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        <title><![CDATA[Fintech Strategy Sketches - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Forward-looking thinking on strategic changes in European Fintech and Retail Payments - Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/fintech-strategy?source=rss----1967c2364e08---4</link>
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            <title>Fintech Strategy Sketches - Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[European neobanking market: review of 2020 and outlook  for 2021]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/european-neobanks-review-of-2020-and-outlook-for-2021-d3304b0d034f?source=rss----1967c2364e08---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[challenger-banks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[neobanks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech-startups]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Yaroslav Taran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jan 2021 23:09:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-07T15:32:32.711Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>European neobanking market: review of 2020 and outlook for 2021</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dx4SBRkRS65AbozDgiSxqQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>&lt;a href=”<a href="https://www.vecteezy.com/free-vector/internet-banking">https://www.vecteezy.com/free-vector/internet-banking</a>&quot;&gt;Internet Banking Vectors by Vecteezy&lt;/a&gt;</figcaption></figure><p>At the beginning of 2020 neobanking market in Europe started showing signs of reaching maturity and the growth started to slow down. Combined with the Covid-19 crisis that brought a significant uncertainty to the market, further disrupting neobanks stellar growth trajectory. This led to a number of market movements summarized in this article.</p><p><strong><em>Key drivers that shaped the neobanks market in 2020:</em></strong></p><p><strong>1.Pandemic slowed down European neobanks growth and largely negatively affected revenues, as some of the leading neobanks use cases collapsed.</strong> New lockdown reality and forced closure of bank branches accelerated the shift to banking online. Interestingly, the massive channel shift to online didn’t result in a major uptake for neobanks, as someone might have expected. Instead, the online-only neobanks sign-ups <a href="https://sifted.eu/articles/digital-banks-growth-corona/">fell off the cliff</a> when the lockdowns started in Europe in March 2020. According to Fincog, a neobanks’ consultancy, internet search frequency (which is a proxy for new user growth) <a href="https://fincog.nl/publications/13/performance-during-covid-19">declined 10–20%</a> in Jan-May 2020 for top European neobanks like Monzo, Revolut, N26, Monese. Lockdowns effectively shut down the favorite neobanks’ uses cases — travelers stopped spending money abroad, the flow of migrants and subsequently remittances slowed down, offline shopping and Horeca spending hit the wall. Some use cases, as investment/brokerage and SME/retail short-term lending actually gained momentum during the pandemic, but only a handful of neobanks had those services in the portfolio (e.g. Starling, Robinhood). As a result majority of leading neobanks saw a sharp decrease in overall user spend/deposits and consequently lower interchange revenues, which for many neobanks remain the key revenue component. Interestingly, neobanks outside of Europe, where the neobanking market is in a lower maturity stage, haven’t been affected as much and managed to maintain growth (see the graph below).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*b9RR3duTwiZeB6lf.jpg" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://fincog.nl/publications/15/unicorn-challenger-banks">Fincog</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>2. Concerns regarding neobanks safety induced deposit outflow and limited growth options.</strong> For customers, using an online-only bank definitely sound convenient for spending and daily servicing, but doesn’t solve for the key banking function — safe money storage. As a result, the model of keeping funds at the high-street bank account and spending through a neobank card gained popularity. In 2018–19 neobanks have put significant effort into luring customers to deposit salaries/savings and generally use neobanks accounts as primary ones — and with certain success (<a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/the-pandemic-as-a-turning-point-for-neobanks-will-they-sink-or-thrive-fe57d071eae8">around 12% of users</a> deposited their salaries with a challenger in 2019). However, the pandemic triggered the <a href="https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/35385/customer-growth-and-deposit-balances-wane-for-uk-neobanks">massive outflow,</a> fueled by public concerns with regard to neobanks stability and solvency in times of crisis, along with ambiguity around deposit protection, as many neobanks operate under e-money license and are not covered by government deposit protection schemes. Scandals like Wirecard fallout <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/barrycollins/2020/06/26/wirecard-collapse-drags-down-online-banking-services/?sh=11cc32c02e28">effectively suspending </a>Holvi, Curve, and other fintechs as well as N26 <a href="https://sifted.eu/articles/n26-workers-push-back/">staff rebellion</a> also negatively affected public trust in neobanks in 2020. According to <a href="https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/37125/brits-still-wary-of-trusting-neobanks">an Accenture UK survey</a>, only 10% of Brits place ‘a lot’ of trust in neobank and only 45% believe that neobanks will exist in 12 months&#39; time. As public trust in neobanks was still low, it effectively remains an obstacle to the market development, limiting the deposit base and users&#39; growth.</p><p><strong>3. Incumbent banks pushed into digital banking. </strong>We see more and more incumbent banks launching and developing their own neobanks:<strong> </strong>Markus (Goldman Sachs), Mettle (Natwest), Bo (RBS), Fyrst (Deutsche Bank), Openbank (Santander), etc. For cash-rich incumbent banks, it is an easy and quick way to enter the neobank market, without the need to disrupt the operations of the main business. As this push grows, independent neobanks will face more and more dangerous competition from incumbents backed neobanks, which have solid cash warchests and customer trust stemming from being associated with the large banks’ brands. This is actually another strong sign that having a digital and tech-rich offering is not a differentiator anymore, but rather a hygiene factor. As incumbent banks strike back, it is of utmost importance for neobanks to innovate further and specialize — in order to survive. Even if it’s clear that banking will continue migrating online in the future, it is still an open question whether it will be dominated by online-first neobanks with evolved product portfolios or by traditional banks mastering the online channel.</p><p><strong>4. Investors’ mindset has shifted from growth at all costs to sustainable growth, mid-term profitability became a pressing issue. </strong>Valuations slumped after the Covid-19 crisis began and several neobanks had troubles getting additional runway cash (e.g. <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/16/monzo-confirms-60m-down-round/">Monzo</a>, <a href="https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/35749/monese-weighs-job-cuts-lowers-funding-ambitions---reports">Monese</a>). Investors are becoming much more concerned about profitability than they were 2–3 years ago.<strong> </strong>In an early-stage market being non-profitable and focusing on growth was the right thing to do. But now, on an overcrowded maturing market with close to zero switch costs and the possibility to have several providers at zero monthly costs, plain scale becomes more of a hygiene factor than a differentiator for the investors. The real differentiator is the ability to have a consistent net revenue-generating relationship with customers. In the near future, the neobanks that will not be able to accomplish this might close their (virtual) doors, even despite the large customer scale.</p><p><strong><em>Next year challenges for Neobanks:</em></strong></p><p><strong>1.Challenge to differentiate </strong>in an already overcrowded space, and find new target use cases. Amid many of the old use cases losing their customer appeal amid pandemic and monetization challenges looming, new neobank use cases and business models, potentially even targeted at new customer groups, should be developed. Neobanks used to leverage UI/UX and low pricing as key differentiators. Both of these advantages are going to be hard to defend in a situation when sustainability becomes a concern, the marketplace is overcrowded by copycats and incumbent banks are starting to move deeper into online. Therefore, now in order to be successful and sustainable neobanks should build their differentiators around providing value-generating services for specific target customer groups. We are already seeing many neobanks tailor their offer <a href="https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/19706/neobanks-should-find-their-niche-to-improve-their-profitability">to a specific use-case/customer group</a>, e.g. freelancers and independents (Tide, Fyrst, Holvi​), the unbanked and underbanked (e.g. Pockit), women (e.g. Elas, First Women’s Bank​), the elderly (e.g. Longevity Bank). We are likely to see more and more neobanks to specialize and develop more differentiated laser-focused propositions in the coming year, e.g. focused on specific professions (such as lawyers, notaries, doctors), affluent customers, specific SME segments, etc.</p><p><strong>2. Challenge to monetize scale</strong> and showcase sustainable profitable growth or at least a clear short- to mid-term profitability. As it was said earlier, European neobanks used to focus on customer acquisition, sometimes at an excessive cost, focusing little on customer retention and monetization - that was supposed to happen at some point in the future, similar to Uber or AirBnb. However, in 2020 most players started to shift their focus from customer acquisition to conversion of new customers into net revenue-generating ones and retention of those customers. There are two key levers neobanks have to convert to profitability: short-term — which is to cut spending on growth (marketing, product development, etc.) and long-term — to create new services that generate customer value and are monetizable on a recurring basis. Currently, for the most neobanks, the key recurring streams are interchange and account subscription fees, both of which were affected by consumption dip in 2020 and excessive competition. In 2021 neobanks are likely for new recurring revenue generators. The key one is, of course, lending. According to Fincog, a neobanks’ consultancy, out of major European neobanks <a href="https://fincog.nl/publications/15/unicorn-challenger-banks">only one focuses primarily</a> on lending — OakNorth, which is also <a href="https://tearsheet.co/funding/why-oaknorth-is-posting-profits-when-other-challengers-arent/">the first UK neobank to turn profitable</a> in 2018. In 2021 more challengers are expected to branch aggressively into lending, as we are already seeing some players applying for bank licenses (e.g. <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2021/01/11/revolut-applies-for-uk-banking-license/">Revolut</a>), opening in-house lending capabilities or looking to buy a lender (e.g. <a href="https://sifted.eu/articles/starling-lender-acquisition-boden/">Starling</a>). Another good example of a new recurring revenue generator is payments acceptance and acquiring for small businesses which, despite being quite a natural fit, has been for long neglected by the neobanks. <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2020/12/04/revolut-lets-businesses-accept-online-payments/?guccounter=1&amp;guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&amp;guce_referrer_sig=AQAAALbLOKP55VNb4VGedg1RVh5BGd_0k2D3aumtBDx7dSKsELUtFEyw7KfesU6CN6X5T5XglSVL9PPJxldt_FomjbHbkq7tIMQ8sHsDnoX2XHv7VLj8qj_UW_snqby-2Z53VAnuS_j5Y0TyFxK_kEultESyUGnPDcyEd5Wtt2fdD0oy">In December 2020 Revolut</a> launched its own in-house acquiring and acceptance capability, other SME-serving neobanks are likely to start exploring this business niche as well in 2021. Overall, we are clearly going to see some creativity and experimentation with tailored revenue-generating services, potentially setting a scene for the banking services re-bundling by challenger banks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*q8Gkohk26L0B40ze.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://fincog.nl/publications/15/unicorn-challenger-banks">Fincog</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>3. Challenge to gain customer trust.</strong> Pandemic raised the question around the safety and stability of neobanks. Frequently, being small, online-only, and underlicensed becomes a strong negative differentiator for neobanks compared to incumbents, affecting new players&#39; ability to raise and maintain customer deposits. With record levels of debts in the economy and a potential looming new debt crisis, this becomes even more of an issue as young and small neobanks are perceived to fall the first victims of this. Therefore, it is key for the Neobanks to find a way to gain customer trust, e.g. by ensuring proper licensing, participating in deposit guarantee schemes, underleveraging their balance sheets. Another opportunity is getting a cover from parent large banks, e.g. through becoming an acquisition target. In the past, many neobanks founders (e.g. those of Monzo, Starling) were resistant to the idea of selling to the established banks (e.g. <a href="https://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/saving/article-7575061/RBS-considered-takeover-Monzo-2017-reports-claim.html">Monzo-RBS case</a> in 2017), however, we can see this stance soften next year, opening a way to an M&amp;A wave in the neobanking market.