Four years ago today, President Obama announced the most significant changes in U.S.-Cuba policy in more than 50 years. The move ended a decades-long containment policy that had failed to advance American interests and instead looked to normalize our bilateral relationship through cultural exchange and trade.

“Neither the American, nor Cuban people are well served by a rigid policy that is rooted in events that took place before most of us were born,” President Obama announced. “I believe that we can do more to support the Cuban people and promote our values through engagement.”

He was right. The announcement kicked off unprecedented growth in U.S.-Cuba relations. Despite President Trump’s efforts to undo Obama-era engagement policies, the comparative progress is undeniable:

1. An open channel for diplomatic engagement

On December 17, 2014, President Obama and Raul Castro announced that they would work to normalize relations between the United States and Cuba for the first time in more than half a century. Embassies reopened the following year and initiated dialogue in areas of mutual interest, such as environmental protection, migration, global health, and combating drug and human trafficking. These joint efforts have successfully reduced narcotics trafficking and unlawful Cuban migration to virtually zero.

2. The return of commercial travel between the U.S. and Cuba

Part of the U.S. opening toward Cuba made it easier for Americans to travel to the island by adding new categories of authorized travel. Under the new rules, the number of non-Cuban American U.S. travelers experiencing Cuba first-hand skyrocketed from 90,000 in 2014 to nearly half a million this year.

3. U.S. business takes hold in Cuba

The relaxed rules on travel and banking also made it possible for U.S. businesses to enter the Cuban market for the first time. Five commercial U.S. airlines and several major U.S. cruise lines now offer direct service to Cuba, and hospitality companies such as Starwood, Marriott, and Airbnb struck historic deals. In 2017, Fast and Furious 8: Fate of the Furious became the first Hollywood film shot in Cuba since the embargo. Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint have also enabled U.S. travelers to use international roaming in Cuba.

4. The growth of Cuba’s private sector

One of the most immediate and measurable gains from improving U.S.-Cuba relations has been the effect on Cuba’s nascent private sector, where as many as 4 in 10 Cuban workers now earn at least part of their income. President Obama removed limits on the amount of money that can be sent to Cuba from the United States, helping many Cubans mount businesses on the island. Cuba’s nearly 600,000 small business owners and workers directly benefit from big-tipping American visitors who tend to patronize small businesses in cultural hubs rather than the state-run beach resorts frequented by their Canadian and European counterparts.

5. Life-saving joint pharmaceutical research

Engaging with Cuba has not only allowed for greater diplomatic and national security collaboration, but has also allowed both countries to work together on scientific and medical advancements. Notably, the New York-based Roswell Park Comprehensive Cancer Center and Cuba’s Center for Molecular Immunology launched the first ever biotech joint venture between the United States and Cuba earlier this year to develop innovative cancer treatments. A Cuban lung cancer drug, CIMAvax-EGF, recently finished a Phase I clinical trial in Buffalo.

6. The rapid expansion of Cuban internet access

Following negotiations with the United States, Cuba rapidly expanded internet access. Beginning in 2015, Cuba has launched hundreds of public Wi-Fi hotspots across the island. Earlier this month, Cuba’s state-run telecommunications company rolled out 3G data plans, making the internet accessible across the entire island for the first time ever. The Cuban government has also begun offering home access to broadband in some areas.

The expansion of internet access in Cuba has been a priority for both the Obama and Trump administrations, and U.S. telecommunications companies are now able to export devices and services to Cuba. Furthermore, increased remittances and travel to Cuba by Americans help more everyday Cubans afford communications devices and internet service.

7. Helping America’s farmers by stocking Cuba’s shelves

When President Trump signs the 2018 farm bill into law, it will mark the first time in nearly 20 years that Congress puts a dent in the 56-year-old trade embargo on Cuba. The farm bill passed with a provision that will give U.S. farmers access to federal funding for market development activities in Cuba, paving the way for greater exports to Cuba of U.S. agricultural commodities like rice, wheat, and soy. Check out our Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram later this week to see what lawmakers and the agriculture community have to say about this historic victory.

A look back at four years of progress was originally published in Engage Cuba on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Introduction: A Changing Cuba

Over the past decade, Cuba’s economy has changed significantly. In the age of Fidel, state-owned enterprises were king. Today, a new hybrid economy has allowed certain small- and medium-sized private businesses to grow, and there are 5,500 agricultural cooperatives in operation. Some estimates show that self-employment in Cuba has increased earnings potential by up to 250 percent. Cuba has also sought to ramp up its foreign investment, seeking over $2 billion per year and approving over 30 new projects in the Mariel Special Development Zone (ZED). But absent critical monetary and political reforms, the transformation under President Raúl Castro has not delivered the boom in GDP (gross domestic product) growth that Cuba hoped it would. The country’s GDP annual stagnation rate hovers around two percent, while its growth rate has fallen short of its target by more than half. Domestic production has slowed under the weight of the government’s burdensome regulations and opaque decision-making structure; exports fell by a third from 2013 to 2016. Lower real wages (adjusted for inflation) and tightened rationing have both accelerated Cuba’s brain drain and stimulated its black market.

Throughout this stagnation, President Castro and the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) have maintained a high degree of control over economic activity on the island. Though the era of Raúl ushered in a new class of entrepreneurs in Cuba, business owners must navigate a challenging environment. Cubans have yet to gain the ability to incorporate as a legal entity, import wholesale, or open a private practice in most white-collar professions. But despite such an onerous regulatory regime, self-employed Cubans have demonstrated an unwavering resourcefulness and entrepreneurial spirit. One thing that has undeniably helped to nudge the Cuban people toward entrepreneurship is exposure to the United States and U.S. travelers. A 2017 survey of American travelers to Cuba observed an astonishing level of engagement between ordinary people from both countries. Not only did virtually all recent U.S. travelers patronize private businesses in Cuba; a significant majority interacted with Cuban entrepreneurs and discussed economics, U.S. culture, and the internet.

Against the backdrop of early economic reforms in Cuba, the Obama Administration saw an opportunity. The President’s gamble on renewed engagement proved fruitful. Whereas over 50 years of severed ties yielded few benefits to the U.S., reestablishing diplomatic relations with the Castro government advanced U.S. national security interests. The U.S. State Department removed Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in 2015, clearing a path for a series of bilateral talks on joint counterterrorism, law enforcement, drug interdiction, human trafficking, and migration. The dialogues resulted in 23 agreements between the U.S. and Cuba, with 9 focused on national security. In early 2017, the administration ended the controversial “wet foot, dry foot” immigration policy, which since 1995 had entitled Cubans to expedited legal status if they arrived in the United States by land. Ending the policy led to a historic plummet in the number of Cubans apprehended by the U.S. Coast Guard. Under President Donald Trump, much of this national security architecture remains in place, and bilateral law enforcement dialogues have continued in Washington.

