On August 28 Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán flew to Milan to meet Italy’s Interior Minister Matteo Salvini. The two far-right leaders discussed a possible alliance between their two parties — the Italian League and the Hungarian Fidesz — in the run-up to the EP elections in May 2019 and their political role in Europe. Salvini and Orbán share Eurosceptic and nationalist positions and, most of all, a strong anti-immigration stance.

Over the past few years, Orbán managed to shut the Balkan route to migrants coming to Hungary, refusing to implement the European Union’s refugee quota system and calling Europe to harden its external borders. Matteo Salvini holds similar border-defending positions. As Interior Minister, Salvini has been under the spotlight for refusing to let humanitarian ships carrying refugees and migrants (as the Aquarius and the Diciotti) to dock at Italian ports. Furthermore, he repeatedly denounced the decision of some EU countries to close their borders to intra-EU flows of migrants and called on other EU countries to accept some form of redistribution of the refugees.

For ten days starting from 24 August — when Salvini announced the meeting with Orbán — we collected all tweets commenting on the event and the public declarations of the political leaders. Overall, more than 50 thousand Twitter users participated in the discussion, producing a total amount of 136,454 tweets

On the occasion of the meeting, Orbán recognized Salvini as “a comrade in destiny”. According to the Eurosceptic leaders, Europe is now at a crossroads, with two opposed visions of Europe’s future pitting against each other. Orbán defined the French President Emmanuel Macron as “the leader of those parties who back migration to Europe” while “on the other side there’s us who want to stop illegal migration”. Salvini and Orbán called for a European anti-immigration front, counting on the cooperation of other Eurosceptic and nationalist parties such as the Le Pen’s National Rally and the Austrian People’s Party.

These declarations echoed widely both in Italy and abroad. When asked about Salvini and Orbán’s claims, French President Macron said that they are right to see him as their main rival in the “strong opposition […] between nationalists and progressives”. In Italy, thousands of people took to the streets of Milan to protest in favour of migrants and to support integration. Members of the social-democratic Partito Democratico (PD), together with left-wing forces joined the protests and voiced their opposition.

The debate on Twitter

We followed the public discussion of these events on Twitter, collecting and analyzing messages, retweets and comments. Twitter users’ reaction can be described within the framework of the so-called “horizontal” Europeanization of national public spheres. The concept depicts the increasing integration of the public debates between the EU countries, arising from a shared sense of belonging to the EU. What emerged in our case study is actually not only a common French and Italian interest in a political event in which people felt involved as EU citizens, but a similar way of reacting in the two countries, using similar tones in spite of different languages, and siding with one part or the other according to a free movement vs. national closure kind of cleavage. Although it is maybe too early to say whether or not this polarisation will structure the forthcoming EP elections campaign, Salvini and Orbán’s nationalist positions and Macron’s globalism are indeed competing visions of EU’s future, and we analysed Twitter conversations looking for signs of such polarisation in the online public discussion.

Employing an algorithm working on users’ interactions, it was also possible to detect different communities, highlighted above with the use of different colours. As it can be noticed from a quick look at which actors took part in the online debate and how they interacted with each other, for the most part, the discussion took place in two arenas: the Italian (purple and green areas) and French (yellow and orange areas) Twitterspheres

For ten days starting from 24 August — when Salvini announced the meeting with Orbán — we collected all tweets commenting on the event and the public declarations of the political leaders. Overall, more than 50 thousand Twitter users participated in the discussion, producing a total amount of 136,454 tweets.

At first, we tried to sketch the different political perspectives of the actors that took part in the online debate, and we did so by building a network visualisation of the interactions between Twitter users based on how frequently they mentioned and retweeted each other.

Figure 1: a network analysis of the users, based on mentions and retweets

Each node in the graph represents a user, while each edge (line) represents a relationship between users. A direct link is created each time a user mentions or retweets another user. The more frequent the interaction, the stronger the link; the bigger the node and the label, the more often the user has been mentioned or retweeted, and the more influential he/she is in the debate. Employing an algorithm working on users’ interactions, it was also possible to detect different communities, highlighted above with the use of different colours. As it can be noticed from a quick look at which actors took part in the online debate and how they interacted with each other, for the most part, the discussion took place in two arenas: the Italian (purple and green areas) and French (yellow and orange areas) Twitterspheres.

On the other hand — and this is a first signal of a “horizontally Europeanized” discussion — two more communities of users are present: the grey and blue clusters both include politicians and journalists from all over Europe reacting to the events in Italy. Among them, Guy Verhofstadt (@guyverhofstadt) stands out with a widely retweeted message in which Salvini and Orbán are defined as “a threat to our liberty, rights & prosperity”. We find other European actors as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden Margot Wallström (@margotwallstrom), and The Economist’s columnist Jeremy Cliffe (@JeremyCliffe).

The analysis of the network structure of the online discussion seems to confirm the presence of a double conflict between the different communities we detected, along with the “openness-closure” cleavage. The first divide would pit the Italian-speaking green and purple groups, while the second one would be between the French-speaking orange and yellow groups

The largest group (coloured in purple) is mostly made up by Italian politicians from left-oriented parties. Some of these politicians took part in the Milan protest. Among the latter, former President of the Chamber of Deputies Laura Boldrini (@lauraboldrini) emerged as the most influential actor within her group. One of her tweets — in which she harshly criticises the authoritarian nature of Orbán’s premiership — resulted in being the most retweeted in our sample. Crucially, this group also includes former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi (@matteorenzi) and the leader of Possible Giuseppe Civati (@civati). The second largest group (in green) seems to be composed by Italian right-wing users. In this group, Matteo Salvini (@matteosalvinimi) is the most important node as much as the most retweeted user overall. The green coloured group also features Alessandra Mussolini, former MEP for far-right Forward Italy and some well-known Eurosceptic commentators such as Paolo Becchi (@pbecchi) and Antonio M. Rinaldi (@rinaldi_euro).

The most influential user of the yellow coloured community is the French President Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron). In the debates, he appears as the primary opponent of Orbán and Salvini in Europe. This group also includes other members of Macron’s En Marche as Gabriel Attal (gabrielattal) and French journals as Le Monde (mdiplo). Finally, the orange coloured group is led by Marine Le Pen (@mlp_officiel) and other members of her party as Philippe Vardon (@p_vardon) and Franck Allisio (@franckallisio).

The analysis of the network structure of the online discussion seems to confirm the presence of a double conflict between the different communities we detected, along with the “openness-closure” cleavage. The first divide would pit the Italian-speaking green and purple groups, while the second one would be between the French-speaking orange and yellow groups.

The Italian polarisation

To corroborate our intuition, we tried to shed some light on the content of the tweets produced by the different groups of users. Similarly, we attempted at checking whether the clusters in our network reflected different political perspectives. We started with the Italian green and purple groups: through topic modelling, we identified the most distinctive features (words or group of words) used within each community when respectively compared to all other conversations. We then ordered the results by frequency and plotted them in two word clouds.

Figure 2: Most distinctive words of two clusters of tweets by Italian users

On the one hand, words in the purple word cloud (based on tweets by ‘purple’ users) clearly express opposition to Salvini and Orbán’s anti-immigration front. These words are exemplative of a pro-Europe perspective: contro (“against”), san babila (the name of the square in Milan, where the protest against the meeting between Salvini and Orbán took place), strampalata intesa (“ill-considered alliance”), contro l’odio (“against hate”), con l’Unione (“for the EU”).

