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        <title><![CDATA[Fall When Hit - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Disruptive ideas for the British Army, by anonymous posters. Member of Military Writers Guild. Broadcast from @fallwhenhit. Curated by @durnure. Submissions welcome: durnure at gmail.com - Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is CGS really humble enough to allow true challenge?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/is-cgs-really-humble-enough-to-allow-true-challenge-640baff40627?source=rss----17f4eb0496c1---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[army]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fall When Hit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Oct 2016 10:32:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-10-30T11:00:43.623Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/0*ZfdIB3YpfzF7Y8et.jpg" /><figcaption>General Sir Nick Carter KCB CBE DSO ADC Gen</figcaption></figure><p>The chief of the General Staff (CGS), General Sir Nick Carter, is executing a pretty strong vision. He has benefited from being the chief architect of the Army 2020 policy in a prior role as deputy commander Land Forces, and now has a strong implementation mandate courtesy of its endorsement by the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (SDSR). He’s particularly fortunate that the conclusion of ops TELIC and HERRICK, as well as a change in the defence planning assumptions that eliminated a brigade plus enduring overseas operation, have given him some room to play in. It’s a lot easier to renovate your house when it’s not on fire.</p><p>Being a Green Jacket, and the latest member of the Black Mafia, CGS is a very clever man. It’s hard to find fault with his vision at a high level.</p><p>But as CGS himself recognises, no one can predict the future: events regularly catch us out (e.g. Brexit, the rise of Trump and the mortgage crisis, to name a few recent ones). Even the invasion of Iraq, due to the way restrictions were placed on planning, was a bit of a shock for the army. That means the current environment — call it a VUCA world — mandates a particular mind-set. Leaders must be open minded and flexible; they need a wide and (intellectually) diverse network; they need candid advisers; and they need to think in terms of probabilities and scenarios rather than point predictions.</p><p>So far, so good: we’ve heard all this many times before.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/530/0*EOzmFg8PbOXOsrat." /><figcaption>Nassim Taleb, who popularised the term “black swan”</figcaption></figure><p>What is not often remarked upon is that many of these so-called black swans were foreseeable: they were actually what are sometimes called “grey swans”. In the case of Brexit, the accuracy of polls was obliterated by Cameron’s re-election, and discontent with the EU was well known. Trump’s appearance was presaged by general polarisation in the US, the rise of populist politicians all over Europe, and a general dissatisfaction with the political elite, as evidenced by the Tea Party and Occupy movements. As painfully chronicled in <em>The Big Short</em>, not only did many people predict the mortgage crisis, and profit from it, but the experts arguing against the prospect were clearly incompetent and living in a bubble (in both senses of the word).</p><p>The point is that we’re often surprised only because we’re ignorant, we lack imagination, and we’re in thrall to narratives that are bullshit (sometimes known as “intellectual capture”).</p><p>Leaders are especially prone to this. Large organisations contain unfathomable complexity, particularly when they operate in the VUCA world. It’s not possible for senior leaders to deal with this complexity, so they simplify. A lot. They concoct a story in their head, and then build their visions, strategies and plans on top of that narrative. Sometimes they’re right, and they build great organisations, and become rich and famous. And sometimes they’re wrong, and blow up their organisations and are remembered as sociopaths. Anyone who has ever heard a senior leader speak, and walked out of the room thinking, “What fucking planet is he on?” knows exactly what I’m talking about.</p><p>Whether they’re right or wrong (and we generally don’t know which they are until the end of their tenure), most leaders really don’t like having people question their narrative. As a purely practical matter, most people don’t have access to all the information the leader does, or understand the trade-offs inherent in an issue, so leaders generally don’t find random challenges from the floor that helpful. But it’s also not nice when someone questions the assumptions that are underpinning what you hope will be the crowning achievement of your career. You don’t get to the top without confidence, and confidence leads to confirmation bias. So people who stick their hand up and say, “Sir, that’s not going to work because …” are quickly — and often secretly — labelled troublemakers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/380/0*7qOgiK4ZP9BdVUiG." /><figcaption>As a Pixar employee, Buzz practices candour</figcaption></figure><p>Followers who want a career and who are not on the autism spectrum quickly learn the difference between honesty and candour: honesty means you don’t lie when you speak; candour (as defined by Pixar co-founder Ed Catmull) means you choose to speak up.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/220/0*03h6_3wu7a3f8x9d.jpg" /><figcaption>General Michael Hayden</figcaption></figure><p>General Michael Hayden knows why candour is hard. He was director of the NSA under Bush 43 and of the CIA under both Bush and Obama. He says that the most difficult element of his job was walking into the Oval Office to tell the president that a critical piece of his narrative was factually incorrect. Needless to say, presidents don’t particularly like being told that.*</p><p>This brings us back to CGS. CGS says all the right things about a brains-based approach, maximising talent, being a learning organisation and bringing challenge at the highest levels. But all senior leaders parrot that boiler-plate language. Dig a little deeper, and you find some warning signs. For one, CGS uses first person singular pronouns — a lot. Indeed, it sounds as though there’s only one big brain powering the whole enterprise. CGS also dismisses concerns over maintaining standards in the Army because, well, maintaining standards is what the Army does (which is a close cousin of “trust us”). Actually, the Army is poor at maintaining standards, and anyone who denies that is pretty disconnected from the frontline reality. It suggests no one is candidly briefing the CGS on the pressure units are (always) under. CGS also talks about bringing in diverse points of view to challenge accepted wisdom, but the general staff project amounts to non-military external advisers. While having a diverse network is a good thing, it’s no substitute for high-quality, candid, internal advice. To prosper in the VUCA world, the first thing out of the CGS’s mouth should be his (or her) progress on creating a culture of candour and respectful dissent.</p><p>There is a real danger, then, that CGS is working in an echo chamber, characterised by over-confidence and lack of challenge (a “surfeit of vision”).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*gHqvNBR4hRFulsAT.jpg" /><figcaption>Jim Collins</figcaption></figure><p>This problem would certainly not be unique to the army, although it might be most extreme there. One of the most enduring memes of recent leadership literature has been Jim Collins’s bus. Collins, who studies successful businesses for a living, has written <a href="http://www.jimcollins.com/books.html">myriad best-selling books on the topic</a> (e.g. <em>Good to Great</em>, <em>Built to Last </em>and <em>Great by Choice). </em>One of the intellectual cornerstones of his work has been that the best companies in the world “get the right people onto the bus, and the wrong people off the bus”. This strikes every leader as common sense (and always frustrated me as a military leader, because we usually don’t get to choose who’s on the bus). But it’s important to capture Collins’s edict exactly: “First who, then what”. In other words, it’s not enough to get the right people onto the bus: you must then decide what to do with input from those right people. And that requires you to create a high-performing team to harness their input. And that in turn requires you to create the conditions in which candour can flourish.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/0*WOUcpcapsD5rI4i4.png" /><figcaption>These people think a lot about how to enable candid, high-performing teams</figcaption></figure><p>Not surprisingly, Google has analysed how to do this. With a couple hundred teams at any given time, tons of quantitative data on how they’re doing, and far too much cash lying around, Google is able to do some pretty scientific research on high-performing teams (<a href="http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/magazine/what-google-learned-from-its-quest-to-build-the-perfect-team.html">link</a>). The company considered just about every factor imaginable, but eventually determined that what matters is “psychological safety”. Psychological safety is defined as a shared belief held by members of a team that the team is safe for interpersonal risk-taking. Achieving psychological safety in turn requires two things: “equality in distribution of conversational turn-taking” (everyone gets an equal chance to talk) and “average social sensitivity” (everyone can sense how each other is feeling).</p><p>You can see the problem right away. How many commanders do you know who are careful to not speak more than others on their command team? Most of mine started every O group with a long diatribe (a surfeit of vision). Social sensitivity is certainly not a term you come across very often in the Army — and note Google says <em>average</em> social sensitivity. That means the social sensitivity of <em>everyone</em> at the table matters (I’m talking to you, LE officers).</p><p>Let us return to Jim Collins. When Collins and his team contrasted good companies with great companies, they discovered that the differentiator was humility: “The x-factor of truly great leadership is humility” (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=136nLhwBoSQ">link</a>).** Synthesising the work of Collins and Google, I submit that it is humility — true humility, not self-delusion or faux humility*** — that underpins psychological safety, that in turn enables challenge and getting to the best answer.</p><p>The British Army has given a lot of thought to battlefield leadership. It’s arguably one of the finest leadership factories in the world. But equivalently superior <em>intellectual</em> performance requires a different kind of leadership, one that focuses on humility and creating psychological safety.</p><p>Maybe it’s time we started celebrating that style of leadership as well.</p><p>*Hayden: “The intel guy is fact based. The policy guy [the president, in this case] is vision based. The intel guy is inherently is swimming at detail, trying to create generalised conclusions. He’s fundamentally inductive. The policy guy is trying to take his first principles, you know, the ones that got him elected, he’s trying to take those first principles and apply them to specific circumstances. He’s inherently deductive. The intel guy: the world as it is. The policy-maker: the world as we want it to be. And then finally, just because the nature of the work, the intel guy is inherently pessimistic …. The policymaker, though, inherently optimistic …. [The intel guy has] got to get into the head of the policymaker even though he knows he’s probably making that man or woman’s day worse than it otherwise would be, with every sentence he utters.”</p><p>** Collins’s research also identified other related characteristics such as willpower and a sense of service, which we can take as read for senior army officers.</p><p>*** Take Sir Frank Chapman, former CEO of BG Group, as an example of faux humility. A magazine profile of Chapman said he loved healthy debate among his top lieutenants. But when I asked one of his senior managers about this, he said that Chapman was a bully who only liked debate as long as no one disagreed with him.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=640baff40627" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/is-cgs-really-humble-enough-to-allow-true-challenge-640baff40627">Is CGS really humble enough to allow true challenge?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit">Fall When Hit</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What would Hack do?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/what-would-hack-do-5036dc44698e?source=rss----17f4eb0496c1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5036dc44698e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[army]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fall When Hit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 23 Apr 2016 06:13:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-05-06T08:59:42.656Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/791/1*D6mKLe88Ig8qdSJ4LB3-iQ.gif" /></figure><p>Prior to 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, you had to look back a bit to find role-models of green-army combat leadership. Really this meant the Falklands and Vietnam. And if you dig into leadership in the Vietnam War, it won’t be long until you come across Colonel David Hackworth.