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            <title><![CDATA[Central banks are now insolvent]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/goldmoney/central-banks-are-now-insolvent-e70ddfe8f6ce?source=rss----18b9cc76e9e5---4</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Goldmoney]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 17 Feb 2022 20:54:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-17T20:54:40.278Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*U8S8RCAoIJZRI3UYT5gKxg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>By Alasdair Macleod</p><p><strong>Behind the battle to convince everyone that price inflation is not a lasting problem is the necessity to keep interest rates and bond yields suppressed. In the past, the interest rate cycle was entirely due to the expansion and contraction of commercial bank credit. But that was before central banks built up bond portfolios through quantitative easing.</strong></p><p>Not only does this expose them to the interest rate cycle, but they have not increased their capital base to keep pace with the expansion of their balance sheets. Hence the problem with rising interest rates and bond yields: on a mark-to-market basis the major central banks are insolvent with balance sheet liabilities now exceeding their assets.</p><p>This article finds this condition true of the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve Board, the Bank of Japan, and the entire euro system. Other central banks are not examined.</p><p>Doubtless this will be resolved in the short term by governments investing more equity in their central banks. But there is one major exception, which is the ECB and the euro system, with all its shareholders sinking into negative equity with the only minor exceptions of the Irish, Maltese, and Slovenian central banks.</p><p>Consequently, with the interconnectedness of the global financial system, the ability of central banks to guarantee the survival of their own commercial banking networks has almost certainly ended due to a collapse of the euro system. The precedent is the failure of a prototype central bank in 1720, John Law’s Banque Royale. That experience allows us to see how this is likely to play out.</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>There is a widespread assumption that commercial banks bear risk while central banks bear none. Folding notes are superior to bank deposits for this reason. It is commercial banks which fail, and central banks that rescue the ones worth rescuing. They are the lenders of last resort.</p><p>As such, their financial integrity goes unquestioned. Of course, we do not usually include central banks in emerging nations in this statement, but any risk is always perceived to be in their currencies rather than the institution. We know that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe can and does run some unconventional monetary policies, but you won’t hear the RBZ’s survival being questioned. It is generally assumed that in any nation a central bank that can issue its currency in unlimited quantities can never go bust, and that is why it is the currency that fails, and not the institution.</p><p>Consequently, commercial banks come and go, but like ol’ man river central banks just keep rolling along. At least, that appears to be the experience. But until recent decades, history has not seen major central banks routinely investing large amounts in their national bond markets, because any respectable central bank has always shied away from overtly inflationary financing of its government’s deficits.</p><h3>Enter QE and its inflationary consequences</h3><p>That changed in 2000, when the Bank of Japan was the first to introduce quantitative easing. Reassured by the unexpected price stability following the BOJ’s asset monetisation, QE was only introduced by the other major central banks in the wake of the financial crisis which led to the failure of Lehman. And after that precedent was created, QE has become a permanent feature of monetary policy, investing in longer maturity bonds than the commercial banks, which usually confine their maturities to less than five years.</p><p>According to the central banking establishment, QE is an unconventional policy tool which is only deployed when interest rates have been reduced to extremely low levels. If the rate of price inflation is still below the mandated 2% target, and aggregate output is deemed to be below potential, QE is then deployed. And there is the Taylor rule, which posits that a central bank should lower interest rates when inflation is stubbornly below the target level of 2%, or when GDP growth is too slow and below its potential, even if it implies negative rates. QE is then justified as the alternative or in addition to this unnatural condition.</p><p>The result has been an explosion in the size of central bank balance sheets. The combined balance sheet total of the Fed, ECB, BOJ and Peoples Bank of China rose from $5 trillion in 2007 to $31 trillion at end-December — more than sixfold.[i] It is an increase which has driven the bubble in financial assets, the link being through the suppression of government bond yields from such massive market intervention through money printing.</p><p>The inevitable result of this coordinated global currency expansion has been widespread increases in prices for commodities, logistics, labour, and consumer goods. Having bought into the Japanese price experience following its QE trailblazing, the consequences for global prices appear to have caught central bankers unaware. They seem to have forgotten that if you expand the quantity of a currency, you dilute its purchasing power, a simple fact that tends to be reflected in rising prices for everything. To this day, you will not find any central banker linking price inflation to their so-called monetary policy, always blaming other unexpected private sector factors.</p><p>This wilful blindness extends to the anticipated remedy, which is to increase the cost of money, and which everyone involved with monetary policy believes is the role of interest rates. The hope is that they can raise the cost of credit marginally to bring demand back to non-inflationary levels and call a gradual halt to their bond purchases. However, it is all delusion.</p><p>Interest rates are only the cost of money to a borrower calculating a return on an investment. Savers, including foreign owners of a currency, look at it differently. In parting with ownership of a currency they expect compensation for loss of its use until it is returned, recompense for the risk associated with the borrower, and increasingly they will incorporate expectations of changes in the currency’s purchasing power between parting with it and its eventual return. An interest rate is always set by market expectations for these reasons, and the control a central bank wields over rates is always temporary. What we are witnessing today is the beginnings of the failure of a long-standing statist suppression of interest rates.</p><p>With that failure in mind, markets are now indicating that interest rates will rise, because current suppressed levels are unnatural. We cannot say how far they will rise to discount future purchasing powers of the major currencies — that is up to markets. But given the extraordinary levels of currency debasement since 2008 and more dramatically since March 2020, be in no doubt that markets will increasingly expect substantial further debasements to be in the pipeline.</p><p>Just by looking at the dollar, we can see how entrenched these pressures are today. Figure 1 shows the amount of currency and credit expansion (M3) which is yet to be reflected in the expansion of GDP.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/968/1*3xlAeOe8x4usVcVf_bIArA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>There can only be two explanations for the divergence indicated by the arrowed gap. The first is there are increasing quantities of currency and credit tied up in secondary financial markets, which will decline as interest rates rise and the speculative bubble ends. That has been partly fuelled by QE, to the extent that deposits in the hands of pension funds and insurance companies have not been invested in new issues (which with a variable time lag would then circulate in the non-financial economy), but used instead to purchase existing securities which are excluded from GDP statistics.</p><p>Secondly, the gap between M3 and GDP growth will be reduced by further price rises for GDP components. On the most recent official statistics, prices are rising at over 7 per cent. Unofficial statistics (such as from Shadowstats.com) claim the figure is more like 15 per cent. Whatever the true figure, clearly, there is much more pressure on prices to rise from past currency debasement, and monetary policy is furiously denying it.</p><p>Whatever the economic outlook (and this is not a matter for GDP, which is just a money total and nothing else), markets will force interest rates higher in all debasing currencies mainly to compensate for loss of purchasing power. As bond yields rise significantly, the global bubble in financial assets will be fatally undermined. This outcome is increasingly certain.</p><p>The question now arises as to what effect these developments will have on the banking system, including the central banks. Much has been written about the consequences for the cycle of bank credit, which affects commercial banks and need not be repeated here. Our focus instead must be on central banks with their massive portfolios of financial assets, and how they will be affected. This article looks at the consequences of a bond bear market on the finances of the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve Board, the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank.</p><h3>The Bank of England</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/862/1*whofxTnWnIj1FJICTxuFNw@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>In a recent article for The Sunday Telegraph Jeremy Warner pointed out that rising interest rates and bond prices will “dramatically increase the losses likely to be sustained on the Bank of England’s $895bn stockpile of government debt, built up over more than 10 years of so-called quantitative easing”.[ii] Quoting recent correspondence between the Governor and the Chancellor, Warner went on to point out that the dividend payments from its portfolio of gilts had been sent to the UK Treasury, and that reverse payments were likely to be needed in the future.</p><p>Warner estimates that the Bank’s losses so far amount to about £100bn, and that reducing the portfolio by allowing it to run off could lead to initial losses for the Bank next month of £3bn from maturing bonds. Fortunately for the Bank of England, under a prior agreement the Treasury is required to cover the bank’s losses. The numbers in Table 1 above reflect the position in the last available audited accounts — accounts for the year to the end of this month will be released in a few months’ time and will be consistent with Warner’s estimates.</p><p>Bonds purchased through QE are off balance sheet and contained in the Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility Fund Limited, financed by a loan from the Bank. We can reasonably assume that maturities are spread out to twenty years and more, and our calculations in Table 1 assume an average maturity of ten years. In the year ending 28 February 2021, net losses on financial instruments (i.e. the portfolio of gilts acquired through QE) was £56,108 million. Negative equity, on our estimate in Table 1 of £78bn and on Warner’s more recent estimate of £94bn, will be covered in full by the Treasury.</p><p>How the Treasury deals with it is an interesting question. It is unlikely that the Treasury will cut its spending to cover the Bank’s losses. Instead, they will be added to the national deficit to be paid for by further gilt issues, increasing the funding requirement. And with the Bank running maturing gilts off its balance sheet at the same time as interest rates are forced higher by rising price inflation, while the borrowing requirement still must be satisfied, we have a recipe for a potential funding crisis.</p><p>Add to the mix a suspicion that the Bank of England is in effect being bailed out by the government, for foreign creditors any benefit of the doubt concerning currency stability might be badly undermined. With the insolvency of the Bank only relieved by a government bailout, the illusion for the British public that the government and the BoE have the magic power to make people happy by endless spending and inflation could come to a premature end.</p><p>But this also raises questions over the positions of other central banks, which might not have had the prescience or even the ability to strike rescue deals with their governments beforehand. Central banks are meant to be independent of their governments (though we all know this is a fiction) which suggests that deals should not have been struck as any part of QE.</p><h3>The Fed’s position</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/630/1*P6MlKhMnOLedlV9Pqj7dpA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>The Federal Reserve Board has accumulated substantial assets since the Lehman crisis in 2008, as the chart in Figure 1 illustrates.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1004/1*9BoRetAWYKLJu9jbOsPIoA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>From $900bn just before Lehman failed, QE took the balance sheet to $4,500bn in December 2014, when attempts to taper began, leading to the repo crisis in September 2019. And following covid lockdowns with nearly two years of zero Fed funds rates, the balance sheet now stands at $8,878bn, nearly ten times the pre-Lehman level. On the liabilities side, this has seen an expansion of commercial bank deposits to $3,859bn, and on the assets side, Treasury and agency bonds totalling $8,267bn. Treasury and Agency bonds are included in the balance sheet at face value, which saves the Fed from the embarrassment of declaring losses on these holdings. But if they were marked to market, then the Fed’s equity at just under $65bn would be wiped out many times over, as indicated in Table 2 above, which uses the change in gross redemption yield on the 5-year US Treasury bond as proxy for all the Fed’s Treasury and agency debt holdings. The maturity profile of US Treasury debt is short relative to those of other major nations and yields on agency debt are not a simple matter, when maturing mortgages within individual securitisations are considered.</p><p>From the end-September balance sheet date, the yield on the 5-year UST rose from 0.997% to 1.925% earlier this week, wiping out balance sheet equity more than five times over. And if bond yields rise again, the situation will deteriorate. Clearly, the practice of including these bonds in the Fed’s balance sheet at face value, on the assumption that they will be held to maturity, is conveniently face-saving. And one can understand the vested interest in believing that interest rates and bond yields are not going to rise, being followed by a high degree of panic when they do.</p><p>But the chart in Figure 1 shows that the feed-through of monetary inflation into rising prices has barely started. Because the private sector is also laden with large quantities of unproductive debt, as interest rates increase to reflect the falling purchasing power of the dollar there will be many bankruptcies. A combination of malinvestment liquidation and falling financial asset values will be virtually impossible for the Fed to ameliorate through monetary policy, let alone at a time when its own financial credibility might be in a state of collapse.</p><h3>The Bank of Japan</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/898/1*2Uz1FSn9r3NO8xqUdymNuA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>The Bank of Japan has been buying government bonds since 2000 and has built up a substantial portfolio. It currently owns ¥528 trillion ($4.6 trillion) of government bonds, split 27% into two and five-year maturities, with the rest being of ten-years and longer. This means the BOJ is highly exposed to bond price volatility. For example, a 100-basis point rise in gross redemption yield on a 10-year bond leads to a fall in price of over 11% from current levels, and it is even greater for the 20-to-40-year maturities that make up 29% of the Bank’s JGB portfolio.[iii]</p><p>In addition to the JGBs on the BOJ’s balance sheet, there are ¥11.5 trillion of corporate bonds and commercial paper, and ¥37.3 trillion in exchange traded funds and REITs.</p><p>The yield on the 10-year JGB has increased from 0.025% to 0.223% since the balance sheet date in Table 3, causing the bond price to fall by over 1%. The loss on the portfolio so far from this source alone is ¥7.4 trillion, compared with equity and capital reserves of ¥4.4 trillion. Since the September balance sheet, the BOJ’s equity has been eliminated on a mark-to-market basis.</p><p>It is small wonder that the BOJ has publicly stated it would buy an unlimited amount of 10-year JGBs at 0.25% to ease the bond sell-off. A higher yield would be more than embarrassing for the bank, already requiring a recapitalisation, presumably with its heavily indebted government stumping up the money.</p><p>Yet as we have seen, global monetary debasement has been unprecedented leading to higher prices everywhere. Prices for food, transport, energy, education, and healthcare are heavily subsidised by the government in Japan and that is the principal reason why consumer price inflation appears to be so low. In other words, if price inflation is to continue to be suppressed by subsidies it will be at the expense of further monetary inflation, which is what is causing pressure for bond yields to rise in the first place.</p><p>Japan will not be insulated from current and future global influences. Unless the Bank of Japan amends its QE policies, the yen is likely to fall heavily against commodities making price subsidies increasingly untenable.</p><p>With a government debt level of 266% of GDP and a budget deficit of about 8.5% expected in the current year, the Japanese economy is less than one quarter the size of that of the US. If the US Government had this level of debt, it would amount to $130 trillion, which gives us an indication of the severity of the debt trap faced by the Japanese government.</p><p>In conclusion, not only has the BOJ’s equity been wiped out by the rise in bond yields so far, but further substantial losses are only temporarily defrayed by doubling down on inflationary bond price intervention.</p><h3>The ECB and the euro system</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/776/1*S6_v3S8f_8qJ7Y3AXwPgLw@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>The ECB and its network of national central banks differs from the other central banks because the ECB is not responsible to any national government, and the national central banks have dual mandates, first to the ECB itself and to their national governments secondly.</p><p>This means that the ECB cannot turn to a government to make up a shortfall in its accounts. Its shareholders are the national central banks in the euro area which own their ECB shares in varying quantities, totalling €8.2bn. The situation has arisen whereby rising bond yields are undermining the ECB’s finances and those of its shareholders at the same time, requiring the ECB and national central banks to all be refinanced.</p><p>Table 4, which assumes average bond durations of ten years, illustrates this point. With the exceptions of Ireland, Malta, and Slovenia all the national central banks have seen losses exceed their equity due to falling bond prices, with the table illustrating the effects for selected national banks, the ECB and the Eurosystem as a whole. The calculations in Table 4 are based on the change in yields on national eurobonds, with the ECB and Eurosystem assuming an average 600 basis point fall in bond prices in their portfolios since 31 December. For Italian, Spanish, Greek and Portuguese paper, which make up the bulk of the bonds, price declines are more.</p><p>The results of this analysis are shocking. Meanwhile there is the additional problem of the TARGET2 settlement system, where imbalances add up to nearly €1.792 trillion, with additional factors taking total imbalance adjustments to €2.476 trillion. TARGET2 is believed to hide bad and doubtful debts in repo collateral, which if they remained in national commercial banking systems would almost certainly be classed as non-performing. The Eurozone’s settlement system also reflects balances from net exporters, such as Germany, and of net importers, such as Italy. Figure 3 shows the TARGET2 position at end-December.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/911/1*xSCRPI8HriPgBjRrU-tlMQ@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>In theory, these imbalances should never have arisen. They indicate, for example, that Germany’s Bundesbank is owed €1.261 trillion by other NCBs, particularly Italy and Spain as well as by the ECB itself. But with falling bond prices a new dynamic is introduced. The following is extracted from a paper by Karl Whelan criticising Jens Weidemann’s concerns about TARGET2 imbalances expressed in a letter to ECB President, Mario Draghi in 2012:[iv]</p><p>“…every national central bank in the Eurosystem currently has assets that exceed their liabilities and total Target2 credits equal Target2 liabilities. Thus, the most likely resolution of Target imbalances in the case of a full Euro breakup would be a pooling of assets held by Target2 debtors to be handed over to Target2 creditors to settle the balance. This may leave the Bundesbank holding a set of peripheral-originated assets that may be worth less that face value, but this scenario would result in losses to the Bundesbank that would be far short of the current value of its Target2 credit.”