</p><p><strong>4. Funding challenge. </strong>Many neobanks had trouble raising investor funds last year, some accepted down rounds with losing up to 40% of they valuation post pandemic (e.g. <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/16/monzo-confirms-60m-down-round/">Monzo</a>). It is clearly getting harder for neobanks to justify their valuation to institutional investors with uncertain growth prospects and mostly negative unit economics. Many independent early-stage neobanks will struggle with funding in 2021 and may fail. Relatively established neobanks are likely to turn to alternative funding routes, with the stock market probably being the first choice. If the stock market will continue favoring innovative tech-centric companies in 2021, we might see many late-stage neobanks taking advantage of the market hype-driven momentum and file for IPO. This will allow not only to attract new funds on a recurring basis but potentially also bring the valuations to the next level.</p><p><em>If you’re interested in the topic and enjoyed the article, feel free to subscribe to my </em><a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy"><em>Medium publication</em></a><em> or follow me on </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/yaroslav-taran/"><em>Linkedin</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d3304b0d034f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/european-neobanks-review-of-2020-and-outlook-for-2021-d3304b0d034f">European neobanking market: review of 2020 and outlook  for 2021</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy">Fintech Strategy Sketches</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Neobanks’ path to profitability — exploring potential routes]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/neobanks-path-to-profitability-exploring-potential-route-e20902556ae8?source=rss----1967c2364e08---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech-startups]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[neobanks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Yaroslav Taran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2020 01:46:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-07T15:35:32.225Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Neobanks’ path to profitability — exploring potential routes</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/576/1*crcIT-nkd8D4XROtjIpvJQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://gomedici.com/neobanks-targeting-niche-customer-segments-deep-dive">Medici</a></figcaption></figure><p>Following a period of an extraordinary boost, neobanks are facing increasing pressures from investors to switch their focus <a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/the-pandemic-as-a-turning-point-for-neobanks-will-they-sink-or-thrive-fe57d071eae8">from growth to profitability</a>. Many smaller neobanks are likely to shut their digital doors in 2020–21, while the frontrunners are entering a period of cost-cutting, converting downloads into revenues and finally finding their path to profitability. Here are a few routes they should consider:</p><p><strong>1) Building up a subscription-based financial marketplace. </strong>Traditional banks spent decades building an ecosystem of ancillary services around their core banking proposition. Nowadays, with APIs flying around, challengers may replicate those much faster and go beyond, through building a balanced portfolio of in-house and partnership-led capabilities. As they become a one-stop-shop for financial needs, it opens a way to monetizing on integrating all services in one place. Most important and value-added services may be brought in-house with time, increasing profit potential. All of the big UK neobanks — Monzo, Revolut, Starling — built marketplaces giving their customers access a variety of <a href="https://www.starlingbank.com/current-account/personal-finance-marketplace/">integrations</a>: investment, insurance, credit brokers, accounting software providers, etc.</p><p>Until 2019, there was a widespread belief, led by Revolut and Monzo, that the <a href="https://monzo.com/blog/2017/11/16/monzo-marketplace">marketplace model</a> is the main bet for neobanks and is enough to reach positive net income territory. However, in late 2019 Monzo <a href="https://www.verdict.co.uk/retail-banker-international/comments/monzo-marketplace-model/">changed</a> its rhetoric, acknowledging that lending is a key lever to profitability. In May 2020 Revolut followed by <a href="https://www.atmmarketplace.com/news/london-based-fintech-revolut-launches-bank-in-lithuania/">launching</a> an official bank in Lithuania.</p><p><strong>2) Boosting lending to consumers and SMEs.</strong> Incumbent banks make the most of their money by lending out 80–95% of their deposits, while most neobanks merely use 10% of their deposit base for credit. Theoretically, increasing leverage will increase profitability, however, there are several pitfalls. Lending to micro-companies, start-ups and underbanked individuals could be extensively risky, long-term loans could hurt solvency and liquidity. When it comes to individuals, mortgage or auto lending is not something neobanks will be able to afford given their shaky deposit base (apart from those owned by traditional banks, e.g. Atom). Direct short-term consumer financing may have a flavor of pawnshops — not something digital challengers would like to be associated with. The remaining niches — credit cards, overdrafts, salary-tied liquidity financing and purchase financing could present significant revenue-generating opportunities. However, the biggest sweet spot is SME lending, especially in a higher market end, as established companies’ solvency is easier to evaluate and collateralize. The only <a href="https://tearsheet.co/new-banks/uk-challenger-bank-oaknorth-posts-profit-growth-of-95-percent-but-growth-slows-significantly/">profitable</a> UK challenger — OatNorth makes its money from lending to mid-sized companies. Therefore, for the banks that signing up smaller companies today (e.g. Starling, Tide) is of utmost importance to maintain the relationship as their customers develop and grow in size — generating more revenue for their digital banks.</p><p><strong>3) Getting into business banking.</strong> Businesses have much higher money flows and deposits compared to individuals, a variety of unmet needs, and are more willing to pay for the services that save them time or money. At the same time, small and medium businesses tend to be underserved by banks, highly susceptible to innovations and more flexible with switching their banks. Moreover, looking from the longer-term strategic perspective, the SME banking segment is less likely to threatened by Big Tech (Apple, Google, etc.) venturing into banking. Those factors make SMEs an ideal playground for functionally mature neobanks. However, the client spectrum is quite wide within SME: some Neobanks like UK’s Starling and German Penta focus on micro-enterprises and freelancers, while others like UK’s OakNorth and French Qonto target primarily higher end of small and medium-sized clients. There is also a diverse set of monetization mechanisms: subscription and freemium models, charging for incoming and outgoing bank transfers, FX services, company cards, accounting and other integrations, and of course business lending. Feeling the segment attractiveness, even retail-focused neobanks entered the space — <a href="https://www.nsbanking.com/news/revolut-business-banking/">Revolut</a> in 2019 and <a href="https://monzo.com/blog/monzo-business-banking">Monzo</a> in March 2020.</p><p>Given the market extensive competition, the upcoming trend is likely to be the emergence of more industry-specific business packages, tailored to the needs of retail, hospitality, travel, e-commerce, etc. The next product frontier is likely to be payment acceptance, which is a high margin business currently overlooked by neobanks. Currently, none of the challengers offers in-house payment acceptance, while a few most advanced went into partnerships with established PSPs (e.g. <a href="https://getpenta.com/en/blog/sumup-partnership/#:~:text=Our%20partnership%20with%20SumUp%20will,offered%20by%20Penta%20via%20SumUp.">Penta</a> directs customers to SumUp). Such partnerships are going to spread when neobanks realize that this is a quick way to earn referral commissions, capitalizing on their SME customer base. Furthermore, the upcoming PSD2 Payment Initiation functionality will allow neobanks to break through into online payment acceptance — as many of them already hold PIS licenses.</p><p><strong>4) Branching into Banking-as-a-Service (BaaS) offering.</strong> Neobanks can sell their payments and accounts back-end platforms for other fintech companies to build their own interface on top of it. This allows for a speedy scale-up of payment volume processed through a neobank platform. Comparing to the client-facing business, the BaaS commission is lower by 80–90%, but the marketing expenses are cut by 100%. Serving as BaaS may also create an economy of scales to payback investment into the platform and cover fixed maintenance costs. US first Neobank <a href="https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-moven-one-of-the-first-challenger-banks-is-calling-it-quits">Moven</a> shut down all of its unprofitable client-facing business in April, in order to concentrate on profitable and flourishing BaaS part of the business — investor pressure had an impact on this decision. The retail neobank market in Europe is overcrowded and has a small revenue potential due to domestic interchange caps. At the same time, UK, French and German Neobanks are state-of-art platforms that could be exported abroad — into fast-growing and uncapped markets of South-East Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa. While expanding client-facing retail operations to those markets is challenging due to tremendous cultural differences, regulations and lack of local expertise, BaaS offering could be easily exported. A great example of a cross-border offer is <a href="https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/35606/visa-invests-in-railsbank">Railsbank</a> — UK BaaS platform that recently received an investment from Visa, and targeting Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Thailand.</p><p><strong>5) Cutting on marketing expenses.</strong> Neobanks used to heavily rely on online advertising, social media marketing, direct sales, and even TV advertising (e.g. Monzo, Starling) — to skyrocket their growth in a highly competitive environment. This practice formed gigantic customer acquisition spends that largely overweighed revenue. At the end of 2019, an average neobank <a href="https://newsroom.accenture.com/news/uk-neobanks-near-20-million-customers-in-2019-but-customer-and-deposit-growth-rates-slow-according-to-research-from-accenture.htm">revenue per customer</a> of £5–15 was much lower than the acquisition cost of £20 to £50. By giving up on 3-digit downloads growth and cutting marketing burn some banks already may jump (or at least come close) to positive net income territory. Neobanks’ consolidation also may facilitate rationalizing marketing costs and balancing growth with profitability.</p><p><strong>6) Getting into a consolidation game.</strong> The two most probable options include getting acquired by a traditional bank and merge or acquire a fellow neobank. The first option allows for quick investment return and potential for a variety of revenue-generating and cost-saving plays: cross-selling services, using neobanks network and interface for credit distribution, exploiting neobank technology, centralizing customer service and overhead functions. We are likely to see acquisitions like this among the second division of neobanks, while the frontrunners are likely to be protected from those deals by their high valuations, risks to the client base, and founders’ resistance. Therefore, the second option is more feasible: neobanks mergers allow for saving on marketing and overhead budgets, product cross-selling, and potentially geographic synergies. Imagine an N26-Monzo merger — the resulting neobank will create a pan-European customer base, huge potential for cost-cutting, and rationalizing IT costs, create weight for partner negotiations, and a strong base for US expansion, where both neobanks are intensely trying to build a presence. The cost-saving and growth generating potential of such a deal would be enormous.</p><p><strong>7) Looking for new emerging niches. </strong>What made neobanks get to the market is high sensitivity to changes in customer needs and technology. To advance to profitability they need to keep adjusting to emerging customer needs — and doing it fast. A great example is Starling’s launch of <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=starling+launches+card+covid&amp;rlz=1C1GCEV_en&amp;oq=starling+launches+card+covid&amp;aqs=chrome..69i57j33l2.10583j0j7&amp;sourceid=chrome&amp;ie=UTF-8">a card</a> allowing delegated shopping on behalf of self-isolating people — only 3 weeks after the pandemic started in Europe. The speed of action and resulting first-mover advantage remains a key differentiator for the overcrowded and commoditized digital banks market. For challenger banks being ahead of the curve is key to pave the way to profitability. There are still plenty of not covered and potentially monetizable use-cases: managing subscriptions for customers, bill payments, payment initiation, SCA white-listing, money pots, etc.</p><p>As the neobank market develops and hype slowly fades away, it becomes clear that the path to profitability — and survival — will be tough. For some it may go through business model diversification and incorporating several options mentioned above, for some it may involve piloting some of them and settling down with two or three, some may find luck through going deeply into one specific business model. Anyway, the market is undergoing tectonic shifts and the challenger bank landscape in 2025 is likely to have very little resemblance with this in 2020.