</p><p>Hack, as he was known, earned over 90 military awards, including two DSCs, ten Silver Stars, eight Bronze Stars, eight purple hearts and thirty-four Air Medals. He was also put in for the Medal of Honor three times. That’s a lot, even by American standards. General Creighton Abrams, the overall commander in Vietnam, called him “the best battalion commander I ever saw”. To fully understand the gravity of that accolade, remember what General Patton in turn had said of Abrams: “I’m supposed to be the best tank commander in the Army, but I have one peer — Abe Abrams. He’s the world champion.” Multiply those two comments together and you get a sense of what an incredible combat leader Hack was.</p><p>There are many officers who love their men; there are many who love killing the enemy; there are others who know their profession inside out; and there are a few who are comfortable telling their superiors to fuck off. What distinguishes Hack is that he was all of these things.</p><p>Hack’s life reminds us some of the the immutable laws of leadership:</p><ul><li>Taking care of soldiers is the foundation of everything</li><li>Leadership is not a popularity contest; what is best for soldiers (discipline) is not at all what they want</li><li>Because of that, good leadership is lonely</li><li>The chain of command is not always right, and deciding how and when to disobey is one of the toughest challenges a leader will face</li></ul><p>Every young infantry leader should read Hack’s work. The point is certainly not to emulate him, because he was truly one of a kind. But in a climate of risk aversion and zero-defect military careers, we should all inject a bit of Hack into our leadership styles.</p><h4><strong>Even the sun has spots</strong></h4><p>Hack was very, very far from perfect. So let’s get the bad stuff out of the way up front:</p><ul><li>Many believed that he was a glory hound</li><li>He was certainly immodest, claiming (correctly, it seems) to be America’s most decorated living soldier</li><li>He was selective about which regulations to follow (for instance, he allowed a brothel on camp to protect his men from STIs)</li><li>In 1971, disillusioned with the war, he spoke out against it in uniform and on TV</li><li>Abrams subsequently threatened to court-martial him, although he was eventually allowed to retire with honour</li><li>He became an anti-war activist</li><li>In the twilight of his life he attacked the generals (“perfumed princes”) with such ferocity one wondered which side he was on</li><li>As a journalist he discovered that CNO Admiral Mike Boorda was inappropriately wearing Combat Vs on two of his decorations; the very popular Boorda subsequently committed suicide</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/756/1*NbEI03B6C72zKtnWsV-4UA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The author’s copy of About Face</figcaption></figure><h4>The terrible 4/39th</h4><p>Hack’s crowning achievement in Vietnam was transforming an infantry battalion. The 4/39th was in a terrible state when he inherited it, even by draftee standards:</p><p><em>“Worst battalion I’ve seen in twenty-six years of service,” [said the brigade commander].</em></p><p><em>From my vantage point coming in from Dong Tam [Hack writes], the [base] looked normal enough, but when I landed, I couldn’t believe my eyes, or my nose. The whole base smelled of raw shit and rotting morale. Toilet paper blew across the chopper pad, machine-gun ammo was buried in mud, and troops wandered around like zombies, their weapons gone red with rust.</em></p><p><em>These were the sloppiest American soldiers I’d ever seen, bar none. Unkempt, unwashed, unshaven, their uniforms ragged and dirty, hippie beads dangling alongside their dog tags, their helmets covered with graffiti.</em></p><p>Far worse than the appearance of the battalion was its performance: in six months it had suffered 32 killed and 307 wounded, “the equivalent of nearly 40 percent casualties without ever meeting a single significant enemy force in open combat. Rockets, mortars, booby traps and friendly fire had done most of the damage.”</p><h4>Becoming hardcore</h4><p>The first thing Hack did upon arriving was order his men to fill in all their scrapes and build better fighting positions. Doing this in the jungle is no joke, and by his own admission his soldiers instantly hated him: “[At first I was considered] the original GI Joe lifer sent from Hell to burn their hides with fire and brimstone.” But like all good commanders, Hack underpinned his tough love with regard for his men:</p><blockquote>A few days later, after finding a very small soldier who told me his feet were killing him because he couldn’t get any boots to fit him — they are all too big — I had a little discussion with the good S-4.</blockquote><blockquote>“Hack went ballistic,” Johnson recalls. “He chewed out his chain of command from his squad leader to his company commander and then he got ahold of me. He made it very clear that I better get the man a pair of boots or all kinds of horrible things were going to happen to me. The Army did not make a men’s boot small enough to fit this little guy. We scavenged the country and found a pair of women’s boots that fit the bill. This taught all of us an important lesson, that Hack cared for the lowest of soldiers and he expected his commanders and staff to damn well look after them.”</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/625/0*IaxuXvS_zARzA7SE.jpg" /><figcaption>Pearl-handled revolvers and funny hats: showmanship is an important tool of leadership</figcaption></figure><p>Hack recognised that the cornerstone of esprit is hard work and success: “You can’t make a unit proud by praising it and you can’t make a soldier proud by telling him how tough or good he is. That’s the superficial stuff. No pain, no gain. They had to earn it.” But equally, Hack knew the value of a little showmanship, particularly in building the cohesion that comes with being part of a distinct tribe:</p><blockquote>… I brought back saluting, a sign of military discipline that had been swallowed up by the rice paddy mud. Then I added a twist. When a soldier saluted, I required him to sound off with a loud “Hardcore Recondo, sir” — to which the officer would reply, “No fucking slack” …. Bob Press hired a machine shop in Saigon to make small black metal Recondo arrowhead pins, which the men quickly began wearing …. all outgoing mail was stamped with the Recondo logo …. All of this said, We’re different, we’re not just plain old infantry, we’re the best.</blockquote><p>And discipline. Lots and lots of discipline:</p><blockquote>Hardcore soldiers wouldn’t look like bums anymore, either. They’d shave every day, wear their gear properly and always be in camouflage when on ops. And the leaders made it happen by setting the example and being hard but fair …. Without absolute discipline, you lose …. I used every second of every day to train and instill discipline, beginning with something as basic as making sure every man worse his steel pot and carried his weapon at all times … I wanted those soldiers to roll into a firing position or take counterambush action even in their sleep.</blockquote><blockquote>The rules were simple: Check weapons, check feet, show that you care and let the troops know if we get into deep shit, help will be on the way.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*MzjTX9f0MO97nLIKVnv4Dw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Hack getting a Silver Star from General Omar Bradley in 1951</figcaption></figure><h4>Loneliness of command</h4><p>What is most striking about Hack’s experience of transforming the 4/39th — though unsaid by him — is the sheer loneliness. He took over the battalion when he was 38 years old, and had been in the army for 23 years (he enlisted when he was 15). His soldiers were draftees who generally had less than one year of service. His senior NCOs were “shake and bakes” with just a few years of experience. Even his company commanders, after Hack fired most of the incumbents, were really just platoon commanders with a couple of years in uniform*. And as described above, they were all in shit state. And they were based in a FOB. And they hated him — to start with, at least.</p><p>The scale of that transformation is stunning. And Hack basically did it alone. It got so bad that the brigade commander heard rumours of rebellion and flew out to the FOB to offer Hack some undercover agents to root out malcontents. Hack declined. But the loneliness must have been crushing**.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/325/0*QdNONusnBCZaKkLr.jpg" /><figcaption>Hack on the left briefs division CG Major General Ewell (centre) and chief of staff Colonel Ira Hunt (right)</figcaption></figure><h4>Getting on great with the boss</h4><p>Transforming a battalion might not have been so tough if Hack had a normal relationship with his chain of command, but … you can probably guess where this is going.</p><p>The US military was trapped in a bodycount strategy in Vietnam, and Major General Ewell was one of its leading exponents. Applying massive firepower to maximise dead bodies was the order of the day, leading to Ewell’s sobriquet as “the butcher of the Mekong Delta”. Ewell’s chief of staff Colonel Ira Hunt was a chip off the block, and when the micromanaging Hunt stood in for an absent Ewell the scene was set for a meltdown.</p><p>The spiral started one morning when Hunt appeared on Hack’s radio net to order Hardcore soldiers to dig up old VC graves to increase the bodycount. Hack responded by ordering his subunits to switch to a pre-arranged frequency to stop Hunt interferring (“skip rope”). Later that day Hack’s battalion doctor kicked Hunt out of the surgical theatre when Hunt ordered him to allow an interrogation of a grievously wounded VC soldier. To cap it off, that afternoon Hunt changed Hardcore subunits’ ambush positions — and put two in the same AO by mistake. Hack changed them back.</p><p>Cue the meltdown:</p><blockquote>Hunt came thundering up screaming that no one, but no one, could cancel his orders and we went face-to-face …. Once we got outside, I told him exactly what I thought of him and how his constant interference in my unit’s operations put my men at risk. “You don’t issue orders directly to my subordinate units, and I’ll be damned if I take your shit.”</blockquote><p>Hunt stormed off, but when Hack was summoned to Hunt’s HQ soon after he knew he was headed for a court-martial.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/560/0*_p0M5dAzLPu82xJX." /><figcaption>OH-6 light observation helicopter (“Loach”)</figcaption></figure><h4>The LRRP rescue</h4><p>When Hack arrived at the TOC he was informed that one of the division’s LRRPs (long-range reconnaissance patrols), comprised of Rangers, were in heavy contact, with 16 of 18 men wounded. A rescue helicopter had also been shot down. They were 40km away and lost in a 4km2 patch of jungle. And the only aviation available was a single Loach (Little Bird).</p><p>Hack extracted his pound of flesh: “Colonel Hunt, if I get these people out, you will never fuck with my battalion again. You just tell me what you want and when you want it done, but keep off my ass when I am doing it. Do you understand me?”</p><p>When Hack arrived above the encircled Rangers, what he saw was not good:</p><blockquote>I’d been in fights like this before with the 101st, but never in a situation where I couldn’t talk to a leader or RTO on the ground. A commander’s in serious shit when he can’t commo with the guys in the fight. The scene below was surreal — red and green tracers arcing in the sky underneath us, the mangled chopper with its blinking red beacon, gun flashes all around the bird.</blockquote><p>Hack located an LZ for one of his companies and was starting to adjust artillery fire when his Loach ran out of fuel. He decided to land in the middle of the firefight.</p><blockquote>“No way, sir [said the Loach pilot]. I’m not gonna land. I refuse to land.”</blockquote><blockquote>The man was no coward — just a smart kid who didn’t want to barge in uninvited to a VC barbecue where he could very well end up as the main course turning slowly over a very hot grill.</blockquote><blockquote>“Think again,” I said.</blockquote><blockquote>I laid the end of my pistol against the side of his helmet. “You’re going to land this sonofabitch right now. Park this fucking thing or I’ll blow your brains out.”</blockquote><blockquote>… We went down like a runaway elevator, flared and hovered above and to the side of the downed Huey. Slugs zipped around the LOH like lightning strikes. When we got to maybe six or seven feet off the ground, hands started desperately reaching for and grabbing the skids as a few survivors tried to pull our little bird from the sky. They were actually shaking the bird. Both Chum and I started kicking them away.