1076. What is prohibited as a result of OFAC’s designation of Tornado Cash?</a></p><p>● <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/1095">FAQ 1095. Who is the Tornado Cash “person” that OFAC designated pursuant to E.O. 13722 (“Blocking Property of the Government of North Korea and the Workers’ Party of Korea, and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to North Korea”) and Executive Order (E.O.) 13694 (“Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities”), as amended?</a></p><p><em>Cyber-related Sanctions</em></p><p>● <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/444">FAQ 444. How will Treasury decide whom to sanction under this authority?</a></p><p>● <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/445">FAQ 445. What are my compliance obligations with respect to E.O. 13694, as amended?</a></p><p>● <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/447">FAQ 447. What will significant malicious “cyber-enabled” activities mean for the purposes of Executive Order (E.O.) 13694?</a></p><p><em>North Korea Sanctions</em></p><p>● <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/456">FAQ 456. What does Executive Order (E.O.) 13722 do?</a></p><p><strong>Material relating to the legality of Tornado Cash sanctions</strong></p><p>● <a href="https://twitter.com/GOPMajorityWhip/status/1562084891247902721">Congressman Tom Emmer’s letter to Janet Yellen</a>: Emmer described the sanctions as the “first of their kind” in that OFAC sanctioned the protocol’s smart contracts rather than a natural person or entity. He further raised potential due process and privacy concerns in his letter.</p><p>● <a href="https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2022/10/30/ofacs-tornado-cash-sanctions-and-the-problem-of-immutability/">Brad Bourque</a>: OFAC’s Tornado Cash Sanctions and the Problem of Immutability</p><p>● <a href="https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/tornado-cash-sanctions-challenges/">Chainalysis</a>: Understanding Tornado Cash, Its Sanctions Implications, and Key Compliance Questions</p><p>● <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/layer2/2022/09/15/ofac-backtracks-but-tornado-cash-sanctions-already-set-a-terrifying-precedent/">CoinDesk, Zac Colbert</a>: OFAC Backtracks but Tornado Cash Sanctions Already Set a Terrifying Precedent</p><p>● <a href="https://mirror.xyz/haunventures.eth/E-iD-jqgD-WmqrZOjCnGjv6U-R_N5tUk8xPzxUHhQGc">Haun Ventures</a>: Tornado Cash: What web3 Needs to Know</p><p><strong>Relevant cases, complaints in relation to Tornado Cash sanctions</strong></p><p>● <em>Joseph Van Loon Et Al V. Department Of The Treasury Et Al</em>, Case № 6:22-cv-00920-ADA-JCM, Complaint dated 22 November 2022</p><p>● <em>Joseph Van Loon Et Al V. Department Of The Treasury Et Al</em>, Case № 6:22-cv-00920-ADA-JCM, Complaint dated 22 September 2022</p><p>● <em>Coin Center Et Al V. Yellen Et Al</em>, Case № 3:22-cv-20375-TKW-ZCB, Complaint dated 12 October 2022</p><p><strong>Material relating to the detention of Alexey Perstev, a Tornado Cash developer</strong></p><p>● <a href="https://www.fiod.nl/arrest-of-suspected-developer-of-tornado-cash/">Press release</a>: Arrest of a suspected developer of Tornado Cash, Alexey Perstev</p><p>● <a href="https://www.bitsofblocks.io/post/tornado-cash-prosecution-lifts-off">Article</a>: Update on the charges alleged against Alexey Perstev</p><p>● <em>Bernstein v Department of Justice</em>, Case № 176 F.3d 1132<br>In this case, the court ruled that regulatory restrictions on an individual’s ability to publish encryption source code was a violation of the First Amendment. It follows that <strong><em>software source code is speech protected by the First Amendment</em></strong> and as such the source code that had been developed by Alexey is considered free speech.</p><p><strong>Other great materials referred to while researching on this topic</strong></p><p>● <a href="https://guang-yi.notion.site/">Guang-Yi</a>: The Crypto Compendium 2023</p><p>● <a href="https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/blockchain-laws-and-regulations/15-u-s-sanctions-and-cryptocurrency-recent-developments-and-compliance-considerations">Global Legal Insights</a>: Blockchain &amp; Cryptocurrency Laws and Regulations 2023</p><p>● <a href="https://stanford-jblp.pubpub.org/pub/law-econ-decentralised-governance/release/2">J.G. Allen</a>: Bodies Without Organs: Law, Economics, and Decentralised Governance (Inquiry into “How should a DAO be apprehended by a legal system?”)