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        <title><![CDATA[Filterwatch - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Monitoring online censorship and internet policy in Iran - Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/filterwatch?source=rss----f61717a7a322---4</link>
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            <title>Filterwatch - Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/filterwatch?source=rss----f61717a7a322---4</link>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Filterwatch Has A New Home!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-has-a-new-home-df8ca19e37f2?source=rss----f61717a7a322---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[human-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-rights]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Small Media]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2020 12:36:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-10T12:36:45.469Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Don’t disconnect. Filterwatch is now available in English and Persian at its new online home.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sQl625Cf8JfLhKdjq3lQbA.png" /></figure><p>Dear Reader,</p><p>We would like to firstly take this opportunity to thank you for supporting the Filterwatch project over the years. We’re not disappearing– this project and our publications will continue over on our new website at <a href="https://filter.watch/">filter.watch</a>, with all of our outputs now available in both <a href="https://filter.watch/en/">English</a> and <a href="https://filter.watch/fa/">Persian</a>.</p><p>We will continue to publish our monthly Policy and Network Monitors, as well as our longer Investigations. We also have a number of upcoming ‘Deep Dive’ reports set for publication in the next few months, and we’ll be holding a number of events where our team will be exploring the development of the Internet, and the vitality of digital rights in Iran.</p><p>So to read our latest reports and to find out more about our upcoming projects, do head over to our new website. You can keep up-to-date with our latest news (and send us your feedback!) via our social media accounts on <a href="https://twitter.com/home">Twitter</a> and <a href="https://www.instagram.com/filterbaan/">Instagram</a>.</p><p>Thanks again for all your support, and we look forward to staying in touch!</p><p>All the best,</p><p>The Filterwatch Team</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/0*mcoWYmRmz7vBtUW0.png" /></figure><p><strong>For more of </strong><a href="http://smallmedia.org.uk/"><strong>Small Media</strong></a><strong>’s work exploring the internet policy landscape in Iran, check out the rest of Filterwatch — either here, on </strong><a href="https://filter.watch/"><strong>filter.watch</strong></a><strong>, or on </strong><a href="https://smallmedia.org.uk/work/filterwatch"><strong>the Small Media website</strong></a><strong>.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=df8ca19e37f2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-has-a-new-home-df8ca19e37f2">Filterwatch Has A New Home!</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch">Filterwatch</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Data Insecurity On Iran’s Localised Internet]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/filterwatch/data-insecurity-on-irans-localised-internet-182ed44d5230?source=rss----f61717a7a322---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/182ed44d5230</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[telegram]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[censorship]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Melody Kazemi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2020 18:00:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-22T15:36:55.152Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>With millions of Iran’s citizens exposed by data leaks this year, it’s clear the country needs some proper data protection laws. But the National Information Network is getting in the way.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QVOkOgI5PYU3yiARmTtyHQ.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>By </em></strong><a href="https://medium.com/u/846a56a6c7c3?source=post_page-----8895ba8bc1ee----------------------"><strong><em>Melody Kazem</em></strong></a><strong><em>i, </em></strong><a href="https://medium.com/u/f4cb6f596a47?source=post_page-----8895ba8bc1ee----------------------"><strong><em>Kaveh Azarhoosh</em></strong></a><strong><em> and </em></strong><a href="https://medium.com/u/583c92322440?source=post_page-----8895ba8bc1ee----------------------"><strong><em>James Marchant</em></strong></a></p><p>With our ever increasing dependency on online and digital services, there has been a global rise in the number of data leaks, leaving users and businesses more vulnerable to cyber attacks.</p><p>This problem is no different in Iran, which has experienced a series of major data leaks in recent years. A particularly significant data leak incident took place in March this year, when the data from 42 million Iranian Telegram users was leaked online, a figure that could represent up to half of the country’s population. Within days, yet <a href="https://www.digikala.com/mag/%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%BE-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B4%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA/">another</a> data leak affected the ‘Sib’ app, with the leaked data from the reportedly being posted online for sale for $500.</p><p>So far, the response from Iranian authorities has been inadequate, failing to take actions to prevent similar leaks in the future or to safeguard users that have found their sensitive data readily available online against potential online attacks.</p><p>We believe that Iranian internet users are made particularly more vulnerable to these data leaks due to two facts that persist in the landscape of Iran’s internet policy: lack of comprehensive and meaningful data protection frameworks in Iran, and a far-reaching internet localisation agenda implemented under the National Information Network.</p><p>In this edition of Filterwatch, we examine a number of recent major data leak incidents in Iran, the effects of the National Information Network on online privacy and data protection, and outline the steps that need to be taken by policy-makers and tech companies in order to protect Iranains from similar leaks in the future.</p><p><strong>How was the Data Leaked Online?</strong></p><p>On 31 March it was <a href="https://www.comparitech.com/blog/information-security/iranian-telegram-accounts-leaked/">revealed</a> that data from 42 million Iranian Telegram users had been leaked online. According to security researcher Bob Diachenko, the data was posted online by a group known as <em>Samaneh Shekar</em> (‘Hunting System’). The data was posted as a cluster on Elasticsearch — an open source search engine for data and analytics –- and did not require a password or authentication to access.</p><p>The data remained exposed online for 11 days before it was reported to the hosting provider by Diachenko, and the Elasticsearch cluster was eventually deleted on 25 March. According to Diachenko, after contacting MAHER — Iran’s computer emergency response team — the server for Hunting System was taken down. However, before the data disappeared, it had already been accessed and posted on at least one other hacker forum, and was being sold online.</p><p>The data set is described as containing 42 million user data records originating from Iran, including account IDs and usernames, phone numbers, and hashes (unique codes relating to the accounts stored on the server).</p><p>In a statement, Telegram announced that the leaked information was scraped from two popular ‘forked’ versions of Telegram known as HotGram and Golden Telegram (also known as Talagram or Telegram Talaei). The two apps were created using Telegram’s open source code following the <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/sunset-for-telegram-irans-latest-act-of-censorship-and-what-happens-next-f5f06c459b68">blocking</a> of the official Telegram app in 2018, and were believed to have ties to Iran’s security and intelligence organisations. We previously raised concerns about the two apps’ <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/totally-forked-how-the-telegram-ban-and-tightened-sanctions-are-putting-iranians-in-danger-c019c63d44d6">security</a> when they first emerged. The servers for the two apps, based inside Iran, were <a href="https://www.eghtesadonline.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C-64/361443-%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AA%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%84%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%87%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B4%D9%87-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B4-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF">“turned off”</a> in June 2019 by their developer company.</p><p>Telegram’s statement has not been independently verified. Some <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-17/data-breach-shows-iranians-use-chat-apps-to-spy-researchers-say">reports</a> also suggest that the leaked data include user account details “associated with active users of the official Telegram app”, and that user records were “accessed as recently as March 2020”.</p><p>Those whose data has been leaked are now said to be vulnerable to phishing and SIM swap attacks, and the leaked information can be used to target these accounts.</p><p>Further <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-17/data-breach-shows-iranians-use-chat-apps-to-spy-researchers-say">investigations</a> reported that the server was registered under the name of Manouchehr Hashemloo, who was using the same email address as a well-known Iranian hacker known as ArYaIeIrAN. The hacker is said to be associated with a government-sponsored hacking group known as Charming Kitten, which has previously been involved with operations targeting activists and journalists.</p><p><strong>Iranian Government’s Inadequate Response</strong></p><p>The authorities’ responses to the data leak were wholly inadequate, as various organisations failed adequately to prioritise the security and safety of those whose data was compromised. Standard response practices were not followed, and potentially at-risk individuals were not notified. The developers behind the two apps — Smart Land Solutions — appear to have offered no reaction.</p><p>On 31 March — the same that the data leak was made public — Amir Nazemi, Deputy ICT Minister and Head of the Information Technology Organisation of Iran, <a href="https://twitter.com/amirnazemy/status/1244895773667581952">tweeted</a> that the website named “[Samaneh] Shekar”, hosted by an Iranian company known as Raspina, has been identified and was being reported to the prosecutor’s office for legal proceedings. A day after Nazemi’s tweet, Raspina <a href="https://itiran.com/2020/04/01/%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%BE%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B2%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/">denied</a> providing hosting services to the website, stating that it only provided co-location services.</p><p>In another <a href="https://twitter.com/amirnazemy/status/1245288023023128577">tweet</a> on 1 April, Nazemi sought to address those questioning the lack of action about the incident stating that according to the Supreme Council for Cyberspace’s (SCC) 44th resolution, Iran’s Cyber Police (FATA), is responsible for dealing with data security issues in the private sector.</p><p>MAHER also <a href="https://www.zoomit.ir/2020/4/2/347027/disclosure-users-telegram-form-sibapp-cert/">published a statement</a> addressed to government organisations and business owners. In the statement they blamed the data leaks on unsecure or low-security data clusters. MAHER further announced that from March 31 it had begun observing any unsecure data banks and would notify their owners (should they be identifiable). It was added that if the issue was not rectified by those responsible after they were notified, they would be referred to the prosecutor’s office.</p><p>However, MAHER reiterated that the SCC’s resolution for “<a href="http://www.president.ir/fa/101474">National System for Prevention and Combating Incidents in Cyberspace</a>” referred incidents relating to private businesses (such as apps or private banks) to Iran’s Cyber Police (FATA).</p><p>FATA has made no public statements about the data leaks, nor provided any information about if and how victims of the data leak would be notified. Also significant is the fact that the developer company for the two forked Telegram apps, Smart Land Solutions, has not reacted to the incident nor been held accountable by FATA or other authorities. Some have interpreted this as a further indication that the apps were linked to the government.</p><p><strong>Iran Does not have a Data Protection Framework</strong></p><p>The response from the Iranian government and relevant authorities towards data leaks has been disjointed and inadequate. It has failed to identify how or who was behind the data leak, or to make a statement on how subsequent threats to users will be appropriately addressed. Iran’s total lack of comprehensive or meaningful legal data protections for users is a primary contributor to the lack of action in this situation.</p><p>The only attempt so far to <a href="https://smallmedia.org.uk/media/articles/files/Filterwatch_BillsBillsBills19.pdf">introduce</a> data protection measures was made in 2018, when the ICT Ministry introduced the draft “Data Protection and Online Privacy Bill”. This bill has failed to make any progress since it was sent to the Cabinet for approval in 2018, despite the fact that its provisions prioritised internet localisation over user security. A few other pieces of legislation such as the Computer Crimes Law (CCL) (2009/2010) and the Electronic Commerce Law (ECL) (2004) make limited reference to data protection and privacy, but are very limited in scope and application.</p><p>The CCL, for example,<a href="https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/2921/12-01-30-FINAL-iran-WEB%5B4%5D.pdf"> sets out</a> criminal penalties for defamation and theft of data “belonging to others”. Article 1 criminalises “illegal access” to computer and telecommunication systems “protected by security measures”, but fails to define “security measures” and appears only to apply to government data and not to individuals or non-governmental bodies. Further provisions of the CCL prohibit the implementation of basic security measures, rendering users vulnerable to data leaks as well as surveillance. Article 10, for instance, prohibits “concealing data, changing passwords, and/or encoding data that could deny access of authorised individuals to data, computer and telecommunication systems”. It is worth noting, however, that we have not yet observed the enforcement of this article in practice.</p><p>The ECL contains some privacy and data protection provisions, however, these only apply to online commerce and transactions and do not have wider da. These are consequently insufficient to address the complex issues of the right to privacy online and data protection raised by general data leaks.</p><p>While the “Data Protection and Online Privacy Bill’’ remains dormant, the SCC has adopted other concerning measures that drastically depart from the principles of data protection and privacy. In August 2019 the SCC approved the text of the ‘Digital Identity Verification Resolution’, which was <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-october-2019-d671d23e52c">published</a> in October 2019.</p><p>Some of the resolution’s main objectives are:</p><ul><li>every online interaction between entities (including individuals, parties, objects or services) must be conducted using a valid ID;</li><li>individuals will be identified using two sets of information managed by the ICT Ministry known as an entity’s “essential identity information” and their attributes. The essential identity is one’s fixed legal identity and attributes are qualifications acquired by an entity over time.</li><li>the National Centre for Cyberspace (NCC), working with the cooperation of the Executive and Judiciary should, within six months of the communication date of the resolution, draft the required regulations and legislation for establishing a Valid Identity System in Iranian cyberspace;</li><li>the NCC should provide a report on the implementation of the resolution every six months to the SCC.</li></ul><p>Though the resolution is not law, the SCC is the highest ranking internet policy making body in Iran with its mandate from the Supreme Leader. As such its authority cannot be disputed, and the resolution appears to be binding on the government.</p><p>The lack of codified processes for ensuring user security and privacy means that domestic apps and other online services need not to prioritise privacy and security safeguards, and will not be penalised for it This lack of legal protection combined with the legal history in Iran means that in the event of data leaks or security breaches, no legal action is taken and tech companies and the government’s ICT organisations cannot be held accountable. The sole recourse remains an active decision by government authorities to investigate, which has not been efficient or effective at putting users first as in the Telegram case.</p><p><strong>National Information Network is not Compatible with Data Protection</strong></p><p>One way to explain Iran’s data protection and online legal vacuum is to view it not as an accident or oversight, but rather as a feature of the Iranian government’s long-term internet policy agenda.</p><p>For decades, various government administrations have been pursuing a localised, self-contained internet, which is now known as the National Information Network (NIN). Government rhetoric promotes the NIN project as a “secure” and “clean” internet, better protected from cyber attacks and allowing access only to approved materials that promote “social harmony”. At the same time, the NIN also serves to downgrade the already limited digital rights of all Iranian citizens.</p><p>By placing internet infrastructure and services inside the country, the government can exercise more effective control over what citizens can access online, and further monitor their behavior without restrictions imposed by international services. We saw some evidence of the NIN’s functionality during the November 2019 near-total Internet shutdown. As international websites and apps were disconnected, some banking services, hospitals, and universities claimed to remain online during the shutdown, as they were connected to the NIN and used domestic hosting services.