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        <title><![CDATA[Digital Gamma Blog - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stuff we are thinking about. Markets. Crypto. Coding. - Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog?source=rss----d446d4ef26d1---4</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Review of The Volatility Machine by Michael Pettis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/review-of-the-volatility-engine-by-michael-pettis-fb46fd0ace72?source=rss----d446d4ef26d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fb46fd0ace72</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ari Pine]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Mar 2022 23:53:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-02T00:38:31.168Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*lBsbWo5AOy4xkQhn" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@kellysikkema?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Kelly Sikkema</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>by Ari Pine</em></p><p>Michael Pettis wrote The Volatility Machine 20 years ago as I write this in 2022. Many finance books are focused on a narrow subject that may be applicable for a certain time, regime, or market. Pettis analyzed and wrote a long term historical perspective to apply an overall framework for thinking about crises in Emerging Market economies. He accomplished what he set out to do. He built his framework from a combination of first principles and empirical data. Therefore, we can take from his writing a more general set of principles applicable across markets and time.</p><p>Pettis starts with a few big, fundamental ideas that individually and together do an excellent job explaining emerging market economic dynamics — swinging between expansion and crisis. In addition, they transfer well to other markets. An additional aspect is that these ideas can by used as criteria to suggest that certain markets are emerging markets (or emerging market style) even though they are not necessarily widely considered as such.</p><p>Pettis’s big, fundamental ideas:</p><ol><li>Price and volatility dynamics of crises are not determined by traders making rational decisions about value. Instead, they are pre-determined by legal-contractual obligations put into place long before any crisis occurs. Those obligations dictate the actions of key market participants by forcing liquidations.</li><li>Expansion of emerging market economies is determined <strong>primarily</strong> by liquidity flows emanating from the major global capital centers. Likewise, contraction and crisis occur when liquidity contracts and withdraws back to those capital centers.</li><li>Funding via both equity and debt includes embedded optionality. The nature of the funding, the pricing of the securities, and the market conditions domestically and abroad, dictate whether long or short convexity dominates for investors.</li><li>Risk management is not about a failure to predict an outcome. It is about having a neutral outlook and, for corporate and sovereign issuers, creating a capital market structure design so that one is not subject to catastrophe.</li><li>Emerging markets are not crippled by crisis, Instead, they are crippled from a sustained drought of incoming capital investment that occurs when the crisis is not handled properly.</li><li>Catastrophe occurs when the combination of money outflow causes asset price decline, leading to currency decline, leading to forced selling on the part of investors, and the corporate sector.</li></ol><p>These key observations / hypotheses lead to important implications:</p><ol><li>Good policy is not the cause of expansion; crisis is not caused by bad policy.</li><li>Sovereign policy makers should focus on the fact that their economy is being impacted by forces outside their control. Therefore, they should realize that their policy is not at fault, and that they should plan for a neutral outcome.</li><li>Debt issuance should focus on laddered maturities and extending duration of bond issuance.</li><li>Debt issuance should be in local currency as it is correlated with the economic fortunes of the nation. Another way of putting this is “outlook neutral”. It aligns the fortunes of the investor/creditor with that of the nation and functions a bit like equity where both investor and issuer outcomes are tied together. Although it costs more initially to issue, Pettis shows that the real cost shows up during crisis when non-local debt causes a vicious downward spiral. And over time, eliminating that tail event reduces the overall cost of debt.</li><li>Planning should accommodate boom-bust cycles and crises so that foreign investment returns as soon as possible.</li></ol><p>The ultimate point for sovereign issuers is:</p><ol><li>Avoid being put into a position to get forced into selling local currency to raise foreign reserves at inopportune times.</li><li>There are not good bankruptcy/default procedures for sovereigns, and this delays capital from flowing back into the country — which is the key to moving beyond the crisis.</li><li>Avoiding having “too much” debt coming due at the same time and creating a liquidity crisis for the sovereign.</li></ol><p>Pettis took the time to turn observations into a framework. He made this explicit by referring to the “capital structure” and in its role to create or dissipate crises or volatility. From that comes the title “The Volatility Machine”. The important part about building a framework is utilize the lessons from the narrow specific instance to a more broadly applicable analysis. A framework is leverageable, for example in cryptocurrency markets.</p><p>What lessons are there for crypto? My observations of cryptocurrency markets strike me as similar to emerging markets as defined by the above criteria. Digital assets are driven by capital flows from major capital centers. Of course, this is not divided by geography but rather by connections and dis-connections from the banking system — be it USD or EUR or RMB. These flows are outside the control of those running digital asset projects. Like emerging markets, all of these projects — like nations — believe that the quality of their project (or the quality of their reform) is what is driving the inflows. And it is not that there are not quality projects just as the economic reforms can be good and successful. It is just that, at least by tracking flows and performance, it is the flows that drive the reform and not the other way around. To be clear, there is demonstrable and sufficient data to show this for emerging market economies. Realistically, the digital asset market is still too new for this to be more than a reasonable hypothesis because the history thus far only includes a single secular monetary expansion that, essentially, birthed it.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Investors don’t typically buy currencies for their own sake but rather for the investment opportunity set to earn returns denominated in that currency. This is the future for digital assets. Pettis suggests how to do this prudently.</em></strong></blockquote><p>How can cryptocurrency projects take advantage of this? By following the risk management maxim to have a neutral outlook: flows will come and go; corporate finance ensures the continuity of the business. It is the responsibility of the prudent manager to secure long term funding when it is cheap, manage liquidity terms, and any debt issued ought to be in “local” currency to ensure the capability of repayment. It is no coincidence that Pettis notes that the two emerging markets — the US and Japan — always had USD and Yen denominated debt exclusively.