The way in which the French and the Italian online debates structured around this event represents an exciting development within the process of “horizontal Europeanization”: the increasing integration of the public debates between the EU countries, arising from a shared sense of belonging to the European Union

Alternatively, in the green group, we find words that reflect Eurosceptic and anti-immigration stances: i confini (borders), il rimpatrio (repatriation), clandestini (“clandestines”). Moreover, this group features mentions of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel as well as messages against l’UE dei banchieri (“EU of the financial elite”) and the domestic left-wing opposition.

The French polarisation

We then took a look at the French-speaking orange and yellow groups and detected the most distinctive words for each group. We plotted the results in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Most distinctive words in the tweets subsets of two users communities

Words and phrases in the yellow coloured word cloud are similar to those in the Italian purple group in Figure 2. As in the Italian case, these messages seem to express pro-European stances and reflect an opposition towards the anti-immigration front of Salvini and Orbán. The ‘yellow’ group of users — in which French President Macron is the leading figure — is defined by words such as Europe ouverte (“open Europe”), but also leur opposant (“their opponent”) and une alternative (“an alternative”), both referring to Macron as the mani opponent of Salvini and Orbán. Interestingly enough, within this area, we could also find messages that, although harshly criticising the nationalist alliance of Orbán and Salvini, refuse to recognise Macron as the leader of a pro-EU, pro-migration and anti-nationalist front. This interpretation can be deduced for example from the frequent use of words such as deux faces (“two sides”) or allégez l’impôt (“lighten the tax”), which refer, respectively, to Macron’s controversial immigration policy and his fiscal reform letting rich people off the hook.

The most distinctive features used by the orange coloured group in Figure 3 are similar to those we found in the Italian green messages: tweets from users of this group express anti-immigration, nationalist and Eurosceptic stances. We found words such as nations libres (“free nations”), Hongrie stoppe (“Hungary stops [the migrants]”), l’immigration illégale (“illegal immigration”), Marine (referring to the National Rally’s leader Marine Le Pen).

Conclusions

As we’ve seen above, the distinctive features and the users identified for each group confirmed a polarisation on the left-right cleavage of both the Italian and the French tweets commenting on the meeting between Salvini and Orbán.

The way in which the French and the Italian online debates structured around this event represents an exciting development within the process of “horizontal Europeanization”: the increasing integration of the public debates between the EU countries, arising from a shared sense of belonging to the European Union. What emerged in our case study is not only a common French and Italian interest in a political event in which people felt involved as EU citizens but a common way of reacting, siding with one part or another according to the left-right cleavage and using similar tones, in spite of different languages.

Photo credits: Google images feat. Alexander Damiano Ricci

Originally published at EuVisions.

Macron Vs Orbán and Salvini: an online debate between openess and closure was originally published in EuVisions on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Ever since its conception, the process of European integration has proven to be a divisive issue for political parties. One might think, for example, of the British Conservative party’s divisions over Europe, or of the differing attitudes of the French socialists at the time of the Constitutional referendum of 2005. ‘Europe’, however, has been a divisive issue even for parties that one would naturally expect to oppose a supranational construction.

This has been the case for the European far-right. While parties of this political belief share a common ‘nativist’ ideology (Mudde 2007), which would lead one to expect them to reject or at least show only a moderate interest in Europe as an idea, the reality of their understanding of Europe is more complex than the term ‘euroscepticism’ suggests. In fact, two languages coexist within the political discourse of the European far-right: on one hand, there is a (familiar, albeit relatively new) opposition to the European Union as a concrete form of political collaboration. On the other hand, however, far-right parties express a measure of attachment to ‘Europe’ as a civilisation and culture. Thus, a politician such as Marine Le Pen could, at the same time, suggest that the EU is a “prison for its peoples” and claim in a speech that: “For us, Europe is not an idea. Europe is a culture, it’s a civilization with its values, its codes, its great men, its accomplishments its masterpieces. For us, Europe is not only a history but also a geography, where Turkey does not belong. Europe is a series of peoples whose respective identities exhale the fecund diversity of the continent […] I believe in a common destiny of the nations and peoples of Europe impregnated by the millenary civilization that they share”.

First and foremost, for the far-right, Europe in its ‘civilisation’ form is conceived as a form of identification […] Second, parties frequently associate talk about Europe with talk about liberty […] The final element underlying the parties’ view of Europe is the idea of an endangered civilisation

In my research, I seek to move beyond the idea of ‘euroscepticism’ and explore the component elements of the far-right’s discourse on ‘Europe’, intended both as a distinct civilisation and as the EU. Focusing on the French National Front(FN) and the Italian Social Movement (MSI), I argue that when these parties speak and have spoken about Europe, they talk about three things: identity, liberty and existential threats. Together, they point towards the existence of a distinct far-right conception of Europe, based on a romanticised view of a European civilisation under threat.

First and foremost, Europe in its ‘civilisation’ form is conceived as a form of identification. Both the MSI and the FN demonstrate an attachment to the distinct civilisation that is Europe. The MSI, for example, spoke in favour of European unity conscious of the “community of interests and destinies, of history, of civilisation, of tradition among Europeans” (MSI 1980), while Jean-Marie Le Pen spoke of Europe as “A historic, geographic, cultural, economic and social ensemble. It is an entity destined for action (Le Pen 1984)”. This view of Europe’ as a distinct civilisation is still present in the current National Front, in spite of its president’s strong opposition to the EU. Most importantly, the parties not only consider themselves as part of this civilisation, they also see it as compatible with their national identity.

Second, parties frequently associate talk about Europe with talk about liberty. The association between the two terms, however, changes significantly through time and is affected by the historic events taking place in Europe today. Thus, particularly in the 1980s, the FN and the MSI spoke of Europe as a space in need of ‘liberty’ in face of the ‘twin imperialisms’ of the USA and the USSR. This was also associated with the need to recreate a Europe that was free to act in the external realm. In other words, Europe as an international power. From the end of the 1980s, however, and particularly for the FN, ‘liberty’ shifts from being an attribute of Europe to being an endangered part of the national heritage. As a result of Maastricht, in fact, the National Front starts speaking increasingly about ‘sovereignty’ as the freedom of self-rule, and the limits imposed on it by the European Union.

We are faced with a specific far-right narrative of Europe, which presents a romanticised image of the continent, but which also sounds almost familiar by drawing on elements of Europe’s history such as its status and place in the world, its distinctiveness vis-à-vis other civilisations and its potential (and need) to come together in close union

The final element underlying the parties’ view of Europe is the idea of an endangered civilisation; a position it shares with its constituent nations. In the 1980s, the most immediate threats were of an external nature, with the USSR occupying a prominent position in the parties’ minds, closely followed by the USA. However, there was also space for concern about the ‘internal decline’ of Europe, brought about by corrupt political classes, demographic decline and foreign immigration. More recently, the National Front has found a new existential threat in the form of globalisation and its treacherous vector: the European Union. While the nature of the threat may vary across parties and across time, Europe and its nations always appear to be threatened by some evil force that requires swift intervention — most clearly, by the ‘enlightened’ patriots of Europe.

Summing up, it appears that far-right parties maintain a view of Europe as a distinct civilisation. In this sense, we are faced with a specific far-right narrative of Europe, which presents a romanticised image of the continent, but which also sounds almost familiar by drawing on elements of Europe’s history such as its status and place in the world, its distinctiveness vis-à-vis other civilisations and its potential (and need) to come together in close union.