</p><p>Whelan’s criticism of Weidemann’s concerns is essentially Keynesian and in accordance with EU establishment opinion. But note that as of now, nearly all NCBs in the Eurosystem have negative equity, which is the condition denied in Whelan’s paper, where liabilities exceed assets. And as bond yields continue to rise a resolution of TARGET2 imbalances becomes impossible without the euro system falling apart.</p><p>Part of the problem is lending by the ECB and NCBs to commercial banks through repos. Together with repos between commercial banks, the entire repo market in euros is estimated to exceed €10 trillion. This market has grown strongly on the back of ultra-cheap funding and a blind eye turned to collateral quality by some of the NCBs. Rising interest rates will make repos less attractive, and trigger what amounts to a contraction of bank credit, at a time when help from central banking sources to bail out the commercial banking network will be compromised by their own deteriorating finances.</p><h3>Consequences for commercial banks</h3><p>The long-held supposition that central banks are the safety net, the lenders of last resort when there is an economic or financial crisis is set to be challenged by the fragile conditions of the major central banks. While there may be some damage to national currencies, the entire financial establishment assumes that that would be a reasonable cost for the protection of depositors’ interests, and that bank runs must be avoided at all costs. Behind it all is a belief that armed with a printing press, a central bank’s own financial position is immaterial.</p><p>These assumptions ride roughshod over the issue of public confidence, which is unlikely to tolerate a situation whereby a government is seen to be the ultimate protector of the banks by recapitalising its central bank to deal with a crisis. Instead, there is a heightened risk that the masses are likely to take avoiding action to protect themselves, undermining any chance of success. It is one thing for central bankers to claim expertise in monetary affairs, but quite another for the political class to do so with credibility.</p><p>There is, therefore, a heightened risk of policy failure, and ultimately of currency failure as well. This is particularly acute when the link between the political class and a central bank does not exist. It is the unique position of the ECB, which now has the distinction of depending on its bankrupt shareholders to rescue itself from bankruptcy. And if interest rates rise in the coming weeks the Euro system’s bloated repo market will contract, leading inevitably to commercial bank failures within the Eurozone.</p><p>To think that Brussels can come to the rescue overnight with a rescue package represents the triumph of hope over experience. Disunited squabbling politicians and bureaucrats would need weeks, even months to agree a rescue package even if agreement can be reached, which with all the blaming and shaming is almost certainly forlorn hope. Shutting markets and banks for more than a few days while the debate rages would simply heighten the sense of crisis.</p><p>The financial structure of the Eurozone, the sharply different economic and political interests of the member states, together with the legacy of bad debt coverups over a string of financial crises and compromises since its inception all point to a lack of any desire to resolve the ECB’s insolvency. Only by individual governments standing behind their own national central banks can they be recapitalised, conditional on the ending of the euro system. No longer can Germany subsidise Italy, Spain and France. A recapitalised Bundesbank will have to walk away from its ECB capital key, as must all the other national central banks. And the Bundesbank will have its hands full stabilising its own commercial banking network.</p><p>The currency will be gone, replaced with — what? To succeed, a new German national currency would probably require a clear out of the existing Bundesbank management and more credible sound money executives to be appointed. Even then, the temptation to rescue every failing bank and business would be hard to resist. Government debt denominated in euros would be wiped out, but to succeed with a new currency government spending must be wholly funded by taxation — the currency and credit expansion must stop.</p><p>The chaos in other Eurozone states would almost certainly rule out any currency replacement succeeding without backing down from cherished socialism. Pleas from Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and France for German subsidies to continue must be ignored for the sake of Germany’s new currency. The political and economic consequences are unimaginable, except for the almost certain collapse of the entire European Project.</p><p>The systemic risks for other banking networks exposed to the euro system’s commercial banks and the euro currency will add to the difficulties faced by them. The precedent of Austria’s Credit Anstalt failure in 1931 will haunt today’s central bankers, and they are sure to move as rapidly as their finances allow to prevent their own commercial banking networks to be destabilised.</p><p>The only way a global banking failure can possibly be stopped is for the other central banks to find a way of shoring up the Eurozone with the utmost urgency.</p><h3>The John Law precedent points to the outcome</h3><p>A way must be found to beef up the equity in central banks. Loan capital will not do — it must be equity. Perhaps the ECB will find a supra-national, like the IMF, to back it. However the central banks’ illiquidity problem is resolved, it will not only be embarrassing for statists but it will send a public signal that their faith in their fiat currencies may have been entirely misplaced.</p><p>The similarities with the failure of John Law’s Mississippi scheme 302 years ago almost to the day are remarkable. At the end of February 1720, Law’s Banque Royale was due to merge with his Mississippi venture, but earlier in the month the scheme was already falling apart. The more shares that the bank bought to support the failing Mississippi share price, the more livre banknotes entered circulation undermining their purchasing power. Hoarding of gold and silver coin increased and the public began to reject the banknotes. Investors began selling shares and disposing of banknotes for any kind of portable asset when Law began confiscating gold and silver coin.</p><p>What is happening today to central banks is beginning to resemble the problems faced by the Banque Royale. The policies of quantitative easing to support financial asset values are no different from Law’s share support scheme for his Mississippi venture. The loss of faith in his paper livres reflected in soaring prices is just beginning to be echoed in today’s paper currencies.</p><p>The Mississippi shares started falling from 12,000 livres in mid-February to 8,500 livres on 1 March. The currency also began its collapse and by September there was no exchange rate for it on the exchanges in London and Amsterdam, meaning it had become worthless. Today, financial asset values have begun to decline, and reflected in their declining purchasing power, currencies have as well.</p><p>Based on the John Law precedent, not only have we been able to anticipate the progression of events today, but we are getting alarming confirmation that what happened in France in 1720 to Law’s forerunner of today’s central banks is now being repeated on a global scale. And surely, the bankruptcies of modern central banks have been the only pieces in the puzzle missing — until now.</p><p><strong>For the latest analysis and interpretation of the precious metal markets, be sure to subscribe to </strong><a href="https://www.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights"><strong>Goldmoney Insights.</strong></a></p><p>[i] Yardini Research.</p><p>[ii] 13 February 2022.</p><p>[iii] Bank of Japan statistical release for 15 February 2022</p><p>[iv] See https://www.karlwhelan.com/IrishEconomy/WeidmannMunchau.pdf</p><p><strong>The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect those of Goldmoney, unless expressly stated. The article is for general information purposes only and does not constitute either Goldmoney or the author(s) providing you with legal, financial, tax, investment, or accounting advice. You should not act or rely on any information contained in the article without first seeking independent professional advice. Care has been taken to ensure that the information in the article is reliable; however, Goldmoney does not represent that it is accurate, complete, up-to-date and/or to be taken as an indication of future results and it should not be relied upon as such. Goldmoney will not be held responsible for any claim, loss, damage, or inconvenience caused as a result of any information or opinion contained in this article and any action taken as a result of the opinions and information contained in this article is at your own risk.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e70ddfe8f6ce" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney/central-banks-are-now-insolvent-e70ddfe8f6ce">Central banks are now insolvent</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney">Goldmoney</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The UK and its lost opportunities]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/goldmoney/the-uk-and-its-lost-opportunities-21f273895da7?source=rss----18b9cc76e9e5---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/21f273895da7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Goldmoney]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 04 Feb 2022 22:15:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-04T22:15:01.063Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*lFftr7HRugab0dz3mPb1Gg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>By Alasdair Macleod</p><p><strong>Two years after leaving the EU Britain has made almost none of the promised progress towards economic liberalisation. While Brussels hasn’t been helpful, libertarian ministers in the Tory government have been both conquered by the bureaucracy of the civil service and even turned into high spending statists. There has been no attempt to reduce the state’s suffocating dominance over the economy.</strong></p><p>On current policies, the private sector is set to continue its long-term decline, with higher taxes and ever-increasing regulation. But it needn’t be so. This article looks at the dangers and opportunities that Britain faces, principally inflation, the challenge of government spending, of maintaining a balanced budget, trade policy and why Britain should just declare unilateral free trade, foreign policy in a world where the future is American decline and a rising Russia — China partnership, and the economic craziness of the green agenda.</p><p>There is no sign that these important issues are being addressed in a constructive and statesman-like manner. Fortunately or unfortunately, rising interest rates threaten to bring forward a crisis of bank credit of such magnitude that fiat currencies are likely to be undermined. Most of the policies recommended herein should be incorporated after the banking and currency crisis has passed as part of a reset designed to avoid repeating the mistakes of big government, Keynesianism, and the socialisation of economic resources.</p><h3>Decline and fall</h3><p>“This is the week a government that began with such promise finally lost its soul. Its great policy relaunch is a tragic mush, proof that it no longer believes in anything, not even in its self-preservation.”</p><p>Allister Heath, Editor of The Sunday Telegraph writing in today’s Daily Telegraph 3 February</p><p>Two years ago this week, Britain formally left the EU. Yet, it is estimated there are 20,000 pieces of primary EU legislation still on the statute books. And only now is there going to be an effort to remove or replace them with UK legislation. Obviously, going through them one by one would tie the legislative calendar up for years, so it is proposed to deal with them through an omnibus Brexit Freedoms Bill.</p><p>Excuse me for being cynical, but one wonders that if the Prime Minister had not come under pressure from Partygate, would this distraction from it have got to first base? After two years of inaction, why now? And it transpires that instead of doing away with unnecessary regulations as suggested in the Brexit Freedoms Bill, legislative priority will be given to the economically destructive green agenda. This underlines Allister Heath’s comment above.</p><p>There is also irrefutable evidence that a remain-supporting civil service has continually frustrated the executive over Brexit and has discouraged all meaningful economic reform. The way the Brexit Freedoms Bill is likely to play out is for every piece of EU legislation dropped, new UK regulations of similar or even tighter restrictions on production freedom will be introduced — drafted by the civil service bureaucracy with its Remainer sympathies. For improvement, read deterioration. It will require ministers in all departments to strongly resist this tendency — there’s not much hope of that.</p><p>The track record of British government is not good. Since Margaret Thatcher was elected, successive conservative administrations have pledged to reduce unnecessary state intervention and ended up fostering the opposite. They raise taxes every time they are elected, even though they market themselves as the low tax party. While the number of quangos (quasi-autonomous national government organisations) has been reduced, in practice it is because they have been merged rather than abandoned and their remits have remained intact. Another measure of government intervention, the proportion of government spending to total GDP, has risen from about 40% to over 50% in 2020. An unfair comparison given the impact of covid, some would say. But there is little sign that the explosion of government spending will come back to former levels.</p><p>Like the unelected bureaucracy in Brussels from which the nation sought to escape, the UK’s civil service has no concept of the economic benefits of free markets. Without having any skin in the game, they believe that government agencies are in the best position to decide economic outcomes for the common good. Decades of Keynesian reasoning, belief in bureaucratic process and never having had to work in a competitive environment have all fostered an arrogance of purpose in support of increasing statist economic management. It is a delusion that will end in crisis, as it did in 1975 when under a Labour government Britain was driven to borrow funds from the IMF that were reserved for third world nations.</p><p>Against this background of restrictions to economic progress, the nation is unprepared to deal with some major issues appearing on the horizon. This article examines some of them: inflation, state spending, trade policies, foreign policies, and the economic harm from the green agenda. These are just some of the areas where policies can be improved for the good of the nation and create opportunities for greatness through economic strength.</p><h3>Inflation</h3><p>In common with other central banks, the Bank of England would have us believe that inflation is of prices only, failing to mention changes in the quantity of currency and credit in circulation. Yet even schoolchildren in primary education will tell you that if a cake is cut into a greater number of pieces, you do not end up with more cake; you end up with smaller pieces. It is the same with the money supply, or more correctly the quantity of currency and credit. Instead, central banks seem to believe in the parable of the feeding of the five thousand: five loaves and two fishes can be subdivided to satisfy the multitudes with some left over.</p><p>The source of an increase in the general price level is increasing quantities of currency and credit, leading to each unit buying less, just like the smaller slices of cake. And measured by the Bank of England’s M4 (the broadest measure of currency and credit) the currency cake has been subdivided into many more smaller pieces in recent times.</p><p>Figure 1 shows that M4 has increased from £1.82 trillion at the time of the Lehman failure to £2.96 trillion last September, an increase of 63%. But the rate of increase accelerated substantially in the first six months of 2020 to an annualised rate of 19.3%. This is the engine driving prices of goods higher, and to a lesser extent, services.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/690/1*VpWrzgeKtOGEMDATyEH8nA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>At that time, currency inflation was everywhere, leading to significantly higher commodity prices. The commodity inputs to industry represent sharply rising production costs, coupled with skill shortages and supply chain disruptions. But these are merely the evidence of the currency cake being more thinly sliced. Buying and installing a new kitchen in your house requires more of the smaller slices of the currency cake than it did last year.</p><p>All else being equal, there are still significant price effects to come with past currency debasements yet to work their way through to prices. And given that monetary policy is to meet rising prices by raising interest rates while still inflating, higher interest rates will follow as well. The effect on bond yields and equity prices will be beyond doubt. But all else is never equal, and the effect of higher production costs will be to close uneconomic production and put overindebted manufacturers out of business. This development is already becoming evident globally, with the post-pandemic bounce-back already fading.</p><p>Being undermined, the effect on financial collateral values is likely to make banks more cautious, reduce bank lending, and at the margin increase the rate of foreclosures. The problem is that most currency in circulation is the counterpart of bank credit. A bond and equity bear market will lead to a contraction of bank credit, triggering policies designed to counter deflation.</p><p>What will the Bank of England do? Undoubtedly, it will want to increase its monetary stimulation at a time of rising interest rates and falling financial values. The Bank will also find itself replacing contracting bank credit to keep the illusion of prosperity alive. The issuance of base currency will not be a trivial matter.</p><p>But according to the Keynesians, who can only equate price levels with consumer demand, inflation during an economic slump should never happen. Worse, it will come at a time when UK banks are highly leveraged at record levels — Barclay’s, for example, has a ratio of assets to equity of about twenty times. And as the European financial centre, London is highly exposed to counterparty risk from the Eurozone which, being in a desperately fragile condition, is a major systemic threat.</p><p>With these increased dangers so obviously present, it would behove the Bank and the Treasury to rebuild the national gold reserves, so foolishly sold down by Gordon Brown when he was Chancellor. It is the only insurance policy against a systemic and currency collapse that is becoming more likely as inflationary policies are pursued.</p><h3>Government spending</h3><p>As mentioned above, in 2020 the government’s share of GDP rose to over 50% and there appears to be no attempt to rein it in. And for all the rhetoric about post-Brexit Britain being an attractive place to do business, any government taking half of everyone’s income and profits in the form of taxes will fail to attract as many international businesses to locate in Britain as would otherwise be possible.</p><p>Government spending is inherently wasteful. To enhance economic performance, the solution is to cut government spending to as low as possible in the shortest possible time and to reduce taxes with it. But instead, the Treasury is seeking to cover the budget deficit, which was £250bn in the last fiscal year (11.7% of GDP) by increasing taxes without reforming wasteful government spending. The civil service has protected its practices by seeing off attempts by government appointees, such as Dominic Cummings, to remodel the civil service on more effective lines.</p><p>Critics of the Treasury’s policies say it is better to cut taxes to encourage growth which in future will generate the taxes to cover the deficit. But with the state already taking half of everyone’s income on average in taxes, the increase in the deficit while maintaining government spending will only add to inflationary pressures. The transfer of wealth from the private sector to the public sector by the expansion of currency will more than negate any benefit to the private sector from lower taxes. And the higher interest rates from yet higher price inflation will bankrupt overindebted borrowers in a highly leveraged economy.