</p><p>Right now, much of the digital asset financing markets are focused on raising USD or other fiat backed by crypto assets. This is the equivalent of emerging market sovereigns borrowing in USD. This is a dangerous path and exacerbates the volatility of crypto currencies. With institutional investors entering the market there will soon become a vibrant debt market. After all, investors don’t typically buy currencies for their own sake but rather for the investment opportunity set to earn returns denominated in that currency. This is both the future for digital assets and the way that “local” companies and the overall space become more robust to currency swings (and ironically how those swings become smaller).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fb46fd0ace72" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/review-of-the-volatility-engine-by-michael-pettis-fb46fd0ace72">Review of The Volatility Machine by Michael Pettis</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog">Digital Gamma Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What volatility should we use?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/what-volatility-should-we-use-e877dfb07c15?source=rss----d446d4ef26d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e877dfb07c15</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[options]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[implied-volatility]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Geeliek]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2020 13:22:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-11T15:40:11.273Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/0*PFh-DoHlChR6EXRT.jpg" /><figcaption>*<a href="https://www.recipetips.com/">https://www.recipetips.com/</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>What volatility should we use?</strong></p><p>We all know implied volatility is one of the key inputs into option pricing. It is simply an expected volatility of a stock over the life of the option based on the standard deviation of log-returns as observed in the options market. Option practitioners typically compare it to the historical or realized volatility over the past “x” days to get a sense as to whether the option is “cheap” or “rich”</p><p>At Digital Gamma, we have also previously looked at several methodologies to calculate initial collateral and assess the risk/reward characteristics of bitcoin lending transactions based on the ability to compute or observe such “volatility”, be it using option implied volatility based on observable market option prices, or using historical bitcoin prices to compute realized volatility. Different approaches result in different levels of volatilities, so which one should we use?</p><p>In fact, there are many more issues that complicate our thought process, both in terms of using traded option prices or historical data.</p><p>Let’s start with the approach where we use traded options to calculate the implied volatility which we then use as an input to calculating collateral. This approach makes intuitive sense as options are being used as hedging instruments. There are a few exchanges which have listed traded options, the biggest of which being Deribit. As you know, Digital Gamma produces a weekly options report where we explore the option analytics primarily based on Deribit data (since it constitutes more than 80% of total listed traded option volume), but we also include some analytics based on CME options, Bit.com options as well as OKEX options. For options which have the same option expiration, we sometimes see different levels of implied volatilities, so which one should we use? For example, we have sometimes observed that longer expiration options on CME demonstrate significantly higher implied volatilities than Deribit options (~10 vol points or more), granted there are differences in the settlement process, exercise procedures and type of market participants involved, but yet, we do not observe the same level of discrepancy for the short-dated options where the implied volatilities are essentially the same on both exchanges. An even more fundamental question is: what option expirations should I look at since they result in different levels of implied volatilities? A simple approach is to use the option expiration that matches closely the tenor of the lending transaction, but is that a reasonable approach? Another fundamental question to the options approach is: what strikes should we consider in calculating the implied volatilities? Should we use a strike that is way out-of-the-money since that is the primary risk in a bitcoin lending transaction where the posted collateral may not be sufficient to cover the losses due to excessive volatility in the movement of bitcoin prices? Or should we use at-the-money options which have more liquidity and market participants, so it may be a much more reasonable consensus estimate to market-based implied volatilities? Or should we use a weighted approach, and if so, what weights should we use?</p><p>The use of historical data to compute volatilities present similar problematic issues. For example, how much data should we use to calculate historical volatilities? If we use the length of data that matches closely the length of the bitcoin lending transaction, are we underestimating the volatility since significant movement outside of that window may occur in the future? Do we even trust that historical data is going to be representative of future price movements? Should we weigh recent data more heavily as compared to data from a longer time ago? Even if we can agree on all of the above, what percentiles should we use, and what probability distribution should I use to model bitcoin prices? In our previous documents, we have advocated using the 99th percentiles and a Student’s t-distribution to model the distribution of bitcoin prices; is that reasonable? Even more fundamentally, which data source should we use and from what exchange? How does the selection of time-stamp to determine daily prices affect the calculation? Also, should we consider futures prices as well since the derivatives market in bitcoin is expanding rapidly? If we also use futures prices, how do we resolve the issue where there might be discrepancy between the cash prices and the futures prices?</p><p>Even if we can agree definitively on the approach to compute historical or implied volatility accurately for our purpose, which one should I trust? In our weekly options report, we have seen that implied volatilities from options can be significantly higher than realized volatilities, sometimes on the order of 50%-80%. Hence, the choice of either volatility will have a significant impact on the collateral calculation. The use of historical data obviously assumes that the past will be representative of the future (which is typically not a reasonable assumption!), but the use of options information may also be somewhat problematic given the motives and strategies adopted by options traders for bitcoin options in a nascent market such as this may not be representative of the whole market and the “truth”.</p><p>Given how sensitive the collateral calculation process is to the various issues discussed above, our methodology results in a significant range of initial collateral percentages, going from about 10% at the minimum to 30% at the maximum. In order to select a number to use which is appropriate to safeguard the interest of our clients, we have determined a range of 20%-25% to be appropriate for initial collateral, granted there is a degree of judgment call that is involved in the process. We will continue to refine the process as we go forward, especially if the options markets develop more to reflect sufficient trading depth.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e877dfb07c15" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/what-volatility-should-we-use-e877dfb07c15">What volatility should we use?