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=242d98fc3585" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/chainlex/legality-of-tornado-cash-sanctions-242d98fc3585">Legality of Tornado Cash Sanctions</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/chainlex">Chainlex</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Monetary Law and CBDC Issuance in the US and EU]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/chainlex/monetary-law-and-cbdc-issuance-in-the-us-and-eu-e14c7edfabad?source=rss----5e229924faf0---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e14c7edfabad</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptolaw]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cbdc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-central-bank]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[federal-reserve]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chua Wei Rong]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Mar 2023 02:25:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-14T02:54:59.715Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>Special thanks to Guang-Yi, Legal Counsel at the Ethereum Foundation, for feedback and review. All views expressed are mine</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gFmNg_yLSJJz0jHTn61ssQ.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Monetary Law and CBDC Issuance in the US and EU</strong></h3><p><em>The United States Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank are considering the issuance of their own Central Bank Digital Currency (“CBDC”) — known as the Digital Dollar and Digital Euro respectively. This article summarises the monetary law issues surrounding the possible issuance of the Digital Dollar and Digital Euro.</em></p><ol><li><strong>What are CBDCs?</strong></li></ol><p>CBDCs are generally defined as a new form of central bank money — a digital liability of the central bank, denominated in existing unit of account, which serves both as a medium of exchange and a store of value.¹ CBDCs can vary in terms of its operational and technical aspects, depending on the central bank’s policy goals.² The two most important design choices a central bank has to decide is whether the CBDC will be: (1) wholesale or retail; and (2) token-based or account-based.</p><p><strong>2. What are wholesale CBDCs and retail CBDCs?</strong></p><p>A wholesale CBDC is one whose access and use are restricted to financial institutions, while a retail CBDC is one that is accessible by the wider public, including financial institutions.³</p><p>This dichotomy reflects the segregation of payment services into wholesale and retail segments, with the former encompassing low-value transactions, and the latter large-value and high-priority transactions.⁴ However, given that a retail CBDC could also be used for wholesale transactions, this dichotomy may arguably become less relevant when retail CBDCs are widely adopted.⁵</p><p><strong>3. What are token-based CBDCs and account-based CBDCs?</strong></p><p>An account-based CBDC contemplates CBDCs held as balances in a cash current account on the central bank’s books. There is a <em>sui generis</em> contractual relationship between the central bank and the individual or institution holding the account.⁶ Transfers of CBDCs are akin to transfers of book money by debits and credits between such accounts.⁷</p><p>A token-based CBDC is analogous to banknotes and coins. It represents a <em>sui generis</em> claim against the central bank, and a transfer of the CBDC amounts to a transfer of the claim.⁸ However, unlike banknotes and coins which are virtually untracked once in circulation, transactions of token-based CBDCs are recorded on the central bank’s blockchain.</p><p><strong>4. What are the legal issues related to issuing wholesale CBDCs?</strong></p><p>Wholesale CBDCs present much fewer legal issues as compared to retail CBDCs. Wholesale CBDCs are regarded as an extension of the Real-Time Gross Settlement (“RTGS”) systems implemented by central banks, such as Fedwire in the US and TARGET2 in the EU. RTGS systems provide a transaction-by-transaction processing of payment in real-time within the central bank for its account holders.