</p><p>As evidenced in the recent resolution on online identity, the NIN is slowly building an internet environment which is also designed for high visibility, traceability and monitoring of users. So long as no data protection laws are put in place, there will be no frameworks to ensure that this information is collected and processed in compliance with individuals’ right to privacy, or to ensure that its use and disclosure is limited, and is not misused. In this situation, the government enjoys far fewer restraints in its capacities to monitor and surveil citizens. It is clear that the goal of making all online interactions traceable (as per SCC’s resolution on “Valid Online Identity Systems”) and localised,is not compatible with a meaningful data protection framework.</p><p>The state’s surveillance apparatus is fundamentally incompatible with data protection regimes. Data protection seeks to protect personal information or personal data whereas state surveillance around the world relies on insecurity of data and lack of individual privacy in online services . Various attempts at definitions have been made across different legislation to define the term ‘personal data’ but international standards such as those established under GDPR refer to “ … any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); … who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person” (General Data Protection Regulation (2018), Article 4).</p><p>Therefore, in order for data protection frameworks to be effective, provisions must be put in place for data to be stored securely through “pseudoanonymity” or “functional nonidentifiability”, using methods such as encryption to allow for the privacy of users.</p><p>The “Verified Online Identity System” negates such practices by creating government-regulated online identity profiles, without which individuals cannot appear online. The resolution neglects to make any recommendations or provisions setting out how this information will be collected, processed and stored safely and securely, nor does it grant the data owner rights and control over their own personal data. Therefore, failing to put in place measures to hold the government accountable for ensuring the security and the use of this daya. Once again, it also fails to consider measures for data leaks and breaches, putting absolutely no effort towards ensuring Iranians’ online users safety and security</p><p>Given that the NIN is being implemented via a programme of enforced data localisation policies, thereby creating a system of constant oversight over citizen’s online behaviours and can cut them off from the global Internet, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Iranian government has been resistant to the notion of introducing meaningful data protection legislation. This lack of regulation and legislation however also has a knock on effect on the private sector, and fails to ensure proper regulation of private tech companies to ensure they sufficiently guarantee the data security and privacy of their users.</p><p><strong>What Comes Next?</strong></p><p>As we have seen, the failure of the Iranian government to update its legislation in line with technological advancements has had considerable consequences for its citizens. Despite continued calls for data protection legislation to be put in place, there has been little attempt from the government to make progress on the implementation of any data protection laws.</p><p>The fact that this legislative process has seemingly fallen into a permanent state of limbo suggests that the state may have realised that any meaningful data protection legislation could threaten or undermine its broader project to develop the NIN, which ultimately seeks to make all citizens visible and traceable online. With this in mind, there cannot be any comprehensive, meaningful data protection legislation which can adequately and sufficiently ensure the security of online users to international standards or provide them with remedies if their security is compromised.</p><p>Therefore, the implementation of the NIN, which at its core negates the notion of online privacy and robust security measures for users must be stopped. Further, the government must ensure that appropriate legislation that can comprehensively protect user data to be put in place without delay. This could start with addressing the progress of the Data Protection and Privacy Bill. It is extremely important to note that the bill, in its current form, does not go far enough to create a data protection framework that is in line with recognised internationally set standards for ensuring user privacy and security, but is a start for the country in this area. The bill can be improved upon and be amended to address its shortcomings before it is progressed further and is passed into law. The combination of these two efforts can hold data controllers and processors, including the government itself, to a high standard for security practices as well as holding them accountable for any failures so that a trustworthy online environment which respects citizens’ digital rights is created</p><p><strong>Things to look out for in the future:</strong></p><p>In light of the current data protection situation in Iran, we make the following recommendations to be considered and implemented by various stakeholders in order to address the shortcomings in the current system and uphold the digital rights of Iranian citizens:</p><ul><li>In the absence of a legal data protection framework, tech companies must recognise their responsibility to prioritise the security and privacy of their users’ data; in doing so they must outline and adhere to clear data protection practice which they should also make available to their users.</li><li>The Iranian government must immediately pass comprehensive data protection and online privacy legislation in line with international standards to include:</li></ul><p>Implementation of standardised practices ensure domestic apps are sufficiently secure, and that processes for data;</p><ul><li>A clear process for informing data owners of any data breaches and leaks of personally identifiable information;</li><li>Legally enforceable remedies be made available to those whose data has been compromised</li><li>Upcoming legislation such as the deeply problematic <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/irans-managing-social-messaging-apps-bill-returns-to-parliament-b0a98c18463f">“Managing Social Messaging Apps”</a> must be abandoned due to their infringement on user’s right to privacy and as well as its lack of security and safety considerations.</li><li>Data protection and online privacy legislation can only exist in name while the NIN project is still being pursued, therefore the practice of internet localisation in Iran must be stopped in order to uphold the digital rights of Iranian users.</li><li>Digital rights advocates and activists must be made aware of the dangers of upcoming programmes such as <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-policy-monitor-april-2020-f9a0f1b622ea">“legal VPNs” </a>and inform Iranian users of their risks to their online privacy.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/346/0*1MfRK4tv1hxgOcSV.png" /></figure><p><strong>For more of </strong><a href="http://smallmedia.org.uk/"><strong>Small Media</strong></a><strong>’s work exploring the internet policy landscape in Iran, check out the rest of Filterwatch — either here on </strong><a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch"><strong>Medium</strong></a><strong>, or on </strong><a href="https://smallmedia.org.uk/work/filterwatch"><strong>the Small Media website</strong></a><strong>.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=182ed44d5230" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/data-insecurity-on-irans-localised-internet-182ed44d5230">Data Insecurity On Iran’s Localised Internet</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch">Filterwatch</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Filterwatch Policy Monitor — May 2020]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-policy-monitor-may-2020-38c8c23bfb41?source=rss----f61717a7a322---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/38c8c23bfb41</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[censorship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Melody Kazemi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2020 17:32:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-22T09:16:27.613Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Filterwatch Policy Monitor — May 2020</h3><h4>Another month without the Supreme Council for Cyberspace meeting as Iran’s Interior Minister took responsibility for the November 2019 Internet shutdown</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_HIXq6BKI-0m-rUQDSYR1Q.png" /></figure><p>According to official figures in May, Iran saw a significant increase in its number of COVID-19 cases following the relaxation of its restriction of social movements, raising fears of a “second wave” of the epidemic. According to official data from the Iranian government, to date, the number of deaths in the country has <a href="https://www.isna.ir/news/99032918574/%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B2-%DB%B9%DB%B0%DB%B0%DB%B0-%D8%AA%D9%86-%DB%B5-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%85%DA%86%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86">surpassed</a> 9,000, with a number of provinces such as Bushehr, Khuzestan, East Azerbaijan, Kermanshah and Hormozgan declaring “critical status” with regard to the numbers of infections. Meanwhile, wildfires devastated the southwest of the country, as local officials <a href="https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-woodlands-engulfed-in-wildfires-as-local-officials-call-for-help/30642311.html">struggled</a> to contain them.</p><p>Against the backdrop of health and environmental emergencies, Iran’s conservative and principalist-majority 11th Parliament began its term this month, electing President Rouhani’s former presidential rival Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf as the new Parliamentary Speaker with an absolute majority.</p><p>While the parliament worked on setting its agenda and filling positions for parliamentary committees, it was a relatively quiet month across the country’s ICT landscape. For the third month in a row, there were no meetings of the Supreme Council for Cyberspace. However, for the first time since the November 2019 internet shutdown, Iran’s Interior Minister took formal responsibility for the shutdown order. We also have details on the ICT Ministry’s unveiling of new digital economy projects.</p><p>Our monthly <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/network-monitor-may-2020-9048041d64d1">Network Monito</a>r supplements this report with a technical analysis of network disruptions and internet shutdowns. Take a look at it to get a better sense of how internet disruptions affected Iranian users in May.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2WIYKH2J85eOZ2TZkFWwPw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Interior Minister Takes Responsibility for Iran’s November Internet Shutdown</strong></p><p>In a TV interview on <a href="https://peivast.com/p/78106">31 May</a>, Iran’s Interior Minister, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli confirmed that he had ordered the November 2019 internet shutdown — which coincided with protests over rising fuel prices — in his capacity as the Head of the National Security Council. He cited public security as the reason for this decision.</p><p>This is the first time an official has publicly claimed responsibility for ordering the internet shutdown. During the shutdown ICT Minister Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/iran-shutdown-monitor-ccd4cad2a681">commented</a> that the decision was made by the National Security Council, but no further details were given. The November internet shutdown lasted for around seven days nationwide, cutting Iranian citizen’s access to the global internet during the widespread fuel price protests, where <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/05/iran-details-released-of-304-deaths-during-protests-six-months-after-security-forces-killing-spree/">hundreds of protesters were killed or injured</a> by the country’s security forces.</p><p><strong>No Supreme Council of Cyberspace Meeting for Third Consecutive Month</strong></p><p>For the third month in a row, there is no record of Iran’s top internet policy making body, the Supreme Council for Cyberspace (SCC), holding a meeting. The council’s last recorded meeting was in February this year, before the COVID-19 outbreak in Iran intensified.</p><p>The SCC is required to meet every six weeks, however it appears that no official meetings have taken place since February. The mandate for the SCC, which is issued by the Supreme Leader was last renewed on 5 September 2015 for a period of four years has now expired and has not been formally renewed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RL4RhYYR7VPNWF2qlxAQXw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Four New Digital Economy Projects Unveiled by the ICT Ministry</strong></p><p>On <a href="https://www.isna.ir/news/99030804250/%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%BE%D8%B1%D9%88%DA%98%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AC%DB%8C%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1">28 May</a> four new “Digital Economy” projects were unveiled by ICT Minister Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi in the presence of President Rouhani. The projects, which focus on the growth and expansion of services on the National information Network (NIN) include:</p><ul><li>“The choice of every Iranian, an online television” — where Iranians with fixed internet can choose between three major VOD providers in the country for a free one-month subscription.</li><li>The first satellite Data Centre for the National Information Network</li><li>Cloud infrastructure project for the provinces of East Azerbaijan, Tehran, Khorasan Razavi and Fars</li><li>Scheme to support digital businesses impacted by COVID-19</li></ul><p>During the unveiling ceremony, Jahromi presented figures relating to Iran’s digital economy, claiming that according to the Statistical Centre of Iran, the country’s gross digital economy production “is at 4% [of GDP]”. Jahromi also stated that the NIN core capacity had “increased by 300% from 2013 to 2019”, however, he was <a href="https://www.mehrnews.com/news/4936064/%D8%AA%D8%B0%DA%A9%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D8%A8%DA%A9%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA">corrected</a> by Rouhani that the figures showed a 30% growth, not 300%.</p><p>Expansion of online services and digital economy is one of the main pillars of the NIN, and the ICT Ministry has been under pressure for their shortcomings in this area for sometime.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*apcSQl15_NmwGP4oqdJHwg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Discounted Internet for Domestic Messaging Apps</strong></p><p>On <a href="https://www.mehrnews.com/news/4917263/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87-%D8%AC%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%AE%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%81-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AA-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C">5 May</a> it was announced that a new circular from the Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) has been issued to domestic messaging apps requiring them to inform Internet Service Providers and the CRA of any new services they offer so that the cost of their internet traffic can be calculated at a third of the cost of international internet traffic. The new circular is said to have been issued due to a complaint from a user about their international internet traffic being used when making video calls using domestic messaging apps.</p><p>Domestic internet traffic which uses the National Information Network (NIN) is calculated at half or a third of the price of international traffic, effectively ending net neutrality in Iran. This regulation is also used to incentivise the use of domestic online services and apps over international equivalents. This is particularly important as reliance on the internet has increased due to the spread of COVID-19 and its added financial burdens on the country’s population.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WH_O8kUdyJq81Hv177PzmQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Over 1,500 Villages “Connected to the National Information Network”</strong></p><p>According to a report by the ICT MInistry on <a href="https://www.ict.gov.ir/fa/newsagency/24290/%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D8%B2-1500-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%A8%DA%A9%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA">17 May </a>it is claimed that 1,578 villages were connected to the NIN and 632 villages were connected to mobile networks via operator Hamrah-e val (MCI), a subsidiary of the Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI).</p><p>According to this report 89% of villages with a population of over 20 families have been connected to the NIN, with the aim of reaching 100% by the end of the year. Additionally 93% of villages now have mobile network coverage with an aim of “reaching 100% for villages with over 20 families by the end of the year”. The ICT Ministry has consistently sought to highlight the extent to which they have invested in infrastructure in rural areas.</p><p><strong>Secretary to SCC Comments on Tension Between ICT MInistry and State Broaster IRIB</strong></p><p>In an interview on <a href="https://www.mehrnews.com/news/4931581/%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3-%DB%B7%DB%B0%DB%B0-%D9%88-%DB%B8%DB%B0%DB%B0-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AA">23 May</a> the SCC Secretary, Abolhassan Firouzabadi commented on the <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-february-2019-8597e47c7fbe">longstanding</a> tension between the ICT Ministry and state broadcaster Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) over the management of 700MHz and 800MHz bands. In recent months Jahromi has revived the argument, asking the President to weigh in on the issue and give the ICT Ministry control of the frequency bands in order to help with increased network demands in light of the COVID-19 outbreak. Jahromi had also reportedly said that he would offer “free internet” for the domestic education app “SHAD” if the ICT Ministry is given ownership of the frequency bands.