</p><p>Those who think the Bank of England is clueless about finances and economics should not omit the Treasury from their criticisms. About the only thing the Treasury gets right is the necessity to eliminate the budget deficit, albeit by the wrong approach which is simply to increase the tax burden on the private sector. But in this objective it has consistently failed, as shown in Figure 2.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/754/1*8bStKG2hy1aHlbFGAhVbgg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>From the seventies, budget deficits have only been eliminated briefly in the boom times of fiscal 1989/90 and 2000/01. The OBR’s forecast of a return to near balance in 2023/24 is a demonstration of wishful thinking. On the verge of a new downturn in production brought about by unsustainable cost pressures, the deficit is likely to decline only marginally, if at all.</p><p>Budget deficits create an additional problem, because without an increase in consumer savings (discouraged by the Keynesians), national accounting shows that a twin trade deficit is the consequence. And without the trade deficit contracting, the Remainers in the establishment are bound to claim that Brexit has not delivered the benefits in trade promised by the Brexiteers.</p><h3>Trade policy</h3><p>Besides gaining political independence, Brexit was said to lead to an opportunity for better terms of trade than could be obtained as a member of the EU. Britain’s industrial history and heritage is as an entrepôt, whereby goods were imported, processed, and re-exported to international markets. The concept of freeports was promoted with this in mind.</p><p>The UK government has so far made laborious progress in signing trade agreements in a protectionist world. A far better approach would be to abandon trade agreements and tariffs altogether, with the sole exception of protecting some agricultural produce, for which special treatment can be justified. Today, agriculture is a small part of the economy, and the benefits to the consumer of scrapping tariffs are relatively minor, but risk fundamentally bankrupting important parts of the rural economy.</p><p>To understand why Britain should abandon trade agreements for tariff free trade, we should refer to David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage. Ricardo argued that if a distant producer was better at producing a good or service than a local one which is therefore unable to compete, then it is better to reap the benefit of the distant production and for the local producer to either find a better way of manufacturing the product, or to deploy the capital of production elsewhere.</p><p>The theory was put to the test by Robert Peel, who as Prime Minister rescinded and finally repealed the Corn Laws between 1846 — 1849. The consequence for the British economy was that lower food prices in what was for most of the population a subsistence economy allowed the labouring masses to buy other things to improve their standard of living.</p><p>Not only did living standards improve, but employment was created in the woollen, cotton, and tobacco industries and much else besides. Furthermore, other countries began to adopt free trade policies, which combined with sound money led to widespread economic improvement. By the First World War, over 80% of the world’s shipping then afloat, central to international trade, had been built in Britain.</p><p>The situation today is different, in that the effect of removing food tariffs from what has become a relatively small sector is far too emotive for the potential gain. This is less true of industry, despite the undoubted cries that would emanate from protectionists. But a Glaswegian is perfectly free to buy a product made in Birmingham, or to contract for a service provided from London, even if there is an equivalent available in Glasgow. But what’s the difference between our Glaswegian buying something from Birmingham, compared with Stuttgart, or Lyons, or China?</p><p>The answer is none, other than he gets more choice, and the signal sent to domestic manufacturers is they are uncompetitive. And it’s no good claiming that foreigners are unfair competition. If a foreign manufacturer is subsidised in its production, that is all to the benefit of UK consumers. Tariffs are a tax on consumers and lead to less efficient domestic production.</p><p>The benefit for Britain is that if it becomes a genuinely free trade centre, international manufacturing and service activities would gravitate to the UK, providing additional employment — all the empirical evidence confirms this is what happens. It would be a direct challenge to the EU’s Fortress Europe trade policies designed to keep foreigners out. And to the degree that tariff reform is promoted, Britain would be doing the world a favour, because as in Robert Peel’s time, other nations would likely follow suit.</p><p>The dirty truth about tariffs is that they are a tax on one’s own people as well as an unnecessary restriction of trade. Instead of recognising this truth and the evidence of its own experience, Britain is pursuing a halfway-house of laborious trade agreements. Through limited relief on taxes, the half-hearted proposal to set up free ports is an admission of the burden the government places on business in the normal course: otherwise, why are free ports an incentive? Far better to reduce taxes on all production and remove the tariff burdens on everyone.</p><p>This conservative administration started with constructive trade policies, but the permanent establishment has whittled them down to the point where they are likely to be minimised and ineffective, confirming in its Remainer yearnings that Brexit was a political and economic blunder.</p><h3>Foreign policy</h3><p>One of the opportunities presented by Brexit was for the UK government to think through its foreign policy agenda, and how Britain can best serve itself and the rest of the world. The history of its foreign policy might have provided a guide, though it seems to have been ignored. Instead, Britain is sticking to the Foreign Office’s and intelligence services’ status quo, which is basically to be unquestioningly allied through the five-eyes partnership with America. Admittedly, it would have been difficult to do otherwise in the wake of President Trump’s successful takedown of Huawei, spreading fear of Chinese spying in a modern version of reds under the bed.</p><p>But the reality of modern geopolitics is that Halford Mackinder’s Heartland Theory, first presented to the Royal Geographical Society in London in 1904, is coming true:</p><p>“Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;</p><p>who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;</p><p>who rules the World-Island commands the world.”</p><p>— Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 150</p><p>There can be no doubt that the alliance between Putin’s Russia and Xi’s China together with the other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are proving Mackinder’s prophecy and that they are destined to become the dominant geopolitical force in the world. Therefore, Britain remains hitched in the long term to the eventual loser when it should be reconsidering its relationship with Eastern European nations, for which read Russia.</p><p>A substantial rethink over foreign policy is due, and instead of the status quo, there is profit to be had in studying the status quo ante — Britain’s foreign policies at the time of the Napoleonic wars and subsequently. Lord Liverpool was Prime Minister, with Castlereagh as Foreign Secretary and Wellington as commander-in-chief of the army. They had an iron rule never to interfere in a foreign state’s domestic policies but only to act to protect British interests. Those interests principally concern trade, and they guided foreign policy and protected British property in the colonies until the First World War.</p><p>Compared with the foreign policy principals of the nineteenth century, the support given to American hegemony in attacking nations in the Middle East and North Africa on purely political grounds has been a disaster, leading to unnecessary deaths and the displacement of millions of refugees. Some of these ventures could have been prevented if Britain had not joined in. Britain’s refusal to support a Syrian invasion after a parliamentary vote turned it down was a rare example of Britain standing up for its own interests, no thanks to a government which would otherwise have sent the troops in.</p><p>The US is dragging its heels with respect to a trade agreement with the UK, and that should be considered as well. A modern Castlereagh would take these factors into consideration in proposing a new treaty securing trade and defence considerations for both European nations and Russia, thereby respecting their sovereignties. There are enough elements in play for a sensible outcome, particularly if America is made to accept that its role in Europe is divisive and that it has no option but to accommodate compromise. The British government is in a unique position to broker a deal, if it can demonstrate political independence from all parties, including America.</p><h3>The green agenda</h3><p>The government’s green agenda, whereby the nation is mandated to cut carbon emissions by 78% from 1990 levels by 2035 with a target of net zero by 2050 is a deliberate policy of economic destruction. After the boost to non-fossil fuel investment, initially funded by yet more government spending, the costs imposed on the population to replace domestic heating by gas and oil with heat pumps is prohibitive and impractical. It can only be achieved by the destruction and rebuilding of swathes of existing residential and commercial properties. The energy available will be overdependent on unreliable wind and solar panel sources, and the available supply will be facing far larger demands on the grid than imposed today.</p><p>Keynesians advising the government seem to believe that all the investment and rebuilding to new ecological standards stimulates economic activity — this has been argued by them before in the context of post-war reconstruction. But then Bastiat’s broken window fallacy, whereby the alternative use of economic resources is not being considered, appears to have passed them by. The green replacement of transport logistics, which is well over 95% diesel driven, is a destruction of efficient and current capacity to be replaced by electrical powered transportation whose energy source is to be shared with all other energy demands.</p><p>The only possible solution to the problem created by climate change activism involves the rapid development of nuclear energy. But besides taking decades from drawing board to switch on, nuclear is stymied on cost grounds, with wind and solar being far cheaper on a per therm basis. Furthermore, only 16% of Britain’s electricity supply is nuclear, and almost half of that is due to be decommissioned by 2025, with only one new plant under construction.</p><p>The UK government’s green policies are propelling the nation into an energy disaster, when it has substantial fossil fuel reserves available in the form of coal and natural gas. Coal driven electricity supply has been reduced to under 3%. Instead of being phased out it should be brought back into supply production, because scrubbers remove almost all particulates and sulphates, and doubtless can be further developed to deal with CO2 emissions as well.</p><p>There are good reasons to reinstate coal and for that matter gas fracking. China and India retain and are increasing their coal powered supplies, giving them a significant energy price advantage for their own economies over the West. And while they have signed up to eventually reducing their coal dependency, it is a promise to do so at a vanishingly future date. On energy grounds alone, Britain along with other European nations are committing themselves to swapping their economic status with emerging nations, so that when the latter have fully emerged, Britain and Europe will then have the third world status.</p><p>Whatever climate change debate merits, it is an argument which is not to be confused with economics. It must be admitted that in the enthusiasm for doing away with fossil fuels and primary and reliable sources of energy, under this current government the outlook for Britain’s economy is of an accelerated decline.</p><h3>The likely outcome of government policies</h3><p>From what started as a government of ministers with a strong libertarian approach, two years later we see the opportunity to improve Britain’s economic consequences sadly squandered. Politically, the position is fragile, with the Prime Minister struggling to survive in the wake of the report on Partygate and the ongoing police investigation. Furthermore, he appears to have found it far easier and more pleasurable to increase spending than address wasteful government spending.</p><p>It is difficult to be optimistic, with the signs that the permanent civil service establishment remains firmly in charge and is increasing its economic and bureaucratic influence over weak ministries.</p><p>Perhaps the most important of the difficulties outlined above is monetary inflation, likely to lead to higher interest rates in the coming months. This is not a trend isolated to sterling, and even on a best-case basis whereby a Conservative government addresses the issues raised in this article, it is very likely that attempts at economic, monetary, trade policy, foreign policy, and administrative reforms will be overtaken by the repetitive cycle of bank lending contraction. So highly geared have banks in the Eurozone become, for which London acts as the principal financial centre, that rising interest rates seem sure to trigger a global banking crisis with London as an epicentre on a scale larger than that of thirteen years ago when Lehman failed.</p><p>Such an event is likely to destroy not only banking and central banking as we know it today, but currencies, the debasement of which socialising governments increasingly rely upon. Nevertheless, the issues raised in this article will remain and need to be addressed after a currency and credit crisis has passed and economic stability begins to return. The role for a British government with respect to foreign policy will become more important, particularly for post-crisis European political stability when the euro and possibly the entire Brussels construct have been destroyed. In this event the threat of another European war cannot be dismissed, and we will need the wisdom of a modern Lord Liverpool and Viscount Castlereagh.</p><p>The destruction of the fiat currency system will provide opportunities for a reset, based on the lessons learned. The post-crisis government must learn from the mistakes of past errors and be the servant of the people and not its master. It must not interfere in the economy, and keep its size to the minimum possible, taxing no more than 10 — 15% of everyone’s income and profits. It must restrict its role to providing a framework for contract and criminal law and the policing of the latter, as well as the defence of the realm. It must not respond to any demands for special treatment from either businesses or individuals. Individuals must take full responsibility for their own actions, and any welfare strictly limited. And most importantly, the state must ensure that currency is sound, backed by and exchangeable for gold coin.</p><p><strong>For the latest analysis and interpretation of the precious metal markets, be sure to subscribe to </strong><a href="https://www.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights"><strong>Goldmoney Insights.</strong></a></p><p><em>The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect those of Goldmoney, unless expressly stated. The article is for general information purposes only and does not constitute either Goldmoney or the author(s) providing you with legal, financial, tax, investment, or accounting advice. You should not act or rely on any information contained in the article without first seeking independent professional advice. Care has been taken to ensure that the information in the article is reliable; however, Goldmoney does not represent that it is accurate, complete, up-to-date and/or to be taken as an indication of future results and it should not be relied upon as such. Goldmoney will not be held responsible for any claim, loss, damage, or inconvenience caused as a result of any information or opinion contained in this article and any action taken as a result of the opinions and information contained in this article is at your own risk.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=21f273895da7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney/the-uk-and-its-lost-opportunities-21f273895da7">The UK and its lost opportunities</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney">Goldmoney</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why dollar CBDCs may never happen]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/goldmoney/why-dollar-cbdcs-may-never-happen-9fb6b7765850?source=rss----18b9cc76e9e5---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9fb6b7765850</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Goldmoney]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Jan 2022 08:07:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-28T08:07:08.102Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*ehQtFD0CQFu9xPA0zR5_GQ@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>By Alasdair Macleod</p><p><strong>The Fed has just released its first public consultation paper on a dollar-based central bank digital currency. For many, central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) are a means of heading off private sector cryptos, but coincidentally the prices of bitcoin and others have collapsed, losing half their value since early November.</strong></p><p>The CBDC proposition is being sold to us by the central banks as keeping up with the times and taking advantage of the opportunities presented by new technologies to evolve payment systems.</p><p>The Bank for International Settlements has been coordinating research into CBDCs, and this article gives a brief description of how the BIS and its committee members sees them evolving. It is early days, and there are several important issues yet to be tackled, such as will CBDCs pay interest, and what will be the likely reaction of commercial banks to seeing central banks muscle in on their territory.</p><p>There are also two separate CBDC functions to consider. There is retail, whereby individuals have direct access to their central bank as counterparty, and a wholesale function for financial intermediaries for international settlement.</p><p>Whether CBDCs will come into existence is doubtful. To have credibility, their introduction will have to be coordinated at G20 level, and they are unlikely to be widely issued before the end of the decade. That will probably be too late to save the world from a developing financial and monetary crisis which threatens to change everything. Furthermore, the Americans will need to be convinced that their dollar hegemony will not be compromised. And what will almost certainly stop it is the powerful US banking lobby, likely to remind politicians presented with the necessary legislation, that a political survivor is one who once bought, stays bought.</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>This month, the credibility of cryptocurrencies came into question as the price of bitcoin and those of its imitators continued to fall heavily. Bitcoin has halved from its peak, which was only two months ago.</p><p>It leaves everyone involved with headaches. As the private sector replacement for failing fiat currencies, the credibility of bitcoin may have suffered a mortal blow, with many observers now comparing it not in the context of rapidly expanding quantities of fiat, but with the wilder tech stocks which coincidentally have taken a battering as well. But a few state actors on the fringes have become strong supporters, notably El Salvador.</p><p>As El Salvador hoovers up bitcoin, there are other governments seeking to ban or to restrict them. While appearing to be keen to develop its own digital currency, the Russian central bank recently proposed restrictions on crypto trading — admittedly this is an ongoing debate. China, being the ultimate authoritarian state, banned crypto exchanges long ago, and is already testing its own state-sponsored digital currency.</p><p>Other governments are treading more carefully, aware that the formally $3 trillion (now $2 trillion) market capitalisation of cryptocurrencies reflects considerable private sector wealth in their own jurisdictions. Surely, major central banks would love to follow the Russians and Chinese in banning bitcoin and its imitators. But instead of a full-frontal attack on distributed ledgers and the threat they mount to their fiat currencies, major governments everywhere appear to be deploying a strategy of gradual strangulation, hoping the crypto phenomenon will subside. After all, currency is the preserve of the state and other than mavericks like El Salvador, who wants a private sector alternative?