Despite the continuity of agreements with the United States, Cuba’s political and economic currents are ever-changing. On April 19, 2018, President Castro will relinquish his position as President of Cuba while retaining leadership of the PCC. The president will be chosen by the National Assembly, the members of which have been pre-selected by a combination of community and labor representatives and ratified by voters. The National Assembly will likely select Miguel Diaz-Canel, the country’s First Vice President, to succeed Castro. A generation younger than the revolutionary “old guard,” Diaz-Canel has historically been perceived as a political moderate. Though Diaz-Canel has sent mixed messages to the United States as he vies for the presidency, Cuba under his leadership would almost certainly have an eye toward modest economic reforms, particularly in currency unification. The transition will test the robustness of Cuba’s institutions and their ability to facilitate a stable transfer of power, as the country has not seen so dramatic a political shift since its 1959 revolution. While the Cubans appear to be taking institutional continuity quite seriously, a transition of this magnitude will inevitably introduce unknown variables into the equation.

The Expansion of Adversarial Power

On the United States’ doorstep stand two challengers to U.S. influence seeking to extend their global reach. China and Russia have successfully expanded their economic and political spheres of influence to Latin America. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson acknowledged this alarming trend when he warned that China is using “economic statecraft” to “pull the continent into its orbit,” while Russia continues to “sell arms and military equipment to unfriendly regimes.” In a 2018 statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) testified that both Russia and China pose hemispheric threats, and that Cuba’s leadership transition is “unlikely to alter continued cooperation” with either country.

“Economic statecraft” is an apt description for China’s growing portfolio of activities in Latin America. China is already the top trading partner for some of the region’s largest economies, like Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru. It appears to be disinterested in direct political manipulation, although it is certainly pursuing a broader geopolitical strategy. China has opted to use economic development in the region’s transition economies as a path to “long-term dependency.” For many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, there are few alternatives to reliance on Chinese capital. States with widespread corruption or nascent democracy often cannot, or will not, meet the lending conditions set by international financial institutions. Enter China, with little to lose and much to gain from dispensing short-term loans to a smattering of countries with ailing transportation and manufacturing infrastructure.

Meanwhile, Russia’s foothold is more modest, driven less by financial appeal than a targeted strategy of arms deals and energy investment. U.S. SOUTHCOM cited Russian intelligence and cyber capabilities as particularly troubling given its intent to actively undermine U.S. partnerships in Latin America. Russia has successfully courted the Bolivian, Mexican, and Nicaraguan armies into purchasing military helicopters. While Russia and China have not collaborated explicitly in the region, in many ways their efforts complement each other. Evan Ellis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies describes a potential scenario in which Bolivarian countries, backed by the security of Chinese financing, are emboldened to engage in risky behavior with Russia. No country in the Western Hemisphere better exemplifies this challenge than Cuba.

I. Russian Displays of Strength

Cuba and Russia have been intensifying their historically connected relationship for the better part of a decade. In 2009, Raul Castro visited Moscow for the first time since the Cold War, initiating a two-way series of official visits that culminated in 2014 with the signing of over 10 agreements for cooperation on education, health, aeronautics, energy, and infrastructure. Among the most significant terms reached were a €1.2 billion deal for thermal energy development, a $4 billion investment in 55 new infrastructure projects in Cuba, and a policy of 90 percent forgiveness for Cuba’s $32 billion Cold War debt. In 2015, Russia touted its growing military influence in the region by docking its massive Viktor Leonov intelligence vessel in the Port of Havana just one day before the U.S. and Cuba entered talks to normalize relations. As it has done in other Latin American countries, Russia intends to replace Cuba’s old Mi-8 helicopters. In late 2016, Russia and Cuba signed yet another agreement to modernize Cuba’s defense apparatus through 2020, which consists largely of assistance in maintaining Soviet-era weaponry. A Russian official had announced to parliament earlier that year that Russia planned to reopen the Lourdes signals intelligence base in Cuba, which had closed in 2002 after funding dried up. Other members of the Russian government have denied this intention.

It is no coincidence that Russia has further ramped up its involvement on the island in the year leading up to Cuba’s presidential transition. As recently as March 16, 2018, the Pentagon reported that Viktor Leonov had once again docked in Havana’s harbor. Meanwhile, Russian cars will soon join Chevrolets on the streets of Havana in greater numbers. After a 12-year hiatus, Cuba in 2018 resumed importing Russian Ladas, just 2 years after the Russian truck company Kamaz signed a delivery contract with Cuba. The Cuban government is currently engaged in joint talks with Serbia to open a Kamaz production facility on the island. Putin has also taken a keen interest in developing Cuba’s transportation infrastructure, as Cuba had requested over $370 million in foreign investment for roads, railways, ports, and airports. The Russian company RZD International is investing over $1 billion in railway development, with a goal to finish modernizing by 2030.

The heightened relationship is also apparent in the energy sector. With economic conditions in rapid decline, Venezuela has been forced to cut daily oil exports to Cuba by over 50,000 barrels; at their peak in 2007–2014, Venezuelan oil exports to Cuba averaged 105,000 barrels. This dramatic reduction in oil accessibility has forced Cuba to slash imports and ration energy across the island. Seizing an opportunity, Russia’s state oil company Rosneft resumed shipments of refined oil to Cuba for the first time since the 1990s. In the absence of sufficient investment for domestic energy production, the $105 million Rosneft deal represents Cuba’s gradual transition away from Caracas and toward increased exchange with Moscow. The two governments extended their initial deal in October 2017 to continue petroleum cooperation and expand Russian oil donations. In December of that same year, Venezuela backed out of a joint venture to modernize a Cienfuegos oil refinery. Taking its cue, Rosneft quietly began discussions to step in. The Russian electric company Inter Rao has also built four conventional power plants on the island since 2015.

II. Chinese Soft Power

China’s presence may not manifest as an ostentatious spy vessel, but its influence looms ever larger and bears serious consequences for U.S. interests. China is Cuba’s largest debt holder and trading partner, accounting for 22 percent ($308 million) of all Cuban exports and a full 28 percent ($1.88 billion) of total imports to the island. To put this in perspective, the value of Chinese imports alone exceeds Cuba’s total agricultural imports from around the world, which represent 80 percent of all food consumption in Cuba. China sources both industrial equipment and quotidian household goods, with electronics, appliances, and vehicles accounting for half of Cuba’s Chinese imports. Chinese Yutong buses and Geely cars are increasingly present on the streets on Havana; over 50 percent of Cuba’s automobile imports are Chinese. China’s fiscal reach, however, extends far beyond trade, and the powerhouse has already integrated itself quite successfully into Cuba’s economy.

As with Moscow, Cuba’s relationship with China has accelerated in recent years. A Chinese firm invested $500 million into a new golf resort, while a $120 million Chinese development loan will finance a new container terminal in Santiago de Cuba. In 2016 President Castro and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang signed approximately 30 bilateral agreements to enhance cooperation in energy, healthcare, agriculture, science, and industry, with a commitment from China to extend new credit. The two countries maintain a strong political relationship, in which Cuba has received assurances from China for zero-interest financing. In 2017, Cuban officials announced that Cuba had begun basing its international financial transactions on the yuan.