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog">Digital Gamma Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Futures? Stocks? Which is a better investment, or are they the same? (Part 2)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/futures-stocks-which-is-a-better-investment-or-are-they-the-same-part-2-633f5911a483?source=rss----d446d4ef26d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/633f5911a483</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Geeliek]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Aug 2020 00:53:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-14T00:53:03.496Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/614/1*iLzwPMGC_vxc9h2zGOqbng.png" /></figure><p><strong>Futures? Stocks? Which is a better investment, or are they the same? (Part 2)</strong></p><p>In a previous blog post, we discuss various reasons why the basis in bitcoin prices exists when we compare the futures price to the cash price. They range from country of jurisdiction of the exchange, investor level of sophistication and so on. Are there more fundamental reasons why the basis should exist? For example, if we consider more financial-based futures, such as futures referencing the S&amp;P 500 stock index, is there a logical reason why they should differ in prices compared to the underlying stocks?</p><p>In the case of the example of S&amp;P 500 stock futures, the difference between the futures prices and cash prices can also be attributed to 2 reasons: risk-free interest rate and dividends. A futures investor typically has to put up a significantly lower amount of capital to get the same exposure as a cash stock investor, and this is excess capital which can be invested in government securities to earn a risk-free rate of return. As a result, the futures price should be higher than the cash stock price, and in fact, the fair futures price should be exactly equal to the spot cash stock price compounded by this risk-free interest rate for the duration equal to the time to expiration of the futures (to ensure no arbitrage, in technical lingo!). This is usually referred to as the time-value of money. Of course, in the last 10 years, interest rates on government securities, especially shorter-term ones, have been pretty much close to zero, so this factor has not played an important role and may have faded from investors’ memories.</p><p>Similarly, a futures investor will not be paid dividends which a cash investor is entitled to. Consequently, the futures price should be lower than the cash stock price. In fact, the fair futures price should be exactly equal to the spot cash stock price discounted by the annualized dividend rate for the duration equal to the time to expiration of the futures (again, to ensure no arbitrage!). To be exact, if we denote S as the initial cash price, F(T) as the fair futures price with T denoting the time to expiration, r as the annualized risk-free rate of return and q as the annualized dividend rate, F(T) should be equal to Sexp[(r-q)T] if we do not want to introduce arbitrage. Alternatively, another approach that is used by practitioners is to look at the difference between the market futures price and the cash stock price, calculate an implied rate of financing, and compare it to the risk-free and dividend rate to determine if the futures price is trading too high or too low relative to the cash stock price (which can introduce a “basis” trading opportunity).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/966/0*PHK8RY7d6HFftGpX" /></figure><p>Now, using the same framework, what happens if we compare a bitcoin cash investor to a bitcoin futures investor? Owning a bitcoin does not provide a steady stream of dividends in the conventional sense so, q, as denoted above, should be equal to zero. What should the equivalent of r, the risk-free interest rate, be? The bitcoin futures investor can deposit his excess bitcoin at various lending platforms which pays about 4–5% for one year. Should we plug r equal to 4% or 5% into the formula above to calculate the corresponding fair futures price to see if we may have a basis trade opportunity? The answer lies in the definition of r which is the “risk-free” interest rate, and any company, no matter how well-funded, is unlikely to have the same credit quality as the U.S. government (which has the ability to “print” money), and hence should not be considered “risk-free”. Even depositing money at a bank is not risk-free, as there is certainly a chance that the bank can fail (remember 2008?). Also, even though most cash deposits are covered by FDIC insurance, the maximum amount covered is only USD$250,000. Certainly, typical bitcoin platforms out there that accept bitcoin deposits are not publicly traded so their financials are not well-understood, and there is also not an equivalent of FDIC insurance for such deposits. Hence r should not be equal to the 4–5% that you can receive from such platforms.</p><p>What might be a better approach if you are sitting on bitcoin and you are thinking about doing a basis trade against bitcoin futures, but you still want to be able to earn a yield from your bitcoin holdings without taking on too much counterparty risks from such traditional platforms? At Digital Gamma, we have introduced a collateralized tri-party repo (TPR) agreement where initial margin is collected from both parties by Digital Gamma, the amount of which is market-dependent and computed based on statistical quantification of bitcoin volatility. Would this be a better approach for you to earn some yield from your bitcoin holdings via a collaterialized repo transaction if you are concerned about uninsured counterparty risk when you are sizing up such basis trades?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=633f5911a483" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/futures-stocks-which-is-a-better-investment-or-are-they-the-same-part-2-633f5911a483">Futures? Stocks? Which is a better investment, or are they the same? (Part 2)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog">Digital Gamma Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Futures? Stocks? Which is a better investment, or are they the same? (Part 1)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/futures-stocks-which-is-a-better-investment-or-are-they-the-same-part-1-b688b392b7af?source=rss----d446d4ef26d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b688b392b7af</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[btc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[futures-trading]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trading]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Geeliek]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2020 11:45:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-28T11:45:45.359Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/747/1*YoCMMG92XMcEWf-FrxdRcg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Futures? Stocks? Which is a better investment, or are they the same? (Part 1)</strong></p><p>Many investors today are surprised by how futures may trade so differently from the underlying instrument they reference. We don’t have to go too far back in time to find an example that best signifies the extreme discrepancy which can occur: April 2020 a few months ago. That was the fateful spring day in April when WTI futures on CME actually traded to -$37 (yes, negative!). Of course, the reason why that happened, in retrospect, is obvious: speculators in WTI futures had no means to take delivery or store the barrels of crude oil and thus had to liquidate the futures, no matter the price, prior to expiration. After all, a futures contract is just an agreement, enforceable by law, to buy or sell something at a fixed price at a fixed time in the future. If you have no means to store it, you have to get rid of such contracts, no matter what the cost is, even when it is negative $37!</p><p>It makes sense why commodity or physical-based futures can trade differently from the underlying products they reference. After all, there are costs necessary for delivering or storing the products or the products themselves can go bad or become useless after a certain period of time (which is especially the case for futures referencing agricultural products). What about bitcoin futures?