<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Moving Europe - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Deep dives into migration and asylum policy in the EU and worldwide. - Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/deepercuts?source=rss----9022ca98b4eb---4</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 16:09:35 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/feed/deepercuts" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Why EU’s Migration Strategy is Failing]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/deepercuts/why-eus-migration-strategy-is-failing-72a2b17ea2ea?source=rss----9022ca98b4eb---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/72a2b17ea2ea</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[migration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[julianawrites]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2025 13:07:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-18T16:08:45.543Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>And What Climate Change Has to Do With It</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*e6WB042rmCng8Q97" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@mael_balland?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Maël BALLAND</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><blockquote>“I’ve lived in the ghetto for seven years. There isn’t any shade or water, and it is extremely hot. We are five living in this makeshift hut.”</blockquote><p>These are the words of <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/65599/italy-high-temperatures-are-making-inhumane-conditions-worse-for-migrant-workers-in-puglia">Adam, a 34-year-old from Guinea-Bissau</a>, who has lived in Italy for 11 years. The conditions he describes aren’t the ones he fled back home from, but the ones he found in the “promised land” of Italy.</p><p>Imagine working under a blazing Italian sun, with temperatures consistently exceeding 40°C. Thousands of migrant laborers in Puglia, Italy, are living in these conditions on a daily basis. These laborers, primarily from Nigeria, Mali, and Ghana, live in makeshift huts in <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/34023/app-against-labor-exploitation-in-rural-southeastern-italy">camps like Borgo Mezzanone</a>, often referred to as a “ghetto.” There are no basic hygiene services and no water supply. Most migrants in Puglia work in surrounding agricultural fields, sometimes even during the hottest hours of the year.</p><p>The effects of climate change are being felt everywhere on the European continent. <a href="https://truthout.org/articles/1500-deaths-in-europes-heat-wave-were-due-to-climate-crisis-study-shows/">An estimated 1,500 people</a> across 12 European cities were killed by human-caused climate change during the latest heatwave. However, the group that is most vulnerable to the extreme weather is not citizens but migrants and asylum seekers. Low pay, language barriers, and poor working conditions are <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667278223000494#:~:text=The%20evidence%20suggests%20that%20gender,extremely%20vulnerable%20to%20heat%20stress.">just some of the reasons</a> they’re more vulnerable to heat-related illness and death.</p><p>On a global scale, <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/summary-global-report-on-internal-displacement-2025/#:~:text=This%20is%20a%20summary%20of,driving%20record%20levels%20of%20displacement.&amp;text=The%20summary%20report%20includes%20the,number%20of%20internally%20displaced%20people.">the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (iDMC) reported</a> 26.4 million new internal displacements in 2023 alone due to natural disasters across 148 countries, surpassing displacements caused by conflict and violence. This number is predicted to grow exponentially as climate change accelerates. It seems logical, then, to assume that migration to the EU would rise accordingly.</p><p>If you thought “Yes,” your answer aligns with the views of most Europeans. <a href="https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_143__Migration_0.pdf">Many Europeans fear</a> climate change will trigger a wave of migration to Europe and exacerbate already legally questionable conditions for migrants in the EU. But where does that fear come from and what makes it so misleading?</p><h4>Is climate change causing mass migration to Europe?</h4><p>Stories like Adam’s rarely make it into mainstream conversations in the EU. Instead, <a href="https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/jrc-news-and-updates/public-discourse-migration-shaped-misinformation-and-conspiracy-theories-2025-06-05_en">the public discourse in the EU</a> conjures an image of a mass migration threatening to overrun Europe. In Germany, <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/56953/germans-fear-migration-more-than-climate-change-study-finds">migration is even ranked</a> as the most important societal problem by about 35% of the population, more than concerns about the economy or climate change itself. A similar narrative is often heard even from UN officials and international think tanks. It predicts a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/feb/14/rising-seas-threaten-mass-exodus-on-a-biblical-scale-un-chief-warns">“mass exodus on a biblical scale,”</a> or billions displaced as climate refugees by 2050. In fact, this line of thinking has become almost the default assumption around climate change and migration, picked up by media, think tanks, and the public.</p><p>However, the truth behind climate-induced migration is far more complicated than populist politicians would like you to think. Climate change doesn’t usually lead to long-distance, cross-border migration. Most people displaced by climate-related disasters <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/climate-change-and-displacement-myths-and-facts#:~:text=Suggestions%20that%20large%20numbers%20of,means%20to%20move%20long%20distances.">move within their own country</a> or to neighboring ones, and rarely reach the EU. In fact, most predictions of mass climate migration to Europe <a href="https://www.persuasion.community/p/the-false-link-between-climate-change">are based on flawed assumptions</a> that climate displacement automatically leads to international migration or that vulnerable communities have the means to move.</p><p>For instance, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378023001449#:~:text=Rural%20riverine%20communities%20in%20Bangladesh,rural%20resilience%20to%20riverine%20hazards.">in Bangladesh</a>, a country severely impacted by climate change, the Jamuna River swells dramatically during the rainy season and destroys homes. Contrary to expectations, those affected remain surprisingly loyal to the river and typically remain in their village.</p><p>While the public imagines waves of climate refugees arriving in Europe, the truth is that many people in climate-affected areas <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/climate-change-and-displacement-myths-and-facts">can’t afford to move at all</a>. Displacement often means losing land, jobs, and savings, and those who are hit hardest are usually the least mobile. Others prefer not to leave. Culture and family keep most people where they are, even when conditions get worse.</p><p>The main reason for the rare instances of cross-border migration is the hope of finding a better job abroad, not only climate change. In reality, <a href="https://api.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/grid2021_idmc.pdf">climate change is a threat multiplier</a>: it worsens existing economic and social conditions rather than being the stand-alone cause for migration.</p><h4>Why does climate change force people to move?</h4><p>The decision to migrate rarely comes down to a single event. More often, it’s the result of life becoming gradually more unlivable. For many people, especially in <a href="https://odi.org/en/publications/bearing-the-burden/#:~:text=Key%20Messages%20*%20Climate%20change%20contributed%20to,crops%20&amp;%20livestock%20losses%20in%20these%20regions.">climate-vulnerable regions like the Sahel</a> or <a href="https://wmo.int/media/news/climate-change-made-horn-of-africa-drought-and-mediterranean-heat-100-times-more-likely">the Horn of Africa</a>, climate change doesn’t just bring hotter days or heavier rains. It pulls the ground out from under them, economically and socially.