Like Russia, China has capitalized on Cuba’s energy crisis. Cuba’s sugar crops make bagasse, a biofuel generated from sugar cane, an attractive option for renewable technology. Chinese companies have plans to build 25 bioelectric plants in Cuba in the coming years to integrate sugar cane biomass and Marabou weed biofuel into Cuba’s energy mix. In turn, modernizing biomass energy production facilities will help Cuba attract investment for increased sugar production, with China optimally positioned as a major player in the process. Cuba’s ambitious plan to generate 700 MW of solar power will also be financed in part by Chinese contractors, who won bids for 3.9 MW and 4.4 MW solar projects.

China has moved to invigorate Cuba’s technology sector. The Chinese tech giant Huawei signed an agreement with ETECSA, Cuba’s state-run telecommunications company. The deal with Huawei, the third-largest smartphone manufacturer in the world, allows the firm to market its products on the island and facilitate the installation of broadband internet in Havana homes. Already, Huawei is responsible for powering hundreds of Cuban Wi-Fi hotspots. After Hurricane Irma, China granted Cuba a new credit line in order to rebuild and modernize Cuban electronic production. In early 2017, Chinese corporation Haier opened its first computer assembly plant on the island. There is little reason to doubt that China’s economic momentum will continue in Cuba, given its investment trends in the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Implications for the United States

In addition to the administration’s 2017 regulatory changes, actions under Secretary Tillerson have demonstrated a marked shift in the U.S. government’s attitude toward engagement with Cuba. In September of 2017, following reports of unexplained health symptoms affecting U.S. diplomats in Havana, the State Department ordered the departure of 60 percent of U.S. embassy personnel. All consular services at the embassy were suspended, which means that no visa applications for Cuban travel or immigration to the United States will be processed in Havana, and there is reduced support for American travelers on the island. U.S. personnel reductions also included the political affairs, human rights, and economics officers who would ordinarily monitor developments during Cuba’s transitional period. September’s temporary “ordered departure” status expired in early 2018, rendering the staff reductions permanent until the State Department actively reverses the policy.

I. A National Security Blind Spot

In April of 2017, 16 retired military flag officers sent a letter to former National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster urging him to continue a policy of engagement with Cuba. The officers highlighted not only the growing threat of Russia and China, who they insist will “rush into the vacuum” if the U.S. fails to engage, but the security risks of allowing existing collaboration to disintegrate. The U.S. and Cuba continue to hold bilateral dialogues regarding cooperation on a number of mutual security concerns, and these dialogues must continue unencumbered under the new Cuban administration. Renewed collaboration on aviation and border security paved the way for milestones in the U.S.-Cuba relationship, such as the restoration of commercial flights between multiple cities and the termination of the “wet foot, dry foot” immigration policy. In January 2017, the Obama Administration signed its final law enforcement pact with Cuba, which affected a wide spectrum of security issues: counterterrorism, cybersecurity, immigration, narcotics interdiction, smuggling, human trafficking, and money laundering.

These areas present less obvious but critical risks if the U.S. neglects its agreements or terminates bilateral talks. The U.S. and Cuba have acknowledged, for instance, a mutual interest in preventing terrorist activity in the Western Hemisphere. In the cybersecurity space, Cuba has shared intelligence on dozens of cybercrime cases involving the U.S., which has aided in implicating suspected hackers and alerting potential victims.

The U.S. and Cuba must also continue their shared efforts to curb dangerous maritime migration. A shift in migration policy that arose through negotiations between the Obama and Castro administrations resulted in a dramatic drop in Coast Guard maritime interdictions. The number of Cubans repatriated by the U.S. Coast Guard dropped from 1,465 in FY2017 to under 50 thus far in FY2018. While there is no current migration crisis from Cuba, a robust system for joint interdiction and repatriation between the U.S. and Cuba has helped prevent loss of life of migrants who attempt the journey by sea.

Further, President Trump has made the fight against cross-border narcotics trafficking a hallmark of his policy agenda. In a region rife with illicit drug trade, Cuba stands out as a relatively small market for narcotics despite the susceptibility to trafficking posed by its long coastline. Information sharing between the Coast Guard and Cuban authorities relieves the U.S. Coast Guard of some of the security burden in the Caribbean approaches to the United States. In 2016, Cuban officials signed a counternarcotics agreement with the U.S. after a dialogue with the State Department, Drug Enforcement Agency, Coast Guard, and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement. Since the agreement, the State Department reported that the U.S. Coast Guard and Cuba were sharing tactical information, coordinating responses to suspected drug traffickers, and had opened a direct, real-time line of communication between the two governments. Cuba has also aided U.S. law enforcement agencies by providing documentation and witnesses for drug trafficking cases within the U.S. court system. In turn, counternarcotics collaboration has stimulated information sharing on trafficking cases between Cuba and other Caribbean nations, creating a stable, more coherent system of prevention and apprehension in the region.

Cooperation on issues of mutual interest fluctuates with the broader climate of U.S.-Cuba relations. At the height of bilateral engagement, mutual security efforts flourished. But without continued U.S. engagement in the post-Castro era, one can easily imagine these critical agreements faltering. In the absence of adequate U.S. diplomatic staff on the island, Cuban officials have fewer open and accessible communication channels to Washington. And as Moscow and Beijing continue to bolster their security collaboration with Havana, the government under Diaz-Canel could increasingly lose trust in the U.S.’s commitment to existing security agreements. If this happens, it will compromise both U.S. and Cuban security interests.

II. The Waning of American Economic Influence

The United States has a choice to make as its relationship with Cuba arrives at a crossroads. The volatility of Cuba’s energy supply, market distortions caused by dual currencies, slow growth, and widening inequality will dial up the pressure on President Diaz-Canel to improve upon Castro’s economic reforms. The new president, anchored by old-school Communist Party decision makers, will certainly try to avoid a Mikhail Gorbachev-style snowballing of liberalization. But the fact is that irrespective of any future democratic ambitions (or lack thereof), Cuba is inching toward a market economy. The rest of the world has already gotten on board, but the train will soon leave the station. China may be ramping up investment, but so are U.S. allies like the European Union. U.S. companies continue to explore Cuban market opportunities, but most are severely constrained by statutory provisions of the trade embargo. Not only does U.S. withdrawal from Cuba shut American businesses out of a natural market; it hurts Cuba’s private sector and limits the ability of Cuban cuentapropistas (entrepreneurs) to interact with and learn from industrious Americans. Exchange programs like the ones organized by Cuba Emprende have given Cuban entrepreneurs opportunities to study and collaborate with U.S. startup incubators around the country before taking their new expertise back to Cuba. This, combined with the fact that U.S. travelers patronize private businesses in Cuba at much higher rates than European and Asian tourists, has directly tied the U.S. to the economic success of Cuba’s private sector. A failure to continue a level of Obama-era engagement is a rejection of both self-employed Cubans and the U.S. commitment to encouraging entrepreneurship.