</p><p>The simple answer is: yes, they can be different, and there are various reasons for this phenomenon, particularly more so for cryptocurrencies! Firstly, bitcoin futures trade on different exchanges all over the world! For example, we have bitcoin futures trading in the US (CME, ICE Bakkt, etc), Asia (Huobi, etc), Panama (Deribit), and so on. Different countries have different rules for the types of investors allowed to trade on their platforms. For example, Huobi does not allow investors based in the US, Hong Kong, and a few other countries. This is understandable as different countries (and platforms) have their own AML (anti-money laundering) and KYC (know your client) requirements. Also, different investors have different levels of comfort with trading on exchanges in countries that may be less financially sophisticated. For example, a US-based investor who intends to trade bitcoin futures may choose to do so only on US-based exchanges, simply because he/she is more comfortable with the rule of law of the United States.</p><p>Secondly, the types of investors involved in the futures markets vs. the cash markets are motivated to trade their respective products for different reasons. For example, participants in the futures markets are typically viewed as speculators (though some participants certainly use futures for hedging purposes), while cash investors are viewed as being more “long-term” focused. Futures investors are typically more sophisticated, or at least possess more trading experience, primarily because futures trading can be highly-levered and require a significantly less amount of margin as compared to regular cash investment. To further complicate the matter, different bitcoin exchanges in different countries may require different levels of leverage and margin requirements. For example, CME requires approximately 30–40% in initial margin whereas Deribit may require an initial margin of as low as 1% (which scales up with size). Even if an investor is fully comfortable with trading on all exchanges, the different levels of initial margin required certainly may impact their risk/reward considerations, and hence dictate their exchange of choice.</p><p>Lastly, futures contracts are also taxed differently compared to cash stock investments. For example, in the US, cash stock and bitcoin investments can enjoy a much lower level of capital gains tax for longer-term investors and such taxes are only payable when gains are realized. Futures contracts, on the other hand, are usually taxed on a mark-to-market basis at the end of the year, whether or not the futures contracts have been unwound. Some countries do not even tax bitcoin capital gains (such as Singapore, Malta, etc)!</p><p>For the above reasons, the types of investors involved in cash and futures investments are fundamentally different, so a discrepancy in their prices may not be that surprising. For this reason, Digital Gamma publishes a weekly basis report on the basis between cash and futures that may exist on different exchanges which includes an annualized yield calculation (we have also previously published reports that detailed the exact calculations). Hopefully, this report may be helpful for discerning investors who are trying to figure out whether it is more desirable to invest in bitcoin cash or futures, and if futures are the desired choice, which exchange is best, at least purely on a price basis.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b688b392b7af" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/futures-stocks-which-is-a-better-investment-or-are-they-the-same-part-1-b688b392b7af">Futures? Stocks? Which is a better investment, or are they the same? (Part 1)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog">Digital Gamma Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Yogi Berra Understood Counterparty Credit Risk]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/yogi-berra-understood-counterparty-credit-risk-51e852c46cbb?source=rss----d446d4ef26d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/51e852c46cbb</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Sacks]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2020 19:32:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-02T19:40:51.345Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6CBKUnpfDaS48lceCocKNg.jpeg" /></figure><h3>“In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is.” YB</h3><p>In theory, if you lend a buddy $100, they’re good for it. You might even say that the loan is collateralized because you have the “value” of the friendship.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/284/0*i9QakrEGH57bqd6Q" /><figcaption>Collateralized Loan</figcaption></figure><p>Your friend is disincentivized to default, presuming you are friends and they’ve been laughing at your jokes because they’re funny, and not because they’ve been softening you up for the ask. In practice, you know how this often goes. Your friend says they need a few more days; then they stop returning calls, then you realize the friendship’s value was far less than initially thought.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/259/0*pl_1eCElS2thntjC" /><figcaption>Uncollateralized Loan</figcaption></figure><p>If you lend $10K, it’s preferable if your friend leaves you with their car until they repay the loan. Far better from a risk management perspective. No comparison. If you’re going to lend someone your bitcoin, wouldn’t it be better to have their collateral in your possession? Concerning risk, there is no mistaking a transaction that is properly collateralized with one that isn’t. Full stop.</p><p>As with most things we turn to Shakespeare for the rubric, “Neither a borrower nor a lender be;/ For loan oft loses both itself and friend.” Hamlet Act:1 Scene:3</p><p>Obviously, he was referring to uncollateralized loans!</p><p><strong>Making sausage, opacity = good. Lending crypto, opacity = not good</strong></p><p>On a centralized platform, your counterparty is the platform itself. Most of the time it’s opaque. You have no visibility into their risk management, their loan book, and any information regarding whether their other customers (synthetically your counterparties) are being held to the same rules that you are.</p><p>There are no audited financials, no credit-rating agency, and no track records. Through a traditional capital market lens, it’s a room full of sub-junk credits. Non-starter. The platform is offering you yield in exchange for you placing your assets with them. How are they paying for it? With VC money? If so, how long until that music stops? Are they lending it to someone else at a higher rate? If so, what is that entity’s creditworthiness? Again, that party is, by extension, your counterparty. To be clear, there is NOTHING inherently wrong with them giving you interest. However, one would like to be able to see how it’s working, and with whom. Without such visibility, this is a faith-based transaction.</p><p><strong>Hold on, what about DeFi?</strong></p><p>On a decentralized platform, your counterparty, in many respects, is the smart contract to which you have given your crypto. If you didn’t look at the code, or you don’t understand how it works, then you have just entered into another faith-based credit arrangement. You entered into an agreement without reading the contract! And it’s not only the code; it’s also the workflow, too. If an asset rapidly declines in value, it is safe to say that there will be an increase in demand placed on the network that supports that asset. If this congested network is how you need to send a time-sensitive payment to address your shortfall … then, well, you do the math. Worse yet, pricing and auction mechanisms failed, and millions of dollars worth of crypto were sold at, wait for it…., ZERO. March 12th was bad, but it can get a lot worse. A lot.