</p><p>In countries like Chad, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, where economies rely heavily on agriculture, <a href="https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2020/03/women-and-climate-change-in-the-sahel_9e94079e/e31c77ad-en.pdf">a warming climate directly threatens food production.</a> Crops depend on seasonal rain, but human-caused climate change is making that rain less predictable, and droughts are lasting longer. <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/11/1104652">In southern Madagascar</a>, years of back-to-back droughts led to famine and displaced thousands. When crops fail, income disappears, and so does food security. In places where there’s little government safety net, people are left with nothing.</p><p>When floods wash away homes or droughts kill livestock, people lose everything they depend on: land, assets, and savings. For those without enough money to leave, this can lead to <a href="https://interactive.carbonbrief.org/climate-migration/index.html">“trapped populations,”</a> with people too poor to flee. But for others with just enough to try, migration becomes the only option left.</p><p>Climate shocks also make basic resources like water harder to access. In fragile states, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877343523000696">the breakdown of public services</a> under climate pressure leads to massive political and security crises. When a government can’t provide the basics (food, water, jobs), people lose trust. In some regions, <a href="https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/publications/Discussion%20Paper%20-%20Preventing%20Violent%20Extremism%20by%20Promoting%20Inclusive%20%20Development.pdf">that opens the door</a> to extremism and violence.</p><p>For many migrants, especially those working today in fields in southern Italy or construction sites in Spain, climate change didn’t cause their migration. It made the conditions back home impossible to survive. The people picking tomatoes in Puglia came to Italy not in search of a better life but in search of any life at all. They arrived in Europe only to find that survival here, too, comes with a cost.</p><h4>Why does Europe rely on migrant labor?</h4><p>That cost exists because Europe benefits from it. The deteriorating economic conditions back home naturally cause people to actively look for ways to escape them. Clearly, the immediate motivations are overwhelmingly economic and social: the hope for better pay, the chance to escape poverty, and the demand for cheap labor in the EU. And when that opportunity comes, even if it means working in 40-degree heat for “small change,” people take it. But that opportunity doesn’t appear out of nowhere. It exists because <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/economy/article/2022/06/11/as-summer-dawns-employers-try-to-fight-the-great-disappearance-of-seasonal-tourism-workers-in-europe_5986375_19.html#:~:text=Yet%20the%20use%20of%20foreign%20labor%20is,the%20seasonal%20worker%20crisis%20in%20Europe%20either.">many European economies rely</a> on a steady supply of underpaid, disposable labor. <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/22540/italian-food-system-exploits-migrant-farm-workers--un">In 2022</a>, Italy employed approximately 362,000 foreign seasonal workers in the agricultural sector. This represents about 31.7% of the total registered working days in Italian agriculture.</p><p>The image of the migrant as a security threat, often repeated in EU debates, simply doesn’t match this reality. In places like Borgo Mezzanone, migrants aren’t a threat to the system. They are the system. <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/689347/EPRS_BRI(2021)689347_EN.pdf">They fill vital roles in agriculture</a>, and they do so under conditions no one else will accept. Many live with no water, no toilets, and no way to escape the heat. <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/SOM_Toolkit_E-book_english_Combined.pdf">They’re caught in the gangmastering system</a>, exploited by criminal networks and forced to work even during the hottest hours of the day, despite laws that say otherwise.</p><p>Migrants in Puglia are not storming Europe’s borders. They are sleeping in aluminum huts, picking fruit in unbearable heat, and getting paid just enough to survive. And yet, across much of the EU, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-europes-turn-on-migration/">the dominant political response is fear</a>. Instead of recognizing how needed many of these workers are, or <a href="https://media.odi.org/documents/10297.pdf">how desperate the conditions were</a> that forced them to leave, migration in the EU is most often associated with control and deterrence.</p><h4><strong>How does EU policy respond to fear?</strong></h4><p>The negative public perception of migrants doesn’t go unnoticed. On the contrary, it actively directs EU migration policy. And if what people want is for migrants to be detained and mistreated, many EU governments seem willing to oblige.</p><p>As a response to widespread anxiety over irregular migration and perceived weak border control, the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/02/migrants-at-the-gate-europe-tries-to-curb-undocumented-migration?lang=en#:~:text=The%20EU%20has%20responded%20to,to%20stem%20the%20migratory%20tide.">EU plans to toughen its migration rules</a> through faster deportations for those who enter illegally. <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20230704STO02012/returns-the-eu-s-new-approach-to-sending-migrants-back">The European Commission is exploring</a> the establishment of “return hubs” in non-EU countries, where asylum seekers would be held as their asylum claims are being processed. For example, <a href="https://www.rescue.org/eu/article/what-italy-albania-asylum-deal">Italy has implemented an Albania protocol</a> to allow for the processing of up to 36,000 asylum applicants per year in centers located in the non-EU country.</p><p>It sounds efficient on paper: if the EU can’t guarantee decent conditions for migrants at home, it can simply pay someone else to do it. In reality, the Italian detention center in northern Albania isn’t some safe haven. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2024/07/italy-new-detention-centres-in-albania-are-a-stain-on-the-italian-government/">It’s a metal-container detention camp</a> under constant surveillance, with no access to legal aid or judicial review. <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/65748/italian-detention-model-in-albania-is-inhumane-and-must-not-last-warns-caritas">Rights groups report</a> migrants shackled with plastic wrist ties throughout transfers and held without information on their status or reasons. It’s hard to call that humane or lawful.</p><p>The spread of false data and fear-based narratives about migration led to what is termed the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/events/2020/1/ministerial-meeting-on-migration/migration-strategic-foresight.pdf">“migration deterrence trap,”</a> or a cycle where policies reduce the visibility of migration without addressing why people move in the first place. A narrow focus on physical force and stricter borders may reduce irregular crossings in the short term, but it doesn’t work in the long run. <a href="https://watermark.silverchair.com/lbae022.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAA0owggNGBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggM3MIIDMwIBADCCAywGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMltqGjXraNkFLo3RZAgEQgIIC_RGY6shNW-383k3IWk_cozqf93iaX94iE6xIySP3m7FbYwc-Q9rjG3wWLtJPVS9v6tIEq9zgYJ0pYOvWwGhNa8QoPlPPSUdQhpWKz4edseozNV4Jg8mRinwlIKlBydtUFlc0VNrHW39I_GSU7RL7NDIevs54C1v3RiE_yl1AAQx36LR7D3u487JctgA5rKfkYNXfCpHYwfKGdbxGCLzB0e7nCQaa7Ten8-GQW1nqvZxxm_D-ntLY0fku3qLN9_JeecpiwRE9NyMsQkSpbOsso8_otW1t7i61iszfKL5EB6tYW9qd4SKR5tHIejbLvk95_jnLa3VPVOJ6F08nOXsKAOUNB-SpOA8D2rcjCszvj-RcH4T7VIEWHz1D2krlt02Lip_7PkCHwASC_Y5bAio9lpKMEKgOVCIhPsZAKEnjUVZvWrT7kyz6M1W9chnlBYmCRATnWQHfjF6_tZqroPieV72g01RKv10B0jBNqcsEIdaXoaz7AUUC6AmUgo938TDS13eK29gwlav8s4ihuXSZ2Xy547ow6sm1AYX9zXz30pw7PKxJ88KTLECD39Fq3lH2498Uk4PgJvU4yGkHUPwQFx0bmDh_4tU53Y7AJyEu3keOpA5AcBaxWkM_hGTe8jXRxzH_ob5yNENs91m8BQcWrQR3HeDdtAG_sk8avPs1hLKU5C4WAXr9Kl38Vu3cKVQY_Iv_MC3dk7bSggvyJAwRSsRf64Tj9rb8cg2V0tQfQJstk6wcyctJ7xeg2iUE5WGJDyKrrNB3AcYSmoRTsYr4MH6itwJm62GT6DNFlBPD5MwZAnk18BJmglAGUu94SpPU5ntQTWl2WiLXVIj09JDS_0ybb8w-DfogCgsWgctmf_Rlb5uZb6hDv_MXsXfDTQrgOslwDW_KT30YFhue5U5EiOQGEcRE0AbgW9rU8itDZx4jhXZVqcOTPo6hlpcDdqi0lvgJ7F3KlHEpz8V61l1aPQ_tHx7Z8i8F9XOyiGFkbJyRbZMJTWlgT5Y2g3xVtA">Italy’s 2017 deal with Libya</a>, for example, was celebrated as a breakthrough in reducing irregular arrivals. By funding the Libyan coast guard to intercept boats and return people to Libya, <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/14564/migrant-arrivals-to-italy-down-80-percent-in-2018">the number of arrivals to Italy plummeted</a> from over 181,000 in 2016 to just 23,000 in 2018.