III. Losing the Diplomatic and Geopolitical Game

Without eyes and ears on the ground, the State Department is losing its foothold in Cuba. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the U.S. could proactively respond to a political and economic environment in flux without the resources to collect and interpret information and maintain critical relationships. Further, neglecting the U.S.-Cuba relationship could have unintended consequences geopolitically. The Bolivarian states have only grown more closely aligned with Cuba in recent years, and the rise of Russian influence could lead to Putin’s exploitation of anti-American sentiment in our backyard. Nowhere is this trend more evident than at the Summit of the Americas. The ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance) states threatened to boycott the 2015 Summit if Cuba), were not invited. The tone of the Summit was conciliatory, but it remains to be seen whether the 2018 Summit can remain similarly diplomatic.

The U.S. also cannot advance its human rights agenda while holding Cuba in isolation. Violations occur in the dark, not under a spotlight. Leading international human rights groups, like Amnesty International, Oxfam, and Human Rights Watch, have repeatedly condemned the U.S. embargo on Cuba and urged the U.S. to pursue policies that allow for greater accountability and monitoring on the island. Meanwhile, the initial 2014 negotiations to restore diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba resulted in a pledge from President Castro to grant international human rights monitors access to the country. No monitors have yet been granted access, but this was the first time the U.S. received any such pledge on the issue.

Conclusion: A Way Forward

The U.S. cannot protect its own national security by turning its back on Cuba, which stands at the edge of a major political transition and consequential economic reforms. As adversarial powers move into the region, the U.S. cannot afford to be pushed to the fringes. Russia and China have already demonstrated their interest in and ability to become further engaged with Cuba’s economy. Fortunately, there are steps the U.S. government can take to shore up U.S. interests in Cuba and seize a unique opportunity to aid and empower the Cuban people:

· Fully staff the U.S. Embassy in Havana.

First, the State Department must commit to gradually re-staffing the U.S. Embassy, even in the absence of a satisfying conclusion to the health incident investigation. The State Department should reassign at least 50 percent of the departed embassy staff — roughly 20 officers — immediately. This first iteration of reassigned personnel should include sufficient consular officers to restart visa processing in Havana, if only at minimal capacity. The reestablishment of consular services is of utmost importance, as Cubans are currently being sent to U.S. embassies abroad for non-immigrant visas and to the U.S. Embassy in Georgetown, Guyana for immigrant visas — a trip few Cubans can afford. The State Department should also set a clear timeline for routine evaluation of embassy staffing. For example, the Department might choose to assign the remaining 50 percent of personnel to Embassy Havana after six months, provided there are no new reports of unexplained health symptoms. Alternatively, the State Department could outline a clear set of safety conditions that, if met, would trigger reassignment of the remaining 50 percent of personnel.

To help ensure that Foreign Service Officers can safely be reassigned to Havana, the executive branch should prioritize the investigation into the health incidents affecting U.S. diplomats and commit resources to protect the safety of U.S. personnel. The President and Attorney General should direct the FBI to cooperate more closely with Cuban and Canadian authorities to conclude the ongoing investigation into U.S. diplomats’ unexplained health symptoms. The government of Cuba has offered U.S. law enforcement considerable access to residences and commercial spaces in an effort to promote intelligence sharing. In light of the recent publication of a preliminary study in the Journal of the American Medical Association and a new theory from University of Michigan researchers, the FBI should return to Havana in the near term.

The State Department and FBI should also keep Congress informed of their progress and continue to offer classified briefings and public testimony as they learn new information.

· Promote U.S. economic engagement with Cuba where possible.

Even absent statutory repeal of the embargo, the executive branch can support the expansion of U.S. businesses into the Cuban market. This step serves as a crucial counterweight to Chinese and Russian soft power. The State Department can restart bilateral economic dialogues with the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade and Investment to discuss areas of mutual concern related to banking, labor, investment, trade, intellectual property, and telecommunications. Importantly, this would serve as a signal to the government of Cuba that the U.S. wishes to remain engaged in long-term economic activity.

Ideally, the President should direct the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to alter restrictions on U.S. commercial engagement with Cuba. In the fall of 2017, the President banned direct U.S. business transactions with entities on the State Department’s new “Cuba Restricted List.” The Administration should liberalize regulations on business with Cuba so that U.S. commercial engagement can continue unencumbered with the new Cuban administration.

Additionally, the Administration should not stand in the way of congressional efforts to expand trade in certain areas. A number of legislative initiatives in Congress take an incremental approach to improving commercial relations with Cuba. For example, one bipartisan bill would amend the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) to allow for the private financing of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.

· Facilitate U.S. travel to Cuba to boost Cuba’s private sector and increase people-to-people exchange.

It is well documented that the presence of U.S. travelers in Cuba delivers economic gains to self-employed Cubans and stimulates the exchange of ideas, values, and customs. Both the State Department’s travel advisory and the Trump Administration’s tighter travel regulations are having a chilling effect on U.S. travel at a time when this exchange matters most. The President last year directed OFAC to eliminate the “individual people-to-people” category of authorized travel to Cuba. While there are other legal avenues for travel, including group “people-to-people” travel, the President should direct OFAC to restore this category of individual travel in order to simplify the process for Cuba travel and grant Americans greater freedom. Individual American travelers in particular are significant contributors to Cuban private sector success. They are the ones most likely to patronize privately owned bed and breakfasts and restaurants, whereas the tour groups authorized under “people-to-people” travel often stay at large state-owned hotels rather than separate the group among several private homes.

The Dangers of U.S. Withdrawal from a Post-Castro Cuba was originally published in Engage Cuba on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Thursday, April 19 marked a historic transition of power in Cuba. Rather than seizing the moment as an opportunity to rebuild relations, the U.S. seemed further from Cuba than it had in decades. Just days before, Vice President Mike Pence had publicly snubbed Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez at the Summit of the Americas before publishing an op-ed with a similar tone. And when asked his opinion on the day of the transition, the President, perplexingly, responded with, “We love Cuba. We’re going to take care of Cuba.”

Mr. President, we are not taking care of Cuba. Depriving Cuba’s nascent private sector of its primary customers by tightening U.S. regulations on travel is not “taking care of Cuba.” Sending Cubans off on a costly journey to Georgetown, Guyana to get their visas is not “taking care of Cuba.”

But U.S. adversaries are, and they show no signs of relenting. Russia has extended a debt forgiveness policy of 90 percent to the Cuban government, alleviating them of nearly $30 billion in Cold War-era debt. Russian state firms have invested billions in 55 new infrastructure projects in Cuba, including a massive railway modernization project. In 2017, in light of Venezuela’s declining oil production, Russian state energy company Rosneft resumed oil shipments to Cuba for the first time since the 1990s. Putin has also expressed interest in modernizing Cuba’s military equipment and has more than once docked a colossal intelligence vessel named Viktor Leonov in Havana’s harbor.

China, too, has gotten cozier with Cuba. Following its quietly potent strategy of economic statecraft in Latin America, China has pledged to finance a new container terminal in Santiago and offered new credit options, including zero-interest financing, to the Cuban government. Chinese companies have announced plans to build at least 25 biomass plants and two solar power generators on the island, while Huawei, a Chinese tech giant, has an agreement with Cuban state internet provider ETECSA to install broadband internet in Havana. Already, Huawei powers hundreds of Cuba’s wi-fi hotspots.

