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        <title><![CDATA[Gamma Point Capital - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Gamma Point is a hedge fund investing in digital assets and blockchain technology. Read what’s top of mind at Gamma Point and in the digital asset ecosystem as a whole. - Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Quest for Yield: Market-Neutral Strategies in Crypto]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/the-quest-for-yield-market-neutral-strategies-in-crypto-2762da22f315?source=rss----117b0e0bcbc8---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[arbitrage]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fixed-income]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[yield]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sanat Rao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2021 02:02:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-22T02:01:59.732Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/0*rhUkZr73Fbwrc1Ca" /></figure><p><strong><em>Disclaimer:</em></strong></p><ol><li><em>The above reflects the views of the investor and should NOT be construed as investment advice, financial advice or legal advice.</em></li><li><em>This information is purely educational and is NOT meant to be taken as a recommendation to buy or sell any product or service. </em><strong><em>Please do your own research before making any decisions.</em></strong></li><li><em>Where relevant, direct quotes &amp; passages have been taken from whitepapers, articles and blog posts, with their sources cited.</em></li></ol><p>2020 was a tumultuous year — as the Covid19 pandemic threatened to shut down the economy, the US federal reserve brought interest rates close to zero to help speed up the recovery. Savings accounts interest rates all over the world today are at an all-time low.</p><p>According to Bankrate, the <a href="https://www.bankrate.com/banking/savings/rates/">best annual interest rate offered by banks</a> in April 2021 is a measly 0.5% !</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*7odY-2bkjfjDhsY6" /><figcaption>Source: Bankrate</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Crypto markets</strong> in contrast have rapidly become institutionalized with a robust <strong>derivatives market</strong> and <strong>borrowing/lending</strong> platforms. <strong>Decentralized finance</strong> (DeFI) has rapidly become the ‘killer app’ for crypto, and will <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/philippsandner/2021/02/22/decentralized-finance-will-change-your-understanding-of-financial-systems/?sh=79898b6e5b52">transform the structure of financial services</a> in the future — DeFi uses smart contracts on blockchains to completely bypass the traditional centralized financial intermediaries and rebuild these primitives( banks, exchanges, asset managers etc) in a more efficient and transparent manner</p><p>These developments have resulting in amazing <strong><em>fixed income opportunities</em></strong> in the crypto world.</p><h3>Market-Neutral Strategies</h3><p>A market-neutral strategy is a position whose return is <strong>un-correlated to the underlying market direction,</strong> and is ideal for investors looking to generate <strong>high risk-adjusted returns,</strong> as measured by high Sharpe ratios. An ideal market neutral strategy will generate returns <em>without taking on directional risk</em>, and can therefore be considered as a fixed-income yield strategy.</p><p>This article covers the use of <strong>market-neutral strategies to</strong> generate <strong>fixed-income (yield)</strong> in Crypto and DeFi markets.</p><p><strong><em>Notes</em></strong><em>:</em></p><ul><li><em>This article is not intended to be a comprehensive list of all market-neutral strategies. For example, we do not cover the use of options strategies to generate yield, etc.</em></li><li><em>For the sake of simplicity, we have organized the recommended strategies from low complexity to high, starting with basic crypto savings accounts and ending with hedged yield farming models.</em></li></ul><h3>1. CeFi and DeFi Lending</h3><p><strong>Annual Yield Range: </strong>6–12%</p><p><strong>Complexity: </strong>Low</p><h4>Centralized Lending Platforms (CeFi)</h4><p>One of the earliest lending platforms to develop in the crypto ecosystem were the large professional crypto lending platforms such as Blockfi, Celcius and Vauld. Investors can open accounts at these firms (similar to a bank savings account), deposit their crypto assets and earn interest payments.</p><p>At the time of writing this article, here are the yields at some of the top crypto lenders for USDC, BTC and ETH:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*syi1yllBHMW5hfyu" /></figure><p>Investors should note that these platforms are NOT FDIC insured and bear all the traditional counterparty risks (these lending platforms lend your deposited assets to other parties who could default) as well as broader ‘systemic’ crypto risks. These are good entry points for investors looking for decent returns while taking on relatively low risk.</p><h4>DeFi Lending Protocols</h4><p>The traditional lending industry relies on underwriting and legally binding contracts to determine default risk and enforce creditworthiness. i.e when you apply for a loan to a bank, you provide your salary statements, credit history etc. and the bank determines if you are worthy of a loan. Once approved, you sign a legal contract that can be enforced in court.</p><p>In decentralized finance, where there are no intermediaries and loans are accessed pseudonymously, lending is instead managed by <strong>over-collateralization</strong> &amp; <strong>liquidation via smart contracts.</strong> Borrowers always have to supply more value in collateral than they can borrow, and suppliers can always seize that collateral through a free and open market for liquidation. These mechanics are enforced by software and work exactly the same way regardless of the borrowers’ creditworthiness.</p><p>Compound, Aave and MakerDAO were the early decentralized lending platforms and are still the market leaders today. The table below shows an example of how <strong>Compound finance</strong> works:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*lOpai4DxctbCXrVR" /><figcaption>Source: Compound Finance</figcaption></figure><p>In return for the (perceived) higher risk of crypto and the big demand for borrowing stablecoins in DeFi, a lender can earn much higher interest rates than traditional CeFi platforms, by “lending to a smart contract”. The graph below shows the lending rate for USDC at the 3 top platforms. These rates are all consistently higher than the interest rates earned on their centralized lending counterparts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*yTrz12EdpyyrXXgC" /><figcaption>Source: Loanscan.io</figcaption></figure><p>In summary, a lender converts their USD to USDC (stablecoins), deposits these assets in Compound and earns the 14.31% interest ! Needless to say, the interest rates move regularly and the lender bears all the traditional DeFi risks (smart contract errors, rug pulls risks, etc.)</p><h3>2. The BASIS trade</h3><p><strong>Annual Yield Range: </strong>20%-50%</p><p><strong>Complexity: </strong>Medium</p><p>The BASIS trade (also known as the Cash-and-carry trade) is a well understood arbitrage strategy in traditional commodities and FX markets. Crypto futures contracts are traded on most large crypto exchanges (Binance, FTX, OKEX etc) as well as traditional exchanges such as the CME.</p><p>Typically, futures contracts trade at a <strong>premium</strong> to the spot market (this phenomenon is known in financial terminology as <strong><em>contango</em></strong>). The term <strong>basis</strong> refers to the difference between the Futures price f(t) and the Spot price S(t), at time t.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CEAqXPevv9FtJmxNlxQYyQ.png" /></figure><p>During a bull market phase, there is a huge demand from retail investors to use leverage to buy BTC and ETH futures contracts. At such a time t = α, F(α) &gt;&gt; S( α) and the basis spread is high. A basis trader buys the spot (i.e. goes long Bitcoin) and sells the futures contract (i.e. short the futures), thereby completely hedging their position.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uJEKsFv2Afco3TP_9_IhgA.png" /></figure><p>At time of expiry (t = ε), the futures price and spot price converge. i.e F(ε) = S(ε) and the trader can unwind the position (buy back the futures contract and sell the spot). By holding the basis position to expiry, the trader has made a net profit of <strong>Basis(</strong>α<strong>).</strong> Since this profit has no directional risk, we can treat it as <strong>yield </strong>(fixed income return) !</p><p>In essence, the basis trader is providing the retail investor with leverage at time t = α, and is earning the yield <strong>Basis(</strong>α<strong>)</strong> in return !</p><p><strong>A simple example:</strong></p><ul><li>On April 10 2021 (t=α), BTC is trading at $60,264 and the BTC June25 futures contract is trading at $66,264.<br> i.e. F(α)= $60,264 and S(α)= $66,264</li><li>A trader will buy 1 Bitcoin and use it as collateral to sell 663 BTC0625 contracts on Binance (each contract = $100). The trader is <strong>fully hedged</strong> since 1 BTC long is hedged by the short futures contracts.</li><li>On the expiry date of June 25, the prices of the 2 instruments are guaranteed to converge (barring any systemic risks).</li><li>By holding this basis position until June 25, the trader is guaranteed to make a Profit = <strong>Basis(</strong>α<strong>)</strong></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gMj8ACH5NRXjmojlhe61yg.png" /></figure><ul><li>This is a <strong>9.94% return in &lt; 3 months</strong> (around 77 days), translating to a <strong>47.19 % annualized return !</strong></li><li>This is a <strong>risk-free return,</strong> as long as the exchange (Binance in this case) doesn’t go bust during the period. That’s because once the spot and futures prices are locked in, they will converge so that the spread between them is the payoff, minus trading fees.</li></ul><p>The chart above shows the BTC rolling basis for the last few months. The basis has been well above 30% during the bull market phase.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*N-SiF467c38PF1nq" /><figcaption>Source: Skew.com</figcaption></figure><p>As always, the complexity in the trade is in estimating the right time to take position (when the overall sentiment is bullish towards the underlying asset) and optimizing for slippage during the trade execution process.</p><h3>3. Perpetual Contract Funding Rates</h3><p><strong>Annual Yield Range:</strong> 10%-160%</p><p><strong>Complexity: </strong>High</p><p>The perpetual contract aka <em>perp</em> is a derivative instrument unique to crypto markets. Perps are similar to futures contract with 2 differences:</p><ol><li>Perps have no expiry date and</li><li>The perp price closely tracks the underlying spot price</li></ol><p>Perps enable traders to speculate on an asset’s price without the need to hold the actual asset. For example. users can open a leveraged long position by buying BTC-PERP contracts if they expect the underlying asset’s (BTC) price to go up, or a short position if they expect BTC price to go down.</p><p>The <strong>Funding Rate</strong> is a mechanism used by exchanges to drive the price of a perpetual contract (called the “mark price”) <strong>towards</strong> the spot price of the underlying asset (the “index price”). Funding payments are a <em>series of continuous payments</em> exchanged between longs and shorts of a perpetual contract, and can be a method of <strong>generating yield</strong>.</p><h4><strong>Funding Rate Premium:</strong></h4><p>In a given interval (<em>usually once per eight hours</em>), a derivative exchange calculates the time-weighted average price (<em>or “TWAP”</em>) of the Perpetual Contract Price (mark price) and the TWAP of the Spot Price (index price). The Funding Rate Premium is calculated as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*t5zNt6a8iRuZ2ME586vTvQ.png" /></figure><p>I<strong>f Premium &gt; 0, the markets are bullish</strong>. This causes the longs to make a payment to the shorts, thereby incentivizing the shorts to take the less popular side, thereby pushing the mark price closer to the index side</p><p><strong>If Premium &lt; 0, the markets are bearish</strong>. This causes the shorts to make a payment to the longs, thereby incentivizing the longs to take the less popular side, thereby pushing the mark price closer to the index price.</p><h4><strong>Funding Rate Interest (I)</strong></h4><p>The Interest Rate term in funding rate calculation is a function of the differential of borrow rates of quote currency and base currency of the perpetual contract. The Interest Rate thus is a proxy for cost of holding a position in a perpetual contract. Most exchanges use a fixed amount for interest rates (for example, I = 0.01% for every 8 hrs in the case of Binance)</p><h4><strong>The Funding Rate and Funding Payments</strong></h4><p>The funding rate formula is relatively complicated. Binance uses the following formula</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bqAaF8qnu42wWZ51j_niPw.png" /></figure><p>A trader can use the perp contract to earn the funding rate as follows:</p><ul><li>Identify a contract where funding rates have been consistently &gt; 0 for a period of time (e.g .3 days, 1 week etc).</li><li>Buy x amount of the spot (e.g.BTC) and use it as collateral to sell x perp contracts (e.g BTC-PERP) short. the trader is now hedged against the underlying price movements in BTC</li><li>As long as funding rate &gt; 0, the trader will earn a funding payment every 8 hours according to the formula above !</li></ul><p>Needless to say, this is a complex position and requires constant monitoring but if executed well, returns can be compelling. For example, the funding rate for the SUSHI -ERP on Delta Exchange has averaged 0.15% for 8 hrs for the past 3 months. This is <strong>13.5% per month</strong> == <strong>162% APY</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*KtFhoaCsTEODyZJS" /><figcaption>Source: Delta exchange</figcaption></figure><h3>4. DeFi “Hedged” Yield Farming</h3><p><strong>Annual Yield Range: </strong>10%-300%</p><p><strong>Complexity: </strong>High</p><p>We now come to the Grand Daddy of all yield strategies in Crypto: the DeFi Hedged Yield Farming position.</p><h4><strong>What is Yield Farming</strong></h4><p>Yield Farming is the broad practice of generating returns on your crypto assets, by using them to provide liquidity or lending them to a DeFi smart-contract liquidity pool. Broadly, there are 3 forms of yield in the DeFi world:</p><ul><li><strong>Transaction Fees (TF)</strong>: ‘Farmers’ (aka liquidity providers) provide liquidity into a DeFi pool and earn a % of the transaction fees. For example, Uniswap charges 0.3% on each token trade as fees, and passes on this fee proportionately to liquidity providers.</li><li><strong>Governance Token Incentives (Gov)</strong>: Farmers also earn the protocol governance tokens as an incentive for providing liquidity. For example, the leveraged YF protocol Alpha Homora is currently distributing 237,500 ALPHA tokens to farmers who opened a leveraged position within the 2-week period from Mar 31 — Apr 14.</li><li><strong>Staking Fees (S):</strong> Some protocols offer additional incentives for governance token holders who are willing to lock up (aka ‘stake’) heir tokens. For example, SUSHI token holders today earn 0.05% fees for staking their tokens.</li></ul><p>Yield Farming is a high risk activity with significant risk for all participants, including smart contract bugs and ‘rug-pulls’. There are 3 financial risks that farmers need to consider:</p><ul><li><strong>Price risk aka Directional Risk</strong> Farmers depositing tokens A and B into a pool to earn fees are obviously exposed to movements in price of these tokens (since they are long A and B by definition)</li><li><strong>Impermanent Loss (IL)</strong>: This is the loss experienced by liquidity providers because prices between pairs in a pool diverge from those at the time of entering the pool. Here is a simple <a href="https://dappgrid.com/what-is-impermanent-loss/">explanation</a> of IL</li><li><strong>Gas Prices(Gas)</strong>: Gas in a blockchain network (e.g. Ethereum) is the fee paid to miners to execute instructions in a smart contract. During times of high demand, gas prices can skyrocket and eat away from the earnings of a DeFi yield farmer</li></ul><p>So a Yield Farmer’s net profit can be calculated as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5A36BBwQRP3FvrFzg-8BNA.png" /></figure><p>As we can see, the net yield is <em>deeply exposed </em>to the price movements in A and B. A “hedged” yield farming example uses futures contracts to hedge out this risk.</p><h4>Hedged Yield Farming Example</h4><p>We outline the process of earning <em>predictable yield</em> from Yield Farming below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ldr7_IRMqMv9gcJ2" /><figcaption>Source: CoinGecko</figcaption></figure><ul><li>In the table above, farmer Chad notices that the Onsen SUSHI/WETH pool on Sushiswap is currently “yielding”an amazing 154.2% APY.</li><li>Chad has a capital of $250,000. He buys $100,000 of SUSHI (token A) and $100,000 of WETH (token B) on a DEX or a DEX-aggregator (like 1inch)</li><li>Chad then proceeds to a centralized exchange (e.g. FTX) and sells $25,000 of SUSHI-perps (at 4X leverage) and $25,000 of WETH-perps (at 4X leverage). This ensures that the position is hedged from the price movements of A and B. [the 4X leverage does expose Chad to liquidation risks if the prices of A or B shoot up drastically]</li><li>Chad deposits A and B into the Sushiswap Onsen pool.</li><li>At fixed intervals, Chad withdraws X SUSHI tokens he received as incentives and stakes them to earn staking fees SF.</li><li>4 months later, Chad unwinds the position by withdrawing liquidity from the pool (thereby receiving the transaction fees and tokens), closing out the futures positions and selling A and B tokens to get back to USD. He also unstaking his X SUSHI tokens and selling them at market at prevailing price P.</li></ul><p>Chad’s net yield is:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DQsUX2kplBoFgGhuMEK-Pg.png" /></figure><p>Needless to say, hedged yield farming positions add an additional layer of complexity to a reasonably complex process. In return, the farmer is hedged from price movements in the underlying tokens and can focus on earning a <strong>market-neutral yield.</strong></p><h3>Summary</h3><p>The crypto ecosystem today and the advent of decentralized finance has opened up incredibly rich yield generating opportunities.</p><p>It is important to note the reasons these yield opportunities exist in the first place:</p><ol><li><strong>Demand for Leverage</strong>: Retail investors in crypto markets create huge demand for leverage during bull runs, driving up yields. Traders providing them with this leverage have a chance to earn yield</li><li><strong>DeFi Incentives</strong>: New DeFi pools will ‘bootstrap liquidity’ by offering their Governance tokens to early liquidity providers.</li><li><strong>Ease of Access</strong>: Borrowers, lenders, liquidity providers and traders in DeFi can freely transact with each other without any regulatory or national boundaries. As more participants flock to these venues, more transaction fees are collected and passed onto liquidity providers as yield.</li></ol><p>With the entry of larger institutional players and large amts of $$, some of these yield opportunities may compress over time. We believe that we are still in the early phase of the crypto market-neutral phase and these opportunities will continue for the next several years.</p><p>Investors seeking superior “risk-adjusted” returns will be well served by adding crypto market-neutral strategies to their investment portfolio.</p><p>— — -</p><p><em>Sanat Rao is the managing partner at Gamma Point Capital. He was previously a Partner at IDG Ventures focused on investments in fintech, blockchain and enterprise software. Sanat held earlier roles at Intel Capital and iSPIRT on the investment and M&amp;A teams.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2762da22f315" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/the-quest-for-yield-market-neutral-strategies-in-crypto-2762da22f315">The Quest for Yield: Market-Neutral Strategies in Crypto</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital">Gamma Point Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Past, Present and Future of Decentralized Exchanges]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/the-past-present-and-future-of-decentralized-exchanges-95dc1cfb6412?source=rss----117b0e0bcbc8---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/95dc1cfb6412</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uniswap]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dex]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul Rai]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Mar 2021 18:19:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-17T18:18:27.632Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Ts6dhRgiduG-2OC1" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@peiobty?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Pierre Borthiry</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>Originally published on </em></strong><a href="https://messari.io/article/the-past-present-and-future-of-decentralized-exchanges"><strong><em>Messari</em></strong></a></p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer:</em></strong></p><ol><li><em>The above reflects the views of the investor and should NOT be construed as investment advice, financial advice or legal advice.</em></li><li><em>This information is purely educational and is NOT meant to be taken as a recommendation to buy or sell any product or service. </em><strong><em>Please do your own research before making any decisions.</em></strong></li><li><em>Where relevant, </em><strong><em>direct quotes &amp; passages </em></strong><em>have been taken from the sources, whitepapers, and blog posts cited.</em></li></ol><p>Market makers play a crucial role in the smooth functioning of financial markets. By continuously quoting prices at which they stand ready to buy (‘bid”) and sell (“ask” or “offer”), they increase liquidity for other market participants, enabling them to trade the underlying asset at tight prices with minimal slippage. In addition, by providing liquidity across various exchanges and arbitraging away inter-market price discrepancies, they increase overall market efficiency and enable price discovery.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*UnkIT1VO3Ne0Sji-" /><figcaption><em>Source:</em><a href="https://towardsdatascience.com/automating-trading-and-market-making-with-artificial-intelligence-d8e975917083?gi=8361203d1f53"><em> Towards Data Science</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>Market making is ultimately a complex optimization problem, in which participants leverage proprietary statistical models and low-latency technology to build sustainable long-term moats. All of this results in the market maker distribution being power-low dominated and fat tailed, with only a few top participants capturing a lion’s share of trading volume. In U.S equity markets for example, Citadel Securities and Virtu together capture almost 50–60% of<a href="https://panteracapital.medium.com/investing-in-wintermute-d4ece31ff665"> market share</a>.