<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[EOS New York - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Top 21 Block Producer on the EOS Blockchain. Always adding value. Everything a Block Away. - Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/eos-new-york?source=rss----cd3133d6facd---4</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 10:14:30 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/feed/eos-new-york" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Uniting Stake-holder Incentives to Maximize Decentralization & Performance]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/eos-new-york/uniting-stake-holder-incentives-to-maximize-decentralization-performance-530af1560401?source=rss----cd3133d6facd---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/530af1560401</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockproducer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosio]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain-governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[staking-rewards]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Rose]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Oct 2019 14:37:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-11-14T20:04:28.319Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>A Possible Future for EOS Governance: Uniting Stake-holder Incentives to Maximize Decentralization &amp; Chain Performance</h3><h4>The Voter Inflection Point (VIP), Staking Rewards, &amp; Global Block Producer Performance Standards</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bnMAABDpV9hTtABioqMMlw.png" /></figure><h3>We’re Still Using Default Settings</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PPJdIeKcVQ8WP71PjtyWZw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Chinese Translation </strong><a href="https://decentium.org/eosnewyorkio/eos"><strong>Here</strong></a><strong>.</strong></p><p><strong>Korean Translation Link Coming Here Soon</strong></p><p>The EOS blockchain is a global billion-dollar DAO based on the EOSIO software. But as of today, there is very little that differentiates EOS from EOSIO. So little separates the two that it would be safe to say that EOS is mostly operating on the default settings of EOSIO. This is especially true with regard to governance, where very little has changed since launch.</p><p>Since EOS is a decentralized and independent community these settings can be changed at any time so long as there is 15/21 approval from block producers and underlying support from the token-holders that support them.</p><p>It is worth noting that EOS faces many obstacles, this only being one of them. Our focus on a particular issue is not to say that it’s the most important, but simply one that we can address sooner rather than later. <strong>This proposal is a significant departure from the default settings of EOS governance</strong>, but it is not beyond what is <em>possible </em>if token-holders agree that it is what is best for themselves as well as what is best for the blockchain’s security. It is when the interest of the individual and the interests of the collective are aligned that EOS will draw closer to an equilibrium point.</p><p>We don’t know if this is the answer but we’ve reached a point of maturity with the proposal where the most appropriate thing to do is to now release it to the community and allow it to take shape according to feedback.</p><p><strong>All numbers displayed are illustrative and should be modified following community discussions.</strong></p><h3>Summary of Changes</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DfaVuZ5nUcEemH6AIJQi2A.png" /></figure><p><em>Currently, the EOS incentive model is structured in such a way that it encourages behavior that is good for the individual but not necessarily good for the blockchain as a whole. This is because as a byproduct of seeking the greatest returns, individuals can erode one of EOS’ core value propositions: decentralization. Block Producer rewards are the most reliable and efficient way to obtain an EOS yield. Over the past year, best practices have emerged for most efficiently capturing this resource. A primary enabling factor is the 1 token 30 vote mechanism which has led to the creation of a codependent mesh of Block Producers who coordinate votes with one another. While 1 token 30 votes remains an issue, there are other contributing factors as well. Vote trading/buying/selling, Sybil attacks on block producer rewards via BPs operating multiple paid nodes, mining pools, and the mega-concentration of tokens on exchanges. Given enough time, these trends will continue. Eventually, control of consensus will cement into the hands of a few powerful actors. In order to prevent businesses from being deterred from deploying on EOS because of the perceived centralization the following changes and adjustments are proposed:</em></p><p><strong><em>About total inflation</em></strong><em>: it is proposed that inflation be adjusted and reallocated. Block pay and vote pay are reduced to 0%. 100% of inflation is awarded to token-holders through staking rewards via staking or lending to REX. This way, the CPU and NET resources that your tokens afford you is never diluted. The yearly inflation rate is modified from a percentage to a fixed number in order to reduce the effects of inflation over a long period.</em></p><p><strong><em>About voting:</em></strong><em> 1 token 30 votes is changed to 1 token 1 divisible vote where each additional block producer voted for further divides the total vote weight rather than multiplying it. Coordination of votes between large stake-holders is no longer possible. The ability to vote oneself into a BP spot with a large enough stake remains.</em></p><p><strong><em>About staking rewards:</em></strong><em> Voting diverts 50% of inflation you would otherwise receive; where 20% is earmarked or burned and 80% is sent to the block producer rewards pool. The 20% that is burned or earmarked upon voting creates a buffer that makes it always more profitable to self-stake than to self-vote. There now exists a general disincentive to vote.</em></p><p><strong><em>About the disincentive to vote: </em></strong><em>To counteract this disincentive and in order to maintain chain security, a voting inflection point (VIP level) is proposed and set at 30% of issued EOS. If total tokens voting relative to total supply drops below the VIP then staking rewards are toggled off, inflation is reduced and 100% of that inflation is awarded to block producers. Since this number is a percentage of total supply, the inflection point rises upward so that the relative security of the chain increases over time, as does the diversity of tokens voting.</em></p><p><strong><em>About Block Producer pay:</em></strong><em> Block Producers are now paid a percentage of EOS tokens in the reward pool based on rank, where each rank receives a fixed percentage of rewards in the pool with the highest percentage at rank 1.</em></p><p><strong><em>About Block Producer performance: </em></strong><em>Block Producers that miss greater than a specific percentage of the total rounds for which they are scheduled within a given pay period will not be eligible to claim pay for that period. Also, once this threshold is hit within a given period by any BP, the total inflation in the system, which is issued to all stakers and block producers, decreases rapidly during that period and refills slowly over time. This ensures that BP performance is a top shared priority for all EOS token-holders.</em></p><p><strong><em>About developer and token-holder attraction and retention: </em></strong><em>the addition of a staking model ensures staked resources never dilute. It can provide dApps with funding for EOS accounts and can attract token-holders to the platform.</em></p><p><em>The result of these proposed components in concert with one another allows token-holders to obtain returns without eroding decentralization, ultimately maintaining the core value proposition of the EOS blockchain.</em></p><h3>EOS Governance</h3><p><em>The collective decisions we make, how we make them, and the mechanisms we use to enforce those decisions.</em></p><p>This is a definition of governance.</p><p>In our opinion, the goal of EOS governance is to maintain a fluid balance between efficiency (throughput, scalability, speed, DX, UX, etc.) and security (decentralization, censorship resistance, cartel-proof, etc.) to provide a stable experience for users, developers, and code. The incentive structure that attempts to achieve this balance consists of at least two mechanisms: inflation and voting.</p><h3>Decentralization as a Value Proposition: <br>Death by a Thousand Cuts</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aqNtaXAMLJUlJHiDkx80pA.png" /></figure><p>Besides scalability, efficiency, throughput, etc., a massive part of the EOS value proposition is decentralization. “Enough” decentralization, or the belief that tokens are scarce, secure, etc. is partly what gives them value. Decentralization is why we’re here. Despite this, the current incentive model is structured in such a way that eroding this value proposition is far more lucrative than maintaining it. With a year of hindsight and an intimate understanding of each of the comprising mechanics of the EOS incentive model, one can observe that EOS is currently hurtling toward a more centralized system governed by a codependent mesh of large stakeholders.</p><p>This is the result of many factors, most notably:</p><ul><li>Voter apathy and vote capture tactics</li><li>Consensus’ lack of Sybil resistance</li><li>An incentive and ability to coordinate votes</li><li>A general lack of options to obtain an APR on token stake.</li></ul><p>If EOS’ governance and the underlying incentive model is not adjusted then it may eventually no longer offer decentralization as a significant value proposition and businesses may go elsewhere.</p><p>It may be that those who build decentralized applications will fear these issues and choose to deploy their ideas, talent, capital, and time elsewhere. We may never hear about these businesses who defer. They may not publish their criticism, they will simply go elsewhere. Once this effect is “felt” we fear it will be too late.</p><h3>The Prisoner’s Dilemma</h3><p>EOS is currently experiencing a prisoner’s dilemma paradox where those in power focus on protecting themselves and are fearful of the other participants. By avoiding the risk of trying to stop what is happening we end up producing a less optimal outcome than if we were to work together to identify the issues and propose a solution. We’ve spoken to large stakeholders who begrudgingly participate in the current system but feel as if they would be hurt if they tried to step over the line and stop it.</p><p>We try not to use the word “cartel” because that isn’t what’s happening here. There are many different perspectives, motivations, and organizations that comprise the majority of the token weight on EOS. <strong>We do not believe there is an issue with large token-holders voting for themselves and assuming a block producer spot. </strong>They paid for the tokens one way or another so this is their right and this proposal does not seek to strip token-weight of its fundamental power and value. It is only when that large stakeholder is able to dictate additional votes for BPs other than themselves to other smaller stakeholders who have no choice but to comply as they rely on the larger stakeholders votes. This coordination is the issue, not who signs blocks as a block producer. This is why we use the phrase “codependent mesh” because that’s what it is.</p><p><em>It’s very important to note that, in our opinion, no parties that are wittingly or unwittingly contributing to these issues are intent on damaging EOS. Quite the opposite, we believe most actors within the ecosystem have good intentions and long term views for the EOS blockchain in mind. But, like all of us, they are operating within the bounds of the incentive model built into the software, i.e. the EOS governance model. This proposal is not to place blame or paint villains, but to help the community identify the problems and to discuss a solution to them.</em></p><h3>The Arguments for Vote Buying</h3><p>Vote buying isn’t a huge problem but we do address it in this paper. We think it’s important to take a moment and to try and understand the motivation behind vote-buying on the surface level. It’s clear that we are in a bear market. During these times, token holders may be hurt because of the drop in token value relative to fiat. Block Producers, despite also being in a bear market, have the ability to generate new token returns from inflation. In an effort to keep token-holders from leaving the community, and to lessen their pain, many block producers decide to share rewards with those who vote for them. This is an act of kindness and it’s a great thing. It’s EOS token-holders being taken care of. We recognize this perspective and respect it. But we also recognize that there are other ways to achieve this end.</p><h3>The Issues</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*V1EXbp53p6mWh1jWbDYPJA.png" /></figure><p>In the following sections, we will demonstrate some of the issues that have resulted in the state of the chain today.</p><h4>The EOS Voting Mechanic Is A Sybil Attack Waiting To Happen</h4><blockquote><em>“In a Sybil attack, the attacker subverts the reputation system of a peer-to-peer </em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_network"><em>network</em></a><em> by creating a large number of </em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudonymity"><em>pseudonymous</em></a><em> identities and uses them to gain a disproportionately large influence.”</em></blockquote><p>EOS consensus is not Sybil resistant because a single actor may register multiple block producer accounts and multiply their voting weight at near-zero cost. Through one’s own stake, vote-trading, and offering “EOS mining” to token-holders, single actors are capable of controlling more than one spot in consensus. They can also control more than one, two, or even three or more accounts that are in standby positions. When businesses doubt whether or not consensus positions are independent of one another then those businesses may find other places to go.<strong> This is not hypothetical, this is happening now.</strong></p><h4>The EOS Voting Mechanic Is An Invitation To Mesh</h4><p>Compounding the lack of Sybil resistance is the fact that separate parties can coordinate and mutually ensure spots in consensus through vote-trading. When enough tokens have been obtained, one can leverage the multiplicative nature of token voting, i.e. 1 token == 30 votes, to create a codependent mesh of the same number and mutually ensure consensus spots. When the turnover rate of consensus becomes zero then the system relies on the benevolence of consensus instead of its trustlessness. <strong>This is not hypothetical, this is happening now.</strong></p><h4>Lack of Options To Obtain A Return</h4><p>EOS does not exist in a bubble, it competes against every other dApp blockchain platform where the concept of “staking rewards” is a common and expected incentive. Yet, EOS remains the holdout. Because EOS has ignored market demand for passive returns block rewards have effectively become “the only game in town” and have become a target as a result. Large token-holders can access block rewards through a myriad of tactics and strategies and provide very little beyond producing blocks in return. <strong>This is not hypothetical, this is happening now.</strong></p><h4>Mining Pools are an Accelerant Toward Centralization in DPOS systems: An Example.</h4><p>A mining pool is created which promises to return 80% of EOS tokens it earns from block rewards back to any EOS account that delegates their vote weight to a proxy that the mining pool designates and controls. This is wonderful for the token-holder because there are no other opportunities for returns for them at this time. The mining pool starts to accumulate votes. The mining pool uses these votes to propel itself upward in the ranks by voting for themselves and coordinating with others so that votes can be reciprocated.</p><p>The mining pool continues to climb the rankings and is able to offer more rewards to their voters. Once the mining pool is in the top 21 ranks they hit a ceiling. Now, the rewards have stopped increasing and each additional vote delegated to the pool incrementally dilutes the previous ones. This is fine for a bit since no more votes are needed… until another mining pool forms who promises 85% reward returns. <strong>The race to the bottom has begun</strong>.