</p><p>Firouzabadi said that the SCC has not yet been asked to deliberate on the questions. However, he said he could not see how the frequency could have relevance to the Shad app, as its traffic is “negligible” and was mostly used “at home” so did not require mobile internet, which is at the heart of the dispute. He also added that the control of the frequencies by the ICT Ministry could have an impact on “job creation and the digital economy”. He added that whether the ownership of the frequencies would be given to the ICT Ministry would depend on what the ICT Ministry would plan to do with frequencies but there are no “time pressures” to make a decision as there are still “global conversations on whether there is enough technological readiness for the frequencies”.</p><p>The ICT Ministry lost the same battle to IRIB in a vote in parliament in <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-february-2019-8597e47c7fbe">February</a> last year. It remains to be seen if the matter will be formally referred to the SCC for a decision.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TNYDsm8HaarQQGyX2uknhQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>FATA Police and Information Technology Organisation of Iran to Rank Security of Apps</strong></p><p>On <a href="https://peivast.com/p/76731">16 May</a> it was reported that Iran’s Cyber Police, FATA, and the Information Technology Organisation of Iran (ITO) are looking to collaborate on recommending an assessment framework to rank applications based on their “security and privacy features”. However, the assessment is said to be voluntary and apps are not required to sign-up to the scheme.</p><p>The move comes as a number of <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/data-insecurity-on-irans-localised-internet-182ed44d5230">significant data leaks</a> have compromised the security of Iranian users but with little to no action being taken as a result to investigate them or make attempts to ensure that better security measures are put in place to protect users more effectively in the future.</p><p>As there are no comprehensive data protection laws in Iran, the lack of any legal requirements means that ensuring the security and privacy of users falls entirely on the private sector. The Iranian government must take immediate steps to address this legal vacuum by introducing data protection laws in line with international standards and the private sector must realise their duty and responsibility towards Iranian users, especially in light of recent events.</p><p><strong>Warning from Iran’s Cyber Police on Wearing Hair Covering on Instagram</strong></p><p>In an interview on <a href="https://www.borna.news/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C-4/1001095-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%87%DB%8C%DA%86-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF">13 May</a>, the Social [Affairs] Deputy at FATA police, Ramin Pashai, warned that for women to not wear headscarves and hair coverings on Instagram is considered public disorder, and will therefore be pursued as a crime.</p><p>Instagram is one of the few international social media platforms that is unfiltered in Iran. There has been a surge in the use of social media platforms and Instagram’s live feature as a result of social restrictions put in place due to COVID-19. There has been mounting criticism of the platform from political and religious figures, who call for the monitoring or filtering of the platform to prevent the spread of “immoral” content and behavior.</p><p><strong>Secretary to SCC: “1,300 Prosecuted for Posting False Content Relating to Coronavirus”</strong></p><p>In an interview on <a href="http://majazi.ir/news/89614-%D9%BE%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1-%DB%B1%DB%B3%DB%B0%DB%B0%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7.html?t=%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1">20 May</a>, Abolhassan Firouzabadi, Secretary to the SCC claimed that the special working group at the National Centre for Cyberspace (NCC) — created by the National Headquarters for Management and Combatting Corona [Virus] they had recorded over 1,300 instances of “false news, fraud, rumours and slander” online and that all of these had been “investigated” or referred to Iran’s Cyber Police, FATA.</p><p>There have been a <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-policy-monitor-april-2020-f9a0f1b622ea">large number of arrests</a> reported for spreading “rumours and misinformation” online since the COVID-19 outbreak was first reported in Iran earlier this year. The lack of transparency behind any detentions or arrests as a result of these charges are concerning as they could result in arbitrary detention or be used to prevent journalists and activists from providing the public with accurate information. Iranians must be able to have access to impartial, accurate information and to be being able to voice their criticism of the government without fear from prosecution or harassment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/346/0*L9suNW5T_V1z2DyR.png" /></figure><p>For more of <a href="http://smallmedia.org.uk/">Small Media</a>’s work exploring the internet policy landscape in Iran, check out the rest of Filterwatch — either here on <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch">Medium</a>, or on <a href="https://smallmedia.org.uk/work/filterwatch">the Small Media website</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=38c8c23bfb41" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-policy-monitor-may-2020-38c8c23bfb41">Filterwatch Policy Monitor — May 2020</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch">Filterwatch</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Network Monitor — May 2020]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/filterwatch/network-monitor-may-2020-9048041d64d1?source=rss----f61717a7a322---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9048041d64d1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-shutdowns]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Amir Rashidi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2020 17:25:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-05T17:34:38.202Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Network Monitor — May 2020</h3><h4>Connectivity challenges returned to Iran this month, including a lengthy regional disruption, and some brief nationwide outages.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_OpRfBQa_n6yEdLUuoiSJQ.png" /></figure><p>After experiencing a month almost entirely <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/network-monitor-april-2020-5a7477ae5598">free from internet disruptions</a> in April, in May Iranians experienced a number of significant disruption events. The four most significant were:</p><ol><li><strong>May 2–8: </strong>Kish Island experienced a near-total internet shutdown for 12 hours on May 2. After this incident, some Internet providers remained disconnected from the internet until May 8. On May 2 state news agency IRIB News <a href="https://www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/2705836/%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B9%DB%8C-%DB%B1%DB%B2%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%B4">stated</a> that the outage was caused by a fire in a telecommunications building.</li><li><strong>May 10:</strong> The Mobile Telecommunication Company of Iran (MTC) <a href="http://itanalyze.com/post/%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AA%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%87%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B1%D8%A7-50%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B2%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF">announced</a> that due to the outbreak of Coronavirus, which has led to the working or studying from home, they have witnessed the growth of nearly 50% of mobile data usage. According to MTC, this is mainly due to the increased use of Internet TVs, online classes and training sessions. Last time in March we <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/network-monitor-march-2020-d8ce32088973#bd56">noticed</a> such a dramatic increase in the use of mobile data.</li><li><strong>May 18–19: </strong>The autonomous systems TCI AS48159 and Pars Online AS16322 were offline for almost four hours without any explanation from either company.</li></ol><p>Pars Online’s disconnection resulted in a number of its users posting their frustration on Twitter. According to many of these users, <a href="https://twitter.com/Sadegh65/status/1263093962392383490">power outages</a> in the data center cause network outages. However, none of the officials of TCI Company or the Ministry of ICT gave any explanation about the four-hour cut-off on TCI AS48159 network.</p><ol><li><strong>May 26: </strong>At 21:30pm UTC (02:00am local time) internet access was almost completely cut off for around 30 minutes. Even local websites were not accessible during this brief shutdown.</li></ol><p>Our day-by-day analysis and documentation of key disruption incidents in May follows.</p><h3>May 2–8: Internet outage on Kish Island</h3><p>On May 2 IRIB News <a href="https://www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/2705836/%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B9%DB%8C-%DB%B1%DB%B2%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%B4">stated</a> that a fire in a telecommunications building caused a 12-hour internet outage. Local sources confirmed to Small Media that mobile data was completely cut off. According to data from OIM, Sanaye va Danesh Rafe Iranian Kish International Company (PJS) on AS206495 was cut off from the internet from May 2–8.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*D1MTIFJ5f9GvtOTx" /></figure><p>Again on May 12, AS206495 was cut off from the internet for a period of roughly a day. According to local sources, the Isfahan-based ISP <a href="http://azinkia.ir/">PJS</a> did not provide any explanation to its users for the internet outages.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*6BcXfSDRxSNUiXMB" /></figure><h3>May 10: Short overnight disruption</h3><p>At around 01:45am local time on May 10, Isfahan’s <a href="https://www.ripe.net/membership/indices/data/ir.arianagostar.html">Ariana Gostar Spadana (PJSC)</a> experienced a brief period of disruption on AS48309. It did not provide any public explanation about the reasons for this disruption on its <a href="http://panaone.com/">website</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*NGXX1LQnLFsDBe0B" /><figcaption>Brief disruption in the early hours of May 10 in one Isfahan-based provider.</figcaption></figure><h3>May 19: Power outages in Pars Online data centre</h3><p>Pars Online AS16322 went offline for roughly five hours, starting at around 2:10am local time. No explanation was provided. Pars Online’s disconnection provoked anger from a number of users on Twitter.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/744/0*iFicN1UNGAK8nsix" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/982/0*NztU79ICTeiqXuTU" /><figcaption>Power outages caused network outages for about five hours</figcaption></figure><p>According to unverified reports from a number of users on Twitter, <a href="https://twitter.com/Sadegh65/status/1263093962392383490">power outages</a> within Pars Online’s data centre were the cause of the network outages.</p><h3>May 20: Internet outage at one of Iran’s international gateways</h3><p><a href="https://map.internetintel.oracle.com/">OIM</a> data shows that on May 20 at around 12:30am local time, Iran experienced an internet outage on TIC AS48159, one of Iran’s international gateways. The outage lasted for around five hours.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/844/0*xgmrUEfrhLUPaRPL" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*165Fj6s9bK9pcfXz" /></figure><p>The internet outage on TIC AS48159 occurred from May 19 at 20:00pm until May 20 00:00am</p><p>No explanation for the five-hour internet outage was provided by either the Telecommunication Infrastructure Company or the Ministry of Communications.</p><h3>May 26: 30-minute nationwide disruption</h3><p>At 21:30pm UTC (02:00am local time) internet access was almost completely cut off. Even local websites were not accessible during this brief shutdown.</p><p>According to Small Media’s investigation, only a small number of mobile telecoms companies such as Mobile Telecommunication Company of Iran remained connected to the internet. During this time, local websites were also inaccessible for users who experienced nationwide disruption.</p><p>The cause of this nationwide disruption remains unknown.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*YyJiXhsx9RdQ21KI" /></figure><p>Based on OIM data, these are the providers that were affected by nationwide disruption on May 26:</p><ol><li>AS58224 Iran Telecommunication Company PJS</li><li>AS12880 TIC</li><li>AS42337 Respina Networks &amp; Beyond PJSC</li><li>AS25184 Afranet</li><li>AS43754 AsiaTech Inc.</li><li>AS48159 TIC</li><li>AS60976 Pars Online</li><li>AS16322 Pars Online PJS</li><li>AS34513 TSTonline co.</li><li>AS206065 Farabord Dadeh Haye Iranian Co.</li><li>AS56402 Dadeh Gostar Asr Novin P.J.S. Co.</li><li>AS48434 Tebyan-e-Noor Cultural-Artistic Institute</li><li>AS49100 Pishgaman Toseeh Ertebatat Company</li><li>AS59441 TELECOM FEED IRANIAN Co.</li><li>AS51074 Gostaresh Ertebatat Mabna</li><li>AS61173 Green Web Samaneh Novin Co Ltd</li><li>AS49596 Fara Negar Pardaz Noor Khuzestan Co.JSP</li><li>AS57218 Rightel Communication Service Company PJS</li><li>AS21341 Soroush Rasanheh Company Ltd</li><li>AS57497 Faraso Samaneh Pasargad Ltd.</li><li>AS39501 Neda Gostar Saba</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9048041d64d1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/network-monitor-may-2020-9048041d64d1">Network Monitor — May 2020</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch">Filterwatch</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Filterwatch Policy Monitor — April 2020]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-policy-monitor-april-2020-f9a0f1b622ea?source=rss----f61717a7a322---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f9a0f1b622ea</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[censorship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Melody Kazemi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2020 11:49:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-01T12:45:00.817Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Filterwatch Policy Monitor — April 2020</h3><h4>This month, new details on legal VPNs emerge, and the Education Ministry rolls out a new e-learning app.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pgWL3aPR1plD7Kufb9JD0w.png" /></figure><p>The COVID-19 crisis continues for another month, claiming lives and devastating families across the globe. In Iran, the rate of infection is continuing to grow daily, with the total official number of infections reaching 109,276 and the total number of deaths coming to 6,586 to date. Though according to the Health Ministry’s statistics suggest some decline in the number of cases, some <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-52223193">reports</a> have questioned whether the true figures could be much higher than the official totals.</p><p>With President Rouhani easing some of the already limited social distancing and quarantine rules in April, there is a risk that the rate of infections will spike, causing a “second wave” in the weeks and months ahead. But facing a lack of appropriate social security measures and an already strained economy, many have no choice but to continue their lives as usual.</p><p>Iran has become increasingly reliant on technology to mitigate the effects of social distancing measures, with a new e-learning app deployed this month despite concerns around its accessibility. This roll-out has ignited fresh debate on Iran’s digital divide, and the limited access to technology enjoyed by those on the country’s social and economic margins.</p><p>Meanwhile, freedom of expression online remains restricted, with reports of thousands of individuals being arrested for “spreading rumours” online. Although limiting the spread of disinformation is a valid objective, this aim should not be achieved through such a punitive, non-transparent and far-reaching crackdown on Iranian users, and instead would be better served by opening up space for critical, independent journalism and credible sources of information. The lack of transparency and sheer number of arrests suggests that security and law enforcement forces in Iran are not seeking to fight disinformation online, but rather are focused on further shrinking virtual spaces for dissent.</p><p>Our monthly <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/network-monitor-april-2020-5a7477ae5598">Network Monitor</a> supplements this report with a technical analysis of network disruptions and internet shutdowns. Take a look at it to get a better sense of how COVID-19-related slowdowns affected Iranian users.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rvERuZlYeJmwdHyYEm-a0w.png" /></figure><p><strong>Supreme Council for Cyberspace Meetings Delayed “Due to COVID-19”</strong></p><p>In an interview on <a href="https://www.mehrnews.com/news/4904174/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%88%DB%8C%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AD-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D8%A8%DA%A9%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AF%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7">21 April</a> Mohammad- Hossein Entezari, a member of the Supreme Council for Cyberspace (SCC), discussed the lack of progress in the macro-planning for the National Information Network (NIN). The NIN progress and planning review which was assigned to a team of specialists at the National Centre for Cyberspace by the SCC, began work <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-policy-monitor-february-2020-41db0293f2e0">in February this year</a><strong>.</strong></p><p>According to Entezari, some members of the SCC have held online meetings in relation to “certain issues”, meetings headed by the President or relating to NIN planning review have not taken place “due to the COVID-19 crisis”. He added that “no SCC meetings have taken place since the spread of Coronavirus began”.</p><p>The SCC is required to meet every six weeks, however it appears that no official meetings have taken place <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-policy-monitor-february-2020-41db0293f2e0">since February.</a> The mandate for the SCC, which is issued by the Supreme Leader was last renewed on<a href="http://majazi.ir/general_content/75706-%D8%AD%DA%A9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C.html?t=%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C"> 5 September 2015</a> for a period of four years has now expired and has not been formally renewed .