</p><p>Many DeFi entities appear to be repeat offenders. It seems they often know there are problems but go straight to production anyway. Maybe they feel it’s a land grab and so there isn’t time for appropriate testing. Dunno.</p><blockquote>This is all a big experiment. Everyone is participating in beta. Know that. Own that.</blockquote><p><strong>Digital Gamma’s Tri-Party Repo (TPR)</strong></p><p>It is based on models from traditional finance that have been adapted for crypto. It solves for counterparty credit risk by replacing it with a risk that can assess, which you can manage — market risk. Some of the key features:</p><ul><li>Loans are collateralized: you can take your counterparty’s collateral external and do whatever you need/want to; yes, that means it is in your possession;</li><li>Two-sided escrow: both parties have skin in the game;</li><li>Borrow &amp; Finance: this is a complete solution; created leveraged long crypto, borrow crypto for shorting or trading, lend crypto or cash for interest, borrow money for bills or business;</li><li>No Liquidations: Don’t wake up and find half you coin gone because some risk manager sold it overnight; with TPR there are no liquidations short of full default;</li><li>Standardized Legal Framework: based on the Global Master Repo Agreement; if you are a capital-markets professional, this protocol should be familiar;</li><li>Transparent Rules-Based Process: No surprises, defined and agreed upon risk management and default procedures;</li><li>We are P2P, but not reliant on smart contracts that can be hijacked by external parties;</li></ul><p>It’s customizable and flexible. Come to the venue to see the rate. Do not execute off-market. Benefit from transparent price discovery before showing your hand. Find counterparties. Collateralized loans. Understandable and robust risk management. A protocol where both parties can tick the necessary boxes. Safer. Better.</p><p>Please let me know if you agree, disagree, or are interested in learning more.</p><p>Next Week: Moe Berg Understood Embedded Negative Convexity?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=51e852c46cbb" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/yogi-berra-understood-counterparty-credit-risk-51e852c46cbb">Yogi Berra Understood Counterparty Credit Risk</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog">Digital Gamma Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[De-Fi-Pri]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/de-fi-pri-33be78e6ff36?source=rss----d446d4ef26d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/33be78e6ff36</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ari Pine]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2020 02:08:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-20T00:36:49.859Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/845/1*kWgFrOzsgxHCz5Ma6OyAeQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>“The Greatest Trick the Devil Ever Pulled Was Convincing the World He Didn’t Exist” — </em>Roger Kint (or Keyser Soze??)</p><p>While many may regularly disagree with me, there can be no argument that there has been a flurry of news over prime brokerage. At the very beginning of 2018, Digital Gamma was formed to deliver a prime brokerage or, probably more accurately, a subset of the “full prime brokerage experience”. There may be no worse curse for a trader or entrepreneur than being early. Paul and I tried to explain how we built a trading platform connecting to multiple exchanges, that one can onboard with DG and gain immediate access to 7 spot exchanges, and that we had a great risk managed borrow solution. Tagomi was just sold for $75M-$100M and we are still toiling. So there’s that.</p><p>Now, of course, we are focused on Tri-Party Repo. We still believe in the benefits that Prime Brokerage can bring and have a great deal of respect for the participants — Tagomi, Copper, FalconX, Anchorage, etc. Working on TPR, however, provides a bit of distance to evaluate the needs of the cryptocurrency market for prime brokerage. Blockworks wrote a <a href="https://blockworksgroup.io/blog/the-battle-to-build-cryptos-first-prime-brokerage">really nice piece</a> on the state of PB in crypto. “A prime brokerage firm provides execution, lending, financing, reporting, cap intro, and clearing and custody services. In other words, they’re the concierge to an investment firm, making their life easier by offering dozens of investment-related services through one easy-to-use platform.” Further, the author notes that the #1 thing to look for in a prime broker: derivatives. And that extension of credit is a primary offering.</p><p>But the author misses one big function of a prime broker: guaranteeing trades. Consider how regulated spot &amp; derivatives markets work. Trading of equities, futures, or options all occurs at a clearing house. Any trading done by an individual or an institution must be done by a clearing member. The vast majority of participants need to open an account at a clearing member to trade although some large entities are self-clearing members. The clearing member <em>guarantees</em> the settlement of the trade. That means that the clearing member that you use must make good — deliver money or securities — regardless of whether that money is in your account or not. In turn, the clearing house itself requires every clearing member to post capital (its own margin) at the clearing house. Who are these clearing members? Generally, they are prime brokers or their equivalents (FCM’s or clearing firms). This is why market participants say the biggest reason Prime Broker’s are needed is for derivatives.</p><p>That’s not how crypto markets work on unregulated exchanges. Exchange is a misnomer. Or maybe something of a malaprop. Back in the day, our pitch deck included a comparison of what exchange meant for a regulated futures exchange and for an unregulated crypto spot exchange. The figure below shows the four elements of an exchange system. All exchanges, regulated or not, have these. Sometimes it is explicit, i.e., regulated exchanges, and sometimes implicit, i.e., unregulated. For instance, in the case of CME where BTC futures trade, the “exchange” is considered to be both the matching engine (the orderbook) plus the clearing house. For options trading in the US, there are many exchanges (CBOE, PCX, NYSE, etc.) that all connect to the same clearing house (OCC). In crypto, all three pieces are under one roof: for example a customer connects directly to Gemini which functions as brokerage (account management), matching engine, and clearing house.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/502/0*5CBz0Q2D0Equl0_E" /></figure><p>Many spot exchanges, like Gemini, require pre-funding of trading. On the other hand, derivative trading has to allow margin trading (i.e., leverage) because the point is to allow participants to trade from the long or the short side. Again, at regulated exchanges, a clearing member guarantees the trades and the clearing house guarantees that clearing member to the other clearing members. The whole process is based on the creditworthiness of the end customer and the extension of credit from the clearing member (prime broker) to that customer.</p><blockquote>Crypto Prime Brokerage exists … hidden in plain sight</blockquote><p>Crypto futures exchanges work differently. Many are not regulated and they did not start with heaps of capital. Firms like Bitmex and Deribit created a new model: dynamic liquidation, insurance funds, and socialized losses. That is how they extend leverage. In financial markets this would require a loan or liability on the part of the Prime Broker (clearing member). Here, since all three functions are handled by the same entity, there is not an explicit loan. Rather, it is an implicit loan: you get to trade and should the trade go against you, the risk management algorithm auto-liquidates you. Should the liquidation cause such a problem that collective losses in that exchange’s system are too big, then the “winners” have to share the pain. Necessity, once again, was the mother of invention.