</blockquote><p>Hack and Chum jumped out of the Loach and into the small group of Rangers. Chum started walking in the artillery fire while Hack set about getting a grip of the soldiers:</p><blockquote>I’d seen such fear before, especially during the bad days of the Korean War. If we didn’t got a old of these guys, get a little discipline and a defensive perimeter going in a hurry, we might find ourselves very dead. Very soon …. I grabbed the Rangers and aircrew by the back of their jackets and seat of their pants, shouting and pulling and pushing until we had a half-assed 360-degree perimeter around the downed bird. Almost every man was wounded, but they were game. On the battlefield when things are bad it takes only a few brave men to turn things around. It’s been my experience in battle that out of ten men, only one or two are natural fighters. But once a fighter shouts “Follow me” and charges, the rest are inspired to follow. In this instance, the Rangers — even bloodied — remained fighters to the man.</blockquote><p>With a perimeter set up, Hack returned to coordinating fire support as Huey gunships arrived. He then faced the problem of landing his company in an LZ the size of a small parking lot, in a firefight, in the dark, with blacked-out helicopters, and with indirect fire going in. He walked to the centre of the LZ, put a strobe light in his upside-down helmet, held it up, and then directed the Hueys in one by one over the radio. As his soldiers landed, Hack extracted the Rangers in an orderly fashion. “After that it was a yawn.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/450/1*gguZNaE8LlK9zNEZGIVGFA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The story of Hack’s time in 4/39 …</figcaption></figure><h4>What would Hack do?</h4><p>The LRRP rescue captures Hack’s essence perfectly: the fearlessess and indomitability, and the juxtaposition between absolute professionalism and disregard for the chain of command. Hack always led from the front: at one point he climbed onto the strut of a helicopter, landed on top of an enemy position and hauled to safety the point elements of a company pinned down and in danger of getting wiped out.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*nQyh4-FTrmPntUvd56wVaw.jpeg" /><figcaption>… and of his life in general</figcaption></figure><p>Therein you can also see the seeds of Hack’s downfall. He only cared about the grunts and winning. As the army’s agenda drifted from those two fundamental elements, Hack was destined to blow up and wash out of the system. It would have been the same outcome in Afghanistan (although one can easily imagine him happily skippering a battalion in Iraq prior to Obama’s disastrous, short-sighted intervention).</p><p>No one could or should emulate Hack — he was truly one of a kind. But implicitly he brings a philosophy we should all replicate: he cared about his career, but not too much. He regularly made decisions he believed in, even though he knew they would probably result in getting sacked or court-martialed. Real integrity means we should all be prepared to walk away when the system stops doing the right thing.</p><p>Whenever we face a tough challenge, particularly an ethical one, we should ask, “What would Hack do?”</p><p>* In the US Army, companies are commanded by captains and bn HQ is staffed by majors, whereas in the British Army this is reversed.</p><p>** This is very reminiscent of the fantastic <em>Platoon Leader </em>by James McDonough (<a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Platoon-Leader-Memoir-Command-Combat/dp/0891418008">link</a>), another Vietnam classic.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5036dc44698e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/what-would-hack-do-5036dc44698e">What would Hack do?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit">Fall When Hit</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Army fitness tests to be lowered for women?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/army-fitness-tests-to-be-lowered-for-women-40ac58e9a73a?source=rss----17f4eb0496c1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/40ac58e9a73a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[army]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fitness]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fall When Hit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 07 Apr 2016 06:01:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-06T15:56:16.921Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/580/0*nfcSZcILTWfvPJGh.jpg" /><figcaption>The Sunday Times used this photo of female American soldiers in its article</figcaption></figure><p><em>The Sunday Times </em>has published a short article headlined, “Fitness test ‘relaxed’ to help put women on the front line” (<a href="http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/Defence/article1684552.ece">link</a>, behind a paywall). <em>The Daily Mail </em>provides a separate summary (<a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3521538/Army-fitness-tests-written-make-sure-female-soldiers-qualify-line-duty.html">link</a>).</p><p>The <em>Times</em> states that current army PT is “optimised for male physiology” and that tests are based on “old and complete science”. In response, new physical standards will be introduced in 2019, to follow Fallon’s expected decision to open up close combat units to women. The <em>Times</em>, citing an MOD report it has seen, states that a research team is questioning the relevance of some tests, such as requirements for push-ups, sit-ups and 1.5-mile run.</p><p>The article doesn’t quite support the headline, though, as it does not present evidence that standards will be lowered. CGS is quoted: <em>“I want to make it very clear that there will be no lowering of training or qualifying levels for soldiers in ground close combat roles.”</em></p><p>Well, we’ll see how that goes. Glad he’s so clearly on record.</p><p>As I wrote more nearly 18 months ago, admitting women into the infantry will lower standards (<a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/allowing-women-into-the-infantry-is-a-mistake-379e73b9250b#.dhqo7vwwa">link</a>). I assumed this would take some time. First we’d have women, then we’d have quotas, then we’d have lowered standards to meet those quotas (in addition to a bunch of other negative consequences). It never occurred to me that the army would just redefine the standards such that it was hard for an outsider to know if they were equivalent, or lower, to existing ones. After all, push-ups, sit-ups and timed run are the most fundamental fitness tests there are (in addition to pull-ups, which the army has already dropped): it’s hard to fiddle with them without giving the game away.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*vrv_APv9PDzee9_9.jpg" /><figcaption>Captain Rosie Hamilton has been told she can’t share her view on the review into women in close combat</figcaption></figure><p>Certainly the army is not keen that voters and taxpayers know what it’s up to: “Top brass have told [Captain] Hamilton she’s not allowed to give a personal view on the review …” (<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/life/the-army-girls-proving-they-are-prepared-to-kill/">link</a>). That’s never a good sign. The military never struggles to find useful idiots in uniform to parrot the party line.</p><p>Time will tell.</p><p>Ironically, on the same day the <em>Times</em> published its article, I randomly came across this little story in <em>Level Zero Heroes</em> (<a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Level-Zero-Heroes-Michael-Golembesky/dp/1250030404/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1459758352&amp;sr=1-1&amp;keywords=level+zero+heroes">link</a>), written by US Marine operator Mike Golembesky:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*zccLEKSdSKclQyOE.jpg" /><figcaption>Staff Sgt Michael Golembesky, author of Level Zero Heroes</figcaption></figure><blockquote>I lit it and took a long drag. Pat looked wired and intense, his eyes wide.</blockquote><blockquote>“That could have gone bad. Real bad,” he said.</blockquote><blockquote>I thought of the fuel trucks. The headlights.</blockquote><blockquote>“Yep.”</blockquote><blockquote>“The Humvee in front of us …” Pat said, then paused.</blockquote><blockquote>“What about it?”</blockquote><blockquote>He exhaled a lungful of smoke. “Jesus Christ. They had a girl up there on the .50. When we took contact, she didn’t even have the strength to rack the bolt.”</blockquote><blockquote>“You’re shitting me.”</blockquote><blockquote>“Nope.”</blockquote><blockquote>We stood there, both in disbelief, staring into the black African night.</blockquote><blockquote>At length, Pat finally said, “Can you believe that? These 82nd [Airborne] guys put a girl in a turret that didn’t even have enough ass on her to charge the weapon.”</blockquote><blockquote>“Fucked up,” I agreed.</blockquote><blockquote>“One of the guys inside their truck had to get up in the turret to take over.”</blockquote><blockquote>A .50 caliber machine gun is one of the best and most effective casualty-producing weapons a convoy possesses. This wasn’t a trivial mistake.</blockquote><blockquote>We thought about that in silence for a while.</blockquote><p>This stuff matters. The consequences of these policy decisions are not immediately felt, or evident — but they cannot be escaped.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=40ac58e9a73a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/army-fitness-tests-to-be-lowered-for-women-40ac58e9a73a">Army fitness tests to be lowered for women?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit">Fall When Hit</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[These crazy politics matter for the British Army]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/these-crazy-politics-matter-for-the-british-army-e9c25e26cd5d?source=rss----17f4eb0496c1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e9c25e26cd5d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fall When Hit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Feb 2016 18:27:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-25T11:47:40.099Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8JN5u4tvR6sXSXeO9jn4LA.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>It’s easy to imagine the rise of the leftists and incoherent populists is a sideshow, but this would be dangerously naïve. Whatever the outcome of the US election, and the next UK election, the leftward shift in parts of the electorate has dangerous implications for the British Army. Jonathan Haidt’s recent work points to why.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/412/1*dkfxFpKrasWCcjEFbSdAxw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Jonathan Haidt</figcaption></figure><p>Jonathan Haidt is a social psychologist and professor of ethical leadership at the Stern School of Business. He writes about the psychology of morality, and has written two best-selling books: The <em>Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom</em> (2006) and <em>The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion</em> (2012). <em>Prospect</em> and <em>Foreign Policy</em> magazines both named him one of the world’s top thinkers. He is also a liberal, who voted for Barrack Obama.</p><h4>Moral Foundations Theory</h4><p>Haidt’s second book reveals all manner of fascinating aspects of our morality (he described an earlier version of his research in a TED talk <a href="https://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en">here</a>). For instance, “intuition comes first, strategic reasoning second”. In other words, we jump to a conclusion about something, and then use our brains to justify our reaction (this aligns closely to the work of Kahneman).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*U6ueC1e2fmPsJ-2aLDClaA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Care</figcaption></figure><p>Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory posits six core elements of morality (and their opposites):</p><p><strong>Care/harm: </strong>cherishing and protecting others</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Yn8NXQropkIdBLfdMifW7A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Fairness</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Fairness/cheating: </strong>rendering justice according to shared rules (alternate name: proportionality)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TjL3yV4ahxm2TdOUX4DUcQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Liberty</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Liberty/oppression:</strong> the loathing of tyranny</p><p><strong>Loyalty/betrayal:</strong> standing with your group, family, nation (alternate name: in group)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zoW-Ui7PYxUE7F00f-jCzA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Loyalty</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Authority/subversion:</strong> obeying tradition and legitimate authority (alternate name: respect)</p><p><strong>Sanctity/degradation:</strong> abhorrence for disgusting things, foods, actions (alternate name: purity)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8qiQOGBN9Akvwu4BSsi7kw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Authority</figcaption></figure><p>Haidt and his colleagues surveyed more than 130,000 Americans to see how they prioritised these six moral foundations; the results were very revealing (and were replicated in other studies and in other countries).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PmZLIbs68Q9_e8mbo3JLmQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Sanctity</figcaption></figure><p>Conservatives not surprisingly care most about preserving institutions and traditions, but in contrast to their unfeeling stereotype, they also value fairness and caring for others. They have a relatively holistic moral foundation.