</p><p><strong>Judiciary’s Head of Cyberspace Affairs is Replaced</strong></p><p>On <a href="https://www.farsnews.ir/news/13990201000294/%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%AF%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D8%AF">20 April</a> it was confirmed that Javad Javidnia, the Deputy Prosecutor General responsible for Cyberspace, was leaving his position. It is unclear whether Javidnia has resigned or was removed from the role, however in a note posted on his channel on domestic messaging app Soroush, Javidnia attributed the move to “not being able to follow [the] Supreme Leader’s orders”. He went on to criticise the “lack of effort from those in charge” in following Khamenei’s line, especially lamenting the continued availability of Instagram, which he views as a major challenge to a harmonious society and the revolution.</p><p>Javidnia, who has been serving in the position since October 2018 — and in its attached capacity as the Secretary of the Committee for Determining instances of Criminal Content (CDICC) — has played a major role in issuing a number of filtering orders<a href="https://globalvoices.org/2019/10/25/irans-drive-to-block-international-services-continues-with-google-play-ban/"> such as the filtering of the Google Play Store</a> and was a vocal supporter of the November 2019 internet shutdown. He has also been behind the roll-out of the process for the sale of government controlled “legal” VPNs.</p><p>On <a href="https://www.isna.ir/news/99020604060/%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%84-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%AF">25 April</a> it was confirmed that Javad Babaei has replaced Javidnia. Babaei previously served as the Head of the Computer Crimes Court. During his time in the role, he was <a href="https://click.ir/1399/02/07/%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%84-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1/">reportedly</a> part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran’s Cyber Police (or FATA) Operation Spider<a href="https://iranwire.com/en/features/1714"> I </a>and<a href="http://www.catchnews.com/world-news/operation-spider-2-iranian-models-find-their-instagram-accounts-hacked-by-revolutionary-guards-1458311887.html"> II</a>, which saw the surveillance and mass arrest of Iranian social media users and models not wearing a headscarf. Javidnia was also involved in these operations prior to becoming the Head of Cyberberspace Affairs at the Judiciary.</p><p>There are no indications that the new appointment will bring any dramatic changes to the current scale of content filtering, however Javidnia’s explanation of the move does suggest that there has been some level of resistance among policy-makers to further extending the scope of filtering to additional social media platforms.</p><p><strong>Legal VPNs Enter Planning Phase, In Preparation for Roll Out</strong></p><p>On <a href="https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AC%DB%8C%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-19/3643897-%D8%A7%D9%BE%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%B4%DA%A9%D9%84-%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AF">14 April</a>, the Secretary to the Supreme Council for Cyberspace (SCC), Abolhassan Firouzabadi announced that the CDICC has drafted the regulation relating to legal sale and use of VPNs. He added that the ICT Ministry will also be involved in executing the new “legal VPN” scheme.</p><p>According to a <a href="https://www.irna.ir/news/83749464/VPN-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C-%DA%86%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B3%D9%88%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%88%D8%A7%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF">recent interview</a> with Javidnia prior to his departure from his position as the Head of Cyberberspace Affairs at the Judiciary, university teachers, students, journalists, doctors, security and judicial organisations and certain professions which require access to filtered websites may apply to receive legal VPNs. A fee will be payable by those who are approved to receive the VPN, which will be set by the Communication Regulatory Authority (CRA).</p><p>He added that while the legal criteria for legal VPNs have been drafted, the technical aspect of rolling out the VPNs and assigning operators and licences has been assigned to the ICT Ministry for consideration within the second phase of the plan. However, Javidnia also mentioned that there have been some delays in progress at this stage due to “low attendance” at CDICC meetings, with some MP members attending “other meetings in their constituencies” on Wednesdays, when the CIDCC is scheduled to meet.</p><p>Discussions around the state regulation of VPNs have been ongoing for some time, although discussions took a more serious turn as we reported <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-october-2019-d671d23e52c">last October,</a>with the ICT Ministry providing a list of approved VPN vendors to the National Centre for Cyberspace.</p><p>The sale of state-regulated “legal” VPNs is in line with what we have observed as an emerging structure developing in Iran’s internet known as “layered filtering”. This system allows different sections of society to have different levels of access to the global internet, and to certain online services as assigned by the government. This not only violates the digital rights of Iranians, but this approach also risks entrenching existing socio-economic divides by creating a privileged class with some level of access to the global Internet. We have <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/is-layered-filtering-the-future-of-irans-national-information-network-efa47574b910">already written</a> about the potential impacts of this “layered filtering” model upon Iranian internet users.</p><p>As well as allowing access to filtered websites, VPNs are also important online privacy and security tools, and government control and monitoring of these tools seriously undermines their benefits. Government interventions to regulate VPNs must be halted immediately, and citizens must be made aware of the risks that such tools pose to their online privacy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*apcSQl15_NmwGP4oqdJHwg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Iranian E-Learning Platform “SHAD” Risks Leaving Students Behind</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/702/0*EPhjYBD6WJo4UpB3" /><figcaption>Ministry of Education launches “SHAD” e-learning platform</figcaption></figure><p>On <a href="https://www.medu.ir/fa/news/item/1150867/%D8%B4%D8%A8%DA%A9%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%E2%80%8C%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A8?ocode=100010876">9 April</a> the Ministry of Education announced the launch of the new domestic e-learning platform officially known as “SHADAP” (and also commonly referred to as “SHAD”) is available to download via shaddl.medu.ir. Following the reiteration of the ban on the use of foreign messaging apps by public bodies, government organisations, schools and universities by the judiciary <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-policy-monitor-february-2020-41db0293f2e0">this February</a>, the opportunity is being used to enforce and normalise the use of domestic analogues. However, SHADAP is already causing concern and challenges among users and digital rights activists.</p><p>On <a href="https://twitter.com/hamiorg/status/1249992969530245120">14 April</a> the Iranian refugee protection NGO HAMI raised concerns about the accessibility of the app by Afghan refugee children, as the app requires national ID numbers to be entered before they can be accessed, which refugee children often lack. According to HAMI, the Ministry Ministry of Education has now “resolved” the issue to allow foreign children to access the app.</p><p>The app was created in <a href="https://www.zoomit.ir/2020/4/10/347340/shadap-dedicated-education-training-platform/">collaboration with Roobika</a>, a domestic messaging app, which has also raised security issues among users. Other concerns, such as low connectivity speeds and technical issues, lack of access to smartphones and internet by students, remain major <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1399/02/04/2248215/%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AF-%DA%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D9%86%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%AC%D9%87-%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%AF">concerns</a> by teachers and students. <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1399/02/18/2259038/%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88-%D8%AA%D9%87%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%BE%DB%8C%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF">According to the Education Ministry</a> the government is “looking into” providing free internet connections and tablets” to students without existing access.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RL4RhYYR7VPNWF2qlxAQXw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Iranians Face Up To 30% Increase in Mobile Phone Prices</strong></p><p>According to a report by Iranian Magazine <em>Peivast </em>on <a href="https://peivast.com/p/75869">27 April</a>, the price of mobile phones have increased by between 20–30% compared to the previous year. Some have attributed the price increase to the sudden demand for devices for the use of the SHAD e-learning application, while others have claimed that the increase is due to stock shortages and import limitations.</p><p>Regardless of the reason for the price increases, many families now face the added financial burden of acquiring smartphones and other devices in order to access online learning platforms including SHAD which is an additional strain on vulnerable groups who have been the most financially impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.</p><p>The current conditions could mean that the competitively priced domestic smartphones could become more popular among users, <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/is-layered-filtering-the-future-of-irans-national-information-network-efa47574b910">posing risks for privacy and security</a> in the absence of data protection and privacy laws.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ncctXj6PIHj0gqZ3j4Q3sw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Journalists Arrested for Allegedly Posting a Cartoon Mocking Religious Figures</strong></p><p>On <a href="https://cpj.org/2020/04/iran-arrests-2-journalists-for-allegedly-sharing-c.php">23 April</a> two Iranian journalists, Massoud Heydari, the Managing Director of the Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA), and Hamid Haghjoo, the administrator of ILNA’s Telegram channel were arrested for allegedly publishing a <a href="https://iranwire.com/fa/jinac/37955">cartoon</a> on the news outlet’s Telegram channel criticising religious figures touting unscientific remedies for COVID-19.</p><p>According to reports, Heydairi has been released on bail while Haghjoo is being detained pending an investigation into the event. In a <a href="https://www.ilna.news/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-3/903506-%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D9%87%D8%B1%DA%AF%D9%88%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%B7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B4%DA%A9%D9%88%DA%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%BE%DB%8C%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF">statement</a>, ILNA has denied any involvement in the publication of the cartoon.</p><p>A number of other journalists and online activists have either been arrested or have received warnings relating to their coverage of the crisis. According to <a href="https://iranwire.com/fa/jinac/37060">reports</a> a number of journalists from the city of Saqez in Kurdistan Province were summoned or received warnings from the police in February, including Fardin Mostafaei, the administrator for Telegram news channel “Saqezroodaho” who was questioned by the police including on his his reporting on the number of infections. Some other online activists from the province received warnings from the police in relation to suspected deaths from COVID-19 and warnings about inadequate health care conditions in the city.</p><p>Along with the safety of prisoners with the spread of COVID-19, freedom of expression and freedom of the press remains crucial especially during times of crisis. The journalists detained must be released immediately and journalists must be able to perform their duties without fear of arrest and intimidation from the government. The ILNA Telegram channel remains accessible.</p><p><strong>3,600 People Arrested for “Spreading Rumours Online”</strong></p><p>On <a href="https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1382421/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AE-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B6%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%87-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD">29 April</a> Aboulfazl Shekarchi, a senior Spokesperson for the Armed Forces announced that to date 3,600 people had been arrested by the Police and Basij forces for “spreading rumours in cyberspace”.</p><p>This is an incredibly high number of arrests, and there is lack of transparency as to the definition of “rumours” and charges of these individuals. There must be full transparency from authorities about the charges being brought against detainees, and unwarranted arrests and detentions should be halted immediately. Iranians’ right to criticise the government’s response to this ongoing crisis must be upheld, without the fear of prosecution and harassment from authorities.</p><p><strong>US Tech Sanction Enforcement Extends to Non-US Companies</strong></p><p>On <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-and-criminal-law/insight-ofac-7-8m-settlement-with-swiss-company-expands-tech-enforcement">16 April</a> it was reported that the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has settled a lawsuit against Swiss IT service provider Société Internationale de Télécommunications Aéronautiques SCRL (SITA) for $7.8 million for “apparent violations of the Global Sanctions Regulations, , 31 C.F.R. part 594 (GTSR)” <strong>. </strong>SITA provides services to commercial air transportation industries, their clients also included Iranian airline companies Mahan and Caspian Air. Both airlines are sanctioned by OFAC due to their “involvement in terrorism”.</p><p>Though SITA is not US-owned, it is believed that the company used US based servers and US made software for the services they provided to the Iranian airlines, leading to OFAC taking legal action against SITA.</p><p>On <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1322.aspx">12 October 2011</a> the US Department of the Treasury announced sanctions against Mahan Air for providing “ financial, material and technological support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).” Caspian Air was sanctioned on <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2618.aspx">29 August 2014</a> for “[providing] support to IRGC elements by transporting personnel, and illicit material, including weapons, from Iran to Syria”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/346/0*kH5itFl8_OrUqT-U.png" /></figure><p>For more of <a href="http://smallmedia.org.uk/">Small Media</a>’s work exploring the internet policy landscape in Iran, check out the rest of Filterwatch — either here on <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch">Medium</a>, or on <a href="https://smallmedia.org.uk/work/filterwatch">the Small Media website</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f9a0f1b622ea" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-policy-monitor-april-2020-f9a0f1b622ea">Filterwatch Policy Monitor — April 2020</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch">Filterwatch</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Network Monitor — April 2020]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/filterwatch/network-monitor-april-2020-5a7477ae5598?source=rss----f61717a7a322---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5a7477ae5598</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[infrastructure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-rights]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Amir Rashidi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 May 2020 16:08:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-12T16:23:36.505Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Network Monitor — April 2020</h3><h4>Iranians enjoyed a month almost entirely free from internet disruptions, although the twin challenges of filtering and sanctions still limit access to key digital tools.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LTqrNafG1UMTqbAX2_Zvcw.png" /></figure><p>Since the total internet shutdown in Iran in November 2019, we’ve not yet experienced a full month without any shutdowns or heavy disruptions. However, over the course of April, our Network Monitor team observed no major disruptions whatsoever.</p><p>According to data from <a href="https://ioda.caida.org/">Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA)</a> there were only two very brief disruption incidents, on April 3 and 17. We believe that these disruptions were the result of the government’s decision to grant <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/network-monitor-march-2020-d8ce32088973#bd56">100GB of free mobile data</a> to users, which saw a large number of Iranian users switch from using their home WiFi connections to their mobile data plans instead, in order to use up their time-limited allowance.</p><p>Although this policy placed a high degree of stress on mobile networks, the policy did enable ISPs to better adapt to increased volumes of internet usage and changing traffic distribution.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*gu3X-YC4uBlkhfox" /><figcaption>Two very brief disruptions were observes on April 3 and 17</figcaption></figure><p><strong>April 26 — TIC AS12880 Loses Connection To International Carriers</strong></p><p>TIC AS12880 was disconnected for almost three hours. After this disconnection, AS12880 now lacks independent connections to international carriers. AS12880 has to travel through either AS49666 or AS48159 to reach the outside world. It is not clear why this happened.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*rEGos5gTQTVkhk9T" /><figcaption>TIC AS12880 was disconnected for almost three hours</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Other Challenges — Popular Lockdown Tools Remain Inaccessible Due To Filtering, Sanctions</strong></p><p>The main challenge for Iranian users in April primarily related to finding a reliable way to stay home and work or study using online tools.