</p><p>It is easy to criticize the socialized losses model because it is unfamiliar. Let me be clear that I have done so in the past. I’m starting to appreciate it for what it is. The dis-advantage of it is that your profitability is unknown. The big advantage of it is that the clearing house is guaranteed to be around the next day no matter how big the move. By the way, THIS is exactly the reason that the regulators in the US are concerned about crypto trading. It is not that the volatility per se is a problem — as Sunayna Tuteja of TD Ameritrade noted recently “have you checked out the FAANGs?”. The problem is that we can go to bed one day with ETH trading $240 and wake up with it trading $1050. Maybe two nations adopt it as their currency. Even 200% margin does not protect accounts against a move like that. Those are the kind of moves/issues that can rock a clearing house and thereby cause problems for financial markets.</p><p>To bring this full circle back to the question of prime brokerage, it has been noted regarding the Coinbase-Tagomi deal that one of the driving reasons for the deal was that “there are too many service providers chasing too few customers” (Ayesha Kiani). If PB is so dang essential why would that be? Let’s go back to the top 2 items on the PB checklist of services: derivatives and leverage. Crypto already provides those. Derivatives have more volume than spot trading in crypto. Leverage is higher and more easily available to any size entity (from full on $1,000 retail account to institutional entity). 100 to 1 leverage is available; 3X that of the banks during the Great Financial Crisis (yes, that crisis from 2009 mentioned in the Genesis block about banks getting bailed out .. hmm).</p><p>So is there a battle to build “Crypto’s First Prime Brokerage”? I don’t know. I think that there is a good argument that it is hidden in plain sight. That’s right: Decentralized Prime Brokerage. De-Fi-Prime. It’s out there: derivatives and leverage, just done crypto-style.</p><p>Oh — and what about the third most important feature of Prime Brokerage? Securities lending? I might happen to know a firm (cough, cough, Digital Gamma) that can help you with that (and leverage) safely while keeping you from the risks of <a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/rehypothecation-the-financial-worlds-15-letter-four-letter-word-38a0202f534a">rehypothecation at a Prime Broker</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=33be78e6ff36" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/de-fi-pri-33be78e6ff36">De-Fi-Pri</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog">Digital Gamma Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Rehypothecation: The Financial World’s 15 letter, Four Letter word]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/rehypothecation-the-financial-worlds-15-letter-four-letter-word-38a0202f534a?source=rss----d446d4ef26d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/38a0202f534a</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ari Pine]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2020 03:14:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-05T03:20:05.122Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AEjOPH9eAAiNyIFo" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@einarstorsul?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Einar Storsul</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/435/1*sT6xDWttPW5zXNZiRrIeKw.png" /></figure><p>Rehypothecation is a term that has a bad reputation. This post is about the difference between rehypothecation and rehypothecation. I’m sure you saw what I did there. I want to highlight the difference between the same word. Which seems very odd. My goal is to get you to understand the word has two meanings. Getting it right is extremely important for the future of crypto finance.</p><p>You have a choice in extending credit, so choose wisely. Regardless of what anyone makes it out to be, an unsecured loan involves the most credit risk. The alternative to unsecured lending is, unsurprisingly, secured or collateralized loans. In this case, one lends out something of value but in return, also receives something of value. For those familiar with the History channel this is something like a pawn shop situation. This is a low risk case. Now the third case is more interesting. Someone hands over a pile of stuff to you to keep an eye on for security and so that you can make it easy (or possible) for them to move it around to different places. You charge them for that and, in addition, get the privilege of using their stuff as collateral on loans for whatever you feel like. If you’d like to make up a name for such a business, try out “prime brokerage”.</p><p>It turns out that both the second case, a collateralized, low-risk loan, and the third case, a “multi-party claim on a single-asset” situation, despite being vastly different, are both called rehypothecation. In a collateralized loan, even if someone borrows and then re-lends it out, everything is dealt with 1:1 and therefore it stays a very safe transaction. On the other hand, things get very dicey when a prime broker goes out of business. That’s what occurred in 2008 when Lehman went bankrupt. The problem was not a chain of collateral gone wrong per se. It was that more than one person (trading firm) was showing up to claim the same bag at the airport (collateral). Hilarity did not ensue.</p><blockquote>Collateral re-use is fine so long as there is a clear claim to collateral by one party at each stage. When more than one party can claim the collateral, the not-so-technical term for that begins with cluster and rhymes with “truck”</blockquote><p>Consider an unsecured loan. Firm A borrows 10 BTC from firm B. Perhaps the term was for 6 months and the rate was 3%. Meanwhile one week BTC lending is trading 6% so A lends those 10 BTC out to another firm, C. What happens if C defaults and does not return the 10 BTC to A? This is an unsecured loan and A incurs a loss. In some way, A will need to obtain 10 BTC to get the 10 BTC back to B. If A is leveraged, then A will likely default causing B to default.</p><p>Unsecured Loan Initiation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/531/0*PUeKijooHuo9ZiMC" /></figure><p>Unsecured Loan Default:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/543/0*iRWQrs3PXxu8Auq8" /></figure><p>Now consider how things work at a prime broker. Note that not all brokers, prime or otherwise, require customers to allow the broker to access the collateral as “rehypothecation”. In some cases, there is an opt-in choice which usually enables some sort of a rebate or otherwise cheaper service. Regardless, this is what it looks like:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/350/0*cwiKgn3zmcZ5cEYl" /></figure><p>The broker uses the 10 BTC in Firm B’s account as collateral to get $100K in USD. One does not even need for A to re-use the 10 BTC in another transaction for this to get ugly. Should the broker get into financial trouble and default with Firm A, Firm A, as is its right, takes possession of the 10 BTC and presumably sells it in the market to get its $100K back. This is at the heart of the problem. To whom does the 10 BTC belong? Firm A or Firm B? <strong>The technical term for this is a real four letter word. </strong>It begins with cluster and rhymes with “truck”.<strong> </strong>Instead, let’s call this version of rehypothecation <strong>multi-party collateral claim transactions</strong>.