</p><p>In order to remain competitive, each mining pool will continue to raise the reward payouts until the absolute maximum has been reached. What do they do after that? They are free to create another block producer account, include it in their voting slate and ask others to do the same, earn more, and raise the payout ceiling. Concurrently, they also reach out to other block producers who do not have the votes to trade and request fees which buys them a spot in the proxy voting slate. This is fine of course, as the mining pool ostensibly has no desire to move these side accounts into the top 21 and affect consensus. That is of course until the competitor does it. Then they will have no choice. The race to the bottom continues. At a certain point, the ability for non-top-ranked BPs to compete evaporates. This is because when an EOS voter is presented the choice between an established mining pool offering a high return and a new mining pool still gathering enough votes to offer any return at all, they will mostly always choose the safe bet. There are few enough spots right now that new entrants can compete, but this may not be the case as the market saturates.</p><p>Because the incentive model allows it and encourages it, the EOS blockchain will continue along this path until it is firmly in control of the hands of the few. Its decentralization value-proposition is lessened or lost, and the value of the token may be damaged as a result.</p><p><strong>This is not hypothetical, this is happening now </strong>but we are just in the beginning stages. We can confirm that certain mining pools operate more than one block producer account with the sole purpose of generating more rewards to give back to voters. Centralized control is cementing.</p><h3>Additional Motivations: Profit, Prestige, &amp; Power</h3><p>It would be wrong if we were to purport that “profit” is the greatest and only motivation to obtain a block producer spot because it’s not. Prestige and power are two others. <em>Prestige</em>, being able to wear the badge of honor that is being a top 21 block producer and perhaps being able to leverage its halo effect into driving more traffic for an EOS-based business. And <em>power</em>, being able to have a seat on the “board” of the future of the decentralized internet. No matter what the motivation, those who possess the token weight to vote themselves into a block producer spot will be able to continue to do so in this new proposal.</p><h3>Flip the Model on Its Head</h3><p>By implementing the following proposal we can expect:</p><ul><li>Token-holders become their own mining pool.</li><li>Coordinating votes is made obsolete by a new voting algorithm.</li><li>Consensus is less susceptible to coordinated control. There’s neither a reason to own more than one BP nor does the voting mechanic enable it as much as it did.</li><li>Block Producer rewards are more evenly distributed across BPs.</li><li>Block Producer production performance is standardized, code-enforced, and directly in the interest of every active EOS stake-holder.</li><li>Greed can flourish or devour itself since the blockchain operation is always protected.</li><li>No more involuntary inflation, you choose to subject yourself to it.</li><li>Distributed resources afforded by the tokens one owns are guaranteed to hold the same relative weight as when they were originally obtained.</li></ul><h3>Changes to Block Producer &amp; Token Holder Incentives</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bSi0r1v7RgrBdYdesFMAOA.png" /></figure><p>The only current way to obtain a reliable return on EOS is to capture block producer and standby producer spots. We observe that the most effective way to do this is through vote-trading, buying, and other means of coordination between a handful of actors. Basically, attacking one of EOS’ core value propositions is the best way to earn a return. So, we must separate the core value proposition (decentralized consensus) from the greatest possibility for returns.</p><p><strong>We propose to remove the 1% inflation awarded to Block Producers entirely and replace it with new mechanics.</strong></p><p>In its place, we propose a new model that puts more power into the hands of the token-holders, as well as access to the greatest returns for using the blockchain.</p><p><strong>We propose to award all inflation to token-holders who stake or lend their tokens to REX.</strong></p><p><strong>A vote for a block producer is now a diversion of 50% of the inflation that a token-holder would otherwise receive into a pool that is distributed to Block Producers based on their rank.</strong></p><p>At a high level, inflation is now a voluntary thing rather than something that is forced upon a user. The choice for any token to not be staked or lent to REX and be used to cast a vote instead, allows others to earn more. If one chooses to only stake, they would receive the maximum reward possible, avoiding any dilution of resources or value and in most cases realizing a net gain of resources.</p><p>When a token-holder votes and diverts inflation from themselves to the BP pool, a portion of the tokens diverted are burned. This means that in nearly all circumstances voting would mean a lower return than if a token-holder were to simply stake for themselves which would reward them the full rate.</p><h3>BP Rank Percentage Pay</h3><p>Originally, we modeled a system where eosio.bpay was removed and pay was entirely allocated through eosio.vpay. We quickly found that this would be fatal to EOS as it would likely reduce the number of paid block producers to fewer than 30. The reason for this is that there are some actors with tens of millions of EOS and now that the voting model encourages voting for fewer BPs it’s reasonable to expect that they would vote entirely for themselves. One positive aspect of 1 token 30 votes is that it floods the market with so many votes (e.g. there are ~300MM tokens voting but 8.16BB total votes at the time of this writing) that eosio.vpay is relatively flat. But, when you reduce to a single vote for each token, one will end up with as many votes as there are tokens at the most. When a single actor controls 30MM tokens with only 300MM total votes it would mean they also earn 10% of the block producer rewards which inadvertently would reduce the number of paid block producers to begin with.</p><p>Any attempt to cap vpay at a certain level would likely result in a Sybil attack where the large actor would simply register a new block producer account and divide their votes among them thereby bypassing any cap.</p><p>The proposed solution is to then implement rank pay where each rank receives a percentage of total BP rewards rather than a flat amount (e.g. 5% for #1, 4.9% for #2, etc). This removes the ability for any BP to extract a large number of rewards that detrimentally reduce the total paid producers. But, this still creates vulnerability on the tail end of the rankings where votes are likely much less concentrated than the top, allowing the large actors to assume paid spots there. But, if we go back to the diversion model, the incentive to assume more of these spots is removed by the fact that staking will always yield more tokens than self-voting due to the portion burned.</p><h3>Block Production Uptime Determines Total Inflation</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wXuXHbn4yYSKBLrcL9-4hg.png" /></figure><p>By removing pay based on the blocks produced we remove any incentive to avoid missed blocks. Even so, the penalty applied for missed blocks was negligible (a few EOS) and in a case where votes are being coordinated with one another, votes are unlikely to change based on performance. We’ve seen this in practice, where a large token-holder/block producer was not producing blocks for 2 hours while only one BP signed a proposal for their removal. In order to avoid poor performance due to lack of an incentive or lack of active BPs, we introduce a global block producer incentive model directly tied to performance.</p><p>To encourage producers to maintain good uptime, the ability for any block producer to claim a reward needs to be removed whenever a threshold of missed full rounds is met. It’s possible for any bock producer to cause the next block producer to miss blocks or a full round, so we propose to decrease the total amount of inflation issued to all stake-holders during that same period as well. This penalty should be realized quickly and dissipate more slowly so that the effect is “felt” and that more time must be spent producing full rounds than the time spent missing them. As a result, for all stake-holders to maximize their returns, they need to ensure the reliability of every block producer in the top 21.</p><h3>Changes to the Voting Mechanics</h3><p>1 token == 30 votes is a large contributor to the current dysfunctional state and would exacerbate the issues identified in this proposal if left in place. We propose that we move from a system where vote weight multiplies with each additional producer voted to a system where vote weight divides with each additional producer vote for. Meaning, (Token Weight/ Number of Producers Voted For). This is similar to “one token, one vote” (1t1v) where a vote for a single BP will carry the most weight and reduces the ability to coordinate. It’s worth noting that this lowers the general approval threshold for producing blocks.</p><h3>The Voter Inflection Point (VIP)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HkPwH-nDANdn3qqxAO3E8Q.png" /></figure><p>Given that voting would now have an opportunity cost (50% of inflation is diverted to the block producer pool or burnt), it’s not difficult to foresee a situation where only a very small minority of the community votes at all, while the majority chooses to keep the inflation for themselves. For this reason, we are proposing a total token-vote threshold which we are calling the Voter Inflection Point (VIP).</p><p>The VIP is the minimum amount of votes that must be cast before staking rewards are “turned on” and awarded to token holders. If total votes fall below this threshold then only block producers receive rewards, which will ensure proper incentive to produce blocks. If total votes are above this threshold then all token holders who stake will receive rewards. We also propose that the VIP also adjusts over time based on total token supply. In this way, the VIP in a similar fashion to POW difficulty, which also adjusts based on the total hashpower present.</p><p><strong>New tokens issued annually are capped at a flat number of tokens per year when total votes are above the inflection point, and the amount of tokens per year reduces and is distributed only to block producers when total votes are below the inflection point.</strong></p><p>For example, a 50MM cap per year, rather than 5%, will mitigate never-ending compounding inflation. The total amount of inflation decreases each year relative to the total tokens in circulation, keeps block producer rewards in check, and creates an incentive to become an EOS token holder sooner than later.</p><h3>Examples:</h3><h4>Macro Example</h4><p>Assume the inflection point is 300MM. Above this number 50MM EOS are issued each year divided across each account that stakes or lends to REX. The total votes on-chain drops to 298MM. The total EOS issued per year is dropped to 10MM and distributed to BPs and Standbys using rank pay. Staking rewards for token-holders are suspended until the total tokens voting is 300MM or more.</p><h4>Micro Example</h4><p>A token holder has 10,000 tokens, stakes them, and receives 500 EOS per year. If the token-holder votes they receive 50% of the reward, divert 40% to the BP reward pool and 10% is automatically burned/retired or earmarked. The token holder’s annual yield is 250 EOS, 100 EOS is burned or earmarked, and 150 EOS goes to the BP pool.</p><p>We end up with a model where the desire for returns is allowed to thrive until it consumes itself without disrupting blockchain operations.</p><h3>Changes to Account Level Voting</h3><p>It stands to reason that the VIP value should be optimized for equilibrium and that every measure should be taken to ensure token-holders have the tools to allow for easier decision making to that end. Currently, a single account must vote with the same amount of tokens they have staked. Instead, we propose that we disconnect the number of tokens staked to be disconnected from the amount tokens voting which provides a better user experience. For example, a token-holder determines that they would like to vote only with 50% of their tokens and stake the other 50%. This change would allow them to do that within one account rather than be forced to split it into two.</p><h3>The Expected Effects</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-J1dAh_XJTl5_AOvbO7cZg.png" /></figure><ul><li>The total amount of votes will always hover near the inflection point, standardizing the capital threshold of attack against EOS.</li><li>Return-seekers would likely withdraw from voting unless it meant dropping below the VIP. The incentive to capture consensus is replaced and entities will choose to stake rather than register multiple BP accounts.</li><li>BPs primarily motivated by power and/or prestige can continue undeterred.</li><li>EOS consensus becomes more Sybil resistant because vote weight cannot be multiplied across BP accounts at zero cost. Every vote has a cost.</li><li>Coordinated votes cannot exist due to the divisible nature of vote weight. For relinquishing this power, large token-holders are compensated.</li><li>Proxies become primarily tasked with maintaining the VIP instead of focusing on which BPs to vote for.</li><li>There is likely global cooperation among all large stake-holders to maintain the VIP and optimize their stake.</li></ul><h3>Summary of Proposed Changes</h3><ol><li>Dynamic inflation is replaced with static inflation (e.g. 50MM flat per year vs. 5% of supply per year).</li><li>1 Divisible Vote replaced 1 Token 30 Votes.</li><li>Staking or lending to REX awards an account with staking rewards.</li><li>An account that votes for a BP diverts 50% of inflation away from itself and 10% is burned while 40% is sent to the BP reward pool.</li><li>If too few tokens vote then staking rewards are shut off, total inflation reduces, and 100% of inflation is now awarded to BPs until such time as the voting threshold is met again.</li><li>Accounts can now set the number of tokens staked and the number of tokens voting independent from one another within a single account.</li><li>Bpay and vpay are replaced with rank pay percentage.</li><li>Block Producer performance determines the total inflation within any given period which materially affects the returns of all stake-holders.</li></ol><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>We believe that these changes successfully separate return-seeking from governance with a failsafe that kicks in if voting and BP pay drops below a critical level and threaten chain operation. The incentive to coordinate votes is removed. Token-holders become their own “miner” and receive a return for staking or lending to REX. The traditional staking model guarantees that resources are not diluted over time and may attract new token-holders to EOS. EOS consensus becomes more Sybil resistant because votes are not multiplicative. Above all, the search for an equilibrium point between altruism and greed becomes a normal and necessary dynamic baked directly into the EOS governance model itself. We feel that potential businesses will feel confident and secure with this model from both governance and resource management perspectives.</p><h3>Approval &amp; Deployment Plan</h3><p>EOS is simply too large, too valuable, and too unpredictable to change all at once. Not only technically but culturally. With this in mind, it’s important that we understand that this proposal is written to describe a larger picture, and not intended to imply a simultaneous roll-out of all changes. Therefore, the following stages are proposed to implement changes slowly in an order that allows for the larger picture to come together with the least disruption at each stage. We have already begun the technical scoping for all the changes that we’ve proposed.</p><h4>Step 1:</h4><p>Adjust voting from 1t30v to 1t1dv.</p><h4>Step 2:</h4><p>Inflection point added, not turned on, no staking rewards yet.</p><h4>Step 3:</h4><p>BP pay adjusted to rank % pay, bpay and vpay removed. Block Producer uptime tracked on-chain for total rewards.</p><h4>Step 4:</h4><p>Account-level changes for allowing for staking &amp; voting to be two different amounts for one account.</p><h4>Step 5 &amp; 6 Simultaneous:</h4><p>Inflation rate adjusted, staking rewards turned on.