<a href="https://www.citadelsecurities.com/products/equities-and-options/"> Citadel Securities</a> in particular trades approximately 25% of U.S equities volume and 39% of all U.S listed retail volume, across more than 8,000 listed securities and over 16,000 OTC securities.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*sHmVAIeQ-W6yzKCl" /></figure><p>In stark contrast to traditional finance, where regulatory and competitive barriers prohibit individuals and smaller shops from filling the market maker role, crypto markets provide direct market access to all participants. Individual traders have full access to the technology stack of centralized exchanges, enabling them to provide quotes and trade algorithmically using the same APIs and servers as professional firms. Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has taken this one step further, and fully democratizes access to market making and liquidity provision through the implementation of Automated Market Maker (AMM) based Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs).</p><p>AMM based DEXs have proven to be one of the most impactful DeFi innovations, allowing investors to seamlessly trade between cryptocurrencies in a completely decentralized and non-custodial manner through pre-funded on-chain liquidity pools. By just depositing capital into these on-chain liquidity pools (LPs), liquidity providers can earn passive income on their capital through accrued trading fees, based on the percentage of their contribution to the pool.</p><p>DEXs have had unprecedented success over the past few months. Led by Uniswap, DEX volumes soared to a record $72 billion high in February, and the total liquidity (otherwise known as total value locked) on DEX platforms also reached a<a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/led-by-uniswap-decentralized-exchange-volumes-soared-above-50b-in-january"> new all-time high</a> of more than $12 billion.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*tnaf6B4GkIq7fCBt" /><figcaption><em>Source: </em><a href="https://duneanalytics.com/"><em>Dune Analytics</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>However despite their success, AMMs face their own set of challenges. A number of inherent problems such as<a href="https://academy.binance.com/en/articles/impermanent-loss-explained"> impermanent loss</a> (IL),<a href="https://blog.chain.link/challenges-in-defi-how-to-bring-more-capital-and-less-risk-to-automated-market-maker-dexs/"> </a>capital efficiency, slippage, gas costs, speed and multi-token exposure are holding them back. In this article we’ll cover the three main areas around which DEXs and AMMs are innovating, and highlight their most promising implementations:</p><ol><li><strong>Capital Efficiency &amp; Customizable AMM Curves</strong>:<a href="https://blog.bancor.network/announcing-bancor-v2-2f56b515e9d8"> Bancor</a>,<a href="https://dodoex.io/"> DODO</a>,<a href="https://medium.com/balancer-protocol/balancer-v2-generalizing-amms-16343c4563ff"> Balancer,</a><a href="https://andrecronje.medium.com/deriswap-capital-efficient-swaps-futures-options-and-loans-ea424b24a41c"> Deriswap</a>,<a href="https://uniswap.org/"> Uniswap</a></li><li><strong>On-Chain Market Makers &amp; Orderbooks</strong>:<a href="https://pro.kyber.network/"> Kyber</a>,<a href="https://0x.org/"> 0x</a>,<a href="https://projectserum.com/"> Serum</a>,<a href="https://raydium.io/#/"> Raydium</a></li><li><strong>DEX Aggregators &amp; Cross-chain Liquidity</strong>:<a href="https://1inch.exchange/#/"> 1inch</a>,<a href="https://matcha.xyz/"> Matcha</a>,<a href="https://thorchain.org/"> THORchain</a></li></ol><h3>Capital Efficiency &amp; Customizable AMM Curves</h3><p>The launch of Uniswap’s constant function market, <strong>x*y=k</strong>, in late 2018, was a pivotal moment that kick-started the Cambrian explosion of innovation around AMM curves and constant-function market makers (CFMMs). Balancer took this one step further by implementing a constant mean market, a generalization of a constant product market, allowing for more than two assets and allowing for weights outside of 50/50. Curve, which launched in early 2020, modified Uniswap’s AMM function to minimize slippage for assets that are relatively stable-priced, demonstrating that small tweaks to CFMM curves could drastically improve capital efficiency and slippage.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*pSpnXO51BqLr-qQK" /></figure><p>There are however some<a href="https://blog.chain.link/challenges-in-defi-how-to-bring-more-capital-and-less-risk-to-automated-market-maker-dexs/"> inherent risks and inefficiencies</a> that LPs in AMM pools are exposed to. The most important, and relatively esoteric, risk is<a href="https://blog.bancor.network/beginners-guide-to-getting-rekt-by-impermanent-loss-7c9510cb2f22"> impermanent loss</a> (IL) — the difference in portfolio values over time between providing liquidity into an AMM pool versus buying and holding the underlying tokens (HODLing). It occurs because AMM prices don’t automatically adjust, so when market wide prices change, arbitrageurs step-in and profit<a href="https://twitter.com/willwarren89/status/1316622355947425794"> at the expense</a> of liquidity providers. So the actual return for LPs in AMM pools is a balance between the accumulated fees from trades and the impermanent loss caused by the price differential.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IO1HjJOS9xP5ncpq" /><figcaption><em>Source: </em><a href="https://pintail.medium.com/uniswap-a-good-deal-for-liquidity-providers-104c0b6816f2"><em>Pintail</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>In addition to IL, AMMs in their current implementation suffer from capital inefficiency, under-utilized liquidity and multi-token exposure. Since AMMs allocate funds uniformly across the price range (0, +∞), only capital allocated near market prices are being utilized efficiently with a substantial portion of funds only available when the pricing curve begins to turn exponential. As a result, AMMs require larger amounts of liquidity to match slippage on traditional order book exchanges. Moreover, AMMs are often referred to as “<a href="https://medium.com/dodoex/dodo-a-revolution-in-on-chain-liquidity-7bc339b9d391">lazy liquidity</a>” since price points being offered to traders cannot be controlled, unlike traditional market makers who are much more informed and nimble. Furthermore, AMMs usually require LPs to deposit two or more tokens to provide liquidity, often forcing exposure to additional assets.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/0*_NAAVCzJhnXsrc0a" /><figcaption><em>AMM curve vs an Order Book. Source:</em><a href="https://research.parsec.finance/posts/amm-tradeoff"><em> Parsec Research</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>Given the current limitations with AMMs, a number of protocols have stepped in to innovate around capital efficiency and customizable AMM logic. <strong>Bancor V2</strong>, which launched in Apr 2020, was one of the first protocols to address capital efficiency, impermanent loss and multi-token exposure. It leverages pegged liquidity reserves, which use price updates from Chainlink oracles to dynamically adjust the AMM pool weights. This aligns the internal pool price with external market prices, preventing arbitrageurs from siphoning value from LPs in the form of IL. In addition, V2 offers customizable AMM curve logic and integrations with lending pools, enabling lower slippage, better prices and higher capital efficiency. Finally by pegging liquidity reserves via Chainlink oracles, LPs can maintain single-token exposure and can select their exposure to any token in the AMM, from 0–100%.</p><p><strong>DODO</strong> is another protocol innovating around customizable AMM logic that pioneered the proactive market making (PMM) algorithm, which aims to be an<a href="https://medium.com/dodoex/proactive-market-making-algorithm-a-universal-liquidity-framework-4dec7fae7091"> elegant generalization</a> of the order book matching system. PMMs allow for greater capital efficiency and IL mitigation by leveraging price oracles to adjust the pricing curve such that a greater fraction of liquidity is concentrated around the market price of an asset. As shown below, it is clear that around the market price the DODO curve is significantly flatter than the Uniswap curve, indicating higher fund utilization and lower slippage.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_GDHRAwlDKbD-WGB" /></figure><p>There are also a few exciting unreleased projects tackling capital efficiency and AMM logic. For instance, <strong>Balancer V2</strong>, which is expected to launch in March this year, is a generalized AMM protocol innovating around capital efficiency, flexibility and gas efficiency. V2 implements a single vault that holds and manages all assets deposited into Balancer pools. Because the AMM logic is separate from the token management and accounting done by the vault, pools can implement any arbitrary, customizable AMM logic including weighted pools (for constant weight index funds), stable pools (for soft-pegged tokens) and smart pools (for ongoing parameter changes).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*VqEVDIleSztEYFIp" /></figure><p>Furthermore, with the launch of Asset Managers — trusted external smart contracts that can utilize the underlying tokens the pool has deposited in the vault — capital efficiency and yield can be improved by lending assets in the AMM, that are not being utilized, to lending protocols. The team recently<a href="https://medium.com/balancer-protocol/balancer-partners-with-aave-to-build-the-first-v2-asset-manager-d9c173330151"> announced</a> a partnership with Aave to build the first Balancer V2 Asset Manager.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*i-hgrX1Gehnu25oY" /></figure><p>In addition,<strong> Deriswap</strong>, which was announced by Andre Crone in collaboration with Sushiswap at the end of last year, combines swaps, options and loans into a single capital efficient contract. By consolidating liquidity and deploying capital across multiple use-cases, it allows LPs to maintain their asset exposure and earn additional yield. Finally <strong>Uniswap V3</strong> is another highly anticipated project that is rumored to implement customizable AMM curves and tackle capital efficiency.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2W4mQ9FN889-7LGO" /></figure><h3>On-chain Market Makers &amp; Orderbooks</h3><p>Capital markets aim to match buyers and sellers of financial assets in the most efficient and cost-effective manner. Historically, there have been two primary systems that centralized financial exchanges have implemented to match buyers and sellers of liquidity:</p><ol><li><strong>Request For Quot</strong>e (RFQ): Price takers send price quote requests to multiple market makers every time they wish to trade</li><li><strong>Central Limit Orderbook</strong> (CLOB): Market makers continuously stream quotes in an order book, which price takers trade against</li></ol><p>Both of these systems have evolved and survived the test of time as highly efficient ways to enable liquidity and price discovery, and they each have their advantages and disadvantages. RFQ systems work better when price takers come in less frequently with relatively larger sizes, and so market makers only have to show prices when they are pinged by takers. Most OTC desks implement some form of an RFQ technology — when I worked on the Foreign Exchange (FX) desk at Morgan Stanley for example, we would constantly respond to two-way OTC price quotes from hedge funds for large currency trades. CLOB systems work best when there is a constant stream of price takers coming in with relatively smaller trade sizes, in which case market makers are happy to continuously stream two-way price quotes algorithmically. Most centralized electronic exchanges implement CLOB systems.</p><p>In DeFi, AMMs captured a lion share of DEX liquidity due to the inherent scaling constraints of Ethereum, which make on-chain orderbooks and market makers less feasible. As AMMs saturate and professional market makers look for more efficient solutions to providing DeFi liquidity, we’re starting to see rapid innovation across both on-chain RFQ and CLOB protocols. Fully on-chain markers do token price quoting, order matching, and trade settlement all directly on the blockchain itself, while hybrid approaches perform orders and matching in an off-chain system.</p><p><strong>Kyber</strong>, for instance, is one of Asia’s leading players as a fully on-chain DeFi liquidity provider and has 5% of the DEX<a href="https://thedefiant.io/kyber-overhauled-its-protocol-and-token-holders-love-it/"> market share</a>. It has already facilitated over $1 billion in on-chain trading volume through the<a href="https://blog.kyber.network/kyber-fed-price-reserve-fpr-on-chain-market-making-for-professionals-7fea29ceac6c"> Fed Price Reserve</a> (FPR) — a liquidity system through which professional market makers can maintain an on-chain inventory of prices with control over pricing and rebalancing algorithms. The team launched<a href="https://blog.kyber.network/kyberpro-the-only-professional-framework-for-on-chain-market-making-d69ca74942b2"> KyberPRO</a> in late October of 2020, an end-to-end framework built on top of the FPR system that provides tools, documentation, and technical support to enable professional market makers to easily onboard to DeFi and run a profitable market making operation on-chain with minimal smart contract knowledge. Further with the recent<a href="https://blog.kyber.network/kyber-3-0-architecture-revamp-dynamic-mm-and-knc-migration-proposal-acae41046513"> Kyber 3.0</a> announcement, Kyber plans to transition from a single protocol to a hub of liquidity protocols that are catered to different DeFi use cases. In addition, they plan to launch Kyber DMM — an automated dynamic market maker that enables programmable pricing curves to improve capital efficiency and dynamic fees based on market conditions to mitigate IL and increase LP profits.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*KAtMeyBkHcwgGNDH" /><figcaption><em>Source:</em><a href="https://blog.kyber.network/kyber-3-0-architecture-revamp-dynamic-mm-and-knc-migration-proposal-acae41046513"><em> Kyber</em></a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>0x</strong> is another leading DEX infrastructure layer that has<a href="https://blockworks.co/pantera-capital-leads-15m-fundraise-in-dex-protocol-0x/"> two main products</a>: a DEX aggregation API that allows developers to integrate cross-platform asset swaps, which has already powered over $3.5B of trading volume, and a consumer facing DEX aggregator called Matcha, which has facilitated over $2.8B in trades in just the past six months. Professional market makers can provide liquidity via RFQs to users of the 0x API through a hybrid system, in which order storage and matching is done off-chain while trade settlement is done on-chain. With the tokenomics of v3, the network has generated<a href="https://blog.0xproject.com/0x-labs-has-raised-15m-to-bring-decentralized-exchange-markets-to-a-global-audience-e374c29c6ac1"> over $1M</a> in fees paid to ZRX holders and market makers, and the team<a href="https://blog.0xproject.com/say-hello-to-0x-v4-ce87ca38e3ac"> recently announced v4</a>, which introduces a new modular architecture that empowers developers to compose 0x with a growing number of DeFi primitives.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*k7p1InD9Tz8-yBTt" /><figcaption><em>Source:</em><a href="https://0x.org/docs/core-concepts#off-chain-relay-on-chain-settlement"><em> 0x</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>In addition, <strong>DODO</strong>, which as mentioned earlier pioneered the PMM algorithm,<a href="https://medium.com/dodoex/dodo-liquidity-provider-and-distributor-a3226e54dff2"> recently announced</a> their v2.0 which aims to bring professional market makers on-chain through the launch of<a href="https://medium.com/dodoex/dodo-private-pool-professional-market-making-on-chain-b18a282596e3"> DODO Private Pools</a> (DPP). Market makers can leverage these private markets and customizable PMM liquidity pools to deploy tailor-made strategies on-chain and react dynamically to market conditions. They also have the option of opening up their pools to retail LPs, which is an exciting step forward in the<a href="https://www.delphidigital.io/reports/dodo-v2-0-will-it-fly/"> democratization</a> of professional market making.</p><p>Furthermore, with some L1 blockchains offering significantly faster transaction throughput and settlement times relative to Ethereum, on-chain order books are becoming increasingly relevant. For instance, <strong>Serum</strong> is a DEX that lives natively on the<a href="https://solana.com/"> Solana</a> blockchain, but is fully interoperable with Ethereum, that offers decentralized on-chain limit orderbooks and trustless cross-chain swaps. Solana is a blockchain that combines a Proof-of-History (PoH) timestamp system with a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus algorithm to optimize for scalability and implements low transaction costs, sub-second settlement times and up to<a href="https://solana.com/"> 65K TPS</a> throughput (vs Ethereum’s current 15 TPS). Serum’s orderbook leverages Solana’s higher speeds and lower costs to deploy a fully on-chain and programmatic matching engine, allowing users to submit orders with directions, size and price specified. With<a href="https://bonfida.com/"> over $950mm</a> in volume facilitated since inception, Serum is one of the fastest growing DEXs and will likely continue to capture market share given the current throughput and gas constraints with Ethereum based DeFi protocols.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qYIHdzgdzTsRGzFX" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.publish0x.com/xyzashu/first-serum-dex-is-live-ftx-celebrates-with-holy-trinity-giv-xxondro"><em>Serum Orderbook</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>With the proliferation of on-chain market makers and orderbooks, we are inching closer to realizing Haseeb’s vision, outlined in<a href="https://medium.com/dragonfly-research/unbundling-uniswap-the-future-of-on-chain-market-making-1c7d6948d570"> Unbundling Uniswap</a>, of DeFi liquidity being commodified by aggregators, with professional on-chain market makers competing alongside with AMMs. It will be interesting to see where value ultimately accrues. Will Ethereum be able to maintain its dominance against other faster blockchains? And will AMMs be able to compete with more capital efficient on-chain market makers?</p><h3>Aggregators &amp; Cross-Chain Liquidity</h3><p><a href="https://www.delphidigital.io/reports/dex-wars-and-aggregation-theory/">DEX aggregators</a>, which consolidate liquidity and intelligently route orders to give users best execution on trades, have rapidly grown in volumes over the past few months. As aggregators continue to capture market share, the demand-side effectively becomes commoditized and AMM liquidity becomes<a href="https://stratechery.com/concept/aggregation-theory/commoditizing-suppliers/"> undifferentiated supply.</a> Traders will increasingly interact with DEXs only indirectly via aggregators, forcing DEXs to focus on owning the supply-side and providing competitive prices.</p><p>In short, <em>aggregators will compete for trader flow while AMMs compete for LP capital.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Mx7PHwBAxnr3tQw-" /></figure><p>Pantera captures this thesis beautifully in a<a href="https://panteracapital.medium.com/investing-in-wintermute-d4ece31ff665"> recent bog post</a> announcing their Series B announcement in Wintermute, a prominent crypto and DeFi market maker:</p><blockquote><em>“</em>We envision a future where liquidity across hundreds of decentralized exchanges is consolidated and easily accessed through aggregators like 1inch or Matcha. Market makers like Wintermute can plug liquidity directly into these aggregators and eventually make DEX markets as efficient as their centralized counterparts. This combination — user-focused DEX aggregators on the front end and hyper-efficient, sophisticated algorithms on the back end — has the potential to accelerate adoption of DeFi and even disintermediate centralized exchanges. In this future, centralized exchanges like Coinbase will serve as front ends for decentralized exchange infrastructure.”</blockquote><p>The two most dominant liquidity aggregators are currently 1inch and Matcha.<a href="https://1inch.exchange/"> </a><strong>1inch</strong> is the leading DEX aggregator, accounting for about 10% of all DEX daily volume and regularly facilitating over $300 million in daily volume. As Messari<a href="https://messari.io/article/1inch-defi-s-leading-aggregator?utm_source=messaricrypto&amp;utm_medium=tweet1&amp;utm_campaign=1inch"> previously covered</a>, the aggregation protocol consists of on-chain contracts which execute batched interactions to multiple DEXes. 1inch’s proprietary off-chain Pathfinder API is used to optimize trade routes (speed, cost, and efficiency) for users that are ultimately executed using 1inch’s on-chain contracts. Since inception 1inch has facilitated over $13 billion in trades, half of which were executed in the past three months alone. In addition to dominating the front-end user experience, 1inch is also aggressively pursuing vertical integration strategies, such as the 1inch liquidity protocol, and cross-chain integrations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*vSWba4s6e6RRQv-f" /></figure><p><strong>Matcha</strong> is a consumer facing DEX aggregator, built by 0x Protocol, that uses the 0x API and smart order routing to aggregate liquidity and provide optimal trade execution. Matcha averaged over $40m a day in January and had its second $1B+ month in February. Under the hood, Matcha splits trades across 0x Mesh, Kyber, Uniswap, Curve, Oasis, and its own proprietary liquidity sources to find the best prices for traders. In addition, Matcha<a href="https://matcha.xyz/blog/how-matcha-finds-the-best-prices"> employs</a> meta transactions and gas tokens to further reduce transaction costs for traders and minimize Ethereum gas fees.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1014/0*TthibKFdYiC55ZQ8" /><figcaption><em>Source:</em><a href="https://www.delphidigital.io/reports/defi-aggregators/"><em> Delphi Digital</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>Ultimately<a href="https://messari.io/article/value-capture-in-the-age-of-defi-aggregation"> value capture</a> is a struggle for DEX aggregators due to the lack of network effects, zero switching costs, and fees extraction becoming a ‘race to the bottom’. DEX aggregators are also starting to face competition from wallets and portfolio management platforms that are all vying to ‘control the end user’ and be the dominant front-end for traders. MetaMask Swaps for example aggregates liquidity from a variety of aggregators and AMMs and charges a service fee of 87.5bps on each trade. It has amassed ~$10m in fees to date and does nearly $20m in daily volume.