</p><p>But this short-term success came at a high cost. Migrants didn’t stop coming, they simply found new, often more dangerous, routes. People started leaving from less monitored stretches of the Libyan coastline or <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/tunisia/tunisia-isn-t-migrant-transit-country-yet">shifting to Tunisia altogether</a>. By 2018, the death rate per attempted crossing had reached historic highs, with one death for every 20 arrivals, <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-33400-2018-deaths-reach-785#:~:text=Worldwide%2C%20IOM&#39;s%20Missing%20Migrants%20Project,estimated%2039%20people%20remain%20missing.">according to the International Organization for Migration</a>. The year 2018 was crowned the deadliest year on record for the Central Mediterranean route.</p><p>This policy of deterrence and outsourcing also risks the EU’s international image. The more headlines along the lines of “EU deports migrants without regard for human rights and violently pushes them back at borders” we see, the harder it becomes to maintain the bloc’s reputation as a global leader in human rights and the rule of law, or to justify these policies at all.</p><h4>What is the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum?</h4><p>In May 2024, <a href="http://a/">the EU passed a new Pact on Migration and Asylum</a>, which was the first major agreement on the issue in over a decade. After years of failed reforms, <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/767218/EPRS_BRI(2025)767218_EN.pdf#:~:text=The%20pact%20was%20adopted%20by%20the%20European,on%20migration%2C%20asylum%2C%20integration%2C%20and%20border%20management.">the Pact gained momentum</a> in the wake of the 2023 increase in irregular arrivals through the Mediterranean and the Balkans, as well as growing domestic pressure in key member states ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. The rise of far-right parties and <a href="https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/wp105-we-need-to-talk-about-dublin.pdf">ongoing failures of the Dublin Regulation</a> created urgency: do something, or lose public trust.</p><p>This pact is <a href="https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en">meant to accelerate procedures and improve scrutiny and border control</a> in asylum processing. It includes an accelerated procedure for asylum applicants from countries with low recognition rates, which controversially involves fast-track processing at external borders and confinement in collective detention-like facilities for up to 12 weeks. The pact also introduces a “<a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/649344/EPRS_BRI(2020)649344_EN.pdf">solidarity system</a>” to address the shortcomings of the previous Dublin Regulation and forces member states to share responsibility either by receiving asylum applicants or contributing financially to hosting countries.</p><p>The new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, <a href="https://www.migrationsverket.se/en/about-the-swedish-migration-agency/the-swedish-migration-agency-answers/2025/2025-06-18-what-is-the-new-eu-migration-and-asylum-pact-about.html#:~:text=The%20Pact%20will%20apply%20from,safeguarding%20the%20right%20to%20asylum.">set to come into full effect</a> by 2026, codifies many of these trends: accelerated border procedures, expanded detention, and a shift of responsibility to frontline states or third countries. But it offers little in terms of long-term thinking. Even less in terms of solidarity. And almost nothing in terms of adaptation to future climate-induced migration patterns.</p><p>More than 160 NGOs and human rights organizations have labeled the Pact everything from a “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/21/eus-migration-pact-disaster-migrants-and-asylum-seekers">disaster</a>” to “<a href="https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/mix-and-match-detention-de-facto-detention-or-just-restrictions-of-freedom-of-movement-in-the-new-pact/#:~:text=The%20RCD%20contains%20special%20rules,allowed%20in%20these%20specific%20situations.">de facto detention camps.</a>” Their main argument is that fast-track procedures and containment might reduce visible arrivals, but at the cost of worsening human suffering and expanding <a href="https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-maze-of-legal-support-in-the-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20Screening%20Regulation,national%20has%20already%20been%20returned.">legal black holes at Europe’s borders</a>.</p><p>EU institutions and several governments have defended the Pact as a long-overdue structural fix. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called it a “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Pact_on_Migration_and_Asylum">huge achievement</a>,” while Germany’s Olaf Scholz described it as “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/07/german-chancellor-olaf-scholz-agrees-historic-stricter-migration-policy">historic</a>” for managing migration pressure. Still, not everyone is on board. Frontline states like Italy, Greece, Spain, and Malta <a href="https://tesi.luiss.it/31428/1/088202_GASPARINI_AGNESE.pdf">have expressed concerns</a> that the Pact may leave them disproportionately burdened, especially if third-country cooperation fails. Clearly, the Pact’s implementation won’t be as easy as signing a few documents in Brussels.</p><h4>What is the futue of climate migration in the EU?</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*J5fukAcuO06zqKk_" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@kommumikation?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Mika Baumeister</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Climate change is accelerating. Conflicts are escalating. Governance gaps are becoming wider. And all three are interacting in ways that create new migration pressure. So far, the policy response has been largely reactive. In practice, this means stricter border controls, externalization deals, expanded detention capacity, and a heavy emphasis on fast returns.</p><p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.nrdc.org/stories/what-are-effects-climate-change">climate science is clear</a>: more displacement is coming. And not just from conflict zones. More people will be uprooted by floods, by drought, by famine, by the disappearance of farmland and the collapse of infrastructure. The impacts will be uneven across the world, but they will be felt inside Europe, too. Not just at the borders, but in labor markets, in food systems, in energy grids, and in the political discourse.</p><p>Even <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025SC0162#:~:text=It%20also%20puts%20additional%20pressure,of%20other%20Member%20States)%2084%20.">the European Commission projects</a> that the EU will need around one million migrants annually just to sustain its workforce and avoid economic contraction. Puglia is a case in point: crops rot without workers, and migrants working in the fields are doing so under conditions that would be illegal in almost any other context.</p><p>These same workers, who are <a href="https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl2616/files/2018-07/Tomorrows-World-of-Migration-and-Mobility.pdf">described in policy only as “economic migrants” or “irregular entrants,”</a> are holding up entire sectors of European economies. Many are also fleeing systems that climate change has helped collapse. The EU cannot afford to treat these pressures as separate or temporary.