</p><h3>The Authors</h3><p>This proposal was written through the combined efforts of multiple organizations and is not the work of EOS New York alone. Most notably, we would like to highlight the $10K USD equivalent donation that <a href="http://cypherglass.com/">Cypherglass </a>has made to fund the development of these changes. Thank you to everyone that contributed to developing and modeling these ideas.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/770/0*vBqhCg_S-Y-vdKo3.jpg" /></figure><p>EOS New York is a Block Producer Candidate on the EOS Blockchain</p><p><a href="https://www.eosnewyork.io/">Website</a> | <a href="https://www.twitter.com/eosnewyork">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://www.medium.com/@eosnewyork">Medium</a> | <a href="https://www.steemit.com/@eosnewyork">STEEM</a> | <a href="https://www.meetup.com/EOS-New-York/">Meetup</a> | <a href="https://t.me/eosnewyorkchat">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.weibo.com/eosnewyork">Weibo</a> | <a href="https://bihu.com/people/463496">Bihu</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=530af1560401" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/uniting-stake-holder-incentives-to-maximize-decentralization-performance-530af1560401">Uniting Stake-holder Incentives to Maximize Decentralization &amp; Performance</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york">EOS New York</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[EOS New York WAX Guild Candidacy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/eos-new-york/eos-new-york-wax-guild-candidacy-59246182f6cd?source=rss----cd3133d6facd---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/59246182f6cd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[wax]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosnewyork]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosio]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Rose]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Aug 2019 20:39:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-08-19T20:39:19.225Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Offering value across Technology, Community, &amp; Governance</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*v5XopVbtiayimkDf9C3nrw.png" /></figure><p><strong>EOS New York is excited to formally announce our candidacy as a WAX Guild for the Worldwide Asset Exchange.</strong></p><p>When WAX announced that it was launching its own EOSIO chain a year ago, <a href="https://steemit.com/eos/@eosnewyork/why-wax-choosing-to-build-their-own-blockchain-based-on-eos-io-isn-t-a-bad-thing">EOS New York was among the first to applaud</a>. The future of the blockchain space is many diverse chains working in tandem, and EOSIO has proven itself as one of the best blockchain software to enable this vision.</p><p>The WAX mission is also aligned with our vision of where gaming is headed as EOS New York believes that gaming is one of the most prime use cases for blockchain. For example, digital ownership of in-game items via NFTs (non-fungible tokens) or SFTs (semi-fungible tokens) are concepts only made possible through distributed ledger technology at this time.</p><p>NFTs and SFTs will evolve the gaming paradigm and WAX will empower a generation of new gamers that will ride this wave of change. In-game items that are so scarce that only a single one of a specific type may exist will likely change the way content is generated by game publishers. For example, what will be the purpose of replaying a raid, knowing that all of the NFTs or SFTs raid rewards have been claimed by other players? It’s likely that game design strategy and development will begin to revolve around tradable NFTs and SFTs. For some genres of games, notably Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPG), the very concept of “replayability” may be challenged because what will then be the purpose of end-game content once scarce items have all been claimed? Ultimately, new economic incentives and behavior dynamics will be introduced for gamers, game developers, and market makers.</p><h3>A Possible Future of Blockchain-powered Game Design</h3><p><a href="https://www.geekwire.com/2018/steams-top-sellers-2018-show-games-service-isnt-going-away-anytime-soon/">Games-as-a-service (GaaS) has already become the model</a> of choice for <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-aaa-game-1393920">AAA developers</a> with titles such as DOTA 2, World of Warcraft, Destiny, Fortnite,and Apex Legends topping the charts month after month. With the introduction of blockchain, NFT, and SFT scarcity, and royalty/micropayment structures, it’s possible that content will be consumed faster than AAA developers can create it. In such a future, AAA developers could become general world builders while freelancers and modding communities are able to build within these worlds, offering microcontent and making professions out of what used to be a hobby. Using the WAX infrastructure, a wealth of value can be created and published by these freelancers, funded through royalty payments enabled by underlying blockchain technology.</p><p>Decentralized gaming is exciting! There is a lot to look forward to with the EOSIO-based WAX blockchain.</p><p>Telling stories is part of what makes us human and gaming is one such powerful form. The team at EOS New York is excited to apply our EOSIO and blockchain expertise to help shape the story of blockchain gaming through WAX.</p><h3>Official WAX Guild candidate name</h3><ul><li>eosnewyorkio (<a href="https://wax.bloks.io/account/eosnewyorkio">https://wax.bloks.io/account/eosnewyorkio</a>)</li></ul><h3>Public Website URL:</h3><p><a href="https://eosnewyork.io/">https://eosnewyork.io</a></p><h3>Location of Company Headquarters</h3><ul><li>Cook Islands</li></ul><h3>Expected Location of Servers</h3><ul><li>Africa, South America, Europe, and North America</li></ul><h3>Current Employee List &amp; Pictures</h3><ul><li><a href="https://www.eosnewyork.io/about_us">Link here</a></li></ul><h3>Relevant Background Qualifications</h3><ul><li>Comprised of avid gamers, EOS New York is one of the foremost EOSIO block producers. The team produces on multiple public chains and was instrumental in launching the first EOSIO chain, EOS. EOS New York is a recognized contributor on matters of blockchain community, governance, technology, and adds value to every chain we touch. [For information regarding the team’s professional backgrounds, please see the “Current Employee List” link.]</li></ul><h3>Tech Specs</h3><p>We utilize a hybrid bare-metal and cloud solution to create a completely redundant system. Our bare-metal producing infrastructure is distributed over global data centers with backups in Google Cloud for completely reliable infrastructure.</p><p>Bare-metal producing node specifications:</p><ul><li>128 GBs — 1.5 TBs of RAM (as needed)</li><li>4–24 vCPUs</li><li>1+ TB of SSD Storage</li></ul><p>EOS New York’s bare-metal servers are reliably within the 1–2ms range for CPU processing, one of the fastest on EOS.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*mVw0PaQjQQWlzLPc" /></figure><p>For more information and design details please see our website: <a href="https://www.eosnewyork.io/tech">https://www.eosnewyork.io/tech</a></p><h3>Estimated Scaling Plan for Hardware</h3><p>EOS New York monitors blockchain needs ongoing. Scaling requires understanding the needs of the blockchain and developing an upgrade rollout accordingly, which will have many factors that will need to be evaluated. We will utilize bare-metal servers for high-performance block production and will upgrade servers as demand increases on the WAX blockchain.</p><h3>Community Benefit Project(s)</h3><ul><li>Manuals, guides, and written education materials</li><li>WAX Hardware Key support and manufacturing</li><li>User and Developer tool creation, including Transit API for seamless wallet and signature provider service</li><li>Since the WAX blockchain has unique needs, we will also survey the WAX landscape to develop the most in-demand Worker Proposal initiatives the community wants</li></ul><h3>Telegram &amp; Node Names for Testnet Participation</h3><ul><li>Telegram: @eosnewyork</li><li>Node Name: eosnewyorkio</li></ul><h3>Governance</h3><p>Blockchain affords people unprecedented ways to establish low-friction shared environments that rely more on alignment than coercion. Over the past two years working in EOS we had the benefit to observe and contribute to decentralized governance in action instead of theory. We have contributed to a number of both proposed and implemented governance improvements throughout that time and continue to participate in governance thought leadership.</p><p>We define governance as the decisions we make, the methods by which we make them, and the mechanisms we use to enforce them. EOS blockchain governance — where a common shared resource is present — can further be defined to include “a framework for incentive-driven decision making that finds an equilibrium point between efficiency and security”. Meaning, where is the optimal middle ground that achieves “good enough” decentralization while providing “good enough” end-user experience. Ultimately, our goal is to provide a stable, predictable platform for dApps that is also malleable enough that it can evolve and grow.</p><p>Governance is a topic many blockchains are continuing to iterate and evolve; and it’s not one size fits all. While many key principles such as on-chain decision making, code over subjectivity, are agreed on by many, there is still room for experimentation based on the community’s needs.</p><p>WAX’s governance system will primarily depend on token holder desires and involvement. We imagine the WAX community would desire to have a say on major decisions (e.g., buggy token contracts), but otherwise let the blockchain logic and Block Producers manage the day-to-day (e.g., code upgrades, resource management, and upgrades).</p><p>We have found success on EOS in listening to the community first, then proposing courses of action. We expect similar success with WAX by listening to what the community needs are and proposing technical solutions to suit token holder needs.</p><h3>Transparency &amp; Accountability</h3><p>EOS New York is one of the most accessible block producers in the ecosystem, available to explain, troubleshoot, and help in as many ways as we can. In our EOS blockchain candidacy, we proudly displayed our values and principles right from the start and we carry those principles with us into WAX. Feel free to contact us anywhere you see EOS New York, <a href="https://t.me/eosnewyorkchat">especially telegram where you can speak directly to our leadership team.</a></p><h3>Security</h3><p>We operate a security program that spans the entire organization and we strive to follow NIST best practices so that the entire organization provides a robust front against threats of all kinds. Our infrastructure uses Google Load Balancer which protects our nodes from DDoS and allows TCP termination on hardware devices. The connections are terminated at the edge and only valid connections are allowed to connect to the core. A whitelist firewall only allows traffic passing through the core network if it is explicitly allowed. We periodically conduct penetration tests against our own infrastructure so that we maintain the highest level of security for you, the token-holder.</p><p>We leverage multi-signature and smart contract-specific permissions structures so that our most critical permissions are protected while we safely engage on-chain.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AoURQC_g-pBtg_HQ" /></figure><h3>Link to Social Media:</h3><p><a href="https://www.eosnewyork.io/">Website</a> | <a href="https://www.twitter.com/eosnewyork">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://www.medium.com/@eosnewyork">Medium</a> | <a href="https://www.steemit.com/@eosnewyork">STEEM</a> | <a href="https://www.meetup.com/EOS-New-York/">Meetup</a> | <a href="https://t.me/eosnewyorkchat">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.weibo.com/eosnewyork">Weibo</a> | <a href="https://bihu.com/people/963496">Bihu</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/770/0*ssjv1oPoQ5-jI-EW.jpg" /></figure><p>EOS New York is a Block Producer on the EOS Mainnet</p><p><a href="https://www.eosnewyork.io/">Website</a> | <a href="https://www.twitter.com/eosnewyork">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://www.medium.com/@eosnewyork">Medium</a> | <a href="https://www.steemit.com/@eosnewyork">STEEM</a> | <a href="https://www.meetup.com/EOS-New-York/">Meetup</a> | <a href="https://t.me/eosnewyorkchat">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.weibo.com/eosnewyork">Weibo</a> | <a href="https://bihu.com/people/463496">Bihu</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=59246182f6cd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/eos-new-york-wax-guild-candidacy-59246182f6cd">EOS New York WAX Guild Candidacy</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york">EOS New York</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Your EOS Account In Safe Mode]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/eos-new-york/your-eos-account-in-safe-mode-86ad99fd8c40?source=rss----cd3133d6facd---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/86ad99fd8c40</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[key-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosnewyork]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eos-permission]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosio]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eos]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Rose]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:40:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-30T11:22:51.515Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Clever Permissions Management That Guarantees More Protection</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*37BQ0aZQ2lc_jahva-r9WQ.png" /></figure><p>EOS is one of the most flexible blockchains for developers and users alike. While this is so critical for developing robust dApp user experiences, its relative complexity can also lead users to sign transactions they otherwise shouldn’t be signing. We’ve seen many people claim they were the victim of alleged phishing or malware attacks since the launch of the EOS blockchain. The result is usually the owner and active key pairs are changed on an account by the attacker and the user’s tokens are liquidated.</p><h3>Permissions, Permissions, Permissions</h3><p>Permissions management is one of the most robust features of the EOS blockchain. In EOS, the 12 character account name is the most important asset and is the thing to which tokens are tied to. This is unlike Bitcoin, where the public key essentially serves as one’s account. Essentially, this difference creates the ability to manipulate keypairs by creating, deleting, or modifying them without affecting token custody.</p><p>What one can end up with is a list of custom permissions with linked actions. This allows for very granular control over who can do what with any key pair. Let’s take a look at EOS New York permissions as an example:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*uhgBAwKr8sO_i0sc" /><figcaption>The EOS New York permissions structure.</figcaption></figure><p>Because we’ve organized our permissions this way we can interact with the EOS blockchain in many ways relatively risk-free.</p><h3>Creating Custom Permissions is Not Good UX</h3><p>Creating a custom permission is relatively easy to do and is a great way to keep your account secure. If the custom permission’s private key is compromised, the attacker can only do whatever it is that the permission itself is authorized to do. While the benefits are great for an organization, this is a pain for the normal user because they can no longer seamlessly switch between applications without switching permissions as well. Who would want to do this for every dApp they interact with? No one, because it breaks UX.</p><p>This is not to mention the fact that many dApps hardcode the Active permission as the required permission to use their dApp. So, even if one creates a custom permission, the dApp will only accept Active anyway.</p><p>With the creation of a single permission, you will make your account safer and exponentially more difficult to become a victim.</p><h3>Your EOS Account in Safe Mode</h3><p><strong><em>WARNING: Before you begin please understand that modifying permissions on your EOS account can have irreversibly negative results if done incorrectly. Please pay attention, write down keys, double-check everything.