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*3aVr3pMY3rxwvB3c" /><figcaption><a href="https://twitter.com/0xProject/status/1360346781108740098"><em>MetaMask Swaps Volume Distribution</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>While most DEX aggregators are focused on Ethereum, cross-chain aggregators and liquidity bridges are becoming increasingly important, as liquidity gets distributed across more L1 chains and protocols. As Ethereum gas fees continue to sky-rocket, we’re seeing users shift to other L1 alternatives such as Binance Smart Chain, Solana and Polkadot. Most Ethereum protocols have announced L2 scaling plans — Synthetix staking is already live on Optimism, Loopring has an active L2 DEX, dYdX announced perpetuals live on Starkware’s ZK-rollup and Uniswap and Curve are also expected to announce rollups soon. But the transition process is slow and as Ethereum Layer 2s scale gradually, other blockchains are stepping in to cater to the burgeoning demand.</p><p>BSC in particular has been steadily gaining traction, with its DEX protocol Pancakeswap<a href="https://cryptoslate.com/pancakeswap-flips-ethereums-uniswap-to-become-the-worlds-biggest-dex/"> recently doing</a> more daily volume than Uniswap and its money market protocol Venus accumulating almost $4B in TVL. As this trend continues, and as new smart contract platforms like Polkadot, Solana, Avalanche, and Near mature, aggregation of liquidity fragmented across blockchains and protocols becomes crucial — and that’s where THORchain steps in.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*3jmqyyygBiKO3u6H" /></figure><p><strong>THORchain</strong> is a decentralized cross-chain AMM, built on the Cosmos SDK, that provides a trust-minimized way to trade spot tokens across various L1 blockchains. Cross-chain swaps are facilitated by a network of continuous liquidity pools (CLPs) and validator nodes. The protocol’s native asset, RUNE, serves as 1) collateral posted by nodes ensuring network security and 2) the common quote currency for each CLP. RUNE is staked as collateral for validators providing cross-chain proofs to settle cross-chain swaps. In addition, it serves as the settlement for each trade in the system, maximizing liquidity of all assets rather than fragmenting liquidity across lower-volume pairs.</p><p>From a tokenomics perspective, THORchain offers strong value capture for RUNE, which accrues value deterministically based on liquidity. Participants of THORchain earn rewards either by bonding RUNE to secure consensus or by staking RUNE along with external assets in the CLPs. As Multicoin explains in their recent<a href="https://assets.ctfassets.net/qtbqvna1l0yq/5WqbfijNKHtIuEX4a8siDA/4569e7b081c73c7de21e7b14ee87c763/THORChain_Analysis.pdf?mc_cid=bd52ba2230"> report</a>, the value of RUNE must always be worth 3x the value of external assets is liquidity pools — for every $1 of a native asset in the network, LPs must stake an equivalent of $1 RUNE to the corresponding CLP and nodes in the network must bond $2 of RUNE to sign transactions and provide network security. This incentivizes nodes to operate honestly, as the value of the bond that can be slashed is always worth more than the total value of assets in the liquidity pool.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*JkkEPLzDEzaq68GN" /></figure><p>The amount of RUNE in the network therefore aims to be balanced 67%-33% between nodes-LPs. THORchain proposes a novel mechanism called the<a href="https://docs.thorchain.org/how-it-works/incentive-pendulum"> Incentive Pendulum</a> to allocate block rewards and network fees between node operators and LPs to maintain this balance. In particular, the proportion of system income distributed to liquidity stakers is given by</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*gaK3uU-PRbre0hG2" /></figure><p>A<a href="https://gauntlet.network/reports/thorchain"> Gauntlet report</a> stress-tested the incentive pendulum under a variety of market conditions, and shows that the existing choices leads to a stable and healthy system. THORchain has already accrued over $85M of TVL on Chaosnet, and is planning for a mainnet launch soon that will support BTC, ETH, LTC, BNB and BCH. THORchain ultimately hopes to be the first AMM to tackle the short-tail of crypto assets, an audacious yet highly lucrative goal. Furthermore, it could also provide the foundation of<a href="https://twitter.com/HighCoinviction/status/1362942764778938370"> cross-chain DeFi</a>, where traders can not only swap cross-chain assets but also access cross-chain debt markets, synthetics, derivatives and so on.</p><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>Ultimately, all investors are looking to deploy their capital to maximize risk-adjusted returns. AMMs have truly been a zero to one innovation, offering a non-custodial, censorship-resistant solution to trading and liquidity<a href="http://pooling.by/"> </a>pooling. By truly democratizing market making and offering a great way for liquidity providers to earn yield on their capital, DEXs and AMMs have been, and will continue to be, a foundational part of the DeFi stack.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*z8ptn74YcjBMuGgF" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=95dc1cfb6412" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/the-past-present-and-future-of-decentralized-exchanges-95dc1cfb6412">The Past, Present and Future of Decentralized Exchanges</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital">Gamma Point Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Fixed Income Protocols — The Next Wave of DeFi Innovation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/fixed-income-protocols-the-next-wave-of-defi-innovation-69215be82b4e?source=rss----117b0e0bcbc8---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/69215be82b4e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fixed-income]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul Rai]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Feb 2021 08:05:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-23T08:05:11.634Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Fixed Income Protocols — The Next Wave of DeFi Innovation</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*zsuGwwB1M5_rNxym" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@bylolo?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">lo lo</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>Originally published on </em></strong><a href="https://messari.io/article/fixed-income-protocols-the-next-wave-of-defi-innovation"><strong><em>Messari</em></strong></a></p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer:</em></strong></p><ol><li><em>The above reflects the views of the investor and should NOT be construed as investment advice, financial advice or legal advice.</em></li><li><em>This information is purely educational and is NOT meant to be taken as a recommendation to buy or sell any product or service. </em><strong><em>Please do your own research before making any decisions.</em></strong></li><li><em>Where relevant, </em><strong><em>direct quotes &amp; passages </em></strong><em>have been taken from the sources, whitepapers, and blog posts cited.</em></li></ol><p>Credit is the cornerstone of every financial ecosystem. It enables <em>non-zero-sum wealth creation</em> by allowing those with surplus assets to lend them to borrowers who have a productive or investment use for those assets.</p><p>The global credit market in aggregate is about <em>three times</em> the size of the global equity market. The overall size of global fixed income markets is approximately $128.3 trillion as of August 2020, according to the <a href="https://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/Secondary-Markets/bond-market-size/">ICMA</a>. In addition, the interest rate derivatives market is the largest derivatives market in the world. For the first half of 2019, the total notional amount outstanding for contracts in the interest rate derivatives market was an estimated $524 trillion according to data from the <a href="https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1911.htm">Bank for International Settlements</a> (BIS).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/710/0*MkJU9CJbTvep8SCV.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://defiprime.com/defi-interest-rate-swaps">Swap.Rate</a></figcaption></figure><p>While most of the trading in equity markets happens electronically, nearly all of the trading in the U.S. bond market takes place between broker-dealers and large institutions in decentralized over-the-counter (OTC) markets. Fixed income markets are thus inefficient and ripe for disruption, and DeFi is perfectly positioned to rapidly innovate on efficiency, liquidity, transparency, and accessibility for the largest financial market in the world.</p><blockquote><em>“The interest-rate market is becoming the hottest topic in the DeFi world recently. The potential market size of interest rate market may be more than 10 times larger than the underlying credit market.” — </em><strong><em>Incuba Alpha Labs</em></strong></blockquote><p>There were two major pathways that traditional financial institutions took to create new credit instruments: i) <strong><em>new forms of credit</em></strong> through new underlying issuers/ assets (eg. treasury bonds, corporate credit, municipal bonds, mortgage backed securities), and ii) <strong><em>new derivatives</em></strong> on existing forms of credit (eg. interest rate futures &amp; swaps, collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps).</p><p>DeFi has done a fantastic job of innovating around lending (MakerDAO, Compound, Aave), trading (Uniswap, Sushiswap, Curve), aggregation (yEarn, Rari, 1inch, Matcha), synthetics (Synthetix, UMA), and insurance (Nexus Mutual, Cover) protocols. However, so far there has primarily been only one form of credit in DeFi — over-collateralized crypto backed loans with variable rates. The playing field is wide open on the <strong><em>fixed-rate lending</em></strong> side and the <strong><em>interest rate derivatives</em></strong> side, with no clear winners having emerged yet.</p><p>In this article we’ll highlight the three main emerging buckets of fixed income protocols, along with some of their most promising implementations:</p><ol><li><strong>Fixed Rate Lending</strong> (Yield Curves): <a href="https://yield.is/">Yield Protocol</a>, <a href="https://notional.finance/">Notional Finance</a>, UMA’s <a href="https://medium.com/uma-project/the-yield-dollar-on-uma-3a492e79069f">yUSD</a></li><li><strong>Interest Rate Markets</strong> (IRS): <a href="https://horizon.finance/#/">Horizon Finance</a>, <a href="https://benchmark.finance/">Benchmark</a>, <a href="https://swivel.finance/">Swivel</a></li><li><strong>Securitization/ Tranches</strong> (CLOs): <a href="https://barnbridge.com/">BarnBridge</a>, <a href="https://app.saffron.finance/#home">Saffron</a></li></ol><h3>Fixed Rate Lending: Zero Coupon Bonds &amp; Yield Curves</h3><p>Fixed rate lending is by far the most common type of lending in traditional finance. For instance, of the $15.3 trillion dollars of debt outstanding in the US corporate debt and mortgage markets in 2018, 88% of it was in fixed rate terms, according to <a href="https://www.magnifymoney.com/blog/mortgage/u-s-mortgage-market-statistics-2018/">data</a> from Lending Tree. Fixed rates allow participants to lock in a predetermined rate, without having exposure to interest rate volatility.</p><p>As an increasingly popular alternative to the variable-rate lending protocols that have gained significant market share, fixed-rate lending zero-coupon protocols permit users to borrow, against crypto collateral, tokens that can be redeemed at maturity for a face value.</p><blockquote>“The types of derivatives &amp; complexity reduction in financial planning you’ll be able to structure and implement with the existence of fixed yield in smart contracts will be mind blowing to traditional financial markets.” — <strong>Barnbridge</strong></blockquote><p>Through over-collateralized lending, users can borrow yield tokens against their collateral deposited, with a commitment to pay it back at face value (say $1). Should these borrowers want to lock in a fixed rate, they would sell their yield tokens immediately at a discount (say $0.85), knowing that at maturity they can buy it back for the $1 face value, and repay the loan. On the other hand, buyers of the yield token essentially lend their $0.85 of capital, knowing that it will always be redeemable for the $1 face value at maturity, and effectively locking in a fixed rate of return.</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/danrobinson">Dan Robinson</a>’s seminal paper, <a href="https://research.paradigm.xyz/Yield.pdf">The Yield Protocol: On-Chain Lending With Interest Rate Discovery</a>, laid the theoretical groundwork for the creation of on-chain zero-coupon bonds and yield curves. <a href="https://medium.com/uma-project/uma-announcing-the-yield-dollar-on-renbtc-440a1ed0c5d5">UMA</a> launched the first yield dollar token (<em>yUSD-SEP20)</em> which was essentially a zero-coupon bond redeemable for $1 at expiry, and tradable against USDC through an Automated Market Maker (AMM) pool on Balancer.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/715/0*O2f9CzipZfQCWdNc.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://medium.com/uma-project/the-yield-dollar-on-uma-3a492e79069f">UMA</a></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://yield.is/">Yield Protocol</a> took this concept one step further and created a specialized AMM equation that accounted for the upward price drift inherent in zero-coupon bonds, allowing LPs to deposit capital without exposing themselves to impermanent loss (IL) and continuous arbitrage.</p><p>As Messari previously wrote about <a href="https://messari.io/article/the-yield-curve-cometh-why-fixed-rate-loans-in-crypto-matter?utm_source=jpurd17&amp;utm_medium=thread&amp;utm_campaign=curvecometh">here</a>, “<em>since Yield Protocol provides a number of varying expiration dates, we can construct a </em><strong><em>yield curve</em></strong><em> similar to the U.S. Treasury curve used by fixed-income analysts across the world.”</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/684/0*Bn-OAEUiCHA1w1_a.png" /></figure><p>As you can see below, most of the activity has been on the short-end of the curve, with the long-end staying relatively stable.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/734/0*peCwTbNQ5tTL6V71.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://twitter.com/RobertoTalamas/status/1327290753760915456">Roberto Talamas</a></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://notional.finance/">Notional Finance</a> has also just come out with a fixed rate borrowing/ lending protocol via a novel financial primitive called fCash. fCash are transferable tokens that represent a claim on a positive or negative cash flow at a specific point in the future and are tradable against the underlying currency (eg. DAI) within its native AMM-enabled liquidity pools. Lenders buy fCash and lock in a rate that represents the amount of the underlying currency that they can claim for their fCash upon maturity. Borrowers mint fCash and can sell it to receive the underlying currency, in exchange for the obligation to repay a fixed amount of the underlying currency at a specific future time. fCash tokens are always generated in pairs — assets and liabilities always net to zero across the Notional system.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/563/0*itDH5HxdC-v7BtGV.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://docs.notional.finance/traders/notional-basics/fcash">Notional Finance Docs</a></figcaption></figure><p>It’s worth noting that with variable over-collateralization rates, high price-volatility, and <a href="https://tokeneconomy.co/superfluid-collateral-in-open-finance-8c3db15efac">superfluid collateral</a> with stacked risks, determining an accurate measure of <strong><em>“risk-free” yield</em></strong> in the DeFi ecosystem is not a trivial task. However over-collateralized lending platforms like MakerDAO and Compound can be considered a fair indication of the risk-free variable rate, while collateral-backed yield dollar tokens like UMA’s <em>uUSD</em> and Yield Protocol’s <em>fyDai</em> can give a fair indication of the risk-free zero-coupon fixed rate. Yield generating stablecoins like yEarn’s <em>yUSD</em> stack more risks and should be appropriately compensated through a spread over the risk-free rate.</p><h3>Interest Rate Markets</h3><p>The ability to trade future yield as an asset/ token is a very powerful idea. It increases the amount of credit and leverage in the ecosystem, improves price-discovery, increases market efficiency, and allows market participants to <em>speculate on</em> and <em>hedge against</em> interest rate exposure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-5dkHFoNPR6KRzb3.png" /></figure><p>Given the prevalence of variable-rate yields in the DeFi ecosystem, there is a huge opportunity for interest rate swap (IRS) protocols to step in and allow lenders and LPs to swap out their floating yields and lock-in fixed yields.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/904/0*P6l8Ux7z4Jxf0JTV.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://twitter.com/Delta_Exchange/status/1273502989001474048">Delta Exchange</a></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://benchmark.finance/">Benchmark</a> is a protocol that enables the tokenization and trading of future yield. It allows participants to strip away the yield from an underlying asset, and separately trade that yield as its own token. In doing so, Benchmark enables holders of such assets to sell their rights to the (variable) yield for up-front cash, thus <em>locking in a fixed rate</em> for a fixed period of time. Buyers of these rights purchase the yield tokens to gain exposure to the variable yield in a capital-efficient manner, without having to stake collateral and worry about liquidations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/967/0*uWQ38LgV6lPjoFy1.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://docs.benchmark.finance/getting-started/system-overview">Benchmark</a></figcaption></figure><p>In addition, Benchmark has developed a new AMM variant that accounts for the time decay (theta) of the yield token. Since yield tokens are designed to expire worthless at a specific date, the price decay would otherwise cause LPs to lock in a permanent loss on traditional AMM platforms.</p><p><a href="https://horizon.finance/#/">Horizon</a> builds on similar concepts, and addresses the problem regarding limited fungibility and liquidity of yield tokens with fixed tenors, as well as the margin and AMM requirements associated with such tokens. It uses a <a href="https://docs.horizon.finance/general/whitepaper">game theoretic approach</a> to form decentralized interest rate markets, by introducing interspersed auction markets (Horizon marks) across various tenors where participants can compete for preferential payment in return for capping their yield, on a fair and transparent playing field.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/963/0*-FbS8v47-FxbVTOD.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://horizonfinance.medium.com/an-introduction-to-version-1-markets-on-horizon-finance-a9de17f260ec">Horizon</a></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://swivel.finance/">Swivel Finance</a> (formerly DeFi Hedge) is a protocol that establishes the infrastructure for the creation of algorithmically enforced fixed-rate lending agreements and truly trustless interest-rate swap. Users are able to create fixed-side or floating side interest-rate swap offers for any Ethereum token offered by Compound or Aave. Takers are then able to fill the offeror’s terms, locking in both the maker and taker’s funds until the agreed-upon term is complete, at which point one party is returned their capital and fixed yield, while the other is returned the remaining floating interest.</p><p>By using the CLOB system, Swivel circumvents the need for AMM pools and avoids slippage altogether. In addition, by operating on top of larger lending protocols like Compound and Aave, it doesn’t have to bootstrap both sides of the market.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/961/0*EUME5uJjrItGfQea.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://swivel.finance/">Swivel.Finance</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Securitization &amp; Tranches</h3><p>The legacy of Wall Street would be incomplete without the infamous Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) that took down the global economy in 2008. Leverage, when taken on irresponsibly, can lead to overvalued bubbles followed by disastrous corrections. However the underlying innovation behind the MBS and other tranched securities is very powerful — splitting up cash flows into different risk profiles, to cater to the needs of a wide variety of investors, with different risk profiles and utility functions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/942/0*yyeQ2hn7idleoPMx.png" /><figcaption>Source:<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tranche">Wikipedia</a></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://barnbridge.com/">BarnBridge</a> is a fluctuations derivatives protocol that aggregates yield across different protocols and pools them into higher-yielding and lower-yielding tranches with different risk profiles. The <em>SMART Yield Bond</em> (Structured Market Adjusted Risk Tranches) pools and deposits collateral into lending protocols or yield generating contracts, the yield of which is then bundled up into different tranches and tokenized. So the most senior tranches have lower yields with much safer risk profiles, while the more junior tranches have higher yields with additional risk exposure. SMART bonds essentially enable free-market pricing for the buying and selling of risk on yield.</p><p>This enables users to not only get access to fixed-rate yield but also pools yield from numerous protocols across the ecosystem, creating greater efficiencies by spreading risk and smoothing out the industry yield curve. You can find the full spreadsheet model <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/157p5D_E_j_zYwc_QzHmVeJH_L64HubkXDPdMwVUkypY/edit#gid=2024388043">here</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/803/0*4txUbVRFROv112ZN.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://app.saffron.finance/#home">Saffron</a> is another protocol that tokenizes ownership of on-chain assets, giving liquidity providers access to greater flexibility and dynamic exposure by selecting customized risk and return profiles via the use of Saffron pool tranches.</p><p>Saffron separately tokenizes the future earning stream and the net present value of utilized principal in each tranche. Earnings, based on tokenized holdings, are distributed accordingly across all tranches via payback waterfalls. The initial application of the payback waterfall leverages two primary tranches: a yield enhanced “A” tranche, and a risk mitigated super-senior “AA” tranche.