⁹ With wholesale CBDCs, the underlying settlement layer of the RTGS system will be enabled by blockchain or distributed ledger technology.¹⁰</p><p>Given the relationship between the central bank and its account holders, wholesale CBDCs operating as a RTGS system are necessarily account-based.¹¹ Thus, the account-based and token-based distinction is not particularly relevant here, unlike for retail CBDCs, which will be discussed below.</p><p><strong>5. What are the legal issues related to issuing token-based retail CBDCs?</strong></p><p>Generally, a token-based retail CBDC can be issued if the central bank has the power to issue legal tender without limiting it to physical banknotes and coins.¹² In the US, the Federal Reserve has no such powers, while in the EU, the ECB is likely to have such powers.</p><p><em>Analysis Under US Law</em></p><p>Section 5103 of the U.S. Code defines “legal tender” as “coin and currency (including Federal reserve notes…)”.¹³ It is unlikely that the Digital Dollar could be classified as either given that these definitions envision a tangible, physical form of legal tender.¹⁴ To illustrate this, the U.S. Code stipulates the specific diameter and weight of each coin.¹⁵ The analysis for “currency” is more nuanced. The use of the word “including” creates ambiguity as it could be read as providing either an exhaustive or non-exhaustive list of the types of currency.</p><p>If read exhaustively, the question is whether the Digital Dollar can be deemed as “federal reserve notes”. This is answered in the negative. Section 16(1) of the Federal Reserve Act authorises the issue of “federal reserve notes” by the Federal Reserve.¹⁶ However, the section also makes references to “engraving plates and dies”, “distinctive paper”, “distinctive letter and serial number”.¹⁷ Based on the context, “federal reserve notes” must refer to paper currency.¹⁸</p><p>If read non-exhaustively, the inability of CBDCs to be deemed as “federal reserve notes” is not fatal, and the legal basis for issuance could come from Congress’s broad constitutional power “to coin money”.¹⁹ However, given that the power to issue currency has been designated to the Federal Reserve, it must be conferred with express legal authority to issue a CBDC.²⁰ In summary, the Federal Reserve lacks the power to issue a token-based retail CBDC.</p><p><em>Analysis Under EU Law</em></p><p>According to the European Central Bank (“ECB”), the Digital Euro could be adopted based on Art 128(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).²¹ Art 128(1) “authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union” and such banknotes “shall be the only such notes to have the status of legal tender within the Union”.²²</p><p>The question, therefore, is whether Digital Euros can be deemed as “banknotes”. This is likely to be answered in the affirmative. In <em>Dietrich and Häring v Rundfunk </em>(“<em>Rundfunk”</em>),²³ the European Union Court of Justice held that Art 128(1) (and other EU laws) are not intended to exclude the possibility of the EU assigning the status of legal tender to other forms of currency that are not necessarily physical.²⁴ While the court also recognised the possibility of introducing CBDCs in the EU, it did not conclusively determine its legal status.²⁵ Nonetheless, it could be surmised that based on the TFEU’s legislative intent and history, there are no compelling reasons why a token-based retail CBDC would be excluded from the definition of “banknotes”.²⁶</p><p><strong>6. What are the legal issues related to issuing account-based retail CBDCs?</strong></p><p>Generally, an account-based retail CBDC can be issued if the central bank has the power to open cash current accounts for the public, in addition to financial institutions.²⁷ In the US, the Federal Reserve has no such powers, while in the EU, the ECB is likely to have such powers.</p><p><em>Analysis Under US Law</em></p><p>Under §342 of the U.S. Code, the Federal Reserve is authorised to accept “deposits of current funds” from “any of its member banks, or other depository institution”.²⁸ However, it does not have the power to open cash current accounts for individuals.