Photo Credits CC: thierry ehrmann

Originally published at EuVisions.

What the far-right thinks of Europe was originally published in EuVisions on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

We are “neither left, nor right”, but “progressives”, kicks off Andrea Venzon, President of VOLT Europa, as he describes in a few words the identikit of the pan-European movement he co-founded in 2016, a few days after Brexit became a reality.

The members of VOLT are 36 years old on average and 70% of them did never subscribe to any political party. At the same time, they are flying high as they promise to “radically change the way politics is done and European institutions” through the first-ever pan-European party in history. As of now, VOLT is establishing political parties in all main EU Member States.

Alexander Damiano Ricci (ADR): Mr. Andrea Venzon, how do you want to get to the point “of radically changing the way politics is done and European institutions”? What is needed to create a pan-European political party?

You need to establish at least seven parties in as many Member States and have national deputies elected in each country.

ADR: What is VOLT?

VOLT is a “moderate” political force and pan-European movement which covers a spectrum ranging from the centre-left to the centre-right. Our manifesto foresees five overarching objectives that will need to be adapted to each national context.

The EU needs to be democratised at large through new electoral procedures for the EP. We need to revamp the linkage between European deputies and national and regional territories

ADR: Which are these 5 objectives?

Establishing an “intelligent state administration”, through the modernisation of the public administration; spurring an economic renaissance based on growth; granting high standards of social equality at the regional and national level; initiating a process by which the EU can influence global dynamics; fostering innovative forms of participative politics without playing into the hands of those who reclaim direct democracy.

ADR: So where does the governance of the EU come into the picture?

Of course, we need to radically reform the EU, starting from the strengthening of the role of the European Parliament in the legislative process.

ADR: Don’t you think this is a bit weak compared to the criticism of Eurosceptic forces?

On top of that, we need to manage the migration crisis. The Dublin regulation needs to be overcome employing a mandatory relocation scheme backed by monetary fines for State who do not accomplish their obligations. At the same time, we need to develop a financial plan to spur the development and stability of the African continent.

ADR: However, migration is not the only concern of the critics of the EU.

That’s right and the reason why we need as well a corporate-financed budget for the Eurozone. Secondarily, the European stability mechanism (ESM) must be anchored democratically to the Eurogroup and work according to a majority voting system. Last but not least, the EU needs to be democratised at large through new electoral procedures for the EP. We need to revamp the linkage between European deputies and national and regional territories.

ADR: So, do you think you will make it for the 2019 EP elections?

Yes. There are political spaces that need to be filled. We look forward to conquering the preferences of the youth through “community organising” practice, that is: restructuring the way politics is done on the ground, starting off from local contexts. We want to bridge traditional politics and the digital age. Exactly as Obama did in his 2008 electoral campaign.

The trajectory of the French President, Emmanuel Macron, is an excellent example in case: counterparts of other Member States block even national leaders with grand reform plans. If VOLT succeeds, things will change

ADR: Can you explain more in detail what community organising is?

We must re-create leadership and participation at the very grassroots level. The latter implies an investment in human capital and resources locally. At the same time, these leaders need to be willing to dialogue with the national and European level. Community organising means building a process that hinges upon the creativity and cooperation of individuals.

ADR: How do you plan to establish the link local-national-European?

We set up an online academy for this strand of activities. Every time there is an event VOLT is called to participate, the academy organises online sessions where party members interact with and learn from policy experts.

ADR: Why is it vital to establish a pan-European and transnational political arena?

Because in the face of nationalist and extremist forces there is much need for an alternative that reaches every corner of Europe. A transnational party and movement is the only chance we have to reform the EU concretely. The trajectory of the French President, Emmanuel Macron, is an excellent example in case: counterparts of other Member States block even national leaders with grand reform plans. If VOLT succeeds, things will change.

An abridged version of this conversation was published in the Corriere della Sera.

Photo Credits CC: Facebook page Andrea Venzon — Public figure

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Originally published at EuVisions.

Andrea Venzon: “If VOLT succeeds, Europe will change” was originally published in EuVisions on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

by Nicola Maggini

In the last years, the issue of solidarity towards vulnerable groups such as refugees has come under the spotlight. On the one hand, the inability of EU institutions and their member states to establish a coordinated asylum policy, mechanisms of admission and integration as well as the success of anti-immigration populist parties across Europe, have raised concerns about the augmented influx of refugees from Syria and other regions affected by wars. On the other hand, however, the refugee crisis has highlighted the relevance and growth of transnational solidarity organisations, which have been working on a daily basis to meet basic needs of refugees, taking the form of both advocacy and service provision. How widespread are solidarity initiatives in favour of refugees? What are the characteristics of the people involved in such initiatives?

This focus examines cross-country evidence on individual perceptions and behaviours towards refugees, in order to outline the profiles of European citizens engaged in solidarity practices in favour of this vulnerable group. It relies on results from original survey data (N=16,000) collected from eight European countries(Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, UK) for the TransSOL project. In our questionnaire, we refer generically to refugees/asylum seekers without focusing on the proper legal distinction between these two groups. Indeed, we are interested in a broader category that includes both, given that most people interpret the terms “refugees” and “asylum seekers” as synonymous.

As a starting point, we need to outline the picture of diverse solidarity practices (donating time or money, passive and active membership, buying products, protest participation) in favour of refugees across the eight countries in question, to mirror both the civic and political dimension of solidarity in different European contexts (see Table 1). The results show that on average, 27.1% of respondents have been engaged in at least one solidarity activity in favour of refugees, with some noteworthy differences across countries: Greece and Germany are the countries with the highest level of engagement (36.4% and 34.1%, respectively), whereas France and the UK show the lowest level of engagement (20.2% and 21.7%, respectively).

If we look at the different types of solidarity practices, the charity behaviour of donating money is the most frequent action in all countries (12.2% on average) except in Greece, where donating time is the most frequent action (15.2%). Conversely, political protest-oriented activities are not widespread (4.7% on average), with a slight peak in Greece (8.9%). Similar patterns can be found regarding the active and passive involvement in organisations supporting refugees. Finally, buying or refusing to buy products in favour of refugees is a political action more widespread than protest-oriented actions in all countries (7.4% on average), with a peak in Greece (12.7%) where such action ranks second after donating time.

Who deserves solidarity?

Previous studies have shown that solidarity behaviour depends on a target group’s image reflected by vulnerable groups and their perceived deservingness (van Oorschot, 2000). In our survey, we asked respondents to name the specific group they would choose for charity donation among the following ones: unemployed people, people with disabilities, migrants, refugees/asylum seekers, and children. We can consider this variable as a proxy for deservingness, arguing that people are more likely to choose a group they deem more deserving of help for charity donation. Results show (see Table 2) that children are by far the most preferred group for charity donation (53.2% in the whole sample), followed by the disabled (28.8%) and the unemployed (9.8%). For European citizens, refugees/asylum seekers and migrants are definitely the groups they deem less deserving (6.7% and 1.6%, respectively). These patterns are confirmed if we look at country-specific results, but with some interesting differences with regards to the relative ranking of unemployed people and refugees/asylum seekers. The latter are considered a more deserving group (in terms of charity donations) compared to the unemployed in Denmark (13.1% vs 9.7%), in Germany (8.4% vs 5.5%) and in the UK (8.3% vs. 3.7%). In Switzerland, there is a substantial equilibrium between those who cite refugees/asylum seekers as preferred charity group (7.9%) and those who cite the unemployed (7.8%). In any case, in all countries, findings show that refugees are an out-group perceived by the in-group of European citizens as less deserving of help compared to other vulnerable groups such as the disabled.