These developments in our hemisphere are problematic for national security, as illustrated repeatedly by experts, including 16 retired military flag officers, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and Senator Patrick Leahy. The final law enforcement pact between Cuba and the Obama Administration increased cooperation on counterterrorism, cybersecurity, migration, narcotics interdiction, smuggling, human trafficking, and money laundering. Joint initiatives by the U.S. Coast Guard and Cuban authorities have proven fruitful, particularly in preventing drug trafficking, which the Trump Administration has claimed is a policy priority. But without continued U.S. engagement in the post-Castro era, we can easily imagine these agreements faltering. In the absence of adequate U.S. diplomatic staff on the island — which is at its lowest point since the 1970s — the U.S. has fewer avenues to advance our interests. As Moscow and Beijing continue to bolster their security collaboration with Havana, the new government could begin to favor new partners over the U.S.

Without eyes and ears on the ground in Havana, the State Department is limiting its own capacity for strategic policymaking. With Cuba forced into the dark under the embargo, the U.S. cannot advance its human rights agenda on the island. We cannot afford to give up our seat at the table while our adversaries increase their economic influence in Cuba. Instead, the U.S. should fully staff its embassy in Havana, promote economic engagement, and facilitate U.S. travel to Cuba, all of which help to bring stability and prosperity to a country 90 miles off our shores.

President Miguel Diaz-Canel is a seasoned bureaucrat, but he is not a Castro. He will face a real challenge in protecting the principles of Castro’s revolution while navigating monetary reforms that are critical to saving an ailing economy. His government will continue to seek foreign investment in almost every sector. Russia and China are not yet the political influencers they could be, but that day may well be on the horizon. The U.S. must get back in the game while a transitional Cuba and its new president are forced to decide their future.

Read the full Engage Cuba report on U.S. adversaries in Cuba here.

We Left a Void in Cuba. Now, Our Adversaries Are Filling It was originally published in Engage Cuba on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Engage Cuba, the leading coalition of businesses, trade organizations and civil society groups advocating for an end to the travel ban and trade embargo, co-published a “Heartland Survey” of voters’ opinions on U.S. policy toward Cuba. The poll, conducted by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, revealed that the majority of voters in Iowa, Ohio, Tennessee and Indiana from both the Republican and Democratic parties support free trade and travel to Cuba.

Cuba is the only country in the world to which the U.S. government prohibits tourist travel. Until Congress lifts the travel ban, Americans will continue to be prohibited from enjoying what is quickly becoming one of the most popular tourist destinations in the world. Congress should not be in the business of telling their own citizens where they can or cannot vacation.

As Cuba’s tourism industry continues to grow, Americans aren’t only missing out on travel. Cuba depends heavily on agricultural imports, which average $2 billion annually, representing a market where the U.S. used to be the No. 1 supplier, but has now dropped to No. 5.

There also is an immediate need for infrastructure improvements to meet the rising demand of foreign travelers. Two cornerstone sectors of the American economy — agriculture and manufacturing — are strongly positioned to address inefficiencies in Cuba and create jobs throughout the country.

The U.S. also is a world leader in clean energy technologies and production, including natural gas, wind power and biodiesel. Cuba has publicly declared its commitment to shift to renewable energy and is poised to reap the benefits of American energy exports. The Cuban government has expressed interest in building its renewable energy sector and set a goal of generating 24 percent of its energy from renewable sources by 2030, including building 13 new wind facilities. As the Cuban energy sector begins to look outward toward international trade, there are ample opportunities for American energy companies to export the infrastructure, technology and expertise that are much needed in Cuba. In prolonging the embargo, the U.S. not only prevents renewable energy companies from capitalizing on this opportunity, but it also ironically benefits foreign competitors, which have expressed interest in supplying wind turbines to the island.

It is clear that the embargo continues to suppress economic growth in Cuba and infringe on the freedom of Americans to travel wherever they choose and conduct business in a promising new market 90 miles off our shores. For this reason, we’re urging Congress to pass the Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act, Agricultural Export Expansion Act, and the Cuba Trade Act.

Restrictions on Cuba hold American businesses back was originally published in Engage Cuba on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

President Obama’s visit comes at a pivotal moment for our country. At a time of heightened political divisiveness in and out of Washington on nearly every issue, support for a new Cuba policy cuts through tired party politics. Seventy-two percent of Americans from both parties agree that it’s time for Congress to end the embargo and open the U.S. up for business and travel with our Cuban neighbors. The Cuban people overwhelmingly support this as well, as 97 percent of them favor ending the embargo.

There is ample room for American businesses across all sectors to gain a foothold in the Cuban market, especially in agriculture. Cuba imports 80 percent of its food from far away countries such as Brazil and Argentina. — James Williams, President of Engage Cuba

This agreement among Americans on both sides of the aisle, and in rural areas and cities alike, is why we launched Engage Cuba, a bipartisan coalition dedicated to ending the Cuban travel and trade embargo. We work with local community leaders and business people from across the country who can envision a future with renewed U.S.-Cuba diplomatic relations and can see the increased economic activity that comes with it. It is amazing to see bipartisan leaders across diverse sectors in states such as Tennessee and Ohio come together through Engage Cuba State Councils to stand united in their support for ending the Cuban embargo, and because of the possibilities ahead, that support will only continue to grow.

Renewed U.S.-Cuba relations is appealing to Americans because at the center of this burgeoning relationship is the core American principle of opportunity. Engagement with Cuba presents numerous prospects for U.S. businesses and the Cuban people. According to the Peterson Institute for International Economics, trade with Cuba could generate $4.3 billion in American exports.

There is ample room for American businesses across all sectors to gain a foothold in the Cuban market, especially in agriculture. Cuba imports 80 percent of its food from far away countries such as Brazil and Argentina. But if the embargo were to be lifted, Cubans could instead import fresh and nutritious food from its close neighbor, the United States, and American farmers could bring their products to a largely untapped market while delivering quality, affordable food to the Cuban people.

This is just one of the many economic opportunities President Obama witnessed during his visit to Cuba. With the need for infrastructure investment, telecommunications expansion and so much more, each day the U.S. cannot trade with Cuba is a missed opportunity. The current embargo halts job growth and economic development in places that need it most — both in Cuba and here in America. But these changes are not solely the responsibility of the U.S. In order to build on this diplomatic moment, Cuba has to do its part to continue to open its economy and support greater economic ties with the United States.

As the President embarked on his first visit to Cuba, and opened up additional possibilities to engage with Cuba in the future, he continued the significant progress made over the last year. Just recently, the U.S. and Cuba reached an agreement to commence commercial flights for the first time in 50 years. In a short time, millions of Americans will have the opportunity to visit Cuba and soak in its rich and vibrant culture.