</p><p><em>If you’re interested in the topic and enjoyed the article, feel free to subscribe to my </em><a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy"><em>Medium publication</em></a><em> or follow me on </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/yaroslav-taran/"><em>Linkedin</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e20902556ae8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/neobanks-path-to-profitability-exploring-potential-route-e20902556ae8">Neobanks’ path to profitability — exploring potential routes</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy">Fintech Strategy Sketches</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Pandemic as a turning point for neobanks: will they sink or thrive?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/the-pandemic-as-a-turning-point-for-neobanks-will-they-sink-or-thrive-fe57d071eae8?source=rss----1967c2364e08---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fe57d071eae8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banking-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[neobanks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[challenger-banks]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Yaroslav Taran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 24 May 2020 22:29:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-02T18:29:12.897Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*4Yu_lgoZRcn8SS-B" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://theface.com/life/challenger-banking-future-finance-monzo-revolut-starling-metro">The Face</a></figcaption></figure><p>There are polarized opinions on how pandemic will affect the neobanks/challenger banks. Some analysts <a href="https://www.euromoney.com/article/b1llz05vrxdfsv/can-europes-neobanks-survive-the-funding-shake-out">conclude </a>that pandemic will present a “moment <strong>similar to the bursting of the dotcom bubble”</strong> for neobanks, while some say <strong>neobanks will thrive as customers </strong><a href="https://thefintechtimes.com/three-in-five-likely-to-use-digital-banking-offered-by-neobanks-and-challenger-banks-by-2025-backbase-report/"><strong>are rapidly moving online</strong></a><strong>. </strong>Which scenario will prevail?</p><p>Neobanks key selling points are state-of-art mobile apps with sleek interface design, comprehensive online functionalities including fully digital on-boarding and expense analytics as well as lower payments fees. However, they frequently lack comprehensive product portfolios of banks (most noticeable in lending), offer limited customer service (e.g. chatbots) and sometimes are not covered by deposit guarantee schemes. At the same time, traditional banks lure customers by their complete suite of banking products, centuries-proof solidity and reliability which is frequently de-facto guaranteed by the state. Neobanks operate asset-light low-cost business model. At the end of 2019 UK average cost per customer being £20 to £50 — compared to traditional banks <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=ccenture%E2%80%99s+Digital+Banking+Tracker.&amp;rlz=1C1GCEV_en&amp;oq=ccenture%E2%80%99s+Digital+Banking+Tracker.&amp;aqs=chrome..69i57j0.316j0j4&amp;sourceid=chrome&amp;ie=UTF-8">whopping £170</a>. But at the same time income per customer difference is even more drastic — on average £9 for Neobanks compared to £270 for traditional banks — with most of it coming from lending. In total it meant an average loss of <a href="https://newsroom.accenture.com/news/uk-neobanks-near-20-million-customers-in-2019-but-customer-and-deposit-growth-rates-slow-according-to-research-from-accenture.htm">£5–15 per customer</a> for UK neobanks.</p><p><strong>However, the focus of Neobanks was not on profit, but on getting large, preferable global scale.</strong> Profit was supposed to follow the scale automatically at some point in the future, when new services will be added and the marketing budget will be cut. Steady growth in the number of customers was driving new investment rounds over gigantic valuations. Pandemic changes that situation in many dimensions.</p><p><strong>1) Investments flow is drying up.</strong></p><p>Intense competition and abundant funding forced neobanks to concentrate on growth for too long, overlooking the revenue management and product portfolio expansion. Depressed revenues caused by pandemic magnify this discrepancy. Already in late 2019 some investors started becoming skeptical about the endless loss-making scaling. As pandemic shifted the expectations about the future further down, there will be more investor voices demanding immediate moves towards profitability — in order for neobanks to secure further funding.</p><p>Revolut and Starling were lucky to close the funding rounds in February — weeks before the pandemic hit. Revolut <a href="https://sifted.eu/articles/revolut-valuation/">tripled</a> its valuation to $5.5bn from $1.7bn in April’18. Monzo’s funding round in May already <a href="https://www.pymnts.com/news/investment-tracker/2020/monzo-closes-in-on-new-funding-as-valuation-plunges-40-pct/">reflected 40% plunge in valuation</a> — showing a desperate need for cash and unfortunate timing. Looking at Monzo’s round other neobanks’ investors are likely to demand cost-cutting and refocusing from growth to profitability — in an attempt to preserve the peak valuation and delay the next funding round until the business is doing better in terms of profit.</p><p>Investment thirst creates favorable grounds for consolidations — neobanks that were rejecting bids from traditional banks (e.g. <a href="https://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/saving/article-7575061/RBS-considered-takeover-Monzo-2017-reports-claim.html">Monzo- RBS in 2017</a>), now they might give it a second thought. More importantly, times, when there were hundreds of neobanks in Europe and US, are likely to be over. The pandemic becomes a mark<strong> </strong>after which the frontrunners continue their run into finals, while all the smaller and more local ventures are going to fall victim to either consolidation or bankruptcies.</p><p><strong>2) Customer growth and deposits are falling, despite accelerating sign-ups from late adopters and unbanked.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/772/1*49wqXjkF3qgJDgNWr7Z5Sg.png" /></figure><p>In March 2020 downloads of Neobanks’ apps on average <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/neobank-app-downloads-fall-amid-pandemic-2020-4?international=true&amp;r=US&amp;IR=T">declined 25%</a> compared to February. It is likely that closure of physical branches and low digital readiness of traditional banks will attract some over-65 (Covid-19 risk group) and late technology adopters to neobanks at a later stage of the lockdown.</p><p>However, the number of active customers and card spend is much more important for profitability than downloads. Neobanks accounts are frequently used as secondary or even tertiary — after accounts in traditional banks. Ample supply of banking services allows customers to cherry-pick particular services from specific providers: e.g. using a traditional bank for deposits and credit, and a neobank for ATMs, FX or payments abroad. More than half of respondents whose primary account is with a challenger bank still do not trust it with making large transactions or salary deposits.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*HK2UUs9I7yzo3AlxxLk1Ow.png" /></figure><p>Already in 2H’19 UK neobanks acquired 6mn customers reaching a total of 20mn, at the same time average deposit per customer slipped down 25% from <a href="https://newsroom.accenture.com/news/uk-neobanks-near-20-million-customers-in-2019-but-customer-and-deposit-growth-rates-slow-according-to-research-from-accenture.htm">£350 to £260 per customer</a>, which in general means that lower percentage of customers deposit funds. This behavior will accelerate this trend even more, as formerly active customers may start withdrawing their money from seemingly shaky neobanks, some of which are not even covered by national deposit insurance schemes (e.g. <a href="https://www.fintechfutures.com/2020/03/revolut-seeking-uk-banking-licence-before-year-end/">Revolut in UK</a>). The good news is that such bank runs will not cause bankruptcies, as most neobanks do not leverage customer money for lending (or leverage a small portion). Nevertheless, it will send neobanks revenues further down.</p><blockquote>Customers at banking startups maintain <a href="https://qz.com/1728419/point-72-ventures-is-betting-on-neobank-killers/">average deposits</a> of only around 4% of their counterparts at incumbent banks.</blockquote><p>The implication is that importance of growth in downloads is misleading and overstated. Increase in ghost customers, that register, use an account for a month and then forget about it, or in customers that use an account for bank transfers and a card for ATM withdrawals actually <strong>means multiplying costs</strong> for the neobank, not revenues.</p><p><strong>As a result, the focus of many neobanks is likely to shift from the insane race for downloads to developing and deepening the relationship with existing customers.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*Wd_BwZiyaKAxJ1GDV8oS-w.png" /></figure><p><strong>3) Collapse of prominent customers use cases: travel, freelance and start-ups</strong></p><p>Many Neobanks built their business model around specific use cases (e.g. servicing SME or travel), and many of those use cases are being severely affected by the Covid-19 crisis. The most prominent example is travel: as people stop traveling and spending abroad, it is useless for them to pay for the Revolut subscription that offers better FX rates and access to the airport lounges. They also stop spending abroad, effectively shutting down interchange revenues for players the likes of Monzo and Monese. Even increased local spend will not build up for this, as cross-regional (1–3%) or commercial (1–2%) <a href="https://www.visa.co.uk/about-visa/visa-in-europe/fees-and-interchange.html">card interchange rates</a> are substantially higher than the ones on local private cards (0.2%-0.3% in Europe).</p><p>Banks that specialized on serving business customers (e.g. Starling, Qonto, Anytime) built their businesses around SMEs, startups and freelancers -the categories most exposed to the current crisis. Wave on bankruptcies and a decrease in new ventures will hit their customer base. Neobanks that were actively lending to SME (e.g. OakNorth) are cautious about an increase in non-performing loans. A large chunk of unbanked people signing with neobanks were newcomer migrants — now with immigration being put on hold, this stream also dries up. The segments less affected by the economic crisis — large companies, affluent individuals, elderly — are core customers of traditional banks.</p><p>Those changing behaviors and needs put additional pressure on neobanks to come up with new services and business models built around new use cases.</p><p><strong>4) Traditional banks accelerate digital transformations</strong></p><p>Many banks were delaying their digitalization and makeover investments for years. Change in core banking systems (e.g. from stationary to cloud) not only requires investment, but most importantly are very risky to current operations.</p><p>Branch closures and the general attitude shift to online brings urgency to this decision. Now banks have an opportunity (and excuse in front of employees) for massive branches shut down. On the other side, the crisis brings urgency to digitalization programs — creating a great opportunity and excuse (in front of shareholders) for banks to take a risk of migration and set off the investment budget. One may argue that banks are generally not capable to do well on the digital front, due to factors like conservative mentality, culture differences and talent gap. However, those on the forefront of banking innovation (ING, Citi, BBVA) <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomgroenfeldt/2018/04/15/going-digital-in-banking-dbs-citi-bbva-ing-lead-the-way/#652210685877">proved</a> that competitive and successful digital products can be created by traditional banks. If a critical mass of traditional banks starts digital transformation, neobank valuations are going to fall off the cliff, as their key selling point is going to dissolve. Having a lower scale, fewer resources, lower trust — neobanks will stand little chance against digitalized incumbents.</p><p><strong>5) The crisis speeds up Big Tech moving into banking</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*4Dwf2p4JFQDkXV-v.jpg" /></figure><p>Actually, the widespread paradigm of “neobanks vs banks” combat doesn’t take into account an elephant in the room — Big Tech. Apple, Facebook, Google and Amazon realize that their scale of global customer relationships is good not only for digital services distribution or e-commerce but also for payment and banking business. The threat is mostly viewed as aimed towards traditional banks, as Big Tech may steal the customer relationships, putting banks in a position of infrastructure providers. However, neobanks might be affected even more. They’ll face a competitor that is digital native, extremely well-funded, has the best talent and most importantly — already has a vast and loyal customer base. While US neobank <a href="https://thefinancialbrand.com/73355/predictive-analytics-digital-banking-website-accounts/">Chime</a> needs to spend millions of investor’s funds on advertising to raise awareness about its service, Apple card doesn’t need a lot of advertising. Apple products are always hard to beat on functionality and design, as they were made by the brightest engineers, sponsored by one of the richest companies globally. Rapid scaling, low customer acquisition costs, great functionality, high loyalty — all the neobanks can only dream of could be easily achieved by Big Tech’s banking products. Google <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/17/google-card/">is launching</a> its card somewhere is 2020. Facebook has an <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2016/12/07/facebook-just-secured-an-e-money-license-in-ireland-paving-way-for-messenger-payments-in-europe/">e-Money license</a> and is expected to roll-off transformed <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertanzalone/2020/05/19/facebook-adds-firepower-to-its-leadership-libra-pushes-for-a-future-where-they-could-change-retail-payments/#5391611a2665">Libra currency</a> in 2020–21. Pandemic shifts the world online and brings even more power and loyalty to Big Tech. If their upcoming banking products achieve scaling in Europe and US, neobanks propositions might very quickly become obsolete.