</p><p>Haidt writes:</p><blockquote>Conservatives are the “party of order and stability,” in Mill’s formulation. They generally resist the changes implemented by the “party of progress or reform.” But to put things in those terms makes conservatives sound like fearful obstructionists, trying to hold back the hands of time and the “noble human aspirations” of the liberal progress narrative. A more positive way to describe conservatives is to say that their broader moral matrix allows them to detect threats to moral capital that liberals cannot perceive. They do not oppose change of all kinds (such as the Internet), but they do fight back ferociously when they believe that change will damage the institutions and traditions that provide our moral exoskeletons (such as the family). Preserving those institutions and traditions is their most sacred value.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/418/1*xTDVgII2Qa5qeYiR5YrNFg.png" /></figure><p>On the other hand, liberals care relatively little about loyalty, respect for authority, or the sanctity of certain things: they have a very focused form of morality.</p><p>Haidt writes:</p><blockquote>The left builds its moral matrix on three of the six foundations, but rests most firmly and consistently on the Care foundation …. Liberals are often suspicious of appeals to loyalty, authority, and sanctity, although they don’t reject these institutions in all cases (think of the sanctification of nature) …. Liberals have many specific values, but I think it’s helpful, for each group, to identify its most sacred value — the “third rail” that will get you electrocuted if you touch it. For American liberals since the 1960s, I believe that the most sacred value is caring for victims of oppression. Anyone who blames such victims for their own problems or who displays or merely excuses prejudice against sacrilized victim groups can expect a vehement tribal response.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/404/1*vHCTnK9dDQQfpQlOyacFWA.png" /></figure><p>Each moral foundation can have a different meaning to the two groups. According to Haidt, fairness means proportionality to conservatives — in other words, you get what you deserve (for better, and for worse). By contrast, for liberals fairness means equality of outcomes, and they are uncomfortable with the downside of proportionality (if you do the crime, you must do the time).</p><h4>Important General Implications</h4><p><em>The Righteous Mind </em>is a fascinating book for many reasons, but there are a few particular implications of Haidt’s theory that are worth highlighting.</p><p>Haidt explains in his book how each moral foundation has an evolutionary purpose. We instinctively apply the moral foundations because over the millennia they have allowed humans to prosper. As an example, sanctity is the result of needing to keep certain things and places perfectly clean for health reasons — the food preparation area, for instance. But this also makes these moral foundations so primal that they can be difficult to overcome (“intuition comes first, strategic reasoning second”). Conservatives’ respect for sanctity results in being much more closed to new ideas and experiences than liberals, for example. Political beliefs turn out to be just as heritable as most other traits: genetics explains between a third and a half of the variability among people in political attitudes, much more than the politics of your parents.</p><p>Haidt emphasises that humans remain incredibly tribal (“groupish” is his word). He notes that Darwin argued natural selection operated at the individual level and the group level, and that this is an important cause of groupishness and morality generally. Depending on your views, you could also argue that this led to religion as a way of binding groups more tightly together. Haidt writes that “morality binds and blinds …. We all get sucked into tribal moral communities”.</p><p>One of Haidt’s core theses is what he calls “a yin and two yangs” (referring to liberals, libertarians and social conservatives): both the left and the right make crucial arguments that can boost society’s “moral capital”. Liberals correctly argue that governments can and should restrain corporations, and that some problems really can be solved by regulation. For their part, libertarians and conservatives correctly argue that markets are miraculous, and that “you can’t help the bees by destroying the hive”.</p><p>This last point is worth dwelling on. Liberals rush to the defence of victims of oppression and exclusion, and seek to break down what they view as arbitrary barriers. But as Haidt writes, “their zeal to help victims, combined with their low scores on the Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity foundations, often lead them to push for changes that weaken groups, traditions, institutions and moral capital”. Haidt also observes, based on the work of Robert Putnam, that diversity “makes people turn inward and become more selfish, less interested in contributing to their communities”.</p><p>So far, so even handed. Haidt makes a strong case in his book that both sides of the moral divide have valid points of view that must be synthesised to create a happy, moral society. But there is one factor he describes but does not fully expand upon: liberals fail the ideological Turning test.</p><p>The Turning test (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test">link</a>) was proposed by Alan Turning, of Bletchley Park fame. In seeking to determine whether computers could think, he asked whether it was possible for a computer to communicate with a human in such a way the human mistook the computer for another human (the so-called “imitation game”).</p><p>An ideological Turning test (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideological_Turing_Test">link</a>), which seeks to determine whether liberals and conservatives can correctly represent each other’s views, was proposed in 2011 when liberal economist Paul Krugman claimed that liberals understand conservatives and libertarians better than conservatives and libertarians understand liberals.</p><p>Haidt doesn’t use the term ideological Turning test, but it’s clear that his research demolishes Krugman’s argument and proves that the reverse is actually true:</p><blockquote>In a study I did … we tested how liberals and conservatives could understand each other. We asked more than two thousand American visitors [to the study website] to fill out the Moral Foundations Questionnaire …. [The survey] allowed us to assess how accurate they were in comparing people’s expectations about “typical” partisans to the actual responses from partisans on the left and right …. The results were clear and consistent. Moderates and conservatives were most accurate in their predictions, whether pretending they were liberals or conservatives. Liberals were the least accurate, especially those who described themselves as “very liberal.” The biggest errors in the whole study came when liberals answered the Care and Fairness questions while pretending to be conservatives. When faced with questions such as “One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenceless animal” or “Justice is the most important requirement for society,” liberals assumed that conservatives would disagree.</blockquote><p>Haidt’s own experience supports his survey findings:</p><blockquote>When I speak to liberal audiences about the three “binding” foundations — Loyalty, Authority and Sanctity — I find that many in the audience don’t just fail to resonate; they actively reject these concerns as immoral. Loyalty to a group shrinks the moral circle; it is the basis of racism and exclusion, they say. Authority is oppression. Sanctity is religious mumbo-jumbo whose only function is to suppress female sexuality and justify homophobia.</blockquote><p>Performance on the ideological Turning test is the direct result of liberal morality resting on three of the moral foundations, while conservative morality rests includes (to varying degrees) all six. Conservatives may score lower on openness to new things and on empathy, but they are unique in understanding the opposite side of the political spectrum, and in respecting the full gamut of foundational morals.</p><h4>Implications for the British Army</h4><p>Let us stipulate for now — although it is debatable — that both sides of the political spectrum are increasingly strident and that the politics in general is increasingly polarised. Let us also stipulate that the British Army is less capital-C Conservative (i.e. Tory) than many would assume, owing to the demographics it recruits from, and the class considerations that influence British electoral politics. Indeed, it wouldn’t be surprising if a plurality of soldiers don’t vote at all.</p><p>We must nonetheless recognise that army is very small-c conservative (in Haidt’s sense) in its values: it recruits for and rewards loyalty and respect for authority. The army also sanctifies all manner of things, from behaviours, to places, to colours, and even to little bits of ribbon. If the army took a survey, it would score low on empathy and openness to new ideas. One could make a case that innovative soldiers need a whole lot of luck to be successful (and it would be fascinating to see how many of the army’s great historical innovators were actually closet liberals). In many ways it is the most quintessentially conservative institution imaginable.</p><p>This makes the British Army a natural target for progressives. To a certain extent this is a good thing: as Haidt argues, we’re collectively at our best when both sides of the moral spectrum are influencing events. There is no question that on behaviour, the army cannot be left to its own devices; no institution is good enough at self-policing for that, and the military is no different. The problem is that the British Army faces a one-way ratchet: progressives drive change in one direction, while conservatives never succeed in moving things back the other way. Take the integration of women into the combat arms as an example; many conservatives, and many soldiers in general, think this is a bad idea, but there is absolutely no chance it will ever be undone. As such, political polarisation will have an asymmetric impact on the army.</p><p>That the army has not already been targeted more heavily is probably due to many of the demographics the left is most concerned about — at the moment, Muslims, gays and women, in that order — not being heavily represented in the ranks. But as the army changes over time, so will progressives’ interest in it.</p><p>One doesn’t have to look very far to see the damage that intolerant progressives can wreak. Consider the Rhodes Must Fall movement, no-platforming university speakers, attacking Peter Tatchell for supporting freedom of speech in the Ashers Bakery case, or forcing Brendan Eich out of the company he founded. Things can get pretty nasty when the progressives take aim.</p><p>Army officers seem — outwardly at least — very naïve about this. They are possibly mirroring — assuming other people think like they do. Haidt’s work should disabuse them of this view: not only do progressives have different values, they actively reject the army’s values. A soldier would say that morale and esprit de corps are critical, as are the training and experiences that reinforce them — but a progressive would say these things are intolerant and exclusionary. A soldier would say respecting the chain of command is paramount, whereas many progressives would say authority is untrustworthy and oppressive, and should be challenged. A soldier would say that combat effectiveness is the ultimate lodestar. But if progressives think that the army oppresses minorities at home, and oppresses and kills civilians abroad, then actually the less combat effectiveness the better.</p><p>How can the military even start a conversation with progressives? And does the military have the integrity to stand up to this bullying, when it comes? We’ll soon see.</p><p><strong>Update:</strong> It’s not looking good for the military’s moral courage, as the army is reportedly telling instructors to done down swearing. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/35646805/british-army-instructors-are-told-to-stop-swearing-at-new-recruits">LINK</a></p><p><strong>Update 2:</strong> US Air Force academy paying to send cadets to to pagan festivals. <a href="http://freebeacon.com/culture/air-force-academy-pays-for-cadets-travel-to-pagan-festivals/">LINK</a></p><p><strong>Update 3:</strong> CIA director has mandated diversity and inclusion performance targets for all employees. Will that lead to quotas? <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/Diversity_Inclusion_Strategy_2016_to_2019.pdf">LINK</a></p><p><strong>Update 4:</strong> “Documents Reveal US Army Indoctrinated Soldiers on Dangers of ‘White Privilege’” <a href="http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/judicial-watch-documents-reveal-us-army-indoctrinated-soldiers-on-dangers-of-white-privilege/">LINK</a></p><p><strong>Update 5:</strong> “Obama marches armed forces leftward” (<a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/24/president-obama-leaving-liberal-blueprint-on-armed/?page=all#pagebreak">LINK</a>). Whether you agree or disagree with the changes, you cannot argue the left is not changing the military: women in combat roles, climate change, gun control, white privilege …</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e9c25e26cd5d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/these-crazy-politics-matter-for-the-british-army-e9c25e26cd5d">These crazy politics matter for the British Army</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit">Fall When Hit</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Call to action: share your leadership stories]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/call-to-action-share-your-leadership-stories-d5fcd70d9069?source=rss----17f4eb0496c1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d5fcd70d9069</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[army]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fall When Hit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jan 2016 07:34:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-01-31T07:38:37.008Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/634/1*cNxP5jp_AfCxzMQKhXZ2xw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The UK has now completed two very difficult and very long campaigns. The country is blessed with a generation of tough and experienced military leaders who have executed in the most challenging conditions imaginable.</p><p>But it is a dangerous conceit to think that experience once gained is never lost, that progress and professionalism are a one-way ratchet.</p><p>Sadly this is not the case. Already some of our finest soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen are leaving the military, and every month the training establishments churn out fresh and untested faces. It won’t be long before we have junior NCOs who never deployed to Afghan. Our battle-tested quality will inevitably be diluted with time.</p><p>British service personnel have always written but our tradition has always been primarily an oral one: stories in the mess, stories from SNCOs, stories on training courses. But the online world has given us a tool to dramatically magnify the impact of these stories.</p><p>The Americans, as is their wont, jumped on this early. Twitter and the blogosphere are full of American serving officers and soldiers writing about their experiences. Many focus on leadership: <a href="http://www.themilitaryleader.com/">The Military Leader</a> and <a href="http://fromthegreennotebook.com/">From the Green Notebook</a> are two great examples.</p><p>Here in the UK … crickets.</p><p>The chain of command has not helped by clearing discouraging any serving personnel from sharing constructive criticism:</p><blockquote>The British response to the urgent need to learn and reform is in stark contrast to the culture of reflective self-analysis that the Americans have adopted. The British military hierarchy have taken active steps to suppress and neuter constructive criticism by experienced and well-intentioned officers. Those who do not toe the party line are ruthlessly censured and passed-over. This is perfectly illustrated by the official response this summer to the publication by a serving TA officer of an extremely well researched and persuasive paper in The British Army Review (the Army’s professional journal) called “A Comprehensive Failure: British Civil-Military Strategy in Helmand Province”, which was damning of official attempts to spin failures into PR successes. In response, the Assistant Chief of the General Staff, issued written instructions effectively removing full editorial control of the British Army Review from its editor and stipulating that political clearance must be sought before the publication of any such articles in the future, due to the embarrassment caused to politicians. What is more worrying was his further direction that in the run up to the Iraq Inquiry there must be no publication of “lessons-learned” from Iraq by serving officers, including those who were actually there. In effect, British officers are no longer free to propose critical and reflective ideas; fresh-thinking that is essential for success, if those proposals might embarrass the Labour Government. (<a href="http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/the-failure-of-british-political-and-military-leadership-in-iraq">link</a>)</blockquote><p>But there is a world of difference between taking on the big issues and sharing leadership insights and lessons.</p><p>So this is a call to action to serving and former army officers and soldiers to share their stories and lessons. There are thousands of young soldiers and aspiring soldiers who need to learn good leadership from you. And it won’t be long before your muckers need to be reminded, too.</p><p>Get writing: fire in any leadership stories — anonymous or for attribution — to durnure@gmail.com.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/1*A1iVE3Ujefi2R9GmwrL0XQ.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d5fcd70d9069" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/call-to-action-share-your-leadership-stories-d5fcd70d9069">Call to action: share your leadership stories</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit">Fall When Hit</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Narratives are a cancer]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/narratives-are-a-cancer-69297b918f94?source=rss----17f4eb0496c1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/69297b918f94</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fall When Hit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2015 12:17:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-06T16:01:53.475Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*82X8AEF0Wlq6_lcM.jpg" /><figcaption>“Every day life is getting better”</figcaption></figure><p>The military seems to love the word “narrative”. This was probably the result of having to create and stick to campaign narratives on Op TELIC and Op HERRICK. Of course this had some pretty pernicious impacts. We got told to exaggerate unit readiness. We got told to change the KPI “traffic lights” in Basra. We got told not to write negative reports in Afghanistan. But these were put in the context of playing the game and getting ourselves back home.</p><p>Now that Op TELIC and Op HERRICK have finished we’re in a slightly different place: business as usual. This involves Israeli-style drone strikes and facing down the Russian bear in Northern Europe. But military leaders are still trotting out the narrative concept to control the flow of information. This is problematic because the current threats won’t be changing anytime soon — and we no longer have the option of declaring victory and running away. Our backs are to the sea and we’re facing existential threats.</p><p>It’s time stop kidding ourselves with “narratives” and start telling the unvarnished truth.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/670/0*PtCI4nqOkD4hO7Kd.jpg" /><figcaption>“Your narrative is bullshit”</figcaption></figure><p>First, <strong>narratives are clearly bullshit </strong>— they’re like an echo from forty years ago when the government controlled all the information and people trusted their leaders. Any Russian with a laptop can now tell you that the military’s ability to generate effects abroad is declining precipitously. There’s no money. There’s no willpower. And our demographics are upside down and getting worse. No amount of accounting tricks and “lines to take” are going to change those truths.</p><p>Second, <strong>they’re self-serving.</strong> To the extent the military is an innocent victim of a wishy-washy PM and a tight-fisted Exchequer there may almost-but-not-quite be a justification to pretend things are better than they are. But you don’t have to look far to see all the generals’ mistakes: just open <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/High-Command-Military-Leadership-Afghanistan/dp/1849044600/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1447582886&amp;sr=1-1&amp;keywords=higher+command"><em>High Command</em></a><em>, </em><a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Ministry-Defeat-British-Iraq-2003-2009/dp/1441169970"><em>Ministry of Defeat</em></a>, or <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Losing-Small-Wars-Military-Afghanistan/dp/0300182740/ref=la_B0051PAEMS_1_1?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1447582848&amp;sr=1-1">Losing Small Wars</a>. The narrative justifies sweeping all these things under the rug: it’s just too easy to switch your target audience from Russia, to your own elected government, to the civil service, to your boss.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/0*tiEeDmaITlpG5JzN.jpg" /><figcaption>“We’ll execute the plan of the great works” … and don’t deviate from the party line</figcaption></figure><p>Third, <strong>they’re anti-democratic</strong>. It is the fundamental nature of complex adaptive systems that it is extraordinarily difficult to identify cause and effect. For this reason, in our increasingly complex world, it is hard for voters to determine if the military should be blamed for an outcome or not (pace all the civilians who covet the apparent binary win-loss structure of military operations). This is one of the reasons the generals have escaped relatively unscathed from the operational train-wreck of the last fifteen years: most people don’t have a Scoobie what happened or who to blame. Further, given the stakes voters cannot wait for an outcome like losing a war to decide whether the defence of the realm is being competently managed.</p><p>Voters can therefore only judge the process and behaviours that got us to an outcome. They can demand action in response to a hollow force or dishonest generals, for instance. But in controlling the narrative the generals are busy repressing this information; they are in effect saying “trust us”. The problem is simple: we shouldn’t trust them. The military is an institution and like every institution it has its own agenda. Look no further than the “use it or lose it” argument for rotating battalions and brigade headquarters through theatre, which was frankly scandalous.</p><p>Put another way, the self-serving and anti-democratic nature of narratives force you to answer a very simple question: can the military self-correct? I’ll inform your answer with two anecdotes. I recently saw one of the most senior generals in the British Army struggle to come up with a single lesson from the last fifteen years of war. I also recently had an argument with one of the most senior generals in the British military over whether our operational reputation had suffered over the same time period. Are they that arrogant? Or are they totally disciplined about staying on message? Or do they believe their own bullshit? Most importantly, as a voter or elected leader, how can you tell?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/650/0*OvbJVSyNuGXSlbiI." /><figcaption>“Yes sir, the whole platoon passed the ACMT first time.”</figcaption></figure><p>Fourth, <strong>narratives are fundamentally destructive to the integrity of those in uniform</strong>. The arguments in favour of maintaining a narrative apply at all levels: “they” don’t understand what’s happening here; the metrics are wrong; we need more time; if I get sacked my successor will be shit; the organisation can’t take a scandal … but if the military as a whole is lying to its elected leaders, then why shouldn’t I lie to you?</p><p>Earlier this year, Leonard Wong and Stephen Stephen Gerras published a US Army War College paper entitled <a href="http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1250.pdf">“Lying to Ourselves”</a>, in which they write:</p><blockquote>This study found that many [U.S.] Army officers, after repeated exposure to the overwhelming demands and the associated need to put their honor on the line to verify compliance, have become ethically numb. As a result, an officer’s signature and word have become tools to maneuver through the Army bureaucracy rather than being symbols of integrity and honesty. Sadly, much of the deception that occurs in the profession of arms is encouraged and sanctioned by the military institution as subordinates are forced to prioritize which requirements will actually be done to standard and which will only be reported as done to standard. As a result, untruthfulness is surprisingly common in the U.S. military even though members of the profession are loath to admit it.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/488/0*UIafKw_16oTO6MPh.jpg" /><figcaption>Old Blood and Guts</figcaption></figure><p>I’ve always said that being in the army is like having a guerrilla war waged against your integrity. Every day presents you with the opportunity to cut corners. Of course you cannot be an army shit; as Patton said, “A leader is a man who can adapt principles to circumstances”. But integrity is a muscle. If the first time you want to show some backbone is when CGS asks you how well trained your platoon is, with your commander glaring at you over his shoulder, then you don’t have a chance.</p><p>Healing an organisation, and returning it to high performance, begins with squeezing out the lies — at all levels. So let’s get started.