</em></strong></p><p>We now understand that creating a custom permission to whitelist every action you want to do is not a good UX. What if, instead of creating a new permission that whitelists, we create a new permission that blacklists instead?</p><h3>Synopsis</h3><p>In short, we are going to create a sibling permission to Active using the owner permission and call it safemode. Then, we will linkauth undelegatebw to this new permission. <strong>This will make it impossible for your Active key to unstake your EOS.</strong> So long as your Owner and Active keys are different, even if you were to give away your Active key to an attacker they will not be able to unstake your EOS tokens and liquidate them. You can continue to add actions to this permission that you wish to blacklist from your Active key. This permission should then be stored in the same way that your Owner permission is stored, safely offline.</p><h4>Steps:</h4><ol><li>Ensure Active and Owner keys are different from one another</li><li>Use Owner Permission to create new child permission called safemode</li><li>Reset Owner Permission and store offline (consider Owner key a single-use key for security reasons)</li><li>linkauth undelegatebw to safemode</li><li>Stake the amount of EOS you want “kept safe”, leaving some liquid in your account to enjoy as you see fit.</li><li>Enjoy your new account in Safe Mode</li></ol><h3>Step 1: Ensure Active &amp; Owner Keys Are Different</h3><p><a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/managing-your-eos-owner-active-permissions-c76bdaf24e6b">Please see this guide</a> we created in order to safely manage your Owner and Active Keys. If your keys are already different then you’re all set to move on.</p><h3>Step 2: Create Safemode Permission</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*0hpRXXcUCUhsH0O_" /><figcaption>Creating the new permission and assigning it a keypair.</figcaption></figure><ol><li>Generate a key pair for the new permission. We recommend <a href="https://eoskey.io/">EOS Key</a>, but most wallets will have a keypair creation tool. Please note, you should write this key down and store it offline in a safe place. This key will be able to unstake your EOS.</li><li>Log into Bloks.io via your Owner Key and go to Wallet → Permissions Manager</li><li>In <em>permission name </em>write: “safemode”</li><li>In <em>parent</em> write: “owner”</li><li>In <em>keys</em> write: [YOUR KEY]</li></ol><h3>Step 3: linkauth undelegatebw to safemode Permission</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*b5U-7y3AUPhdNEtc" /><figcaption>Tying the action you wish to blacklist to the safemode permission.</figcaption></figure><ol><li>Open <em>link/unlink auth</em> in the <em>List of Tools </em>sidebar in your wallet on Bloks.</li><li>In <em>permission </em>enter: “safemode”</li><li>In <em>contract name</em> enter: “eosio”</li><li>In <em>contract action </em>enter: “undelegatebw”</li><li>Click <em>Link Auth</em> button.</li></ol><h3>Step 5: Stake The Amount of EOS You Want to Lockdown</h3><p>You can use your Active key with your normal wallet to complete this function. Please note that you will not be able to unstake your EOS with your Active key and must use your Safemode key to do so. Your Safemode key cannot do anything else besides unstake.</p><h3>Step 6: Change Your Owner Key After Using</h3><p>This is not a required step but it is a best practice. Think of your Owner Key as a one-time use item. Once you use it, you should reset it and store it securely offline. <a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/managing-your-eos-owner-active-permissions-c76bdaf24e6b">Please see this guide for managing Owner and Active Keys</a></p><h3>Step 7: Enjoy</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qqGx7cgABZ3t-dHc" /><figcaption>Trying to unstake EOS with your Active Permission will no longer work.</figcaption></figure><p>If you try to unstake your EOS with your Active key then it will fail. If an attacker obtains your Active key he or she will not be able to take the EOS you’ve staked, only the EOS that remains liquid. To prevent this or any other action you can continue to add actions to the safemode permission such as: specific dApp token transfers, selling REX, EOS token transfer, etc.</p><p>If you wish to remove this permission, it can be deleted by logging into Bloks with your Owner Permission and deleting safemode from the Permissions Manager tab.</p><p><a href="https://github.com/EOSIO/eos/blob/5082391c60b0fa5e68157c385cd402bf25aea934/libraries/chain/authorization_manager.cpp#L328">Please note: this method will not work</a> for updateauth, deleteauth, linkauth, unlinkauth, and canceldelay actions. These actions are treated specially in EOS and are linked to every permission by default.</p><p>Your account is now in Safe Mode! While you are more protected now than you were, please note that you should always be aware of what you’re signing. This does not give you a license to be careless, but it does give you extra security. For even more security, please visit <a href="https://eosmetro.io/">https://eosmetro.io</a> and enter in your e-mail to be notified when the EOS Metro, the easiest to use Hardware Key for EOSIO, is released.</p><p><a href="https://eosmetro.io/">GO ANYWHERE. GO EOS.</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/770/0*5cfphQZJMWWuF8De.jpg" /></figure><p>EOS New York is a Top 21 Block Producer on the EOS Mainnet</p><p><a href="https://www.eosnewyork.io/">Website</a> | <a href="https://www.twitter.com/eosnewyork">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://www.medium.com/@eosnewyork">Medium</a> | <a href="https://www.steemit.com/@eosnewyork">STEEM</a> | <a href="https://www.meetup.com/EOS-New-York/">Meetup</a> | <a href="https://t.me/eosnewyorkchat">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.weibo.com/eosnewyork">Weibo</a> | <a href="https://bihu.com/people/463496">Bihu</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=86ad99fd8c40" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/your-eos-account-in-safe-mode-86ad99fd8c40">Your EOS Account In Safe Mode</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york">EOS New York</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Missing Piece to the EOS Incentive Model: Part 2]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/eos-new-york/the-missing-piece-to-the-eos-incentive-model-part-2-727aed48f817?source=rss----cd3133d6facd---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/727aed48f817</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[staking-rewards]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosio]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockproducer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosnewyork]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Rose]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2019 17:52:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-17T18:18:50.174Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A Technical Exploration Into The Mechanics of Staking Rewards on EOS</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZpVCgWoS41Jr443h2qwu7A.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://decentium.org/eosnewyorkio/the-missing-5">Check out this same post on Decentium</a>, a decentralized blogging platform built on EOS.</p><p><em>On 13 May 2019, EOS New York published a proposal to introduce staking rewards on EOS. Please go</em><a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/the-missing-piece-to-the-eos-incentive-model-bd39977d243f"><em> here</em></a><em> to read the full post.</em></p><h4>Summary of Part 1:</h4><p><em>The purposeful expansion of token supply (inflation) is a tool which underpins the EOS incentive model. The EOS incentive model, like all blockchain incentive models, is designed to encourage the necessary work that ensures long-term health and functioning. Currently, it only prioritizes block production, which is obviously vital for maintaining the blockchain. But, the EOS incentive model omits another piece of work critical to EOS, voting.</em></p><p><em>Voting is required to secure the network and choose block producers, but token-holders are incentivized to do neither. In fact, there is an opportunity cost to vote, where one sacrifices liquidity and time-value. EOS New York is exploring a staking reward in order to incentivize token-holders to vote which further secures the blockchain, further decentralizes the voting base, and completes the EOS incentive model which will in part ensure EOS’ long-term health.</em></p><p>In this article, we will revise some of our previous assumptions while exploring the technical feasibility and specifications to deploy staking rewards on EOS.</p><h3>Technical Specification &amp; Feasibility</h3><h4>High-Level Design Goals</h4><ol><li>Incentivize voter participation.</li><li>Incentivize voting for most block producer candidates possible.</li><li>Action(s) associated with claiming must be rate limited and not place a significant additional burden on EOS resources.</li><li>Mitigate the ability to game, abuse, or optimize reward claiming.</li></ol><h3>An Adjustment from Part 1: Using a Flat Rate Over a Dynamic One</h3><p>In part 1 (<a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/the-missing-piece-to-the-eos-incentive-model-bd39977d243f">which can be read here</a>) we discussed a dynamic rate which can adjust itself based on the total voter participation on-chain. A far simpler implementation includes a rate which remains flat and agnostic (e.g. X% unchanging). The fewer tokens that are participating, the larger the awarded portion of the total rewards available per token. The fewer participants the fewer times the reward pool is divided, the more participants the more times the pool is divided.</p><p>We are not proposing a specific rate at this time as we are just working through the development of how the solution specifically functions. The specific figures are better proposed once the mechanics of the solution are technically understood and the community has had a chance to provide feedback.</p><h3>Calculating Rewards Based on Vote Weight</h3><p>One’s first thought might be to simply award tokens based on total tokens staked. While this is a straightforward method it does not incentivize voting for more BPs over fewer. Therefore, we used vote weight over token-stake in our calculations to start.</p><h4><strong>Vote Weight Explained</strong></h4><p>The way EOS counts a token-holders vote is not as simple as 1 token:1 vote-weight. A calculation is performed when a vote occurs that encompasses both the number of tokens one is voting with and the time at which the vote is cast relative to all other older votes. <a href="https://www.eoscanada.com/en/how-is-your-vote-strength-calculated-on-eos">EOS Canada does a good job of explaining this.</a></p><p>The total vote weight is tracked by the system contract and increases with each additional BP voted for. (e.g. <a href="https://github.com/EOSIO/eosio.contracts/blob/master/contracts/eosio.system/src/voting.cpp#L287">#1</a>, <a href="https://github.com/EOSIO/eosio.contracts/blob/master/contracts/eosio.system/src/voting.cpp#L378">#2</a>, and other places)</p><p><em>“total vote weight” = SUM (“vote weight received by BP”)</em></p><p>What this means is that if a voter casts his or her vote for 20 BPs then his or her share of the total vote weight is 20 times higher than if he votes for 1 BP. By using this as the basis of our calculations we can reward voting for more BPs rather than fewer, meeting design goal #2.</p><h4>Understanding Vote Decay</h4><p>Vote decay was introduced in<a href="https://medium.com/eosio/introducing-eosio-dawn-4-0-f738c552879"> Dawn 4.0 of May 2018</a>.</p><blockquote><em>Much of the work we are doing since Dawn 3.0 involves tweaking the system contract. One of those tweaks is the implementation of vote decay. In order to maintain maximum voting influence, each voter will have to re-assert their vote every week. Voting influence decays with a half-life of 1 year for those who do not keep their votes up to date.</em></blockquote><p><em>“Vote decay”</em> is actually increasing weight of newer votes cast, not the decreasing weight of old votes. So, voters who update their vote will increase their vote weight even if their stakes stays the same (<a href="https://github.com/EOSIO/eos/blob/2ad412773d6ccc72045dae760ae3d81cf229c8ee/contracts/eosio.system/voting.cpp#L105-L108">link</a>).</p><p>The vote decay “cut-off” is 00:00 UTC each Saturday.</p><p>For example:</p><p>U1 casts their vote of 100 EOS on 11:59 UTC on Friday</p><p>U2 casts their vote of 100 EOS 00:01 UTC on Saturday.</p><p>U2’s vote weight will be 1.36% than U1 higher despite them both voting with the same amount of tokens.</p><p>All of this introduces an incentive to revote each week to receive the maximum and helps us meet design goal #1 &amp; #2.</p><h4>How Can Vote Weight Change?</h4><ol><li>Changing stake (e.g. delegatebw, undelegatebw)</li><li>Voting<br>- Vote weight can increase each time someone votes.<br>- Voting for a different number of BPs changes vote weight. (e.g. voteproducer which includes proxies)</li><li>Changing REX balance (e.g. buyrex, sellrex, withdraw)</li></ol><p>The total vote weight changes each time someone votes. Therefore, each voter’s share of total vote weight changes as well.</p><h3>Feasibility of using the Current BP Reward Per-Vote Algorithm</h3><p>The algorithm that outputs Block Producer reward based on votes, (eosio.vpay), similarly uses vote-weight in its calculations. Let’s explore the idea of adapting it to fit our purpose to reward voter action.</p><p>BPs per-vote reward algorithm is briefly described <a href="https://github.com/EOSIO/eosio.contracts/issues/20">here</a>.</p><p>The idea of the algorithm is to push rewards proportional to both vote weight and the time the vote weight has been held. Let’s call it <em>“vote weight-time”</em>. Vote weight for a BP changes when someone votes for a BP or votes for a new set of BPs where the original BP is no longer present i.e. the BP vote is removed. So, we have periods of constant votes that looks like: from time t1 to time t2 vote weight was W1, from t2 to t3 vote weight was W2, and so on.</p><p>So, vote weight-time accumulated over time:</p><p><em>“BPs vote weight-time” = SUM(“BP’s vote weight” * “time the BP has held the vote weight”)</em></p><p>Each time vote weight changes or a BP claims rewards <em>“previous vote weight” * “time since last change”</em> gets added to the BP’s balance (votepay_share).</p><p>It also calculates <em>total vote weight-time</em> which increases every time someone votes for BP directly, or proxy votes for BP (in this case BP receives votes from all users of the proxy plus votes of the proxy itself).</p><p>When BP claims rewards:</p><p><em>reward = BP’s votepay_share / total_producer_votepay_share * “amount in rewards bucket”</em></p><p>… and BP’s vote weight and total vote weight get decreased by “<em>BP’s </em>votepay_share”.</p><p>On top of that, the algorithm makes an adjustment to artificially lower vote weights which in turn lowers the total reward for a BP who doesn’t claim often enough to be considered “active”. Meaning, if “you don’t use it, you lose it”.</p><h4>Adapting eosio.vpay for Voter Rewards</h4><p>In order to use this same algorithm for voter rewards, we should update a voter’s balance every time the vote weight generated by a voter is changed.</p><p>As we’ve seen earlier, vote weight can change not only as a result of voter’s action but also when a proxy votes for different number of BPs.</p><p>But there is a problem, there is no way to update voter’s <em>“weight-time” </em>balance when proxy casts its vote, for 2 reasons:</p><ol><li>There are no “pointers” from proxy to its users, which means there is no efficient way to find voters whose data should be updated.</li><li>Even if we could find all users of a proxy, there can be too many of them and updating their data will require a proxy to have extremely high CPU and NET stake. This may also exceed the maximum transaction size.</li></ol><h4>Here is an example:</h4><p>Let’s assume there is a voter with 10 EOS who stakes and delegates his or her vote to a proxy that has voted for only 10 BPs. This means that going forward the voter generates the following weight:</p><p><em>10*stake2vote(10 EOS) per hour</em></p><p>One hour later the proxy changes its vote to 5 BPs, 9 hours after that the voter claims his reward. If we apply the algorithm as is then the voter’s <em>“vote weight-time”</em> will look like:</p><p><em>10 *stake2vote(10 EOS) * 10 hours = 100*stake2vote(10 EOS)</em></p><p>But in fact it is:</p><p><em>10*stake2vote(10 EOS) * 1 hour + 5*stake2vote(10 EOS) * 9 hour = 55*stake2vote(10 EOS)</em></p><p>So, we can record the correct vote weight for a voter when a user casts his or her vote. But, if he or she voted for a proxy we are not able to update their vote weight when the proxy changes the number of BPs it has voted for (which changes total vote weight). Furthermore, we would accumulate vote weight-time for the voter at a faster or slower rate than we otherwise should.