</p><p>Despite the pandemic-triggered shift to online, neobanks do not appear to be the clear beneficiaries of the crisis. Raising demand for online onboarding, digital account servicing and mobile payments and expense management undoubtedly comes to their advantage. However, <strong>drying up investment flow, lack of customer trust and loyalty, badly affected customer segments and arming-up competition puts neobanks on coronavirus victims bench.</strong></p><p>What neobanks are definitely great at <strong>is</strong> <strong>adapting to the new conditions. </strong>The crisis will clean up and consolidate the market, leaving space for the stronger and more adaptive to lead the industry tomorrow.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/neobanks-path-to-profitability-exploring-potential-route-e20902556ae8"><em>My next article</em></a><em> looks more specifically into neobanks’ options to reach profitability.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fe57d071eae8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/the-pandemic-as-a-turning-point-for-neobanks-will-they-sink-or-thrive-fe57d071eae8">Pandemic as a turning point for neobanks: will they sink or thrive?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy">Fintech Strategy Sketches</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Disruptions in Banking and Automotive markets — same or different?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/disruptions-in-banking-and-automotive-markets-same-or-different-9d3b22a231a5?source=rss----1967c2364e08---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9d3b22a231a5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[automotive]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[electric-car]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tesla]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Yaroslav Taran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2020 12:46:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-14T12:46:16.374Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Disruptions in Banking and Automotive markets — same or different?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/873/1*4XCCXw-eXlmJL5scXiHE-g.png" /></figure><p>Banking and Automotive are the two large markets where long-standing champions and proven business models face a sudden threat from impudent challengers. Those challengers create significant hype in media and social networks and appear to be supported by millennial customers and sometimes regulators.</p><p>The two industries are frequently compared for the sake of projecting disruption trajectories from one into another and trying to predict what happens next in each of them. In this article, I analyze industry fundamentals, dynamics of technological changes and business models change in both markets to answer the key question — <em>are those two industries’ disruptions comparable?</em></p><p><em>To be precise the comparison focuses on the Passenger Car market and Retail Banking market. The comparison is quite broad, therefore, certain simplifications and generalization were made to market outlooks.</em></p><h3><strong>Industry Fundamentals</strong></h3><p>When comparing the industry fundamentals, it becomes clear that <strong>Automotive and Banking are two very different industries</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/760/1*mbWAA828TNiaeSAAQhVjTQ.png" /></figure><p>Product type and differentiation, level and structure of competition, supply and distribution models, revenue and cost drivers, financial structure and performance — all of those are dramatically different. Automotive is an industry of <strong>high fixed assets and R&amp;D costs, cyclical and highly differentiated products, long planning horizons and indirect distribution</strong>. Banking is a very specific service industry, with <strong>comprehensive portfolios of generally non-differentiable products, extremely high degree of competition and with the distribution network and brand power being the key differentiators </strong>(at least until recently).</p><p>The only important common factor between the two is a <strong>heavy and localized regulatory pressure</strong>, which has intensified in the last two decades. Banks face increasing capital adequacy and liquidity requirements, increasing anti-money laundering and KYC complexities combined with investment constraints. Automotive is pushed by regulators to decrease vehicle emissions with a new standard coming out every 4–5 years.</p><p>Both industries are facing two types of newcomer challengers: Product/Technology challengers like Revolut, N26, Monzo in Banking and Tesla, Faraday, Nio in automotive, and Business Model challengers like Funding Circle or Lending Club in Banking and Uber or Zipcar in mobility.</p><h3>Product and Technology Challengers</h3><p>Challengers of this type are trying to enter an established market by offering innovative product or technology.</p><p>Retail banks face product disruption from fintechs in areas like payments, lending, savings and investment. Market newcomers are normally featuring simplified products with simple online sign-up, great functionality and slick interface. A great example is Revolut offering simple stripped-down bank account+ card with better-than-market FX rates.</p><p>Automotive manufacturers are challenged by automotive start-ups offering all-electric, high-tech and futuristically designed alternatives to traditional cars. Tesla is clearly the most prominent example of a successful scale-up challenger.</p><p><strong>What’s different?</strong></p><p>New fintech ventures require much lower investments than setting up the mass car development and production, therefore, there <strong>much lower number of new entrants</strong> in Electric vehicles compared to Fintech.</p><p>Fintechs also scale up their customer base much quicker, due to (almost) zero sign-up cost (unlike electric cars) and the fact that while you sign-up with Revolut <strong>you can still keep your account </strong>with Lloyds, while keeping your old Audi while you buy a Tesla is frequently not economically viable.</p><p>Despite this, banks are frequently less threatened by fintechs than OEMs by Tesla, because of the differences in <strong>customer stickiness</strong>. Yes, there are much lower barriers to customer switching in Banking compared to Automotive, however, the switch is frequently <strong>only partial </strong>and is much more <strong>reversible</strong>, with many customers using services from traditional banks along with challengers. Frequently, customers switch to fintechs for low-margin payments products, but continue to use high-margin credit and investment functionalities from incumbent banks. In case of Automotive the traditional OEMs are losing customers <strong>slower, but more irreversibly,</strong> together with after-sales revenue streams.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/527/1*BAPslEqo4ZoTEYqlBvBFMw.png" /></figure><p>Despite the lower scale-up speed, automotive challengers are more likely to reach profitability. Low product differentiation frequently forces neobanks to engage in <strong>price wars</strong> with incumbents and between themselves in order to gain scale fast. An attempt to increase price or decrease value proposition at later stage results in customers exodus. Electric cars OEMs on contrary can charge <strong>a premium</strong> for their innovative products which are being highly differentiated on the market. After-sales revenue stream also builds up with gaining scale. All of it make successfully scaling automotive challengers <strong>more likely to reach sustainability</strong> compared to neobanks.</p><p><strong>What’s common?</strong></p><p>Challengers waves in automotive and banking both started with the emergence of new technology in areas where traditional players were <strong>too slow and hesitant</strong> to react. However, in both markets the window of opportunities is closing down with incumbents catching up — OEMs come up with electric models and banks digitalize their offerings. The product and technology innovations brought by challengers are being <strong>quickly internalized</strong> by traditional providers closing down the gap. At the end of the day, only a few most successful challengers in both industries are going to remain afloat.</p><h3>Business Model Challengers</h3><p>Challengers of this type are trying to introduce a new business model, which is largely substitutional to an established market.</p><p>Banking faces emerging competition from P2P service providers in lending, which basically minimizes the role of middleman in-between lender and borrower, such as Finding Circle or Lending Club. The concept effectively allows borrowers to save on costs (sometimes) and lenders to increase return at the same time bearing the risks that would normally be absorbed by a bank.</p><p>On the contrary, automotive OEMs face an increasing threat to their sales volumes from the emerging mobility market comprised of ride-hailing and car-sharing.</p><p><strong>What’s common?</strong></p><p>In this case actually almost nothing.</p><p><strong>What’s different?</strong></p><p>The banking core business model remains largely unchanged for the last 500 years. Within the same timeframe, mobility business models managed to change several times.</p><p>And even nowadays there <strong>no real threats</strong> to the banking business model. Emerging business concepts such as P2P lending do not really threaten the mainstream customer flow, as they are targeted specifically at several narrow customer segments —e.g. lenders with excessive risk appetite and borrowers with low/no credit score. This business <strong>is going to remain niche</strong>, as the mainstream retail credit market will still require banks to absorb credit and liquidity risks for both lenders and borrowers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/707/1*LK5mN_77xfFQiZd_N5t6Aw.png" /></figure><p>At the same time, the rise of ride-hailing and car-sharing is driven <strong>by tectonic mainstream market shifts</strong>. Several intensifying forces, including <strong>increasing urban population density, tightening parking and city entrance regulations along with shifting customer preferences</strong> give a boost to shared mobility winning over traditional car ownership concept. Shared mobility business models will significantly influence the number of passenger cars sold in mid- to long-term. According to <a href="http://image-src.bcg.com/Images/BCG-Whats-Ahead-for-Car-Sharing-Feb-2016_tcm9-64441.pdf">BCG research</a>, shared mobility will result in 1.3% of lost car sales in Europe and 1.2% in Asia already as soon as in 2021.</p><p>The situation is difficult for both challengers and incumbents. Challengers require <strong>giant investments</strong> to gain viable scale — and turning scale into profitability remains unchartered waters for many scale-ups like Uber and Lyft. On the other side, automotive manufacturers <strong>struggle to internalize</strong> this new business model. They try to partner and invest into ride-hailing (Toyota/Uber and Lyft, GM/Lyft, VW/Gett) and develop their own car-sharing businesses (Daimler/Car2Go, BMW/Drive Now, Ford), in an attempt to hedge their bets, however, it is clear that this business is quite different from their core operations and success chances of this attempt are doubtful. There already cases of investment write-downs (Ford/Chariot, VW/Gett), and scale-back from certain cities (ReachNow in Seattle and Portland, Car2Go in Chicago and some other cities). When initial investment enthusiasm and cash-burning run for scale is over, it becomes clear that those adjacent businesses are not easy to set up and manage, especially for slow-moving car manufacturers.</p><p><em>[I am not touching the autonomous driving topic here, which has very little external disruption element to it and is still too far into the future, despite the hype]</em></p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The disruptive forces in Banking and Automotive markets are quite different with regard to industry fundamentals, disruption impact and incumbents&#39; ability to successfully respond.</p><p>It is clear that in both industries Technology/Product innovations <strong>will be fully internalized</strong> by long-standing players. However, their short- to medium-term lag in internalization creates an opportunity for most successful challengers <strong>to gain a foothold</strong> in the industry. Anyway, banking revenue streams are much less affected by those disruptions compared to those of automotive manufacturers. At the same time, automotive contenders have <strong>much higher chances</strong> to reach sustainability compared to their banking vis-a-vis due to the profound differences in industry fundamentals and customer behaviors described above.</p><p>When it comes to the Business Model disruptions, the difference between the two industries is even more dramatic — banking is<strong> largely unaffected</strong>, while the automotive industry <strong>may experience profound changes</strong> including declining production numbers, diving after-sales revenues and a pressing need for traditional players to diversify into new and distant business models.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9d3b22a231a5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/disruptions-in-banking-and-automotive-markets-same-or-different-9d3b22a231a5">Disruptions in Banking and Automotive markets — same or different?