Profiling Europeans engaged in solidarity

Regarding the profile of people engaged in pro-refugee actions, we need to take into account the individual characteristics of respondents. Previous research has shown that solidarity is highly determined by political preferences and ideological orientations (Skitka and Tetlock, 1993; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Amat and Wibbels, 2009; Likki and Staerklé, 2014) and by citizen’s differentiation in terms of personal resources and skills, such as education and affiliation to social class (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978; Cainzos and Voces, 2010). Building on these studies, we have focused on the political orientations of respondents (in terms of economic left-right positions and libertarian-authoritarian values) and social traits (social class and education level). To grasp the specificity of solidarity towards refugees, it is useful to compare the profile of respondents involved in solidarity practices towards refugees with those engaged with solidarity practices towards the disabled, i.e. the most deserving vulnerable group (except children) according to our data. We operationalized the dependent variable, i.e. solidarity practices toward specific target groups, by combining a series of questions about the aforementioned different kinds of solidarity actions that help to mirror charity, civic and political dimensions of solidarity. The reliability scale between these items is high (alpha test 0.66): thus, the items shared an important covariance, measuring the same underlying concept. Consequently, we created two dichotomous variables (0 ‘no action’, 1 ‘at least one action’) per target group.

Table 3 shows the relationship between solidarity actions towards our target groups and political orientations in the pooled dataset, particularly looking at respondents’ left-right positions on economic issues and their values along the libertarian-authoritarian dimension. In our survey, there are several questions on economic issues connected to a broader left-right divide, as confirmed by a factor analysis. Hence, the economic left-right orientation of respondents has been measured as an additive index of positions linked to a unique factor component. Results of the factor analysis show that a specific economic left-right item (“equal incomes vs. larger income differences”) is not related to the other economic items. Consequently, we separated the relationship between this variable and solidarity actions towards our target groups. Finally, respondents were asked about several cultural items connected to a broader libertarian-authoritarian divide, as confirmed again by a factor analysis. Therefore, we created an additive index of values linked to a unique factor component.

Considering the economic left-right index, results show that, in our sample, centre-right positions on economic issues prevail over centre-left stances, even among people involved in solidarity actions. Nevertheless, data also shows that centre-left people are over-represented among people supporting refugees (34.8% vs 24.3%), whereas centre-right people are under-represented (41.3% vs 53.9%). Conversely, the shares of centre-left and centre-right people supporting the disabled do not differ so much from the sample’s average. This over-representation of centre-left people among people supporting refugees disappears if we look at the share of respondents with an egalitarian stance regarding income differences; indeed, egalitarian positions prevail among people supporting refugees (62.6%), but this share is around five percentage points lower than the sample’s average. With regards to the libertarian-authoritarian index, the field of solidarity towards refugees is even more singled out for its specificity. Here, libertarian people are by far the largest category (53.2%) and are clearly over-represented. Conversely, the share of libertarian people supporting the disabled (45.4%) is practically the same as the whole sample (45.5%). In conclusion, the findings show that solidarity engagement for refugees is related to political-ideological elements, whereas solidarity towards the disabled is not a divisive issue in political terms.

Table 4 reports solidarity actions towards target groups by subjective social class and level of education. Quite interesting patterns emerge if we take “social centrality” into examination, as measured by perceived class belonging. Results confirm the specificity of solidarity activities in favour of refugees. Among people supporting refugees, the lower class and, above all, the working class are under-represented compared to the total population, whereas the middle, upper middle and upper classes are over-represented. Conversely, the distribution of people supporting the disabled across class categories is in line with that of the total population. Considering educational attainment, highly-educated people are over-represented among those supporting refugees. Indeed, the percentage of respondents with a higher education is 28.5% among people supporting refugees (vs 22.5% of the total population) and 24.5% among people supporting the disabled.

Solidarity towards refugees as a contested ground

To conclude, solidarity towards refugees is a contested issue that differentates people of different political orientations related to both the (traditional) economic left-right divide and the cultural divide on libertarian vs authoritarian values. This politicisation of solidarity does not occur when the target of solidarity is a vulnerable group such as the disabled, which is considered worthy of being helped. In particular, solidarity towards refugees entails a political commitment to libertarian values as opposed to authoritarian stances, confirming the specificity of this cultural dimension compared to the traditional left-right dimension and the importance of new cultural issues for contentious politics (Flanagan and Lee, 2003). This is particularly significant for a continent that has faced both economic turmoil and a refugee crisis in the last years, and where right-wing populist parties (Mudde, 2011) have mobilised more on cultural “demarcationist” issues such as immigration (Kriesi et al., 2006) than on the economic left-right divide in order to gain votes among the lower classes, using migrants as scapegoats for their fears and economic distress. In this regard, our data shows that refugees are supported more by middle and upper-class people with a high level of education, compared to working class people with a lower level of education. Thus, the challenge for policy-makers is to adopt effective and inclusive welfare policies that enable pro-refugees attitudes and behaviours to spread, also among the lower social strata, who are concerned about competition over scarce resources and attached to a social model more strictly defined in terms of traditional nation-state.

Photo Credits CC: Gustave Deghilage

Originally published at EuVisions.

Refugees and individual solidarity: Social beliefs, political-ideological orientations and social… was originally published in EuVisions on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Maurizio Ferrera (MF): Your work has spanned across several disciplines, in particular, philosophy and sociology. What is the contribution that the philosophy of the social sciences can offer for a better understanding of social and political reality?

Daniel Little (DL): Reflecting on his role as a philosopher, John Locke said that he felt “employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground …. and removing some of the rubbish which lies in the way to knowledge.” This is still a good account of what philosophers do. Philosophy and epistemology clarify the concepts and theories used by empirical social scientists, make them aware and sensitive to the importance of robust methodologies and spur them to refrain from dogmatism and misleading assumptions, not only about the empirical world but also about science as such. Contemporary philosophical analysis has for instance squarely challenged the key tenets of positivist approaches, such as the claim that all science must be quantitative and observational, that the social sciences are (or ought to be) no different from the natural sciences and that they should aim at unveiling general laws. Such beliefs were mere “dogmas”. Positivism has not disappeared from economics, sociology or political science. But the philosophical critique has paved the way for epistemological and methodological innovations which now inspire frontier research in these three disciplines.

MF: One of these innovations — which you have in fact pioneered — is the shift from methodological to ontological individualism, which acknowledges distinctive causal properties to collective entities, including shared mental constructs. Let us take “ideologies”, for example. In what ways do these abstract thought-entities produce recognizable effects in a real world made up, ultimately, only by individuals?

DL: Let us take a concrete ideology, for example, “patriotism”. This entity is a cluster of values and their relations: one’s homeland is “good”, it is right to make sacrifices to defend it, to give priority to fellow nationals and so on. Patriotism is clearly a collective phenomenon. It is generated from individual mental lives, but then acquires a dynamic of its own, for example by infusing certain social institutions and practices (school education of children, or military service) which in turn shape, locally, individual mentalities.