</p><p>Incorrect accumulated vote weight-time will result in an incorrect share of total vote weight-time attributed to the voter. If shares have been miscalculated for one or many voters, then the sum of their shares may be no longer equal to 100% of the reward bucket. This may result in pushing higher rewards to some voters while others get nothing. Or in the inability of voters to claim all rewards generated for them.</p><p>In our example, the share of rewards calculated by the original algorithm is almost 2 times higher than the share of “vote weight-time” generated by the voter.</p><p>So, applying BPs per-vote reward algorithm as-is to voter rewards is not optimal and it would mean that we could not meet design goal #4.</p><h3>Adapting Block Producer eosio.vpay Algorithm to Account for Proxy Voting</h3><p>As we have seen in the previous section, we cannot always calculate the correct <em>SUM(“vote weight time”)</em> for voters who have delegated their votes to a proxy, therefore we cannot calculate their fair share of actual <em>“total vote weight-time”.</em></p><p>To avoid this problem we are going to push rewards based on their share of <em>“</em><strong><em>observed</em></strong><em> vote weight-time”.</em> We will record vote weight when voters make their changes. And we will update <em>“observed total vote weight”</em> at the same time. The observed total vote weight may be different from real total vote weight at some periods. But by definition observed total vote weight will always be exactly equal to the sum of observed vote weights of all individual voters.</p><p>The substantial difference here is that we are no longer interested in actual total <em>“vote weight-time”</em>. We intentionally and completely ignore the actions of proxies and changes to total vote weight caused by them with this change. But, we still use the number of BPs a proxy has voted for at the moment when a voter chooses the proxy. Next time the voter changes or updates his or her choice of a proxy, we will take the number of BP the proxy voted for again. But we won’t try to adjust to changes made by proxies.</p><p>Even the original algorithm for BPs per-vote rewards does not calculate <em>“total vote weight-time”</em> fairly but makes some adjustments for the purpose of stimulating BPs to actively claim their rewards.</p><h3>A Proposed New Requirement on Registered Proxies</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*FjWPXSo6CNCJqvuV" /></figure><p>While we have dealt with the issue of not being able to calculate rewards for voting accounts as their proxy’s votes change total vote weight, we’ve unintentionally created another one. By only checking the vote weight of a proxy on behalf of a voter at the time a vote is delegated a coordinated effort could result between the two where the proxy vote is higher when the voter delegates and is subsequently lowered once the vote weight is observed. The voting account will enjoy the maximum amount of rewards but with the lowest vote weight possible. This jeopardizes design goal #2.</p><h4><a href="https://medium.com/@auroraeos/an-overview-of-proxy-voting-on-eos-a748fb388db5">The roles and mechanics of proxies in EOS are described well in this post</a> by Myles Snyder, formerly of Aurora EOS.</h4><p>Voting has a large impact on rewards that go to block producers. These rewards should be distributed widely and as evenly as possible so that they may benefit a diverse set of interests and also so that they are not concentrated into the hands of a few. This understanding was effectively the reason for design goal #2.</p><p><strong>For this reason, and to avoid the loophole we’ve described above, we are advocating that an additional requirement be added to proxies; they must vote for a minimum of 21 block producers at any given time.</strong></p><p>This requirement is in REX for non-proxy voters but the proxy loophole remains (<a href="https://github.com/EOSIO/eosio.contracts/blob/c046863a65d7e98424312ee8009f0acb493e6231/contracts/eosio.system/src/rex.cpp#L568">link</a>). Any EOS account may still choose to vote for fewer BPs on their own, but they will not reap the maximum benefit of the work they’ve done to cast their vote and secure the network.</p><p>Now we meet design goal #2 &amp; #4.</p><p>As an added benefit, we completely remove the need to have a REX voting requirement at all as it becomes redundant with the staking reward proposal. We propose the community considers removing the requirement due to its redundancy.</p><h3>Effect of Voter Rewards on Resource Utilization &amp; Limiting Claim Frequency</h3><p>By implementing this proposal we will incentivize more token holders to vote, to vote more often, and to vote for more BPs. We propose that reward claim periods be once a week where the cutoff is the vote decay time of 00:00 UTC Saturday. This way, we limit incentivizing voters spamming the network with votes unnecessarily and helps meet design goal #3.</p><p>The claim action would be combined with the voteproducer action. This will mean an increase in the frequency of the voteproducer action and the cost of CPU and NET each time the action is called.</p><h4>NET increase example:</h4><p>Currently, voteproducer takes on average 1,767μs of CPU and 179 bytes of NET (<a href="https://eoscharge.io/">source</a>). Increasing the BPs included in each vote cannot increase the total NET per action beyond 352 bytes, which is the NET cost to vote for 30 BPs (<a href="https://bloks.io/transaction/e11e58129221ebc2f067909490ecde4effc837518c2ebc9c62a2e3f9734b7728">source</a>).</p><p>If all 1,257,993 accounts on EOS (total accounts at the time of this writing) directly vote for 30 BPs every week, it will take:</p><p><em>1,257,993*352 = 442,813,536 NET bytes per week</em></p><p>Theoretical total network capacity (2 block per second and 1,048,576 bytes per block):</p><p><em>1,048,576*2*7*24*3600 = 1,268,357,529,600 NET bytes per week</em></p><p>So, voting can take up to:</p><p><em>442,813,536 / 1,268,357,529,600 = 0.00035, i.e. 0.035% of NET</em></p><h4>CPU increase example:</h4><p>The CPU usage will grow with the number of BPs in the voteproducer action as well because a longer list of BPs takes longer to process. In addition, a new system contract will calculate observed vote weight-time, transfer funds to the voter, and sometimes issue new funds. Unfortunately, it’s hard to come up with reasonable numbers for these factors so we will include an exploration of this additional workload once we begin testing. Even so, we can still get a baseline from working through an example.</p><p>Based on the current average of 1,767μs all accounts voting every week will take:</p><p><em>1,257,993×1,767 = 2,222,873,631μs CPU</em></p><p>While theoretical total capacity (2 blocks per second, 200000μs per block)</p><p><em>200000*2*7*24*3600 = 241,920,000,000μs CPU per week</em></p><p>Utilization:</p><p><em>2,222,873,631 / 241,920,000,000 = 0.00919, i.e. 0.9%</em></p><p>Even if this number grew by magnitudes, it would still be a negligible increase.</p><h3>The New Dynamic</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*3LrfV_vIsZi2zm7u" /></figure><p>As a result of this proposal being implemented, we expect strong incentives to organically encourage more token-holders to vote once a week at the most, to do so with the maximum of 30 votes, and with little ability to game or optimize the system. As a byproduct, proxy accounts would now be held to the same standard of voting that individual accounts are per REX requirements, and REX requirements would be removed because this better solution now exists. Ultimately, by increasing the total tokens voting on-chain EOS will be more decentralized and secure.</p><h3>High-Level Design Goals Met</h3><ol><li>Incentivize voter participation. ✔️</li><li>Incentivize voting for most block producer candidates possible. ✔️</li><li>Action(s) associated with claiming must be rate limited and not place a significant additional burden on EOS resources. ✔️</li><li>Mitigate the ability to game, abuse, or optimize reward claiming. ✔️</li></ol><h3>Next Steps</h3><p>EOS New York will continue to develop the open-source code for this solution with the community and we welcome all contributions. Once completed, the code will be released for the community to decide.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*1qEjuOCpiXk_XW4o" /></figure><p>EOS New York is a Top 21 Block Producer on the EOS Blockchain</p><p><a href="https://www.eosnewyork.io/">Website</a> |<a href="https://www.twitter.com/eosnewyork"> Twitter</a> |<a href="https://www.medium.com/@eosnewyork"> Medium</a>|<a href="https://www.meetup.com/EOS-New-York/"> Meetup</a> |<a href="https://t.me/eosnewyorkchat"> Telegram</a> |<a href="https://www.weibo.com/eosnewyork"> Weibo</a> |<a href="https://bihu.com/people/963496"> Bihu</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=727aed48f817" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/the-missing-piece-to-the-eos-incentive-model-part-2-727aed48f817">The Missing Piece to the EOS Incentive Model: Part 2</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york">EOS New York</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[You Cannot Fake EOS Transactions & EOS Doesn’t Care About Their Intent, Origin, or Destination.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/eos-new-york/you-cannot-fake-eos-transactions-eos-doesnt-care-about-their-intent-origin-or-destination-d76c436bb5f4?source=rss----cd3133d6facd---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d76c436bb5f4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[eosio]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bots]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosnewyork]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Rose]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2019 17:52:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-14T14:26:20.267Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A response to AnChain.ai’s report and the subsequent media coverage regarding the evaluation of the transaction activity of the top 10 gambling dApps on EOS.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2QvLMQX9dIUOaxpnNI1Ttw.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://bihu.com/article/1390983592">Chinese Translation</a></p><p>Earlier this month, <a href="https://medium.com/u/4b408418dac1">AnChain.ai</a> announced that their proprietary platform analyzed the top 10 gambling dApps on EOS (they do not specify by which metric by which they determined their rank) and concluded that 51% of the total unique accounts and 75% of transactions associated with the <strong>underlying smart contracts on these dApps</strong> are the result of automated behavior a.k.a. bots.</p><p>As a result of this article, some media outlets wrote “New Report Finds Dapps Useless — Eos Users Are Mostly Bots”, in an attempt to delegitimize EOS itself.</p><p>Nevertheless, nothing in Anchain.ai’s report can be used to infer that EOS is any less fast, secure, decentralized, flexible, scalable or agile than it actually is.</p><h3>dApps are Useless?</h3><p>To start, we will forgive the sweeping dismissal the person responsible for this particular headline calling dApps useless in general. This doesn’t just attack EOS but also dismisses Ethereum, Tron, NEO and every platform that supports smart contracts as well. It ignores the exploitation of content creators across existing social platforms, the insecure way personally identifying information is stored, and the centralized consensus that rules much of the internet. But even so, EOS has only been live for one year. The UX/DX tooling and development infrastructure has only just started to take hold. Is it not prudent to allow more time for such a foundational technology to find its footing given its nascent stage, if not for EOS but for the dApp concept in general? Bitcoin has been around for over a decade, has it “won” yet? These things take time and organizations across the world are experimenting with decentralized applications more and more each day on EOS and other platforms. Despite this, we see a <a href="https://eosmap.org/">rich and diverse dApp ecosystem</a> emerging on EOS, <strong>again after only a year</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/790/1*R7Vojmz4vg1GeIPHGDICMg.png" /><figcaption>https://eosmaps.org</figcaption></figure><p>What this report and the supporting media demonstrates is that, based on their claims, neither AnChain.ai nor these media outlets understand the difference between the application layer and the protocol layer (i.e. specific product vs. agnostic product platform).</p><p>We are not interested in debating whether or not these transactions are driven by bots or humans. Nor do we wish to debate the intent behind the transactions at all because, frankly, EOS does not care about intent when processing transactions. <strong>Transaction intent of a subset of dApps is not important when evaluating the fitness of the EOS blockchain.</strong></p><h3>Addressing The Report</h3><p>From reading the report we can infer that its purpose is to establish the importance of “authentic” activity when measuring the value of a public blockchain platform or any applications built on top of it.</p><blockquote><em>We are in the early stages of the blockchain technology industry. A lot of new blockchain protocols and businesses are being created within this space, and more often than not, user activity, transaction volume, daily volume, and various other growth metrics are often used as proxies for how successful a DApp, protocol, or business is performing.</em></blockquote><p>They are half right.</p><p>Within the report, they correctly point out that inflating dApp activity may be intended to inflate the value of the underlying dApp token. If one is evaluating a specific dApp token for whatever purposes, this is problematic and likely deceitful.</p><blockquote><em>Most DApps are backed by tokenomics, meaning they have a token crypto asset that is actively traded across various crypto exchanges. If there is no trading activity for this token and the exchange where it is listed has an illiquid order book, the token asset will likely face sell-side pressure and decrease in value.</em></blockquote><p>Verifying that any business applications’ activity is authentic is foundational to understanding the value of any business overall. No one should refute this.</p><h3>Transaction Intent Does Not Alter The Intrinsic Properties of a Blockchain</h3><p>Here’s where the bias shows, an analogous situation to what is playing out now, but in the reverse with Bitcoin instead of EOS.</p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/cbovaird/2019/03/22/95-of-reported-bitcoin-trading-volume-is-fake-says-bitwise/#13dd94b66717">95% Bitcoin transaction volume is fake</a>, <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/exchange-volumes-may-be-fake-but-bitcoins-value-is-real">but its value is real.</a></p><p>Does bot-driven exchange trading transfer of Bitcoin make it any less secure of a store of value? Does surmising the intent behind a transfer in any way affect the intrinsic properties of the token or the underlying protocol? Of course not.</p><p>When an Ethereum smart contract is hacked and funds are captured, is Ethereum defunct as a smart contract platform? Is the consensus mechanism at fault? Or is it developer error?</p><p>Does surmising the intent of transactions on EOS mean that it’s any less able to support applications that require a high transaction throughput? Does it mean that the cost of development is more or less? Is governance affected? A dApp smart contract “inflating” its transaction count does not affect the intrinsic properties of the EOS blockchain.</p><p>If EOS were unable to support these transaction activity levels under normal circumstances, then we would have an issue. But these transactions aren’t “fake”, one cannot “fake” a blockchain transaction. The reality is that the infrastructure that runs the EOS software is real and distributed across the globe with 21 block producers and hundreds to thousands of validating nodes. It is collectively processing these transactions irrespective of intent, source, content, or destination. These transactions have upfront capital costs. EOS does not award resource discounts for bot-driven traffic, nor does it prioritize organic traffic. EOS doesn’t care about intent, applications do.