</p><p><a href="https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-09/climat_mission_implementation_plan_final_for_publication.pdf">The EU’s own adaptation strategy</a> must begin with something basic: funding the collection of disaggregated, climate-linked migration data across its institutions. Without it, policymakers don’t even have the tools to anticipate where people will move, when, and why. It also means introducing scientific expertise into every level of decision-making. In Greece, for example, <a href="https://www.athenarc.gr/en/information-management-systems-institute/projects/flagship-initiative-climate-change#:~:text=Climpact%20is%20a%20flagship%20initiative%20on%20climate,measurements%20from%20relevant%20national%20infrastructures%20in%20Greece.">the CLIMPACT project</a> brings together universities and public agencies to translate climate projections into sectoral risk assessments to inform everything from crop planning to flood management. Migration policy deserves the same integration of evidence.</p><p>But evidence alone isn’t enough. Political will must follow. This is where the intersection of climate, conflict, and governance becomes unavoidable. These crises do not operate separately, and EU responses cannot either. <a href="https://epthinktank.eu/2025/01/23/understanding-eu-humanitarian-action/#:~:text=Since%20the%20creation%20of%20its,and%20environment%2Dsensitive%20approaches%2C%20among">It is no longer sustainable for humanitarian aid</a>, development, migration, and climate policies to operate independently, so the cooperation between European institutions on a regional level is inevitable.</p><p>Adam didn’t arrive in Italy looking for suffering. He came to survive. But survival shouldn’t look like this. “It’s suffocating,” he said. No shade. No water. No future.</p><p><em>The truth is: people like Adam are our future neighbors, workers, caregivers, and friends. And how we treat them says more about the EU than it does about migration.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=72a2b17ea2ea" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/deepercuts/why-eus-migration-strategy-is-failing-72a2b17ea2ea">Why EU’s Migration Strategy is Failing</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/deepercuts">Moving Europe</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Discrimination against Syrian Migrants in Istanbul: What Temporary Protection Looks Like 14 Years…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/deepercuts/discrimination-against-syrian-migrants-in-istanbul-what-temporary-protection-looks-like-14-years-a6779a4388ea?source=rss----9022ca98b4eb---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a6779a4388ea</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[migration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[human-rights]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[julianawrites]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 24 Jun 2025 14:31:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-29T22:43:47.778Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Discrimination against Syrian Migrants in Istanbul: What Temporary Protection Looks Like 14 Years Later</h3><p><em>In January 2025, we visited Istanbul and spoke with one of the many Syrian migrants living in the city. We had the opportunity to ask them about their life as a refugee in Istanbul, years after the Syrian conflict began. (Big thanks to </em><a href="https://www.instagram.com/niss.0a?igsh=eWQxNXozeHIzemRy"><em>Nissa</em></a><em> for doing this with me ❤️)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*mfzvySQi8FO3wptl" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@_guneyakin?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Güney Akın</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><blockquote><strong>“The Turkish people thought we were tourists. They didn’t know we were running from war.”</strong></blockquote><p>Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria in 2011, <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis-explained/#:~:text=outside%20the%20country.-,Where%20do%20Syrian%20refugees%20live?,of%20Syrian%20refugees:%202.8%20million.">over 3.5 million Syrian immigrants have found refuge in neighboring Türkiye</a>, making it the largest refugee population in the world compared to the host country’s population. But it has been a long time since Syrians were welcomed as guests. In fact, they weren’t even officially considered refugees. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/17/magazine/syrians-turkey-return.html">Ankara decided</a> to give them a less permanent status, calling them “guests” under a system of temporary protection. The key word here is, of course, <em>temporary</em>. The message was clear: “We’re happy to welcome you, but sooner or later, you’ll have to leave.”</p><p>This status has caused long-term harm to Syrian refugees. As the war dragged on for years, the “temporary” label became harder to justify. Recent earthquakes, economic problems, a collapsing currency, the authoritarian shift of the current government, and the impact of COVID-19 all took a toll on Turkish society. In turn, tensions with Syrians grew. <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/turkeys-refugee-dilemma/">Many Turks began to see</a> Syrians not as guests, but as competitors for housing, jobs, and resources.</p><p>Violence, discrimination, and property damage against Syrians <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/46835/antisyrian-sentiment-grows-in-turkey-following-earthquake">have become more frequent</a>. Many locals blame Syrians for their own hardships and the lack of social cohesion. While the known attacks are shocking and sometimes deadly, the true scale of the violence may be <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/12/turkey-news-log-jan-12#:~:text=The%20murder%20of%20Nail%20al,against%20refugees%20in%20the%20country.&amp;text=Istanbul%2C%20Turkey%20%E2%80%93%20Turkish%20police%20have,he%20died%20later%20that%20night.">much greater</a>, since many refugees are too afraid to report incidents. At the same time, the Turkish government continues to impose new restrictions on them.</p><p>Istanbul now hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees, with more than <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8332-syrian-refugees-in-istanbul-and-gaziantep-comparative-findings-on-settlement#:~:text=Istanbul%20has%20a%20population%20of,included%20%C5%9Eahinbey%20and%20%C5%9Eehitkemal%20districts.">500,000 registered individuals</a>, after the camps reached full capacity. For many, especially those without family ties in other regions, Istanbul offered better job prospects and more anonymity. Still, with a large refugee population and economic pressure, <a href="https://islamic-relief.org/news/still-we-stand-11-years-of-strength-and-survival-in-syria/#:~:text=At%20least%2050%25%20of%20the%20working%20age,their%20(%20Syrian%20Arab%20Republic%20)%20families">finding work became a challenge</a> for over 50% of Syrian refugees. Housing was an issue for about 35%. Rising rents, limited availability, and poor living conditions also became serious concerns.</p><p><strong>One of the people living through this reality is Saeed, a 57-year-old Syrian man in Istanbul. He has lived in Türkiye for seven years and faces the same legal, economic, and social challenges as many other Syrians in the country.</strong></p><h3>A Stolen Future</h3><p>Like many others, Saeed came to Türkiye hoping the war in Syria would end quickly. Instead, he found himself stuck in Türkiye, with the only alternative being going back to a country in ruins. “We thought we’d go home in a few months,” he said. “But the war kept going, and our city was destroyed.”</p><p>The country’s GDP <a href="https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2025-02/undp-sy-seia-final-24022025_compressed.pdf">has virtually collapsed</a>, with inflation over 30 times higher than pre-war levels in 2011. Syria went from being a middle-income country to one where almost all Syrians live below the poverty line defined by the <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099051624114042163/pdf/P1787061921ca30fc187161b7d84a5e4532.pdf">World Bank</a>. Two-thirds of the population live in extreme poverty. These factors make it impossible for most Syrians to return home, even after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.