</p><p>We asked 50 Iranian users what tools they used to stay connected during the lockdown in April, with respondents including teachers, students, reporters, and developers. These users raised 16 common tools, many of which are not readily accessible as a result either of filtering, or companies citing international sanctions:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*URAX6nFhqMJxJTyZ" /></figure><p>Out of these 16, two are blocked by Iranian authorities, with a further four restricted for Iranian users by the tools themselves, citing international sanctions. Two additional tools are not explicitly blocked, but remain inaccessible due to financial sanctions, which prevent subscriptions from being paid. Eight are accessible.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/346/0*nwEhnk1KHe-wrnXD.png" /></figure><p><strong>Edited by: </strong>James Marchant and Kaveh Azarhoosh</p><p>For more of <a href="http://smallmedia.org.uk/">Small Media</a>’s work exploring the internet policy landscape in Iran, check out the rest of Filterwatch — either here on <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch">Medium</a>, or on <a href="https://smallmedia.org.uk/work/filterwatch">the Small Media website</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5a7477ae5598" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/network-monitor-april-2020-5a7477ae5598">Network Monitor — April 2020</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch">Filterwatch</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Iran’s Self-Isolated Internet Is Ill-Equipped To Confront COVID-19]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/filterwatch/irans-self-isolated-internet-is-ill-equipped-to-confront-covid-19-8895ba8bc1ee?source=rss----f61717a7a322---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8895ba8bc1ee</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-rights]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kaveh Azarhoosh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 May 2020 19:11:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-01T19:21:55.398Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>As states turn to tech to help track and contain the pandemic, Iran’s poor record on privacy and data protection is holding it back.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lrAcTk0hBbByiG1-I_qQNQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong><em>By </em></strong><a href="https://medium.com/u/f4cb6f596a47"><strong><em>Kaveh Azarhoosh</em></strong></a><strong><em>, </em></strong><a href="https://medium.com/u/583c92322440"><strong><em>James Marchant</em></strong></a><strong><em>, and </em></strong><a href="https://medium.com/u/846a56a6c7c3"><strong><em>Melody Kazemi</em></strong></a></p><p>Iran has been on the frontlines of the struggle against the COVID-19 pandemic for several months now. With the first documented cases <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51563039">arriving</a> in the city of Qom on February 19, the virus spread rapidly, claiming at least 6,028 lives as of May 1, according to official figures.</p><p>In response to the crisis, the Iranian government has looked to internet connectivity as a key lifeline, both for sustaining some level of economic activity under lockdown, and for developing technological solutions to help monitor and contain the virus.</p><p>Iran isn’t alone in this — governments all over the world are being forced to become more dependent than ever on digital infrastructure in order to function properly, and to combat the pandemic. But Iran does face some very unique challenges, owing to its decade-long efforts to further its objective of <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/resisting-iranian-information-controls-in-the-2020s-a840561e5b11">internet localisation</a>, and undermine citizens’ rights online.</p><p>In this article, we outline some of the digitally empowered measures that Iran has taken to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic so far, and set out our thoughts and concerns about how the current crisis may impact on Iranians’ digital rights in the medium-term, as well as its implications for the realisation of Iran’s long-term objective of internet localisation.</p><h3><strong>Technology Will Not Save Us… Will It? — Global Responses, and the March Towards Contact Tracing</strong></h3><p>In recent weeks, there has been an emerging consensus among governments that digital tools might serve a useful function in tracking and containing the COVID-19 pandemic.</p><p>It is hoped that technologically-augmented solutions might be able to help smooth the path towards an easing of social distancing measures, and help to mitigate the negative social and economic impacts of the pandemic. Although a battle <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/france-uk-apple-contact-tracing-apps-2020-4?r=US&amp;IR=T">continues to rage</a> between Apple and multiple European governments over privacy-protecting mechanisms, contact-tracing tools are already being developed, adopted and deployed (<a href="https://sea.mashable.com/tech/10123/malaysias-contact-tracing-app-could-hold-the-key-to-stop-the-spread-of-coronavirus">as in Malaysia</a>).</p><p>The global rise in the use of online tools, and indications from governments and<a href="https://www.wired.com/story/apple-google-contact-tracing-strengths-weaknesses/"> tech companies</a> that using government-recommended apps might offer a path forward to help trace and combat the virus, has led to number of global civil society organisations to <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/access-now-joins-100-organisations-in-telling-governments-dont-use-the-coronavirus-pandemic-as-cover-for-expanding-digital-surveillance/">sign a joint letter </a>advising governments about how to take radical action without causing fundamentally degrading citizen’s rights to privacy and free expression online.</p><p>As we navigate through these troubling times, we must remain more vigilant than ever to uphold and protect our human rights online. This pandemic poses real threats to global standards of privacy, free expression, and inclusion, and responses must be constantly reviewed and reexamined at both the global and local level.</p><p>This is an urgent priority in Iran even more than many other places, given that it is a closed society without any meaningful legal protections for privacy and free expression online, and a long track record of human rights abuses (including the <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/iran-shutdown-monitor-ccd4cad2a681">near-total shutdown of access to the global Internet in November 2019</a>).</p><p>So let’s now turn to Iran’s digital response to the pandemic so far.</p><h3><strong>State-Approved Apps To Save the Day! — Iran’s Digital Responses to COVID-19</strong></h3><p>Social distancing and national lockdown policies have led to a huge surge in remote working and online learning globally, with more global citizens than ever depending on online tools to maintain some sense of normalcy in their daily lives. In Iran, this was used as an opportunity to promote and enforce the use of domestic messaging apps, in line with its digitally protectionist agenda of data localisation.</p><p>Following school closures in Iran, many students and teachers relied on messaging apps (domestic and otherwise) to facilitate distance learning. Having previously banned the use of foreign messaging apps for official use and in educational establishments, in <a href="https://www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/2688625/%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86">April</a> Iranian authorities introduced the “<a href="https://shadweb.iranlms.ir/">Shaad” app</a> — a domestic, state-backed alternative to foreign messaging apps designed specifically for e-learning. At the outset of social distancing measures on <a href="https://www.isna.ir/news/98120907147/%D9%85%D9%85%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D8%A7%DA%A9%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C">February 28</a>, Javad Javidnia, the former Deputy for Cyberspace Affairs at the Public Prosecutor’s Office, restated guidelines that teachers and students must use domestic apps as the sole intermediary for distance learning.</p><p>Soon after its launch, the Iranian NGO <a href="http://hamiorg.org/">HAMI</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/hamiorg/status/1249992969530245120">raised the issue</a> of Afghan refugee children — who frequently lack national ID cards — being excluded from accessing the app, which requires a valid national ID. According to HAMI, Iran’s Education Ministry did later address these concerns, adjusting the app’s settings, and <a href="https://twitter.com/hamiorg/status/1250330523571896320">allowing</a> for the registration of Afghan children using their documentation numbers.</p><p>Then in March, the Iranian government released the AC19 app specifically to deal with the spread of COVID-19, raising further questions about a potential overreach of surveillance powers in combating the pandemic.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*kIrEXRf3Qg41l2Yr" /><figcaption><em>A screenshot from the AC19 app </em>(<a href="https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/epgkmz/iran-launched-an-app-that-claimed-to-diagnose-coronavirus-instead-it-collected-location-data-on-millions-of-people">Source</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Soon after these claims were made, Google removed the AC19 app from the Google Play Store. Although the timing of the removal of the app has led many to believe there was a connection between the <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/spying-concerns-raised-over-irans-official-covid-19-detection-app/">claims</a> and the app’s take-down, the company’s failure to provide a clear statement explaining its decision has led to confusion about the app’s security, and the reasons for its removal. In the absence of such an explanation, some media outlets in Iran have claimed that the removal was due to the phrasing of the app’s description, which may have been interpreted as offering to provide a cure for COVID-19.</p><p>It has since become clear that the company behind the development of the AC19 app is Smart Land Solutions, the same company that created the <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/totally-forked-how-the-telegram-ban-and-tightened-sanctions-are-putting-iranians-in-danger-c019c63d44d6">dangerous and unauthorised domestic ‘forked’ alternatives to Telegram </a>(Golden Telegram and Hotgram) which were both backed by state-aligned actors until they were <a href="https://smallmedia.org.uk/news/filterwatch-june-2019-policy-analysis">taken offline</a> in June 2019. These apps were accused of collecting users’ data without consent, and censoring news agencies and certain other channels. <a href="https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/100810/data-breach/unofficial-telegram-fork-leak.html">Recently, a vast number of Telegram</a> data leaks associated with these apps has further brought into question the validity of their data security practices.</p><p>On this basis, there are real reasons to be concerned about any health tracking apps developed by Smart Land Solutions. But what were the real issues with their roll-out of the AC19 app?</p><h3><strong>A Failure To Communicate — The Case of the AC19 App</strong></h3><p>There may well be a role for apps such as AC19 to play in fighting the pandemic. All around the world we have seen the emergence of state-endorsed apps that hope to monitor the spread of the disease, track contacts by infectious individuals, and support interventions that could lower the rate of transmission.</p><p>The Ada Lovelace Institute <a href="https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/our-work/covid-19/covid-19-exit-through-the-app-store/">identifies three general</a> categories of apps that have been introduced with those aims:</p><ul><li>contact tracing;</li><li>symptom tracking; and</li><li>immunity certification.</li></ul><p>It appears that the Iranian app was first developed as a symptom tracking app. However, it also appears that the app failed to clearly communicate the fact that geolocation data was being collected by the app, perhaps with the intention of upgrading the app into a contact tracing app at a later date.</p><p>In the middle of an unprecedented crisis like this, how big a deal is this? Public discourse globally has shown that <a href="https://privacyinternational.org/examples/apps">despite experts’ warnings</a>, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1752affb-24dc-4ad9-8503-78f9ce1adca9">a notable section of society</a> would be satisfied to forgo some of their individual and civil liberties during the pandemic in order to slow its spread.</p><p>However, it would be incredibly dangerous to afford Iranian authorities such free licence. Given Iran’s long record of disregarding citizens’ right to privacy and free expression online <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/location-surveillance-counter-covid-19-efficacy-what-matters">(especially given that we don’t really know how useful these apps)</a>, it is only right to be wary of any apps sanctioned by the Iranian government, and particularly if they are developed by companies with records as troubling as Smart Land Solutions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Drkn0teVXSq-smjeef8Kow.png" /><figcaption>The website of Smart Land Solutions, the controversial developers of the AC19 app (<a href="https://www.sls.ir/fa">Link</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>A decade of disregard for privacy and digital rights by the Iranian government, and a lack of meaningful legal frameworks for protecting digital rights sit at the root of the controversy around the AC19 app. However, it must be recognised that <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/tech-giants-are-failing-iranians-in-their-struggle-against-a-national-internet-1327d0ce8afa">global tech giants</a> have again failed to act in a way that prioritises the safety and security of its Iranian users.</p><p>Transparency and clear communication from Google is imperative in situations like this. If it turns out that the app <em>should not</em> be classified as spyware (<a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/spying-concerns-raised-over-irans-official-covid-19-detection-app/">as argued by</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/LukasStefanko">Lukas Stefanko</a>) then Google has needlessly pushed Iranian users to download the app from domestic app stores such as CafeBazaar, further advancing internet localisation, and endangering users by making it more challenging for the app to receive timely software and security updates.</p><p>If the app <em>should</em> be classified as spyware, and if this is the reason Google has removed it from the Google Play Store, then Google has the responsibility to inform the Iranian public of the app’s risks, as they did with the <a href="https://www.cnet.com/news/google-removes-stalkerware-apps-after-researchers-discover-trackers-on-play-store/">stalkware apps in July 2019</a>.</p><h3><strong>Under Strain — Iran Faces Connectivity Disruptions, But No Shutdowns</strong></h3><p>Given the experience of November and Iran’s prolonged internet shutdown, there was concern that anxiety around the impacts of the COVID-19, might lead Iranian officials to limit access to the global Internet again.</p><p>As <em>Filterwatch</em>’s <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-network-monitor-february-2020-e08b5c4b6cf5">February</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/network-monitor-march-2020-d8ce32088973">March</a> editions of Network Monitor<em> </em>demonstrate, Iran experienced a number of short disruptions in network connectivity. However, it appears that these disruptions were caused by high demand for bandwidth as a result of increased remote working and studying, rather than as an attempt to control information.</p><p>The strain on service providers was dramatically increased by the actions of Iranian ICT Ministry <a href="https://medium.com/ifp-news-iran-front-page/iran-to-offer-100-gb-of-free-internet-to-keep-people-home-b2e0e6abaab6">offering 100GB </a>of free internet to users in order to encourage social isolation. It should be noted that Iranian authorities showed a lack of transparency regarding planned disruptions experienced during this period.</p><h3><strong>Crackdown Under Lockdown — Journalists Targeted For Criticising COVID-19 Response</strong></h3><p>Regrettably, when it came to criminalising freedom of speech online, Iran fell into old habits in its response to COVID-19. On a number of occasions Iranian Cyber Police (or FATA) forces from around the country announced the arrest of individuals on charges linked to COVID-19. For example <a href="https://www.cyberpolice.ir/news/147285/%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%88%D8%B9-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%AF">on 10 March</a>, Semnan’s FATA force announced that their social media “monitoring” team had identified a source of rumors and false information regarding the COVID-19 virus, and arrested the individual involved. According to a senior spokesperson for Iran’s Armed Forces, the Basij and Police had arrested up to <a href="https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1382421/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AE-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B6%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%87-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD">3,600 people</a> by April 29 for spreading false information and rumors online.</p><p>Professional journalists have also been the target of Iran’s law enforcement agencies. <a href="https://cpj.org/2020/04/iran-arrests-2-journalists-for-allegedly-sharing-c.php">On 23 April</a> Masoud Heydari, the Managing Director of the Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA), and Hamid Haghjoo, the administrator of ILNA’s Telegram channel were arrested for publishing a cartoon that was posted for a short period of time on the news agency’s Telegram channel. The <a href="https://iranwire.com/fa/jinac/37955">cartoon</a> — which was deleted shortly after it was posted — mocked the unscientific remedies to COVID-19 promoted by religious individuals and public figures.</p><p>Another example of an attack on freedom of speech online was the case of the economics reporter Mohammad Mosaed, who was questioned by the security forces in <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/one-free-press-coalition-spotlights-journalists-under-attack-april-2020/">late February</a> after he posted a series of tweets questioning the country’s handling of the COVID-19 crisis. It appears that during his interrogation, security forces took control of Mosaed’s online accounts. In an <a href="https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1231304603574116353">interview</a> with BBC Persian, Masaed stated that he is banned from publishing any online content until his awaited court date.