MF: But over time we do observe changes in ideologies and individual mentalities, regardless of the supporting practices. How does this happen?

DL: Because old values can be always challenged by single individuals or groups. Take the Black Lives Matter movement in the US, recently formed in the wake of police acts of violence against some black people. This movement is not “unpatriotic”, but it challenges an assumption shared by hegemonic views on patriotism, i.e. that the government is indifferent to race. What the new movement argues is that yes, indeed, the law ought to be indifferent to race, but factually it is not, because young African-American males are more exposed to police violence. Redressing this racial bias is thus a normative duty which should become a key component, in present times, of the value cluster associated with US patriotism.

MF: Let us stay with the topic of racism in the US. However lamentable, violence exposure is only the tip of the iceberg: empirical research demonstrates that African-Americans are more vulnerable than whites in a host of different domains, from the labour market to social security. Can we say that racism is not only a mental construct, but a real property of the US economic, social and political structure?

DL: Yes, I believe so. The US still have today a degree of “structural racism” which has no parallel in other advanced democracies. Such racism has historically co-evolved with a wide range of social and organizational practices, which have concurred to reproduce and even amplify it. Take urban systems of mass transportation in the US. For those who live in inner cities — predominantly African Americans- it is much more difficult and to reach the suburbs where jobs are concentrated than it is for people who live in the suburbs, typically the white middle classes.

MF: In this case, an unrelated social practice — public transport- ends up supporting structural racism…

DL: Well, yes and no. When the Washington Metro was built, black organizations did voice their concerns about the territorial design of the network. But the existing power constellation — itself imbued with racist norms- inhibited changes that would have inner-city dwellers. Again an example of the causal impact that collective phenomena deeply embedded in societal structures does exert on individual choices and behaviours.

MF: Racism and more generally “hate speech” is, unfortunately, resurrecting on this side of the Atlantic as well. You have addressed this topic several times on your blog…

DL: This is one of the most challenging developments that North America and Europe are currently facing. National societies always contain latent xenophobic dispositions and mutual resentments and even hatred between social groups. What has happened in recent years is that opportunistic leaders have been able to activate these dispositions and built on them to construct a racist agenda. Such dynamic are virulent, they tend to spread throughout and across societies very quickly. Hate is to politics what Ebola is to viruses: it triggers off life-threatening epidemics. Perhaps hate is a human property which has resulted from social evolution and still latently has the potential to prevail over the trust. This might explain why it is easier to activate feelings of division and separateness than it is to activate altruistic and other-regarding disposition: under certain conditions, Trump is inherently likely to be more politically successful than Obama. Once opportunistically activated the politics of hatred — like Ebola- may contaminate the whole political sphere.

MF: This syndrome has probably something to do with the rise of immigration flows and the economic crisis. We know from cognitive sciences that humans are more sensitive to potential losses (for example due to higher job competition) than they are to potential gains (for example the contribution that immigrants could give to pension funding).

DL: Yes, that might also be a hypothesis. In the case of racism, especially in the US, I think it is hard to explain it in rational terms. I believe that it has more to do with structural features of the economic and social systems.

MF: How could this virulent epidemic of hatred in our democratic societies be contained?

DL: A general question must first be raised: can we think of social practices and institutional designs which have the capacity to alter from above (downward causation) the mentality of hatred and racial (or religious, ethnic ) conflict at the individual level? Yes, we can. I am thinking of organizations and ideologies that are explicitly established and promoted with a view to favouring inter-group collaboration and understanding.

MF: Social psychologists have indeed proposed a “contact theory” of intergroup trust: practical interactions and mutual knowledge are able to neutralize or at least contain suspicions, resentments and divisions. In my research on intra EU migration, I have indeed found that what I call “EU-politan” experiences and cross-national contacts to reduce chauvinist dispositions

DL: Very interesting. In the area where I live, historically characterized by high ethnic and religious pluralism, the early creation (by wise local politicians) of intercommunity organizations has prevented the spread of divisions and conflicts.

MF: What type of organisations, exactly?

DL: One of the most successful is ACCESS (Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services) originally founded by some enlightened leaders of the large Arab community in the Detroit area. This organization has played a double role: helping Arab immigrants to adapt to the American way of life, but also promoting harmonious inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations through educational and cultural activities and social assistance open to all Americans. Southern Michigan has now the lowest level of violent conflict in the US. The ACCESS experience has attracted US-wide and even international attention, for example in the Netherlands.

MF: Perhaps we should bring this experience to the attention of our new Minister of the Interior… Is there any chance that initiatives like this can drive some political countermovement against the politics of hatred?

DL: The US problem today is that at the national level the politics of hatred and hate speech are accepted by the governing party, the Republicans and that the Democrats seem unable to react effectively. The local level is the only promising arena where a countermovement against hatred can take off.

MF: Well, after all, Obama’s “yes, we can” discourse and politics grew out of a local context precisely, that of Chicago.

DL: Right. So I am worried but not entirely pessimistic. There are possibilities for reversing the trend, both in the US and in Europe. As I said above, ideologies and practices are fluid and amenable to change. Social reality is heterogeneous and plastic, very sensitive to contingent events and developments. The microfoundations of social processes are always individuals, with their capacity for political imagination and choice.

An abridged version of this conversation was published in the Corriere della Sera.

Photo Credits CC: William J Serson

Originally published at EuVisions.

Racism and integration — A dialogue between Maurizio Ferrera and Daniel Little was originally published in EuVisions on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Some people are ashamed of the figures for admissions. I have always been ashamed of the deaths that the European Union pretended not to see for so many years before we took office. And I am proud of a European Union that saves lives at sea, although I regard each life that we, along with our friends in North Africa and in Africa, fail to save as a defeat for all of us.

(Federica Mogherini, 21 June 2017)

The European response to the recent migration flows to the continent is everything but successful. Yet, the High Representative of the EU Foreign and Security Policy Federica Mogherini could be proud of a few initiatives started by the Union thanks to its capacity of ‘rightly reading’ the political climate and to mobilising all resources at the EU’s disposal. Migration policies have been at the top of Federica Mogherini’s policy agenda since the early years of her dual appointment as High Representative of the EEAS and Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP) in 2014. Federica Mogherini represents over 500 European citizens, yet her initiatives do not capture the public opinion as much as other national European leaders. Her contribution is an attempt to shed light on the important initiatives that the current EU High Representative is advancing in a domain like migration, currently considered among the most problematic and divisive in Europe.

The first example of Mogherini’s leadership in responding to the migration crisis was the launch of the EUNAVFOR Med (Sophia) Operation in the southern-central Mediterranean

Migration flows pose an enormous challenge for the European Union, but this challenge cannot be overcome unless the EU is united in its response; unless the root causes that are forcing people to leave their countries are tackled and unless migration starts to be perceived as a global issue that requires a multilateral approach. The EU High Representative Mogherini proved political leadership so far by launching a series of multi-level initiatives, aimed at managing the external dimension of migration, tackling its root causes, while bringing the discussion beyond Europe to a more global discussion.

A joint European response to save lives and fight smugglers

As soon as Mogherini, former Italian Foreign Minister, arrived in Brussels, she worked hard to make migration not a national but a European issue. Her primary objective was a European collective response to migration. Indeed, the first example of Mogherini’s leadership in responding to the migration crisis was the launch of the EUNAVFOR Med (Sophia) Operation in the southern-central Mediterranean. Two months after around 900 migrants lost their lives in a shipwreck off the Libyan coast, this first-ever joint EU naval mission aiming at fighting human trafficking and arms smuggling was unanimously agreed on the 22nd of June 2015. It took two months to move from a political initiative to a full CSDP operation.