</p><p>Simply put: when someone uses the word narrative, there can be only one response:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/475/1*TwHG8oygt3i6dAMQIiJdbw.gif" /></figure><p><strong>Update:</strong> Lt Gen (ret) Michael Flynn, former head of the DIA, interviewed <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/01/politics/michael-flynn-obama-isis/index.html">link</a>):</p><blockquote><strong><em>Tapper:</em></strong> “In 2012, your agency put out a now declassified report that seems to have predicted the rise of ISIS; the deteriorating security situation in Iraq and Syria could lead to the declaration of a ‘Islamic State through its union with other terrorist organisations in Iraq and Syria, which will create grave danger in regards to unifying Iraq and the protection of its territory.’ It was not long after you issued that report that President Obama referred to ISIS as the JV team. Do you feel as though your warnings were ignored?”</blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Flynn:</em></strong> “You know, <strong>I think that they did not meet a particular narrative that the White House needed</strong>, and I’ll be very candid with you. I have said and I believe that the people that were around the president, his sort of inner circle that were advising him, I think advised him incorrectly … <strong>I think the narrative was that al-Qaeda was on the run and bin Laden was dead</strong> … we’d beaten them. And we knew that [wasn’t true]. We’ve killed more leaders in the al-Qaeda, ISIS, AQ-I, Boko Haram — more leaders than we can say, and they continue to just multiply.”</blockquote><p><strong>Update 2: </strong>CENTCOM is forcing out intelligence analysts who refuted its Syria narrative (<a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/04/03/intel-analysts-we-were-punished-for-telling-the-truth-about-obama-s-isis-war.html">link</a>).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=69297b918f94" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/narratives-are-a-cancer-69297b918f94">Narratives are a cancer</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit">Fall When Hit</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ghost Fleet: get ready for war with China]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/ghost-fleet-get-ready-for-war-with-china-479197fdb2b0?source=rss----17f4eb0496c1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/479197fdb2b0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[future-of-war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fall When Hit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 18 Oct 2015 10:40:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-30T20:35:28.937Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K9PWA3gSkGTo7wD0wdsQ7A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Sitting on the dock of the bay</figcaption></figure><p>Sitting on the dock this summer my father asked me what percentage of the books I read that were fiction. I said zero percent. When I said that, I had <a href="http://www.ghostfleetbook.com/"><em>Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War</em></a> in my right hand. That pretty much sums up the odd nature of this book, which uses fiction to challenge the way we think about future war.</p><p>The authors explicitly set out to write a contemporary version of Tom Clancy’s <em>Red Storm Rising </em>(co-written with Larry Bond). As a work of fiction, <em>Ghost Fleet</em> probably doesn’t quite match that book (<em>Ghost Fleet </em>is short both on pages and on character development), but it is immensely thought provoking nonetheless.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/331/0*uHNd8RXtDY_7eI3L.jpg" /><figcaption>Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War (<a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Ghost-Fleet-Novel-Next-World/dp/0544142845/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1445159913&amp;sr=8-1&amp;keywords=Ghost+Fleet">AMZN lin</a>k; £0.99 on Kindle!), by Peter Singer and August Cole.</figcaption></figure><p>The book revolves around a surprise attack by the Chinese on Hawaii. The authors have declined to provide a year in which the book takes place, but ten or fifteen years in the future is probably about right: close enough that we can recognise the world, but far enough away that some of today’s latent trends have reshaped the nature of war.</p><p><em>Ghost Fleet</em> has several interesting themes:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*1Od1cK-a6O9Yf89f.jpg" /><figcaption>USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000)</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Return to full-spectrum warfare. </strong>First and foremost, the book features a return to full-spectrum war, which would come as a big shock to a post-Obama military. Huge numbers of American ships and aircraft just disappear in combat, as they did in World War II. The impact is much more severe, though, as spending cuts and defence inflation mean there are fewer platforms to begin with. In <em>Ghost Fleet,</em> new Coast Guard cutters and the <em>Zumwalt</em>-class DDG have all been cancelled, for instance. The USN very quickly loses surface superiority.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*W7LJ261q5_ofiYLW." /><figcaption>F-35A Lightning II</figcaption></figure><p>This move to big, systemic technology bets (higher quality, lower quantity platforms) has an even bigger impact in the air. Large defence prime contractors, mindful of cost, have already outsourced key components, and struggle to really understand their own supply chains. In <em>Ghost Fleet</em>, many of the F-35’s chips are produced in China, and this gives that country the opportunity to hack these planes. With so much riding on it (creating huge technology risk), the neutralisation of the F-35 eliminates US superiority. Even today, it has been fifty years since the US found itself at such disadvantage. A key part of the book’s resolution comes as the US is forced to put its ghost fleet ships and boneyard birds back into service.</p><p>Another facet of full-spectrum warfare is the attrition of mid-level NCOs and officers. The US is very quickly forced to press its retired greybeards back into service, which creates a huge generational culture clash.</p><p><strong>Americans as insurgents. </strong>A corollary of the return to full-spectrum warfare and the ensuing losing of superiority is the sudden importance of US soldiers and civilians becoming insurgents. We are used to our forces being in uniform and operating from bases, and the authors clearly play on moral relativism when they cast US soldiers beyond enemy lines essentially behaving as terrorists (they even call themselves mujahideen).</p><p><strong>Technology.</strong> Naturally technology plays a huge role in <em>Ghost Fleet</em>, and arguably the book’s protagonist is a rail gun. There are “viz glasses” (e.g. Google Glass) that mean people are constantly filming and browsing and processing information while doing other things. There are satellites blasting each other. There are armed drones, large and small, operating seamlessly with soldiers. There are even all manner of drugs taken regularly to improve physical and cognitive performance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*GZrf7uGuWaMbbQoo.jpg" /><figcaption>Inevitable</figcaption></figure><p>Technology is also an area in which the book is quite conventional: it doesn’t examine the full potential of artificial intelligence (AI). AI does appear in a few places: drones operate largely autonomously, to avoid jamming, for instance, and AI does a lot of work analysing information and optimising speeches, for instance. But nowhere (as I recall) do we have large numbers of robots, operating autonomously, with humans taken completely out of the loop. Although we might find this distasteful (who can forget the Terminator T-800), it is as inevitable as nuclear weapons: if the enemy has robots that can react faster than humans, then so must we — particularly if the citizens of the West have largely lost the will to fight. The oversight is slightly odd given Singer’s seminal work, <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Wired-War-Robotics-Revolution-Conflict/dp/0143116843/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1445161892&amp;sr=8-1&amp;keywords=wired+for+war"><em>Wired for War</em></a>. Perhaps he thought robots would make the book too unbelievable.</p><p><strong>The limitations of friendship.</strong> When we think of total war, we naturally think of World War II, when Allied countries harnessed their full industrial might, and everyone fell in line to support the war effort. If we spent much time thinking about what a war with China would look like, we’d subconsciously apply the WWII mental model to that war as well. <em>Ghost Fleet </em>should give us pause.</p><p>Singer has separately written extensively about the yawning chasm between Silicon Valley and the military. There are many reasons for this: West Coasters live in a Matrix-like fantasy land of peace and security, they have particularly liberal values, and they are still angry about the intrusive government surveillance revealed by Snowden (but then, who isn’t?). It shouldn’t really be surprising then that when the balloon goes up in <em>Ghost Fleet</em>, the US gets precisely zero support from Silicon Valley. This only changes when an iconoclastic tech billionaire creates an Anonymous-style group of hackers to regain the initiative in cyberspace, but even that has to be done in secret. Even Walmart takes awhile to get on board (they have huge operations overseas, after all). The US military even has to hire international privateers to regain superiority in space.</p><p>One of the lessons (a reminder, really) from our recent forays into the sandbox is that total military might is largely irrelevant: what matters is how much power we can bring to bear relative to the enemy at a specific point in time and space (firstest with the mostest). We need to be very sober about just how much of the West’s total power can really be brought to bear, even in existential conflict.</p><p><em>Ghost Fleet</em> is an enjoyable and fairly quick read, but it has a very powerful message: get ready. Really get ready — because things are changing quickly, our position in the world is not secure, and transitions between great powers usually results in war.</p><p>And in case the book’s message was too subtle, Cole and Singer recently penned a short piece in <em>The Daily Telegraph</em> to draw an explicit line between today and the future of <em>Ghost Fleet</em> (“<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11920013/Heres-how-World-War-Three-could-start-tomorrow.html">Here’s how World War Three could start tomorrow</a>”).</p><blockquote>It is no longer politic to avoid talking about these trends. It may seem like a fear of the distant past or the realm of fiction, but if there is a hope of averting such great power fights, a frank and open discussion about their real risks of and likely horrors is needed. Not persuaded? At least weigh the statement of a Chinese military officer in an official regime publication last year. “<a href="http://en.people.cn/n/2014/0916/c90000-8782955.html"><strong>The world war is a form of war that the whole world should face up to</strong></a>”, he said. It is a statement to be both considered and chilled by.</blockquote><p>P.S. On cue: “<a href="http://dailycaller.com/2015/10/18/obama-navy-now-half-the-size-of-reagan-navy/">Obama Navy Now Half The Size Of Reagan Navy</a>”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=479197fdb2b0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/ghost-fleet-get-ready-for-war-with-china-479197fdb2b0">Ghost Fleet: get ready for war with China</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit">Fall When Hit</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A different kind of late-entry officer]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/a-different-kind-of-late-entry-officer-e3fbce16f99f?source=rss----17f4eb0496c1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e3fbce16f99f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[army]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ceo]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fall When Hit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 09 Aug 2015 16:22:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-05T06:03:39.191Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/594/0*npg3Su007jJ33Qg-.jpg" /><figcaption>Retired general Stanley McChrystal</figcaption></figure><p>In 2006 retired US Army officer Dr Leonard Wong wrote a short article called “Fashion Tips for the Field Grade” (<a href="http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB731.pdf">LINK</a>), in which he noted that when officers reach major their sartorial progress stalls — they no longer keep up with fashion, and don’t even seem to be aware of this. By analogy, Wong argues that field-grade officers have stopped developing. He cites statistics indicating that the number of generals who have had genuinely broadening experiences — graduate school for instance — has fallen precipitously.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/425/0*uqd9Y5sDwthJ4j5f.jpg" /><figcaption>Dr Leonard Wong</figcaption></figure><p>Wong expanded his argument in a longer essay entitled, “Changing minds in the army: why it is so difficult and what to do about it” (<a href="http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1179">LINK</a>). He cited the adoption of the black beret in the US Army and the exchange of Humvees for mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs) as examples of this.