</p><p>Since December 2024, <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/64070/more-and-more-syrians-leave-turkey-to-return-home-amid-uncertainty#:~:text=More%20and%20more%20Syrians%20leave%20Turkey%20to%20return%20home%20amid%20uncertainty,-Published%20on%20%3A%202025&amp;text=Over%20175%2C000%20Syrians%20have%20reportedly,2024%2C%20according%20to%20official%20figures.">only 175,000 Syrian refugees</a> have returned to Syria from Türkiye. Most refugees will stay in Türkiye until the country becomes stable enough economically, and until they have a home or anything to return to. However, that will take billions of dollars in economic restoration before conditions become livable again.</p><p>Reconstruction is limited, basic infrastructure is missing, and large regions are still controlled by non-state armed groups. For many refugees, the idea of returning is not just emotional, it’s impossible. As Saeed explained, “Even if I gain citizenship somewhere else, nothing replaces your home. Of course, I would go back, but only if there is real safety.” That safety, he added, “still doesn’t exist today. The state has no full control, armed groups are everywhere, and there’s chaos.” Until that changes, return is not an option.</p><h3>Living in Uncertainty</h3><p>Until a chance to return presents itself, most Syrians will be stuck in refugee camps, big cities, or <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/28/syrians-face-dire-conditions-turkish-occupied-safe-zone">Tel Abyad</a>, a remote Turkish-occupied region in northern Syria where humanitarian conditions are dire. Despite being chosen by over 500,000 Syrian refugees, Istanbul is still not entirely safe for many Syrians who choose to live there, especially since their “temporary protection” status instead of a “refugee” status has become a limitation.</p><p><a href="https://help.unhcr.org/poland/accessing-international-protection/#:~:text=What%20is%20International%20Protection?,apply%20for%20international%20protection%20there.">Being recognized as a refugee</a> generally comes with certain international protections, such as legal residency, access to social services, the right to work, and safeguards against forced return. These help displaced individuals begin to rebuild their lives with some stability. However, most Syrians in Türkiye are not formally recognized as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Instead, they are classified under a status called “<a href="https://www.asileproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/D5.2_WP5-Turkey-Country-Report-Final.pdf">temporary protection,</a>” which provides only limited rights and can be revoked at any time. While this status offers basic protections like access to emergency healthcare and education, finding formal employment or secure housing becomes extremely difficult without full residency status, and many are pushed into informal labor markets or overcrowded, unstable living situations.</p><h3>A New Kind of Agression</h3><p>Saeed looked surprised when we asked about life in Türkiye. “The Turkish people, may God reward them, have given us safety. That’s something no other Arab country offered us. Türkiye opened its doors, provided work opportunities, and allowed us to rebuild our lives. We had to rely on ourselves, of course, but at least we were given the chance.”</p><p>He added that even here, his movements are limited. “I can’t go beyond certain areas of Istanbul,” he said. He turned in his seat and pointed out the window, gesturing toward a neighboring building. “I can’t rent there.” His hand moved toward a small park. “We can’t go past the park.” He explained that there are entire neighborhoods where Syrians are simply not allowed to live. “At first, the Turks thought we were tourists. That’s why they welcomed us.” Then, he added, “Now they’re making our lives hell.”</p><figure><img alt="Saeed’s storefront on a narrow street in Istanbul, with shelves of goods visible through the open entrance." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KuZhg5yX1nML8onHXJFzQA.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong><em>Saeed’s storefront on a narrow street in Istanbul, with shelves of goods visible through the open entrance.</em></strong></figcaption></figure><p>The legal issues are not the only ones Syrian refugees in Istanbul have to struggle with. One of the biggest reasons Syrians don’t feel welcome anymore is the gradual shift in public perception of them. Violent acts and discriminatory comments against Syrian refugees <a href="https://www.google.by/search?source=hp&amp;btnG=%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BA&amp;q=Violent+acts+and+discriminatory+comments+against+Syrian+refugees+became+more+prevalent+in+recent+years%2C+especially+with+their+heavy+use+by+political+parties+in+the+2023+elections.&amp;oq=%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BA+%D0%B2%D0%BA%D0%BB%D1%8E%D1%87%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%8C+%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BA&amp;gs_l=psy-ab.3.1.0l10.11129.28680.0.31058.56.31.25.0.0.0.152.3439.3j27.30.0....0...1.1.64.psy-ab..1.55.3720...0i131k1j0i10i1i42k1j0i10i1k1j0i10k1j0i22i10i30k1j0i22i30k1.0.GJL181ai13c">became more prevalent</a> in recent years, especially with their heavy use by political parties in the 2023 elections. Turkish authorities have now <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/violent-rise-anti-syrian-racism-turkey#:~:text=Turkish%20authorities%20have%20now%20stopped,at%20camps%20near%20the%20border.">stopped issuing <em>kimlik</em> cards</a>, which grant Syrian refugees legal protections, entitle them to move freely within Turkish territory, and make them eligible to receive all Turkish government services. They have also been detaining refugees at camps near the border.</p><p>Violent attacks, and specifically mob violence, against Syrian refugees have also increased in recent years, especially in densely populated areas like Istanbul. In June 2022, <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/violent-rise-anti-syrian-racism-turkey">two racist murders</a> shook the community. Sultan Abdel Baset Jabneh was stabbed to death in front of his shop in the Taksim district of Istanbul, and Sherif Khaled al-Ahmad was shot and killed by a group of young Turkish men.</p><h3>A Search for Options</h3><p>Saeed told me about his son, whom he had sent to Germany when he was 13. “We were desperate,” he said. The boy, now around 17 or 18, has a medical condition. “He needed treatment,” Saeed explained. “It wasn’t an easy decision, but we had no other choice.”</p><p>For some Syrian refugees in Türkiye, especially in urban areas like Istanbul, their sights are set even further, toward migrating to the EU. During 2015 and 2016, an unprecedented influx of more than <a href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6992858/#:~:text=Syrian%20asylum%20seekers%20who%20arrived,people%20per%20day%20%5B13%5D.">750,000 Syrian asylum seekers</a> went from Türkiye to Western Europe by using the Balkans route. Organizers of human trafficking confiscate their money by cheating migrants and put their lives in danger by cramming too many people into boats using unsafe methods. Syrian asylum seekers trying to enter Europe can die during this journey. In fact, <a href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6992858/#:~:text=Syrian%20asylum%20seekers%20who%20arrived,people%20per%20day%20%5B13%5D.">it has been observed</a> that those who choose to emigrate to Europe often have higher levels of education, lower income status, and worse physical conditions in their home country.</p><p>When asked if he had ever planned to go to Europe himself, Saeed replied, “Honestly, we were thinking of going back to Syria, back when we hoped Assad would fall.” But that plan changed. “I’m from a place called Deir ez-Zor. The situation there has only gotten worse. The destruction is total. The region isn’t controlled by the central Syrian government. It’s under the control of the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces). The current Syrian regime isn’t paying attention to Deir ez-Zor or its people. People there are still living in fear, in extreme poverty, and without basic necessities, especially during winter.”</p><h3>Still Waiting for Stability</h3><p>Over the past two years, life has grown more difficult for Syrians in Türkiye. Many have lived in the country for over a decade, sent their children to Turkish schools and universities, and built lives in cities like Istanbul, Gaziantep, and Sanliurfa. Still, most work in informal jobs with low pay, no insurance, and no protections.