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy">Fintech Strategy Sketches</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Mobile Payment Apps in Europe — Part 3: BLIK and Twint]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/mobile-payment-apps-in-europe-part-3-blik-and-twint-f1fb356024c?source=rss----1967c2364e08---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f1fb356024c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[payments]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-payment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-wallet]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Yaroslav Taran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2020 12:45:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-14T12:45:49.796Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Mobile Payment Apps in Europe — Part 3: BLIK and Twint</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/651/1*2DlGoaPjkLLPqyoYm5UlMw.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://medium.com/@alex.ram/digital-wallets-landscape-in-europe-part-1-cfa151bcbd5c">The first part</a> of these series was analyzing successful solutions from Nordics — the forefront market for digital payments globally. <a href="https://medium.com/@alex.ram/mobile-payment-apps-in-europe-part-2-payconiq-and-tikkie-671e0a2be2c5">The second part </a>looked into Benelux players — Tikkie and Payconiq. The third part is devoted to the two bright cases of national <em>alternative payment methods development</em> in Poland (quite successful) and Switzerland (rather a failure).</p><h3>BLIK</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*Cr5Kb44bBJvYdPmg.jpg" /></figure><p>BLIK is one of the brightest examples of bank collaboration to tackle digital payments on a country level. Launched in 2015 by a consortium of Polish banks, BLIK entered already <em>well-served and overcrowded</em> Polish payments space, offering POS, Online, P2P payments and ATM withdrawals. Poland did (and still does) have one of the highest contactless terminal penetration in Europe, along with high contactless cards penetration. In online space multiple bank proprietary transfer buttons were dominating with &gt;50% share, card transaction accounted for the other 35%. Nevertheless, united bank support for the new payment method as well as smart marketing and a good selection of use cases with the highest potential value-added allowed BLIK to scale up quickly on this well-served and crowded market.</p><p><strong>Reach in 2019:</strong> &gt;6M users (20% of Polish population) with at least 3.2M active users</p><p><strong>Pricing: </strong>0.2–0.4% POS transaction, 1–2% online transaction.</p><h3>Key success factors:</h3><ol><li><strong>Strong bank support </strong>— uniform and united backing of all major banks (who also dominate POS acquiring in Poland) significantly facilitated BLIK go-to-market in POS, ATM and P2P</li><li><strong>Negotiated PSP support — </strong>concentrated PSP<strong> </strong>market with<strong> </strong>top 4 PSPs (PayU, P24, Dotpay and eService) maintaining &gt;70% of e-Comm market and concentrated e-Commerce market (with Allegro marketplace controlling ~50% of sales), it was quite easy for BLIK to get high e-commerce acceptance quickly by just striking a few partnership deals</li><li><strong>Well-rounded value proposition package with strong monetization potential from the start </strong>— unlike Nordic peers that normally first aimed at getting scale in P2P and only after several years were moving into other payment domains, BLIK from the start supported all 4 payment worlds — P2P, POS, Online and ATM. Therefore, it was a much more compelling value proposition from the beginning, stimulating user sign-up and app usage. At the same time monetization areas come into play from the beginning, without a money-less P2P scale-up period</li><li><strong>Playing everywhere, winning in certain segments</strong>— the highest scale-up was achieved in Online and ATM space, where BLIK the highest value-added potential. In Online environment, BLIK allowed for a higher convenience compared to traditional bank buttons (more below) and in ATM (with the absence of contactless withdrawal possibilities in Poland) BLIK only competed with Chip&amp;PIN - offering customers the luxury of cardless withdrawals which turned out to be of high demand</li><li><strong>Historically, a stronger focus on authentication security over convenience in online payments in Poland </strong>— high usage of 3DS requirement on cards and clunky multi-step online bank transfer process (also requiring 3DS) made Polish customers used to long multi-step authentication processes. And although BLIK can cut 1 authentication step out of 5, it is still in some cases considered as a more convenient online payment method</li><li><strong>Software-enabled POS integration </strong>— BLIK at POS integration did not require any separate hardware and was implemented as a software patch to existing terminals. This allowed BLIK to save costs and quickly scale up POS acceptance. However, BLIK POS usage remains low mainly due to complicated multi-step authentication, as customers prefer much faster and simpler contactless card payments.</li><li><strong>Well-designed promotion campaigns — </strong>BLIK promotion game was big and multi-channel.<strong> </strong>First, it launched a heavy online and offline advertising campaign to raise awareness, followed by advertising and promotion through the participating banks (offline and online). Agreement with all major PSPs raised BLIK button to the top of the (long) payment methods list on online payment pages. Multiple promotion campaigns with retailers offered a small discount or additional bonus to customers paying with BLIK. Main campaign messages were around the method speed and “requiring only a mobile phone”.</li><li><strong>Very unique technology and transaction authentication flow— </strong>BLIK remains unique on the European market when it comes to transaction flow, security and customer experience. BLIK authentication relies on codes generated on mobile and is fully SCA compliant. The solution is efficient and elegant enough to be potentially scaled across other European markets.</li></ol><h3>Potential and Challenges ahead:</h3><ol><li>There is a <strong>very high potential of pan-European expansion</strong>, especially given BLIK scale-up figures in Poland, uniqueness of the underlying technology and upcoming PSD2 XS2A regulation. BLIK already partnered with Mastercard on this matter.</li><li><strong>The unique technology behind BLIK could be licensed or white-labeled</strong> for export to other countries (first deal with UAE buyer already signed in May 2019)</li><li><strong>Adding contactless mobile payment functionality </strong>to conquer POS segment and compete against Apple Pay and Android Pay (that are already present in Poland). BLIK announced launch os this feature for second half of 2019.</li><li>One of the most obvious potential improvements is a <strong>creation of separate BLIK payment app</strong> serving as a customer payment hub (currently BLIK is still embedded into bank apps, which limits marketing potential)</li><li>The main challenge is still <strong>relatively complicated authentication flow </strong>which requires manual code type-in, with<strong> </strong>limited improvement potential (e.g. it is hard to replace manual type-in with biometric authentication, etc. without changing the whole underlying technology)</li></ol><h3>Twint</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/439/0*ce8yMMHgFbBE39HZ.jpg" /></figure><p>Twint is one of the most expensive national wallet scale-up attempts which managed to achieve a certain scale, but still is seen by many as a failure. Twint was launched in 2016 in an attempt to replicate the success of Nordic solutions in Switzerland. From the start, it got a strong backing of all major Swiss banks, including local ones, as well as SIX and Worldline. However, after this Twint story become a series of scandals: technical problems immediately after launch, low user-friendliness of the app, the cartel accusation from Apple Pay and Samsung Pay and Swiss watchdog investigation against participating banks. At the end, the development cost is rumored to be as high as 500mn CHF, which is inadequately high especially given all the technical problems and low customer adoption rates. Finally, in 2018 UBS started offering the possibility to 1,000 CHF for anyone downloading Twint app — which might be seen as an ultimate sign of despair.</p><p><strong>Reach in 2019:</strong> 850K total users (~10% of Swiss population)</p><p><strong>Pricing: </strong>1.3% per transaction</p><h3>Key factors:</h3><ol><li><strong>Strong banks and acquirers backing — </strong>which provided development funds, technology and a protective shield against global competitors (Apple Pay, etc)</li><li><strong>The relatively high cost of payment acceptance service</strong> and hardware in Switzerland creates a business case for alternative payment methods. At the same time, generally low merchant price sensitivity lowers opportunity for price differentiation</li><li><strong>Standalone payment app from the beginning</strong> — allowing for better, more centralized and focused marketing</li><li><strong>Merger with competing Paymit in 2016</strong> (developed by UBS, SIX, Zurich Cantonal Bank), consolidating the efforts only on</li><li><strong>The well-rounded capability set — </strong>POS, online, P2P capabilities offered</li><li><strong>Parking payment use case</strong> — possibility to pay parking fees with Twint though integration with Swiss parking system — one of the most appealing Twint use cases (and unique on European arena)</li><li><strong>Targeting flea market sellers and farm shops</strong> for cashless payment acceptance — which is a large underserved market in Switzerland</li><li><strong>The well-rounded capability set — </strong>POS, online, P2P capabilities offered. POS payments operate through QR codes and physical acceptance beacons (sale of acceptance beacons potentially provides additional revenue stream)</li><li>Twint started offering <strong>white-label wallet technology </strong>for wallet providers abroad, which potentially can be an additional revenue stream</li></ol><h3>Potential and Challenges ahead:</h3><ol><li><strong>The weak start is the bad public image </strong>is going to be very difficult to reverse</li><li><strong>Scale-up to neighboring countries</strong> (Austria, Germany, Italy) make little sense without domestic success</li><li><strong>Swiss customers are generally known</strong> <strong>as relatively more conservative </strong>compared to rest of Europe, which limits the potential for new payment methods</li><li><strong>Credit Suisse opened the market for Apple Pay</strong> in 2019, which may significantly damage Twint position (especially as other banks have no choice but to follow)</li><li><strong>Twint is currently stuck </strong>in their local market scale-up, most likely paths forward involve: a) transform into niche use case provider (e.g. parking payment app, recurring payments app etc.); b) try to expand abroad; c) become a white-label software provider or d) shut down the project altogether.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f1fb356024c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/mobile-payment-apps-in-europe-part-3-blik-and-twint-f1fb356024c">Mobile Payment Apps in Europe — Part 3: BLIK and Twint</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy">Fintech Strategy Sketches</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Mobile Payment Apps in Europe — Part 2: Payconiq and Tikkie]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/mobile-payment-apps-in-europe-part-2-payconiq-and-tikkie-671e0a2be2c5?source=rss----1967c2364e08---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/671e0a2be2c5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[payments]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[payment-systems]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-payment]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Yaroslav Taran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2020 12:44:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-14T12:45:04.561Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Mobile Payment Apps in Europe — Part 2: Payconiq and Tikkie</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*tt9nsZLoNi_G-XhKt-tS-g.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="https://medium.com/@alex.ram/digital-wallets-landscape-in-europe-part-1-cfa151bcbd5c">The first part</a> of these series was analyzing successful solutions from Nordics — the forefront market for digital payments globally. The second part is devoted to two Dutch digital payment apps <em>— </em>Payconiq and Tikkie.</p><p>Tikkie strategic path is the complete opposite of Payconiq. Payconiq was launched and banked by a consortium of banks, Tikkie had only one parent. Payconiq bet on partnerships and acquisitions, Tikkie remains a lone self-sufficient warrior. Payconiq tried to conquer the market from the merchant end and offer broad functionality set, together with geographic focus throughout Benelux, Tikkie was doing the opposite — one simple functionality, one market (Netherlands), focus on user base scale-up.</p><p>Let’s explore in detail.</p><h3>Payconiq</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/672/0*urpEl3WmX1Jj98vc.png" /></figure><p>Payconiq is a semi-successful mobile payment app, initially launched in 2015. Normally payment players first scale-up in home country and then expand abroad. Payconiq followed a different path — being born in the Netherlands by a consortium of Dutch banks, it failed to scale up in the home country. Subsequently, Payconiq entered the Belgian market (partially via acquisition) and managed to gain significant traction there. Key pillar of Payconiq strategy was expansion via M&amp;A — it acquired competing solution Digicash in 2017, then merged with Belgian loyalty platforms Qustomer and CityLife, and finally joined forces with Belgian local card scheme Bancontact in 2019. This allowed Payconiq to gain a significant merchant base in Belgium and positioned the solution well in the loyalty segment. Interestingly, having a large merchant base (60,000+ merchants, mostly in Belgium), Payconiq failed to reach scale with customers — users figures are not disclosed, and most likely are very low (&lt;100,000 total users)</p><p><strong>Reach in 2019: </strong>1.5M users, 75,000 merchants (mostly in Belgium)</p><h3>Key success factors:</h3><ol><li><strong>Strong Benelux banks backing</strong> — again consortium of banks provided resources for development and scale-up</li><li><strong>Smart M&amp;A and partnership strategy</strong> — buying/merging/partnering with competitors and providers of adjacent services proved to be an efficient cross-border and cross-segment expansion strategy. A smart partnership strategy is and has always been a key success factor for payments players.