</p><p>This is the statist’s view. But just in case, research is being conducted into central bank digital currencies — CBDCs. Cynics can anticipate how the relationship between private sector distributed ledgers and a centralised state version will evolve. As the development of national CBDCs progresses, increasing restrictions on bitcoin and other rivals will be introduced. There is one thing that governments and central banks cannot abide, and that is private sector rivals to their currency monopolies.</p><p>Research into the development of CBDCs is being coordinated by a committee at the Bank for International Settlements, led by the major central banks (with the notable exception of the Peoples Bank of China) and the BIS itself. All other central banks can expect to benefit from the project and follow its recommendations.</p><p>Only last week, the US Fed issued the first in what promises to be a series of consultation papers on a US CBDC. The importance of the Fed’s strategic approach is paramount, since the dollar is the big daddy of all currencies through which America controls the world. A CBDC replacement must not threaten the dollar’s hegemony. If it does, then we can assume the whole CBDC concept will end up being stillborn.</p><h3>What is a CBDC?</h3><p>A CBDC is a digital form of central bank money that is different from balances in traditional reserve or settlement accounts. It is a digital payment instrument, denominated in the national unit of account and is a direct liability of the central bank.[i]</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/968/1*oV70ZmzvIAJ_0IHqNfjZZg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Two separate functions have been identified. There is a general purpose, or retail function, whereby a CBDC is an alternative to currency cash and commercial bank deposit money. And there is a wholesale function for use between financial intermediaries, incorporating cross-border settlements. Figure 1 above illustrates the flows of these two different functions.</p><p>The adoption of a CBDC requires a central bank to upgrade their banking systems to deal with tens or even hundreds of millions of depositors and businesses — a task whose sheer scale and technological challenges should not be underestimated.</p><p>Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between a retail CBDC and existing currency liabilities.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/949/1*kkwfbf7z47EVL7Hkakl1WQ@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>CBDCs are intended to be an addition to current settlement systems and currency quantities. Declining use of banknotes and coins, which are a bearer form of central bank liability and a direct claim on it, is being claimed as a justification for a new electronic settlement medium with the same currency standing in the form of a retail CBDC.</p><p>The widespread use of debit cards has blurred the distinction between the cash notes and coins issued by a central bank, and deposit money which is a liability of commercial banks. Users of currency in retail transactions are generally unaware of the distinction, and bank regulators believe that their oversight provides justification for the seamless operation between these different risk categories.</p><p>Nevertheless, central banks are aware of the potential disruption a CBDC might cause to existing settlement systems, and for this reason amongst others are certain to proceed cautiously.</p><p>The wholesale function of a CBDC is a different one to being purely an alternative to bank notes, being more attuned to reserves on a central bank’s balance sheet. If a wholesale CBDC is introduced it will be with the objective of extending a central bank’s function into cross-border settlements, with the intention of making them more efficient with lower transaction fees. That will require the same operational and legal standards between different CBDCs, necessitating international cooperation in the way they are set up — hence the likely future role for the BIS, which already sets out the global regulatory framework under the Basel Committee to which commercial banks must adhere.</p><p>Undoubtedly, cross-border cooperation in CBDCs is a multiyear project. All that the BIS committee can do for now is come up with guidelines to which individual central banks can make long term plans, so that different CBDCs might eventually be integrated into a global settlement system. This is also behind an initial phase of designing CBDCs for retail, or domestic use with a view to them being compatible with wholesale use.</p><h3>The benefit of a retail CBDC for the state</h3><p>Augustin Carstens, General Manager at the Bank for International Settlements made the following comments in an IMF sponsored video about central bank digital currencies:</p><p>“We intend to establish the equivalence with cash, but there is a huge difference there. For example, with cash we don’t know who is using a $100 bill today, we don’t know who is using a MX$1,000 bill today.</p><p>A key difference with a CBDC is that a central bank will have absolute control under the rules and regulations that will determine the use of that expression of central bank liability, and we will have the technology to enforce that. Those two issues are extremely important and make a huge difference with respect to what cash is.”[ii]</p><p>Clearly, the attraction to Carstens is that CBDCs offer the potential for central banks to increase their controls over how currency is used, control not only over markets and economies, but over individuals and businesses. Carstens seems completely unfazed by the issues for personal liberty. However, Figure 1 above suggests there is an option of token based CBDCs to provide anonymity. But given all central banks’ desire for control to minimise criminal transactions and tax evasion, it is unlikely that anonymity will be preserved. And for any jurisdiction where personal freedom might be regarded as important, there’s always the pull of international conformity to ensure that in the name of preventing international fraud and tax evasion personal freedom cannot be protected.</p><p>The issue of individual freedom to buy and sell goods and services with the state being automatically informed of every transaction is a huge departure from using banknotes and coin. This could become an impediment to the widespread adoption and success of a retail CBDC in some countries. But for individuals there may be no option if retail CBDCs become the pretext to do away with cash entirely.</p><p>Furthermore, while some central banks will be wary of a CBDC interfering with the implementation of monetary policy, other central banks have expressed the desire to use them to extend control over economic outcomes. For example, by deploying CBDCs with an expiry date beyond which they become worthless, it would enable a central bank to accelerate capital spending, employment expansion, or consumer demand in favoured industries, such as green energy, or other sectors deemed worthy of state promotion and protection.</p><p>The application of positive and negative interest rates selectively on retail CBDCs might be seen as a further tool for enhancing monetary policies by directing capital investment and economic management. This, surely, is one of several possibilities that will excite the planners as CBDC concepts develop.</p><p>That is in the future. For now, the CBDC concept needs to be consistent with promoting improved settlement options. Through commercial bank reserves, central banks supply the ultimate backstop for the banking system, and in respect of settlements generally, they offer guarantees of safety, integrity and access to currency and deposits. Central banks are also tasked with providing sufficient liquidity to ensure the smooth workings of the payments system, ultimately as the lender of last resort. Through their banking regulation, central banks oversee the integrity and efficiency of their national settlement systems.</p><p>The introduction of a CBDC must not undermine these functions but be seen to enhance them.</p><h3>The consequences for commercial banks</h3><p>One of the problems that is yet to be addressed is the effect of an introduction of retail CBDCs on bank deposits. The origin of bank deposits is always loan creation, acting as the double-entry bookkeeping liability counterpart of bank credit recorded on bank balance sheets as assets. As borrowers draw down their loans to make payments, deposits received by their payees are distributed throughout the banking network, and rebalancing is achieved through wholesale interbank markets.</p><p>A new class of central bank liability to be used for electronic settlements risks draining the commercial banking network of deposit money that would otherwise be recycled between them. And while it is tempting to think that deposits at the larger banks are likely to be safe, there will be many smaller ones around the world that could face deposit runs into the relative safety of a CBDC.</p><p>The effect of deposit flight into central banks from highly leveraged commercial banking systems, particularly the euro system and the Japanese sector, could be catastrophic. Both sport asset to equity ratios of over twenty times on average with some banks even more highly geared, so a shift of less than 5% of their deposits could tip them into crisis.</p><p>Furthermore, for bank depositors the convenience of transferring deposits electronically and immediately for a CBDC without the hassle of queuing up for cash which a bank refuses to release in quantity could turn a bank liquidity crisis into an intraday or overnight event.</p><p>For this reason alone, a CBDC giving access to the public without hinderance seems unlikely. Furthermore, when commercial bankers are presented with a CBDC scheme, they are likely to oppose it strongly because of the threat to their customer deposits. This is even likely to be more important to commercial banks than the risk that a CBDC will represent unfair competition with commercial banking, a possibility upon which views are likely to be divided.</p><p>In authoritarian regimes, the competition argument might not matter. But in the US, banks are powerful lobbyists paying for politicians’ election spending. It seems likely that their antipathy will become an insurmountable obstacle to the introduction of a dollar CBDC, if proposals get that far.</p><h3>Practical and political considerations</h3><p>While some central banks might find there is minimal political opposition, most jurisdictions will require enabling legislation to be passed without which a global CBDC regime cannot proceed. The course of action is probably as follows:</p><p>With the agreement of the major central banks, the BIS finalises draft proposals for CBDCs to present to finance ministers at a G20 meeting. At the earliest, this initial step will be put before the G20 Summit in 2023 in India. More likely, it will be 2024 or 2025. Bear in mind that Basel 3, which was the response to the 2008 — 2009 financial crisis, is still not fully implemented more than a decade later.</p><p>Central banks will want to reassure their legislators that their proposed systems are thoroughly tested, secure and robust before framing the necessary legislation. Testing by pilot schemes could start as early as next year in some cases but given the seriousness of this issue and the bureaucratic nature of the introduction and implementation of government IT systems, and the sheer scale of opening accounts for the entire population and its businesses, it is likely to take some time.</p><p>The earliest an international agreement for CBDCs on common standards and the necessary legislation passed in the G20 nations and their implementation is unlikely to be before the end of this decade at the earliest, if not well into the 2030s.</p><p>To complicate matters, objections could arise from Russia and China. As a G20 member, Russia ploughs its own furrow, with the West periodically threatening to cut it off from SWIFT and imposing other penalties — hardly conducive to international cooperation. China is already testing her version of a CBDC, so is unlikely to conform to a BIS template which does not yet exist. But by far the most serious problem is likely to be with the US.</p><p>From remarks on the subject by Jay Powell, the Fed is taking a very cautious line. Earlier this month the Fed issued what promises to be only the first in a series of public consultation papers, and from reading it there emerges an impression of a reluctance to engage with the real issues. A suggested list of twenty questions to be answered makes the point, so that this CBDC plan is likely to be kicked into the long grass.[iii]</p><p>That the Fed is dragging its heels is obviously a matter of opinion. A crucial issue behind this opinion is the effect of CBDCs on the dollar’s existing hegemony. While the Fed might engage with a retail dollar CBDC, arguing it will offer the prospects of an improved settlement system, we can be reasonably sure that the Treasury will balk at the BIS setting the agenda for a wholesale version of the American currency. For international settlements, the dollar is already under attack from the renminbi and the euro, a rot which the Treasury will be keen to contain.</p><p>We cannot guess the outcome of this issue. And there are also the spanners to be thrown into the works by powerful commercial banking interests, which will not want to see their credit creation monopoly threatened because of the drain on their deposits.</p><h3>The threat to state fiat currencies from bitcoin</h3><p>That central banks are banding together to provide a viable alternative to bitcoin and its imitators before banning them from being used as media of exchange is a supposition supported by the interests and actions of the central banks. If this is indeed the case, we should not be surprised, given that the monetary authorities have demonstrated that they do not admit to the relationships between money, currency, and credit. They are therefore unable to decide on whether bitcoin fits into any of these categories, and therefore the seriousness of the threat.</p><p>To act as the principal media of exchange as a replacement for government fiat, bitcoin must fulfil all these functions. Through millennia, gold has been money without counterparty risk, more recently as the backing for currency substitutes with only small quantities of physical gold actually circulating. In theory, bitcoin in a wallet could fulfil that role of traditional money, backing a currency system based upon it. This backing would also be fundamental to its backing for a new currency, perhaps in the form of an obligation to deliver bitcoin held in custody by a trusted counterparty. Where it will fail is as the medium of credit due to its inflexibility compared with gold.</p><p>Besides its physical qualities, gold’s success as money is because the quantity of above ground stocks used as money is flexible and demand for the money function is set by its users (not the state, which is the important distinction from fiat currencies). The quantity of gold circulating as money draws upon reserves used mainly for ornamentation. Consequently, over the centuries there has been remarkable price stability for commodities and products exchanged by those dividing their labour measured in gold.</p><p>This is not possible with bitcoin, whose quantity is finite, and if it was to be adopted as money its purchasing power measured in goods would rise inexorably as billions of people build their cash reserves. This would continue after the shock of the collapse of the fiat regime because of the hard limit on bitcoin’s quantity, while the purchasing power of gold and its substitutes can be expected to stabilise.</p><p>A borrower of bitcoin investing in production would be faced with repayments of uncertain value measured against his final output, making it impossible to conduct the economic calculations necessary for the investment.</p><p>Besides this hurdle the promoters of bitcoin would have to convince most of the inhabitants of this planet that it is the only replacement for fiat currencies when they fail. Unlike the promoters, people dividing their labour are not speculators, only seeking a stable means of exchange. Indeed, the speculators’ motives are to encourage as high a price for bitcoin as possible, which is not the function of money.</p><p>It should therefore be obvious that bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are incapable of providing a monetary role because of their unsuitability as media of exchange. This being so we can only surmise that cryptocurrencies are little more than a concept which has succeeded in attracting speculation on a scale seen only when currency and credit to inflate it are available in unlimited quantities. In short, the phenomenon is a bubble that eclipses most of those seen hitherto.</p><p>As such, cryptocurrencies do not pose a threat to fiat currencies. It is gold the authorities should look out for, and there is no sign of them doing so.</p><h3>The economic and monetary consequences of CBDCs</h3><p>It is clear from Augustin Carsten’s comments quoted above that the objective is to use CBDCs to increase state control over how currencies are used. That being the case, personal freedom and free markets will be further suppressed through their introduction. All the evidence is that state-determined economic outcomes are failures. We can explain this simply by pointing out that only acting individuals can take the decisions that lead to economic progress, while government plans always lack the basis of economic calculation.</p><p>Instead of providing solutions for failing economic and monetary policies, CBDCs are a continuing move in the same direction. Nowhere in all the literature emanating from the BIS, or in the Fed’s consultation paper, is there any suggestion that an expansion of the quantity of CBDCs will be offset by a contraction in central bank balance sheets or in the quantity of bank credit. The only offset is the declining use of banknotes and coins, which is a minor portion of the circulating currency.</p><p>Therefore, CBDCs represent an additional source of inflationary finance, reminding us of the fate of mandats territoriaux in revolutionary France in 1796, when they replaced the assignat which had become virtually worthless. The mandats lasted barely six months. The only material difference is that CBDCs are planned to be issued contemporaneously with existing fiat currencies while they still retain public credibility.</p><p>There can be no doubt that the expansion of currency and bank credit since the Lehman crisis in 2008 has instilled in all major states an enhanced dependency on inflationary financing of government spending. Rather than raising taxes or cutting spending, it is far easier to cover their deficits by expanding the media of exchange, and while notionally independent from the political class, central bankers have fully embraced this use of inflation.</p><p>But inflation is an invidious tax, eventually realised by those who suffer under it. A lethal combination of the monetary arithmetic that an expansion of currency invokes, together with a loss of all confidence in the integrity of the issuer is always the death knell for fiat currencies. The only question remaining is the time taken for the public to realise that far from its government providing free lunches ad infinitum, they are not only paid for through their taxes but also through currency debasement.</p><p>There comes a point where this realisation leads to a widespread revulsion and rejection of the currency, when it then becomes worthless. The best that might be said of CBDCs is that by adding a layer of confusion, the final rejection of government fiat by the public might be delayed briefly. But as the experience of revolutionary France showed, the replacement of one fiat currency with it in another form changes nothing.</p><p>Existing currency problems are more immediate than plans for the adoption of CBDCs can possibly allow. In the coming months, a fatal destabilisation of fiat currencies is in prospect as central banks are forced to choose between submitting to the inevitability of interest rates rising to reflect the loss of their currencies’ purchasing power or continuing to provide inflationary finance for their governments. Without doubt, the problem is becoming urgent. Only this week, we have seen the hold fire in the face of rising interest rates, leaving US Treasuries on negative yields of over six per cent, according to official CPI figures.[iv] On an independent estimate of price inflation, negative bond yields for US Treasury debt exceed double that.[v]</p><p>Clearly, a consequence of monetary policies is that markets now fail to function. The Eurozone and Japan face the additional difficulty of surmounting negative interest rates as well as negative nominal yields on government bonds. We can only surmise that these extraordinary conditions persist due to the success of central bank propaganda backed by false and misleading statistics, while the financial world is in thrall to the false gods of Keynesianism.</p><p>As pointed out above, a further falsity is the belief that cryptocurrencies could become a viable medium of exchange. It is those dividing their labour who decide their medium of exchange, and not a shadow issuer comprised of technology enthusiasts who have achieved no more than create a bubble to end all bubbles. Bitcoin is simply another form of fiat, and as fiat dies, we can expect bitcoin and its imitators to do so as well.