</p><p>The Turkish government <a href="https://www.fmreview.org/return/sahinmencutek/">has spoken about returns</a>. But experts warn that pushing Syrians to return too quickly could hurt the economy and ignore the lack of infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and jobs waiting for them in Syria.</p><p><a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis-explained/]">Across the region</a>, more than 6 million Syrian refugees remain in neighboring countries, and over 7 million are displaced inside Syria. Although Assad’s fall in late 2024 shifted political dynamics, <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/where-we-work/countries/syrian-arab-republic">UNHCR maintains</a> that Syria is not yet safe for mass returns. Most refugees say they want to return eventually, but only when conditions improve.</p><p>Some countries have started allowing <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/allow-syrians-to-go-back-for-short-visits-eu-activists-say/a-71235829">short visits to Syria</a> without revoking refugee status. Others, <a href="https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/middle-east/jordan#:~:text=2.3%20Grounds%20for%20administrative%20migration%2Drelated%20detention.&amp;text=In%20Jordan%2C%20however%2C%20immigration%20infractions,law%20does%20not%20specify%20this.">like Jordan</a>, have blocked re-entry for those who leave. Still, even under optimistic forecasts, millions of Syrians are expected to remain in host countries. Türkiye, like others, must now decide how to balance political pressures with economic realities and how to manage the future of a refugee population that is no longer temporary.</p><p>Later, Saeed spoke about returning. “There’s nothing better than home,” he said. He would go back, even without electricity or water, if there were peace. But Syria, he added, “is not free.” Ongoing violence and foreign involvement mean it is still not safe.</p><p>As we spoke, a customer walked up, and Saeed stood to help right away. Like many displaced people, he still carries the responsibility to keep working, for his family and for his future. Before we left, Saeed offered tea, a few small gifts, and a Syrian flag. When we tried to pay, he shook his head. “This is a gift,” he said.</p><p><strong>He invited us to return. And I know we will.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a6779a4388ea" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/deepercuts/discrimination-against-syrian-migrants-in-istanbul-what-temporary-protection-looks-like-14-years-a6779a4388ea">Discrimination against Syrian Migrants in Istanbul: What Temporary Protection Looks Like 14 Years…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/deepercuts">Moving Europe</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Europe’s Migration Problem Isn’t Migration]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/deepercuts/europes-migration-problem-isn-t-migration-166ff2d538c3?source=rss----9022ca98b4eb---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/166ff2d538c3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[migration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[julianawrites]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Jan 2025 08:22:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-16T21:37:31.933Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*NRYPFf8jM34qijpD" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@christianlue?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Christian Lue</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><blockquote><strong>What is Europe?</strong></blockquote><p>An answer to this question depends on both who and when you ask it. From decades of shared history, culture, and ideals to its current position on the international stage as an economic powerhouse and a unique political experiment, Europe remains fundamentally a place that thrives on constant change—the movement of ideas, goods, and, yes, people.</p><p>The European Union has always been a unique place because of its diversity and a strong social contract between the governing bodies and their citizens. Centuries of political and economic unrest in the region, wars, and Europe’s troublesome colonial past—which still casts a dark shadow over former colonies—taught Europe one thing: collaboration, rather than conflict, is the only way forward.</p><h4><strong>Europe’s Promises and Challenges</strong></h4><p>The European Union came out of necessity. Centuries of war, economic crises, and reconfiguration of borders had left Europe ravaged and vulnerable. Following the devastations of World War II, Europeans desperately needed peace and security. This desperation led to the creation of a common institution that vowed to uphold mutual accountability for peace, prosperity, and the fundamental rights of all citizens. They were guaranteed universal healthcare, fair labor laws, and strong social welfare programs—commitments that the EU has pledged to prioritize.</p><p>In 2022, the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Social_protection_statistics_-_social_benefits#:~:text=update%3A%20November%202025.-,Highlights,health%20care%20function%20with%2030%25.">EU spent about €4.3 trillion</a> on social protection benefits, which constitutes 26.9% of its GDP, compared to a <a href="https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/WSPDB.action?id=42">global average</a> of 12.9%. In fact, the EU accounts for over 50% of global <a href="https://fullfact.org/europe/does-europe-account-half-worlds-welfare-spending/">social welfare spending</a>, despite its citizens making up only about 5.6% of the global population. This is one of many reasons why the EU has become such a popular destination for migrants. At the same time, migration has become a particularly touchy subject for many European host countries.</p><p>And thus, the demands on the EU’s social systems and migration policies have been increasing over the years, leaving it with two options: adapt or risk falling behind.</p><h4>A Complicated History of Migration in Europe</h4><p>Nowadays, the European Union is facing many issues, from corrupt politicians and environmental concerns to aging populations and economic stagnation, but no other issue graces the headlines of local news media as often as migration does. In recent years, the issue of migration has resulted in tightened border policies and populist rhetoric that portrays migrants as a threat to the EU. However, is migration really the problem of the European Union?</p><p>Migration in Europe is nothing new. However, it wasn’t until the 18th and 19th centuries that mass migration in Europe began on a scale and intensity that was unprecedented. Some estimate that between 1846 and 1924, over <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46n2qg.6?seq=1">65 million Europeans emigrated</a> out of Europe, primarily into the US, Brazil, Argentina, and Canada. At the same time, the nineteenth century was marked by a mass intra-European migration from rural areas into bigger cities, influenced primarily by the industrial revolution. Factories and industries in urban centers created a demand for large numbers of workers, which drew millions from rural areas. Some of the largest European cities (Manchester, Paris, etc.) saw explosive population growth with agriculture workers looking for stable, higher-paying factory jobs.</p><p>Previous to the 19th century, migration was too slow, risky, and expensive for most Europeans. With no transportation options, Europeans could not afford to migrate or seek better job opportunities elsewhere. The invention of steamships made transatlantic travel more affordable and faster. A journey from Europe to America that once took weeks could now be completed in days. Some European governments and companies even subsidized the passage of workers for migration purposes.</p><p>However, most importantly, the 19th century was unique because of its unprecedented level of freedom of movement. Unlike today, with strict visa requirements and border controls, policies in the 19th century were far more relaxed, and migration was largely unregulated. People could travel between regions or countries without needing a passport or visa, especially before modern nation-states and centralized borders were established.