</p><h3>Making Business Decisions</h3><p>When a business is evaluating blockchains to deploy on they are probably evaluating their direct competition. But based on the numerous “Why We Chose EOS” articles we’ve read over the past few months (example <a href="https://medium.com/effect-ai/effect-ai-brings-artificial-intelligence-to-eos-main-net-ead7e68e09fa">1</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/insightsnetwork/why-eos-over-ethereum-for-insights-network-7521aa4f7076">2</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/blockchainbeach/status/1115752980496568320">3</a>, <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/a-freelance-job-market-is-moving-its-700000-user-web-2-0-business-to-eos">4</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/@swirld/swirld-launches-this-summer-228f0f5ba365">5</a>, <a href="https://venturebeat.com/2019/04/13/why-we-built-our-blockchain-business-on-eos-instead-of-ethereum/">6</a>, <a href="https://sp8de.com/sp8de-on-eos-why-we-chose-it-and-what-to-expect/">7</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/scruge/why-eos-a11c6b744d46">8</a>, <a href="https://www.genereos.io/index.php/2019/04/16/a-deep-dive-with-the-boid-project/">9</a>, <a href="https://link.medium.com/ZVoIZevprX">10</a>, etc.) the overwhelming reasons behind their decisions to deploy on EOS were based on EOS’ ability to perform and realistically support their business.</p><p>To make their decisions, these businesses valued decentralization, throughput, capacity, token liquidity, governance, transaction model, security, cost of development, cost of resources core features, etc. These are the challenges answered by EOS at the protocol layer.</p><p>UX/UI, transaction intent, key management, etc., are challenges answered by the application layer. <strong>Generating “meaningful” transactions is the responsibility of the dApp, enabled by the EOS blockchain.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*d-Iw7zS_nxydFlop" /></figure><p>Could this volume level be “faked” on competing platforms even if attempted?</p><p>With 15,000 to 40,000 unconfirmed transactions at any given moment, we are guessing at least Ethereum could not at the current point in time.</p><p>We thought we would find a similar report for Ethereum activity published by AnChain, but we could not. We look forward to when AnChain publishes such a report with the same level of academic rigor as they did for 10 EOS dApps so that they can substantiate claims like the one they tweeted below, which touts “active addresses” as one the metrics contributing to Ethereum’s “victory” over EOS &amp; TRON. <a href="https://twitter.com/AnChainAI/status/1131310431639883777">Source</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/429/0*Nv4GFwfvasZJL1Ey" /></figure><p>We look forward to watching the EOS dApp ecosystem mature and for amazing businesses to continue to disintermediate, disrupt, and reposition power and influence back into the hands of the everyday value creators. VOICE by <a href="https://medium.com/u/54dca590e385">Block.one</a> will be a welcome entry in the space and will shed light on user authenticity metrics in general as<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-yU_hu_LGos&amp;feature=youtu.be&amp;t=474"> the platform will require one’s identity to be to verified</a>.</p><p>In the meantime, EOS will flourish. Many Block Producers, candidates, and developer groups around the world work around the clock to maintain the EOS blockchain and/or build open-source tools to aid the community in their development. <a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/the-transit-api-connecting-dapps-signature-providers-5d816c056f7f">Wallets and dApps can connect easier than ever before</a>, <a href="https://github.com/EOSIO/eos/issues/6332">updates are coming which will eliminate the EOS user’s need to manage their own resources on-chain</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/itam/introducing-itam-social-login-257eedcfbec8">and some have developed ways to abstract away private key management altogether</a>. Eventually, users will no longer know they are engaging with a blockchain-based dApp. This is where we are going together.</p><p>We are hopeful that nearly all blockchain platforms facing obstacles are able to surmount them because we are all still in a very small boat together. It will take a behemoth lift by the entire blockchain industry to move the world toward a more equitable decentralized one. In that world, many solutions will exist and EOS will be one of them. EOS New York will continue its work to provide world-class infrastructure, open-source software contributions, and actively participate in governance developments.</p><p>Lastly, here’s a list we compiled of EOS successes.</p><p>Thank you to <a href="https://medium.com/u/fe452ce4be24">EOS42</a> for contributing to this post.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IC3FYyIK4hNk-yyW.jpg" /></figure><p>EOS New York is a Top 21 Block Producer on the EOS Blockchain</p><p><a href="https://www.eosnewyork.io/">Website</a> | <a href="https://www.twitter.com/eosnewyork">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://www.medium.com/@eosnewyork">Medium</a> | <a href="https://www.steemit.com/@eosnewyork">STEEM</a> | <a href="https://www.meetup.com/EOS-New-York/">Meetup</a> | <a href="https://t.me/eosnewyorkchat">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.weibo.com/eosnewyork">Weibo</a> | <a href="https://bihu.com/people/963496">Bihu</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d76c436bb5f4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/you-cannot-fake-eos-transactions-eos-doesnt-care-about-their-intent-origin-or-destination-d76c436bb5f4">You Cannot Fake EOS Transactions &amp; EOS Doesn’t Care About Their Intent, Origin, or Destination.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york">EOS New York</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Road To EOSIO v1.8]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/eos-new-york/the-road-to-eosio-v1-8-b3aedb0d5098?source=rss----cd3133d6facd---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b3aedb0d5098</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[eos-block-producer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosio]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosnewyork]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Rose]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2019 17:52:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-04T20:01:12.172Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>What Needs to Happen and When Will It Happen?</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*F8-7mjFt3RIVWDvjLNsLuA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/721/1*jY2qFbl7Gji5xebG9EJh7g.png" /><figcaption><a href="http://t.me/EOSproject/1229008">Source</a></figcaption></figure><h4>Dan Larimer has stated that EOSIO v1.8 is Needed to launch VOICE, the social media platform announced by Block.One.</h4><p>Here’s how we get there…</p><h3>The First EOS Hardfork</h3><p>EOS benefits from a streamlined method of upgrading because it places many important features within a smart contract called eosio (the system contract), and EOSIO.contracts (eosio.token, eosio.msig, etc.). Smart contracts can be upgraded on EOS with relative ease, and Block Producers have updated eosio and EOSIO.contracts many times without issue (REX was one such upgrade). It is only when there are fundamental changes to the core code of the EOS blockchain that we require a “hardfork”. Examples of these changes are alterations to the methods and mechanisms for achieving consensus, or the structuring of block and transaction data.</p><h4>In the case of EOSIO v1.8 a hardfork is required.</h4><p>This is the first time that EOS will undergo this type of upgrade.</p><p><em>Please note that the use of hardfork in this case does not imply a new token will be created and the community will divide. This is not a contentious hardfork, but a coordinated one where 15/21 BPs will agree and continue the longest chain.</em></p><p>The following is a list of high-level considerations for the successful deployment of this upgrade.</p><h4>Stable releases of both EOSIO v1.8 and EOSIO.contracts v1.7 are required.</h4><p>Block.One released <a href="https://github.com/EOSIO/eos/releases/tag/v1.8.0-rc2">EOSIO v1.8 RC2</a> and <a href="https://github.com/EOSIO/eosio.contracts/releases/tag/v1.7.0-rc1">EOSIO.contracts v1.7 RC1</a> for testing and are in the middle of continued development as well as obtaining feedback from the eosio community. Both updates must occur for the new features to be activated.</p><h4>Block Producers will need to manually agree to an exact time.</h4><p>In the case of this upgrade eosio.msig cannot be utilized. Manual agreement to a specific point in time must be had among Block Producers and entered in as earliest_allowed_activation_time (<a href="https://github.com/EOSIO/eos/issues/7237">link</a>). This means that when BPs know, the community will know.</p><h4>All EOS nodes around the world must update.</h4><p>At a certain point during the upgrade all EOS nodes running v1.7.x or earlier will no longer sync, and their last irreversible block will stop increasing. This means that sufficient time must be given to all EOS node operators to prepare(dApps, block explorers, echanges, etc.) and there must be sufficient communication in many different languages to accommodate them. Besides understanding the upgrade process, the global community will also need time to test their own smart contracts against these new versions.</p><h4>Block Producers must practice and test.</h4><p>…And test, and test, and test again. Testing is already underway in the most popular test networks such as Jungle and Kylin. The importance of this cannot be understated as uptime is paramount.</p><p>The level of coordination required for this upgrade is second only to genesis launch of the EOS blockchain. Every dApp, block explorer, and exchange that touches EOS is required to participate.</p><h4>For these reasons EOS New York <em>conservatively</em> estimates 3–6 months from now for EOSIO v1.8 to be deployed successfully (sometime between September and December 2019).</h4><p>For a list of feature upgrades in EOSIO v1.8 please see the original post by Block.One <a href="https://medium.com/eosio/eosio-version-1-8-0-rc1-2d2d68995bbe">here</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IC3FYyIK4hNk-yyW.jpg" /></figure><p>EOS New York is a Top 21 Block Producer on the EOS Blockchain</p><p><a href="https://www.eosnewyork.io/">Website</a> | <a href="https://www.twitter.com/eosnewyork">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://www.medium.com/@eosnewyork">Medium</a> | <a href="https://www.steemit.com/@eosnewyork">STEEM</a> | <a href="https://www.meetup.com/EOS-New-York/">Meetup</a> | <a href="https://t.me/eosnewyorkchat">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.weibo.com/eosnewyork">Weibo</a> | <a href="https://bihu.com/people/963496">Bihu</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b3aedb0d5098" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/the-road-to-eosio-v1-8-b3aedb0d5098">The Road To EOSIO v1.8</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york">EOS New York</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Above & Beyond: Some Things Should Be Left “Unscalable”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/eos-new-york/above-beyond-some-things-should-be-left-unscalable-f81967beb432?source=rss----cd3133d6facd---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f81967beb432</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockproducer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosnewyork]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosio]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Rose]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2019 17:52:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-03T20:18:11.724Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A Thank You to an Invaluable Member of EOS New York and of the EOS Community</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*rpZX9dG-g7O-zYcdN4GyhQ.png" /></figure><h3>Sometimes “Unscalable” Is Good.</h3><p>EOS New York is a self-funded and independent group. We are diligent with how we allocate our time and resources and we make these allocations not just based on how impactful something can be, but just as importantly, how scalable it can be. Very often, companies follow this same ethos when they build out their customer relations or help desk services and outsource or automate as much of it as they can. At EOS New York, this is something we purposely chose to keep “unscalable”.</p><p>We would like to recognize an unsung hero of the EOS New York team, Evan Shepard, who for nearly a year, has spent hours upon hours communicating with new EOS users who are just getting the hang of things. He has helped EOS community members with managing keys, to voting, to REX , and everything in between.</p><p>While we work to scale out the EOS blockchain, we will always keep our customer-service attitude as “unscalable” as we can. We are proud that Evan is part of our team.</p><p>The following quotes are real pieces of feedback from real people (typos and all). We’ve removed any identifying information.</p><blockquote>Guys, @Evan_Shepard literally just walked me though almost 2 hours of help creating a scatter account and linking my ledger. In no other tg room would I have received help so quickly and thoroughly…im truly thankful and impressed with the timeliness and professionalism here</blockquote><blockquote>I want to thank @Evan_Shepard and the OESNY team for the help they gave me to open the account and have the wallet. On Friday after asking for help, Evan spent several hours Friday night until I could have my wallet. This is not the first time he does it, someone from OpenLenger4members told me about his good experience and that is why I recommended him to do it on this channel.</blockquote><blockquote>Ok awesome Evan thanks a lot for your help.</blockquote><blockquote>I read through the guide and so how I go… if I get stuck I’ll DM you … cause have had these for a while but it took a couple of months for the Exchange to get these converted 🤙</blockquote><blockquote>Thanks, also HUGE THANK U TO 👉 @Evan_Shepard for all his help getting my account set up properly. No way I could of done that on my own, without making a mistake! Cheers bud!</blockquote><blockquote>@Evan_Shepard Thank you for the help!</blockquote><blockquote>Thanks @Evan_Shepard excited to join. EOSny is one of my favorite BPs</blockquote><blockquote>Shout out to @Evan_Shepard for helping/guiding me through the entire process of getting my EOS off a NANO Ledger and into an EOS Wallet. I am really impressed by the patience this guy had with me. Thanks Evan for kindly spending all this time with me :D</blockquote><blockquote>Thanks again to @Evan_Shepard and everyone who has helped, big thanks</blockquote><blockquote>Thanks @Evan_Shepard!! Love the work you guys do! Keep up the great work! 😁👌</blockquote><blockquote>I would like to say huge thanks to @Evan_Shepard !!! he was really helpful and thoughfull. Without his help I would not probably be able to finish my fallback method. It was really nice and I am really grateful!!</blockquote><blockquote>@Evan_Shepard huge thanks for helping with the EOS move off the exchange and continued help, much appreciated</blockquote><blockquote>I just want to say that @Evan_Shepard has been helping me resolve my EOS issues since 4pm Eastern Time. He has been incredibly helpful and patient in guiding me through some issues and setting up an account. I offered to tip him but he wont allow it. This guy is unreal and we need more people like him in this community. Thank you so much man!!!</blockquote><blockquote>@Evan_Shepard was really helpful and patient. he guided me step by step to set up my greymass account and i really appreciate his help</blockquote><blockquote>@Evan_Shepard thanks for the awesome help mate and have a great day 👍👍😃😃</blockquote><blockquote>Huge thanks to @Evan_Shepard for helping me with my EOS crisis today! You have been an incredible help — much appreciated! 🙏</blockquote><blockquote>@Evan_Shepard This is the man right here! good thing i ran into him because he cleared up all my questions with the EOS wallet setup! AMAAZING HELP</blockquote><blockquote>@Evan_Shepard This man has helped me to link my ledger nano s to the scatter wallet. Top man</blockquote><blockquote>@Evan_Shepard really appreciate the help with alleviating my permission anxiety. ✊🏽thanks for taking the time.