The idea of creating a more equal partnership with shared rights, but also shared responsibilities is reflected in the November 2017 meeting in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Here, Mogherini promoted the first African Union-European Union Ministerial Meeting since 2014

During this ‘remarkably short’ period of time for an EU mission (Faleg and Blockmans 2015), a consensus was built among EU member states, capabilities were identified, and deployment began. Up to now, the mission has neutralized 545 smugglers, arrested 143 traffickers, trained Libyan coast guard officers, and most importantly, saved 44,251 lives (EU Council, 2018). “A drop in the ocean” as the same Mogherini has said in the recent documentary ‘Europe at Sea’, produced by Annalisa Piras. Nevertheless, the Operation Sophia represents a key component in the Mogherini-led process of building European unity around the external dimension of migration policy. It’s already an important step, given that before the launch of the operation, Italy was alone in facing the crisis with the Italian mission Mare Nostrum.

An interregional approach to tackle the root causes of migration

In addition to the EUNAFOR Med CSDP operation, Mogherini moved the focus of the EU from border security to the root causes of migration. This move recognizes that the EU alone cannot resolve the migration issue and that the cooperation with local, regional and international actors is indispensable. Although this claim was not completely innovative within the EU discourse, initiatives show Mogherini’s clear push to implement solid partnerships with the other key actors in the region. The idea of creating a more equal partnership with shared rights, but also shared responsibilities is reflected in the November 2017 meeting in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Here, Mogherini promoted the first African Union-European Union Ministerial Meeting since 2014. Ministers agreed to turn the meeting into an annual appointment to discuss agenda’s priorities, such as the migration issue as: “We cannot close our eyes on the common responsibility we have, to protect lives, save lives, open also regular channels for migration and mobility, to offer economic alternatives to our young people in Africa” (Mogherini 2017).

Overall, beyond the €20 billion a year the EU and its member states provide to Africa, an additional €44 billion are expected from private investments. Working with African partners — both governments and NGOs — is therefore vital, not only to better target the money within the local communities but also to start a process that will be sustainable in the long-run

Although working with local partners and governments is sometimes difficult and subject to criticism, there doesn’t seem to be valid alternatives. Cooperation is necessary both for helping migrants get out of Libyan detention camps and to safely go back to their communities, but also to create better local conditions to tackle the primary reasons for leaving: precarious security conditions and no opportunities. Thanks to the partnerships and the support of the UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), around 16,000 people were rescued from the camps of Libya and returned back to their communities. In addition to that, the Africa Emergency Trust Fund was launched in November 2015 to support the economic development of local communities, to prevent irregular migration and fight human trafficking, and to promote conflict prevention actions and rule of law enforcement. Overall, beyond the €20 billion a year the EU and its member states provide to Africa, an additional €44 billion are expected from private investments. Working with African partners — both governments and NGOs — is therefore vital, not only to better target the money within the local communities but also to start a process that will be sustainable in the long-run. This cannot be done unless the local governments are involved.

A global agreement on mass migration

The challenge of migration is not only affecting the European Union and its neighbours, but it should be understood and considered as a global trend. The tensions at the border between Mexico and the USA or the struggles of Asian nations facing growing waves of desperate migrants crossing the Indian Ocean to reach Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are just two examples of what should be considered a global challenge. Mogherini was very active on an international level, promoting in practice what the Global Strategy labelled as a rules-based global order, anchored within multilateralism and with the UN at its core. Her push for a more global management of migration resulted in the adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (Resolution 71/1) by the UN General Assembly in September 2016, and in the initiation of the development of two global compacts, one for refugees and one on migration. The two compacts are in line with Mogherini’s proposal to consider migration not only as a crisis to tackle but also as an opportunity if properly managed at a global level. In particular, after the withdrawal of the US in December 2017, Mogherini took the leadership of the process as this represented the “unique opportunity to bring forward the European vision on migration” (Mogherini 2018).

It is important to recognise that there is a political leadership within the EU that is proactively seeking to find solutions at European, regional, as well as at the global level, to one of the biggest challenges of our time

Beyond these initiatives, the work that the European Union still needs to do on the issue of migration is huge. European national governments have the responsibility to find solutions to the other elements of the migration puzzle, of which the external dimension is only one piece. Yet, it is important to acknowledge some of the achievements reached so far. It is important to recognise that there is a political leadership within the EU that is proactively seeking to find solutions at European, regional, as well as at the global level, to one of the biggest challenges of our time. Finally, in times where the role of the European Union is questioned, it is important to show that the EU is not only an entity full of ‘eurocrats’ — as the EU is pictured by some national leaders — but that there are concrete actions that the European Union can and is implementing. The external actions that the EU is promoting to respond to the challenge of migration are not perfect, yet sometimes even researchers have the moral responsibility of sharing good initiatives without seeking for perfection.

Photo Credits CC: European External Action Service

Originally published at EuVisions.

Regional, national, global: Mogherini’s take on migration was originally published in EuVisions on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

If anything, “social Europe” has long been the subject of intense discussions. In a chapter of a forthcoming book, we argue that looking at the discourses produced about social Europe in historical perspective reveals how the understanding of the “social” in the European Union has been framed — and that this casts light on some of its shortcomings today.

Since the 1980s, two concepts were widely used to describe the European social dimension: the European social model and the social market economy. A chronology of the occurrences of both terms in the plenary debates of the European Parliament (EP) reveals that both concepts have emerged as successful ways of defining social Europe roughly at the same time, starting from the late 1980s, and have been widely used until today (even if since 2003 European social model seems to have become more used than social market economy). Our research finds that while these two concepts were used at the beginning with different — and even conflicting — purposes, they increasingly converged towards a de-politicized and economized conception of the “social”, whereby the primary aim of social policy becomes the promotion of employment.

Social Market Economy vs. European Social Model

While the idea of developing a social dimension of European integration was of course not born in the 1980s, the expression “social Europe” started to be increasingly used in European debates at that time. Against the backdrop of economic crisis, the limited ability of Member states to deal with the economic and social problems at national levels opened up new opportunities for developing the social dimension at European level. Moreover, such a project was seen as a promising tool in order to re-build the lost legitimacy of the Community.

In this context, an important way to talk about the social dimension of European integration started to gain ground: the definition of the European Economic Community (EEC) as a social market economy. The concept of social market economy had emerged in post-war Germany as a tentative equilibrium between economic freedom and social concerns. Its origins are to be found within the Ordoliberal School, a group of scholars who played a crucial role in German politics after the War. In a nutshell, their basic idea was that the best social policy was a sound, market-oriented economic policy. Interestingly, in the German debate of the 1950s the concept was regularly opposed to the EEC economic policy, supposedly reflecting the model of French planning. But, over time, social market economy became a more consensual watchword in German debates, and escaped its original promoters. With the reunification debate, it started to be used to define a core element of the German national identity. In this context, it made its way to the European debates about social Europe. In the EP, during the 1980s, it was supported by conservatives, by liberals trying to avoid a “socialist Europe”, and by many Germans seeing in social market economy the key to the European social question.