</p><p>Added liquidity, when removed, is used to pay back the initial principal of AA holders before paying the principal and interest of the yield enhanced A tranche. In exchange for this enhanced return, participants of the A tranche must stake Saffron’s native tokens (SFI) to mitigate against failures on the underlying platform (such as Compound, Aave, or Curve). The Saffron protocol in this scenario acts as an escrow service for the transfer of risk between A tranche participants and AA tranche participants.</p><p>Overall, there is huge potential to unleash credit expansion in the DeFi market. The migration of yield and yield-based derivatives from less efficient centralized financial systems to more efficient decentralized financial systems could be one of the<a href="https://medium.com/barnbridge/introducing-barnbridge-3f0015fef3bb"> largest movements of wealth in human history</a>, and it will be interesting to see how protocols across fixed-rate lending, interest rate markets, and tranched yields step in to provide the market with the highest quality of credit and efficient access to leverage across the risk curve.</p><h3>Sources</h3><p><a href="https://swivel.substack.com/p/analysis-of-decentralized-interest">Analysis of Decentralized Interest-Rate Swap Models</a></p><p><a href="https://incuba-alpha.medium.com/vertical-expansion-of-defi-decentralized-interest-market-rises-3508406a72f9">Vertical Expansion of DeFi: decentralized interest market rises</a></p><p><a href="https://incuba-alpha.medium.com/derivatives-the-second-half-of-defi-ed3c20d4cf07">Derivatives, the Second Half of DeFi</a></p><p><a href="https://messari.io/article/the-yield-curve-cometh-why-fixed-rate-loans-in-crypto-matter?utm_source=jpurd17&amp;utm_medium=thread&amp;utm_campaign=curvecometh">The Yield Curve Cometh: Why Fixed-Rate Loans in Crypto Matter</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=69215be82b4e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/fixed-income-protocols-the-next-wave-of-defi-innovation-69215be82b4e">Fixed Income Protocols — The Next Wave of DeFi Innovation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital">Gamma Point Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Impermanent Loss Hedge Total Return Swap Litepaper]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/impermanent-loss-hedge-total-return-swap-litepaper-7c5e17e00332?source=rss----117b0e0bcbc8---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7c5e17e00332</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[impermanent-loss]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul Rai]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jan 2021 09:22:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-14T00:55:00.979Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Impermanent Loss Hedge Total Return Swap Whitepaper</h3><p><strong>Whitepaper</strong>: <a href="https://www.notion.so/Impermanent-Loss-Hedge-Total-Return-Swap-Whitepaper-158a9b90e3f349ff876f35334fe7f01b">https://www.notion.so/Impermanent-Loss-Hedge-Total-Return-Swap-Whitepaper-158a9b90e3f349ff876f35334fe7f01b</a></p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer:</em></strong></p><ol><li><em>The above reflects the views of the investor and should NOT be construed as investment advice, financial advice or legal advice.</em></li><li><em>This information is purely educational and is NOT meant to be taken as a recommendation to buy or sell any product or service. </em><strong><em>Please do your own research before making any decisions.</em></strong></li></ol><h3>Abstract</h3><p><em>In this paper, we describe a generalized, non-custodial, fungible protocol for the implementation of a total return swap that hedges liquidity providers’ (LPs) exposure to impermanent loss (IL) in liquidity pools of decentralized exchanges (DEXs). By paying a fixed funding rate, LPs can hedge out any IL exposure and can be confident in receiving the original value of their investment, along with accrued trading fees, when they withdraw liquidity.</em></p><h3>1. Introduction</h3><h3>1.1 DEXs &amp; AMMs</h3><p><strong>1.1.1 Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs)</strong> DEXs are decentralized exchanges for digital assets, allowing investors to seamlessly trade between cryptocurrencies, without the need for a traditional order book-based centralized exchange DEXs typically have three participants:</p><ul><li><strong>Traders</strong>: Use DEXs to swap assets in and out of the pool</li><li><strong>Liquidity providers (LPs)</strong>: Deposit their assets in liquidity pools, on which they earn returns by collecting trading fees</li><li><strong>Arbitrageurs</strong>: Maintain the price of assets within that portfolio in accordance with the market price in exchange for a profit.</li></ul><p><strong>1.1.2 Automated Market Makers (AMMs)</strong> AMMS are smart contracts that hold liquidity reserves (or liquidity pools) that traders can trade against. These reserves are funded by liquidity providers (LPs). AMM protocols use a formulaic approach to determine the price of an asset. Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs) are specific and the most widely used type of AMMs that were designed by the crypto community. The term <em>“constant function”</em> refers to the fact that any trade must change the reserves in such a way that the <em>product of those reserves remains unchanged.</em></p><p>There are three main types of DEXs/CFMMs:</p><ol><li><strong>Uniswap</strong> (Constant Product Market Maker)</li></ol><p>2.<strong> Balancer</strong> (Constant Mean Market Maker)</p><p>3.<strong> Curve</strong> (Hybrid Function Market Maker)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*YnylIzV2ad0n5hnW" /></figure><h3>1.2 Motivation</h3><p>Impermanent Loss (IL) is one of the most common, yet least understood, sources of risk for any DEX/ AMM liquidity provider (LP). Many LPs are unaware of the fact that they are exposed to price risk, that can wipe out the profits they earned through fees by providing liquidity. The nature of the constant market functions that DEXs use exposes LPs to a negatively convex loss, versus buy &amp; hold, if the entry price differs at all from the exit price. The term “impermanent” is in fact a misnomer, as the loss is very much permanent unless liquidity is withdrawn at the exact price of entry.</p><p>The difficulty with IL is that there is no clean way to hedge it out. Long straddle positions are one way to hedge out some of the exposure, but the linear payout function of vanilla options makes them not highly effective. In addition, limited liquidity and high costs of decentralized option markets provide further barriers to retail investors.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Nfuwo6FVsgDqJ3SM" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://medium.com/@pintail">Pintail</a></figcaption></figure><h3>1.3 Prior Work</h3><p>The convexity protocol pioneered by Opyn <em>[1],</em> and the Hegic Protocol <em>[2]</em> are the most notable ERC20 options market protocols. Maker <em>[3]</em> and Compound <em>[4]</em> have made excellent progress in the creation of collateralized on-chain decentralized lending markets, while Synthetix <em>[5]</em> and UMA <em>[6]</em> have laid the foundation for the creation of synthetic asset exposure, and total return swaps. Yield Protocol <em>[7]</em> took these ideas one step further and pioneered the adoption of reverse dutch auction token sales. Last but not least, MakerDAO <em>[8]</em>, Compound <em>[9]</em> and Aave <em>[10]</em> laid the fundamental groundwork for lending protocols implemented by over-collateralized liquidity vaults, fungible yield-bearing tokens and liquidation mechanisms.</p><blockquote>Overall we stand on the shoulder of giants, and leverage the incredible innovations around derivatives protocols, token fungibility, vault collateralization, and incentivized liquidation<em>.</em></blockquote><h3>2. Theoretical Underpinning of Impermanent Loss</h3><h3>2.1 Uniswap</h3><p>Uniswap <em>[11]</em> is one of the first ever open source decentralized exchange protocols. It was launched in November 2018 by Hayden Adams (V2 was launched in May 2020) and it pioneered the implementation of a constant product market. A transaction in this market, swapping Δβ coins of β for Δ⍺ coins of ⍺ must satisfy:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*sUfS0T7BU8b8v8ksNQzPsA.png" /></figure><p>Where Rα and Rβ are reserves of each asset, k is the invariant, and γ is the transaction fee. After each transaction, reserves are update in the following way:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*ZYiuaPXLBzqqnxebYp3uFA.png" /></figure><p>The name “constant product market” comes from the fact that adding any amount of either asset must change the reserves in such a way that <em>the product Rα * </em>Rβ remains equal to<em> the constant k</em> (<em>assuming no fees</em>)<em>.</em> This is often simplified in the form of <em>x*y=k</em>, where x and y are the reserves of each asset.</p><p>Assuming no-arbitrage conditions, the marginal price of coin ⍺ in terms of coin β, which is defined as the price of an infinitesimally small trade (Δ⍺ → 0), can be determined by differentiating the constant product market equation as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*VGxd89xHN4w3a4tGGxLrRA.png" /></figure><p>Hence marginal price offered by Uniswap (<em>assuming no fees, i.e γ=1</em>) can be represented as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*BMmCks9PltgvzlnWJ3X3Dg.png" /></figure><p>A constant product function forms a hyperbola when plotting two assets, which has a desirable property of always having liquidity as prices approach infinity on both sides of the spectrum.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*bXqwTv9qq62b0wxCkI7kOg.png" /></figure><p>Balancer <em>[12]</em> took this one step further by implementing a constant mean market. A constant mean market maker is a generalization of a constant product market maker, allowing for more than two assets and allowing for weights outside of 50/50, and satisfies the following equation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/0*_Twtp6ZavxA-_fIJ.png" /></figure><p>Where Ri is the reserve of each asset, w is the weights of each asset, and k is the invariant. In other words, in the absence of fees, constant mean markets ensure that the weighted geometric mean of the reserves remains constant. For example, the function for an equal-weighted portfolio of three assets would be (<em>xyz</em>)¹/3 = <em>k.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*IR41Qu2dpZI_iQM6vnJoJg.png" /><figcaption>Source: Balancer <a href="https://balancer.finance/whitepaper/">Whitepaper</a></figcaption></figure><h3>2.2 Impermanent Loss Calculation</h3><p>As shown above, assuming no-arbitrage conditions, the price at any point t can be represented as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*F2rsgVzL0CnhwYC_eStUog.png" /></figure><p>Where Rα,t and Rβ,t are reserves of each asset at time <em>t</em>, and Pt is the price of token ⍺ in terms of token β at time <em>t</em> (i.e the no of tokens of β that you would receive in exchange for one token of ⍺).</p><p>Combining this with the constant product market function <em>Rα * Rβ=k</em>, we can work out the size of each liquidity pool at any given price as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*oYBaPuC9_Yijd6qsbU4xRA.png" /></figure><p>We can now compute Vt the value of the LP’s portfolio at time <em>t</em> (in units of coin β):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*cv5jECDN3GMSGMgk_2WVaA.png" /></figure><p>Hence, the LP’s PnL (in units of token β) at any time t=T can be represented as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*Ur5OzrI_FjoHkFLajZxIAQ.png" /></figure><p>Hence, the PnL from price movements increases non linearly with a change in price.</p><p>The value of a portfolio (HODL) that was bought at time t=0 and held to time t=T is:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2Iq7j4hxIBEzr8-n.png" /></figure><p>We’re now ready to calculate the impermanent loss. Impermanent loss<em> </em>is defined as<em> the % difference between portfolio values if we bought and held the underlying coins (HODL) vs provided liquidity into the pool</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/910/0*OzqDmkFdtbChfmhk.png" /></figure><p>This means that no matter which direction the price moves in, LPs will <em>always</em> be taking a hit vs HODL because of the impermanent loss. If long term price movements are large, they could result in losses much greater than the yield generated from collecting fees. However, if Uniswap manages to gain enough traction it could be profitable for LPs, as long as price movements remain sufficiently rangebound.</p><h3>3. Implementation Mechanism</h3><p>In the following sections, we will describe a framework for creating a fungible ERC20 token that replicates the negative payout generate by IL by leveraging the UMA total return swap protocol.</p><p>At a very high level, buyers of protection deposit into a collateral vault for a total return swap and receive<em> il</em>Tokens, which represent ownership claims to the collateral vault. The total return swap has a payout function that is meant to replicate the payout structure IL, enabling buyers to hedge out any IL that they are exposed to for a fixed fee.</p><p>The makers who provide this protection, do so for a fixed fee that should cover any costs of hedging the position. <em>il</em>Tokens are always redeemable for the underlying collateral, and the swap can be re-margined or cancelled at any time.</p><p>Given that the losses are potentially unlimited, if the price rallies, for those who are providing protection against IL, the contract will have a “<strong><em>maximum price ratio level</em></strong><em>”</em>, beyond which there will not be any protection.</p><h3>3.1 Buyer Motivation &amp; Process</h3><p>Imagine that Bob deposited 10 ETH and 3500 USDT into the 50–50 ETH/USDT Uniswap pool when the exchange rate between them was P_entry = 350. He will accrue yield through trading fees and farming UNI. However, he is exposed to impermanent loss (IL), and if he ever withdraws liquidity from the pool when the ETH/USDT spot price is say P_exit, he will also be losing money on the underlying position (as compared to if he had just bought and held the ETH &amp; USDT), as long as P_entry ≠ P_exit.</p><p>Therefore, Bob buys protection against IL by purchasing an <em>il</em>UNI ETH/USDT LP token, with a strike/ entry price of P0, which for a variable rate <em>i%</em>, determined by the<em> il</em> protocol, would provide protection against any impermanent loss that he’s exposed to in this pool. He also will have to deposit collateral to cover the funding rate payments that he will have to constantly payout.</p><p>Buying an <em>il</em>UNI ETH/USDT LP token provides the holder the right to receive the NPV of the IL function at any point in time. When Bob decides to withdraw his liquidity from Uniswap, and redeem his UNI LP tokens, he would also unwind his <em>il</em>UNI ETH/USDT LP token. The funds are received when Bob sells the token, upon which the proceeds are transferred from his margin account into his wallet.</p><p>The sequence of events can be summarized as follows:</p><ul><li>Bob buys 10 ETH and 3500 USDT and deposits them into a Uniswap pool.</li><li>He will then look at the rates offered to provide protection for the UNI ETH/USDT pool with P0 as close as possible to P_entry = 350.</li><li>If the cost of protection (i%) looks reasonable to him, he then purchases <em>35,000 USD</em> worth of IL protection (<em>il</em>UNI ETH/UST_350 tokens)</li><li>Bob also deposits collateral to cover the variable funding rate payments that are continuously paid out to the liquidity pool. If Bob’s collateral ever reaches zero, i.e his funding rate payment fails to go through, the<em> il </em>contract will be terminated and Bob will receive the NPV at that point in time.</li><li>As the price of ETH/USDT, Pt, changes with time t, the NPV of the IL total return swap changes according to the NPV formula</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-jy6g1seZks0JV5u.png" /></figure><ul><li>When Bob decides to withdraw liquidity from the Uniswap pool, he will also unwind (burn) his <em>il</em>UNI ETH/UST_350 tokens and receive the NPV payout which should exactly cover the amount he lost due to impermanent loss.</li><li>In theory, Bob could unwind his <em>il</em>UNI ETH/UST_350 tokens position at any point in time, not necessarily when he withdraws liquidity from the Uniswap pool. In this case, however, Bob will essentially be speculating, rather than hedging his underlying LP position.</li></ul><h3>3.2 Seller Motivation &amp; Process</h3><p>Alice is a crypto vol market maker and wants the opportunity to trade vol through impermanent loss hedge tokens (which are essentially short vol)or she is a sophisticated investor who wants to capture the attractive yields that the <em>il </em>liquidity vault is offering.</p><p>She will deposit liquidity into the <em>il </em>liquidity vault and then goes and hedges her short exposure to vol (or she leaves it unhedged if she’s trying to take a directional vol view). As a reward for doing the complicated short vol hedge, she is compensated in terms of the yield (<em>i%</em>).</p><p>The sequence of events can be summarized as follows</p><ul><li>Alice deposits $5,000 worth of DAI or ETH into the <em>il</em> liquidity vault</li><li>In return, she receives ($5,000/ $Pool Value) <em>il </em>LP tokens, which are <em>fungible tokens</em> that represent a claim on the deposited assets, along with accrued funding payments, of the <em>il</em>liquidity vault.</li><li>All funding payments that Bob (and other purchasers of <em>il</em> protection) makes are distributed to the pool and are essentially split evenly amongst LP token holders, proportional to their ownership %.</li><li>When Bob, or any other buyer of protection, chooses to unwind his LP token, he receives a payout, as determined by the NPV function. This payout is taken from the liquidity vault, and so essentially it is split between Alice, and all the other LPs, proportional to their respective % ownership.</li><li>When Alice finally decides to withdraw her liquidity from the<em> il </em>liquidity vault, her <em>il</em> LP tokens will be burned, and her wallet will be deposited an amount equal to her % <em>ownership * $ Pool Value.</em></li></ul><h3>3.3 Total Return Swaps</h3><h3>3.3.1 Very Brief History of Financial Derivatives</h3><p>A derivative is a financial security with a value that is reliant upon or derived from, an underlying asset or group of assets — a benchmark. The derivative itself is a contract between two or more parties, and the derivative derives its price from fluctuations in the underlying asset. Derivatives can be used to hedge a position, speculate on the directional movement of an underlying asset, or give leverage to holdings.</p><p>Derivatives can trade over-the-counter (OTC) or on an exchange. OTC derivatives constitute a greater proportion of the derivatives market and are more exposed to counterparty risk. Conversely, derivatives that are exchange-traded are standardized and more heavily regulated.</p><h3>3.3.2 Synthetic Assets</h3><p>Synthetic is the term given to financial instruments that are engineered to simulate other instruments while altering key characteristics. Often synthetics will offer investors tailored cash flow patterns, maturities, risk profiles and so on.</p><p>One example of this is a total return swap (TRS). A Total Return Swap is a contract between two parties who exchange the return from a financial asset between them. In this agreement, one party makes payments based on a set rate while the other party makes payments based on the total return of an underlying asset.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*Ylqr9lbGzAYrVxnt" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/total-return-swap-trs/">CFI</a></figcaption></figure><h3>3.4 Maximum Price Ratio Level</h3><p>As derived earlier, the impermanent loss, <strong><em>as a % of the original funds supplied into the liquidity pool</em></strong>, can be represented by the following equation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/915/0*RRVLj4KOsJp_dCrk.png" /></figure><p>So this impermanent loss exhibits negative convexity and is capped to -50% on the downside, while the upside losses are unlimited.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/848/0*LiyggkGxNW0PSRNb" /></figure><p>Given that the losses are potentially unlimited, the contract will have a “maximum price ratio level”, rM, beyond which there will not be any protection. For the sake of simplicity and symmetry, we will use rM=4 for the rest of the paper, which means that the protection against IL on the upside only lasts if the price ratio increases by <em>at most</em> 4x.</p><p>We choose rM=4 because that is the value of rT for which the IL = 50%, same as the downside IL if rT = 0.</p><h3>3.5 Smart Contract Functions</h3><h3>3.5.1 Collateral</h3><p>In a fully collateralized implementation, the party that is short the protection contract (usually the maker) must provide the full amount of upfront collateral. As the payout function for IL is bound between [-50%,50%], assuming a max protection ratio of rM=4, the seller must put up half the value of the underlying position.</p><h3>3.5.2 NPV, Re-margin, &amp; Liquidation</h3><p>The NPV is calculated according to the equation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*aiTCI3TZEr2iIEBW.png" /></figure><p>At any point in time, either party can call on the <em>remargin</em>() function, which will reallocate funds between the collateral accounts of each counterparty, depending on the NPV at that time. In case of either party being undercollateralized, the <em>terminate() </em>function will be called and will execute the default procedure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*0uw79HppY1ROAUjO" /><figcaption>Source: UMA <a href="https://umaproject.org/UMA-whitepaper.pdf">Whitepaper</a></figcaption></figure><h3>3.6 ilTokens Fungability</h3><p>This is potentially the hardest and most important problem to solve for any derivatives protocol, especially when there are a number of different parameters that can be tweaked. However, fungibility is crucial in developing liquid, self-sustaining financial ecosystems.</p><p>There are two kinds of tokens in the protocol described above:</p><p>i) <em>il</em> LP tokens (for sellers of protection, represents ownership of assets in the liquidity vault)</p><p>ii)<em> il</em>UNI ccyA/ccyB P0 tokens (for buyers of protection, represent claim on NPV payout)</p><p>The <em>il</em> LP tokens are inherently fungible, as they do not have any parameter specifications — they all represent a claim on the same liquidity vault. All funds received and paid out, are split between every LP token holder, in proportion to their respective ownership %.</p><p>On the other hand, the <em>il</em>UNI ccyA/ccyB P0 tokens are not inherently fungible due to the number of different parameter specifications.