</blockquote><blockquote>Thank you @Evan_Shepard for your help and guidance on importing account on Ledger, You Rock buddy!</blockquote><blockquote>Finally my account is set I have to say a special thanks To Mr even that he guide me step by step to settle my account and now my tokens ready in the wallet and everything is perfect thank you man I hope to see eos token in the future in the best place and moon price soon</blockquote><blockquote>Very grateful to Evan and his team to help this community!</blockquote><blockquote>shout out to @Evan_Shepard for the last couple hours guiding my dumb ass through the prosess of setting up my account with Scatter and bloks.io!!!</blockquote><blockquote>I love EOS and Evan just solidified my love for this unit even more…… Best Community in Crypo!!! cheers brother</blockquote><blockquote>Thank 100 @Evan_Shepard for your help today morning</blockquote><blockquote>Excellent customer service and community management. We spent the better part of my opening going through the process of opening an account, sending transactions, staking, downloads, upgrades, woah! I leant a lot And after the process i see why EOS is King 👑</blockquote><blockquote>Thanks a lot to @Evan_Shepard for the detailed and clear understandable step by step help about EOS, how to claim, creating new account, voting, using wallets bloks.io and scatter, again there too a step by step explanation, it is a bit complex the whole EOS thing, but you helped very good, top support I appreciated a lot!</blockquote><blockquote>Exactly like that it should be in any support team. 👍</blockquote><blockquote>@Evan_Shepard thank you so much for the help and guide me to the all process, to finally get my EOS!!appreciated</blockquote><blockquote>@Evan_Shepard got me hooked up and got my Chintai working! Many thanks! My Ledger App was 1.0 instead of 1.2. Needed to update Ledger permissions and reconfigure Scatter as well.</blockquote><blockquote>Shout out to @Evan_Shepard for the awesome help. Don’t think I would have changed my owner and active keys but he helped me every step of the way.. and I’m finally able to use the eos blockchain</blockquote><blockquote>#evanshepard thanks so much for your help and patience with EOS. Greatly appreciate it. Evan is such a great asset to the Community!</blockquote><blockquote>Hey guys evan got me all fixed up using ledgar with me eos account. He was very very helpful. Thank you! @Evan_Shepard</blockquote><blockquote>evanshepard1 @evan_shepard helped me tonight ,i cant be more grateful for his help and patience .im new to this and he was able to get me through a difficult situation ,he even talked me down out of the tree a couple of time</blockquote><blockquote>Evan Shepard@evan_shepard this guy sure helped me out of a tough spot. so patient and never missed my call. spent 2 hours with me . i can sleep good now ..josh from eoscanada recomended evan and that was a good call. Thank to eos New York also .another vote for you guys and recommendments also.</blockquote><blockquote>Well dang. I had a problem and put a call out on a FB group. Some good peeps tried to help and then recommended I join this group and ask for Evan. I have to say a huge thank you to Evan for his patience and skill in helping me through my problem. @Evan_Shepard you are a legend and a true testament of where this crazy crypto world should go. Thank you again. Each one teach one. )’( If I’m ever in NY or you go to Burning Man, I’m going to shout you a cracking hangover.</blockquote><blockquote>@Evan_Shepard helped my do some things with my ledger/eos account. He was very helpful. Thanks!</blockquote><h4>Thank you Evan!</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IC3FYyIK4hNk-yyW.jpg" /></figure><p>EOS New York is a Top 21 Block Producer on the EOS Blockchain</p><p><a href="https://www.eosnewyork.io/">Website</a> | <a href="https://www.twitter.com/eosnewyork">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://www.medium.com/@eosnewyork">Medium</a> | <a href="https://www.steemit.com/@eosnewyork">STEEM</a> | <a href="https://www.meetup.com/EOS-New-York/">Meetup</a> | <a href="https://t.me/eosnewyorkchat">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.weibo.com/eosnewyork">Weibo</a> | <a href="https://bihu.com/people/963496">Bihu</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f81967beb432" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/above-beyond-some-things-should-be-left-unscalable-f81967beb432">Above &amp; Beyond: Some Things Should Be Left “Unscalable”</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york">EOS New York</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Missing Piece to the EOS Incentive Model: Part 1]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/eos-new-york/the-missing-piece-to-the-eos-incentive-model-bd39977d243f?source=rss----cd3133d6facd---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bd39977d243f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[staking-rewards]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosnewyork]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockproducer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosio]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Rose]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 18 May 2019 16:38:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-18T13:07:30.902Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A Proposal for Voter Incentivization Through Staking Rewards</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*D6lv-AjCV5KHP7X6" /></figure><h3>The EOS Incentive Structure</h3><p>“Inflation” is the primary tool which establishes the incentive structure of EOS. Slightly a misnomer, <em>inflation </em>in DPOS refers to the issuance of new tokens into circulating supply rather than any increase of the price of a particular basket of goods. There are two key groups that require incentive to keep EOS running, the block producers and the token-holders who vote. Block Producers are incentivized through a kind of <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/seigniorage.asp">seigniorage</a> of newly issued EOS tokens, which are rewarded in exchange for producing blocks and receiving votes (<a href="https://bloks.io/account/eosio.bpay">eosio.bpay</a> and <a href="https://bloks.io/account/eosio.vpay">eosio.vpay</a>). In this way, Block Producers are akin to gold miners, figuratively pulling resources out of the ground with the right to introduce them to the market. Their work is absolutely necessary for the EOS blockchain to exist.</p><p><strong>Voters, however, are <em>currently </em>excluded from any similar incentive.</strong> This is despite the fact that voting necessarily secures the network by increasing the capital threshold of attack on EOS i.e. the cost of purchasing enough tokens to install “malicious” block producers increases as total votes cast increases. Furthermore, a voter sacrifices token liquidity through staking as well as time-value in order to make informed votes. This is regardless of whether or not those votes be cast through direct staking, <a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/the-ultimate-guide-to-rex-participation-on-eos-9cc0e449b320">REX participation</a>, or delegating to a proxy.</p><h3>Equal Access for All Voters</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2IYX-Z6S7X_NUxjn" /></figure><p>Token-holders who vote, an act that is critical to the ongoing security of the network, should have access to token seigniorage within the base-layer incentive model otherwise EOS is operating with an incomplete model.</p><p>While some may argue that REX is a sufficient incentive to vote, it discriminates against one valuable type of EOS voter in particular, the type that actually uses the EOS tokens they own (e.g. the developer who builds a business on top of EOS). If a developer owns 1,000 EOS and stakes those tokens to access resources and vote, they are denied the same benefits as those token-holders who have no need to access on-chain resources and instead choose to lend them out through REX.</p><p><em>EOS New York proposes that newly issued tokens should be awarded at a dynamic rate to all token-holders who vote.</em></p><p>Through this, token-holders of every type who vote, without discrimination or exclusion, rightly reap the benefits of the base-layer incentive structure with which they were already expected to participate. This also creates an opportunity cost for those who choose not to vote, as the proportionate value of those that do will increase over time.</p><h3>The Dynamic Rate</h3><p>The rate of token issuance (inflation) should be dynamic and adhere to the following rule; the higher the <a href="https://www.eoscanada.com/en/how-is-your-vote-strength-calculated-on-eos">voting weight is on-chain</a> the lower the amount of tokens issued to voters is. The reasoning is simple, if the capital threshold of attack of EOS is low then this would incentivize token-holders to raise it. If it’s “high enough” then the rate can be lowered with each time incremental voting weight is applied on-chain.</p><p>The idea here is that we establish a minimum voting target of X whereby inflation will remain at the upper bound limit A until this target X is achieved. Every vote that incrementally increases the total voting weight on-chain past X target will decrease the percentage% rate of inflation until the lower bound B is met. After the lower bound is hit is any incremental voting weight is considered just as valuable.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/968/0*eAU98xW-IXi5it6C" /><figcaption>For illustrative purposes only. Final model pending feedback.</figcaption></figure><h4>For example (NUMBERS ARE FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY):</h4><ul><li>The minimum voting weight target is 75% while the maximum voting weight target is 90%.</li><li>The upper bound of the rate of token issuance is 2% inflation while the lower bound is 1% inflation. If the current voting weight is less than 75% of total possible than the maximum rate of 2% will be active.</li><li>If the current voting weight is between 75% and 90% the rate of inflation will be somewhere between 1% and 2%.</li><li>If the current voting weight is above 90% the rate is 1%.</li></ul><p><strong>This is for illustrative purposes only as we are still exploring optimal figures. Discrete numbers will be proposed following rigorous community discussion.</strong></p><h3>Voting Requirements</h3><p>It is worth noting that requirements to receive voting rewards, such as voting for at least <em>n </em>Block Producers, should be considered but were intentionally left out until technical requirements and feasibility became more clear.</p><h3>Conclusion &amp; Next Steps</h3><p>Voting is a fundamental pillar of maintaining a functioning DPOS blockchain and so it should be included in the base-layer incentive model. EOS New York, pending feedback from the community, will begin to develop the dynamic inflation rate values and explore the technical requirements of how exactly staking rewards would be implemented. Our stance on inflation, in general, is that it be reduced to a level which includes this program, which we view as a critical piece of the incentive model which operates and secures the EOS blockchain.</p><p>If you are interested in this discussion please join us in the <a href="https://t.me/eosnewyorkchat">EOS New York telegram channel</a> or leave your comment below.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/p/727aed48f817/edit">Please read Part 2 of this proposal here.</a></p><p>This article represents the opinion of EOS New York only. Thank you to <a href="https://medium.com/u/92f7ec102e17">Aaron Cox</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/u/fe452ce4be24">EOS42</a> for contributing to the development of this article by providing feedback.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IC3FYyIK4hNk-yyW.jpg" /></figure><p>EOS New York is a Top 21 Block Producer on the EOS Blockchain</p><p><a href="https://www.eosnewyork.io/">Website</a> | <a href="https://www.twitter.com/eosnewyork">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://www.medium.com/@eosnewyork">Medium</a> | <a href="https://www.steemit.com/@eosnewyork">STEEM</a> | <a href="https://www.meetup.com/EOS-New-York/">Meetup</a> | <a href="https://t.me/eosnewyorkchat">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.weibo.com/eosnewyork">Weibo</a> | <a href="https://bihu.com/people/963496">Bihu</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bd39977d243f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/the-missing-piece-to-the-eos-incentive-model-bd39977d243f">The Missing Piece to the EOS Incentive Model: Part 1</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york">EOS New York</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Ultimate Guide to REX Participation on EOS:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/eos-new-york/the-ultimate-guide-to-rex-participation-on-eos-9cc0e449b320?source=rss----cd3133d6facd---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9cc0e449b320</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[eosnewyork]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eos-titan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[staking-rewards]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosrex]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosio]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Rose]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 26 Apr 2019 17:51:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-08T17:18:38.568Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The What, Why, How, and Where for the Average EOS Token-Holder. Buy &amp; Sell REX in 3 Easy Steps.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*hRxy2_sxgxntFYd3" /></figure><p><strong><em>If you want to get right to purchasing REX tokens and skip the information then scroll down to “Where Can I Buy &amp; Sell REX?”.</em></strong></p><h3>Translations:</h3><ul><li><a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/gIfeotbCWhpLfiFkPPpEow">Chinese</a></li><li><a href="https://steemit.com/castellano/@josuepalacios/la-guia-fundamental-para-participar-en-rex">Spanish</a></li></ul><h3>When REX?</h3><p>The final step to deploy REX is likely to be proposed as early as 29 April 2019 and approved within the week. This guide will tell you all you need to know to participate in REX safely and smartly.</p><h3>What is REX?</h3><p>REX is short for “Resource Exchange” and is a novel creation <a href="https://medium.com/@bytemaster/proposal-for-eos-resource-renting-rent-distribution-9afe8fb3883a">first officially proposed by Block.One on August 8, 2018</a>. It is a marketplace created within the EOS blockchain that allows for the risk-free leasing of network resources (CPU &amp; Network)</p><h3>Why Do We Want REX?</h3><p>REX was originally proposed at a time when EOS was experiencing a high degree of congestion which affected the ability for the average user to transact successfully on-chain. Just as important, large decentralized applications (dApps) were voicing concerns over the rising cost and increasing scarcity of resources required to run their dApp.</p><p>At network launch, all tokens were staked and around 46% of these tokens remain staked today. When one stakes their tokens one essentially lays a claim to a percentage of network resources whether a user uses those resources or not. EOS rate-limiting algorithms, which govern resource allocation, take this into account. When a user is staking but not using resources it essentially becomes an inefficient allocation of these scarce resources. In short, fewer resources for developers to access and at a higher cost. REX introduces a leasing market to allow for token-holders to stake their tokens for the same reasons they did before (e.g. security, voting), but relinquish their claim on resources out to those that need it (i.e. dApp devs). This creates a free-market to more efficiently allocate on-chain resources.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*hHq-Uvt62fqqTl2Lgwe_QQ.png" /></figure><h3>Why should token-holders care? Because REX will pay token-holders to care.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*JswgLYG-W_0z3J7S0HRTLA.png" /></figure><h3>How Rex Works</h3><p>As REX is a resource exchange system, it shares similarities with the <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OQYfbEsyfixrOOUxfMtguRlDWAW0N5If/view">Chintai platform</a>. Specifically, the ability to borrow resources or lend available ones and receive a return. Contrary to Chintai, REX only allows 30 day loan terms but benefits from the ability to keep a user’s votes and retain full custody of their EOS. REX returns are based on the demand for network resources, that can be supplemented by fees from name bids and ram trading.