²⁹</p><p><em>Analysis Under EU Law</em></p><p>According to the ECB, the Digital Euro could also be adopted based on Art 127(2) of the TFEU in conjunction with Article 17 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”).³⁰ Art 17 of the Statute of the ESCB provides that “the ECB and the national central banks may open accounts for credit institutions, public entities and other market participants”,³¹ for the purposes stated in Art 127(2) of the TFEU, specifically to implement the monetary policy of the EU.³²</p><p>The question, therefore, is whether the Digital Euro can be regarded as part of “monetary policy”. This is likely to be answered in the affirmative. To determine if a particular measure falls within the scope of “monetary policy”, which is not precisely defined in the TFEU,³³ the court will refer principally to the objectives of that measure.³⁴ The ECB has stated that the Digital Euro is, in part, to prevent the euro’s decline amidst competition from foreign CBDCs and private stablecoins.³⁵ This objective will place the Digital Euro within the scope of monetary policy.³⁶ Following <em>Rundfunk</em>, monetary policy “must be understood as encompassing all the competences and powers necessary for the creation and proper functioning of the single currency, the euro”.³⁷ In this regard, an account-based retail CBDC would likely be deemed as a tool of “monetary policy”.</p><p><strong>7. Conclusion</strong></p><p>CBDCs represent an important milestone in the evolution of money. However, they raise questions under monetary law which must be addressed before implementation. Wholesale CBDCs raise fewer legal issues as they can be implemented through existing RTGS systems. Retail CBDCs raise different legal issues, depending on its nature. Token-based CBDCs require the central bank to issue legal tender in non-physical form, while account-based CBDCs require the central bank to open cash current accounts for the public.</p><p>Overall, the Digital Euro will face much fewer legal obstacles as compared to the Digital Dollar given the broader scope of the ECB’s powers. Conversely, the powers of the Federal Reserve are much more constrained. In the absence of new laws and regulation, the US will lack a sufficiently strong legal basis to issue the Digital Dollar.</p><p>[1] Markets Committee, Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, <em>Central Bank Digital Currencies</em> (Bank for International Settlements, 2018) &lt; <a href="https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf">https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf</a>&gt; (“BIS Report”) at p 3.</p><p>[2] See Gabriel Soderberg <em>et al</em>, <em>Behind the Scenes of Central Bank Digital Currency: Emerging Trends, Insights, and Policy Lessons</em> (International Monetary Fund, 2022)&lt;<a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fintech-notes/Issues/2022/02/07/Behind-the-Scenes-of-Central-Bank-Digital-Currency-512174">https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fintech-notes/Issues/2022/02/07/Behind-the-Scenes-of-Central-Bank-Digital-Currency-512174</a>&gt;.</p><p>[3] Economic Policy Group, <em>A Retail Central Bank Digital Currency: Economic Considerations in the Singapore Context</em> (Monetary Authority of Singapore, 2021) &lt; <a href="https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/mas/epg/monographs-or-information-paper/a-retail-cbdc---economic-considerations-in-the-singapore-context.pdf">https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/mas/epg/monographs-or-information-paper/a-retail-cbdc---economic-considerations-in-the-singapore-context.pdf</a>&gt; at p 7.</p><p>[4] BIS Report, <em>supra </em>n 1, at p 4.</p><p>[5] <em>Ibid.</em></p><p>[6] Wouter Bossu <em>et al, Legal Aspects of Central Bank Digital Currency: Central Bank and Monetary Law Considerations (IMF Working Paper 20/254)</em> (International Monetary Fund, 2020) &lt;<a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2020/11/20/Legal-Aspects-of-Central-Bank-Digital-Currency-Central-Bank-and-Monetary-Law-Considerations-49827">https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2020/11/20/Legal-Aspects-of-Central-Bank-Digital-Currency-Central-Bank-and-Monetary-Law-Considerations-49827</a>&gt; (“IMF Report”) at p 12.