</p><p>To improve fungibility, the first thing that needs be done is to reduce the degrees of freedom in the contract specification. Currently, there are seven different degrees of freedom, five of which can be specified in advance.</p><p>i) Underlying AMM pool (Eg. Uniswap 50/50 ETH/USDT pool)</p><p>ii) Entry Price: P0</p><p>iii) Current Price: Pt (can be determined using an on-chain oracle like Chainlink or NEST)</p><p>iv) Maximum price ratio (rM = 4 in the simplest case)</p><p>v) Expiry of the contract (can be made perpetual to avoid dealing with this)</p><p>vi) Initial and maintenance margin requirements (does not need to be specified, as the buyer will be auto-liquidated on any funding rate payment failure)</p><p>vii) Liquidation penalty (can initially be set to 20%)</p><p>That leaves us with <em>two primary degrees of freedom</em> — the underlying pool token and the entry price P0. The simplest and cleanest way to implement this would be to have different tokens for each type of underlying pool token, and for each entry price P0.</p><p>The series of tokens for the different entry prices (P0s) would be similar to the standard option series used in traditional financial markets, and LPs would purchase protection where the entry price most closely represents the time price when they deposited liquidity into the pool.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Cicz7RPMV8PZDMoC" /></figure><h3>4. Future Work (needs work)</h3><p>Further research needs to be done into hedging strategies for market makers. Liquid markets with low slippage would require market makers being able to easily hedge out their exposure, which could approximately be done by buying straddles or more exotic long-vol option structures. Furthermore, additional research must be done into the calculation of the fair funding rate that liquidity providers should receive in exchange for exposure to the IL NPV function.</p><h3>References</h3><p>[1] <a href="https://opyn.co/#/">https://opyn.co/#/</a></p><p>[2] <a href="https://www.hegic.co/">https://www.hegic.co/</a></p><p>[3] <a href="https://makerdao.com/en/">https://makerdao.com/en/</a></p><p>[4] <a href="https://compound.finance/">https://compound.finance/</a></p><p>[5] <a href="https://www.synthetix.io/">https://www.synthetix.io/</a></p><p>[6] <a href="https://umaproject.org/">https://umaproject.org/</a></p><p>[7] <a href="https://research.paradigm.xyz/Yield.pdf">https://research.paradigm.xyz/Yield.pdf</a></p><p>[8] <a href="https://makerdao.com/en/whitepaper/">https://makerdao.com/en/whitepaper/</a></p><p>[9] <a href="https://compound.finance/documents/Compound.Whitepaper.pdf">https://compound.finance/documents/Compound.Whitepaper.pdf</a></p><p>[10] <a href="https://aave.com/">https://aave.com/</a></p><p>[11] <a href="https://uniswap.org/whitepaper.pdf">https://uniswap.org/whitepaper.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7c5e17e00332" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/impermanent-loss-hedge-total-return-swap-litepaper-7c5e17e00332">Impermanent Loss Hedge Total Return Swap Litepaper</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital">Gamma Point Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Algorithmic Stablecoin Game — Empty Set Døllar]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/the-algorithmic-stablecoin-game-empty-set-d%C3%B8llar-fd19eacee606?source=rss----117b0e0bcbc8---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fd19eacee606</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stable-coin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul Rai]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 Jan 2021 10:46:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-28T10:46:36.057Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Algorithmic Stablecoin Game — Empty Set Døllar</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*hmsyHYf5cBHzGA8M" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@giorgiotrovato?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Giorgio Trovato</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Stablecoins are cryptocurrencies that are designed to track the value of a “stable” asset (eg. 1 USD) or a basket of assets. The high volatility of traditional crypto assets makes them a poor unit of account and store of value, and is one of the main factors limiting their mass adoption. Stablecoins solve this problem, and enable market participants to hold their assets in USD, instead of more volatile cryptocurrencies.</p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer:</em></strong></p><ol><li><em>The above reflects the views of the investor and should NOT be construed as investment advice, financial advice or legal advice.</em></li><li><em>This information is purely educational and is NOT meant to be taken as a recommendation to buy or sell any product or service. </em><strong><em>Please do your own research before making any decisions.</em></strong></li><li><em>Where relevant, </em><strong><em>direct quotes &amp; passages </em></strong><em>have been taken from the sources, whitepapers, and blog posts cited.</em></li></ol><p>Stablecoin adoption has been growing steadily, with total market cap eclipsing the $25 billion mark. USDT is the most dominant stablecoin in use, currently sitting at north of $20 billion in circulating supply, but recently has come under <a href="https://medium.com/dragonfly-research/fighting-to-be-stable-the-evolution-of-stablecoins-aca81fb432f9">regulatory scrutiny.</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IH8z0q_aCCGDJHOx.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://medium.com/u/dd6a8357807c?source=post_page-----81e900b9aafb--------------------------------">TwoBitIdiot</a></figcaption></figure><p>High-level, there are three main types of stablecoins:</p><p>i) <strong>Fiat Collateralized</strong>: Each stablecoin is backed 1 for 1 by USD held in bank accounts <em>(eg. USDT, USDC)</em></p><p>ii) <strong>Crypto Collateralized</strong>: Each stablecoin is backed by over-collateralized crypto assets <em>(eg. DAI, sUSD)</em></p><p>iii) <strong>Algorithmic </strong>(<em>Seniorage-Style/ Non-Collateralized</em>): Stablecoins where supply can be algorithmically expanded or contracted in order to move the price of the underlying closer to the target price <em>(eg. AMPL, ESD, DSD)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/892/0*33dO0KbnCJOu_4NH.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://medium.com/hackernoon/stablecoins-designing-a-price-stable-cryptocurrency-6bf24e2689e5">Haseeb Qureshi</a></figcaption></figure><p>The theoretical underpinnings of algorithmic stablecoins come from Ferdinando Ametrano‘s <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2425270">paper</a> titled “<em>Hayek Money: The Cryptocurrency Price Stability Solution</em>”, Robert Sams’ <a href="https://github.com/rmsams/stablecoins/blob/master/paper.pdf">paper</a> titled “<em>A Note on Cryptocurrency Stabilization: Seigniorage Shares</em>”, and the Basis <a href="http://basis.io/basis_whitepaper_en.pdf">whitepaper</a>.</p><p>In this post we’ll dive into the design and game theoretic aspects of Empty Set Døllar, one of the latest algorithmic stablecoins that has been getting widespread attention recently due to the high APYs being paid out to DAO holders and Uniswap liquidity providers (LPs).</p><h3>Intro to Empty Set Dollar</h3><p>Empty Set Døllar (ESD) is an algorithmic stablecoin designed to track the US Dollar. The ESD design leverages coordination between market participants and enforces the peg through two main mechanisms:</p><p><strong><em>i) Expansion: </em></strong>When the price of ESD exceeds $1, the protocol mints new ESD (<em>increasing supply</em>) which are used to purchase debt coupons <em>(explained below) </em>and the remaining are awarded to participants that staked their ESD in the governance DAO, and to Uniswap LPs</p><p>ii)<em> </em><strong><em>Contraction</em></strong>: When the price of ESD falls below $1, the protocol issues debt coupons at a discount, that can be purchased by burning ESD (<em>reducing suppl</em>y) and can be redeemed at par ($1) during the next expansion</p><h3>Market Participants &amp; Incentives</h3><p>High level, ESD market participants can do one of three things:</p><p>i) <strong>Bond ESD in DAO</strong>: Participate in network upside and supply increases</p><p>ii) <strong>Trade ESD</strong>: Speculate on short term price action</p><p>iii) <strong>Burn ESD for Debt Coupons</strong>: Speculate on mean-reversion by purchasing debt coupons during contractions</p><p>This is in addition to<em> ESD holders</em> that use it as a stablecoin for regular transactions and/ or supply it into Uniswap pools as LPs.</p><h3>Contractions</h3><p>In contractions cycles, when ESD is below $1:</p><ul><li><em>Demand increases</em>, as traders buy ESD at a discount, speculating on a price reversion back to $1 or acquiring to burn an covert into debt coupons</li><li><em>Supply decreases</em>, as speculators burn their ESD for debt coupons, that will be redeemable for $1 if the price of ESD reverts back to $1 within a fixed time-frame</li></ul><p>This combination of an increase in demand and a decrease in supply puts an upwards pressure on ESD an pushed the price back up to $1 during contractions.</p><p>From a game theory perspective, if there is (<em>almost</em>) perfect coordination, all participants would buy the debt coupons, and earn the premium, as the price of ESD would for sure go back above $1.</p><p>In reality, you just need a increase in demand an/ or a decrease in supply, to push the price of ESD back up, which will occur if just a portion of market participants have faith that the price go back above $1, and express this view though trading/ buying ESD or burning ESD for debt coupons.</p><h3>Debt Coupon Market</h3><p><em>Source: </em><a href="https://github.com/emptysetsquad/dollar/blob/master/d%C3%B8llar.pdf"><em>ESD Whitepaper</em></a></p><p>To incentivize participants to burn ESD during contractions to purchase debt coupons, the coupon premium was designed to increase with the debt ratio. As the debt ratio increases, the coupon premium also increases, further incentivizing participants to burn their ESD and reduce supply.</p><p>The debt ratio R is defined as</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*hNnVEa-bqYZuTxRh.png" /></figure><p>The premium curve as a function of R can be represented as</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*JU9vpCIUKrSg8n1q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*KmSlnQIkRENZ00bK.png" /></figure><p>Clearly the premium is zero when the there is no outstanding debt, and increases asymptotically as the outstanding debt amount approaches the total supply.</p><p>Given the premium curve, we can now calculate the premium for an order of size <em>n</em>, as a function of the new debt ratio <em>R’</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Tfl4dWKSn-DVvC8P.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*QNk_GMxt_Ka1RDMq.png" /></figure><p>Once the premium is calculated, we can calculate the coupon amount as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*y7z88HuymVjvQj0D.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*kIL5BVYS5EpkpP59.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://esd.tools/">https://esd.tools/</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Expansions</h3><p>In expansion cycles, when ESD is above $1:</p><ul><li><em>Demand decreases</em>, as traders are less incentivized to buy USD at a premium, and are in-fact incentivized to sell ESD at a premium, speculating on a price reversion back to $1</li><li><em>Supply increases</em>, as the protocol mints new ESD which are distributed to debt holders followed by networked participants that have staked ESD in the DAO</li></ul><p>It’s interesting to note that during expansions, the system offers excellent rewards for network participants not to sell — by bonding their ESD in the DAO, participants are rewarded by the new ESD minted. So there will always be a tradeoff — some participants will sell their ESD while others will bond them in the DAO to maximize rewards.</p><p>The amount of ESD minted is designed to increase the supply such that the if the underlying network value doesn’t change, the price of ESD should be $1.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*RSHcf0sJKNLjKfLq.png" /></figure><p>From which we can back-out the required change in supply, to maintain pice stability as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*POf9VTlNIyRF5LqE.png" /></figure><p>Since supply is also used to payback debt coupons, net supply (supply <em>less</em> debt) is used in the equation above.</p><h3>Summary</h3><p>Overall algorithmic stablecoins are a force to be reckoned with. By combining algorithmic game-theory with macro-economics and monetary policy, a new breed of stablecoins are evolving that can track specific underlying assets value in a truly de-centralized, permissionless and capital efficient way.</p><p>Will algorithmic stablecoins overcome the initial scaling and network- coordination challenges and be able to maintain price-stability with low volatility? We’re still in the first innings, but so far the initial wave of successful protocol launches and mass community adoption seem very promising indeed!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*CrqVxc9QjCZpACL8.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://medium.com/@0xans/ess-a-brief-intro-towards-novel-elastic-stablecoin-implementation-607e86654a9f">0xans</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Sources</h3><ul><li><a href="https://github.com/emptysetsquad/dollar">emptysetsquad/dollar</a></li><li><a href="https://medium.com/@0xans/ess-a-brief-intro-towards-novel-elastic-stablecoin-implementation-607e86654a9f">{ess} — A brief intro towards novel elastic stablecoin implementation</a></li><li><a href="https://coolrick.medium.com/game-theory-in-dsd-2248d06bec49">Game theory in DSD</a></li><li><a href="https://medium.com/hackernoon/stablecoins-designing-a-price-stable-cryptocurrency-6bf24e2689e5">Stablecoins: designing a price-stable cryptocurrency</a></li><li><a href="https://insights.deribit.com/market-research/stability-elasticity-and-reflexivity-a-deep-dive-into-algorithmic-stablecoins/">Stability, Elasticity, and Reflexivity: A Deep Dive into Algorithmic Stablecoins - Deribit Insights</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.emptyset.finance/">Empty Set Dollar - Documentation</a></li></ul><p><a href="https://medium.com/dragonfly-research/fighting-to-be-stable-the-evolution-of-stablecoins-aca81fb432f9">https://medium.com/dragonfly-research/fighting-to-be-stable-the-evolution-of-stablecoins-aca81fb432f9</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fd19eacee606" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/the-algorithmic-stablecoin-game-empty-set-d%C3%B8llar-fd19eacee606">The Algorithmic Stablecoin Game — Empty Set Døllar</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital">Gamma Point Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Applied Game Theory & Prediction Markets — The Future of DeFi]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/applied-game-theory-prediction-markets-the-future-of-defi-c1f24d2ef68b?source=rss----117b0e0bcbc8---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c1f24d2ef68b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[chess]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul Rai]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 Jan 2021 10:39:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-28T10:38:54.013Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Applied Game Theory &amp; Prediction Markets — The Future of DeFi</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Ek0EzhEbw0IJT0xa" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@vtr?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Ravi Kumar</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>Disclaimer:</em></strong></p><ol><li><em>The above reflects the views of the investor and should NOT be construed as investment advice, financial advice or legal advice.</em></li><li><em>This information is purely educational and is NOT meant to be taken as a recommendation to buy or sell any product or service. </em><strong><em>Please do your own research before making any decisions.</em></strong></li><li><em>Where relevant, </em><strong><em>direct quotes &amp; passages </em></strong><em>have been taken from the sources, whitepapers, and blog posts mentioned.</em></li></ol><p>A recent wave of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) protocols have cleverly combined game theory based incentive &amp; coordination mechanisms with prediction markets to enhance liquidity and enable free-market price discovery.</p><p>In this post, we’ll dive into four protocols in particular — <strong><em>Keeper DAO, Numerai, Charm </em></strong><em>and</em><strong><em> Cover. </em></strong>Each of these protocols leverages game theory and/or prediction markets and showcases the immense power of these simple concepts.</p><h3>Keeper DAO</h3><p>Whitepaper: <a href="https://github.com/keeperdao/whitepaper">https://github.com/keeperdao/whitepaper</a><br>Image Sources <em>(where not specified)</em>: <a href="https://medium.com/keeperdao/introducing-keeperdao-an-on-chain-liquidity-underwriter-dbb63731f4a5">https://medium.com/keeperdao/introducing-keeperdao-an-on-chain-liquidity-underwriter-dbb63731f4a5</a></p><p>KeeperDAO is a game-theory protocol designed to capture the maximum possible on-chain profit through arbitrage and liquidations. Priority Gas Auctions (<em>PGA)</em><strong><em> gambits </em></strong>cause keepers to engage in a “race to the bottom”, with incremental bids diminishing profits to zero. As an alternative to minimizing profit by competing with each other, KeeperDAO incentivizes keepers to pool their liquidity and share their profits.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/959/0*bxfdZ0Sdx6HtmiHb.png" /><figcaption>The Queen’s Gambit is one of the oldest known chess openings. A gambit (from ancient Italian gambetto, meaning “to trip”) is a chess opening in which a player sacrifices material, with the hope of achieving a resulting advantageous position. Source: <a href="https://bit.ly/2VruE8x">https://bit.ly/2VruE8x</a></figcaption></figure><p>Before we deep dive into it, let’s briefly go over some important topics.</p><p><strong>Mempool<br></strong>A <a href="https://academy.binance.com/en/glossary/mempool">mempool</a> (a contraction of memory and pool) is a cryptocurrency node’s mechanism for storing information on unconfirmed transactions. It acts as a sort of waiting room for transactions that have not yet been included in a block.</p><p>In <a href="https://medium.com/@danrobinson/ethereum-is-a-dark-forest-ecc5f0505dff">Ethereum is a Dark Forest</a>, a blog post written by Dan Robinson and Georgios Konstantopoulos, they highlight how deadly <em>arbitrage bots</em> that lurk on the Ethereum blockchain mempool can actually be.</p><blockquote>“If the chain itself is a battleground, the mempool is something worse: a dark forest.”</blockquote><p><strong>Miner Extractable Value (MEV)<br></strong>MEV is a general term for profit that can be extracted by miners. This extraction can happen when miners reorganise blocks, reorder transactions, front-run, and tailgate.</p><p><strong>Flashboys 2.0<br></strong><a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.05234.pdf">Flashboys 2.0</a> is a fantastic paper that highlighted front-running, transaction re-ordering, and consensus instability in decentralized exchanges. They document and quantify the widespread deployment of <em>arbitrage bots</em>, that engage in <strong><em>priority gas auctions</em></strong><em> </em>(PGAs), competitively bidding up transaction fees in order to obtain priority ordering for their transactions.</p><p>Now back to <strong>Keeper DAO</strong>. By incentivizing collaboration, KeeperDAO is able to avoid the wastefulness of gas wars and maximize the profit for all participants. Liquidity providers are also able to deposit liquidity and share in the profits generated by keepers. And for those that do not cooperate, its <strong><em>grim-triggering</em></strong><em> </em>strategy is guaranteed to <em>erase all profitability</em>.</p><p>Grim-triggering is an adversarial PGA strategy where if the pool detects another bid on the same liquidation/arbitrage, it will grim trigger by setting the gas price to the value such that the liquidation opportunity would <strong>no longer be profitable for anybody</strong>.</p><p><strong>Assumptions</strong></p><ul><li><em>There is one competitor for a liquidation opportunity.</em></li><li><em>The liquidation opportunity has a maximum payoff of </em><strong><em>M.</em></strong></li><li><em>If the competitor joins the pool, there will be </em><strong><em>n</em></strong><em> parties that a liquidation profit will be shared amongst.</em></li><li><em>The pool can respond to external gas bids with delay </em><strong><em>Δ</em></strong><em>.</em></li></ul><p><em>The block time </em><strong><em>D</em></strong><em> is exponentially distributed with rate parameter </em><strong><em>λ=0.1 </em></strong><em>(this corresponds to the average block time of Ethereum being 12.5 seconds).</em></p><p>Let’s consider the case that the competitor competes with the pool. The only way that the competitor can make money is if they bid and the block is mined before the pool can react and grim trigger.</p><p>The payoff for the competitor, which we will assume submitted a bid at time <strong><em>t</em></strong>, in this instance would be <em>M</em> times the probability that the block gets mined before time t+Δ. For an exponential distribution, this probability is</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ax7eeRHOzXIcw66G.png" /></figure><p>Thus the expected payoff is</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*rGiJI62fHeKSc3Wm.png" /></figure><p>Now, if instead, the competitor joined the pool, it would simply get an equal share of the maximum payoff, and hence the expected payoff is</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*F7MpARacJc1NV_kZ.png" /></figure><p>We are interested in the case that this latter payoff is greater than the former; in this case, it <strong>makes more sense to join the pool than to compete against it</strong>. Solving this inequality for Δ gives:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2kg2FzMpqnPu-itE.png" /></figure><p>Alternatively, we can solve for <em>n</em>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*HJi-kLw30-O6Jyt_.png" /></figure><p>As an example, if Δ=100ms, then it is more profitable for the competitor to join the pool if there are not more than 100 parties in total sharing in the profits.</p><p>To conclude, any competitor to KeeperDAO faces the <em>bleak reality of the grim trigger.</em> There are theoretically only 2 outcomes: <strong>either nobody makes a profit again or everyone joins the system</strong>.