</p><p>On the other hand, collateral re-use is absolutely fine so long as the legal claim to the collateral is clear. Consider firms A, B, C. B lends 10 BTC fully collateralized to A. And A turns around and lends the 10 BTC to C also on a fully collateralized basis. For the purpose of this example, consider that BTC is priced at $10,000. It looks like:</p><p>Collateral Re-Use Initiation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/550/0*XxOUfO2oPiP7at2y" /></figure><p>Suppose C defaults:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/566/0*55GDht0Vek6lVpIr" /></figure><p>The combination of full collateralization and the clear claim of A over the $10,000 means that the default is isolated to Firm C. Firm A sustains no loss and Firm B is not even aware that Firm C even exists.</p><p>By the way, in case you were wondering if the BTC that Firm B lent out is the same that came back to it, there is no such thing as the “same” BTC. There are no CUSIPs or serial numbers for BTC. That’s not how value is transferred in a distributed ledger. Firm B’s wallet/account for BTC does not indicate certain BTC. It is just a running summation of all the deposits and withdrawals for that particular wallet number. A distributed ledger is the electronic equivalent of hash marks.</p><p>What is now quite transparent is that reusing collateral under fully collateralized conditions is safe so long as the value of the collateral matches. At Digital Gamma we work to ensure that is the case by securing additional collateral in escrow so that should the value of BTC climb, A would have more than just the $10,000 to use to repurchase the 10 BTC.</p><p>What is not so transparent is that “rehypothecation” has two different meanings and the two meanings are very different for those participating in the lending markets. Simply reusing collateral to engage in trades is stable and safe. Enabling and engaging in situations where multiple parties can lay claim to the same collateral is clearly problematic when things go wrong. The main reason that these situations occur is that the customers of firms that engage in this practice either are not aware of it or don’t have a realistic alternative.</p><p>There are those in the crypto world that are going to take advantage of the ambiguity of the word rehypothecation. A “multi-party collateral claim” situation is unequivocally bad. On the other hand, collateral re-use works just fine. The beauty of the crypto community is that we are focused on thinking for ourselves and trusting in the process, not the players. The process for collateral re-use works.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=38a0202f534a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/rehypothecation-the-financial-worlds-15-letter-four-letter-word-38a0202f534a">Rehypothecation: The Financial World’s 15 letter, Four Letter word</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog">Digital Gamma Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[(some good and bad) Parallels between Bitcoin and Gold]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/some-good-and-bad-parallels-between-bitcoin-and-gold-8fb5af5caddf?source=rss----d446d4ef26d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8fb5af5caddf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gold]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Sacks]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2020 00:59:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-22T00:59:49.241Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/668/1*EAgKu7niwxryTpHfCE-APA.png" /></figure><p>I spent 20 years in the gold market before coming to crypto, or more specifically, to Bitcoin. It was a smooth transition in many respects. The two markets have a lot in common. At a minimum, they enthusiastically extol many of the same benefits.</p><p>Most commonly, gold is thought of as a hedge against inflation because the price should rise when the cost of living increases. Put another way; it maintains its purchasing power. It also is supposed to perform well during times of geopolitical uncertainty. Therefore, it the “crisis commodity.” When acrimony between governments takes center stage, gold often does well.</p><p>Another purported benefit is portfolio diversification. The key is its correlation with the stock market. Not always the case, certainly not day to day, hour to hour. But historically, over many decades, gold has a non-positive relationship with the equity markets. Combining gold with stocks and bonds, for example, can be shown to reduce the overall volatility of the portfolio.</p><p>Boring people with post-graduate degrees in economics define money as a medium of exchange, a unit of accounting, and a store of value. And gold is REAL money. It has no issuer’s counterparty liability. In other words, it is sovereign. You cannot print it out of thin air.</p><p>To many, Bitcoin is a better version of gold. It has some version of all the qualities mentioned above. And by at least two measures, it is explicitly better. Its scarcity value is superior to that of gold’s — 21 million, full stop. No more mining. No new secret supply of Bitcoin to unearthed from the bottom of the Mariana Trench. No one will mine Bitcoin from asteroids. And when it comes to divisibility, Bitcoin comes out on top. Not sure how someone would give me 1/100,000,000th an ounce of gold. But a single Satoshi, that is simple.</p><p>So why do I cringe a bit when I see all the headlines extolling Bitcoin’s virtues in the face of expanding balance sheets and runaway deficits. The only way out of this mess is to inflate the debt away, right? The world will have no choice but to turn to Bitcoin. This is the problem. This is the argument gold bugs have been making since people have been making arguments — about anything. I cringe because it has not worked for gold, and it has had a 5,000-year head start.</p><p>Deficit spending may have brought down the Roman Empire. Printing money and the resulting hyperinflation crushed the Weimar Republic — it ultimately did the equivalent of a reverse stock split at one trillion to one. So that is the scale of the event for which folks are looking? Upending the current fiat system is like overthrowing the government, not a government — ALL the governments. It seems a tall order if you ask me. I guess it is possible. Improbable, but not impossible. That would be a dramatic increase in price. Historic!</p><p>The total value of “Broad Money” (coins, banknotes, money market accounts, saving deposits, checking deposits, time deposits) is about $90 T. Dividing that by the total number of Bitcoin (21M) yields 4.3M. It is a ludicrous analysis with an exciting result. That is approximately 450X on your investment in bitcoin today.</p><p>I propose for a moment that you consider what Bitcoin has already done. Not for me, and I’m guessing not for you. But there is no arguing with the following. On November 8th, 2009, the first market transaction for Bitcoin took place. 5,050 Bitcoin were sold for $5.02. Today that is worth about $48M. That is 9.6M times your money. Not 450X, but 9,600,000X. Maybe they are right.</p><p>Maybe the current fiat regime will fail. Maybe Bitcoin, and not gold, will be the winner. Maybe it has already won. Maybe it is already priced in.</p><p>The easy money has been made. We need to do better than just evangelize about the end of the world. Do not bet against the establishment — but instead, roll your sleeves up, and work to improve it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8fb5af5caddf" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/some-good-and-bad-parallels-between-bitcoin-and-gold-8fb5af5caddf">(some good and bad) Parallels between Bitcoin and Gold</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog">Digital Gamma Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Banker, A Hedgie, and Satoshi Walk Into a Bar …]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/a-banker-a-hedgie-and-satoshi-walk-into-a-bar-61c1b723925c?source=rss----d446d4ef26d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/61c1b723925c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trading]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ari Pine]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2020 00:01:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-15T00:01:59.352Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>A Banker, A Hedgie, and Satoshi Walk Into a Bar …</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8ToIWAib5ktnPpql" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@braydona?