The European social model and social market economy thus started to function together. This made room for a trans-partisan endorsement of both concepts

However, this was not the only available vocabulary that circulated at the time to define the much-wanted social Europe. Another concept was introduced and promoted in the 1980s, namely that of European social model. It was first circulated by the European Commission, as an element of a broader strategy of re-legitimating the EC, developed under the new leadership of Jacques Delors. The aim was to reconcile the idea of a necessary step forward in European integration and of the preservation of the national social arrangements of the past. The European social model was thus very loosely defined as “a balance between the rights and obligations of society and the individual”. However, it was presented as a distinct counter-project to social market economy and supported by the reformist left. In the European Parliament, during the 1980s and early 1990s, the first and only users of the concept were to be found in this social-reformist stream of thought. Hence, these two concepts represented two distinct projects for social Europe.

Social Europe Beyond Partisan Politics

Both concepts were nevertheless to be increasingly associated during the following years. This change can be observed in the policy documents produced by European institutions throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s. For instance, while in its White Paper on social policy (1993), the European Commission insisted on the need to “preserve and develop” the European social model, mainly understood as a set of values involving “in particular the rights and responsibilities of the individual”, the report never mentioned social market economy. When in 2006, the Committee on social affairs of the EP produced a report on “a European social model for the future”, it restated that “the European social model is first and foremost a question of values”. But these values, it was said, were precisely those embedded in the defunct draft constitutional Treaty — where they were subsumed under the concept of social market economy.

The de-politicization of welfare reform and the economization of the social go hand in hand: the development of the European “social dimension” is identified with technically finding an equilibrium between social and economic objectives — an equilibrium that involves the subordination of the former to the latter

The European social model and social market economy thus started to function together. This made room for a trans-partisan endorsement of both concepts. For instance, it is striking to notice that most left-wing MEPs who used the term of social market economy in 2003 did it in a positive sense, while most conservatives and liberals who talked about European social model approved the concept. Political differences may have explained the inclination to use one term rather than the other, but they did no longer account for the approval or criticism of the concepts. The initial opposition line of social democrats defending the concept of European social model, on the one hand, and conservatives and liberals defending social market economy, on the other, had been almost completely blurred.

Social Europe: De-politicization through Economization?

The convergence between the discourses on the European social model and the social market economy was not only a rhetorical one. On the contrary, it was connected to the rise of a more substantial conception of Social Europe, which is reflected and further strengthened in more recent European initiatives, such as the Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020 Strategy and the Social Investment Package (adopted respectively in 2000, 2010 and 2013).

This substantial conception seems to involve a specific interpretation of the relations between the social and the economic: rather than working against each other, the social should facilitate the functioning of the economic, improving the opportunity for all to participate within the market. Thus, a crucial aspect of this conception is the reconciliation between social and economic goals — a reconciliation that involves a high degree of de-politicization. Indeed, contrary to the post-War compromise, the process of reconciling the social and the economic dimensions is not seen as a task for democratic politics and social movements but rather for “experts” — a technocratic issue involving the search for “policy solutions” aimed at addressing “challenges”, such as increased international competition and the emergence of the “knowledge-based economy”. Welfare reform becomes a matter of adaptation and reform proposals are not presented as possible political options but rather as part of an inevitable “modernization” process that the new conditions make necessary. In this way, the development of social Europe is withdrawn from the political debate and from social struggles.

Re-establishing the legitimacy of the European project and overcoming its (in)famous “democratic deficit” require — among other things — the re-politicization of the relationship between the economic and the social

In particular, the reform path aimed at the “modernization” of welfare states implies that the main goals of social policy become those of promoting paid employment and enhancing people’s human capital. Thus, the reconciliation of social and economic goals occurs mainly through the economization of the social: from being a limit to the economic logic, social policy has been reframed as “social investment” — an economic asset, positively contributing to competitiveness and economic growth. From this perspective, the de-politicization of welfare reform and the economization of the social go hand in hand: the development of the European “social dimension” is identified with technically finding an equilibrium between social and economic objectives — an equilibrium that involves the subordination of the former to the latter.

Can Social Europe be re-politicized?

Yet, the economization of the social is not a neutral or merely technical process. Rather, it has deeply political implications. It requires to reform welfare states focusing on promoting employment, shifting social policy priorities away from protection from the market and de-commodification towards inclusion in the market and “recommodification”. But growing inequalities and precarity within the labour market increasingly undermine the legitimacy of re-commodification policies. In this context, it seems that re-establishing the legitimacy of the European project and overcoming its (in)famous “democratic deficit” require — among other things — the re-politicization of the relationship between the economic and the social. Given the central role that paid employment plays in reconciling economic and social goals, it seems that this re-politicization entails initiating a democratic debate aimed at re-discussing the place that work — and what kind of work — should have in contemporary Europe.

Photo Credits CC: Bart

Originally published at EuVisions.

Social policy without politics? Social Europe between de-politicization and economization was originally published in EuVisions on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

In our last infographic, we saw how EU member states are polarized when it comes to policy initiatives EU institutions have adapted to handle the increasing influx of immigrants from non-EU member states. While some countries are in favour of a more prominent role of the EU, other countries disagree with the decisions taken by the EU institutions. Do Europeans prefer for their governments to take back control of their country’s borders?

Eurobarometer 87.3 published in May 2017 asked respondents if additional measures should be taken to fight irregular immigration of people from outside the EU. The first graph shows that at the aggregate (EU28) level, almost 90% of European respondents believe that additional measures should be taken to handle extra-EU immigration. 38% think that these measures should be dealt with at the EU level, 28.5% believe that they should be a prerogative of national governments. Another 21% prefer a conjunct role by the EU and national governments instead. Important differences between countries emerge from the data. In the United Kingdom, where during the Brexit referendum campaign “take back control of our borders” was one of the most frequently used slogans by the“Leave” block, almost one respondent out of two believes that additional measures to fight irregular immigration should be dealt with by the British government. A number of respondents agree with this position in eastern European member states as well (e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania), and in Austria and Cyprus. However, in the large majority of EU member states, a large portion of citizens believe that these additional measures should be adopted at the EU level or at both the EU and the national level. This last position is the most preferred among German respondents (43%).

Project 28 survey, conducted in the same period during 2017, asked respondents if their country should have fences to protect its borders against immigrants, as Hungary has already done. At the aggregate level, a slight majority (51%) of respondents disagree with this statement. However, in Hungary, as well as in Bulgaria, a large majority of respondents support building fences to protect their country’s borders. A number of respondents in some eastern and southern EU member states support this position. A broad share of respondents in north-western European countries, on the other hand, disagree with this position.

This infographic is the fifth episode of a series entitled “Free movement and migration in the EU”

Photo Credits CC Flickr: Rasande Tyskar

Originally published at EuVisions.

Taking back control: An EU or national issue? was originally published in EuVisions on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

European Welfare Solidarity to Realize a Social Europe

The Great Recession and the Eurozone crisis took a large toll on EU Member States and their economies. Subsequently, many EU citizens faced wage cuts, higher risk of unemployment and poverty. The crisis forced many Europeans into precarious life situations. Member States were also strained, as the burden to retain a safety net for their citizens in precarious life situations added to their fiscal challenges while their state budgets were already under pressure due to the crisis.