</p><h3>Numerai</h3><p>Medium: <a href="https://medium.com/numerai/building-the-last-hedge-fund-introducing-numerai-signals-12de26dfa69c">https://medium.com/numerai/building-the-last-hedge-fund-introducing-numerai-signals-12de26dfa69c</a><br>Image Sources <em>(where not specified)</em>: <a href="https://numer.ai/whitepaper.pdf">https://numer.ai/whitepaper.pdf</a></p><p>Numerai is an AI-run, crowd-sourced hedge fund. At its core, Numerai incentivizes the creation of signals with predictive orthogonal components — the original part of the signals that we don’t already have. <em>Numerai rewards people how the market should reward them: for the marginal predictive value of the non-redundant component of their signal.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*BI9ctaezbABX6IzP.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://medium.com/numerai/building-the-last-hedge-fund-introducing-numerai-signals-12de26dfa69c">Numerai</a></figcaption></figure><p>The primary issue with any machine learning competition is <strong><em>intentional overfitting. </em></strong>Numerai solves this problem by introducing a new ERC-20 token called Numeraire (NMR), which data scientists can stake in amounts proportional to their confidence level in their model to compete in tournaments.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*hhnsaqOaQY4EeAhK.png" /><figcaption>An overfitting curve where the test error continues to decrease with more submissions from data scientists, but the error on new data increases.</figcaption></figure><p>Every tournament has a staking prize pool, which is some fixed number of dollars. Data scientists can submit bids to the auction. Bids are tuples (c, s) where c is confidence defined as the number of NMR the data scientist is willing to stake to win 1 USD and s is the amount of NMR being staked.</p><p>For some time t, s is locked in the Ethereum contract and is inaccessible to anyone, including Numerai. Performance is evaluated after time t, and its evaluation metric is logloss, a suitable metric for binary classification problems like Numerai’s machine learning competition.</p><p>A model is considered to have performed well if logloss&lt; -ln(0.5), and badly if logloss &gt; -ln(0.5). The data scientists are ranked in descending order of confidence until the prize pool is depleted; data scientists are awarded s/c dollars if their models performed well or they lose stake s if they perform badly. Once the prize pool is depleted, data scientists no longer earn dollars or lose their stakes.</p><p><strong>Analysis of Staking<br></strong>Let p be the probability that the model achieves logloss &lt; -ln(0.5) on new, unseen data. A low p would imply a high probability that a model is overfit. Let s be a data scientist’s total Numeraire staked. Let e be the exchange rate of Numeraire per dollar. c is the confidence.</p><p>A data scientist will stake Numeraire if the expected value of staking Numeraire is positive. The expected value in dollars of staking s with confidence c is</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*SzHQI5O8z9O4CfjA.png" /></figure><p>A data scientist will stake if</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*io5NaOGmd6ghTM5h.png" /></figure><p>This implies</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Oi8c4ul1diYJQ51H.png" /></figure><p>This result speaks for itself. The beauty of this game theory based coordination incentives is that solely in the interest of maximizing winnings, they move participants to reveal their true knowledge of their models’ abilities to generalize to new, unseen data. <em>Brilliant.</em></p><h3>Cover</h3><p>Whitepaper &amp; Image Sources <em>(where not specified)</em>: <a href="https://www.coverprotocol.com/Cover%20Product%20Paper.pdf">https://www.coverprotocol.com/Cover%20Product%20Paper.pdf</a></p><p>Cover leverages <strong><em>prediction markets</em></strong> to provide peer to peer coverage with fungible tokens,<em> allowing the market to set prices</em>.</p><p>Fungible cover tokens are created and maintained on a 1:1 basis with their collateral when a user deposits collateral into a Cover smart contract. Each Cover contract specifies the protocol to be covered (eg. Curve), the preferred collateral (eg. DAI), the amount to deposit, and then the expiration date of coverage.</p><p>For each DAI deposited the user receives 2 tokens: a CLAIM token and a NOCLAIM token. The NOCLAIM token represents rights to receive the deposited collateral in the event that a claim payout is NOT awarded during the designated coverage period. The CLAIM token represents a right to receive the deposited collateral (or a fraction thereof) in the event that a claim payout is awarded by the claim’s management process.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*YpH1_Aogfsv3PP4T.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.coverprotocol.com/Cover%20Product%20Paper.pdf">Whitepaper</a></figcaption></figure><p>There are three types of participants in the Cover Protocol market: Market Makers (MMs), Coverage Providers, and Coverage Seekers. Market makers hold both CLAIM and NOCLAIM tokens and provide liquidity for both fungible tokens. Coverage providers hold and provide liquidity for <strong>only </strong>NOCLAIM tokens. Coverage seekers hold <strong>only </strong>CLAIM tokens. The goal is to cover the exposure to the protected product.</p><p>Both the CLAIM and NOCLAIM tokens can be deposited into Balancer pools (or any AMM/ centralized exchange). This allows liquid markets, with free price-discovery of the fair value of protection, and allows MMs/ LPs to accrue fees on the deposited tokens.</p><h3>Charm</h3><p>Litepaper: <a href="https://www.notion.so/Charm-Litepaper-92c6ce47ec804cfe925549ac2c814fd3">https://www.notion.so/Charm-Litepaper-92c6ce47ec804cfe925549ac2c814fd3</a></p><p>Charm is a decentralized options protocol that leverages the LS-LMSR (liquidity-sensitive logarithmic market scoring rule)prediction market AMM.</p><p>The method consists of two steps:</p><ol><li>Take a pair of options whose payoffs sum up to a fixed amount.</li><li>Use a prediction market AMM to create liquidity for this pair.</li></ol><p>Step 1 pairs up options which are negatively correlated and whose liabilities can be matched up with each other. The property that their payoffs sum up to a fixed amount means they can be viewed as a prediction market — a market where prices correspond to probabilities that sum up to one.</p><p>The elegance of this is that the LS-LMSR sets the price purely based on supply and demand and doesn’t rely on a fixed formula like Black-Scholes.</p><p><strong>How the LS-LMSR Works<br></strong>Let’s consider the case of a covered call option the same underlying asset, strike price K and expiration date. The payoffs of these two options are guaranteed to sum up to the underlying price S.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/942/0*PuzcbH52FVQ04rnF.png" /></figure><p>Pairs of call and covered call options with the same strike/expiration can therefore be viewed as a prediction market since their payoffs sum up to one (in terms of the underlying).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*3dEYBdzIFbHIQsb0.png" /></figure><p>The price quoted by the LS-LMSR only depends on <em>q1</em> and <em>q2</em>, the current total supply of call options and covered call options with the same strike/expiration. The price can be described by the following cost function, which determines the amount of the underlying held by the AMM given <em>q1</em> and <em>q2:</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Ev2LJo8HHMlk-cIG.png" /></figure><p>Users can buy options by paying the underlying to the AMM. The cost of the incremental amount of options can be represented as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ZsxgN7fhHE_toYoY.png" /></figure><p>Overall, these new waves of protocols exemplify Ethereum’s core values — coordinating diverse and untrusting participants on a global scale. As DeFi continues to scale, we are likely to see more protocols like these come up that enforce powerful coordination mechanisms through game theory based incentives and leverage prediction markets to increase liquidity and enable free-market price discovery.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c1f24d2ef68b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/applied-game-theory-prediction-markets-the-future-of-defi-c1f24d2ef68b">Applied Game Theory &amp; Prediction Markets — The Future of DeFi</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital">Gamma Point Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Hitchhiker’s Guide to DeFi (Part II) — DEXs & AMMs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/the-hitchhikers-guide-to-defi-part-ii-dexs-amms-e9fdf5a2635d?source=rss----117b0e0bcbc8---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e9fdf5a2635d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uniswap]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul Rai]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 Jan 2021 16:33:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-31T09:23:18.437Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Hitchhiker’s Guide to DeFi (Part II) — DEXs &amp; AMMs</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*pbQnVctX4UGYEVkp" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@silverhousehd?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">André François McKenzie</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>Disclaimer:</em></strong></p><ol><li><em>The above reflects the views of the investor and should NOT be construed as investment advice, financial advice or legal advice.</em></li><li><em>This information is purely educational and is NOT meant to be taken as a recommendation to buy or sell any product or service. </em><strong><em>Please do your own research before making any decisions.</em></strong></li><li><em>Where relevant, </em><strong><em>direct quotes &amp; passages </em></strong><em>have been taken from the sources, whitepapers, and blog posts mentioned.</em></li></ol><p>In our previous piece, we covered lending &amp; borrowing protocols, the building blocks of DeFi. In this post we’ll we’ll dive into Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs). DEXs are peer-to-peer (p2p) electronic markets that are built on the blockchain, and that utilize Automated Market Maker (AMM) protocols to provide continuous liquidity with minimal slippage. We’ll highlight the three main types of DEXs, and highlight the underlying equations that drive their AMM protocols.</p><p>We’ll end by deriving an equation to quantify “<em>impermanent loss</em>”, an exotic financial risk that all DEX liquidity providers are exposed to, yet most are either unaware of, or don’t mathematically model out.</p><h3>DEXs &amp; AMMs</h3><p><strong>Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs)</strong> DEXs are decentralized exchanges for digital assets, allowing investors to seamlessly trade between cryptocurrencies, without the need for a traditional order book-based centralized exchange DEXs typically have three participants:</p><ul><li><strong>Traders</strong>: Use DEXs to swap assets in and out of the pool</li><li><strong>Liquidity providers (LPs)</strong>: Deposit their assets in liquidity pools, on which they earn returns by collecting trading fees</li><li><strong>Arbitrageurs</strong>: Maintain the price of assets within that portfolio in accordance with the market price in exchange for a profit.</li></ul><p><strong>Automated Market Makers (AMMs)</strong> AMMS are smart contracts that hold liquidity reserves (or liquidity pools) that traders can trade against. These reserves are funded by liquidity providers (LPs). AMM protocols use a formulaic approach to determine the price of an asset. Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs) are specific and the most widely used type of AMMs that were designed by the crypto community. The term <em>“constant function”</em> refers to the fact that any trade must change the reserves in such a way that the <em>product of those reserves remains unchanged.</em></p><p>There are three main types of DEXs/CFMMs:</p><ol><li><a href="https://uniswap.org/"><strong>Uniswap</strong></a> (Constant Product Market Maker)</li></ol><p>2.<strong> </strong><a href="https://balancer.finance/"><strong>Balancer</strong></a> (Constant Mean Market Maker)</p><p>3.<strong> </strong><a href="https://www.curve.fi/"><strong>Curve</strong></a> (Hybrid Function Market Maker)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ZcalvAFNl_7M5t-4" /></figure><h3>Uniswap</h3><p>Uniswap is one of the first ever open source decentralized exchange protocols. It was launched in November 2018 by Hayden Adams (V2 was launched in May 2020) and it pioneered the implementation of a constant product market. A transaction in this market, swapping Δβ coins of β for Δ⍺ coins of ⍺ must satisfy:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*sUfS0T7BU8b8v8ksNQzPsA.png" /></figure><p>Where Rα and Rβ are reserves of each asset, k is the invariant, and γ is the transaction fee. After each transaction, reserves are update in the following way:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*ZYiuaPXLBzqqnxebYp3uFA.png" /></figure><p>The name “<em>constant product market</em>” comes from the fact that adding any amount of either asset must change the reserves in such a way that <em>the product Rα*</em>R<em>β</em> remains equal to the constant k (<em>assuming no fees</em>)<em>.</em>This is often simplified in the form of <strong><em>x*y=k</em></strong>, where x and y are the reserves of each asset.</p><p>Assuming no-arbitrage conditions, the marginal price of coin ⍺ in terms of coin β , which is defined as the price of an infinitesimally small trade (Δ<em>⍺</em> → 0) can be determined by differentiating the constant product market equation as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*VGxd89xHN4w3a4tGGxLrRA.png" /></figure><p>Hence marginal price offered by Uniswap (<em>assuming no fees, i.e γ=1</em>) can represented as</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*BMmCks9PltgvzlnWJ3X3Dg.png" /></figure><p>A constant product function forms a hyperbola when plotting two assets, which has a desirable property of always having liquidity as prices approach infinity on both sides of the spectrum.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*bXqwTv9qq62b0wxCkI7kOg.png" /></figure><h3>Balancer</h3><p>Balancer took this one step further by implementing a constant mean market. A constant mean market maker is a generalization of a constant product market maker, allowing for more than two assets and allowing for weights outside of 50/50, and satisfies the following equation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_Twtp6ZavxA-_fIJ.png" /></figure><p>Where Ri is the reserve of each asset, w is the weights of each asset, and k is the invariant. In other words, in the absence of fees, constant mean markets ensure that the weighted geometric mean of the reserves remains constant. For example, the function for an equal-weighted portfolio of three assets would be (<em>xyz</em>)^(1/3) = <em>k.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IR41Qu2dpZI_iQM6vnJoJg.png" /><figcaption>Source: Balancer <a href="https://balancer.finance/whitepaper/">Whitepaper</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Curve</h3><p>Curve Finance, which focuses on stablecoin and wrapped asset liquidity, has seen a significant increase in trading volume.</p><p>The following figure shows the daily trading volume of each stablecoins on Curve. The figure shows that <strong><em>DAI, USDC</em> &amp; <em>USDT</em></strong> have the highest trading volume among the stablecoins supported on the platform due to the direct demand from liquidity mining.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LB6FGNB61xcYllKJh0kT1Q.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://image.tokeninsight.com/levelPdf/TI-2020_Q2_DeFi_Industry_Research_Report_ALL.pdf">TokenInsight</a></figcaption></figure><p>Curve aimed to modify the AMM function to minimize slippage for assets that are relatively stable-priced. The protocol looked for an invariant that’s relatively flat near balance (price changes slowly), however that shifts towards the constant-product invariant as the portfolio becomes more imbalanced. The hence came up with the following Stable Swap invariant:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*xw2GVd8gDgFknM8F" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/0*sBHF55J2j0GDFKyz" /><figcaption>Source: Curve <a href="https://www.curve.fi/stableswap-paper.pdf">Whitepaper</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Impermanent Loss Calculation</h3><p>One final, yet crucial, comment on DEXs — there is an exotic financial risk called <em>impermanent loss</em> that is not intuitive, and yet every liquidity provider (LPs) is exposed to it.</p><p>Many LPs are unaware of the fact that they are exposed to price risk, that can wipe out the profits they earned through fees by providing liquidity. This price risk is captured by the term “impermanent loss”. For eg, when liquidity providers look at the value of their stake in the liquidity pool, they may find that it’s <em>worth less</em> than what they put in. What’s going on here?</p><p>To understand why this can happen, let’s assume that the liquidity providers are using the Uniswap V2 protocol. As shown earlier, assuming no-arbitrage conditions, the price can be represented as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*F2rsgVzL0CnhwYC_eStUog.png" /></figure><p>Where Rα and Rβ are reserves of each asset at time t, and Pt is the price of token ⍺ in terms of token β at time <em>t</em> (i.e the no of tokens of β that you would receive in exchange for one token of ⍺)</p><p>Combining this with the constant product market function Rα*Rβ=k , we can work out the size of each liquidity pool at any given price as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oYBaPuC9_Yijd6qsbU4xRA.png" /></figure><p>We can now compute Vt the value of the LP’s portfolio at time t (in units of coin β)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cv5jECDN3GMSGMgk_2WVaA.png" /></figure><p>Hence the LP’s PnL (in units of token β) at any time t=T can be represented as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ur5OzrI_FjoHkFLajZxIAQ.png" /></figure><p>The value of a portfolio (HODL) that was bought at time t=0 and held to time t=T is:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y_N0-yR1bg6BEe-qY90zsw.png" /></figure><p>Expressing R⍺ and Rβ in terms of P<em>o</em>, this equation can be expressed as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9VHVAliDEK6HpgKT4S8jZw.png" /></figure><p>We’re now ready to calculate the impermanent loss. <strong>Impermanent loss</strong> is defined as <em>the % difference between portfolio values if we bought and held the underlying coins (HODL) vs provided liquidity into the pool</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QE1GCLoCxO7nZ5N826Orsw.png" /></figure><p>When we plot the impermanent loss as a function of the price ratio, we get the following graph that clearly exhibits <em>negative convexity, </em>which is never desirable for LPs!! This means that no matter which direction the price moves in, LPs will always be taking a hit vs HODL because of the impermanent loss.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IbzjWa2hqzp_8Gia" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://pintail.medium.com/">Pintail</a></figcaption></figure><p>So the actual return for LPs is a balance between the impermanent loss caused by the price differential and the accumulated fees from trades on the exchange. Does this make intuitive sense? Absolutely! When price takers come in looking to trade or swap, the liquidity providers are forced to take the opposite side of the transaction. Hence The phrase “impermanent loss” is hence a misnomer, as the loss is very much permanent, unless the exchange rate returns back to the <em>original price</em>.</p><p>If long term price movements are large, they could result in losses much greater than the yield generated from collecting fees. However, if Uniswap manages to gain enough traction it could be profitable for LPs, as long as price movements remain sufficiently rangebound.</p><h3>Summary</h3><p><strong>1</strong>) Constant Function Market Makers is the brainchildren of the ingenious DeFi community. For LPs providing liquidity to these protocols, the value of their pool at any time t can be represented as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*r4nLyRaZek0gqiGOVVa_sg.png" /></figure><p>Hence, we can model out the returns LPs are expected to earn by using the following equations:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2TRT7FNswnu3o5lyaXjYZA.png" /></figure><p><strong>2</strong>) And finally <em>impermanent loss</em>, which is defined as the % difference in portfolio values for providing liquidity vs buying &amp; holding, can be represented as</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*QE1GCLoCxO7nZ5N826Orsw.png" /></figure><h3>Sources</h3><ul><li><a href="https://pintail.medium.com/understanding-uniswap-returns-cc593f3499ef">Understanding Uniswap Returns</a></li><li><a href="https://medium.com/bollinger-investment-group/constant-function-market-makers-defis-zero-to-one-innovation-968f77022159">Constant Function Market Makers: DeFi’s “Zero to One” Innovation</a></li><li><a href="https://blog.gnosis.pm/building-a-decentralized-exchange-in-ethereum-eea4e7452d6e">Building a Decentralized Exchange in Ethereum</a></li><li><a href="https://medium.com/dragonfly-research/unbundling-uniswap-the-future-of-on-chain-market-making-1c7d6948d570">Unbundling Uniswap: The Future of On-Chain Market Making</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e9fdf5a2635d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/the-hitchhikers-guide-to-defi-part-ii-dexs-amms-e9fdf5a2635d">The Hitchhiker’s Guide to DeFi (Part II) — DEXs &amp; AMMs</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital">Gamma Point Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Hitchhiker’s Guide to DeFi (Part I) — Lending Protocols & Superfluid Collateral]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/the-hitchhikers-guide-to-defi-part-i-lending-protocols-superfluid-collateral-27d8e654eefc?source=rss----117b0e0bcbc8---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/27d8e654eefc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralized-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rahul Rai]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Jan 2021 10:53:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-20T03:59:05.356Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Hitchhiker’s Guide to DeFi (Part I) — Lending Protocols &amp; Superfluid Collateral</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AIEwBt9Z3kNOJyPu" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@timtrad?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Tim Trad</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>Disclaimer:</em></strong></p><ol><li><em>The above reflects the views of the investor and should NOT be construed as investment advice, financial advice or legal advice.</em></li><li><em>This information is purely educational and is NOT meant to be taken as a recommendation to buy or sell any product or service. </em><strong><em>Please do your own research before making any decisions.</em></strong></li><li><em>Where relevant, </em><strong><em>direct quotes &amp; passages </em></strong><em>have been taken from the sources, whitepapers, and blog posts mentioned.