We celebrated President Obama’s trip to Cuba as a historic moment, one that aimed to put an end to the conflict and tension that defined the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba for decades. After years of a failed policy, it is time for our country to engage with Cuba and ensure our foreign policy encourages opportunity that is good for both Americans and Cubans.

A version of this article was originally posted in Fox News Latino.

At center of U.S.-Cuba relationship is America’s core principle of opportunity was originally published in Engage Cuba on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

As the leading coalition of private companies and organizations working to end the Cuban travel and trade embargo, Engage Cuba wholeheartedly endorses President Obama’s decision to visit Cuba. This historic Presidential visit will benefit U.S. interests as well as the Cuban people. And it is a vital step towards reestablishing normal ties with our Cuban neighbors. After decades of destructive, isolationist policies towards Cuba, the Obama administration has taken multiple, meaningful steps to constructively engage with the island, making more progress in the last year than in the five decades prior.

Engage Cuba’s Policy Council Advisors have written extensively about some of the momentous developments we can expect to take place during President Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama’s trip in Cuba. Below, we’ve highlighted five of the most significant and symbolic items that we anticipate will take place next week in Havana:

1. A bipartisan congressional delegation will travel to Cuba.

Engage Cuba was founded in the spirit of bipartisanship, which is epitomized in our senior advisers’ collaboration on this issue. The robust bipartisan congressional delegation that will accompany the President on this trip underlines that U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba crosses party lines.

2. U.S. businesses will strike deals in Cuba.

As the Wall Street Journal reported, AT&T, Starwood, and Marriott all expect to sign business deals to operate in Cuba leading up to President Obama’s trip. It’s Engage Cuba’s stance that every deal that happens shows we’re moving forward and makes the whole process of U.S.-Cuba normalization irreversible. It also argues for why we need a full lifting of the embargo to get the major deals that we all want to see.

3. Human rights will be discussed.

President Obama will meet with his counterpart Raul Castro. Behind closed doors, as Engage Cuba Policy Advisor Christopher Sabatini suggests, President Obama will likely “press for the Cuban government to make good on allowing credible international monitors, such as the ICRC or the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, to come to Cuba to visit the country’s prisons and to assess the country’s human rights situation. Doing so will not only help justify Obama’s trip, it will also signal a big step in the country’s re-integration into the global order.”

4. President Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama will see first-hand the changes underway in Cuba.

Significant change is underway in Cuba. Private entrepreneurship is burgeoning, public Wi-Fi hotspots are sprouting up, citizens and residents can purchase and sell property, and civil society activity is expanding. As the President and First Lady — along with an entourage of correspondents — tour Havana, they will undoubtedly take note that Cuba is in an important moment of flux.

5. Baseball diplomacy will be in full swing.

The Tampa Bay Rays are scheduled to play the Cuban national baseball team on March 22. Derek Jeter will join the MLB to witness the historic game. The last time a major American baseball team visited Cuba was in 1999 when the Baltimore Orioles faced off with the Cubans. Engage Cuba Senior Advisor Luke Albee was there for the historic game, and Engage Cuba will be at the 2016 game to celebrate sports diplomacy once again. Not only is the President expected to attend the game, but there is also widespread anticipation that the MLB will reach a deal that would allow Cuban players to legally play in the U.S. big leagues.

5 Things We Expect to See on President Obama’s Trip to Cuba was originally published in Engage Cuba on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

With President Obama’s trip to Havana around the corner, Engage Cuba, the leading coalition of private businesses and organizations working to end the travel and trade embargo on Cuba, has created an analysis regarding benefits that U.S. agribusiness stand to gain in future trade agreements with Cuba. (See here for a full breakdown of state-specific opportunities.)

Significant opportunities exist for American agribusiness in Cuba — an island nation that imports up to 80% of its food. American producers and exporters of agricultural commodities and food products, as well as associated industries, stand to benefit from greater market access and increased trade with Cuba.

Yet, in order to capitalize on the opportunities for U.S. agriculture in Cuba, we must change U.S. policies that restrict financing and reduce the competitiveness of U.S. industry. American agribusiness continues to lose market share to the EU, Brazil, and Argentina due to current U.S. policies: the U.S. now ranks 4th in agricultural exports to Cuba. If Congress were to change U.S. policy on agricultural exports to Cuba, American exports would be more competitive and able to recapture lost market share in a country with 11 million consumers a mere 90 miles from our shore.

Key Points

• American agribusiness continues to lose market share to the EU, Brazil, and Argentina due to current U.S. policies. The U.S. now ranks 4th in agricultural exports to Cuba.
• Cuba’s agricultural imports are expected to grow as increased tourism fuels demand for food products, especially those of higher quality, and as remittances flow more freely due to U.S. policy revisions — all within the context of stagnant Cuban production.
• If Congress were to change U.S. policy on agricultural exports to Cuba, American exports would be more competitive and able to recapture lost market share.

U.S.-Cuba Overview

Cuba imports up to 80% of its food. In 2014, Cuban agricultural imports totaled almost $2 billion, nearly doubling since 2004. Cuba’s main imports include dairy (14%), soy products (13%), wheat (13%), corn (11%), rice (10%), and poultry (10%). The top U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba are poultry, corn, and soybeans.

As a result of U.S. policies, American agribusiness is losing ground to countries who are able to offer financing. The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) of 2000 prohibits U.S. exporters from extending credit to Cuba’s agricultural importers. Consequently, the U.S. fell from its position as the #1 supplier of agricultural products from 2003 to 2012; the U.S. is now Cuba’s #4 supplier after the EU, Brazil, and Argentina.

Significant opportunities exist for American agribusiness in Cuba, from exporters of agricultural commodities and food products to associated industries that will benefit from greater market access. Demand for high quality U.S. agricultural products is driven not only by the increasingly middle class Cuban population of 11 million, but also by remittances and tourism, which is expected to rise dramatically. In order to capitalize, we must change U.S. policy.

U.S. Losing Market Share in Cuba

Value of U.S. Agricultural Exports to Cuba

Prospects for U.S. Agribusiness in Cuba was originally published in Engage Cuba on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Under President Obama’s leadership, the United States has made more progress to change its relationship with Cuba in the last year than in the five preceding decades. After 55 years of a failed isolationist policy, it is clear that the time has come for a policy of engagement — and an end to the embargo. In spite of the advances that these recent regulatory changes have generated, U.S. businesses and American travelers are still prevented from taking full advantage of opportunities in Cuba because Congress has yet to lift the trade embargo and travel ban. Until Congress acts to end the embargo, the U.S. and Cuba will be hindered from making any truly major breakthroughs — a disservice to both countries and both peoples.

In order to get a better understanding of how far we’ve come, and where we’re going, let’s take a look back over the last year of changes in U.S.-Cuba relations.

Overview: U.S. Regulatory Amendments to Cuba Sanctions Since December 17, 2014

Overview: Since December 17, 2014

In addition to major milestones such as restoring diplomatic relations, re-opening embassies in Havana and Washington, reaching historic environmental and civil aviation agreements, and a variety of official delegation visits from both countries, the U.S. has made important changes to its regulatory framework toward Cuba.