</p><p>And given the time taken to introduce CBDCs, not only will we be writing a further chapter on extraordinary popular delusions and the madness of crowds over the entire cryptocurrency phenomenon, but we will have found CBDCs to be stillborn.</p><p><strong>For the latest analysis and interpretation of the precious metal markets, be sure to subscribe to </strong><a href="https://www.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights"><strong>Goldmoney Insights.</strong></a></p><p>[i] See Central Bank Digital Currencies: foundational principals and core features, Report No 1. Published by the BIS.</p><p>[iI] See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mVmKN4DSu3g at 23 minutes in.</p><p>[iiI] See https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/money-and-payments-20220120.pdf</p><p>[iv] 12-month US T-bills currently yield 0.7% compared with a CPI of 7% (27 January, 2022).</p><p>[v] See http://www.shadowstats.com/alternate_data/inflation-charts</p><p><em>The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect those of Goldmoney, unless expressly stated. The article is for general information purposes only and does not constitute either Goldmoney or the author(s) providing you with legal, financial, tax, investment, or accounting advice. You should not act or rely on any information contained in the article without first seeking independent professional advice. Care has been taken to ensure that the information in the article is reliable; however, Goldmoney does not represent that it is accurate, complete, up-to-date and/or to be taken as an indication of future results and it should not be relied upon as such. Goldmoney will not be held responsible for any claim, loss, damage, or inconvenience caused as a result of any information or opinion contained in this article and any action taken as a result of the opinions and information contained in this article is at your own risk.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9fb6b7765850" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney/why-dollar-cbdcs-may-never-happen-9fb6b7765850">Why dollar CBDCs may never happen</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney">Goldmoney</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Understanding the inflation problem]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/goldmoney/understanding-the-inflation-problem-e3ad6c75a5cd?source=rss----18b9cc76e9e5---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e3ad6c75a5cd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Goldmoney]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 21 Jan 2022 03:48:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-21T03:48:38.550Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*T9F75ZoYILA6cRx4S6LNBg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>By Alasdair Macleod</p><p><strong>In recent weeks inflation has become a major economic concern. Nearly all the commentary emanating from monetary policy makers, economists, and the media is misguided, believing inflation is rising prices and must be addressed accordingly.</strong></p><p>They are only the symptoms of inflation. The true cause is the expansion of currency and bank credit, which, reflected in the US dollar’s M2 money supply has increased substantially since March 2020, and now stands at nearly three times the level when Lehman failed.</p><p>After defining the differences between money, currency, and credit which together make up the media of exchange, this article explains how changes in the quantities of currency and credit translate into prices.</p><p>The solution to the inflation problem is not price controls, which are always counterproductive, but to return to a regime of sound money. This article shows what must be done to achieve this outcome and concludes that it is impossible to do so without a sufficiently serious financial and economic crisis to discredit government intervention in markets and to then allow governments to stabilise their currencies and reduce their spending to a bare minimum.</p><h3>Defining inflation, money, currency, and credit[i]</h3><p>A resolution of the inflation problem requires an understanding of inflation itself. It is an increase in the quantity of the media of exchange, whether it be money, currency, credit, or a combination of any or all of them. It is not a rise in the general price level. That is the consequence of inflation when the media of exchange loses purchasing power.</p><p>To avoid misunderstanding, it is important in any discussion about money to provide an accurate definition of what is money and what is not money. Let us clarify this at the outset:</p><p>That which is commonly referred to as money is more correctly any form of circulating media used for the payment of goods and services in an economy based on the division of labour. The term “circulating media” or “media of exchange” more accurately represents the common concept of money as the term is used today.</p><p>The amount of circulating media is never fixed. Indeed, the quantity of metallic money — gold, silver, and copper, but particularly gold, which we can simply define as pure money with no counterparty risk, has increased over the millennia since weights of these metals first evolved to replace barter. The population of active users of metallic money has also increased. Throughout history, the pace of increases of above ground gold stocks and the human population have been similar. The quantity of gold has therefore broadly kept pace with the population increase.</p><p>Over the long term, therefore, money proper has ensured a stable purchasing power despite the increase in above-ground stocks. An important advantage of gold as money is that its use is dominated by the twin functions of ornamentation and as the medium of exchange — unlike silver and copper it is never consumed. Gold’s utility is set by its users, who collectively decide how much circulates as money and how much is used for ornamentation. Its use switches between these two functions as its possessors collectively impose their needs, and gold’s purchasing power is determined by the quantity circulating as money. As well as the flows between its use as money and ornamentation, the quantity of money can also be affected by variations in mine supply from its general correlation with global population growth.</p><p>Gold’s purchasing power is stable due to these self-correcting factors. Currency is a different matter, always bearing in mind the counterparty risk of the issuer and its propensity to inflate its quantity. Today, these are central banks. A central bank’s balance sheet always shows currency in circulation as a liability of the bank, along with deposits owed by it to its depositors, normally confined to licenced commercial banks. The quantity of currency in circulation is set not by its users, but by the central bank managing its balance sheet.</p><p>In accordance with their monetary policies, Central banks can and do vary the amount of currency and the deposits recorded on their balance sheets, the latter more normally termed the reserves of commercial banks. Setting the level of these reserves in addition to a commercial bank’s shareholder capital used to be the means of regulating the quantity of credit that a commercial bank could issue. But today, central banks actively buy financial assets, payment being credited to the reserve accounts of the commercial banks. It is now the principal source of central bank inflation, and the regulation of a commercial bank’s lending capacity is now controlled more by other forms of regulation.</p><p>A commercial bank is a dealer in credit. It lends money to borrowers at a higher rate than it pays to its depositors. By lending money, it creates an asset on its balance sheet, and at the same time a counterbalancing liability is credited to the borrower, representing the amount of credit that the borrower has available to draw upon. The borrower’s bank statement will not usually reflect the counter-deposit, but double-entry bookkeeping demands that it exists. By a few strokes of a bookkeeper’s pen, credit which is indistinguishable from currency is created out of thin air and put into circulation.</p><p>We therefore have three types of circulating media: money, currency, and credit. A central bank sets the quantity of currency, and the commercial banks the quantity of bank credit and therefore deposit money, which is bank credit’s counterpart. The only circulating media whose use-value is set by its users is money. For the modern state which demands control over what circulates as the circulating media, money is actively discouraged in favour of its own substitutes, currency and bank credit issued by its licenced commercial banks, which it controls. Even under a gold coin standard, very few transactions involved money, being almost entirely settled by currency and credit.</p><h3>The consequences of inflation</h3><p>As the British economist John Stuart Mill pointed out there is a relationship between the quantity of money, currency, and credit in circulation (today, collectively termed erroneously as the stock of money) and the purchasing power of its units. This is now described as the equation of exchange, mathematically formulated later by Irving Fisher, which states that changes in the general level of prices are proportional to changes in the quantity of circulating media. But Mill’s equation of exchange showed a variance between changes in the quantity of media in circulation and the effect on prices, which was resolved by Fisher introducing another factor to make the equation balance. He called this its velocity of circulation, introducing the concept of money “working” to a greater or lesser extent in setting prices.</p><p>This is an error, as a moment’s thought confirms. In accordance with the division of labour, we earn salaries and profits which we then spend or save. Over any given period, such as a year, there is a total deployment of income that can only occur once. The relationship in the equation cannot be one of “velocity”, confirming it is a catch-all factor to make an equation balance which should only have ever been regarded as a theoretical concept.</p><p>John Stuart Mill described the relationship between the quantity of money and money substitutes in the nineteenth century when people commonly understood money to be gold. There can be no doubt that the price stability that gold brings with it ensures that quantity was the dominant factor in the price relationship. Today, the circulating media is exclusively unbacked currency and credit, which are less stable because they impart additional risk.</p><p>The addition of fiat currency risk into the media of exchange introduces uncertainty to its value because an issuer with a history of inflating currency quantities will find its currency deemed more risky and prone to valuation shocks than that of a currency with a more stable history. This is why the Turkish lira loses purchasing power more rapidly than the Swiss franc for given quantity changes. The introduction of the risk variable can have a significant effect on confidence in an unbacked currency.</p><p>Simply by varying the amount the average person holds in readily accessible currency reserves, its purchasing power can be altered considerably. Imagine, for a moment, a population that loses all faith in a currency. It will reduce its accessible reserves to zero by buying goods just to dump the currency, irrespective of the quantity in circulation. This was described by Austrian economists as the flight into goods, or a crack-up boom. The currency loses all its functionality.</p><p>Alternatively, if a currency is increasingly hoarded, perhaps by a population fearing events that require it to increase its currency reserves, the purchasing power of the currency, being more scarce in its circulation, will increase. Again, this is independent of any changes in the quantity in issue.</p><p>These variations from the monetarist norm are poorly understood by mathematical economists but were properly explained by the founders of the Austrian school. Being originally published in German their British contemporaries were generally unaware of these findings. And it was from these errors that our current understanding of the relationship between circulating media and its purchasing power have evolved.</p><p>Nevertheless, assuming a reasonable degree of stability in the use-value of a currency by a given population, there is a strong link between the quantity in circulation and the general level of prices. If the quantity is increased, the issuer gains a benefit through being able to issue currency or credit before it has the impact on prices. As the new currency and bank deposits (being the balance sheet counterpart of credit expansion) are spent into circulation, they will reduce the purchasing power of pre-existing currency and deposit balances. It is a gradual process as the new currency is passed on from buyers of goods to sellers. Known as the Cantillon effect (after the eighteenth century Irish-French banker and economist, Richard Cantillon), the increased quantity of money drives up prices following its entry and subsequent pathway into circulation.</p><p>Just as the issuer of currency or credit derives a seigniorage benefit, a loss is suffered by its users. The time taken for this loss to be realised depends on the speed of the absorption of currency and bank credit into general circulation, and the effect is never even. The least loss is suffered by its early spenders as explained by the Cantillon effect, and the greatest by those who spend it last. The further away from a financial system spewing out currency and credit both geographically and in the chain of transactions, the greater is the loss, which is why prices are highest in financial centres, being the source of inflation, declining as one moves into rural backwaters. But once extra currency and credit is fully absorbed into the existing stock everyone with currency and bank deposits will have lost purchasing power. And the purchasing power of those unable to adjust their income for falling purchasing power, such as the low-paid and pensioners, declines as well.</p><h3>The link between changes in media of exchange and consumer prices</h3><p>It is commonly said that inflation is rising prices. But as stated above, this is not so. Rising prices are the consequence of an increase in the quantity of money, currency, or credit, diluting their purchasing power which is reflected in higher prices for goods and services. If, instead of inflating, the quantity of the media of exchange remains the same, then consumers must choose how they spend the media they have earned. And they cannot spend collectively more than they have earned. The prices of some goods will fall while others rise, reflecting the choices consumers make, but the general level of prices will remain approximately the same, other factors being equal.</p><p>Alternatively, if the quantity of credit is expanded, by borrowing consumers no longer have to choose between their preferences. The prices of goods will rise above what they would otherwise be without credit expansion. Therefore, on an economy-wide basis, the availability of expanded credit will lead to an increase in the general level of prices to the extent it is drawn down, assuming other influences on prices do not change.</p><p>The source of expanded credit is the commercial banking system and shadow banks — a term which embraces financial intermediaries which are dealers in credit but are not licenced specifically as banks.</p><p>If a central bank increases the quantity of currency, it makes it available to the private sector on demand. By the same process as the expansion of bank credit, prices will tend to rise from the extra spending an expansion of currency permits.</p><p>An increase in bank reserves is nowadays the result of the central bank purchasing financial assets. It is recorded as a central bank’s liability, which through quantitative easing for example, is matched by both increases in a commercial bank’s assets and its liabilities (deposits) in favour of its depositors (usually pension funds or insurance companies) which sell the securities to the central bank. The selling institution then has a surplus of liquidity to invest.</p><p>It may subscribe for a new issue or buy securities in the secondary market. By subscribing for a new issue, the cash balance of the issuer increases, who then spends it on the factors of production. This spending of additional deposit money tends to raise prices. If the investing institution buys existing securities in the secondary market, the seller of these securities may reinvest the proceeds or spend some or all of them. Again, the extent to which they are spent on goods or services will tend to raise prices, because this deposit money is additional to that previously existing.</p><p>It can therefore be seen that inflation is always a monetary phenomenon, and not one of changes in consumer preferences and suppliers’ ability to satisfy them. But so ingrained has the fallacy become that changes in the level of circulating media have little or nothing to do with changes in the general price level, that current attempts to control it are repeating the same errors seen throughout history. By not understanding or denying the origin of the inflation curse, the state attempts to pass the blame on to others, when it is the state’s agencies, being its central bank and its licenced commercial banks, which are responsible.</p><p>By not addressing the source of rising prices but the symptoms instead, the problem of rising prices is usually made worse. In 301 AD, the Emperor Diocletian pronounced an edict of maximum prices on more than 1,200 products, raw materials and labour, animals and slaves, which had risen as a result of the debasement of the coinage. Any tradesmen caught selling goods for more than the edict’s limitations were punished, even to the point of execution. Unable to make a profit, the affected trades ceased and the citizens in Rome faced starvation. Throughout history, when governments have debased the coinage, or inflated the currency, they have embarked on similar policies.</p><p>The solution to the inflation problem</p><p>The traditional solution to the inflation problem was for the state to operate a gold coin standard. This differs from a bullion standard, such as that introduced in Britain in 1925, when deposits could only be exchanged for 400-ounce bars — an operating standard that excluded most of the population.</p><p>A gold coin standard permitted anyone even with limited currency or bank deposits to exchange bank notes for gold coin on demand. This did not require the issuer of bank notes to back every note in issue with gold coin at the ratio of the standard, but it did require the further issuance of bank notes to be fully backed. And for anyone wishing to cash in a bank deposit for gold coin, the route was either to do so with the deposit-taking bank itself, or to exchange deposits for bank notes which could then be exchanged for gold coin.</p><p>Operating a gold coin standard was incompatible with a government’s spending exceeding its tax revenues for anything other than a temporary basis. Failure to comply with this iron rule always led to a surplus of currency and credit in the hands of domestic and foreign actors, who had the right to demand gold coin in exchange and tended to do so.</p><p>Before the First World War a secondary standard become increasingly common. A note-issuing central bank would work a currency board standard, whereby it operates a note and deposit exchange facility not with gold but with another currency on a gold standard. In all essentials, the modus operandi was the same as a working gold standard.</p><p>In the days of empire, this was how the sterling area linked local currencies to the pound. Today, in our fiat money system, currency boards usually operate with the US dollar as the exchange alternative. Properly run, a currency board is extremely robust, tested recently by the failure of American attempts to drive the Hong Kong dollar off its currency peg. Economist Steve Hanke of John Hopkins University has advised several foreign governments over the years to adopt dollar-based currency boards to bring high rates of price inflation under control. Properly implemented they have always worked.</p><h3>Stabilising purchasing power</h3><p>From the foregoing, we can see there are two sources of monetary destabilisation. Since the time of the goldsmiths in London, when the role of banks first evolved into being dealers in credit, the periodic expansion and contraction of bank credit has driven the repetitive cycle of booms and busts. Recognising that this is the case is just the first step in eliminating monetary instability from this source, or at least reducing its disruptive effects.</p><p>There are two basic approaches that might apply. The first is to split bank roles into deposit-taking and the arranging of finance, while the second approach is to moderate the extent to which bank credit can be expanded. We shall comment briefly on these in turn.</p><p>The first approach is to eliminate the role of banks as dealers in credit entirely, and separate their functions into custodial deposit taking, offering the facility for individuals to temporarily store money and currency liquidity, and into the separate function as arrangers of finance. By their nature, custodial deposits would not pay interest, and depositors face charges for the facility. A custodial deposit-taker would in turn have to act as agent for customer deposit accounts at the note-issuing bank, so that electronic currency has the same status as bank notes. Charges for the service can be expected to be similar to secure vaulting services today.