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Braydon Anderson</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>I normally try to write something timeless, like a snarky view from the back seats, or to talk about Tri-Party Repo changing the world, or maybe why we ought to take a <em>first principles</em> look at regulation. This note, however, is dedicated to two separate but important news headlines that warrant special attention. We all know that cryptography and Bitcoin are based on math but humans are humans. They need socialized permission to act.</p><p>And, no, this is not about the halving. At all.</p><p>The first is <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/07/paul-tudor-jones-reportedly-buys-bitcoin-as-an-inflation-hedge-compares-crypto-to-70s-gold-trade.html">Paul Tudor Jones buying Bitcoin as an inflation hedge</a> and the second is <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/jpmorgan-extends-banking-services-to-bitcoin-exchanges-11589281201">JP Morgan providing banking services for Gemini and Coinbase</a>. These are big headlines. I mean, in the milieu of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technology_adoption_life_cycle">Crossing the Chasm</a>, this has the potential to mark a transition from early adopters to early majority. Beyond being a bit of semantics about where we may be in some cycle of technology adoption, the early majority period is the section of the growth cycle where the real big sustainable growth occurs. That has the potential to mean that the money that has been coming into the system up until now has been small as compared to what will be. And that the refrain “the institutions are coming” might actually begin to mean something.</p><p>Knowledgeable people will note that JP Morgan is not offering banking services to just any cryptocurrency exchange, let alone any random cryptocurrency related business. In fact, Coinbase and Gemini are two institutions that have gone out of their way to follow the regulatory regime in place. Of particular note is their following the “travel rule” (h/t Emma Channing) which is a rule by FinCen (in the US) to push along customer information related to a transaction between financial institutions. I acknowledge this and, to me, this is the point! Now that other crypto related businesses can see that there is actually something to be gained by engaging the existing system, they are far more likely to do so.</p><p>The biggest boost though is behavioral. Finance is, in the aggregate, very conservative and regulated. That has a tendency to have CYA (cover your butt) as a major motivation. Career advice (really critique of the industry) is that you won’t get fired for failing with the crowd but you can easily lose your job scampering off into new and exotic territory (and even when successful). Seeing Tudor and JPM move into cryptocurrency are big forces in defining the status quo. When firms write about the argument for adding cryptocurrency to a portfolio as a diversifier, the math might be spot on, but until the industry has received “permission” from OGs like Tudor &amp; JPM, it is moot.</p><p>In addition to being a long term move up the adoption chasm, there are some actionable observations. Of course, “not investment advice” and “do your own research”. First, Tudor has been reported to have executed his position entry on the CME, and second, it is specific to Bitcoin rather than cryptocurrency more generally.</p><p>Again, knowledgeable observers note that this is a cash settled futures product and not actual Bitcoin. That means that the sellers of the futures to Tudor either were long holders of Bitcoin that exited via cash futures or were arbitrageurs trading the price between futures and spot Bitcoin (the basis). And we can see the footprint of a large trade in the <a href="https://14dc4778-ec14-4c89-b835-6c21327996b4.filesusr.com/ugd/adc4e1_83f93b2753fa4ad482816c6f6e51d438.pdf">basis</a> (just the price difference between futures and spot) from being quite tight a couple of weeks ago to widening out. At the time of this writing, if one has the infrastructure, there is the potential to earn a 16% yield selling futures and buying spot (at least in theory).</p><p>Secondly, the implication of potential institutional money coming into cryptocurrency is that Bitcoin will benefit far more than its other cryptocurrency brethren. That’s because the institutions will likely follow one of two tactics. The first is to do exactly what Tudor did and buy futures: it is easy, it is regulated, and they don’t need to run afoul of regulators regarding holding cryptocurrency outright. The second is to invest in vehicles that are indexed. Most of these indexes are far more heavily weighted to BTC and therefore far more money will flow to Bitcoin than anything else. And that is for the “majors” meaning BTC, BCH, ETH, LTC, and a couple of others. My guess is that alt-coins will be actively avoided.</p><p>In conclusion, the news that Tudor and JPM moving into cryptocurrency are good for the industry is an obvious take. Agreed. The math was already there; now the narrative and CYA is in place, too.</p><p>Sometimes the obvious take is the correct one.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=61c1b723925c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/a-banker-a-hedgie-and-satoshi-walk-into-a-bar-61c1b723925c">A Banker, A Hedgie, and Satoshi Walk Into a Bar …</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog">Digital Gamma Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Talking Technical: Insight into Digital Gamma Process]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/talking-technical-insight-into-digital-gamma-process-d61f1d067129?source=rss----d446d4ef26d1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d61f1d067129</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[repos]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ari Pine]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2020 02:53:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-08T02:56:15.061Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*cY1taU_mlD2X_8e7" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@viazavier?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Laura Ockel</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Check out Digital Gamma’s head of research, Gee Liek Yeo, <a href="https://14dc4778-ec14-4c89-b835-6c21327996b4.filesusr.com/ugd/adc4e1_90a7596f0a1643be877330e8a91eae5e.pdf">discuss</a> how we think about setting retained collateral levels for our Tri-Party Repo Product.</p><p>The goal of retained collateral is that it is security against performance by counterparties in our TPR product. If you enter into a crypto borrow or lend, and the other side defaults, the retained collateral held by Digital Gamma is available to help make you whole.</p><p>Even more important is that we give you a good perspective on exactly the transaction that you are entering so that you can make the right business decisions regarding credit extension.</p><p>Let us know what you think.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d61f1d067129" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog/talking-technical-insight-into-digital-gamma-process-d61f1d067129">Talking Technical: Insight into Digital Gamma Process</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/digital-gamma-blog">Digital Gamma Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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