</em></li></ol><p>Capital markets are ripe for disruption. Decades of high commissions, massive incumbent banking institutions, legacy tech infrastructure, regulatory oversight, and compliance restrictions have stalled growth and innovation in the financial services industry.</p><p><strong>Decentralized Finance </strong>(DeFi) is the broad term for a collection of open financial systems, enabled by decentralized blockchains, that aim to disrupt the incumbent financial intermediaries by leveraging the power of open-source technology to rebuild financial primitives in a more efficient, transparent, and accessible manner.</p><p>The ultimate vision for Decentralized Finance (DeFi) is to build a self-sovereign financial system allowing users to engage in a broad range of economic activities without the need to rely on centralization, trust, and accessibility.</p><p>DeFi took off on the Ethereum blockchain primarily because of Ethereum’s high level of <strong>composability</strong><em>- the ability to coordinate different parts of a modular &amp; stateless software stack</em>. Composability allows different smart contracts to interact with each other to produce complex financial structures, creating a network of interlinked protocols, or “Money LEGOs”. Composability creates a virtuous cycle and enables powerful network effects.</p><p>The buckets of protocols that have amassed a bulk of the capital that has flown into DeFi, along with their most popular platform implementations, are:</p><p>i) <strong>Lending/ Borrowing </strong>— MakerDAO, Compound, Aave, dYdX</p><p>ii) <strong>Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs</strong>) — Uniswap, Balancer, Curve, Serum</p><p>iii) <strong>Derivatives/ Synthetics</strong> — Sythnetix, dYdX, Opyn, Hegic</p><p>iv) <strong>Aggregators / Asset Management</strong> — yEarn, Harvest, Rari, 0x, 1inch, TokenSets</p><p>v) <strong>Stablecoins</strong>: USDT, USDC, DAI, AMPL</p><p>vi)<strong> Oracles</strong>: UMA, Chainlink</p><p>In this post, we will primarily focus on lending/ borrowing protocols. DEXs and other protocols (derivatives, stablecoins, asset managers, aggregators, oracles etc.) will be covered in future posts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*I__W1xFS_vBJ4pDZ.jpg" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://multicoin.capital/2020/11/24/the-defi-stack/">Multicoin Capital</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Growth of the DeFi Ecosystem</h3><p><strong>Global Macro Backdrop<br></strong>DeFi has taken the crypto and blockchain world by storm. Billions of dollars have been locked up in <em>lending &amp; exchange protocols </em>and the yields that DeFi can offer are especially attractive given the low-interest rate environment that we’re currently in. With central banks injecting massive liquidity through unprecedented levels of quantitative easing (as well as a coordinated fiscal stimulus by governments across the globe), crypto and DeFi have never been more appealing to yield-seeking investors.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*l3rfzXPPNdmzFcpw.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-feds-balance-sheet-the-other-exponential-curve/">Visual Capitalist</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Total Value Locked (TVL)</strong><br>There is almost <strong><em>$25B</em></strong><em> </em>of total value locked up in DeFi protocols. While this is a modest amount relative to the amount of capital flowing through the traditional financial platforms, the rapid growth in TVL is a testament to the widespread adoption of DeFi by the broader crypto community.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Hd0y2lzBQrA0ZhYH.png" /></figure><p><strong>DeFi Users Data</strong><br>There are currently almost <strong><em>1 million</em></strong><em> </em>unique addresses that have interacted with an Ethereum DeFi protocol. The number of users across DeFi protocols remained fairly consistent up through Q1 2020 and then spiked up exponentially mid-June due to the release of the Compound governance token (COMP), with Balancer (BAL), Curve (CRV) and other top platforms following suit.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*zHYAQaIfq0rO_gmM.png" /></figure><h3>Lending Protocols</h3><p>Credit is the cornerstone of every financial ecosystem. It enables <em>non-zero-sum wealth creation </em>by allowing individuals with surplus assets to lend them to borrowers who have a productive or investment use for those assets.</p><p>The traditional financial services industry relies on <em>counter-party trust and legally binding contracts </em>to<em> </em>determine default risk and enforce creditworthiness. But, how do you translate this on to the blockchain, which can be accessed pseudonymously and lacks a centralized judicial system? Two words — <strong><em>over-collateralization </em></strong><em>&amp; </em><strong><em>liquidation.</em></strong></p><p>Instead of relying on their trust in borrowers, suppliers rely on overcollateralization and liquidation to ensure that they can withdraw their assets at any time. Borrowers always have to supply more value in collateral than they can borrow and suppliers can always seize that collateral through a free and open market for liquidation. These mechanics work exactly the same way regardless of the borrowers’ creditworthiness. In other words, over-collateralization and liquidation are intended to <em>almost completely eliminate default risk.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/820/0*RKPFlJtT8K7bIGnQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://medium.com/helisnetwork/everything-you-need-to-know-about-defi-lending-protocols-6a5e8404f2b0">Helis Network</a></figcaption></figure><p>A simple example — say the lending protocol has a 1.5x overcollateraliztion ratio and a 1.25 liquidation level. That means that if I deposit $150 worth of ETH as collateral, I can then borrow $100 worth of DAI stablecoin (or any other asset), which I will have to repay with accrued interest. If the value of my ETH collateral ever falls below $125, it will be automatically be liquidated to pay back the lenders in full ($100 + accrued interest worth of DAI).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/635/0*gZ0RBgBMqZUEACic.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://samczsun.com/so-you-want-to-use-a-price-oracle/">SAMCZSUN</a></figcaption></figure><p>The first lending protocol was the <a href="https://makerdao.com/">MakerDAO</a> project, which in Dec 2017 launched the Dai Stablecoin System, a decentralized, unbiased, <em>collateral-backed </em>cryptocurrency soft-pegged to the US Dollar through unique smart contracts known as Collateralized Debt Positions (CDPs).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*K0VPIyaE7J7ea0_P.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://medium.com/@blockspace.info/investment-analysis-makerdao-e58245d07c2f">Blockspace</a></figcaption></figure><p>Following MakerDAO, a number of other lending platforms, such as <a href="https://compound.finance/">Compound</a> and <a href="https://aave.com/">Aave</a>, came up that used similar collateralization and liquidation protocols. The rest of the DeFi ecosystem also began to take shape, with some of the early DEXs/ AMMs, insurance, and asset management platforms launching throughout the late 2018 — mid-2019 period.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*gkZlAI208BsJQrxu.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://medium.com/@WTFdao">DeFi.WTF</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Superfluid Collateral</h3><p>Any crypto asset <em>A</em> can be lent out to earn yield through a lending protocol. In return, the lender will receive an asset that represents a claim on the underlying asset <em>A</em>, as well as all of the lending interest that it accrues. Let’s call the asset or token, that represents this claim c<em>A</em>. Now c<em>A </em>itself is an asset that can be borrowed, lent, traded, swapped etc. As it can always be exchanged for the underlying asset <em>A</em> (+ accrued interest), its value is always greater than the <em>A</em>, and will continue to increase steadily over time as interest accrues.</p><p>Hence, <em>every crypto asset A, has a yield earning counterpart cA that’s wrapped in a lending protoco</em>l. It almost always makes sense to own the wrapped coin, as it is always worth more than the underlying coin and bears (<em>almost</em>) no additional risk. The beauty of wrapped coins is that it creates a financial universe where <em>every single asset can, and should, be earning an efficient risk-adjusted yield</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*cGdK2Sb1R3MlRZ99.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://tokeneconomy.co/superfluid-collateral-in-open-finance-8c3db15efac">Superfluid ETH</a></figcaption></figure><p>In addition, c<em>A</em> itself is an asset, and so it can be used as collateral to borrow another asset, say<em> B</em> which can then be further lent out and so on. Hence collateral can be lent out, and that lent out collateral can replace the original collateral. And so on. Till infinity? Sure, as long as there are no transaction/ gas fees.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*UP-N12CoV8NK-NzD.png" /></figure><p>A great example of a protocol that leverages this beautifully is <a href="https://compound.finance/">Compound</a>. The Compound protocol aggregates the supply of each user; when a user supplies an asset, it becomes a fungible resource. Suppliers are issued cTokens that represent a claim on the underlying asset, along with the accrued interest. In this way, earning interest is as simple as holding a ERC-20 cToken, whose value relative to the underlying token constantly increases over time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*lRkYNnwrHAGeSggl.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://blog.kalinoff.com/compound-finance-explained/">Kalinoff’s Blog</a></figcaption></figure><p>In addition, Compound allows users to frictionlessly borrow from the protocol, <em>using cTokens as collateral</em>, for use anywhere in the Ethereum ecosystem. Supplied collateral assets earn interest while in the protocol, but users cannot redeem or transfer collateral while it is securing an open borrowing position.</p><p>If the value of an account’s borrowing outstanding exceeds their borrowing capacity, a portion of the outstanding borrowing may be repaid in exchange for the user’s cToken collateral, at the current market price minus a liquidation discount; this incentivizes an ecosystem of arbitrageurs to quickly step in to reduce the borrower’s exposure, and eliminate the protocol’s risk.</p><h3>Single-Asset Recursive Money Market Model</h3><p>Let’s consider a crypto investor that holds all of their wealth in DAI. They can leverage money-market platforms, like Compound, to borrow more DAI, as long as they are sufficiently collateralized. They can continue to do this recursively to infinity, by lending out the borrowed DAI and using that as collateral to borrow more DAI and so on (<em>ignoring transaction costs and gas fees</em>)</p><p>The expected wealth from this strategy can be represented as:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*yhF-d7C5uBRIUjWU.png" /></figure><p>If c = 1.5, we can simplify this infinite GP series to:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uV-flDAREgCM1aIp4b1g8w.png" /></figure><p><em>Hence, the money market protocol enables crypto traders to leverage their positions by 3x, through recursive borrowing &amp; lending.</em></p><h3>Summary</h3><p><strong>1</strong>) Wrapped tokens are risk-free claims on an underlying coin/ asset and are steadily increasing in value, relative to the underlying asset, due to accrued interest</p><p><strong>2</strong>) These wrapped tokens are themselves assets that can be used as collateral on lending protocols. Hence, risk-free yield can be earned on assets locked up as collateral</p><p><strong>3</strong>) Recursive lending and borrowing enables crypto traders and investors to obtain leverage and to generate additional yield on their assets</p><h3>Sources:</h3><p><a href="https://bankless.substack.com/p/aquaponic-yield-farming">Aquaponic Yield Farming</a></p><p><a href="https://compound.finance/documents/Compound.Whitepaper.pdf">Compound Whitepaper</a></p><p><a href="https://multicoin.capital/2020/11/24/the-defi-stack/">The DeFi Stack</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=27d8e654eefc" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/the-hitchhikers-guide-to-defi-part-i-lending-protocols-superfluid-collateral-27d8e654eefc">The Hitchhiker’s Guide to DeFi (Part I) — Lending Protocols &amp; Superfluid Collateral</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital">Gamma Point Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[2020 Crypto Year-in-Review and 2021 Predictions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/2020-crypto-year-in-review-and-2021-predictions-da91d16daded?source=rss----117b0e0bcbc8---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/da91d16daded</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gamma]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stable-coin]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sanat Rao]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Jan 2021 11:53:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-04T11:56:17.315Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>2020 Crypto Review and 2021 Predictions</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*zrdpeVEXGZJkaFX7u2oDMg.jpeg" /></figure><p>2020 was truly a momentous year — the Covid19 pandemic changed how we live, work and travel; the economic shock and resulting K-shaped recovery heightened the divide between the elite and the working class, and a contentious election highlighted the deep fissures in our society.</p><p>While 2020 was the year of change, it was also an incredible year for crypto. From rapid institutional adoption of crypto to next-generation decentralized platforms, we will look back at 2020 as the year crypto finally came of age.</p><p>This report covers a review of the state of cryptoverse in 2020 and our predictions for 2021.</p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer:</em></strong></p><ol><li><em>The above reflects the views of the investor and should NOT be construed as investment advice, financial advice or legal advice.</em></li><li><em>This information is purely educational and is NOT meant to be taken as a recommendation to buy or sell any product or service. </em><strong><em>Please do your own research before making any decisions.</em></strong></li><li><em>Where relevant, direct quotes &amp; passages have been taken from whitepapers, articles and blog posts, with their sources cited.</em></li></ol><h3>2020 Crypto Highlights</h3><p><em>Here are some of our key highlights:</em></p><h3>1. Bitcoin price touches an all time high, driven by institutional investor demand</h3><p>One of the primary functions of a monetary asset is to be a ‘store of value’ — a mechanism to hold its purchasing power over time. The federal reserve printed an unprecedented amount of money (<strong>$3.38 Trillion in 2020</strong>) to support the economy during the coronavirus pandemic, driving real interest rates close to zero in the process. According to some estimates, <a href="https://www.cityam.com/almost-a-fifth-of-all-us-dollars-were-created-this-year/">1 in every 5 US dollars was created</a> in 2020.</p><p>Institutional investors believe that such a large infusion of currency into the economy <em>will undoubtedly lead to inflation,</em> reducing the attractiveness of the US$ as a store of value. This ‘smart money’ is now looking at Bitcoin as a hedge against inflation and a digital alternative to Gold.</p><p>In 2020, institutional money managers and companies started to publicly allocate capital to Bitcoin. Examples include:</p><ul><li><strong>Square</strong> <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/08/square-buys-50-million-in-bitcoin-says-cryptocurrency-aligns-with-companys-purpose.html">bought 4709 bitcoins at $50M</a>, representing 1% of the companies total assets</li><li><strong>Microstrategy</strong> announced that i<a href="https://www.microstrategy.com/en/company/company-videos/microstrategy-announces-over-1b-in-total-bitcoin-purchases-in-2020">t owns 70,470 BTC</a>, acquired at an aggregate price of $1.125B</li><li><strong>Massachusetts Mutual</strong> Life Insurance Co. (Mass Mutual), a 169 year old insurance company, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-10/169-year-old-insurer-massmutual-invests-100-million-in-bitcoin">purchased $100 million in Bitcoin</a> for its general investment fund</li><li><strong>Paul Tudor Jones,</strong> the legendary hedge fund manager, said <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/paul-tudor-jones-bitcoin-undervalued">Bitcoin comprises 1–2% of his portfolio,</a> and believes it is the ‘fastest horse’</li><li><strong>Stanley Druckenmiller,</strong> another Wall Street legend, said <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2020/11/12/a-legendary-hedge-fund-billionaire-just-flipped-to-bitcoin-calling-it-better-than-gold/?sh=13f023b7222f">he owns Bitcoin</a> and believes it to be a store of value</li><li><strong>JP Morgan</strong> <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/jp-morgan-says-gold-will-suffer-for-years-because-of-bitcoin/articleshow/79655180.cms?from=mdr">released a report</a> showing institutional investors pulled out money from Gold ETFs and invested in the Greyscale Bitcoin trust in Q4 2020</li></ul><p>This momentum drove BTC prices to an all-time high as the year drew to a close. At the time of writing this article, BTC price was at $32,000.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*_jpqK7WoPpK8i8AC" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="http://www.coingecko.com/">CoinGecko</a></figcaption></figure><h3>2. Stablecoins grew by $20B+ in 2020</h3><p>Stablecoins are ‘crypto dollars’ on the blockchain whose values are pegged to a stable asset, like the US dollar (e.g. 1 USDC stablecoin = 1 USD). Traditional crypto assets such as Bitcoin tend to have volatile prices, making them difficult to use for transactions. Stablecoins enable market participants to hold and transfer their assets in USD, and serve as the <strong>de-facto money</strong> for the crypto ecosystem today.</p><p>Stablecoin adoption has sky-rocketed in 2020, with <strong>28 billion</strong> stablecoins in existence (In contrast, Paypal is estimated to have $157 billion across all user wallets in 2020). USDT (Tether) is the most dominant stablecoin in use, currently sitting at north of $21 billion in circulating supply.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qsiXEU7QJqf6MiMI" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="http://messari.io/">Messari.io</a></figcaption></figure><p>There are three categories of stablecoins:</p><p>i)<strong> Centralized Stablecoins</strong> : Each stablecoin is backed 1 for 1 by USD held in bank accounts <em>(eg. USDC, USDT), acting essentially as IOUs</em>. By definition, these fiat-collateralized stablecoins are centrally managed (USDC is a joint project between Circle and Genesis Capital), and are not censorship resistant.</p><p>ii)<strong> Crypto-Collateralized Stablecoins</strong>: Each stablecoin is backed by over-collateralized crypto assets <em>(eg. DAI, sUSD where the user deposits ETH or BTC to mint the stablecoin).</em> These coins are truly decentralized and censorship resistant, but are subject to liquidations when the collateral drops in price.</p><p>iii)<strong> Algorithmic Stablecoins</strong> (<em>Seigniorage-Style/ Non-Collateralized</em>): These stablecoins are not backed by any asset; an algorithm expands or contracts the <em>supply</em> of the stablecoin in order to move the price of the underlying closer to the target price <em>(eg. AMPL, ESD, DSD)</em></p><h3>3. Decentralized Finance (DeFi) — the birth of a new Financial System</h3><p>DeFi was absolutely the <strong>#1 development</strong> in Crypto in 2020. We have been fortunate to witness (and participate in) a once-in-a-lifetime birth of a new <strong>open financial system,</strong> powered by thousands of developers developing open source applications on top of the Ethereum blockchain. Smart-contract based exchanges, payments, lending products, derivatives and robo-advisors were all created in a matter of months, and adopted by thousands of users.</p><p>The hottest DeFi trend was <strong>Liquidity Mining,</strong> a process to incentivize users to provide liquidity for a new protocol, and in return earn a % of the transaction fees + the governance token of the platform. It all started with Compound <a href="https://medium.com/compound-finance/expanding-compound-governance-ce13fcd4fe36">distributing its COMP token</a> as an incentive to suppliers and borrowers on its platform. Since then, It has become common for early LPs to earn 100–200% APR while helping new protocols bootstrap liquidity.</p><p>Teams learnt quickly from the COMP experiment, rapidly launched their open source platforms, and pioneered the IDOs (Initial DEX Offering) where their governance tokens traded on decentralized platforms instead of exchanges. Uniswap, the leading AMM (automated market maker), saw its <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/uniswap-monthly-trade-volume-exceeded-164350546.html">monthly volume exceed that of centralized exchange Coinbase</a> in September.</p><p>Examples of key projects and platforms in the <strong>Defi Stac</strong>k today include:</p><ol><li><strong>Blockchain Layer1</strong>: Ethereum, Solana, Cosmos</li><li><strong>Self-Custody</strong> <strong>Wallets</strong>: Metamask, TrustWallet</li><li><strong>Units of Value</strong>: DAI, USDC, WBTC, ETH, cTokens, aTokens</li><li><strong>Automated Market Makers</strong> (AMMs): Uniswap, Balance, Curve</li><li><strong>Lending Protocols:</strong> Compound, Aave, Cream</li><li><strong>Derivative Networks:</strong> Synthetix, DyDX</li><li><strong>Defi Yield Aggregators</strong>: Yearn Finance, Rari Capital</li><li><strong>Oracles</strong>: Chainlink, UMA</li><li><strong>Front-Ends:</strong> Zapper, Matcha</li></ol><p>etc.</p><p>At the same time, we also had a front row seat to the <strong>potential risks</strong> of DeFi, including:</p><ul><li><strong>Vampire Mining</strong>: a new project forks the code and sucks away liquidity from the market leader via incentives. (e.g. <a href="https://defirate.com/sushiswap-vampire-mining/">Sushiswap drained $800M liquidity from Uniswap)</a></li><li><strong>Rug Pulls:</strong> developers intentionally create hidden backdoors in the smart contract code, which are later used to drain funds (e.g. <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/compounder-developers-implicated-alleged-smart-contract-rug-pull">Compounder Finance</a>)</li><li><strong>Algorithmic exploits</strong> such as <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/defi-exploits-flash-loans-industry-leaders">flash loan</a>s, where attackers use a key blockchain feature (atomic transactions) to borrow large amounts of money without collateral, take advantage of an arbitrage and repay the loan after pocketing the difference. (e.g. <a href="https://news.bitcoin.com/defi-protocol-bragged-having-flash-loan-attack-prevention-hacked-6-million/">Value Defi attack</a>)</li></ul><p>While the damage varied by project, the threat of a massive apocalyptic event continues to hang over the DeFi sector.