</p><p>The anecdotal evidence glosses over a few important things. Implementing new solutions requires not just a change of opinion, but prodigious amounts of the right kind of leadership to force change through large bureaucratic organisations. In other words, having open-minded officers is necessary but not sufficient for institutional agility, and so absence of agility in the military does not necessarily prove that its officers are inflexible.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/682/0*1bBxcuhObYs1K1SW.jpg" /><figcaption>The dreaded Snatch Land Rover… but hey, it was fine in Northern Ireland</figcaption></figure><p>Military officers are by nature professionally conservative. This means they require a higher level of certainty before making decisions that conflict with their experience and TTPs. It is easy to point out examples of officers being slow to adapt, like the MRAP fiasco (which has the Snatch Land Rover as its British equivalent). But for a complete analysis you would also have to prove officers had an exceedingly low level of proactive decisions that turned out to be wrong (false positives). If officers are coming unstuck due to the iconoclastic decisions they do make as well as the iconoclastic decisions they don’t make, then it’s probable the context is simply too complex for their intellectual capabilities — and their conservative decision-making style might therefore be quite well calibrated.</p><p>But Wong goes beyond citing anecdotes. He points out that the US Army War College personality data shows that average “openness” scores are lower among more senior officers. He also explains the concept of imprinting, whereby professionals tend to persevere with whatever has made them successful early in their careers. Wong makes the case that intuition is increasingly deleterious as officers get promoted (see our take on the perils of intuition <a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/the-perils-of-intuition-8c4c0a19b349">HERE</a>). These negative dynamics can of course be exacerbated by organisational culture.</p><p>What is to be done?</p><p>Wong argues the army should continue developing self-awareness and open-mindedness through personality assessments, 360-degree feedback, and the use of structured decision-making (e.g. hypothesis testing and red-teaming) to counter-balance an overreliance on intuition. Broadening experiences is also critical (as noted above, the number of US officers going to high-quality civilian graduate schools is actually falling, and I would hazard a guess the number in the UK is pitifully small).</p><p>Retired general Stanley McChrystal has another idea: recruiting very senior civilian leaders into the military, and putting them straight in as generals.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*9qhsGnOkSiBCTlp4.jpg" /><figcaption>Intuit’s Brad Smith</figcaption></figure><p>In a recent <em>Washington Post</em> interview (<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2015/05/15/gen-stanley-mcchrystal-on-shaking-up-the-military/">LINK</a>), McChrystal says: “I’ve dealt with a lot of chief executive officers who could walk in and be general officers in the military tomorrow. All we’d have to do is get them a uniform and a rank. They’d step in and it would be seamless — because they solve problems and they lead people. Take Brad Smith from Intuit. He could be brought in as a three- or four-star general in the military, and he’d be value-added at the end of the first week.”</p><p>That is a big call.</p><p>A couple of thoughts.</p><p>McChrystal, as we know, is four years into a journey from army super-star to civilian consultant. He is one of the most impressive military leaders the United States has produced in a generation, but his naiveté is perhaps revealed a bit when he goes on to say, “I think military leaders could walk out and be effective in business tomorrow.” That’s not true, or at least it’s true in only a very limited sense. A leadership consultancy is perhaps the easiest company for a good military leader to captain, because the staff is hyper-motivated and the business model is not that complicated. Things get harder from there. We are in an era of intense specialisation and outsourcing that has produced very complicated commercial ecosystems. Understanding how the pieces fit together, and how they are underpinned by competing technologies, is not easy. Understanding what customers want and will pay for is not easy; sometimes it’s even hard to tell if you’re winning or losing. Understanding employees in multiple countries with fundamentally un-martial values is not easy. Finally, understanding whether business failure is due to a manager or the conditions she is working in, one of the trickiest problems, takes a lot of very sound functional knowledge (Let it run? Intervene? Fire her?). These problems are not insurmountable, but they do make it virtually impossible for a military leader to walk into a modern business and be effective, at least as a general manager.</p><p>The flip-side of all of these points is that it’s going to be equally hard for a CEO to slot into the military. There is a real danger that weak understanding of military leadership and culture and of combat would turn these CEO transplants into helicopter generals who never get a grip of the situation and their command. Leading a team of experts with generic leadership skills will only get you so far — at a certain point you need a deep understanding of how operations work. <em>Task &amp; Purpose</em> has a very well-constructed piece making a similar argument (<a href="http://taskandpurpose.com/mcchrystals-plan-to-shake-up-the-service-shouldnt-stop-at-senior-ranks/">LINK</a>).</p><p>And that’s before we even address the question of whether filthy-rich business stars would want to put it all on the line for something a goodly number find completely alien. The military, it can be argued, has never been more distant from the civilian world than it is now.</p><p>But that does not mean it’s not worth a try. The military is under huge strain, from reduced recruiting and resources to a huge and expanding spectrum of threats. In the UK the British Army has just failed in two campaigns, and it shows little evidence of recognising this fact, let alone genuinely accepting responsibility and learning from it. The RAF is being slashed to irrelevance and the Royal Navy has bet the farm on two carriers. The defence industrial complex is pushing ever more expensive platforms and politicians — let’s face it — have become dangerous dilettantes. It is a critical and completely open question whether the military can think its way through these challenges.</p><p>The idea of getting some world-class leaders with a completely different set of experiences into the mix to start (metaphorically) blowing things up is extremely appealing. The opportunity to bring back into uniform some very talented military leaders who have been successful in business or elsewhere should also not be scoffed at.</p><p>But clearly they should not directly slot in as generals —this will need a different model. Perhaps they should be brought in as advisors, or board-members, or as reserve staff officers. But it is certainly worth a try.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e3fbce16f99f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/a-different-kind-of-late-entry-officer-e3fbce16f99f">A different kind of late-entry officer</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit">Fall When Hit</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Good execution is deeply tedious]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/good-execution-is-deeply-tedious-c85ab1a4e90d?source=rss----17f4eb0496c1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c85ab1a4e90d</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fall When Hit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2015 10:53:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-07-04T10:53:37.415Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kQCJ8viPbrSs5Z-dLx6TwQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Soldiers training at Fort Irwin</figcaption></figure><p>The British Army is not very good at executing.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/639/0*DiOgXU_AzkwG1CWP.jpeg" /><figcaption>Basra, 2005</figcaption></figure><p>Sure, we brassed up some druggies in Op BARRAS, and fought PIRA to a draw in Op BANNER, but let’s be honest: in both Op TELIC and Op HERRICK, our most recent enterprises, we failed. The lads fought like lions, as they always do, and we had pockets of success, but ultimately we got bounced out of both Iraq and Afghanistan. And if our strategic objective was to maintain the strength of our relationship with the Americans, we failed there too (though of course we haven’t been helped by the worst president in living memory).</p><p>If it’s any consolation, the success rate in the civilian world is no better. Employees at three out of five companies rate their organisation as weak at execution. Mergers and acquisitions fail more than 60% of the time. Of major software implementations, nearly two thirds cost more and over 90% take longer than expected.</p><p>And let’s not even get into government, of which the military is widely regarded as the most effective part, because it’s basically a write off.</p><p>In the shadows of the big headline initiatives we face a daily struggle against entropy: our systems are more and more complex, and they take more and more effort to keep them stable, current and useful.</p><p>Meanwhile, our leaders — who are responsible for navigating us through this increasingly VUCA world — seem to have developed ADD. We could charitably call them “smart creatives”, in the Google terminology, who are clever but easily bored. They have tons of ideas, which sometimes converge but often just spiral off into confusion or out of sight. They think a decision is the same thing as action, that policy is the same as an outcome … until the next progress review, or O group, or board meeting, at which point they realise they need some more policies, because they don’t have any actions or outcomes to show for their tenure. They love an exciting debate but as soon as it comes to the details they starting tapping away on their smartphone.</p><p>There is clearly a connection here. We celebrate good outcomes but often do not appreciate all the work that has enabled them. We worship trigger pullers and superstar leaders but often fail to give adequate recognition to the patient professionals working behind the scenes, or — perhaps more importantly — to the mindset that enables that work to happen. Worst of all, we tell ourselves stories about how we were stabbed in the back by ignorant, self-serving politicians, but fail to really understand why we failed to execute well with the resources we did have.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*GQljv9MsN1HbIGCy.JPEG" /><figcaption>General George “Old Blood and Guts” Patton (front row, second from left) and General Dwight “Ike” Eisenhower (front row, middle)</figcaption></figure><p>The stark reality is that good execution is tedious. It might start with a good idea but it ends with boring, disciplined, focused action over a long time. It is making the trains run on time. It is Eisenhower, not Patton.</p><p>It is not a single light-bulb insight, it is a strategy patiently developed and iterated over years.</p><p>It is not one speech, it is twenty face-to-face conversations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/560/1*4lnTbxFoBi0HtPgt_1_u8w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Jack Welch: repeat your strategy so many times you want to gag.</figcaption></figure><p>It is rigorous prioritising — killing the zombie ops, projects and activities that are not helping but that never seem to die — even if that sometimes means micromanaging.</p><p>It is applying systems thinking* — looking at the whole, and all of its parts, and how they support or limit each other.</p><p>And it is not process for process’s sake, or for controlling people — it is process clearly in support of the strategy.</p><p>When we invaded Iraq, smart people said fixing that country would take ten years. What we needed was one Op TELIC, spread over a decade, with a clear overarching strategy and a series of commanders that showed outstanding leadership, but also — and counter-intuitively — good followership, and an engineer’s mindset.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*ZnE2NaxQF4gjjdxS.jpg" /><figcaption>Sandhurst and West Point cadets on exercise</figcaption></figure><p>Followership (more on which <a href="http://iveybusinessjournal.com/publication/followership-the-other-side-of-leadership/">here</a>) is not a concept that is often discussed, but all army officers learn its value at Sandhurst, where command appointments are rotated constantly, and in five hours you can go from a rifleman, to a section commander, to a platoon commander, and back again. Cadets succeed as leaders when they have pulled out all the stops as followers; it is a powerful lesson in serving to lead.