</li><li><strong>Focus on merchant adoption and monetization ways from the beginning</strong> — those aspects are frequently overseen by digital solutions that try to gain scale quickly via free P2P payments and only after this move into monetization areas (Swish, Mobilepay, etc). Payconiq was focusing on C2B payment acceptance from the start (which in turn backfired with low customer adoption)</li><li><strong>Partnering with large merchants </strong>— e.g. launched POS payments in McDonald’s self-service stands in Belgium, these kinds of flagship merchant partnerships are expected to boost solution recognition and adoption</li><li><strong>Experimenting with new innovative use cases — </strong>launched payment on music festivals, bill payments in Belgium, in-app fuel payments partnering with fuel station network, etc.</li><li><strong>Focusing on value-adding loyalty proposition — </strong>integrated loyalty is one of the key value-added levers that digital payment apps can leverage to win over cards and Payconiq is probably the most advanced payment app in Europe regarding loyalty integrations</li></ol><h3>Potential and Challenges ahead:</h3><ol><li><strong>The main challenge is still low customer adoption</strong>, which remains a hard-to-solve problem for Payconiq</li><li><strong>Apple Pay coming to Benelux in 2018 </strong>will limit the scale-up potential even further</li><li><strong>Generally, low payment acceptance costs in Benelux</strong>(through local debit cards at POS and iDeal in e-Commerce) limit the space for new alternative payment methods</li><li><strong>Integrated loyalty</strong> is one of the key value-added features of Payconiq and main potential differentiation lever going forward (both within online and POS payment)</li><li><strong>Expansion into PIS space</strong> in an attempt to serve as iDeal for Belgium (or even EU-wide) is a natural development. Payconiq already received PIS license in Sep’2019</li><li><strong>The potential for Payconiq also lies within niche customer application </strong>(merchants without terminals, closed-loop payments e.g. music festivals, in-app payments)</li><li><strong>A merger of Payconiq with Tikkie </strong>potential could create a strong Benelux local champion, matching Payconiq merchant base and functionality with Tikkie user base.</li></ol><h3>Tikkie</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*c4mk9SHoTydiKYGm.png" /></figure><p>Tikkie is another Dutch payment app, that was launched in 2016 by ABN Amro Bank, which left the Payconiq coalition in 2019 to focus entirely on Tikkie. As said, Tikkie strategic path is the complete opposite of Payconiq. Launched and supported by only one bank, Tikkie remains a company with almost no partnership deals. Also contrary to Payconiq, Tikkie focused on customer adoption first (and succeded in it) selling the only use case (P2P transfers through payment requests). And the approach worked surprisingly well. It’s not like nobody offered payment request functionality before (in fact it was already a part of many mobile banking apps), but Tikkie managed to package and sell it well — as a separate app, designed specifically to solve the narrow but very widespread problem (e.g “I owe you 10 EUR for lunch”). Catchy name and simple use case allowed to scale up quickly. However, monetization prospects remain ambiguous.</p><p><strong>Reach in 2019:</strong> &gt;5M users (30% of Dutch population)</p><p><strong>Pricing: </strong>0.15–0.25 EUR per transaction</p><h3>Key success factors:</h3><ol><li><strong>App simplicity, catchy name, good marketing</strong></li><li><strong>Offering bank transfer with immediate payment confirmation</strong> (while it might take several hours for money to reach the payee account, Tikkie sends an instant confirmation of the fact that transfer was initiated by the payer). This basically opens up the use of bank transfer at POS and online without instant payment infrastructure. However, in 2019 Netherlands launched instant payment infrastructure, decreasing importance of this Tikkie functionality</li><li><strong>Targeting specific use-cases</strong>, where there was space for value-add, such as Online payments and ATM withdrawals</li></ol><h3>Potential and Challenges ahead:</h3><ol><li><strong>A simple single P2P use case is good for scale-up, </strong>however, moving from this starting point into monetization areas is quite difficult</li><li><strong>Tikkie attempts to play in POS payments</strong> (via QR code or classic payment request), targeting segments POS-underserved segments like flea market sellers, craftsmen and deliveries positioning Tikkie payment sometimes like a short-term deferred payment. However, the demand for this product offering remains niche and following this route Tikkie POS payment is unlikely to go mainstream</li><li><strong>Tikkie online payment</strong> offers little value-added over well-established iDeal, and therefore unlikely to gain any scale in e-commerce</li><li><strong>Generally, low payment acceptance costs in Benelux</strong>(through local debit cards at POS and iDeal in e-Commerce) limit the space for new alternative payment methods</li><li><strong>The main challenge and potential for Tikkie’s management is probably to get brave enough to explore monetization areas that are not directly adjacent to current solution functionality. </strong>Leveraging 6M user base to cross-sell value-adding payment services for underserved or innovative segments, such as recurring payments, loyalty, in-app, grab-and-go payments, etc.</li></ol><p>The two solutions went completely different paths and achieved two different results. Tikkie has an established and active customer base, Payconiq has the monetization functionalities and acceptance network. Tikkie stronghold is the Netherlands, Payconiq is present there as well, but focuses mainly on the Belgian market. This leaves us with a perfect merger case potential resulting in the creation of a strong Benelux mobile payment solution.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=671e0a2be2c5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/mobile-payment-apps-in-europe-part-2-payconiq-and-tikkie-671e0a2be2c5">Mobile Payment Apps in Europe — Part 2: Payconiq and Tikkie</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy">Fintech Strategy Sketches</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Digital Wallets Landscape in Europe — Part 1]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/digital-wallets-landscape-in-europe-part-1-cfa151bcbd5c?source=rss----1967c2364e08---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cfa151bcbd5c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mobile-wallets]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-wallet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[payments]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Yaroslav Taran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2020 10:18:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-14T10:18:35.187Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Mobile Payment Apps in Europe — Part 1: MobilPay, Swish and VIPPS</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/733/1*opnF7ZDV8EUpVhCrhhe0sw.jpeg" /></figure><p>A wave of Mobile Wallets/Payment methods took over Europe in 2012– up to now (2019). Trying to think over and structure this phenomenon, we can break down the wallet solutions into groups according to:</p><ul><li>underlying technology they use (bank transfer-based, card-based)</li><li>ownership parent (owned/started by individual founders, banks, telecom, technology players)</li><li>by services they provide (P2P, C2B payments at POS, e-Commerce, ATM)</li></ul><p>However, with further development of the wallets, very frequently technologies, services and ownership structures mix up. Therefore, I believe the best split is: Successful scaled-ups, Uncertain scale-ups and Scale-up Failures. It is interesting to look into success factors and headwinds that influenced players in each of these groups.</p><p>The first part of the analysis explores 3 Nordic national champions: Mobilepay, Swish, and VIPPS.</p><h3><strong>Mobilepay</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*L7440dZT1xHnlGhsMbYTVQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>One of the first successful scale-up stories, started by Danske Bank in 2013 and currently run by a consortium of banks. It was a first successful P2P wallet scale-up in Europe, quickly followed by a successful scale-up in e-Commerce and even POS environment (contrary to Swish). Mobilpay moved quickly and aggressively into POS and e-Comm acceptance in 1 year after P2P app launch. e-Commerce solution worked as a simple bank transfer-based pay button. POS installation called Mobilepay Box included printed QR code and Bluetooth beacons which allows customers to pay with MobilPay wallets at physical shops. Mobilepay was able to equip around 100k Danish merchants with this small MobilePay POS acceptance circumvents cards — biggest alternative (non-card) POS acceptance network in Europe.</p><p><strong>Reach:</strong> 4M users (70% of Danish population), 100k merchants in 2019.</p><h4><strong><em>Key success factors:</em></strong></h4><ol><li><strong>Being first on the market</strong> (competitor Swipp that was launched a few months later was not able to scale up, as “winner takes it all” in the wallet game)</li><li><strong>Successful partnership with other banks</strong>, opening the doors for other banks customers to register and for other banks to participate in the wallet development</li><li><strong>Quick and timely movement into e-Commerce and POS</strong> (1 year after P2P launch)</li><li><strong>High smartphone penetration and low reliance on cash in Denmark</strong>, which encouraged customer adoption</li><li><strong>Relatively high card acceptance fees and POS terminal prices in Denmark</strong>, which encouraged merchant adoption — as MobilePay is charging merchants much smaller fee compared to cards (0.04–0.10 EUR per transaction vs 1–2% of volume)</li><li><strong>Variety of strong use-case/product offerings</strong>: cashless phone-to-phone acceptance, subscriptions, invoicing for companies, in-app e-Commerce integration, expense sharing app (integrated with MobilePay)</li></ol><h4><strong>Challenges (ahead) and Potential:</strong></h4><ol><li>Denmark is a small country and <strong>national penetration ceiling is reached</strong></li><li><strong>Scale-up to neighboring countries</strong> (Norway, Sweden, Finland) <strong>proved difficult</strong>, as domestic champions already took the ground there</li><li><strong>Monetizing the solution is extremely difficult</strong>, even after such an impressive scale-up. Fees are low enough for scale-up, not high enough to make profit. Increasing fees may potentially damage relationships with merchants</li><li><strong>Volume shift from cards to Mobilepay is still slow to happen</strong>. High user penetration does not necessarily imply high usage.</li><li><strong>Mobilepay customer payment experience is lagging behind</strong> this of cards in certain aspects: clunky POS payment process requiring opening the app and then scanning the code/connecting via Bluetooth and final confirmation, longer e-Commerce checkout compared to card-on-file.</li><li><strong>Threat from Apple/Android Pay</strong> which basically has a similar value proposition but with a better interface and more frictionless customer experience</li></ol><h3>2. Swish</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*fzu2dJoUi_aex7_X.jpg" /></figure><p>Swish is actually an older Swedish brother of Mobilepay, as it was launched a couple of months before. It is almost a twin of Mobilpay: runs on bank transfer rails, started with P2P, owned by a consortium of bank, uses national Bank ID for authentication. It basically mimics Mobilepay’s P2P scale-up success but when it comes to moving into acceptance Swish story is different. While it took around 1 year for Mobilepay to move into e-Commerce, for Swish it took long 4 years. Moreover, when the solution was launched in 2016, the technical side of solution appeared not to be ready for the popularity the Swish had got — number of transactions was too high for backend payment infrastructure to handle them and e-Commerce product got shut down until being relaunched in 2017. When it comes to POS pilots, then only started in 2019 (compared to 2014 for Mobilpay) and</p><p><strong>Reach: </strong>6.7M users, 160k companies in 2019.</p><h4>Key success factors:</h4><p><strong>Similar to Mobilpay: </strong>first mover, bank partnership, cashless society, high penetration of smartphones, high card rates and POS terminal prices</p><h4>Challenges (ahead) and Potential:</h4><ol><li><strong>Late move from P2P into revenue-generating areas</strong> (POS and e-Commerce acceptance) poses questions over the feasibility of conquering those areas at all, especially now, after Apple/Android Pays already arrived in Sweden</li><li><strong>Swish generally doesn’t offer any other user propositions</strong> apart from the basic ones (P2P, e-Com, QR at POS acceptance).</li><li>Potentially <strong>Swish can move into recurring, or try to expand abroad in e-Commerce </strong>as an alternative payment method, but given the speed the solution was developing so far and the amount of time already wasted, this is unlikely</li><li>The <strong>key monetization and development areas </strong>for Swish lie<strong> in e-Commerce acceptance (displacing cards) as well as in recurring, in-app and Grab-Go</strong> use cases, which are still developing and remain underserved.