Thanks to four rounds of regulatory amendments, the treatment of U.S. engagement with Cuba from a regulatory standpoint has changed significantly — though more remains to be done. Here is an overview of what has been done since that announcement and what further policy changes can and should be made to concretize the normalization effort.

Four Rounds of Changes: January 2015 — September 2015 — January 2016 — March 2016

The coordinated regulatory changes made by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR), respectively, are intended to implement the policy to engage and empower the Cuban people. Major changes in each round are outlined below.

TRAVEL

January 16, 2015:

· Facilitated travel to Cuba for authorized purposes in 12 categories by general license:

1. Family visits
2. Official business of the U.S. government, foreign governments, and certain intergovernmental organizations
3. Journalistic activity
4. Professional research and professional meetings
5. Educational activities
6. Religious activities
7. Public performances
8. Athletic and other competitions, and exhibitions
9. Support for the Cuban people
10. Humanitarian projects
11. Activities of private foundations or research or educational institutes
12. Export, import, or transmission of information or information materials

• Authorized U.S. travelers to Cuba allowed to import up to $400 worth of goods acquired in Cuba for personal use. This includes no more than $100 of alcohol or tobacco products.

September 15, 2015:

• Cruise ships and cargo ships authorized to go to Cuba without a special license.
• Authorized aircraft on temporary sojourn to remain in Cuba for up to 7 consecutive days and authorized vessels on a temporary sojourn to remain in Cuba for up to 14 days.

January 27, 2016:

Authorized travel categories were expanded to include:

• organizing professional meetings or conferences in Cuba
• disaster preparedness and response projects (included in “humanitarian projects”)
• professional media or artistic productions in Cuba (including movies, TV, music)
• amateur/semi-professional sports competitions, public performances, clinics, workshops, exhibitions

· OFAC amendments allow travel-related transactions by crews from airlines and vessels.

March 16, 2015:

· Authorized individual people-to-people travel by removing requirement that such educational travel be conducted under the auspices of an organization.

· Allow Cubans legally present in the U.S. to earn salaries and stipends beyond living expenses. For example, Cuban athletes, artists, performers, and others who obtain the requisite visas can travel to the U.S. and earn salaries in excess of basic living expenses

· Authorized certain dealings in Cuban-origin merchandise (e.g. Cuban rum or tobacco) by individuals for personal consumption while in a third-country, and to receive or obtain services from Cuba or a Cuban national that are ordinarily incident to travel and maintenance within a third country.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

January 16, 2015:

Authorized sale of certain communications items to eligible users in Cuba, including the sale of certain consumer communications devices, related software, applications, hardware.

September 15, 2015:

• U.S. telecommunications companies allowed to establish subsidiaries or joint ventures with Cuban companies and enter into licensing agreements with them to provide connectivity.
• Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction will be allowed to import Cuban-origin mobile applications into the United States and to hire Cuban nationals to develop them.
• Certain commodities and software for use in software development may be exported or re-exported to eligible end-users in Cuba.

January 27, 2016:

• General policy of approval for exports/reexports of telecommunications items that improve communications to, from, and among Cuban people.
• General policy of approval for certain commodities and software to U.S. news bureaus in Cuba whose primary purpose is gathering and dissemination of news to general public.
• General policy of approval for certain commodities and software to human rights organizations or to individuals and NGOs that promote independent activity intended to strengthen civil society in Cuba.

March 16, 2015:

· OFAC authorized the importation of Cuban-origin software.

FINANCIAL SERVICES

January 16, 2015:

• Allow U.S. financial institutions to open correspondent accounts at Cuban financial institutions to facilitate the processing of authorized transactions.
• Travelers allowed to use U.S. credit and debit cards in Cuba.
• Authorized travelers allowed to engage in transactions ordinarily incident to travel within Cuba.
• U.S.-owned or -controlled entities in third countries, including banks, will be authorized to provide goods and services to an individual Cuban national located outside of Cuba, provided the transaction does not involve a commercial exportation of goods or services to or from Cuba.
• OFAC will generally authorize the unblocking of accounts of Cuban nationals who have permanently relocated outside of Cuba.

September 15, 2015:

• All persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction will be allowed to provide goods and services to individual Cuban nationals located outside of Cuba, provided there is no commercial exportation of goods or services to or from Cuba.
• Banking institutions will be able to open and maintain accounts for Cuban individuals for use while the Cuban national is located outside of Cuba, and to close such accounts.
• Allow certain persons and all authorized travelers to open and maintain bank accounts in Cuba for authorized purposes and in order to access funds for authorized transactions.
• Authorize all persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to provide goods and services to Cuban nationals located outside of Cuba; and allow a number of other activities, including those related to legal services, imports of gifts, and educational activities.

January 27, 2016:

Added an authorization for depository institutions to provide financing for such authorized exports (non-agricultural).

March 16, 2016:

· Allow Cubans legally present in the U.S. to earn salaries and stipends beyond living expenses. For example, Cuban athletes, artists, performers, and others who obtain the requisite visas will be able to travel to the U.S. and earn salaries and stipends in excess of basic living expenses.

· U.S. banking institutions authorized to process U-turn transactions in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest. This provision authorizes funds transfers from a bank outside the U.S. that pass through one or more U.S. financial institutions before being transferred to a bank outside the United States, where neither the originator nor the beneficiary is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

· U.S. banking institutions will be authorized to process U.S. dollar monetary instruments, including cash and travelers’ checks, presented indirectly by Cuban financial institutions. Correspondent accounts at third-country financial institutions used for such transactions may be denominated in U.S. dollars.

· U.S. banking institutions will be authorized to open and maintain bank accounts in the United States for Cuban nationals in Cuba to receive payments in the U.S. for authorized or exempt transactions and to remit such payments back to Cuba.

REMITTANCES

*Note: These changes apply only to non-family remittances. The limits on family remittances were removed entirely in April 2009.

January 16, 2015:

Raise the limits on and generally authorize certain categories of remittances to Cuba and authorize banking institutions to process authorized remittances without a specific license.

September 15, 2015:

• Entirely removed the limits on donative remittances to Cuban nationals (other than prohibited Government or Cuban Communist Party officials), which had been set at $2,000 per quarter.
• Entirely removed the limits on authorized remittances that individuals may carry to Cuba, previously $10,000 for persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction and $3,000 for Cuban nationals.
• Depository institutions allowed to maintain accounts for certain Cuban nationals present in the U.S. in a non-immigrant status; no longer required to block such accounts if not closed before departure.
• Removed the $250 monthly limit on payments from previously blocked accounts held in the name of such Cuban nationals to more adequately allow access to funds for living expenses.
• Remittances from Cuba and from Cuban nationals in third countries to the U.S. authorized by general license, and financial institutions allowed to provide related services.
• Expanded general license authorized additional remittances to Cuban nationals in connection with the administration of estates.