</p><h3><strong>Our Recommendations — A Time For Action On Digital Rights</strong></h3><blockquote><strong>The international community must recognise that their decisions at home have significant effect on digital rights in closed and semi-closed societies. Global digital rights should not be an afterthought in this pandemic.</strong></blockquote><p>In open societies, the discussion around balancing civil liberties and the right to privacy against the urgent need to combat COVID-19 have largely been focused around the length of time for which social distancing and lockdown measures will be imposed. However, what has been missing is a discussion about the long-term implications of governments’ response for digital rights, and in particular the rights of those living in politically closed and semi-closed societies.</p><p>During the last decade, whenever global governments demanded the downgrading of encryption technologies, companies and activists pointed out that this could have devastating effects on the privacy of users in places such as Iran.</p><p>In a similar vein, when <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/france-asks-apple-to-relax-iphone-security-for-coronavirus-tracking-app-development/">France asked Apple for the relaxation of security settings on iPhone</a> to allow government-sanctioned apps to “fight COVID-19”, it is crucial that they be reminded that such moves threaten to compromise the security of users around the world. Even if the measures are temporary in some countries, they may remain as part of enduring surveillance regimes in others.</p><blockquote><strong>Both Iran and the international community should act to reverse Iran’s agenda of rapid Internet localisation. An open and truly global Internet is essential to empower citizens and safeguard their rights in a time of social distancing and global pandemic.</strong></blockquote><p>It is disappointing (but not surprising) that Iran remains committed to a restrictive and narrow agenda of internet localisation, even at a time when the global community — Iran included — have called for unprecedented levels of global collaboration. Yet by forcefully promoting domestic services (such as <em>Shaad</em>) and locally hosted content, Iran has used this crisis as an opportunity to further advance its digitally protectionist agenda, and lock large sections of society into an online ecosystem which exists some distance away from the open global Internet, and which operates under constant control and surveillance of the authorities.</p><p>This is even more disappointing considering that recent data breaches have significantly compromised the online security of millions of Iranians, all due to the ill-advised security practices (or lack thereof) of domestic, state-backed apps. Iranian authorities have shown no remorse, and neither have they introduced substantive policy changes that could help to address these challenges in the future. The continued (and highly visible) involvement of Smart Land Solutions in the production of Iran’s state-approved COVID-19 diagnosis app is a clear demonstration of how the state is blind to the long-term risks raised by its disregard for citizens’ right to privacy online.</p><p>At times like this, the international community must <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/tech-giants-are-failing-iranians-in-their-struggle-against-a-national-internet-1327d0ce8afa">recognise the obstacles</a> posed by compliance and over-compliance with US sanctions, which have impacted tech companies and forced Iranian users to migrate to domestic services and data hosting solutions.</p><p>Whereas Iran views this as an opportunity to double down on its terrifying internet localisation plans, the international community must seek to stand for an open and global internet and with the Iranian people in promoting more global connectivity which is more crucial now than ever before.</p><blockquote><strong>Iran must immediately put an end to mass arrests of citizens and guarantee the online freedoms of journalists and activists. Now more than ever, people’s lives around the world depend on meaningful scrutiny being applied to government policies.</strong></blockquote><p>Time and time again, journalists, campaigners, and opposition leaders in open and closed societies across the globe have proven that it is imperative for the sake of sound decision-making that leaders face rigorous questioning and scrutiny during the pandemic. In Iran, perhaps even more than many other countries dealing with the pandemic, it is crucial that journalists, campaigners and community representatives are granted the opportunity to freely scrutinise the government’s handling of the crisis.</p><p>Although the furloughing of a number of prisoners held under security charges is a welcome move, the aggressive actions of the judiciary and FATA in limiting freedom of expression online must be condemned in the strongest terms. It is baffling that any policymaker would on the one hand create an app to collect information in the hope of limiting the infection rate, and on the other to obstruct the inquisitive activities and reporting of experts (whether in the press, academia, or local communities) in a period of crisis like this.</p><blockquote><strong>Iranian officials must act immediately to close the digital divides that exist in Iran today. Legal discrimination and socio-economic disparities are denying vulnerable and marginalised Iranians access to key online services.</strong></blockquote><p>Policymakers and commentators have lined up in the past few months to tell the public that it may be some time before there is an end to social distancing measures. Although Iran has demonstrated a willingness to lift the measures sooner than many had anticipated, many Iranians are continuing to engage in self-imposed lockdowns.</p><p>This has provided the ICT Ministry with the opportunity to introduce a vast number of new platforms and governmental infrastructure to enable remote working and learning. While these innovations may be a gift to many, allowing them to access services and maintain a degree of normality, the same technologies may result in the reinforcement of existing social and economic inequalities, and the denial of human rights for already marginalised sections of society.</p><p>Although many of these digital divides are rooted in Iran’s socio-economic and geographical class divides, some other forms of digital exclusion are rooted in overtly discriminatory state policy. For example, it has been <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/02/01/iran-uses-national-card-fresh-discrimination-against-bahai/">highlighted</a> that Baha’i citizens are being excluded from being issued biometric ID cards, and as a result are being excluded from using a number of core online services. As noted, the educational app launched by the Iranian government also excluded Afghan refugees and non-citizen children (including those born in Iran) from remotely accessing education.</p><p>Iran’s ICT Ministry can not celebrate itself and its officials for delivering the necessary infrastructure for maintaining social distancing if it fails to acknowledge the digital exclusions imposed by Iranain authorities against minority communities. These discriminatory policies must be amended as a matter of priority, in order to enable all residents of Iran to access necessary online services for the duration of this crisis.</p><h3><strong>Protect Digital Rights, Save Citizens’ Lives</strong></h3><p>To list the digital rights challenges faced by Iranians during this crisis must serve as more than just a warning about privacy, censorship and social inclusion. If states are going to increasingly seek to augment their policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic with technological responses, then Iran might find itself behind the pack as the result of their sustained attacks on digital rights over the past decade, and the erosion of public trust in domestic infrastructure and services</p><p>It is increasingly becoming clear that digital solutions without public consent or trust are bound to fail. This is why around the world civil society groups are seeking to play an active and constructive role in helping to shape governments’ responses. This is how Google and Apple have teamed up to showcase a potential solution to the challenge of contract tracking that demonstrates genuine respect for user privacy. At the other extreme, Iran’s desire for a closed and localised internet has resulted in distrust from both the general public and entrepreneurial community.</p><p>In the past it was clear that success of Iran’s burgeoning digital economy was dependent on Iran changing direction and adopting meaningful data protections and digital rights guarantees. Now, the stakes are even higher — unless the government can restore public confidence in its handling of digital initiatives, it is Iran’s public health that may be at risk.</p><p>As the events of the past year have demonstrated, there is a large section of Iranian society that feels a strong sense of distrust and resentment toward the political establishment. To them, the events of last November demonstrated that Iran’s internet policymaking establishment will take advantage of any opportunity to use the Internet and other technologies to extend their power and influence over society.</p><p>Iran’s ICT policymakers must recognise that their sustained attack on digital rights and their aggressive pursuit of Internet localisation will not help Iran in times of crisis, but it will hinder its ability to respond and recover. In order to safeguard its citizens, Iran should commit to changing course, and take action to guarantee the rights — and win the trust — of all its citizens.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8895ba8bc1ee" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/irans-self-isolated-internet-is-ill-equipped-to-confront-covid-19-8895ba8bc1ee">Iran’s Self-Isolated Internet Is Ill-Equipped To Confront COVID-19</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch">Filterwatch</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Filterwatch Policy Monitor — March 2020]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-policy-monitor-march-2020-519391a66b7f?source=rss----f61717a7a322---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/519391a66b7f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[censorship]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Melody Kazemi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2020 17:18:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-23T15:29:16.023Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Filterwatch Policy Monitor — March 2020</h3><h4>Privacy concerns raised over Iran’s COVID-19 app as links to developer behind recent data leaks revealed.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*arwCqbMrQr2N1lM27Q7CCg.png" /></figure><p>As the Iranian calendar year came to a close this March, there were few signs of the traditional Nowruz celebration as the country continued its fight against the spread of COVID-19. Though some good news emerged from the crisis this month with a number of prisoners with security and political charges being granted temporary release, there is still little evidence to suggest that sufficient and effective measures are being taken by the government to contain the virus.</p><p>This of course is not a problem exclusive to Iran, and the number of cases and deaths continue to rise globally. But Iran has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51930856">faced questions</a> from some quarters for potentially playing down the impact of the virus in an effort to keep the country’s economy moving, and for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/03/an-absolute-disaster-iran-struggles-as-coronavirus-spreads">reacting too slowly</a> to its spread. These policy failures have been compounded by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/21/end-us-sanctions-iran-fight-coronavirus-pandemic">added pressure of sanctions</a>, which have further disrupted access to the purchase of medicine and other vital supplies for Iran’s healthcare system.</p><p>Meanwhile, the internet continues to offer a vital lifeline during this crisis, further highlighting the urgent need for citizens’ digital rights to be fully upheld and protected.</p><p>This month we saw connection speeds slowing down to cope with increased traffic, alongside major data leaks from forked Telegram clients. While much of political life seems to have ground to a halt as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak and the Nowruz holidays, the Iranian Parliament attempted to carry on its business by holding sessions online.</p><p>Our <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/network-monitor-march-2020-d8ce32088973">Network Monitor</a> supplements this report with a technical analysis of network disruptions and internet shutdowns. Take a look at it to get a better sense of how COVID-19-related slowdowns affected Iranian users.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2WIYKH2J85eOZ2TZkFWwPw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Iran’s Parliament Temporarily Moves Online</strong></p><p>On <a href="https://peivast.com/p/72658">17 March</a> the first online parliamentary test session was held with reportedly 76 MPs and Speaker Ali Larijani present. The decision was made following a ban on public meetings by the “National Coronavirus Task Force”. Two further parliamentary sessions were held online in March. However, none of the sessions were quorate — reportedly due to MPs encountering technical difficulties when joining — and were therefore not officially recognised, as votes could not be taken. The sessions were held using a dedicated platform known as “Majles-yar” and hosted by Irancell.</p><p>The first in-person parliamentary session since the closure on 25 February has now been held on 7 April with a limited number of MPs present and headed by Deputy Speaker Masoud Pezeshkain, following Larijani contracting COVID-19 in early April.</p><p>According to a <a href="https://twitter.com/azarijahromi/status/1233047974885953542">tweet</a> by ICT Minister Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi, the ICT Ministry has also been holding meetings online.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WEBuZzYai90nGmJ0cNU58Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>“Free Broadband Internet” for Iranian Users for a Limited Time</strong></p><p>On 7 March, Jahromi <a href="https://twitter.com/azarijahromi/status/1236217365026803714">tweeted</a> that following “numerous’’ requests, broadband providers were giving free 100GB packages to their users for two weeks, which was extended until 26 March by some ISPs.</p><p>The free internet package increased the traffic load on the national network which resulted in ISPs slowing down internet speeds to cope with the increased traffic. The March edition of our <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/network-monitor-march-2020-d8ce32088973">Network Monitor</a><strong><em> </em></strong>has more details on this month’s network disruptions and shutdowns.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TNYDsm8HaarQQGyX2uknhQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Data From 42 Million Iranian Telegram Users Leaked Online</strong></p><p>According to a report by Comparitech on <a href="https://www.comparitech.com/blog/information-security/iranian-telegram-accounts-leaked/">30 March</a>, data from 42 million Iranian users from Telegram clones or “forks” (unofficial and unaffiliated versions of the app) including user IDs, telephone numbers, usernames, and hashes and secret keys.</p><p>Compatitech added that a group known as “Hunting System” (Persian:سامانه شکار) posted the data on Elasticsearch, which could be viewed without a password or authentication. It has been confirmed that the data was exposed for “around 11 days” before it was removed from Elasticsearch on 25, however, before it was removed unauthorised users had already accessed the data and one user had posted the data on a hacker forum.</p><p>The filtering of Telegram has led to many Iranain users to move to unsecure clone versions of the app which do not have the same security measures, putting their data at risk. Those whose data has been leaked are now vulnerable to phishing and SIM swap attacks. Iranian users must be notified of this leak immediately and should be allowed access to secure messaging apps in an unhindered fashion.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bBd387obsFIVH_CX96xa6Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Google Removes Iran’s Covid-19 “Diagnosis” App from The Google Play Store</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/922/0*Ir1Yk-4d8C4jl1PR" /><figcaption>Iranian COVID-19 App known as AC19</figcaption></figure><p>On <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1398/12/20/2220611/%D9%86%D8%B1%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%DA%AF%D9%88%DA%AF%D9%84-%D9%BE%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%81-%D8%B4%D8%AF">9 March</a>, Google removed Iran’s COVID-19 “diagnosis” app known as AC19. The app, which claims to “diagnose” COVID-19 through a series of yes or no questions collected mobile phone numbers and real-time geo-location as well as other personal data from individuals, raising concerns about data privacy and surveillance.</p><p>To date, Google has not commented on the reasons behind the decision to remove the app. <a href="https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/epgkmz/iran-launched-an-app-that-claimed-to-diagnose-coronavirus-instead-it-collected-location-data-on-millions-of-people">Claims made</a> about the app containing malware or spyware have been <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/spying-concerns-raised-over-irans-official-covid-19-detection-app/">challenged</a> by a security expert, who commented that the collection of geo-location data was made through “legitimate permission prompt that users had to agree [to]”, similar to many other Android apps. Instead, some reports suggest that the removal of the app was due to its “misleading claims’’ about diagnosing COVID-19, as part of a wider crackdown on apps making false or misleading claims amid the pandemic.</p><p>However, Jahromi made clear that geolocation data was being collected and used when he tweeted maps on 9 March and 11 March with “hotspots” which he claimed were produced using data from 3.5 million AC19 users to identify locations with heavy footfall, seeking to minimise unnecessary travel.