</li></ol><h3>3. VIPPS</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*VxqH5kAvA01uDqqb.jpg" /></figure><p>VIPPS is the youngest among the three — launched in 2015 by DNB (biggest Norwegian bank) and currently owned by a consortium of &gt;100 Norwegian banks (while DNB still holds 52% of shares). VIPPS expansion from P2P into acceptance was not that aggressive as one of Mobilepay and not that slow and cumbersome as of Swish. Instead, VIPPS played smart and well-weighted tactics of point attacks, with good use of strategic partners. It used diplomatic negotiations to shut down some rival wallets (mCash, Mobilepay) and get into a strategic partnership with others (Alipay). It targeted specific innovative use-cases in POS and in e-Commerce instead of trying to reinvent the wheel and build the acceptance network from scratch.</p><p><strong>Reach:</strong> 3.2M users (65% of Norwegian population), 30k business</p><h4>Key success factors:</h4><ol><li><strong>Scale-up unchallenged by competitors.</strong> DNB negotiated shut down of rival wallet from Spareabank with a transfer of users to VIPPS. Later, when MobilePay tried entering Norway, DNB managed to persuade Danske to back up, offering share in VIPPS in return.</li><li><strong>Strategic partnerships outside Norway. </strong>In 2019 VIPPS partnered with Alipay and 5 other European wallets (Blucode, Pivo, ePassi, momo pocket, Pagaqui) in 2019 with an aspiration towards a European wallet alliance, which means VIPPS users are able to pay with their wallet abroad using QR-codes, based on the Alipay QR-code format.</li><li><strong>e-Commerce partnerships with Nordic PSPs </strong>(DIBS, Nets, Valitor, Bambora, PayEx) towards fast e-Commerce acceptance scale-up in the Nordics</li><li><strong>Phone-to-phone QR-based payments targeting specific use cases </strong>underserved by card acceptance providers like flea markets and handymen</li><li><strong>Targeting NFC POS acceptance instead of Bluetooth. </strong>NFC technology doesn’t require additional hardware at acceptance points, is more reliable and offers better user experience compared to Bluetooth technology. On the downside, NFC user base is limited to Android phones only.</li><li><strong>VIPPS GO solution targeting Grab-and-Go use case is among the first ones in Europe. </strong>Grab-and-Go or in-store mobile ordering stands for the situation when a customer orders and pays on mobile while being in and purchasing from a physical shop/cafe/bar (with Amazon Go being a global pioneer). The segment is in an early development stage and is a perfect technological fit for VIPPS-like mobile wallets. It is much more efficient to create value in an underserved emerging area then try to fight your way though established and more capital-intensive acceptance value chain (like Mobilpay Box)</li></ol><h4>Challenges (ahead) and Potential:</h4><ol><li><strong>Nordea, Danske and smaller banks brought Apple Pay in Norway. </strong>DIBS opposition to Apple Pay coming from a natural move to support VIPPS may backfire if Apple Pay gains popularity in Norway (especially given the relatively high iOS penetration rate of 49%)</li><li><strong>e-Commerce penetration among traditional online retailers (medium and large-sized) remains low,</strong> which basically cuts VIPPS out of the main potential monetization area. VIPPS doesn’t seem to win e-Commerce game unless more effort is put into. e-Commerce expansion should be seen as key attack area for VIPPS in light of both scale-up and monetization aspirations</li><li><strong>Cross-border QR-code acceptance has limited potential </strong>given that it targets same Norwegian users traveling abroad(and national customer base is very limited). Economics of wallet partnership for VIPPS is also unclear and uncertain</li><li><strong>VIPPS GO (Grab-and-Go) is a promising use-case</strong> with significant value-added potential. However, the emergence of Global or pan-European player in this may provide a threat to VIPPS in this area.</li><li><strong>VIPPS should explore additional niche value-adding</strong> use-cases auxiliary to main value proposition (such as recurring, invoicing, digital credit, expense sharing and moneypots, etc.)</li></ol><p>Next part of this analysis is going to talk about other (non-Nordic) relatively successful scale-up wallets: BLIK, Twint, Payconiq, Tikkie.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cfa151bcbd5c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/digital-wallets-landscape-in-europe-part-1-cfa151bcbd5c">Digital Wallets Landscape in Europe — Part 1</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy">Fintech Strategy Sketches</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[2020 crisis as a “rise and shine” moment for mobile wallets at POS — will they capture it?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/2020-crisis-as-a-rise-and-shine-moment-for-mobile-wallets-at-pos-will-they-capture-it-ed75e313b54f?source=rss----1967c2364e08---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ed75e313b54f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech-startups]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mobile-wallets]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mobile-payments]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[payments]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Yaroslav Taran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 May 2020 14:15:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-01T14:53:29.857Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>2020 crisis as a “rise and shine” moment for mobile wallets at POS — will they capture it?</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZL2BUr2WpzDpHAcZ8niwOA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@jonasleupe?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Jonas Leupe</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/oRKF_ZBJYGM?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Paying with cash for groceries nowadays highly increases your risk of catching CoVID-19. Paying with a magnetic strip card (common in the US) means you hand on your card to the cashier, who is a potential virus transmitter. Even with the safest card option — chip or contactless, there is still probability you need to contact with contaminated surfaces, entering the PIN code. The safest option nowadays? Contactless Mobile wallet payments where the customer identification happens on your smartphone.</p><p>Over the last couple of years a number of mobile wallets did emerge. The customer adoption of those products was sluggish, as customers didn’t see any major benefits of using those solutions over the classic plastic card. Amid CoVID-19 pandemic <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-16/no-touch-payments-skyrocket-because-no-one-wants-to-handle-cash">safety replaces convenience</a> as a key driver of customer payment behavior. Minimizing the contact between customers and store surfaces dramatically increases the value of mobile wallets to customers and society. This might rapidly increase customer adoption — in case wallet providers follow the right strategy.</p><p><strong>Apple Pay and Big Pays (Google, Samsung)</strong></p><p>Apple Pay is likely to be the biggest beneficiary, as it was best prepared with its infrastructure. Currently, there are more than 120mln iPhones in US and more than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-lifeline/reasons-for-hope-the-drugs-tests-and-tactics-that-may-conquer-coronavirus-idUSKBN21Z2HP">700mln in the world</a>. More than half of them are in countries where Apple Pay is <a href="https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT207957">already launched</a>. That implies that before the epidemic Apple Pay had 1) astonishing potential customer base, 2) comprehensive bank coverage, 3) huge acceptance network as it works on all the contactless POS terminals. In 2019 it all was ready for the boost, the only remaining problem was sluggish customer adoption, which in Apple’s key market, the US, <a href="https://appleinsider.com/articles/19/08/29/study-apple-pay-at-9-adoption-in-us-lags-far-behind-paypal-and-traditional-payment-methods">stood at 9%</a> — far below projections. Sanitary concerns amid CoVID-19 worked as an ideal adoption enhancer, as dozens of millions of Apple users rushed to sign-up for the service. Some of the new users may like it, some may just get used to it over the course of the pandemic. As a result, a rapid spike in adoption might transform into a long-term increase in the active user base.</p><p>Google Pay and Samsung Pay face a very similar situation, although they are in a much weaker position due to open access HCE technology on Android phones. Any issuer may create their own HCE solution for Android phones that essentially circumvents Android/Samsung Pay. This means Google and Samsung will face all the types of localized competition, primarily from bank-developed “Pays” and local wallets.</p><p><strong>Bank Wallets</strong></p><p>Many banks in Europe and US created their own digital wallet solutions for Android. In most cases those apps were not very successful. Dutch <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/abn-amro-shutting-down-its-wallet-app-for-android-devices-2019-11?international=true&amp;r=US&amp;IR=T">ABN Amro</a> and American <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/21/jp-morgan-to-scrap-digital-wallet-app-chase-pay.html">JP Morgan</a> even shut down their Android wallet applications in late 2019 due to low customer adoption. The current crisis presents a “rise and shine” moment for those neglected wallets to finally become of value for their Banks’ customers. The most important for banks in this situation is to reach to their customers early and efficiently with communication on how the Bank wallet solution can help shoppers to minimize the risk of contacting coronavirus followed by clear instructions on wallet setup and support contacts.</p><p>Banks have very limited revenue potential on their own wallet products but increased “Bank Pay” adoption might drive long-term loyalty and decrease the risk of disintermediation for banks.</p><p><strong>Payconiq</strong></p><p>Another potential beneficiary is Belgian Payconiq. Many alternative wallets are based on QR or Bluetooth connection technology and therefore require two types of scaling to grow big: from one side they need a significant number of customers to download their app, from the other side they need merchants to sign acceptance contact and incorporate QR or Bluetooth technology in their checkout. So, while many emerging wallets focused on driving customer adoption first, Payconiq was focused on merchant adoption throughout Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg <a href="https://medium.com/@alex.ram/mobile-payment-apps-in-europe-part-2-payconiq-and-tikkie-671e0a2be2c5">reaching 75,000 merchants</a>, which is a truly remarkable success for an independent solution. From the other side reported customer base stood at only 1.5mln users (meaning there were only 20 users per 1 accepting merchant), which is very low given 20mln+ adult population in Benelux and the fact that large chunk of those users was unlikely to be active ones. Given those numbers, the current crisis presents a break-it-or-make-it moment for the Payconiq and an ideal time to gear up its customer adoption. Despite the full lockdown in Belgium and quasi-lockdown in the Netherlands, people are still going to the supermarkets and grocery stores, many of which do accept Payconiq, but rarely see a customer willing to pay with it. Now is the perfect moment for a strong communication and customer education campaign. Even with little budget, there are good moves that could be done. First — push-app communication towards registered customers highlighting benefits of solution over the usage of plastic cards. Second — a joint campaign with merchants aimed at 1) educating merchants 2) visual marketing campaign to raise awareness of the solution and its benefits amid epidemic among store visitors. The sanitary concerns of pandemic present opportunities, the question is how quickly and efficiently Payconiq team is going to react and adjust their marketing strategy (at the moment of writing this article there are no coronavirus-related public communications from Payconiq visible online — surprisingly).</p><p><strong>BLIK</strong></p><p>Blik, Polish mobile wallet, owned jointly by the biggest Polish banks, is a great example of a mobile wallet done right. Blik already has great adoption scale-up in e-commerce and ATM payments, while growth in POS payments was slow since launch. Similar to Payconiq, the merchant acceptance network was well-established, but customers just founded it too quirky to use Blik at POS compared to contactless card. Now, with “safety first” this might change”. Before, only two parties benefited from each Blik transaction: merchants were saving money on acceptance costs (for many merchants Blik is cheaper to accept than cards) and issuing banks were getting a bit more than standard card interchange. Now customers also see the clear benefit for themselves — no need to ever enter PIN and minimized contagion risk. With the last missing piece covered, Blik POS transactions are likely to sky-rocket in Q2’20, as Polish customers are generally flexible, quick to embrace innovations and well aware of CoVID-19 danger and preventive measures that should be taken.</p><p>But Blik once again proved that they do not just rely on consumer behavior shifts, but reinforce them — quickly launching a great promotion campaign. #Shopsharing promotes a new way of shopping: one person going to the shop to buy supplies for friends and family. Blik helps twice in this customer journey: first, the shopper is encouraged to pay with Blik in the shop to avoid contagion, and later Blik app could be used to settle the bills among split shopping participants. One-minute <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PmteC9jqjKk&amp;fbclid=IwAR2dYwslU9z3017wctPkftPCW49vfjok2tK8vMf2t1r5xB0xaYQ8me_l52A">#Shopsharing campaign video</a> featuring top Polish MC gained &gt;1mln views on Youtube in just 2 weeks. An amazing result for a digital wallet promo. Blik marketing continues to be best-in-class among peer solutions in Europe.