EXPORT LICENSES & FINANCING

January 16, 2015:

• Regulatory interpretation of “cash in advance” is redefined from “cash before shipment” to “cash before transfer of title to, and control of,” exported items; to allow expanded financing of authorized trade.
• General license authorizing foreign vessels to enter the U.S. after engaging in certain trade with Cuba.
• General policy of approval for exports and reexports to Cuba of items for the environmental protection of U.S. and international air quality, and waters, and coastlines (including items related to renewable energy or energy efficiency).

January 27, 2016:

· OFAC amended regulations regarding non-agricultural export trade, and it is now possible for U.S. banks to provide direct financing for authorized exports to Cuba, as opposed to requiring cash-in-advance or routing through a third country.

· General licenses provided in a variety of categories, including:

• Telecommunications items that improve communications to, from, and among Cubans
• Certain agricultural items, such as insecticides and equipment
• Items for safety of civil aviation and safe operation of commercial aircraft

· Pending case-by-case review, authorization to export to some Cuban state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that “provide goods and services for the use and benefit of the Cuban people.” This includes items for agricultural production, education, food processing, public transportation, wholesale distribution, and construction of facilities for supplying energy (among others). (Exports to SOEs that primarily generate revenue for the state are excluded, along with military, police, intelligence and security services.) As before, the general policy of denial remains in place for any exports or reexports to the Cuban military, police, intelligence and security services.

March 16, 2016:

· BIS will generally authorize vessels to transport authorized cargo from the United States to Cuba and then sail to other countries with any remaining cargo that was onloaded in the United States.

SMALL BUSINESS PROMOTION

January 16, 2015:

· Certain micro-financing projects and entrepreneurial and business training, such as for private business and agricultural operations, will be authorized.

· Authorize commercial imports of certain independent Cuban entrepreneur-produced goods and services, as determined by the State Department, and U.S. sales to small businesses.

September 15, 2015:

· U.S. businesses in sectors such as construction, agriculture, shipping and telecommunications will be allowed to establish a physical presence in Cuba with a warehouse or office; may directly hire Cubans.

March 16, 2016:

· Case-by-case review for exports and re-exports of items that would enable or facilitate exports from Cuba or items produced by the private sector.

· Expanded the existing authorization for “physical presence” (such as an office, retail outlet, or warehouse) to include entities that engage in authorized humanitarian projects, non- commercial activities intended to provide support for the Cuban people, and private foundations or research or educational institutes engaging in certain authorized activities.

· Expanded the existing authorization for “business presence” (such as a joint venture) to include exporters of goods that are authorized for export or re-export to Cuba or that are exempt, entities providing mail or parcel transmission services or cargo transportation services, and providers of carrier and travel services to facilitate authorized transactions. The physical and business presence authorizations permit exporters and re-exporters of authorized or exempt goods to assemble such goods in Cuba.

SUPPORT FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE

January 16, 2015:

A licensing exception for export and re-export of certain products that provide support for the Cuban people in three areas: improving living conditions and supporting independent economic activity; strengthening civil society; and improving communications.

September 15, 2015:

License Exception no longer limited to sales or donations; intended to support other types of transactions, such as leases and loans of eligible items for use by eligible end-users.

March 16, 2016:

· OFAC will authorize the provision of educational grants and awards, and clarify that an existing authorization applies to the provision of grants and awards for the humanitarian projects authorized in OFAC’s regulations. This step will further enable U.S. support for educational projects in Cuba and U.S. participation in philanthropic efforts.

LEGAL SERVICES

September 15, 2015:

• Existing general license authorizing provision of certain legal services to Cuba and Cuban nationals was expanded to allow the receipt of payment for such services.
• General license authorizing persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to receive, and make payment for, certain legal services from Cuba or Cuban nationals.

AVIATION

September 15, 2015:

Case-by-case review policy for exports and reexports to Cuba of items to help ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft.

January 27, 2016:

• Allow entry into blocked space, code-sharing, and leasing arrangements with Cuban airlines.
• Authorized transactions by the crew of aircraft or other vessels.
• General policy of approval for exports and reexports of items necessary to ensure safety and safe operation of commercial aircraft engaged in international air transportation, including the export or reexport of such aircraft leased to state-owned enterprises.

EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

September 15, 2015:

• General license, additional educational activities involving Cuba and Cuban nationals, including the provision of standardized testing services and internet-based courses.
• Authorized academic exchanges and joint non-commercial academic research with universities or academic institutions in Cuba and travel-related transactions in connection with these activities.

NOTABLE INDUSTRY IMPACTS FROM JANUARY 2016 ROUND

Agriculture:

General policy of approval for exports and reexports of some agricultural items, but not those defined as agricultural commodities, which are governed by a separate license exception. Examples of authorized exports: agricultural equipment (hand tools or motorized); pesticides, insecticides, or herbicides; wood furniture; clothing manufactured from plant or animal materials; or cosmetics (unless derived entirely from plant materials). Items for use in “agricultural production” reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

Energy:

Case-by-case review for exports and reexports of items for use in construction of facilities for supplying electricity or other energy to the Cuban people.

Infrastructure:

Case-by-case review policy for exports and reexports of items related to food processing, public health and sanitation, residential construction and renovation, and public transportation; and for items for use in construction of:

• Facilities for treating public water supplies
• Facilities for supplying electricity or other energy to the Cuban people
• Sports and recreation facilities
• Other infrastructure that directly benefits the Cuban people

REMAINING ACTIONS THAT COULD BE TAKEN

By the Administration:

• Negotiate a settlement of the outstanding “certified property claims,” and support private negotiations to settle legal judgments entered against Cuba.
• Allow Americans to take advantage of medical advances in Cuba by licensing both clinical trials and sales of Cuban pharmaceuticals in the United States, and joint ventures between U.S. and Cuban pharmaceutical companies. Also, extend a general license to pharmaceutical companies to conduct clinical trials in Cuba.
• Issue additional guidance (via OFAC) to banks and financial institutions that would clarify concerns over potential enforcement actions resulting from processing authorized payments to Cuba.
• Remove regulations that expose third-country banks to U.S. legal sanctions for processing financial transactions between Cuba and third-country firms.
• Expand opportunities for the U.S. hospitality industry by creating exceptions within the hospitality sector for U.S. companies to operate in Cuba in ways that would directly benefit the Cuban people; i.e., construct facilities for medical tourism or rehabilitation centers.
• Allow philanthropic organizations to undertake projects in Cuba, provide payments to participating Cuban nationals and institutions, and require deliverables and reports at the end of the project.
• Allow U.S. insurance providers to insure U.S. and other foreign business operations in Cuba, as well as Cuban private business operations.

By Congress:

Eliminate restrictions on travel to Cuba, and on transactions incident to such travel:

o Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2015

Allow financing for agricultural exports to Cuba:

o Cuba Agricultural Exports Act

Fully lift all economic sanctions against Cuba:

o Cuba Trade Act of 2015

Allow American companies to build telecommunications infrastructure in Cuba:

o Cuba Data Act of 2015

What You Need to Know About U.S. Regulatory Amendments to Cuba Sanctions was originally published in Engage Cuba on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.