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Qd1wv0KqQdAmo8Er" /><figcaption>Jahromi tweets a map of infection hotspots on 11 March using “data from 3.5 million AC19 users”</figcaption></figure><p>Concerns remain raised about the privacy and the security of the app for users given the lack of clarity from the app and the government on continued tracking of users and the collection and storing of their location data, preventing users from being able to give informed consent to the app. Given Iran’s track record on surveillance and the absence of any meaningful data protection laws and safeguards for users, there is also the increased risk from the government potentially exploiting this data for surveillance purposes, which could last beyond the duration of the pandemic.</p><p>These concerns are heightened as it has been revealed that the AC19 app was developed by Smart Land Strategy, the company behind clone Telegram apps Hotgram and Golden Telegram which have weak and unsatisfactory security practices, highlighted in the recent data leak containing information from 42 million Iranian users collected through these apps (see cybersecurity and cybercrime section). These clone apps were removed from the Google Play Store due to concerns about spyware and malware spreading through app installations. AC19 is still available on <a href="https://cafebazaar.ir/app/co.health.covid?l=en">Cafe Bazaar</a> and <a href="https://ac19.ir/">online</a>.</p><p>During these unprecedented times, technology is serving as an invaluable tool to help understand and prevent the spread of the virus, and to collect crucial data about its prevalence and spread. Across the world, many countries have deployed apps or relied on other data sources to better understand the viruses symptoms and spread. This has opened up a debate around balancing issues of surveillance, privacy, and public health.</p><p>Although these questions are challenging, it is clear that any methods for surveilling users to collect data on the virus must be built with public trust and government transparency about its use at the forefront. So far, the Iranian government has failed to offer this. This is especially important given the lack of legal data protections in the country. Until such meaningful protections are in place, users and rights activists will continue to maintain a degree of scepticism about the intent and scope of these measures.</p><p><strong>Domestic Messaging App “Soroush” Advertised for Auction</strong></p><p>On <a href="https://www.asriran.com/fa/news/717796/%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%85%E2%80%8C%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B4-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B4-%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA">8 March</a> reports based on an auction advertisement confirmed that domestic messaging app Soroush is being sold. Soroush, which is backed by the state broadcasting organisation The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) who own majority shares in the app, was marketed as a replacement for Telegram in the aftermath of its filtering in 2018.</p><p><a href="https://ana.ir/fa/news/113/477055/%D8%A2%D8%AE%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B2%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AF%D9%87-%DB%B4%DB%B0-%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%85%E2%80%8C%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B4">According</a> to Soroush’s Managing Director Morteza Rahimi, the sale is to “increase investment” so that “services can expand”.</p><p>The use of domestic messaging apps continues to be a concern due to lack of privacy measures which can allow government surveillance. While Iranian citizens currently have a choice to use foreign messaging apps, it may be likely that domestic messaging will be pushed more aggressively by the government <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/irans-managing-social-messaging-apps-bill-returns-to-parliament-b0a98c18463f?source=collection_home---4------0-----------------------">if new legislation is passed</a>, limiting options for Iranian users.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/346/1*pj4fMiBjiR2zmOWu1n1N9A.png" /></figure><p><strong>For more of </strong><a href="http://smallmedia.org.uk/"><strong>Small Media</strong></a><strong>’s work exploring the internet policy landscape in Iran, check out the rest of Filterwatch — either here on </strong><a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch"><strong>Medium</strong></a><strong>, or on </strong><a href="https://smallmedia.org.uk/work/filterwatch"><strong>the Small Media website</strong></a><strong>.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=519391a66b7f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/filterwatch-policy-monitor-march-2020-519391a66b7f">Filterwatch Policy Monitor — March 2020</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch">Filterwatch</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Network Monitor — March 2020]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/filterwatch/network-monitor-march-2020-d8ce32088973?source=rss----f61717a7a322---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d8ce32088973</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[infrastructure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Amir Rashidi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Apr 2020 15:37:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-03T15:37:09.489Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Network Monitor — March 2020</h3><h4>As Iran continues to battle against COVID-19, increased internet usage is putting a real strain on the country’s digital infrastructure.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*G_O9t2G7lkcatxiZ" /></figure><p>Iran was plunged into yet another major crisis in March, with the COVID-19 outbreak spreading rapidly from its epicentre in Qom to villages, towns, and cities across the country. The public health emergency, which according to Iranian authorities has seen 53,183 recorded cases and 3,294 deaths (as of April 3), has resulted in massive social and economic disruption, and the introduction of tight controls on movement.</p><p>This crisis has also had a number of implications for citizens’ ability to get online and access information, though this appears to be largely due to strains on network infrastructure, as internet service providers (ISPs) struggle to cope with increased demand brought about by widespread remote working.</p><p>Iran’s network disruptions this month seem to have been largely attributable to two issues:</p><ol><li><strong>Online streaming has increased dramatically</strong></li></ol><p>Slow connection speeds were the main issues faced by users during March. As the government has advised citizens to stay home in order to combat the spread of COVID-19, Internet usage — and especially online streaming — has increased dramatically. According to <em>Etemad Online</em>, <a href="https://etemadonline.com/content/392697/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AA-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%DA%A9%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AF">internet usage increased by 40%</a> in the first week after COVID-19 started spreading in Iran.</p><p>In an effort to keep people at home, Iran’s ICT Ministry granted all home subscribers <a href="http://itanalyze.com/post/%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AA">100GB of free internet</a> access, a very heavy traffic load on the national network.</p><p>Multiple sources from different internet providers in Iran confirmed to Filterwatch that ISPs purposefully slowed internet speeds in order to better cope with high traffic loads. It is likely that traffic loads were further increased as a result of the government’s 100GB giveaway, as users rushed to use their allowance before the offer’s expiry date.</p><ol><li><strong>Pre-planned maintenance-related internet shutdowns</strong></li></ol><p>Filterwatch received documents relating to planned maintenance-related service disruptions from a source that shall remain anonymous for security purposes. Based on these documents, the Telecommunication Infrastructure Company (TIC) informed ISPs that access to the global Internet would be disrupted during the following periods, while maintenance work was undertaken:</p><ul><li>March 4 from 02:00 until 08:00 IRST (Iran Standard Time)</li><li>March 5 from 01:30 until 07:30 IRST</li><li>March 10 from 02:30 until 07:30 IRST</li><li>March 14 from 00:30 until 06:35 IRST</li><li>March 15 from 00:30 until 07:10 IRST</li></ul><p>None of these planned disruptions were announced by Iranian officials or ISPs, causing confusion among users during these maintenance periods. In order to prevent this, the TIC and ISPs should communicate planned disruptions in a transparent manner, and clearly outline the reasons for such disruptions.</p><p>Our day-by-day analysis and documentation of key disruption incidents in March follows:</p><h4><strong>March 2 — Pre-planned internet shutdown</strong></h4><p>Qom was among the major cities that were disconnected from the Internet on March 2. During previous internet shutdowns, it was impossible for users outside Iran to access domestically hosted websites. During this brief shutdown, news sites remained accessible from abroad, but a number of websites — including Arvand Cloud’s network measurement service <a href="https://radar.arvancloud.com/">‘Radar</a>’ — were not.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AjETP61oliMmz1cA" /><figcaption><em>Arvand Cloud was not accessible from outside the country.</em></figcaption></figure><p>On March 4 Sajjad Bonabi, a board member of the Telecommunications Infrastructure Company (TIC), <a href="https://digiato.com/article/2020/03/03/%D8%B4%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7/">responded</a> to a question from the technology website <em>Digiato </em>about the disruption, stating:</p><p><em>“Approximately 40% of users were disconnected from the internet from 04:15 to 04:55 [IRST]. Yesterday we informed all ISPs that we had a planned update on the network from 02:00 to 08:00 [IRST], which may cause disruption.”</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ekZuRzjZy6S2r3G6" /><figcaption>Between 01:40–06:30 IRST (21:10–02:00 UTC) Iran’s internet was disconnected from the global internet.</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://ioda.caida.org/">IODA</a> data showed that the three provinces experiencing the most widespread internet outages were Markaz, Semnan, and Qom.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*JPqjiVvfrkys691o" /></figure><p>On the same night, Persian-language Wikipedia was filtered for a period of around two hours, before being unblocked. We believe this was a side effect of network maintenance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HC8kYivxc0mt_ydPbV1bMA.png" /><figcaption><em>Persian-language Wikipedia was filtered for around two hours.</em></figcaption></figure><h4><strong>March 3 — Widespread disconnections across multiple providers</strong></h4><p>Based on OIM data, March 3 was the worst day of the month with regard to internet disruptions. On this day, eleven major internet providers were disconnected from the Internet for a short period.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*B7ffvcjsm8cYElZZ" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*SD6BGeLgCrEUsd6Z" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*A49knyzI8_1KR5JI" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*pth3ho4zSf24yZmW" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*6ocLT0JTOuhfPwtL" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*P0AudPa1qzxybP0v" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*0UmHp0_zMnMbiGNP" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*K6H5-USli8rZ4TiL" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*WOdkwzaQkom2Up1q" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*sGM9y5GHofzry2Hp" /></figure><h4><strong>March 4 — Brief disruption identified</strong></h4><p>In line with the TIC documents observed by Small Media, a very brief period of disruption was observed between 22:00–23:00 UTC.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*JeIbNpwgPVUHoxYq" /></figure><h4><strong>March 10 — Further disruptions detected</strong></h4><p>Pars Online was one of the ISPs most affected by the planned network disruptions on March 10. Although the disruption was in line with predictions from the leaked TIC document, no ISPs warned their customers about the planned outages.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*h-HwPkAWYfwDsqB1" /></figure><h4><strong>March 11–24 — Minor disruptions reported</strong></h4><p>On March 11 rom 17:20–20:01 UTC (21:50–00:31 IRST) <em>Arvand Radar </em>reported disruptions. Based on <em>Radar</em> data, AsiaTech and Respina were particularly badly affected by this disruption.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*LhYA-ZX_6-JIHEgY" /></figure><p>Between March 11–24 Small Media observed very minor disruptions. During this period internet speeds decreased noticeably, especially on international traffic.</p><h4><strong>March 26 — Research Center of Theoretical Physics &amp; Mathematics (IPM) goes offline</strong></h4><p>The Research Center of Theoretical Physics &amp; Mathematics (IPM) network went offline completely from around 10:00 on March 25 until around 13:00 March 26. This is particularly important because IPM is responsible for managing top-level domains (TLDs) in Iran, including the .ir TLD.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*O34H63cr2Ibp9a4H" /><figcaption><em>IPM was almost completely disconnected from the Internet without any explanation from around 10:00 March 25 until around 13:00 on March 26.</em></figcaption></figure><p>Crucially, this outage would have had nothing to do with increasing online streaming, because IPM is not an internet provider — the only service they provide is the management of Iran’s TLDs. As such, this outage is unexplained.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/346/1*pj4fMiBjiR2zmOWu1n1N9A.png" /></figure><p><strong>Edited by: </strong>James Marchant and Kaveh Azarhoosh</p><p>For more of <a href="http://smallmedia.org.uk/">Small Media</a>’s work exploring the internet policy landscape in Iran, check out the rest of Filterwatch — either here on <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch">Medium</a>, or on <a href="https://smallmedia.org.uk/work/filterwatch">the Small Media website</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d8ce32088973" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/network-monitor-march-2020-d8ce32088973">Network Monitor — March 2020</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch">Filterwatch</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Iran’s “Managing Social Messaging Apps” Bill Returns to Parliament]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/filterwatch/irans-managing-social-messaging-apps-bill-returns-to-parliament-b0a98c18463f?source=rss----f61717a7a322---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b0a98c18463f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[telegram]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[censorship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Melody Kazemi]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2020 15:07:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-01T09:47:38.486Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>If passed, the “Managing Social Messaging Apps” bill could heavily diminish digital rights in Iran. We highlight the biggest challenges and some possible solutions.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Aa7pfvJqK7CPo8vnNgWWjw.png" /></figure><p>After a year of slow moving progress, the “Managing Social Messaging Apps” bill returned to the Majles’ Parliamentary Cultural Committee in late 2019. It is the only one of the six ICT-related bills unveiled in 2018 to have made it this far — the other five (detailed in our special report <a href="https://smallmedia.org.uk/media/articles/files/Filterwatch_BillsBillsBills19.pdf"><em>Bills, Bills, Bills: Upcoming Policy Challenges in Iran, and How We Can Resist Them</em></a><em>)</em> remain on ice.</p><p>The bill’s primary objective is to provide support for the development and promotion of localised, domestically hosted messaging apps, and to restrict foreign messaging apps such as Telegram, WhatsApp and Signal. It also aims to formally define Iran’s “digital borders”, and to strengthen support for a localised, national internet.</p><p>With the bill’s prospects for passage through the Majles looking more likely in the wake of Principalist gains in February’s parliamentary elections, we’re taking the opportunity to review its implications, appraise its progress, and explain why the revisions proposed during the 2019 review process have done little to minimise the dangers it poses for digital rights in Iran.</p><h4><strong>Background // The Bill’s Origins</strong></h4><p>The first draft of the “Managing Social Messaging Apps” bill was handed to Majles’s Leadership Committee on 18 November 2018, with a total 95 supporting signatures from MPs. It was introduced as one of six major internet-related bills: eGovernance, Electronic Transaction, Electronic Identification, Intermediary Liability, Data Protection and Online Privacy and Managing Social Messaging Applications) unveiled in 2018.</p><p>The “Managing Social Messaging Apps” was the only bill out of the six not to be written by the ICT Ministry, but rather by a coalition of MPs belonging to the Majles’ “Cyber Faction”, with members largely (but not exclusively) drawn from the conservative Principlists Grand Coalition. Building on the momentum gained from the <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/sunset-for-telegram-irans-latest-act-of-censorship-and-what-happens-next-f5f06c459b68">judiciary’s decision to filter Telegram in April 2018</a>, the proposed legislation proposes to tightly regulate messaging apps, and create a supportive environment for the creation of domestic messaging services which can be more easily subjected to monitoring and control by state authorities.</p><p>Two years later, this is the only bill out of the six on the parliamentary agenda, following its return to the Majles late last year. The draft bill made a reappearance after criticism from some pro-reform MPs and members of Iran’s tech community. It was subsequently handed over for expert review by the Parliamentary Research Centre, as the next step of the legislative process.