</p><p>The rex system introduces the REX token, a non-transferrable, non-tradable token which represents a claim to economic activity within the REX pool, essentially it is an internal accounting unit.</p><p>Users can acquire REX by lending their resources. This can be from their liquid EOS balance, or directly from their staked resources, so don’t worry about unstaking prior to REX launch.</p><p>To curb market manipulation, purchased REX will be held in maturity buckets that cannot be sold until matured. These buckets mature at midnight (UTC time) 4 days after being bought. So if one buys REX on Monday 2pm UTC, they will mature on Friday at midnight UTC (~4.42 days). REX bought on the next day will go into a new bucket, allowing up to 4 buckets that mature on different days. A user can also consolidate different buckets into a new bucket that will start a new 4 day maturation process from the point of consolidation.</p><p>After REX is matured (~4days), it can be sold immediately, unless there is a liquidity crunch, i.e. not enough EOS tokens in the REX pool to cover the sale. As the REX value, relative to EOS, can only go up, it is impossible to receive less EOS than they initially exchanged. Therefore, REX tokens can be retained to continuously accrue value as a result of the economic activity within the REX pool.</p><p>Once REX matures it is as liquid as unstaked EOS. A compromised active key could allow a malicious user to sell all one’s REX and move the EOS tokens immediately. To address that, a savings feature into REX. Essentially, savings is a bucket that effectively never matures. One can move their maturing or matured REX into the savings bucket at any time. If ever removed, a minimum delay of the point of removal to midnight UTC that day + 4 days will be needed for the maturation process. This will allow some time for a user to use the owner keys to override any compromised keys and move the REX tokens back into savings.</p><h3>REX Participation Requirements &amp; rexcoreproxy</h3><p>To be eligible to buy REX, a user must be voting for at least 21 block producers or delegating their vote to a proxy. Users can quickly delegate that responsibility to rexcoreproxy; A proxy run by EOS New York and EOS Titan, two block producers that have been actively involved in EOS since before launch. For more information on rexcoreproxy <a href="https://www.alohaeos.com/vote/proxy/rexcoreproxy">visit the proxy portal here</a> or read <a href="https://medium.com/@eosnewyork/ux-is-king-the-rex-core-proxy-f2c463833e6c">the announcement post here</a>.</p><h3>REX Pricing</h3><p>The price of REX is affected by the demand of the resources and any additional system fees funneled to REX.</p><p><em>REX price = (Total Lent + Total Unlent) / Total REX</em></p><p>Users or dApps can borrow resources using the rex system. Fees paid for loans drive up the REX price as they go into the Total Unlent. The borrower only submits the payment and type of resource to the smart contract and receives delegated resources.</p><p>One can determine the exact payment required, to receive the desired amount of delegated resources using the following equation which is derived from <a href="https://medium.com/eosio/analysis-of-bancor-equations-supporting-rex-74ef4aaeca1c">Analysis of Bancor Equations Supporting REX</a></p><p><em>Loan Cost = Total Rent * Loan Amount / (Total Unlent — Loan Amount)</em></p><p>Example of REX Price:</p><ol><li>Assume there is 100 EOS in REX pool and 100 REX tokens, then REX Price (0+100)/100 = 1 EOS</li><li>A developer takes out a loan of 100 EOS worth of resources and pays a fee of 5 EOS tokens.</li><li>Total lent will increase by 100, total unlent will decrease 100 plus the 5 EOS fee.</li><li>New REX price is (100+5)/100 = 1.05 EOS</li></ol><h3>REX Strategy</h3><p>It is not possible to receive less EOS upon selling REX tokens than the amount of EOS a user started with. So, the strategy is simple, the earlier a user stakes to REX the better. Remember, once a user has purchased REX tokens they will want to move all of their REX to their “REX savings” <a href="https://steemit.com/eos/@eosnewyork/practice-safe-staking-one-easy-tip-for-keeping-eos-tokens-safe">which is the same as staking EOS tokens for the sake of security</a> (if the goal is long-term holding)</p><p>For a detailed list of REX Implementation actions and explanations, visit the <a href="https://github.com/EOSIO/eosio.contracts/issues/117#">EOSIO contracts github here</a>.</p><h3>Where Can I Buy &amp; Sell REX?</h3><p>We have reviewed nearly half a dozen REX interfaces and are happy to present our recommendations for the easiest and most intuitive of the bunch.</p><p><strong>Please note that many of these links will not be live until REX is live. Each platform was kind enough to give us advance access in order to create this guide.</strong></p><h3>RECOMMENDED: EOS Titan REX in 3 Steps</h3><h4><a href="https://eostitan.com/rex">Link Here</a>: <a href="https://eostitan.com/rex">https://eostitan.com/rex</a></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*5FZFIXzoF1JLE1Lf" /></figure><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/6103d67e103d">EOS Titan</a> has created an intuitive and simple user interface for REX which will take less than 2 minutes to use and in only 3 easy steps. It leverages the <a href="https://www.eostransit.com/">Transit API</a> to enable direct login using Scatter or Ledger on the desktop or through one’s favourite mobile wallet. Visit [<a href="https://eostitan.com/rex">https://eostitan.com/rex</a>].</p><p><strong>Step 1: </strong>Login with the preferred method</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AKgKn3Mt1jgZvaeI" /></figure><p><strong>Step 2:</strong> Confirm vote for proxy. We recommend rexcoreproxy managed by both EOS New York and EOS Titan. REX Core Proxy is focused on supporting all REX UI builders within EOS as well as general UI builders. To see the list of BPs the proxy is voting for, <a href="https://www.alohaeos.com/vote/proxy/rexcoreproxy">please visit here</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*kdCe8hP2jkvpAMw1" /></figure><p><strong>Step 3</strong>: Buy/Sell REX. Lend all EOS or the desired amount.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*OjAHIW8zlOYvNQ7c" /></figure><p><strong>Moving to Savings:</strong> From here, users will want to move REX tokens they purchased into savings if they are not planning on selling at the end of the ~4 day maturation period. Click on the <em>Manage</em> tab and click on <em>Savings</em> in the <em>REX </em>table which is outlined below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*bz-5HucRcGdEJWFs" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Mm7rmMDG2BcXCrWI" /></figure><h4>Selling REX (Once matured)</h4><p>Once a user’s REX has matured they are eligible to be sold. It’s very easy to do this.</p><p><strong>Step 1:</strong> Click <em>Sell REX</em> in the REX table</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*MvKhSRQ4rt_OYsAK" /></figure><p><strong>Step 2:</strong> Make sure the toggle for immediate withdrawal is checked and click <em>Sell [Number] REX</em>. This action sells REX tokens and moves the EOS from a user’s <em>Fund </em>into their liquid EOS account balance. <strong>Done!</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*vn-PeDNAzL27BBdc" /></figure><p>On the <em>Manage</em> tab users can:</p><ul><li>Buy/Sell REX</li><li>View REX Maturities Status <em>(Matures Fully In ~4 Days)</em></li><li>Start New Loan/ Borrow EOS</li><li>View Trading Charts/ Account balances</li><li>Automate Loan Renewal</li><li>Fund REX Savings</li><li>View Action History</li></ul><p><em>NOTE: Matured REX can show “0” when there may be maturities showing they expired days ago. This is because tables are only updated on next action in the smart contract. Performing a simple action such as depositing REX into savings will update all tables and correct any inaccuracies. (EOS Titan REX interface auto calculates the correct matured, maturing and savings, regardless of chain state. An update is bundled in a transaction if required.)</em></p><h3>Other recommended REX interfaces</h3><p>Most of all other REX user interfaces have the functionality available that the average token-holder would need. Once you understand the steps above, a user should be able to use every UI listed below.</p><h3>TokenPocket (Mobile &amp; Desktop)</h3><h4><a href="https://rex.tokenpocket.pro/#/">Link Here</a>: <a href="https://rex.tokenpocket.pro/#/">https://rex.tokenpocket.pro/#/</a></h4><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/6a4c7ce0dbc0">TokenPocket</a> is a leading mobile wallet across the world which comes highly recommended. TokenPocket also has a desktop interface which has integrated Transit API for easy login and is featured below. To access the mobile version, <a href="https://www.tokenpocket.pro/">download their app from links on their website</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*zlmy8H3KwutuaxsX" /></figure><h3>Bloks</h3><h4><a href="https://rex.tokenpocket.pro/#/">Link Here</a>: <a href="https://bloks.io/rex">https://bloks.io/rex</a></h4><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/2bc343981c49">EOS Cafe Block</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/u/cbb5476a9fbf">HKEOS</a> built one of our favorite block explorer, Bloks.io. Bloks will feature an estimated rate of return calculator along with other necessary features plus a wallet, permission management, and more, also available on Bloks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/765/1*naaootn-nxE2w1z9-xnUOQ.png" /></figure><h3>EOS Authority:</h3><h4>Link Here: <a href="https://eosauthority.com/rex">https://eosauthority.com/rex</a></h4><p>The <a href="https://medium.com/u/fd25c2e83dd">EOS Authority</a> site is incredibly useful and includes a simple REX tool. They also maintain <a href="https://eosauthority.com/rex/statistics">total REX statistics here as well</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2C-scNAXY-zFRk8zFSXQHw.png" /></figure><h3>Chintai</h3><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/f283d3bb8fa7">Chintai Team</a>, is to token leasing and resource leasing as Bancor is to token exchange and liquidity. Chintai’s development is lead by <a href="https://medium.com/u/fe452ce4be24">EOS42</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*G08H-5zlgY8ryBP5" /></figure><h3>EOS Inbox</h3><h4><a href="https://eosinbox.io/">Link Here:</a> <a href="https://eosinbox.io/">https://eosinbox.io/</a></h4><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/c103ab113056">EOS Inbox</a> takes a novel approach to the block explorer, designing it similarly to how one’s e-mail interface looks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Xj_i7A2flqikDZm8" /></figure><h3>EOSDAQ</h3><h4><a href="https://eosdaq.com/">Link Here:</a> <a href="https://eosdaq.com/">https://eosdaq.com</a></h4><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/49667decb08b">EOSDAQ</a> runs a decentralized exchange on EOS so their REX interface will look and feel quite similar to that.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*NEVNNkYEYu6jSEWu" /></figure><h3>EOSREX.io</h3><h4><a href="https://eosrex.io/">Link Here:</a> <a href="https://eosrex.io/">https://eosrex.io/</a></h4><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/5b2244fe80c6">EOSREX.IO</a> has built a dedicated website to host their interface. It was built by EOS Lab and EOS Socal, the BP candidate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*yavkQFMmZ9cO8f2X" /></figure><p>REX will undoubtedly be a powerful tool which the EOS community can adopt to help lower the cost of development, increase token holder voting participation, and reward EOS token holders for their resource contribution. Stay tuned for our in-depth guide on interfacing with REX as a developer! Thank you to <a href="https://medium.com/u/6103d67e103d">EOS Titan</a> for contributing to this article.</p><p><em>Disclaimer</em>: This article does not constitute financial advice and is only intended to explain and convey the behavior of the EOS Resource Exchange. Please do your own research.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IC3FYyIK4hNk-yyW.jpg" /></figure><p>EOS New York is a Top 21 Block Producer on the EOS Blockchain</p><p><a href="https://www.eosnewyork.io/">Website</a> | <a href="https://www.twitter.com/eosnewyork">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://www.medium.com/@eosnewyork">Medium</a> | <a href="https://www.steemit.com/@eosnewyork">STEEM</a> | <a href="https://www.meetup.com/EOS-New-York/">Meetup</a> | <a href="https://t.me/eosnewyorkchat">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.weibo.com/eosnewyork">Weibo</a> | <a href="https://bihu.com/people/963496">Bihu</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9cc0e449b320" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/the-ultimate-guide-to-rex-participation-on-eos-9cc0e449b320">The Ultimate Guide to REX Participation on EOS:</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york">EOS New York</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Metro: A Sneak Peek & Get Notified]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/eos-new-york/the-metro-a-sneak-peek-get-notified-e5aee2eec6f1?source=rss----cd3133d6facd---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e5aee2eec6f1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[eosnewyork]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hardware-wallet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosmetro]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eosio]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eos]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Rose]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2019 17:20:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-22T14:13:42.940Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Get Notified When The Metro Goes On Sale. The Easiest to Use Hardware Key for the EOS Blockchain.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*W-QQGkgkZ1BxostsxEzukA.png" /></figure><h4>Visit <a href="https://www.eosmetro.io/">EOSMetro.io</a> To Get Notified!</h4><p><a href="https://www.eosmetro.io/">GO ANYWHERE. GO EOS.</a></p><p>EOS New York is bringing you the easiest to use hardware key for the EOS blockchain. We are hard at work on perfecting the Metro, but while we do, we want to hear from you! If you want a sneak peek at the Metro features, or are interested in purchasing the Metro when it becomes available, please visit the link above and/or fill out the form below.</p><h4>A Limited Supply Will Be Available!</h4><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fdb55a0%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fdb55a0%2F&amp;image=http%3A%2F%2Fapi.screenshotlayer.com%2Fapi%2Fcapture%3Faccess_key%3Dfe59908dad3baab69ffab249a2224b03%26viewport%3D1024x612%26width%3D1000%26url%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fupscri.be%252Fdb55a0%253Fscreenshot&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/ed198bdf07feffeaf3f0ca038b8412b8/href">https://medium.com/media/ed198bdf07feffeaf3f0ca038b8412b8/href</a></iframe><p><em>Please note, we will contact you for no other reason and your information will never be shared with third parties. This is not a reservation nor a pre-order and does not represent any commitment whatsoever.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IC3FYyIK4hNk-yyW.jpg" /></figure><p>EOS New York is a Top 21 Block Producer on the EOS Mainnet</p><p><a href="https://www.eosnewyork.io/">Website</a> | <a href="https://www.twitter.com/eosnewyork">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://www.medium.com/@eosnewyork">Medium</a> | <a href="https://www.steemit.com/@eosnewyork">STEEM</a> | <a href="https://www.meetup.com/EOS-New-York/">Meetup</a> | <a href="https://t.me/eosnewyorkchat">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.weibo.com/eosnewyork">Weibo</a> | <a href="https://bihu.com/people/963496">Bihu</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e5aee2eec6f1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york/the-metro-a-sneak-peek-get-notified-e5aee2eec6f1">The Metro: A Sneak Peek &amp; Get Notified</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/eos-new-york">EOS New York</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>