</p><h4><strong>The Interwar Period and the Birth of Immigration Controls</strong></h4><p>The aftermath of World War I significantly impacted Europe: the redrawing of borders and the creation of new nation-states resulted in the displacement of millions of people. The economic downturn, not only in Europe but in the U.S. and South America, led to widespread unemployment and poverty. This troubling state of the European economy fueled continent-wide anti-immigrant sentiments: migrants became the scapegoats for the region’s economic problems, while citizens struggled with their own hardships. In response, many European countries introduced restrictive immigration laws, such as quotas and work permits, to protect domestic labor markets.</p><blockquote><strong>“The age of free movement was over, and suddenly there was paperwork— because nothing says progress like queuing for a stamp.”</strong></blockquote><p>People readily blamed migrants, particularly those from poorer regions of Europe, for the weak labor market. Passports, visa requirements, and quota policies, introduced for the first time in European history, forever changed the turbulent relationship between Europe and migration.</p><p>To this day, these policies, shaped by political ideologies and economic pressure, continue to inform many debates within the European Union on managing migration—for better or for worse.</p><h4><strong>From Migrants to Guest Workers</strong></h4><p>From the interwar period and the aftermath of World War II, known as the “age of refugees,” to the late 1940s when <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-review-of-social-history/article/becoming-a-continent-of-immigration-charting-europes-migration-history-19192019/2D432566BDC4FF3CC824E277A7885D04">Europe entered the “age of immigration,”</a> the continent transitioned from being a region defined by emigration to becoming one of immigration.</p><p>During the post-war economic recovery, Western Europe (Germany and France) opened its borders to labor migrants, primarily through guest worker programs. These countries heavily relied on workers from Southern Europe, Turkey, and North Africa to rebuild their economies. Originally intended to be temporary, these programs resulted, in most cases, in permanent settlement, as temporary workers eventually relocated their families to the host countries. The need for extra labor to rebuild the European economy resulted in relaxed migration policies and made it possible for many workers to move in search of better living conditions and wages.</p><p>However, in the 1970s, the oil crisis and rising unemployment forced many European countries to halt labor migration and shift their focus to managing asylum seekers and family reunification. During this period, they reintroduced strict entry conditions and migration quotas. By the late 20th century, globalization and the Schengen Agreement facilitated freer movement within the European Union for member states, while migration from the so-called “third countries” became subject to increasingly restrictive measures.</p><blockquote><strong>“Europe’s migration policies have always been a bit like its weather: unpredictable.”</strong></blockquote><p>This incredible diversion in migration policies is similar to the trend we see today: while intra-European migration has become easier through, e.g., the Schengen Agreement, the EU struggles to manage immigrants from outside the EU.</p><h4><strong>The 21st Century Migration Debate</strong></h4><p>Before discussing current migration policies in the EU any further, it’s important to emphasize that numerous disagreements exist both within the EU and globally regarding the definition of “migrant’” or “immigrant.” These disagreements have resulted in stagnation in European migration policymaking, but that’s a topic for another article. Going forward, however, a migrant is defined as any non-EU citizen who lives in the EU for the purposes of this article.</p><p>Exactly why the EU became such a popular destination for migration and immigration is a far more complicated question. According to <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en">Eurostat</a>, however, for most third-country citizens arriving in the EU, the reasons are usually family links, work opportunities, and asylum. In 2023, the <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en">European Union reported</a> a population of over 448.8 million, with 27.3 million, or 6% of the total, being non-EU citizens. This number is higher than the <a href="https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/msite/wmr-2024-interactive/">global average</a>, which sits at around 3.6%. However, this is still much less than some of the world’s largest economies, like the <a href="https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2024/demo/acsbr-019.pdf">U.S. with a 13.9% (2022)</a> foreign-born population and <a href="https://www.statista.com/topics/2917/immigration-in-canada/">Canada with an even larger 20% (2023) portion</a> of the population being non-Canadian citizens.</p><p>The year 2015 became a turning point in Europe’s migration history, as the continent faced one of its largest influxes of migrants and refugees since World War II. <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global-migration-and-demography/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/">Over 1.3 million people</a> applied for asylum in the European Union, fleeing war, persecution, and poverty, primarily from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.</p><p>The sudden influx of migrants exposed weaknesses in the EU’s migration and asylum systems. <a href="https://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/bitstreams/299d3608-da4f-4ba6-9792-305d6ffd5de0/download">David Scott Fitzgerald argues</a> that rich democracies, including the EU, have systematically blocked legal pathways to safety through an “architecture of repulsion.” Fitzgerald draws comparisons with “medieval metaphors of cages, doems, buffers, moats, and barbicans to create a visible system of remote control that does much more to keep out refugees than the more obvious border walls.”</p><p>Nevertheless, migration policies in the EU have significantly improved since the beginning of the 20th century. Nowadays, the EU allocates billions to integration programs to support migrants in learning local languages, finding employment, and even assisted deportation. Still, the current migration policies are far from perfect, and only with serious changes will they be able to treat all migrants approaching European borders with the dignity and respect they deserve.</p><h4>Europe’s Missed Opportunities</h4><p>Arguably one of the most influential EU policies on migration remains the Dublin Regulation, which states that the country of first entry is responsible for processing asylum applications. Originally, it was introduced to prevent “asylum shopping,” where applicants can apply for protection in multiple countries and rely on the variability of conditions for asylum in different European countries. While this sounds reasonable in theory, it has a disproportionate impact on border countries (Italy, Greece, and Spain), which are the primary entry points for migrants arriving by sea or land.</p><p>Transfers between states under Dublin rules are time-consuming and sometimes do not occur at all. In 2023, <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en">only 13% of accepted Dublin requests</a> resulted in actual transfers, despite case approval rates of 74%.</p><p><a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-migration-policy/eu-migration-asylum-reform-pact/asylum-migration-management/">In May 2024</a>, the EU recognized the obvious disadvantages of such a policy and adopted the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMMR), set to replace the Dublin III Regulation. The new regulation establishes a solidarity mechanism in which all member states share equal responsibility for asylum seekers. <a href="https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/voluntary-solidarity-mechanism-5000-asylum-seekers-relocated-ahead-mechanisms-transition-new-2024-06-14_en">By June 2024</a>, relocation of over 5,000 asylum seekers to other European countries had already taken place, removing them from the frontlines of suffering.