While the magnitude of the Great Recession’s effects varied across European citizens and Member States to a large degree, EU policy makers have come to identify the difficult situation of individuals and the burden they exert on Member States as a European problem in the aftermath of the Great Recession. In recent years, the European Commission has emphasized more and more the aim to achieve a “social Europe”. The launch of a Youth Employment Initiative to support young adults in regions strongly hit by the crisis matches this aim, as well as the ratification of the European Pillar of Social Rights, which seeks to ground the benchmark principles for social rights of all Europeans. These measures all indicate an evolution of European welfare solidarity.

An overwhelming majority of interviewees supports the idea that the EU should guarantee access to health care, a decent standard of living for the elderly and the unemployed

European welfare solidarity is a form of solidarity that transcends the nation state container and refers to solidarity with vulnerable Europeans. One of the key tasks of welfare states is to establish a social security system in order to protect people from risks who cannot cover their living expenses alone through their wages. Thus, European welfare solidarity exists when Europeans are willing to extend their support to all Europeans in precarious life situations, regardless of where they reside in the EU.

In this contribution, we explore to what degree Europeans support European welfare solidarity on the basis of the Transnational European Solidarity Survey (TESS) carried out in 13 EU countries in 2016. We investigate whether Europeans support European-wide social security for the sick, elderly, and the unemployed. Traditionally, these three groups constitute the main target for welfare benefits.

Uncontested High Support Bolstered By Self-interest and Value Orientations

The positive vision of a social Europe from the policy maker’s side is also met with enthusiasm from the general public. Our survey clearly shows that there is an overwhelming majority of respondents believing that the European Union (EU) should be responsible for providing social security for people in need, irrespective of the source of their vulnerability [Figure 1]. While 90 % of respondents agree that the EU should be responsible for Europeans with health issues, a similarly high rate of respondents (92%) think it is important for the EU to provide decent living conditions to elderly Europeans. These figures are considerably higher than the response rate in connection with unemployed Europeans. Here 79% of respondents support the notion that the EU needs to secure the standard of living of unemployed Europeans. However, this still well exceeds three-fourths of the respondents. Overall, data indicate a high support for European social security.

Are there differences between educational groups and between different European countries in their support for European solidarity? We concentrate on support rates for unemployed Europeans only.

[Figure 1] Approval of providing social security by the EU — Source: TESS 2016

Figure 2 illustrates how the support for the EU providing help for unemployed Europeans varies by level of education. We find that individuals with the lowest level of education (primary level or less) have the highest rate of approval (88%) for the EU guaranteeing a decent standard of living for unemployed Europeans. Those with secondary and tertiary education are more reserved to such measures, although still exhibit high approval rates. Four fifths of respondents with secondary education level approve of European level measures, while 73% of respondents with tertiary education agree that European unemployed should be supported.

However, policy makers should not be so hasty to build a supranational welfare system to realize a social Europe, as our results do not give policy makers a green light for a concrete endeavor. Uncontested high approval rates for European social security do not automatically suggest that further supranational policy measures will be undisputed

These findings indicate that self-interest bolsters support for European social security. In the wake of the crisis those with lower levels of education have become so-called outsiders in the European labor market (Heidenreich 2015, 2016). They have one of the highest potential to become unemployed and would gain from European-wide social policy measures to support the unemployed. So, they have a vested interest to support the notion that the EU should aid unemployed Europeans.

[Figure 2] Approval rate of the EU guaranteeing a decent standard of living for unemployed by level of education — Source: TESS 2016

On top of self-interest, cultural underpinnings to support European social policy initiatives also exist. The more left-oriented a respondents’ political value the more she or he will support measures connected to European welfare solidarity. To a lesser degree European identity is also relevant for attitudes. If respondents identify with Europe, they will more strongly support European social security measures. Overall, a detailed analysis (see forthcoming publications) shows that high support rates are driven by not only self-interest of respondents, but also value underpinnings connected to the notion of European social security.

The European Commission could draft appropriate directives, urging national Member States to adequately protect vulnerable groups within nation states, similar to the European Pillar of Social Rights, or an EU-wide minimum wage mentioned by Emmanuel Macron in his Sorbonne address

It is also worth looking at how the support rates vary across countries. Figure 3 depicts how the support rates for providing unemployed Europeans a standard of living by the EU varies across countries. On the one end of the approval rates are Mediterranean countries: Spaniards, Cypriots, and Greeks show the highest approval rates. In contrast, with Sweden, Germany, and Poland we find countries with a relative stable economy during the crisis with the lowest approval rates.

[Figure 3] Approval rate of the EU guaranteeing a decent standard of living for unemployed by country — Source: TESS 2016

Delving into the country differences in more detail, we can identify systematic cross-national variations in attitudes. Figure 4 depicts how the rate of approval for supporting unemployed Europeans increases when the unemployment rate in the country is high. The connection between attitudes and the level of unemployment rate is strong and it indicates that also on the country level self-interest is a key factor. What is also notable is that post-socialist countries do not significantly differentiate from Western attitudes, and these do not build one unified and distinct group of countries. Instead, there seems to be a large gap between respondents from creditor and debtor countries of the Eurozone crisis.

Source: TESS 2016 and World Bank 2016

The Path to a Social Europe Still Needs to be Paved

Our results provide tailwind for those politicians who want to deepen the European integration process and build a social Europe. The analysis shows that the overwhelming majority supports the idea that the EU should guarantee access to health care, a decent standard of living for the elderly and the unemployed. Our results indicate that Europeans consider social security a right that should be granted to all Europeans.

However, policy makers should not be so hasty to build a supranational welfare system to realize a social Europe, as our results do not give policy makers a green light for a concrete endeavor. Instead, the results rather provide a general framework for social policy actions, as the TESS was only directed at measuring general attitudes towards Europe-wide responsibility for people in need. Uncontested high approval rates for European social security do not automatically suggest that further supranational policy measures will be undisputed. Previous studies show (Baute et al. 2017; Gerhards et al. 2016) supranational institution building does not have a majority in all European countries.

The European project has started to shift from an elite project to one that is relevant to other parts of the population as well

Nonetheless, there are various non-supranational policy tools at hand. For instance, the European Commission could draft appropriate directives, urging national Member States to adequately protect vulnerable groups within nation states, similar to the European Pillar of Social Rights, or an EU-wide minimum wage mentioned by Emmanuel Macron in his Sorbonne address. Second, an emergency budget to fund national social security systems in case of short-term shocks. This could constitute the “golden mean” between European and national responsibilities (Weber 2017).

Lastly, we want to highlight that more affluent Europeans (who more likely constitute part of the European elite) are more reluctant to express their support for European welfare solidarity. Our findings indicate that the European project has started to shift from an elite project to one that is relevant for other parts of the population as well.

Of course, exactly such a development can also endanger the European project, as economic interest based coalitions are more likely to disperse once there is no interest. Future analyses need to delve deeper into the matter and assess whether self-interest really bolsters European welfare solidarity, or it has the potential to undermine it, with also a consequence for building a social Europe.

Photo Credits CC: Nan Palmero

Originally published at EuVisions.

European Welfare Solidarity in Focus: High Support for European Social Safety Net was originally published in EuVisions on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

<p>Florian K. Kley is a researcher in the HORIZON 20202-Project, <em>Solidarity in European Societies: Empowerment, Social Justice and Citizenship (SOLIDUS)</em> at the Chair for Societal Institutions and Social Change at the Institute of Sociology at Leipzig University. His main research fields are European social integration, social stratification research, and quantitative data analysis.</p>

Originally published at EuVisions.

Florian K. Kley was originally published in EuVisions on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.