</p><p>Instead of creating loans, banks would arrange finance off balance sheet, with savers offered specific investment opportunities, either directly into loans and equity or into collective investment schemes. The provision of working capital for businesses would be through funds established specifically for the purpose.</p><p>Interestingly, suitable central bank digital currencies could be ideal as the media of exchange for establishing separated custodial deposit and investment arranging functions. But that is not what they are intended for, so there is little point in discussing them in the context of a sound monetary system.</p><p>The second basic approach is not to undertake a root and branch reform of the banking system as described above, but to remove the limited liability status enjoyed by commercial banks and to ban the central bank from bail-outs and bail-ins. The human desire to take insufficient account of lending risk at times of economic expansion by pricing loans not on their merits but to attract lending business would come under greater control. Instead of seeing asset to equity ratios of ten or more times, these can be expected to fall perhaps to three or four times. Bank shareholders would expect their investments to be dull, but safe, given they would face the entire losses from their managers’ mistakes.</p><p>Bank reform on these scales would meet insurmountable resistance from banking interests except in the wake of a decisive financial crisis when the whole banking system faces collapse and the opportunity to reset the whole system is presented.</p><p>Having identified the problem of fluctuating bank credit, our attention turns to inflation of the currency. The most effective way of dealing with this is to remove the temptation of unfettered seigniorage from the state and its agents and let the currency’s users decide on its quantity requirements. This is the role that a gold coin standard plays, whereby the state must cover every supplementary currency unit issued with gold at the rate of exchange laid down. The users of a gold-backed currency determine the quantity. Thus, the quantity of money in circulation is set by market demand and supply, which in turn sets gold’s purchasing power and therefore that of its exchangeable bank notes and deposits.</p><p>If it was only a question of turning a fiat currency into a functioning gold substitute, it could be dealt with very simply. But it also requires the state and its central bank to accept the other disciplines of sound money, including not intervening in markets. In the event of a commercial bank failure or of an industrial enterprise, markets must determine outcomes without state intervention. But the likelihood of bank failures and their systemic consequences will have been eliminated or lessened considerably by the banking reforms recommended above.</p><p>More difficult, perhaps, will be the discipline sound money imposes on government spending. From the state’s point of view, the purpose of inflation is to permit it to spend more than it raises in taxes. For money in the form of gold coin to back a fully exchangeable currency requires abandoning inflation as a source of finance. Sound government finances with budget surpluses are initially required to reduce today’s extraordinarily high levels of government debt over time. Any deviation from this objective must be only temporary. And legislation to eliminate most of mandated future liabilities must also be introduced. The role of the state must be reduced to a bare minimum, and taxes reduced in step with declining government spending.</p><p>It amounts to a denial of anything other than very basic roles for the state, going against the modern democratic socialist grain.</p><p>The difficulties of persuading the political class and its electorate to accept this course of action are such that it will only be adopted after a currency crisis has been sufficiently dramatic to undermine socialist ideals and persuade the political establishment and the people that unsound monetary practices must be avoided at all costs.</p><p>It will happen because the current relationship between the state, the economy and fiat currency is wholly untenable. And a gold standard will be reintroduced by the state as the only way to save itself. We can only hope that when they are politically possible the required actions are taken swiftly and without compromise.</p><p><strong>For the latest analysis and interpretation of the precious metal markets, be sure to subscribe to </strong><a href="https://www.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights"><strong>Goldmoney Insights.</strong></a></p><p>[i] For a more detailed description of money, currency, and credit, see James Turk: Money and Liberty — In the Pursuit of Happiness &amp; The Theory of Natural Money, Published by Wood Lane Books ISBN 978–1–7398511–1–8. Available as a Kindle book from Amazon.</p><p><em>The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect those of Goldmoney, unless expressly stated. The article is for general information purposes only and does not constitute either Goldmoney or the author(s) providing you with legal, financial, tax, investment, or accounting advice. You should not act or rely on any information contained in the article without first seeking independent professional advice. Care has been taken to ensure that the information in the article is reliable; however, Goldmoney does not represent that it is accurate, complete, up-to-date and/or to be taken as an indication of future results and it should not be relied upon as such. Goldmoney will not be held responsible for any claim, loss, damage, or inconvenience caused as a result of any information or opinion contained in this article and any action taken as a result of the opinions and information contained in this article is at your own risk.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e3ad6c75a5cd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney/understanding-the-inflation-problem-e3ad6c75a5cd">Understanding the inflation problem</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney">Goldmoney</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Money supply and rising interest rates]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/goldmoney/money-supply-and-rising-interest-rates-7fec27a6a45f?source=rss----18b9cc76e9e5---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7fec27a6a45f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Goldmoney]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 07 Jan 2022 18:49:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-07T18:49:21.782Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*TuUM8QCXDoaq1Y-_BQ-mig@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>By Alasdair Macleod</p><p><strong>The establishment, including the state, central banks and most investors are thoroughly Keynesian, the latter category having profited greatly in recent decades from their slavish following of the common meme.</strong></p><p>That is about to change. The world of continual Keynesian stimulus is coming to its inevitable end with prices rising beyond the authorities’ control. Being blinded by neo-Keynesian beliefs, no one is prepared for it.</p><p>This article explains why interest rates are set to rise substantially in this new year. It draws on evidence from the inflation crisis of the 1970s, points out the similarities and the fact that currency debasement today is far greater and more global than fifty years ago. In the UK, half the current rate of monetary inflation for half the time — just for one year — led to gilt coupons of over 15%. And today we have Fed watchers who can only envisage a Fed funds rate climbing to 2% at most…</p><p>A key factor will be the discrediting of this Keynesian hopium, likely to be replaced by a belated conversion to the monetarism that propelled Milton Friedman into the public eye when the same thing happened in the mid-seventies. The realisation that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon will come too late for policy makers to stop it.</p><p>The situation is closely examined for America, its debt, and its dollar. But the problems do not stop there: the risks to the global system of fiat currencies and credit from rising interest rates and the debt traps that will be sprung are acute everywhere.</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Clearly, the outlook is for higher dollar interest rates. The Fed is trying to persuade markets that it is a temporary phenomenon requiring only modest action and that while inflation, by which the authorities mean rising prices, is unexpectedly high, when things return to normal it will be back down to a little over two per cent. There’s no need to panic, and this view is widely supported by the entire investment industry.</p><p>Unfortunately, this narrative is based on wishful thinking rather than reality. The reality is that over the last two years the dollar has been dramatically debased as part of an ongoing process, as the chart in Figure 1 unmistakably shows.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1002/1*i0kzQwYpZ67QSCqWLbBODA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Since February 2020, M2 has increased from $15,470 to $21,437 last November, that’s 38.6% in just twenty months, an average annualised inflation rate of 23.2% for nearly two years on the trot. And that follows unremitting expansion at an accelerated pace since the 2008 Lehman crisis, an inflationary increase of 175% since August 2008 to November 2021. If the CPI is the relevant measure, then its current indicated rate of price inflation at 6.8% is only the beginning of upward pressure on prices.</p><p>For now, markets are ignoring this reality, hoping the Fed is still in control and can be believed. But we can be sure that it will soon become apparent that the monetary authorities have a major problem on their hands which will no longer be satisfied by jaw-jaw alone. Interest rates will then be destined for significantly higher levels, not because there is demand for capital against a background of limited savings supply, but because anyone holding dollars will require compensation for retaining them. A similar error is to think that with economic growth slowing from its initial recovery and with concerns that the world may be entering a recession, demand and supply will return to a balance and prices will stop rising.</p><p>These errors aside, the 10-year US Treasury, which is currently yielding 1.7% cannot continue for long at these levels with CPI prices rising at 6.8% and more. And in the next few months, with higher producer prices, energy, and raw material costs in the pipeline the pressure for a substantial upwards rerating of bond yields (which is a catastrophic fall in prices) is only going to increase.</p><h3>International investment flows</h3><p>This article is less concerned with the implications for financial asset values than with how such a shock will affect the currency and confidence in monetary policy. The dollar is over-owned by foreign interests, which with cash deposits and investments now exceed $33 trillion, 145% of estimated current US GDP and not too far from the Bank of International Settlements’ estimate of US non-financial core debt.[i] Of this foreign ownership, nearly $27 trillion is in long-term securities, with private sector ownership of equities by foreign investors standing at $12.5 trillion within that figure.[ii]</p><p>It should be appreciated that nearly all foreign ownership of US equities is with profits in mind only: foreigners may be required by their regulators to hold domestic equities, but there is no such requirement covering foreign equities. Consequently, an increase in interest rates of a magnitude suggested by the dollar’s debasement can be expected to trigger an avalanche of foreign selling of all classes of financial assets. Whether they sell the dollar as well will depend partly on how high interest rates are permitted to rise, and partly on alternative currency, precious metal, and commodity options.</p><p>Countering foreign investment in USD financial assets, US residents’ investment in foreign currency assets is far less, with only $651.4bn of foreign currency deposits and short-term investments, one tenth of foreign entitlements to dollar bank deposits and ownership of Treasury and commercial bills. But ownership by US investors in long-term foreign securities stands at $15.7 trillion, less than half the foreign position in US securities, of which $12 trillion is in equities. A bear market in US stocks will therefore lead liquidation of foreign stocks as well, ensuring an equity bear market in the US will become truly global. But the net effect on the dollar is likely to be negative</p><p>Another aspect for foreign holders of dollar assets to consider is the ongoing supply of dollars and dollar credit. So far, the prospect of further dollar debasement relative to other currencies has not been reflected on the foreign exchanges because the other major currencies face similar outcomes. This may be changing. The euro and Japanese yen have weakened significantly recently with the ECB’s and Bank of Japan’s deposit rates trapped below the zero bound.</p><p>The inability of governments and monetary authorities to escape from currency debasement is what will ultimately matter, setting the scene for purchasing power, interest rates and systemic instability. For now, prospects for the money supply of the world’s reserve currency are central to these issues.</p><h3>Does M2 truly represent the dollar’s money supply?</h3><p>In February 2021 the Fed changed the components in M1 and M2 and began to report them monthly instead of weekly. Put simply, savings deposits at the banks were added to M1, which accounted for a large jump in the M1 total. Adjustments to prior figures were only backdated to May 2020 onwards, rendering it useless for comparisons with data prior to that date.</p><p>The composition of M2 was left unchanged.[iii]</p><p>There are two additional factors, which arguably should be included in M2. The first is IRA and Keogh accounts at the banks. Presumably, they are excluded on the basis that they are not readily available for consumer spending, and if they are withdrawn from one bank, they must be deposited in another. But this ignores the fact that they are part of the deposit money which banks deploy for their dealings in credit, and that the total of these deposits varies. They should therefore be included in any bank deposit-based definition of the money supply. The effect of including these balances is to increase M2 today by $974bn (November 2021).[iv]</p><p>The second factor is the treatment of repurchase agreements (repos and reverse repos or RRPs), which are tools for liquidity management both between commercial banks and between the banks and the Fed. We are not concerned with inter-bank repos, because they do not affect the overall amount of currency and credit in circulation. But when the Fed is one counterparty, the situation is different.</p><p>Readers may recall the liquidity crisis in September 2019, when the Fed stepped in and provided finance by providing repos to commercial banks. When the Fed acts in a repo transaction, it buys high quality assets (usually US Treasury bills, Treasury bonds or agency debt) with an agreement to sell them back on pre-agreed terms, which will give the Fed a profit, currently set at an annualised rate of 0.05%. The selling bank then has use of the cash proceeds over the duration of the repo, until the transaction is completed by the bank repurchasing the collateral from the Fed on the pre-agreed terms, thereby returning the cash. Because these transactions are short-term, usually providing overnight liquidity, there is little point in including them in money supply statistics.</p><p>A reverse repo is the other side of a repo transaction. If a commercial bank has too much liquidity on its balance sheet it can use a reverse repo to provide it to another bank in need of liquidity on profitable terms. But if the Fed is the counterparty to a bank or eligible institution in a reverse repo then liquidity is being taken out of general circulation reducing money supply on a short-term basis. Therefore, an increase in the Fed’s reverse repo book reduces the M2 money supply figure below what would otherwise be reported.</p><p>For the Fed, repos and reverse repos are overnight liquidity management tools to allow the Fed to keep its funds rate within the limits set by the Open Markets Committee. Repos are deployed to put a cap on interest rates and reverse repos a floor.</p><p>But commercial banks are unlikely to make use of the reverse repo facility. The only way a bank will be encouraged to enter a reverse repo transaction with the Fed is as a dealer in credit. The return on an RRP must exceed alternative uses of the liquidity available to a bank on the liability side of its balance sheet. Banks will not undertake a reverse repo with the Fed because the rate is fixed at 0.05%, which is less than the interest paid on bank reserves at 0.15%.</p><p>But on 31 December last week, the Fed’s total reverse repo operations stood at $1.905 trillion (it has since declined by $400bn because in the last few trading sessions the yield on 13-week T-bills has risen to 0.085%, giving a higher yield than that offered by the Fed’s reverse repo facility). Nonetheless, outstanding overnight reverse repos are still a very large item. If commercial banks are disinterested because they earn more on their reserves, then who are the Fed’s counterparties? The answer is money funds.</p><p>Money funds faced two problems. With interest rates fixed by the Fed at the zero bound, there is a heightened risk that they will “break the buck”, in other words they would no longer be able to guarantee to return their investors’ capital. The second problem is that commercial banks are no longer interested in acting as counterparties in wholesale money markets absorbing money funds’ liquidity. The issue is Basel 3’s net stable funding ratio rules introduced on 1 July. The NSFR is intended to ensure that banks have stable funding for their activities, and a bank exposed to large depositors, who might withdraw their deposits at little or no notice, for the purpose of the NSFR rules do not constitute a stable source of funding. Consequently, banks are no longer interested in taking in deposits from the money funds permitted to deposit money with them through wholesale money markets.[v]</p><p>Therefore, all money funds are driven towards the New York Fed’s Open Market Trading Desk to earn a paltry 0.05% on their funds when the yield on 13-week T-bills declines towards the zero bound. This facility was specifically opened to them in March 2020 when the Fed reduced its funds rate to 0 — 0.25%. Ahead of the NSFR’s introduction to US bank regulations last June, the Desk’s reverse repo facility stood at just a few billion from which it exploded to nearly $2 trillion last week, coincided with the NSFR’s introduction. And for money funds restricted to dealing in T-bills and the Fed’s reverse repos, the T-bill rates also dropped. The consequences for the Fed’s reverse repo facilities is illustrated in Figure 2.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/881/1*LLVS3E7or9ExJ17kjF6pKQ@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Now that the Fed’s reverse repo counterparties have been identified, we return to the question posed above: how does this unprecedented increase in outstanding overnight reverse repos affect our understanding of the quantity of currency and credit in the system?</p><p>There is little doubt that in the absence of the Fed’s intervention that money funds’ cash placed with commercial banks would be recorded as part of the deposit-based money supply, and that on a change in the interest rate situation, it is likely to flood back into circulation. Money funds invested in short-term Treasury instruments, which is most of them, are reflected in bank deposits when it is spent out of the government’s general account.</p><p>Therefore, like the IRA and Keogh balances, the Fed’s reverse repos distort M2 and should be added to broad money M2 to give a truer picture of the quantity of currency and credit in circulation, despite the timing differences involved. M2 and M2 adjusted for these items are shown in Figure 3 below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nO_DeNHvrmmVxG3PxhUc3A@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>M2 so adjusted has increased from $8.3 trillion the month Lehman failed, to almost $25 trillion today, an increase of 200%. The gap between official M2 and our adjusted figures has also increased significantly. In the introduction to this article, it was pointed out that since February 2020 the average annualised rate of official M2 inflation was 23.2% for twenty months. The adjusted annualised rate for M2 modified increases to 27.7% for the same period. Crucially, the recent slowdown in M2 growth properly adjusted has not happened.