</p><p>The controversial aspect of this new policy, however, is that countries may opt to provide financial support instead of accepting relocated migrants. For a “small fee” of €20,000 per non-relocated individual, each member state can buy their way out of accepting migrants and avoid responsibility for them. The money, of course, would go to the “lucky” country that accepts these migrants.</p><p>When it comes to migration in Europe, there’s no shortage of spending—just not always in the right places. In 2023, Frontex, the EU’s main border and coast guard agency, <a href="https://prd.frontex.europa.eu/document/annual-accounts-2023/">received a whopping €837 million</a>, making it one of the most well-funded agencies in the EU. This is nearly a 20-fold increase compared to its budget in 2006. What does the money go toward? Well, nothing too extreme—only high-tech surveillance drones, patrol ships, and thousands of security personnel.</p><p>Meanwhile, programs that help migrants integrate into society—language classes, job training, and housing support—remain underfunded. The Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund (AMIF), which supports integration programs across the EU, <a href="https://medium.com/r?url=https%3A%2F%2Fhome-affairs.ec.europa.eu%2Ffunding%2Fasylum-migration-and-integration-funds%2Fasylum-migration-and-integration-fund-2021-2027_en">will receive approximately €9.88 billion</a> for the entire bloc between 2021 and 2027. While this sum seems substantial, its distribution across 27 countries leaves limited funds for significant outcomes in each member state.</p><blockquote>“These funds [AMIF] will help Member States whose return systems are under pressure, by increasing their capacity building and supporting voluntary returns.”</blockquote><blockquote>— <a href="https://brusselssignal.eu/2024/10/eu-to-give-members-e25-million-to-boost-migrant-voluntary-returns/">European Commision, 2024</a></blockquote><p>AMIF’s structure is divided into <a href="https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/funding/asylum-migration-and-integration-funds/asylum-migration-and-integration-fund-2021-2027_en">two funding channels</a>. A majority (63.5%) is allocated through shared management, where Member States design and implement national programs based on their specific needs. The remainder is directly managed by the European Commission, with a focus on transnational actions, emergency responses, and capacity-building efforts. Thus, even with limited funds available, the specific programs and policies implemented with the help of AMIF funds are largely determined by individual Member States. When anti-migration rhetoric dominates in certain Member States, the funds can be directed toward policies or programs that align with restrictive or exclusionary migration agendas over the inclusive and integrative goals outlined by the EU.</p><p>It’s clear by now that Europe has invested heavily in keeping migrants out but is hesitant to spend on helping those who make it in. Integration programs don’t just help migrants; they benefit entire economies by giving migrants a chance to contribute to the host country’s economy. <a href="https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2017-03/Finding-their-Way-Germany.pdf?">A survey</a> by the OECD and the Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry found in 2017 that good German language skills are absolutely necessary for employment. 50% of employers require at least good proficiency for low-skilled jobs, and this demand rises to over 90% for medium-skilled positions.</p><blockquote><strong>“The EU got locks for its doors but clearly forgot the furniture.”</strong></blockquote><p>A popular belief, dating back to the interwar period and still circulating today, is that immigrants are “stealing jobs” from citizens—an idea that has recently resurfaced in coincidence with high youth unemployment. <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en">In 2022</a>, however, the employment rate in the EU among working-age people (20–64) was higher for EU citizens (76.2%) compared to non-EU citizens (63.1%). Furthermore, it’s important to understand that non-Europeans mostly hold “essential positions,” meaning those that are critical to keeping society running and are underrepresented among the citizens of the host country.</p><p>In Germany alone, as of 2023, <a href="https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/en/press/2024-19-nursing-staff-in-germany-mostly-female-part-time-and-in-more-demand-than-ever-before">over 16% of nurses</a> and <a href="https://schengen.news/germanys-healthcare-staff-shortage-crisis-to-further-deepen-without-foreign-doctors/">12% of doctors</a> working are foreign nationals, and the country is open about their dependence on this critical source of labor. Furthermore, it is not a myth that immigrants benefit the economy; studies show that over their lifetime, immigrants in Europe pay significantly more in taxes than they receive in social benefits. According to research conducted between 2014 and 2018, migrants were net contributors to the EU’s public finances. In fact, they contributed about <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10797-023-09787-9">€1,510 more per capita</a> than native-born people.</p><h4>A Better Way Forward</h4><p>Migration today is not what it used to be. The absence of modern welfare systems in the 19th century meant that governments bore a smaller financial burden from migration. Migration now affects not only labor markets but also healthcare, housing, and education, which makes it a far more structured and complicated process. This is especially true in Europe, where half of the world’s social welfare benefit budget is spent. This social contract between the EU and its citizens makes migration policies in Europe uniquely serious—and uniquely difficult.</p><p>Misinformation and mismanagement are the two most serious issues facing EU migration management today. Fortunately, both can be fixed. Europe spends billions on border control and does not provide sufficient funding for social integration efforts, which are often left to NGOs and the benevolence of local communities. In most cases, this creates a bottleneck for the migrants: they arrive but are left without any means to succeed in a new environment—a problem that can be fixed through reallocations of funds towards language training, skills development, and housing programs.</p><p>It’s also no secret that much of the anti-immigrant sentiment isn’t based on facts. This is largely due to the rise of populist parties across Europe, which has had a significant impact on public perception and policymaking regarding migration.</p><p>In Austria’s recent parliamentary elections held on September 29, 2024, the far-right Freedom Party (FPO), founded by a former Nazi SS officer, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Austrian_legislative_election">received 28.8% of the votes</a>. Similarly, in France, the far-right Rassemblement National (RN) <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2024/06/09/2024-european-elections-far-right-rassemblement-national-achieves-historic-success_6674319_5.html">received 31.4% of the votes</a> in the European elections, with <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2024/06/13/european-elections-how-the-migration-issue-influenced-the-french-vote_6674612_7.html">43% citing immigration</a> as a deciding factor. The impact of such rhetoric can be seen in policy shifts within countries such as Sweden, which has moved away from its liberal migration stance. <a href="https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3167/?">Under the influence of the hard-right Sweden Democrats</a>, the country has tightened migration policies and reversed its migration rate, for better or worse.</p><p>In the end, one thing is clear: migration isn’t going away; it’s an essential part of the globalized world, so a shift in the narrative is not only expected but almost unavoidable: <strong>migrants are an opportunity, not a threat.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/200/0*M3pIcyR5tVyshOXC.gif" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=166ff2d538c3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/deepercuts/europes-migration-problem-isn-t-migration-166ff2d538c3">Europe’s Migration Problem Isn’t Migration</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/deepercuts">Moving Europe</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>