</p><p>The survival of this bill is undeniably important in context of Iran’s ICT policy-making landscape as well as the future of digital rights in the country. The delivery of a large Principalist majority in the 2020 parliamentary elections has reshaped the politics of the legislature. Given the conservative faction’s tough line in support of information controls, we cannot expect that the Majles will act to moderate elements of the draft bill that threaten digital rights.</p><p>If the bill is passed, it could also build momentum for further legislative efforts to limit digital rights in Iran. In light of this, it’s now more important than ever for activists, Iranian legislators and those involved in Iran’s tech industry to be alerted to the potential dangers posed by this proposed bill, and to exert their influence to prevent it from progressing further during the last few months of the current Majles session, set to end in May 2020.</p><h4><strong>The First Draft // Promoting Domestic Messaging, Demoting Digital Rights</strong></h4><p>The “Managing Social Messaging Apps” bill was brought forward in the name of promoting the use of domestic messaging apps by introducing significant levels of state oversight concerning the operation, use and management of messaging apps, both domestic and foreign. The majority of these tasks were proposed to be undertaken by a new Oversight Committee that deals exclusively with regulating messaging apps. This committee would include some existing members of the Supreme Council for Cyberspace (SCC), and the bill made clear that the committee must follow the SCC’s mandate (<strong>Article 4</strong>).</p><p>The bill also proposed to hand over control of key internet infrastructure — which is currently under the control of Rouhani’s government via the Telecommunication Infrastructure Company — to the military, and to pre-load chosen domestic messaging apps onto Iranian mobile devices.</p><p><strong>Armed Forces Assigned Control Over Key Internet Infrastructure</strong></p><p>The biggest cause for concern was contained in <strong>Article 12</strong> of the original bill. According to this clause, the General Staff of the Armed Forces would take charge of protecting Iran’s “digital borders” and “cyber defence” by controlling the movement of data via international gateways to prevent “data exploitation”. This clause essentially removed the responsibility of the government (through the ICT Ministry and the Telecommunication Infrastructure Company) for matters relating to cybersecurity and defence, assigning this remit instead to an unelected body under the direct influence of the Supreme Leader.</p><p><strong>Requirement for Pre-Loading Domestic Apps on Mobile Phones</strong></p><p><strong>Article 24</strong> of the bill <a href="https://www.isna.ir/news/97082813960/%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%86-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AD-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87%DB%8C-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C">set out</a> that import licenses and activation of mobile phones would become subject to pre-installation of domestic messaging apps. The decision on issuing import licences for mobile phones would be made by the new supervisory board, who would also decide on giving permission to foreign messaging apps to operate inside Iran. This proposed initiative would effectively result in all new devices being packaged with selected state-approved messaging apps, posing significant threats to users’ privacy.</p><h4><strong>Support for the Bill Wavers // The Bill is Sent for Expert Review</strong></h4><p>The proposed involvement of the armed forces in “digital security” signalled the creation of fresh, legally entrenched control and surveillance mechanisms, which would also allow for the monitoring of mobile phones and users of messaging apps led to concerns about the overall intentions of the bill.</p><p>This, alongside further concerns around the bill’s lacking practical considerations, such as the impracticality of the application of certain articles of the bill (for example introducing a licence requirement for “creating and administering group chats”) lead to criticism from MPs. With some <a href="https://www.aftabir.com/news/article/view/2018/12/05/2025862">publicly withdrawing their support,</a> such as Zarabadi, it became apparent that the bill was unlikely to successfully make its way through the Majles in its current form.</p><p>Voices outside the Majles echoed similar concerns, with the founder and CEO of Gap Messenger Mahdi Anjidani<a href="https://digiato.com/article/2018/12/10/%d9%85%d8%ae%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%81%d8%aa-%da%af%d9%be-%d9%86%d8%b3%d8%a8%d8%aa-%d8%a8%d9%87-%d8%b7%d8%b1%d8%ad-%d8%ad%d9%85%d8%a7%db%8c%d8%aa%e2%80%8c-%d8%a7%d8%b2-%d9%be%db%8c%d8%a7%d9%85%e2%80%8c%d8%b1/"> publicly asking MPs</a> not to support the bill. Following further criticisms, the bill was eventually sent for review by the Parliamentary Research Centre.</p><h4><strong>The Bill Returns to Majles // Some Important Changes Recommended</strong></h4><p>The Parliamentary Research Centre’s review was <a href="https://rc.majlis.ir/fa/report/show/1371881">completed in late 2019</a>, and the bill — along with a series of the body’s recommendations — was returned to the Parliamentary Cultural Committee during the final months of 2019 for approval.</p><p>Despite a number of suggested amendments, the overall essence of the bill remains the same, with the majority of its articles undergoing only minor changes. The most controversial articles which caused major debate when the bill was first introduced remain unchanged, including the requirement to pre-install domestic messaging apps on mobile devices prior to sale.</p><p>At the same time, a number of noteworthy amendments have been proposed to certain articles, which warrant further attention from digital rights advocates and the tech community. The remaining problematic segments of the bill are discussed below:</p><p><strong>Supreme National Security Council to Decide on “Protecting Digital Borders”</strong></p><p>The biggest alteration proposed by the review relates to the replacement of the General Staff of the Armed Forces from taking outright control of “digital border security” and management of “data movement”.</p><p>The recommendation from the Research Centre proposes instead that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is placed in charge of deciding which body or bodies will be assigned these responsibilities, rather than assigning them to the General Staff of the Armed Forces outright. The SNSC is mandated to allocate these responsibilities within three months of the bill’s passage.</p><p>The notion of the existence of “digital borders” is misleading, given that the internet is a series of interconnected computers which naturally is not confined by sovereign borders, and its meaning in the context of this bill is not clearly defined. However, in this context, this article appears to relate to the allocation of control over key pieces of network infrastructure governing Iran’s connectivity with the global Internet (including international gateways and Internet Exchange Points). This approach assigns security authorities with responsibility for defending Iran’s imagined ‘digital borders’ in the same way as the country’s real borders. Such an approach advances the state’s objective to impose the ideology of state sovereignty onto digital space.</p><p>The amendment proposed in the recent review does not fundamentally alter the implications of the original article — the SNSC is still in charge of national security matters, so the involvement of security forces over ICT Ministry and other internet policy making bodies in this “digital border protection” still remains. The amendment instead is more pragmatic as it gives the SNSC flexibility to define and allocate responsibilities as it sees fit (however there is no guarantee of parliamentary oversight), and confirms the SNSC’s primacy on issues relating to national security — including, as a result of this bill — cyberspace.</p><p><strong>Domestic Messaging Apps Can Only Be Established and Owned by Iranians</strong></p><p>The law also forbids non-citizens and Iranians possessing dual nationalities from owning domestic messaging apps. The bill states that only “Iranian persons” can own domestic messaging apps, in order to guarantee national security and for “data protection”. This is in line with the SCC’s 2017 <a href="http://majazi.ir//parameters/majazi/modules/cdk/upload/content/circularinformation/50/15432319377955a0ku3boh75i9oql2a6ubig3j2.pdf">resolution on messaging apps.</a> The expert parliamentary suggestion also drops the allowance of “up to 49% foreign investment in domestic messaging apps”, on the basis of security concerns. Instead all investment in messaging apps should be limited to Iranian citizens.</p><p>In addition, any foreign messaging apps operating inside Iran are required to appoint an Iranian company to represent them to ensure their compliance with Iranian law, and which would retain liability for their operations.</p><p><strong>Groups and Channels with 5,000 Members or Over Must be Registered with a New Organisation</strong></p><p>The expert opinion recommends an amendment to the requirement of a licence for creating channels or group chats in both domestic and foreign messaging apps. Instead it proposes that any groups or channels with 5,000 members or more be registered with a new organisation which will be created by the Organisation for Cultural and Islamic Guidance.</p><p>If this registration requirement is not met, the group or channel in question will be filtered. The recommendation does not make clear what, if any, requirements exist in order to be able to register with this organisation and who the members of this new organisation are.</p><p>This newly proposed amendment brings the bill in line with the <a href="https://advox.globalvoices.org/2017/01/12/for-telegram-users-irans-registration-requirement-boosts-state-snooping-powers/">SCC’s 2016 announcement </a>ordering Telegram channels with Iranian admins with more than 5,000 to be registered with the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, failing which they would be faced with criminal prosecution.</p><p>It is very clear however that this new article seeks to give legal power to the government to regulate all popular channels and groups accounts, a popular source of news and group mobilisation for Iranian users which Iran’s leadership sees as a threat. These accounts can then be blocked in the name of security and its members and administrators are left without legal protection and defences.</p><p>The measures call to mind Iran’s previous attempt to require websites to register officially on its <em>Samandehi</em> platform, as <a href="https://smallmedia.org.uk/sites/default/files/u8/IIIP_MAY15.pdf">Small Media reported in May 2015</a>. Although the uptake of this was relatively slow, we found that the system did ultimately come to hold sensitive, personally identifiable data of the owners of a significant number of Iran’s most widely accessed websites.</p><p>Given the complications that arose with the registration scheme for Telegram channels, we would expect similar implementation challenges in the application of this clause to foreign apps. If deemed unmanageable, this could feasibly lead them to be restricted or filtered altogether in favour of domestic apps. At the same time it is very possible that domestically produced messaging apps could be constructed with these kinds of registration requirements in mind, driving up compliance.</p><p><strong>Changes in Members of the Management and Oversight Committee</strong></p><p>The recent proposed changes made to the bill extends the powers of the Oversight Committee in comparison to the first draft of the bill. The new recommendation gives the new committee power to give operating licences to messaging apps, manage the fund for supporting messaging apps, identifying breaches and setting financial or other forms of fines among and reporting to the Supreme Council for Cyberspace as to the operation of messaging apps among others.</p><p>The recommendation also removes Oversight Committee representation from the Islamic Seminary, the Parliamentary Cultural Committee, and (perhaps most importantly) the representative for domestic messaging apps. This leaves the body with zero industry representation. It instead adds a representative from the Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade.</p><p>The removal of a representative for domestic messaging apps limits their ability to advocate for the rights and needs of their users. As mentioned, a number of industry figures working to produce domestic messaging apps were vocal critics of this bill — not only for reasons relating to handing over control of the internet to security forces but also due to the shortcomings of domestic messaging apps in comparison to their foreign counterparts.</p><h4><strong>Recent Events and the Future of the Bill // What Can be Done</strong></h4><p>As mentioned, the recommendations made by the Parliamentary Research Centre are currently being reviewed by the Parliamentary Cultural Committee who have reportedly made some progress having approved the initial articles of the bill.</p><p>It remains to be seen what the final draft of the bill will look like as further changes could still be made to the text. It will also need to pass through a vote in Majles before being handed over to the Guardian Council for their approval before it can become law. When the bill was first introduced, the SCC and ICT Ministry officials did not hide their dismay towards Majles seeking to legislate on issues that they believed the SCC holds the mandate to deal with. If the bill passes a parliamentary vote and is passed to the Guardian Council, it would be a real test regarding the legal status and powers of SCC.</p><p>What is certain is that the Iranian authorities recognise the importance and the vital role messaging apps in ordinary daily life as well as in social and political movements. Many hardliner and conservative representatives have made clear that they will ensure that at least one piece of legislation concerning messaging apps will pass through Majles to fill this legal gap. This will give the authorities legal instruments to rely on to force users to migrate to domestic apps which lack privacy controls and can more easily be monitored by the government and make it impossible for users to use online platforms freely and securely in the name of “security” and “user protection”.</p><p>Recent events such as <strong>the internet shutdown ordered by the National Security Council</strong> <strong>last November </strong>as well as the continued internet disruptions especially during times of political turbulence or crisis have revealed the extensive reliance of the Iranian government on restraining its citizens through the internet. This could draw in more support for the bill which seeks to achieve these objectives more quickly by giving legal legitimacy to such actions.</p><p><strong>The recent parliamentary election gave a major boost to hardliner MPs. </strong>The 2020 parliamentary elections gave a major boost to Principalists in Majles, this faction which previously faced more balanced opposition from pro-reform and other factions of MPs during the previous parliamentary term, now holds a <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/fa/%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AC-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B4%D8%AF-%DB%B7%DB%B3-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AF-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%84%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA-20200223/%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86">reported 75% of the seats</a> in Majles following the first round of the recent parliamentary election. Among the newly elected MPs are a number of former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders who typically support filtering of content and restricting the access of users to the global Internet in the name of “safety” and creating a “clean cyberspace”.</p><p>Other individuals voted in during this election also includes known enemies of digital rights and internet freedoms in Iran such as Reza Taghipour, former ICT Minister during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, and a current member of the SCC. Taghipour was a key figure in implementing internet disruptions and restrictions following the 2009 post-election protests, as well as playing a major role in proposing the localisation of the internet in Iran.</p><p>It is unlikely that the bill will pass through Majles before the new MPs take over this summer. If so this will give a greater chance to the bill to pass through without any objections when the new parliamentary cycle begins. Therefore, advocacy efforts to prevent this bill from progressing further are urgent and time-limited.</p><p><strong>The private sector in Iran should continue to be vocal about their concerns on new legislation. </strong>The Iranian private sector still maintains some influence in shaping legislation relating to digital rights and internet freedoms in Iran, which can still influence the outcome of this bill.</p><p><strong>International tech firms must be aware of the implications of stopping services for Iranians.</strong></p><p>Global tech services must be aware of the digital and human rights implications of restricting access to Iraian users due to US sanctions. They should be more transparent about the details of the sanctions being complied with as well as giving advance notice to users before their services are affected. We have <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/tech-giants-are-failing-iranians-in-their-struggle-against-a-national-internet-1327d0ce8afa">already written</a> about how the lack of transparency by the tech companies in dealing with Iran and compliance with US imposed sanctions is undermining digital rights in Iran.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/346/0*cYlayoGCIm5vXR_j.png" /></figure><p><strong>For more of </strong><a href="http://smallmedia.org.uk/"><strong>Small Media</strong></a><strong>’s work exploring the internet policy landscape in Iran, check out the rest of Filterwatch — either here on </strong><a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch"><strong>Medium</strong></a><strong>, or on </strong><a href="https://smallmedia.org.uk/work/filterwatch"><strong>the Small Media website</strong></a><strong>.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b0a98c18463f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch/irans-managing-social-messaging-apps-bill-returns-to-parliament-b0a98c18463f">Iran’s “Managing Social Messaging Apps” Bill Returns to Parliament</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/filterwatch">Filterwatch</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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