</p><h3>The funding precedent from the 1970s</h3><p>With currency and credit increasing at this rate, it is only a matter of time before the US Government will find its funding costs rising materially. Not only will that change the outlook for its spending plans, but there is a risk of periods of funding disruption. Relying on its proven auction process may no longer be wise.</p><p>It is well worth revisiting the 1970s precedent to today’s financial conditions. It was the last time there was an inflation-linked funding crisis. But it wasn’t the US Government that suffered, because it ran relatively small budget deficits relative to the economy at that time — the largest being an unprecedented $74 million in 1976 (compared with $3,131,917 million in 2020, over 42,000 times the 1976 deficit!).</p><p>It was the UK that had problems, but on a far smaller relative scale. Periodically, the Bank of England, acting for the UK Treasury, was unable to fund its budget deficit, which peaked at 6.9% of GDP in 1975/76, forcing the then Chancellor (Denis Healey) to borrow $3, 900 million from the IMF to cover the entire deficit. Following this episode, IMF restrictions on government spending capped the UK budget deficit at approximately 5% in the years following, and the rate of price inflation, which had peaked at 25% in 1975, declined to 8.4% in 1978. Furthermore, in late-1973 there had been a combined commercial property and banking crisis on a scale never seen in the UK before. And in the bear market in equities between May 1972 and the end of 1974 the FT 30 Share Index lost over 70%.</p><p>More than anything else at the time, this episode discredited Keynesianism. For comparison, the US deficit to GDP ratio in 2020 was 11.6% in 2020 and 10.3% in 2021, nearly double that of the UK at the height of its crisis, but so far for two consecutive years. With similarly socialist policies which led to a sterling crisis forty-five years ago, the dangers facing the dollar, which are potentially far greater, are yet to materialise. And the IMF cannot come to the rescue of the US, as it did for the UK in 1976, and Greece in 2010–12.</p><p>Crucially, the Bank of England lacked the tools to hide the true extent of monetary inflation. Repos and reverse repos didn’t exist in the UK until the early 1990s. Intentionally or not, to a degree central banks can massage the numbers today with the financial press being none the wiser. But that changes nothing, other than fooling markets for just a little longer.</p><p>Back in seventies’ Britain, the initial cause of a series of funding crises was that the Bank of England, under pressure from politicians, did not accept the market’s demands for higher interest rates. This sent a negative message to foreign holders of sterling, weakening the exchange rate, triggering foreign selling of gilts, and raising fears of further imported price inflation.</p><p>Meanwhile, government spending continued apace (as described above), pushing extra currency into circulation without it being absorbed by debt issuance funded by genuine savings. And as sterling weakened and money supply figures deteriorated at an increased pace, yet higher interest rates would be required to persuade investing institutions to subscribe for new gilt issues.</p><p>The longer the delay in accepting reality, the greater the chasm became between market expectations and the authorities’ position. Only then would the politicians and the Keynesians at the UK’s Treasury throw in the towel. The Bank of England then had the authority to fund at its discretion. It deployed what became known in the gilt market as the Grand Old Duke of York strategy, after the nursery rhyme: “He had ten thousand men. He marched them up to the top of the hill, then marched them down again.” The Bank of England would raise interest rates high enough to take all expectations of higher rates out of the market, then issue gilt stocks to absorb pent-up investment liquidity before allowing and encouraging rates to fall again. That was how 15% Treasury 1985, 15 ¼% Treasury 1996 the 15 ½% Treasury 1998 gilts came to be issued on separate occasions.</p><p>At the top of the interest rate hill and following the announcement of the terms of the new gilt, sterling would rise, the crisis passed, and the money supply figures corrected themselves. Paul Volcker at the Fed did something similar at the Fed in June 1981 when he raised the Fed funds rate to 19.1% — except the objective was less about funding and more about killing expectations of price inflation.</p><p>Though they are being ignored, there are worrying similarities with the Fed’s position today. The budget deficit has been and remains far higher than the one that forced the UK to call in the IMF, as much as 11.6% of GDP and over 42,000 times the US deficit in 1976. With a US economy bound to be impacted by rising interest rates, the outlook is not recovery as forecast by the Congressional Budget Office, but for further deterioration, requiring continual inflationary funding.</p><p>The Fed is reluctant to acknowledge the argument for significantly higher interest rates, and risks losing control over them. It is in this context that reverse repos have come to the Fed’s partial rescue by suppressing statistically the true rate of growth in currency and credit. That will unwind in the coming months</p><p>A further lesson from the 1970s was that they commenced with Keynesianism in vogue, which became gradually discredited, notably in the wake of the UK’s 1976 crisis. Monetarists, such as Milton Friedman, gained credibility, and with it a growing recognition that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”. Today, neo-Keynesianism appears as entrenched in monetary policy committees than they were in the early seventies. We can be reasonably sure that as prices, interest rates, and currency and credit quantities continue to rise, that Keynesianism will be discredited again, and a new realisation based on monetarist principals will gain ground.</p><p>When investors in US Treasuries begin to drift away from failed Keynesian arguments and understand the Fed’s dilemma is in a monetary context there can be little doubt that US Treasury auctions will begin to experience failures. How the Fed responds will be crucial: will it be reluctant to raise interest rates sufficiently? Almost certainly the answer is in the affirmative, because of the economic damage to highly indebted businesses and government finances.</p><p>And no one yet is contemplating Treasury coupons at anything like the 15% seen in UK gilts in the far milder inflationary conditions of the 1970s. The rate of US M2 growth recently is the highest by far since records began, even greater than at any time in the two World Wars and compares with a maximum of rate of 13.8% in February 1976, half of that today.[i]</p><h3>The dangers from rising interest rates</h3><p>We now turn to the consequences of rising interest rates on the money supply, and the impact on government funding. There seems little doubt that as rates move above the zero bound, so long as T-bill rates remain above the Fed funds rate minimum target that money funds will no longer use the Fed’s reverse repo facility. Indeed, earlier this week a jump in the yield of the thirteen-week T-bill to 0.085% has already coincided with a reduction of $400bn in overnight reverse repos.</p><p>From the money funds’ viewpoint, the risk of “breaking the buck” disappears as the Fed funds rate moves above the zero bound, and a purchase of short-term T-bills becomes an increasingly profitable alternative. These money funds are likely to increase their buying of T-bills, which will be credited to the government’s general account at the Fed. The funds gained in the general account will be subsequently drawn down and spent by the Federal Government, when they will then be reflected as bank deposits adding to M2 money supply.</p><p>With this ready source of short-term funding, there is a danger that the government will rely increasingly upon it, making government finances more immediately exposed to rising interest rates. And with the growth of reverse repos having initially slowed down the growth of M2, its subsequent release into deposits as the government spends it out of the general account risks accelerating its growth subsequently at a time when Keynesian policies are being discredited in favour of monetarism.</p><p>The Fed only agreed to deal with money fund counterparties as a temporary measure in March 2020 to ensure that large deposits from them did not face negative deposit rates from banks while the Fed funds rate was at the zero bound. But when rates move up, the money fund problem disappears, and the facility may be withdrawn.</p><p>But with interest rates rising, the Fed will have a far greater problem dealing with the economic fallout. We can all agree that rising interest rates increases the burden on all borrowers exposed to market rates, while those who have locked in low fixed rates merely have the problem only deferred over the length of their loans.</p><h3>Rising interest rates and national debts</h3><p>According to the Bank for International Settlements total non-financial core debt for the US stood at $35.2 trillion at the end of 2021 Q2 (other estimates appear to be higher). The trend since 2000 is illustrated in Figure 4.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/738/1*07RqwSc5pVS7qZqTJja5sQ@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Non-financial debt expanded to record levels between 2000 and the financial crisis of 2008–09, much of it in lieu of stagnating wage increases outpaced by rising prices. The repayment of total non-financial debt, the expansion of which had led up to the Lehman failure, was then deferred by expansive monetary policies, and subsequently rose sharply in 2020–21 driven by soaring government deficits. The economic cost of rising interest rates to non-financial actors is indicated by its sheer scale.</p><p>Mounting non-financial debt is a global problem, with the US at 286% compared with its GDP, the Eurozone at 284%, the UK at 290%, Japan at 416.5%, Switzerland at 308%, and China at 285% (BIS figures for 2021 Q2)[i]. The springing of debt traps by rising interest rates of more than a few per cent is bound to destabilise the entire global economy. As well as the Fed, the other central banks will be acutely aware of their own situation and we can be sure that G7 finance ministers and central bankers will try to coordinate interest rate policies, by which we mean doubling down on their suppression. The recent situation for highly indebted national governments is shown in Table 1.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/737/1*VnQaOpX9G4qNW8VEh7ugzA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Advanced economies have had debt to GDP ratios of over 100% for at least ten years, a hangover from the financial crisis in 2008–09. The debt position of some of them has since deteriorated alarmingly.</p><p>In a joint paper, economists Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff concluded in 2010 that “…public debt levels of debt/GDP that push the 90 per cent threshold are associated with lower median and average growth”.[i] In other words, all the countries in Table 1 will find it difficult, if not impossible to grow their way out of these peacetime debt levels.</p><p>Highly indebted national governments, such as Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Japan will struggle to survive a rise in global interest rates without being in the front line of a funding and systemic crisis. And the Eurozone nations in Table 1 will almost certainly destabilise member states with less direct exposure to debt traps.</p><p>Only recently, President Macron of France and Prime Minister of Mario Draghi of Italy wrote a joint article calling for “The EU’s fiscal rules to be reformed”.[ii] For “reform”, read increase borrowing levels. In other words, having achieved government debt to GDP ratios of 128% and 174% respectively, they now want to increase these debt levels even further.</p><p>The race into a European debt crisis is bad enough. But Japan is particularly alarming, with government debt obligations further extended in a policy of supressing risk premiums on corporate loans and subsidising a wide range of consumer goods with the result that over 50% of the consumer price index is government controlled.[iii] With interest rates trapped beneath the zero bound, a rise in global rates is set to deliver a currency crisis for the yen.</p><p>Japan’s banking system is also highly leveraged, with debt to GDP levels for all their large systemically important banks of over twenty times. China has a far lower level of government debt to GDP. But its heavily indebted non-financial private sector has an estimated $27 trillion equivalent and cracks in the system are already becoming evident with the Evergrande crisis.</p><h3>Summary and conclusion</h3><p>It seems extraordinary that the link between changes in the quantities of currency and credit, epitomised by deposit-based monetary statistics, is being totally disregarded by governments, monetary authorities, and the entire investment establishment. But that is certainly the case today. And no one seems to expect much more than an increase of a few percentage points in global interest rates.</p><p>We should not be surprised, therefore, that rising prices measured by the CPI have caught the whole establishment unawares. Nor should we be surprised that the current situation continues to be analysed through a neo-Keynesian lens, when we know it has led us to the current crisis. The crisis is now of debt traps not just for the US Government, but in all the other major jurisdictions.</p><p>The Keynesian belief that government economic and monetary management is superior to free markets is set to be discredited by market reality, which can only be suppressed so far. It has led to savers being forced to accept deeply and further deepening negative yields on their bond investments. So far, they have been prepared to have their pockets picked by this means, but that cannot last. When it becomes clear that inflation of prices is only a marker for currency debasement, and that this debasement can only continue, these deeply negative rates will no longer be available to subsidise profligate government spending.</p><p>The scale of an interest rate and bond market crisis for everyone’s reserve currency appears to be severely underestimated. The sudden emergence of runaway price inflation has led to tentative comparisons being made between the current situation and the 1970s. But so far, there is little evidence that these comparisons are being taken seriously enough.</p><p>If they were, analysts would have to conclude that events in common with the 1970s which led to high nominal bond yields and coupons in UK gilts exceeding 15%, are potentially far more destabilising today than they were then. That being so, the world is on the edge of a substantial bear market in financial assets driven by global bond prices normalising from the current deeply negative real rates to levels that truly reflect deteriorating government finances. All financial asset values will be undermined by this adjustment.</p><p>It is increasingly difficult to see a way out of these difficulties, and the Keynesian hope that economic growth will deal with the debt problem is simply naïve. In 2010, respected economists (Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff) concluded that at a government debt to GDP rate of over 90% it becomes exceedingly difficult for a nation to grow its way out of its debt burden. With advanced economies averaging a ratio of 125%, Japan and Greece at over 200%, and some Eurozone nations at over 150%, there are debt traps almost everywhere ready to be sprung.</p><p>In highly indebted fiat currency economies, there can only be one outcome: once one falls into a crisis, the others will follow with accelerating currency debasements leading to the destruction of faith in their currencies as well. And with a government core debt ratio to GDP of 125%, the US with its dollars is up there with the others to be destabilised, being over-owned by foreigners, and transmitting risk to all currencies that regard the dollar as its principal reserve currency.</p><p>It can only be concluded that as we enter a new year the adjustment to market reality is likely to be more violent than anything seen in the 1970s.</p><p><strong>For the latest analysis and interpretation of the precious metal markets, be sure to subscribe to </strong><a href="https://www.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights"><strong>Goldmoney Insights.</strong></a></p><p>[i] See Figure 4 below and the accompanying commentary about debt levels</p><p>[ii] All foreign ownership statistics taken from the US treasury’s TIC figures.</p><p>[iii] See the Fed’s announcement at federalreserve.gov/feeds/h6.html</p><p>[iv] See https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ira</p><p>[v] See https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.pdf . See Table 1 on page 6: large non-financial and financial corporate deposits suffer a 50% ASF haircut.</p><p>[vi] See https://www.ft.com/content/6536113f-f509-41e2-bee0-597ed90843b6 which points out that 2020’s surge in US money supply is the highest for 150 years.</p><p>[vii] See https://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/f1.1</p><p>[viii] See Growth in a time of debt, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff: American Economic Review —Papers and proceedings 100 (May 2010) pp 573 — 578</p><p>[ix] Financial Times 23 December 2021.</p><p>[x]See Mises Wire, Japan’s inflation is hidden behind central bank-financed subsidies by Taiki Murai and Gunther Schnabl —3 January 2022</p><p>The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect those of Goldmoney, unless expressly stated. The article is for general information purposes only and does not constitute either Goldmoney or the author(s) providing you with legal, financial, tax, investment, or accounting advice. You should not act or rely on any information contained in the article without first seeking independent professional advice. Care has been taken to ensure that the information in the article is reliable; however, Goldmoney does not represent that it is accurate, complete, up-to-date and/or to be taken as an indication of future results and it should not be relied upon as such. Goldmoney will not be held responsible for any claim, loss, damage, or inconvenience caused as a result of any information or opinion contained in this article and any action taken as a result of the opinions and information contained in this article is at your own risk.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7fec27a6a45f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney/money-supply-and-rising-interest-rates-7fec27a6a45f">Money supply and rising interest rates</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney">Goldmoney</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Gold and silver prospects for 2022]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/goldmoney/gold-and-silver-prospects-for-2022-e74f47dc5dfe?source=rss----18b9cc76e9e5---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Goldmoney]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 25 Dec 2021 09:29:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-12-25T09:29:51.363Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*8ewKoFoAQRiMvWMOIjGM1A@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>By Alasdair Macleod</p><p><strong>It has been a disappointing year for profit-seeking precious metal investors, but for those few of us looking to accumulate gold and silver as the ultimate insurance against runaway inflation it has been an unexpected bonus.</strong></p><p>After reviewing the current year to gain a perspective for 2022, this article summarises the outlook for the dollar, the euro, and their financial systems. The key issue is the interest rate outlook, and how that will impact financial markets, which are wholly unprepared for the consequences of the massive expansions of currency and credit over the last two years.</p><p>We look briefly at geopolitical factors and conclude that Presidents Putin and Xi have assessed President Biden and his administration to be fundamentally weak. Putin is now driving a wedge between the US and the UK on one side and the pusillanimous, disorganised EU nations on the other, using energy supplies and the massing of troops on the Ukrainian border as levers to apply pressure. Either the situation escalates to an invasion of Ukraine (unlikely) or America backs off under pressure from the EU. Meanwhile, China will continue to build its presence in the South China Sea and its global influence through its silk roads. Less appreciated is that China and Russia continue to accumulate gold and are ditching the dollar.</p><p>And finally, we look at silver, which is set to become the star performer against fiat currencies, driven by a combination of poor liquidity, ESG-driven industrial demand and investor realisation that its price has much catching up to do compared with lithium, uranium, and copper. The potential for a fiat currency collapse is thrown in for nothing.</p><h3>2021 — That was the year that was</h3><p>This year has been disappointing for precious metals investors. Figure 1 shows how gold and silver have performed since 31 December 2020.