</p><p>[7] <em>Ibid.</em></p><p>[8] <em>Id, </em>at p 11.</p><p>[9] Marcelo Prates, “Money in the Twenty-First Century: From Rusty Coins to Digital Currencies” (2021) 15(1) Ohio State Business Law Journal 164 at p 203.</p><p>[10] See Fabio Panetta, Executive Board Member, European Central Bank, “Demystifying Wholesale Central Bank Digital Currency”, speech at Symposium on “Payments and Securities Settlement in Europe” (26 September 2022) &lt; <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2022/html/ecb.sp220926~5f9b85685a.en.html">https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2022/html/ecb.sp220926~5f9b85685a.en.html</a>&gt;.</p><p>[11] For Fedwire, see John Crawford, Lev Menand, &amp; Morgan Ricks, “ FedAccounts: Digital Dollars” 89(1) George Washington Law Review 113 at p 138–139. For TARGET2, see European Central Bank, “What is TARGET2?” &lt; <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/target/target2/html/index.en.html">https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/target/target2/html/index.en.html</a>&gt;.</p><p>[12] IMF Report, <em>supra </em>n 6 at p 19.</p><p>[13] 31 U.S. Code § 5103.</p><p>[14] Nicholas Mack, “Obstacles to Successful Introduction of a U.S. Central Bank Digital Currency” (forthcoming, 2022) 18 Journal of Business Technology Law at manuscript pp 21–22.</p><p>[15] 31 U.S. Code § 5112.</p><p>[16] Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §16(1).</p><p>[17] <em>Id, </em>at §§16(3), 16(12).</p><p>[18] Paige Paridon, “Legal Authority to Issue a U.S. Central Bank Digital Currency” (2021) Bank Policy Institute at p 3.</p><p>[19] US Constitution Art I, §8 , cl. 5. See also Mack, <em>supra </em>n 14, at p 20.</p><p>[20] Mack, <em>supra </em>n 14, at pp 23–24.</p><p>[21] European Central Bank, <em>Report on a Digital Euro </em>(2020) &lt;<a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/Report_on_a_digital_euro~4d7268b458.en.pdf2">https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/Report_on_a_digital_euro~4d7268b458.en.pdf2</a>&gt; at p 24.</p><p>[22] Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) (12012E/TXT) Art 128(1).</p><p>[23] <em>Johannes Dietrich and Norbert Häring v Hessischer Rundfunk</em> [2022] ECLI:EU:C:2020:756 (“<em>Rundfunk”</em>).</p><p>[24] <em>Id, </em>at [96].</p><p>[25] <em>Id, </em>at [82].</p><p>[26] See Seraina Grünewald, Corinne Zellweger-Gutknecht, &amp; Benjamin Geva, “Digital Euro and ECB Powers” (2021) 58(4) Common Market Law Review 1029.</p><p>[27] IMF Report, <em>supra </em>n 6 at p 22.</p><p>[28] 12 U.S. Code § 342.</p><p>[29] Paridon, <em>supra </em>n 18, at p 5.</p><p>[30] European Central Bank, <em>Report on a Digital Euro </em>(2020) &lt;<a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/Report_on_a_digital_euro~4d7268b458.en.pdf2">https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/Report_on_a_digital_euro~4d7268b458.en.pdf2</a>&gt; at p 24.</p><p>[31] Statute of the European System of Central Banks (“ECSB”) (12016E/PRO/04) Art 17.</p><p>[32] Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) (12012E/TXT) Art 127(2).</p><p>[33] <em>Gauweiler a.o. v. Deutscher Bundestag</em> [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:400 at [42].</p><p>[34] <em>Id</em>, at [46].</p><p>[35] European Central Bank, <em>Report on a Digital Euro </em>(2020) &lt;<a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/Report_on_a_digital_euro~4d7268b458.en.pdf2">https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/Report_on_a_digital_euro~4d7268b458.en.pdf2</a>&gt; at pp 11–12.</p><p>[36] Annelieke Mooij, “European Central Bank Digital Currency: The Digital Euro. What Design of the Digital Euro Is Possible Within the European Central Bank’s Legal Framework?” (2021) BRIDGE Network Working Paper Series No 14 at p 13.</p><p>[37] <em>Rundfunk</em>, <em>supra </em>n 23 at [70].</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e14c7edfabad" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/chainlex/monetary-law-and-cbdc-issuance-in-the-us-and-eu-e14c7edfabad">Monetary Law and CBDC Issuance in the US and EU</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/chainlex">Chainlex</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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