</p><p>DeFi closed the year on a strong note with almost <strong>$15B</strong> Total Value Locked (TVL), an incredible number for an entire system which was practically non-existent at the beginning of the year.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/564/0*9-L1WqAa9besiU-E" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://defipulse.com/">Defi Pulse</a></figcaption></figure><h3>4. Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs): Early green shoots emerging</h3><p>CBDCs are essentially digital versions of a country’s fiat currency on a blockchain. By definition, CBDCs are centralized and backed by a suitable amount of the country’s currency reserves.</p><p>The US Dollar has been the <strong>global reserve currency</strong> for much of the last century, with 80%+ of global trade being priced and settled in USD. This allows the US to easily finance its trade and budget deficits, and expand its geopolitical influence by controlling the value and flow of USD. As China’s economic might grows, <a href="https://www.thebalance.com/yuan-reserve-currency-to-global-currency-3970465#:~:text=China%20wants%20its%20currency%2C%20the,more%20control%20over%20its%20economy">its leaders have been exploring opportunities</a> to gain market share as a reserve currency.</p><p>CBDCs provide a potential path for countries to engage in cross-border transactions in a <strong>non-US dollar currency</strong>, fully outside of the visibility of the US. CBDCs also permit a high velocity of money as well as negative interest rates well below the current bounds. The digital trail of CBDCs and the potential to control its use through incentives and sanctions are irresistible for any regime seeking to learn about economic activities of global users.</p><p>In 2020, we saw some early signs of progress:</p><ul><li><strong>China</strong> piloted its “digital Yuan” DCEP pilot for residents in Shenzen, Suzhou and Xiong’an — the first central bank digital currency to be launched. <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/china-central-bank-official-reveals-results-of-first-digital-yuan-pilots">According to the People’s bank of China,</a> 113,000 consumer wallets were created with 3.1M digital Yuan transactions in 3 months and $162M transacted with partners such as Didi Chuxing ride-sharing, Meituan-Dianping food delivery, etc.</li><li>The <strong>Bank of England</strong> published a <a href="https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/paper/2020/central-bank-digital-currency-opportunities-challenges-and-design.pdf">discussion paper</a> on a potential CBDC, denominated in Pounds Sterling, and is currently evaluating opportunities and risks of launching such a currency.</li><li><strong>Japan</strong> has created a <a href="https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2020/rel201009e.htm/">CBDC working group</a> to prepare for a future surge in demand for CBDCs</li><li><strong>South Korea</strong>’s central bank aims to <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/south-korea-central-bank-test-digital-currency-banks-2021">launch a CBDC pilot</a> in 2021.</li><li><strong>Russia</strong> <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2020/10/22/russian-government-officials-says-digital-ruble-is-the-future/?sh=26a520ef7a78">expects to pilot a</a> digital ruble in late 2021, but little information is available at this stage</li></ul><h3>Our Crypto Predictions for 2021</h3><h3>1. Bitcoin price will continue its historic rise</h3><p>Bitcoin is already up 10% in just the first 3 days of 2021. We believe that the US government will continue its fiscal stimulus policy to support the economy in 2021, adding more $$ to the federal reserve balance sheet, and in turn <em>driving further demand for Bitcoin.</em></p><p>We believe that Bitcoin will be a <strong>mainstream investment</strong> for large institutional money managers, sovereign wealth funds and corporations looking for an inflation hedge. With legends like Paul Tudor Jones and Stanley Druckenmiller endorsing Bitcoin, <em>institutional investors will flock to buy Bitcoin this year.</em> In addition, “web3.0 CEOs” like Elon Musk will add Bitcoin to their treasury to set a precedent.</p><p>According to Delphi Digital, the supply of BTC held on exchanges has dropped by 20% from the ATH in Feb 2020. This is a very bullish signal, since it typically means the bitcoin supply has been moved offline to cold storage for long-term holding.</p><p>Bitcoin has a capped supply of 21M, and the increased investor demand coupled with inelastic supply will drive Bitcoin price up significantly in 2021. While it is hard to arrive at a fundamental valuation of Bitcoin, here are some possible scenarios:</p><ul><li>As a decentralized store of value, Gold is the nearest <em>market comparable</em> to Bitcoin. Gold’s market cap stood at close to $10 Trillion in Dec 2020. <em>Bitcoin price would need to reach </em><strong><em>$47,619</em></strong><em> to equal 10% of Gold’s overall valuation ($1 Trillion)</em><strong><em>.</em></strong></li><li>Global equity market cap is at $100 Trillion in Dec 2020. If Bitcoin were to reach 5% of this market cap, it would need to hit $238,000 in price.</li><li>Several investors believe that Bitcoin will <a href="https://www.businessinsider.in/stock-market/news/bitcoin-should-be-worth-400000-based-on-its-scarcity-and-value-versus-gold-according-to-guggenheims-scott-minerd/articleshow/79777763.cms">approach Gold in market cap this decade</a>, putting BTC’s fair market price in the <strong>$400,000 — $450,000 range</strong></li></ul><h3>2. Regulations around Stablecoins will increase in 2021</h3><p>Stablecoins are truly digital cash, and are perfect for currency transfer, remittances and retail payments. We estimate that USD-backed stablecoins will cross $100B in marketcap this year.</p><p>As crypto prices go up and more stablecoins emerge, it is inevitable that governments will pay close attention to crypto in 2021. Historically, US crypto regulation has typically been centered around <em>distinguishing securities from commodities</em> and ensuring that tokens follow SEC and CFTC guidelines. On the other hand, countries such as India and China have focused on the more conventional issue of ‘<em>are crypto tokens currencies’</em> and the bypassing of capital controls. We believe there will be higher scrutiny and government interest in 2021 in the overall crypto ecosystem.</p><p><strong>The Tether Problem</strong></p><p>Tether Holdings Limited and the Bitfinex cryptocurrency exchange, the companies behind USDT, are currently <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2020/07/09/ny-supreme-court-approves-investigation-into-10-billion-cryptocurrency-created-by-a-presidential-candidate/?sh=5858202f783b">being investigated</a> by the NY attorney general; The core controversy is around whether each USDT is truly backed by a US dollar, something which has never been proven by a full audit of the tether reserves. Any action against Tether will be a huge shock to the crypto ecosystem, since USDT accounts for 70% of the stablecoin space today.</p><p><strong>Facebook Diem</strong></p><p>Facebook’s Libra stablecoin (now called Diem) was announced in 2019, but delayed its 2020 launch as <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/08/facebook-hopes-the-cryptocurrency-diem-it-backs-will-launch-in-2021.html#:~:text=Menu-,Facebook%20hopes%20the%20cryptocurrency%20it%20backs,in%202021%2C%20top%20exec%20says&amp;text=David%20Marcus%2C%20the%20head%20of,Libra%20before%20a%20recent%20rebrand.">regulators raised several concerns</a> about data privacy and financial stability. Libra is now renamed to Diem, and the Diem Association is currently waiting for approval from the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority.</p><p>We expect Diem to be launched in 2021 (along with Facebook’s Novi wallet), with modifications made to its privacy architecture to ease regulators concerns on consumer protection. The biggest attraction of Diem will be a simple UX and a focus on consumer-merchant payments and remittances.</p><p><strong>The STABLE act</strong></p><p>The <a href="https://tlaib.house.gov/media/press-releases/tlaib-garcia-and-lynch-stableact">STABLE act</a>, a new act introduced in the US congress, would force stablecoin issuers to obtain a banking license and hold FDIC insurance. If passed, this act would be a setback to stablecoins, since burdensome compliance costs will almost definitely slow down the progress of DeFi and put power back in the hands of large banks and corporations.</p><p><strong>CBDCs</strong></p><p>We believe that central bank digital currencies will continue to grow at a glacial pace, driven by focus on the pandemic and the lack of understanding of the underlying technology. 2021 may see further pilots and announcements, but is unlikely to see any large scale CBDC rollouts.</p><h3>3. DeFi adoption will explode in 2021</h3><p>1.25M unique addresses used DeFi in 2020. However, the actual number of DeFi users are estimated around 200,000 (since many users are responsible for multiple wallets).</p><p>In 2021, we believe DeFi will scale out beyond its early adopters:</p><ul><li><em>Yield on crypto &amp; stablecoin deposits will be the primary consumer use case</em> and driver for DeFi adoption. We expect Neo banks to offer high interest rate checking accounts on top of stablecoins and expect to see <em>&gt;$30B in loans</em> outstanding in DeFi protocols.</li><li>We will see more of Bitcoin’s large market cap offered as collateral in Defi (as wBTC, renBTC etc.), <em>increasing the TVL of Defi to $100B.</em></li><li>New DeFi aggregators will reduce the complexity of interacting with DeFi, and enable broader retail participation in this emerging sector</li><li>New “Oracle solutions” will be launched which solve the reliability &amp; latency issues of today’s oracles.</li><li>Prediction markets such as sports betting and S&amp;P500 trading are an ideal use case for Defi and will take off in 2021</li></ul><h3>4. Ethereum will cement its position as the “base layer” for crypto</h3><p>Ethereum is already the #1 smart contract platform and has <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/ethereum-set-to-become-first-blockchain-to-settle-1-trillion-in-one-year">processed close to $1Trillion worth of transactions</a> in 2020, driven primarily by the DeFi boom. Most stablecoins and financial applications are settled on the Ethereum blockchain. However, the network’s utilization has been maxed out and the cost of transactions (called gas fees) is at an all time high.</p><p>The Ethereum community successfully launched Phase0 of Ethereum 2.0 in Dec 2020. Ethereum2.0 is essentially a brand new blockchain, and the change in consensus algorithm from <a href="https://medium.com/mycrypto/eth2-0-everything-you-need-to-know-eb32fbfe0bd">Proof-of-Work to Proof-of-Stake</a> will help Ethereum scale its transaction throughput by 1000x while using far less computing power. In 2021, we will see Phase1 of Ethereum 2.0 go live, further improving scalability and cementing its position as the leading base layer for crypto.</p><p>We anticipate new DeFi projects on recent blockchain projects such as Solana and Polkadot. However, <em>Ethereum will continue to be the king of the smart-contract hill in 2021.</em></p><h3>5. Payment services will add crypto-native features</h3><p>PayPal <a href="https://newsroom.paypal-corp.com/2020-10-21-PayPal-Launches-New-Service-Enabling-Users-to-Buy-Hold-and-Sell-Cryptocurrency">announced in Oct 2020 t</a>hat its users will be able to buy, hold and sell cryptocurrency directly from the PayPal app. In 2021, we will see PayPal enabling its 26 Million merchant network to accept and transact with digital currencies, in turn enabling crypto as a funding source of payments. <em>PayPal and Square will consider offering their own stablecoins on their networks.</em></p><p>Global giants such as Visa and Mastercard will allow partners to launch USDC and stablecoin denominated credit cards so customers <em>can make payments in stablecoins</em> at merchants using their credit cards.</p><h3>6. The first Crypto IPOs will take place in 2021</h3><p>Coinbase <a href="https://fortune.com/2020/12/17/coinbase-ipo-cryptocurrency-initial-public-offering-stock/#:~:text=Cryptocurrency%20giant%20Coinbase%20announced%20on,pursue%20an%20IPO%20in%202020.&amp;text=Coinbase&#39;s%20announcement%20comes%20at%20a,cryptocurrency%20prices%20are%20red-hot.">announced</a> that it has filed for a public offering in 2021, and its IPO will be a key milestone in the establishing the legitimacy of the crypto industry. The Coinbase IPO is an incredible opportunity to demonstrate the potential of offering security tokens on a blockchain, rather than the traditional IPO process of placing shares via investment banks.</p><p>Other prominent crypto companies which have reached Unicorn status and may explore IPO options include Circle, Binance and BlockFi.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>At Gamma Point Capital, we believe crypto is just at the beginning of a 10 year journey to mainstream consumer adoption. We are incredibly bullish on the sector and are believe crypto offers a very compelling risk/reward opportunity for long-term investors.</p><p>We wish everyone a very happy new year and an incredible 2021 for Crypto!</p><p>— — -</p><p><em>Sanat Rao is the managing partner at Gamma Point Capital. He was previously a Partner at IDG Ventures India focused on investments in fintech, blockchain and enterprise software. Sanat held earlier roles at Intel Capital and iSPIRT on the investment and M&amp;A teams.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=da91d16daded" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/2020-crypto-year-in-review-and-2021-predictions-da91d16daded">2020 Crypto Year-in-Review and 2021 Predictions</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital">Gamma Point Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Trading the 2020 US Presidential Elections]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/trading-the-2020-us-presidential-elections-37e47d0fe891?source=rss----117b0e0bcbc8---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/37e47d0fe891</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gamma Point Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2020 07:32:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-12-03T02:52:31.279Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mWPvavLm61sHZPgcr4aQHQ.png" /></figure><p>The 2020 US presidential elections were riveting, and are still on-going at the time of writing this. In this post, we’ll dive into the significance of prediction markets, and how we leveraged them to trade the 2020 US presidential elections using an algorithmic arbitrage strategy.</p><p><strong><em>Disclaimer:</em></strong></p><ol><li><em>The above reflect the views of the investor and should NOT be construed as investment advice, financial advice or legal advice.</em></li><li><em>This information is purely educational and is NOT meant to be taken as a recommendation to buy or sell any product or service. </em><strong><em>Please do your own research before making any decisions.</em></strong></li></ol><p>One of the standout features of this election (apart from Trump’s election fraud Hail Mary) was the presence of both expert predictions <em>and</em> liquid prediction markets.</p><p>Why is this important? First of all, this enabled market participants to “put their money where their mouth is” and trade on their election views. More importantly, this enabled the first widely followed battle between <strong>experts</strong> and <strong>markets</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*1mHJdJqZaVVx-NSp.png" /></figure><p>In the weeks leading up to the election, polls and statistical models (FiveThirtyEight) were indicating a 15% chance of a Trump re-election, economic data models (The Economist) had him lower at 10%, and prediction markets (FTX, Betfair) had Trump higher at 35–40%.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*te7nqAcohgl-E9Eh" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/">FiveThirtyEight</a></figcaption></figure><p>Prediction/ betting markets represent the mean estimate of all of the market participants that placed monetary bets on their views. The bullish case for prediction markets stems from the incredible power of <strong>collective intelligence</strong> (CI), or “wisdom of the crowds” — the argument that the mean estimate of a sufficiently large population will be more accurate than any one individual’s. However, prediction markets are still in their infancy stage, with limited liquidity and restricted access, especially for large institutional investors. In addition, human biases such as confirmation bias, loss aversion, anchoring bias etc. can limit their accuracy.</p><blockquote><em>Collective intelligence is shared or group intelligence that emerges from the collaboration, collective efforts, and competition of many individuals and appears in consensus decision making — Wikipedia</em></blockquote><h3>Prediction Markets</h3><p>There are three main types of prediction markets:</p><ol><li><strong>Betting Sites</strong>: Betfair, PredictIt, Polymarket</li><li><strong>Centralized Crypto Exchanges</strong>: FTX</li><li><strong>Decentralized Exchanges</strong>: Augur, Catnip</li></ol><p>Of the above, FTX had the highest liquidity, a centralized limit order book, and API integrations, enabling high-frequency algo trading.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*xfjId9ZBSPVI2qsS.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://messari.io/article/crypto-prediction-markets-take-center-stage-during-u-s-election">Messari</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Trading Strategy</h3><p><a href="https://ftx.com/">FTX</a> is a centralized crypto derivatives exchange that supports derivatives, options, volatility products and leveraged tokens for all major cryptocurrencies.</p><p>There were two main election-related products that were tradable on FTX: <strong>TRUMPWIN </strong>and<strong> TRUMPLOSE. </strong>These are cryptocurrencies that will be redeemable on FTX for either $1 or $0 USD based on whether Trump wins the election or not.</p><blockquote><em>To clarify: we will be following the original rules for the contract, and will not expire the contracts unless a candidate has reached a majority of the electoral college votes or every one of the selected publications has called the election. If neither of those happen, the contracts will settle to whoever is president in February — FTX</em></blockquote><p>Ignoring fees and slippage, it can be easily shown that the following equation must <em>always</em> hold:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TZQUWuyyZ4wDDQ6q.png" /></figure><p>Our arbitrage strategy was straightforward:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ZnYSeppU_sbYC7SD.png" /></figure><p>The goal here was to buy every time the underlying package dipped below its $1 fair-value and sell whenever it rose above $1, as the package could always be redeemed for $1 post-election. This strategy, in theory, would earn ~ 2% each time capital was turned over.</p><h3>Fees</h3><p>It’s easy to adjust the above equations to account for fees. Let <em>f</em> be the fee in bps (1bp = 0.01%) that is charged by the exchange. On FTX, the standard fee is 7bps (0.07%) per trade. The equations above can be re-written to account for fees as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*pnflBvzZ1pXA5tCS.png" /></figure><p>We used a 1% buffer to account for any potential slippage and latency that could occur for each trade. The 1% was chosen somewhat arbitrarily, in theory, a backtest could be run testing different buy/sell entry levels to maximize ROIC. Given our rush to deploy, we did not conduct this analysis.</p><h3>Implementation</h3><p><strong>Step 1</strong>: Write a script to constantly scrape TRUMPWIN<em> </em>&amp; TRUMPLOSE<em> </em>prices.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*h2Xg0omHbZpjrXlX.png" /></figure><p><strong>Step 2</strong>: Check to see if the BUY condition is met. If so, buy 500 of each of the coins.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ZToqH2v52n93WYS0.png" /></figure><p><strong>Step 3</strong>: Check to see if the SELL condition is met. If so, and if we are already sufficiently long, sell 500 of each of the coins.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*s2M1e-04QhsO6vow.png" /></figure><p><strong>Step 4</strong>: Manage risk with a script to constantly check that we’re fully hedged (i.e, that we own equal amounts of each of the coins). This may occur due to failed trades, code bugs, fund balance issues etc. If we were ever un-hedged, we would sell the unbalanced coin to remain delta neutral.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Ocgi-k2xYtnw4lx2.png" /></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The actual markets were a roller-coaster. On election night (Tue, Nov 2), TRUMPWIN spiked up to a high of $0.80, before subsequently crashing to low of $0.10, where it has stayed for the time being.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*yMk8MmxEF7hUA4uW" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://ftx.com/trade/TRUMP">FTX</a></figcaption></figure><p>Who emerged as the winner — the experts or prediction markets? It’s unclear.</p><p>The polls’ and experts’ initial call was clearly more accurate, as they were less bullish on Trump heading into election night. However, this is the incorrect metric to benchmark performance as information continued to flow in throughout the night, and markets/models adjusted real-time, increasing volatility in the expected probabilities.</p><p>In theory, backtests would have to be run for multiple elections across multiple geographies to determine whether models or markets are better predictors. Also, when evaluating the performance of collective intelligence, a key metric of success must be defined — is it the collective estimate at time <em>t=0</em> pre-election night, or should we look at a weighted average of the predictions throughout election night as a more accurate indicator?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*sdQABvgJKLHrSr_8.png" /></figure><p>Overall, the 2020 elections proved that prediction markets are a force to be reckoned with. Expect to see liquidity and trade volumes increase exponentially over the next few years, alongside increased institutional adoption and regulatory oversight. In the meanwhile, prediction markets will continue to provide great discretional and market-neutral opportunities for traders and investors.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=37e47d0fe891" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital/trading-the-2020-us-presidential-elections-37e47d0fe891">Trading the 2020 US Presidential Elections</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/gamma-point-capital">Gamma Point Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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