</p><p>Good followership enables the engineer’s mindset: if you have really taken on board the strategy, and not tried to reinvent the wheel or do your own thing (and even if you disagree, “you can only tell ‘em twice”), then you can focus on the boring work of putting all the right cogs into the machine, and making sure they are running smoothly. People who do this work well do exist. They are not dashing amateurs tearing around the AO with their hair on fire. They are not brilliant strategists devising grand schemes. They are patient, meticulous, and enjoy finishing things. And they are not traditionally celebrated as heroes in the army.**</p><p>In Iraq, what we needed was one Op TELIC, staffed with finishers grinding good execution out within the right strategic framework.</p><p>What we got was thirteen Op TELICs, each with a distinctive leader and strategy, some of which were brilliant, and some of which were not. The impact of this fragmentation has been documented elsewhere, in <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/High-Command-Military-Leadership-Afghanistan/dp/1849044600"><em>High Command</em></a> and <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Losing-Small-Wars-Military-Afghanistan/dp/0300182740/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1435998293&amp;sr=1-1&amp;keywords=Losing+Small+Wars"><em>Losing Small Wars</em></a>, for instance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*JAaPOMXawpb-XR9k.jpg" /><figcaption>Paras taking a breather in Belfast. Typical.</figcaption></figure><p>Contrast this with Op BANNER.*** The British Army knew it had to win in Northern Ireland, and it invested for a long struggle. It balanced six-month and two-year tours, all under the rubric of a permanent brigade headquarters. It built local security forces from scratch. For the duration of that forty-year operation, thousands of patient professionals built the physical infrastructure, the networks, the processes and the knowledge to be successful. SF may have garnered the headlines, but the game-changing execution was the work behind the scenes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Xx8igXRKjutCT_2w.png" /><figcaption>Palantir screenshot</figcaption></figure><p>Compare this to intelligence in the recent conflicts. For years, taking over an AO meant getting a stack of intelligence briefing slides. But slides are just collateral from doing business as usual. Handing these over is just lazy. Game-changing execution would be handing over a fully loaded Palantir database. But that takes years of tedious work by analysts glued to their computers. That in turn takes a leader willing to put manpower and money behind it, and browbeat her operators into feeding int to the analysts, and spend enough time understanding the work to make sure it’s done properly. There’s no way around it: it’s just tedious.****</p><p>It is hard to overstate how much energy this takes. Leadership is lonely and exhausting at the best of times, but when you are methodically grinding out good execution it is much, much worse because it requires so much mental energy. Gone are the motivations of distinctive ops and rapid fame, replaced by endless drudgery and no closure. Gone is the old standby of bulldozing subordinates into compliance, replaced with long hours spent understanding and managing the myriad problems they identify, but need help to solve (only a fool says “don’t bring me problems, just bring solutions”).</p><p>Of course we need incisive commanders, and brilliant strategists (and we could certainly have done with a few more of the latter over the last fifteen years). But good execution is deeply tedious, and requires legions of people who slowly and methodically drive to a conclusion, sometimes over years. It may be too much to ask that the system rewards these people, but at the very least our ass-kicking commanders need to understand the nature of the challenge, and then resource, recognise, and back up our patient professionals.</p><p>* Consider Peter Senge’s laws of the fifth discipline:</p><p>1. Today’s problems come from yesterday’s solutions.</p><p>2. The harder you push, the harder the system pushes back.</p><p>3. Things get better before they get worse.</p><p>4. The easy way out usually leads back in.</p><p>5. The cure can be worse than the disease.</p><p>6. Faster is slower.</p><p>7. Cause and effect are not closely related in time and space.</p><p>8. Small changes can produce big results, but the areas of highest leverage are often the least obvious .</p><p>9. You can have your cake and eat it too, but not at once.</p><p>10. Dividing an elephant in half does not make two smaller elephants (it makes a mess).</p><p>11. There is no blame — relationships and systems are the solution.</p><p>** Consider as a possible parallel the difference between architects and engineers:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/670/1*igpDaSkzA-QpZC4KOCa5Sw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Graphic courtesy of the <a href="http://newschoolarch.edu/academics/school-of-architecture/infographic-architecture-vs-engineering/">New School of Architecture</a>.</p><p>*** Did anyone serve on Op BANNER XXIII? Or was it just Op TELIC and Op HERRICK that adopted this counter-productive <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groundhog_Day_(film)">Groundhog Day</a> nomenclature?</p><p>****As an example, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Slow-Burn-American-Intelligence-Vietnam/dp/0671692585"><em>Slow Burn</em></a> is fascinating account of how a CIA handler built an immense human intelligence network in Vietnam, over seven years, using shoe leather and index cards.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c85ab1a4e90d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/good-execution-is-deeply-tedious-c85ab1a4e90d">Good execution is deeply tedious</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit">Fall When Hit</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The perils of intuition]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/the-perils-of-intuition-8c4c0a19b349?source=rss----17f4eb0496c1---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8c4c0a19b349</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defense]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[army]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cognitive-bias]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intuition]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Fall When Hit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2015 17:24:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-05T06:08:26.097Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*Sdhqc0Et1o7KAofZB7i7XQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Intuitive decision making is celebrated in many fields, from leaders who effortlessly make decisions to sports stars who just seem to have more time on the ball than anyone else. They raise decision making to an art form, and relegate the rest of us to plodding, uncreative box tickers.</p><p>This is particularly true in the British Army, where from early on officers hear terms like <em>coup d’œil</em> (stroke of the eye) or <em>fingerspitzengefühl </em>(finger-tip feeling). The British Army loves its amateurs — and intensely dislikes reading pamphlets.</p><p>But there is a real danger in elevating intuitive decision making, and in not recognising its perils.</p><p>As an example, <em>British Army Review</em> 158 included an article by Lieutenant Colonel (ret’d) Chris Booth called “Knowledge Based Intuition”. The article celebrated this faculty, and cited its recognition by US and UK doctrine. It is a quick and interesting canter through the literature in the context of our recent experience in operations.</p><p><strong>Unfortunately, though, the two most critical factors in intuitive decision making were glossed over, and this could have serious consequences for operational success.</strong></p><p><strong>First, heuristics should not be regarded simply as clever rules of thumb employed by intuitive decision makers, for a very good reason: they are not always helpful, and are often very dangerous.</strong> Heuristics are models of how humans actually make decisions. In other words, humans make decisions in subtle, complicated and largely unconscious ways, and researchers try to explain these with heuristics. Unfortunately, patterns in human decision-making lead to systematic decision failures, called cognitive biases.</p><p>For instance:</p><ul><li><strong>Confirmation bias:</strong> people tend to seek facts to support their arguments, rather than disprove them</li><li><strong>Belief bias:</strong> people tend to overweight strength of belief at the expense of logical argument</li><li><strong>Availability heuristic: </strong>people overestimate the importance of something that is easy to remember</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sUle-mAIJMnbDebQTVpJQQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Daniel Kahneman</figcaption></figure><p>Nobel-prize-winner Daniel Kahneman has done extensive research into the field of cognitive biases, and before anyone gets too excited about intuition they should read his magnum opus, <em>Thinking, Fast and Slow</em>.</p><p>Ironically, Kahneman got his start as an Israeli army officer conducting that country’s equivalent of the Army Officer Selection Board. The dominant heuristic was — and is — to find candidates with “officer quality” — confidence, poise, physical stature, athleticism, etc. Over time his research revealed that so-called officer quality was completely uncorrelated to effectiveness in combat. That heuristic was actually harmful.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/428/1*tEFyISjyWGnu5rnbCWf0Yw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Gary Klein</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Second, we must be clear how good intuition is formed and when it is appropriate. </strong>Booth cites the work of both Gary Klein (a proponent of intuition) and of Kahneman (a sceptic). When these two intellectual opponents collaborated for the first time they were able to address their conflict, agreeing that intuition is useful in the short-term in relatively straight-forward environments where cause and effect can be linked.</p><p>Decision makers who apply intuition must have extensive experience in the relevant area, and this experience absolutely must involve feedback loops that allow the decision maker to test and improve her skills over many years. Although the 10,000-hour rule popularised by Malcolm Gladwell has been discredited (it was, after all, just a straight average of the number of hours required to become world class in one particular field), the bottom line is that you need a lot of experience to develop sound intuitive judgment — and exercises on the Plain against disinterested opfor who are not allowed to be creative does not count.</p><p>A mid-career A&amp;E nurse, for instance, if he has been closing his feedback loops methodically over the years, is ideally placed to use his intuition. A young officer fresh out of Sandhurst is not, and neither is a senior commander arriving in theatre for the first time.</p><p>It is always possible to cite examples of people who trusted their instincts and came back alive, as Colonel Booth does. The problem is that we don’t hear from the people who trusted their instincts and didn’t. Ironically enough, that’s actually a cognitive bias too (the survivorship bias).</p><p>As an aside, once you understand the concept of survivorship bias you see its relevance all over. This is most famously true in investing, where a sufficiently large group of stock pickers who cannot in the aggregate outperform the market always produce a select few superstars. Gallons of ink is then spilled understanding their methods, when in reality they are simply very lucky. The finance professor Ken French has said it would take more than thirty years of investing returns to definitively know whether a stockpicker is good or lucky. Not surprisingly, survivorship bias is a major theme of Taleb’s <em>The Black Swan</em>.</p><p>A related challenge is understanding how good organisations function. Most famously, Jim Collins’s book <em>Good to Great</em> (a fascinating read) identified a series of companies that outperformed very similar peers. Collins then identified what set apart the successful ones from the unsuccessful ones, and produced one of the best-selling business books of all time. The flaw in this analysis is that Collins failed to look for dis-confirming examples — companies that had these criteria but failed to succeed. Richard Feynman has called this sort of mistake cargo cult science.</p><p>To make matters worse, many of the companies that Collins identified under-performed afterwards. As Clayton Christensen identified in <em>The Innovator’s Dilemma</em>, many companies feted for their success (by featuring on magazine covers, for instance) have passed their peak and are already having their business models destroyed.</p><p>Michael Mauboussin examines this timeless challenge in <em>The Success Equation: Untangling Skill and Luck in Business, Sports, and Investing</em>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8c4c0a19b349" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit/the-perils-of-intuition-8c4c0a19b349">The perils of intuition</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fall-when-hit">Fall When Hit</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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