</p><p>In the beginning of April 2020 Mastercard <a href="https://www.wiadomoscihandlowe.pl/artykuly/mastercard-kupil-udzialy-w-blik-u-to-wazny-moment-,62908">bought a share</a> in Blik — most likely this is a sign of coming European expansion of the solution. Great traction in Poland, strong management and marketing teams and unique technology are likely to make Blik’s European expansion a success. Mastercard wants to become both an enabler and a beneficiary of this success.</p><p><strong>Twint</strong></p><p>Swiss Twint is a venture created by large local banks to confront Apple and Google Pay on home turf. UBS and Credit Suisse poured gigantic 500mln CHF into development and blocked Apple efforts to come to set a foot in Switzerland for some time. Combined efforts secured a certain level of merchant adoption with Twint Bluetooth Beacons and POS QR codes in <a href="https://telebasel.ch/2018/07/02/twint-strebt-eine-marktabdeckung-von-ueber-90-prozent-an/?channel=8950">50,000 retail outlets</a>, but customers simply didn’t see enough benefits from the solution. Customer base included only 10%, with most customers being dormant users. This gave Twint <a href="https://medium.com/@alex.ram/mobile-payment-apps-in-europe-part-3-blik-and-twint-f1fb356024c">the reputation of a failure</a>, there were even voices suggesting future potential roll-off, especially after Apple Pay market entrance. However, CoVID-19 crisis gave it another hope — at the end of March Twint reported new daily registrations more than doubling (from 3000 to 7000 per day) and transactions increase by 60–100% in certain retail segments. The demand from online and POS retailers surged as well. One of the biggest grocery chain, Aldi, <a href="https://www.blick.ch/news/wirtschaft/jetzt-auch-beim-discounter-bei-aldi-kann-man-neu-mit-twint-bezahlen-id15838057.html">incorporated Twint</a> in their stores at the beginning of April, as part of the effort to promote social distancing. Interestingly, Twint faces an easier battle compared to Payconiq and Blik. While in card-centric contactless heavens like Netherlands and Poland wallets fight against cards, Twint main competitor is cash, which Swiss customers still use for eye-popping <a href="https://cashessentials.org/publication/70-of-swiss-payments-are-in-cash/">70% of in-store transactions</a>. Conservative payments habits are being changed by the CoVID-19 crisis and Twint has local banks support and strong initial adoption to capitalize on this shift.</p><p>The contactless card payments still remain the main substitute for mobile wallets. Now contactless limits for cards are being raised throughout the world, resulting in customers being less frequently asked to enter PIN. First of all, this raises fraud risks — now fraudsters can spend more with a lost or stolen card. Second, in many countries, customers still need to enter their PIN when the cumulative transaction ceiling is reached (e.g. in Belgium each time <a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/brussels/105031/banks-increase-limit-for-contactless-payments/">more than 100 EUR is spent</a> in contactless mode). With mobile wallets, PIN entry is eliminated completely — and with no compromise on fraud protection.</p><p>All of these create a “rise and shine” moment for mobile wallets solutions. The ones that have their acceptance infrastructure in place and are quick enough to capture the opportunity — like Apple Pay and Blik — will rule in the cashless (and potentially cardless) world of tomorrow.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ed75e313b54f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/2020-crisis-as-a-rise-and-shine-moment-for-mobile-wallets-at-pos-will-they-capture-it-ed75e313b54f">2020 crisis as a “rise and shine” moment for mobile wallets at POS — will they capture it?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy">Fintech Strategy Sketches</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How the Corona Crisis and European lockdown will affect payments fintech?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/how-the-corona-crisis-and-european-lockdown-will-affect-payments-fintech-e31bde931ab0?source=rss----1967c2364e08---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e31bde931ab0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[payment-gateway]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[payments]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Yaroslav Taran]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2020 19:42:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-24T20:42:59.529Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/704/1*2FstoeccgZhAUhDRG6vzvg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Economic crisis stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic will affect all the industries, although the size of the effect and its longevity will vary. Intrinsically, payments business is relatively more stable and less susceptible to shocks than airlines, hotels or production businesses. Long contracting times bring price and relative volume stability to payments acceptance business, while customer stickiness and spending patterns give stability to issuing business. Nevertheless, COVID-19 crisis and global lockdown are rapidly changing the ways customers pay and businesses accept payments. All companies of a comprehensive payments eco-system are affected — although each group is affected in its own way. Within next couple of months (or more) some companies are going to get hurt and some might get bankrupt, while others will get a strong push for their business.</p><h3>POS Acquirers/PSPs</h3><p><strong>(e.g. Worldline, Elavon, Concardis)</strong></p><p><strong>Downsides</strong>:</p><ul><li>Sharp decline (up to 60–80%) in POS payments in travel, hospitality, non-food retail, and services.</li></ul><p><strong>Upsides:</strong></p><ul><li>Short-term increase in food retail (+20–30%) and healthcare sectors due to an increase in customer spending in those two segments</li><li>In addition, there is a surge in POS card transactions at the expense of a decline in cash usage, especially in markets with high cash penetration (Italy, Germany, Spain, Eastern Europe), as people are trying to use cash less to stop the coronavirus transmission</li></ul><p>In this situation, short-term volume winners could be POS players with large share of food retail (e.g. MarketPay), while biggest potential losers are acquirers serving sectors largely affected by shutdowns, such as hospitality, travel, fashion (e.g. Elavon, First Data, Adyen). Players with a more balanced sector portfolio (e.g. Worldline) also will experience margin eradication as with volume shifting towards less profitable food retail segments.</p><p>Clear long-term winners are acquirers rooted in previously cash-centric markets (e.g. Nexi in Italy, Comercia in Spain, Concardis in Germany) as an increase in card penetration might be retained and after the crisis.</p><h3>eCommerce Acquirers/PSPs</h3><p><strong>(e.g. Adyen, Wirecard)</strong></p><p><strong>Downsides:</strong></p><ul><li>Sharp short- to mid-term drop on travel and hospitality transaction volumes (up to 100%)</li><li>Potential mid- to long-term decline in non-essential retail volumes (fashion, etc.) due to economic downturn</li><li>Drop in recurring payments volumes, as many customers may temporarily cancel non-essential offline subscriptions (gym, transportation, club memberships)</li></ul><p><strong>Upsides:</strong></p><ul><li>A drastic surge in online retail due to closure of offline shops and fears over going out for shopping</li><li>Fashion retail, healthcare, DIY, games, entertainment and media sectors will drive the online volume increase for acquirers/PSPs</li><li>A drastic surge in digital subscriptions, as people have more time for digital content</li></ul><p>In short-term eCommerce, acquirers/PSPs focused on digital goods and online retail will be the biggest volume winners among payment providers. Given the situation uncertainty and formation of new customer habits over the course of the crisis, that can be translated into a significant growth push to already high-growing online payments acceptance business. On the other hand, providers serving to travel retail will be the biggest losers, experiencing up to 80–90% volume drops in those segments.</p><p>In reality, most PSPs have pretty diversified sector portfolios and volume losses in one sector will be offset by gains in another. However, given that travel transaction fees are normally 30–50% higher than those in retail, average pricing per transaction is likely to go down, hurting end-year revenues.</p><h3>Card-focused Neobanks</h3><p><strong>(e.g. Revolut, N26, Monzo)</strong></p><p><strong>Downsides:</strong></p><ul><li>Travel-oriented product propositions clearly lose their customer appeal during the pandemic (and potentially for some time afterwards). Companies like Revolut might see their active customer base dropping down for some time, which is a death-like scenario for an aggressive high growth business. Re-positioning early and quickly is going to be vital. New proposition could be centered around cross-border payments, investments, credit, etc.</li><li>A crisis is a tough time for high-growing cash-burning businesses and can lead to wave of neobanks fallouts or consolidations (unless they secured 500M financing just before the crisis, <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2020/02/24/revolut-raises-500-million-at-5-5-billion-valuation/">like Revolut did</a>)</li></ul><p><strong>Upsides:</strong></p><ul><li>Neobank’s propositions featuring short-term credit, overdrafts, payday loans and business financing (e.g Monzo, Starling) are likely to get swamped with loan applications. However, a surge in borrower might be followed by a surge in non-performing loans</li></ul><p>Different value propositions will pay off differently during the crisis. Neobanks are quite fast to adjust, but, nevertheless, they are entering a period of a tough time.</p><h3>Traditional Card Issuers</h3><p><strong>(e.g. Banks)</strong></p><p><strong>Downsides:</strong></p><ul><li>A decrease in card transactions, leading to an increase in interchange revenue</li><li>Potential brief increases in ATM withdrawals in panicking regions</li></ul><p><strong>Upsides:</strong></p><ul><li>More savings left on individual accounts of customers with stable uninterrupted cash flow (e.g. salaried employees in less affected industries)</li><li>Inflow of savings from neobanks into accounts in traditional banks, as customers look for safer heaven. Also rising potential of 0% to negative deposit interest rate for customers</li><li>Higher credit card balances with customers and businesses experiencing liquidity problems (e.g. freelancers)</li></ul><p>While banks might experience many problems arising from the coronacrisis, issuing business is clearly not one of them. Higher credit card usage from some customers and increased unused savings from other will</p><h3>Card schemes</h3><p><strong>(e.g. Visa, MasterCard, American Express)</strong></p><p><strong>Downsides:</strong></p><ul><li>Juicy revenues from cross-border transactions are going to dry out for the period of lockdown (Mastercard and Visa already issued statements revising earnings)</li><li>High margin hospitality sector revenues are vaping out for the same time</li><li>American Express revenues might fall off the cliff since business travel is stumbled across Europe and North America</li><li>General drop in transactions across markets in lockdown</li></ul><p><strong>Upsides:</strong></p><ul><li>Increased card penetration at POS in cash-centric markets due to sanitary concerns around coronavirus. Potentially can lead to increased adoption even after the pandemic is over, creating long-term revenue opportunities for Visa/Mastercard</li></ul><h3>Cross-border P2P payment providers</h3><p><strong>(e.g. Transferwise, WorlRemit, Remitly)</strong></p><p><strong>Downsides:</strong></p><ul><li>A sharp decline in remittances as some expat workers in Europe and US might temporarily lose (a portion of) their income in the future in case of a lasting economic downturn</li><li>Freezing of business-related payments (e.g freelance, small B2B), due to many projects going on hold over the economic uncertainty</li></ul><p><strong>Upsides:</strong></p><ul><li>New volumes arising from payments that otherwise would be carried over in cash, but could not due to travel restrictions</li></ul><p>New volumes stemming from travel bans are unlikely to cover all volume losses from remittances and traditional B2B. Moreover, in Europe many short-term workers from Eastern Europe already went back to their home countries on the onset of the crisis, and many more are likely to follow in the event of a lasting downturn. This implies we are most likely to see cross-border P2P payments volumes down by 10–20% in 2020, with the largest players, such as Transferwise, Moneygram, Western Union, Worldremit and Paypal being affected the most.</p><h3>Alternative payments methods and wallets</h3><p><strong>(e.g. Apple Pay, Klarna, Payconiq)</strong></p><p>Contactless payment methods that can eliminate touching the terminal are in an upswing, with Apple Pay and Google Pay adoption accelerating over the sanitary concerns. Alternative payment methods like Swish, Payconiq and MobilePay might also get increased adoption if they position themselves wisely.</p><p>In e-commerce, while there is rising uncertainty with delivery times, immediate bank transfer-based payment methods (e.g. PaybyBank) may slightly lose share, while credit-drive Klarna and Afterpay will become a method of choice for many customers.</p><p>— — — — —</p><p>Despite many downsides, the crisis also offering many payments players the emerging niches and evolving opportunities to increase volumes and customer adoption. In order to do so, they need to be quick with changing their strategies and repositioning their products at a crisis mode speed.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e31bde931ab0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy/how-the-corona-crisis-and-european-lockdown-will-affect-payments-fintech-e31bde931ab0">How the Corona Crisis and European lockdown will affect payments fintech?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fintech-strategy">Fintech Strategy Sketches</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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