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/869/1*dIGKZp3iP6bkdI2ImllJfA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Having lost as much as 11.3%, gold is down 6.5%. And silver, which at one stage was down 19.3% is down 15%. Admittedly these returns followed strong gains in 2020, so 2021 could be described as a year of consolidation.</p><p>But this outcome was counterintuitive, given the monetary background. Total assets of the five major central banks (Fed, ECB, BoJ, PBoC and BoE) rose from $20.4bn to $32.5bn between February 2020 and today, which works out at an average annualised increase of 32% for each of two years on the trot. Since 2006, total assets for these central banks have increased by 500%.</p><p>Since February 2020, US M2 money supply has increased at an annualised rate of 20.2%, for nearly two successive years, and now stands at over 90% of GDP, having started the millennium at 44.4% of GDP. But as will be demonstrated later in this article, adjusted for the temporary withdrawal of liquidity through reverse repos, the true quantity of M2 money is practically 100% of GDP.</p><p>Without doubt, there is a surfeit of dollars and similar excesses of all other major currencies in circulation, a global condition which has worsened considerably since March 2020. The rate of inflation of currency and credit has never been so high on a global basis, ever. Yet gold and silver hardly reflected it.</p><p>Behind it all is the fatal but common mistake to fail to connect rising prices with currency debasement. No statements from any of the major central banks on monetary policy have mentioned the quantity of currency, only the consequences for prices and interest rates. And there is a broad consensus between central banks that rising interest rates are to be deployed only in the last resort. The right to issue as much currency as central banks desire will remain sacrosanct. That prices are rising above the common target level of 2% and will remain there must be denied.</p><p>For now, ovine investors accept this narrative unquestioningly. Officialdom is also wrongly committed to inflationary policies to increase the GDP total. Policymakers, establishment economists, and investment strategists alike fail to understand that increases in GDP are not indicative of an improvement in economic conditions — progress is intangible and unquantifiable. GDP is only a reflection of the quantity of currency and credit in the economy. The remarkable recovery from the collapse in GDP in 2020 was not an economic recovery; it was simply a reflection of ramped-up unproductive government deficit spending. And the savings ratio which shot up was no more than a temporary reservoir of stimmy-inflated bank deposits. What should worry us all is that no one in charge of economic and monetary policy, let alone the wider public, appears to understand this basic error.</p><p>It is not in their interest to do so, because take away GDP and the entire argument for state intervention collapses. For this reason, the commitment to monetary inflation must be total. We can conclude, to paraphrase Noël Coward, “Hurray-hurray-hurray, Inflation’s here to stay!”[i]</p><p>The antipathy to recognising this fundamental error is behind the confused market response to inflationary conditions — with the notable exception perhaps of cryptocurrency enthusiasts. But even for them, the inflation argument only goes so far as to recognise the difference between an open-ended facility to issue national currencies and the hard restrictions on the issue of bitcoin. No hodler has yet to come up with a convincing explanation of how bitcoin will replace failed fiat currencies as a widely accepted medium of exchange. It has been this confusion over what money truly is and the difference between money and fiat currency which in 2021 has suppressed a wider interest in physical gold and silver.</p><p>To this confusion has been added structural changes in the banking system with the introduction of Basel 3’s net stable funding ratio. Most banks now must comply with the NSFR, with the notable exception of UK banks so far, until that is, the New Year. The intention is to ensure that bank liabilities are stable with respect to the funding of assets, thereby lessening the risk of financing instabilities and their systemic consequences. Under the new rules a bank that maintains principal positions in derivatives of all types must accept a financing penalty. And even if a bank finds that dealing in derivatives is so profitable that it is worth paying the penalty, its management is unlikely to freely embrace business lines that could adversely affect its reputation with the regulators.</p><p>2021 was therefore a year when banks attempted to moderate their positions in derivatives as the NSFR was introduced, actions that are likely to continue into 2022. Bullion banks will want to cut their liabilities to unallocated precious metals’ deposit accounts — that can be done simply by varying account terms. But taking the short side of regulated futures contracts cannot be negated by the stroke of a pen. They must be closed or the NSFR penalty tolerated. My guess is that bankers will initially restrict their derivative positions to regulated futures markets because they can more easily be defended from a reputational standpoint.</p><p>Compared with London’s OTC forward and swaps, Comex’s regulated futures are by far the smaller market, approximately one eighth the size. And as banks reduce their derivative exposure, the withering of forward markets can be expected to unlock hidden physical demand. Physical commodities, including precious metals, are unregulated, but an unallocated bank account tied to a commodity price is. This might not trouble investors managing their own money, but any regulated investment manager holding unallocated gold deposits on behalf of clients will lose that facility. And if a manager wishes to retain price exposure, he will be forced to buy ETFs or persuade his compliance officer to sign off on an allocated physical investment instead.</p><p>As London’s forwards market shrinks, the structure of Comex, whereby the Swaps category and banks operating within the Producer/Merchant/Processor/User category are classified as non-speculators, when they are in fact speculators and not genuine hedgers, should come under increased scrutiny. The trigger for such a debate is likely to be an overall loss of market liquidity as the London market diminishes, leading to greater price volatility and severe price backwardations as derivative supply dries up. And while we can point to the effects of Basel 3 on precious metals, we must not ignore the consequences for other commodities and energy contracts. Following the recent global fiat currency debasements, many commodity contracts have been in persistent backwardation. The reduction of derivative liquidity is sure to aggravate physical shortages for commodities generally and inflate their prices further.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/929/1*CtsbhkO3aD1hUddC1q2yTA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>For policy planners in the central banks, these changes could hardly come at a worse time. Renewed rises in raw material and commodity prices will lead to a rational expectation of a far greater fall in state currencies’ purchasing power at the consumer level than has occurred so far. It appears therefore, that the fall in the purchasing power of the dollar and of other currencies has barely started.</p><h3>Inflation outlook for the US dollar</h3><p>First, we must define inflation: it is the increase in the quantity of money, currency, and credit, generally taken to be represented by total deposit liabilities in the banking system. It is not an increase in prices. Changes in the general price level is the consequence of a combination in changes of the quantity of deposit currency and changes in the level of the public’s retention of deposit currency relative to their possession of goods. We can record deposits statistically, but cannot quantify human behaviour.</p><p>But even statistics cannot be taken at face value. Deposit liquidity is managed by central bank intervention using repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements (repos and RRPs respectively). By entering into a repo transaction, in return for collateral held as security a central bank injects liquidity into the financial system, increasing large deposits held at the banks. The liquidity crisis in September 2019 was dealt with in this way when the Fed’s overnight repos rocketed up to a record $80bn.</p><p>By entering into RRPs, a central bank removes liquidity from the financial system. Both repos and RRPs are temporary in nature, mostly being overnight in duration. Being temporary, we must adjust M2 money supply by subtracting repos from it and adding in reverse repos for a truer picture. The outcome is illustrated in Figure 3.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/920/1*L5fU3g6bdU1By6gWL2jhzw@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Repo balances had diminished to zero by July 2020, and RRPs only became significant last April. Together, these explain the deviation of the blue line from M2 (the red line) since December 2019. Taking the most recent RRP number of $1,748bn, the adjusted M2 level becomes approximately $23,100bn, an increase of 48.2%, or 24.1% annualised for two successive years.[ii]</p><p>The excess liquidity currently hidden in RRPs is the consequence of unfunded government deficit spending. It is government spending which ends up as surplus deposits in the banking system without them being offset by public subscriptions for government debt. Quantitative easing contributes to the problem, giving deposit money to pension funds and insurance companies in return for securities that end up on the Fed’s balance sheet.</p><p>The effect of this inflation on prices is still working through the US economy. It is important to appreciate that the inflation of bank deposits is the primary cause for the increase in raw material, production and consumer costs and prices, and not supply chain disruptions. Central bankers are being disingenuous when they insist that rising prices are a temporary phenomenon. The expansion of deposits and excess liquidity, particularly since last April, tells us that even without changes in the public’s level of retention of currency relative to goods, there is a considerable loss of the dollar’s purchasing power yet to come. And neo-Keynesian arguments that faltering demand will restore the balance between supply and demand for consumer goods are incorrect.</p><p>We therefore enter 2022 with the prospect of further increases in the rates of production cost and consumer price increases. That interest rates will begin to rise significantly is guaraanteed. Already, with the US CPI recording an annual increase of 6.8%, establishment investors are accepting a negative real yield on the 10-year US Treasury of 5.4%. And for those who follow John Williams’ Shadowstats.com, which calculates consumer price rises “Consistent with the methodologies of pre-1980 headline CPI reporting” at 14.9%, the real yield on the 10-year bond is minus 13.5%![iii]</p><p>How far interest rates will rise in the coming months is not yet clear, but it is likely that they will rise substantially more and sooner than is currently discounted. Furthermore, the tapering of QE is planned to be accelerated, reducing in a roundabout way the support to government funding from the Fed. Without that support, markets will almost certainly demand lower negative real yields on Treasuries at the least, forcing nominal yields considerably higher. The shock of a move towards market reality could be immense and unexpected.</p><p>Higher nominal yields on bonds mean significant investment losses for bond portfolios, and the basis for equity valuations will also be badly undermined. A substantial bear market in all financial assets is becoming more certain by the day. Furthermore, higher borrowing costs will threaten the zombie corporations unable to earn sufficient returns on their borrowings. It is a situation the Fed has tried to avoid, using QE to sustain low bond yields and high market values.</p><p>Having decided to reduce the monthly QE stimulus, a bear market in financial assets has been made more certain. To counter the effect, the Fed will probably end up increasing QE again to support market prices, as they did in March 2020. But QE and a return to it is blatant currency printing which can only serve to undermine the dollar’s purchasing power even further and eventually require yet higher bond yield compensation: it is no more than a temporary sticking plaster on a suppurating wound.</p><p>A developing slump in economic activity from higher nominal interest rates will also add to the Federal Government’s deficit by reducing tax income and increasing welfare spending. In any contemporary administration, particularly the Biden one, there is no mandate to address this problem and we must assume at this distance that it can only be resolved by further debt being issued at increasingly higher yields.</p><p>The situation resembles that faced by an earlier proto-Keynesian, John Law in 1720. To sustain his Mississippi bubble, he supported the share price by freely issuing his livre currency to buy stock in the market, which he could do as controller of the currency. It was not long before the livre’s purchasing power was undermined entirely.</p><p>As the current situation for the dollar unfolds, its purchasing power is set to decline similarly to the French livre of three centuries ago. But there is also an ugly systemic problem in the commercial banking network, for which to appreciate we must turn our attention to Europe.</p><h3>The looming collapse of the euro</h3><p>Like the Fed, the ECB is resisting interest rate increases despite producer and consumer prices soaring. Consumer price inflation across the Eurozone was most recently recorded at 4.9%, making the real yield on Germany’s 5-year bond minus 5.5%. But Germany’s producer prices for October rose 19.2% compared with a year ago. There can be no doubt that producer prices have yet to feed fully into consumer prices, and that rising consumer prices have much further to go, reflecting the acceleration of the ECB’s currency debasement in recent years.[iv]</p><p>Therefore, in real terms, not only are negative rates already increasing, but they will go even further into record negative territory due to rising producer and consumer prices. Unless it abandons the euro to its fate on the foreign exchanges altogether, the ECB will be forced to permit its deposit rate to rise from its current —0.5% to offset the euro’s depreciation. And given the sheer scale of recent monetary expansion, euro interest rates will have to rise considerably to have any stabilising effect.</p><p>The euro shares this problem with the dollar. But even if interest rates increased only into modestly positive territory, the ECB would have to quicken the pace of its monetary creation just to keep highly indebted Eurozone member governments afloat. The foreign exchanges are bound to recognise the developing situation, punishing the euro if the ECB fails to raise rates and punishing it if it does. The euro’s fall won’t be limited to exchange rates against other currencies, which to varying degrees face similar dilemmas, but it will be particularly acute measured against prices for commodities and essential products. Arguably, the euro’s derating on the foreign exchanges has already commenced.</p><p>But there is an additional factor not generally appreciated, and that is the sheer size of the euro’s repo market and the danger to it that rising interest rates presents. Demand for collateral against which to obtain liquidity has led to significant monetary expansion, with the repo market acting not as a marginal liquidity management tool as is the case in other banking systems, but as an accumulating source of credit. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which is of an ICMA survey of 58 leading institutions in the euro system.[v]</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/861/1*3eRLgu5QsXFcSOSe-IcATQ@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>The total for this form of short-term financing grew to €8.31 trillion in outstanding contracts by December 2019. The collateral includes everything from government bonds and bills to pre-packaged commercial bank debt. According to the ICMA survey, double counting, whereby repos are offset by reverse repos, is minimal. This is important when one considers that a reverse repo is the other side of a repo, so that with repos being additional to the reverse repos recorded, the sum of the two is a valid measure of the size of the repo market. The value of repos transacted with central banks as part of official monetary policy operations were not included in the survey and continue to be “very substantial”. But repos with central banks in the ordinary course of financing are included.[vi]</p><p>Today, even excluding central bank repos connected with monetary policy operations, this figure almost certainly exceeds €10 trillion by a significant margin, given the accelerated monetary expansion since the ICMA survey, and when one allows for participants beyond the 58 dealers recorded. An important element of this market is interest rates, which with the ECB’s deposit rate sitting at minus 0.5% means Eurozone cash can be freely obtained by the banks at no cost.</p><p>The zero cost of repo cash raises the question of the consequences if the ECB’s deposit rate is forced back into positive territory. The repo market will likely contract in size, which is tantamount to a decrease in outstanding bank credit. Banks would then be forced to liquidate balance sheet assets, which would drive all negative bond yields into positive territory, and higher, accelerating the contraction of bank credit even further as collateral values collapse. Moreover, the contraction of bank credit implied by the withdrawal of repo finance will almost certainly have the knock-on effect of rapidly triggering a liquidity crisis in a banking cohort with exceptionally high balance sheet gearing.</p><p>There is a further issue to consider over collateral quality. While the US Fed only accepts very high-quality securities as repo collateral, with the Eurozone’s national banks and the ECB almost anything is accepted — it had to be when Greece and the other PIGS were bailed out. And the hidden bailouts of Italian banks by bundling dodgy loans into repo collateral was the way they were removed from national bank balance sheets and hidden in the TARGET2 system</p><p>The result is that the first repos not to be renewed by commercial counterparties are those whose collateral is bad or doubtful. We have no knowledge how much is involved. But given the incentive for national regulators in the PIGS to have deemed non-performing loans to be creditworthy so that they could act as repo collateral, the amounts will be considerable. Having accepted this bad collateral, national central banks will be unable to reject them for fear of triggering a banking crisis in their own jurisdictions. Furthermore, they are likely to be forced to accept additional repo collateral if it is rejected by commercial counterparties and bank failures are to be prevented.</p><p>The numbers involved are larger than the ECB and national central banks’ combined balance sheets.</p><p>The crisis from rising interest rates in the Eurozone will be different from that facing US dollar markets. With the Eurozone’s global systemically important banks (the G-SIBs) geared up to thirty times measured by assets to balance sheet equity, rising bond yields of little more than a few per cent will likely collapse the entire euro system, spreading systemic risk to Japan, where its G-SIBs are similarly geared, the UK and Switzerland and then the US and China which have the least operationally geared banking systems.</p><p>It will require the major central banks to mount the largest banking system rescue ever seen, dwarfing the Lehman crisis. The required expansion of currency and credit by the central bank network is unimaginable and comes in addition to the massive monetary expansion of the last two years. The collapse in purchasing power of the entire fiat currency system is therefore in prospect, along with the values of everything that depends upon it. The only sure-fire escape for the ordinary person is to physically possess the money of history that cannot be corrupted, and to which when the state theory of money is disproved yet again, becomes the only acceptable medium of exchange. That is physical gold and silver.</p><h3>Geopolitical factors</h3><p>This millennium, Kipling’s “Great Game” moved from the Central Asia of the nineteenth century and the Middle East to become truly global, with America and its close five-eyes allies on one side, and a coalition of China and Russia on the other. It also happens that the two protagonists are on different sides in the matter of money and currencies, with China and Russia having seized control over the world’s physical gold while America insists gold has no role in modern currency systems.</p><p>Elsewhere, I have reasoned that China has secretly accumulated enormous quantities of gold, likely to be at least 20,000 tonnes, possibly even more, and its citizens have also accumulated a further 17,000 tonnes.</p><p>Briefly, the evidence is as follows. The Peoples’ Bank was mandated to acquire and manage the state’s gold and silver resources by regulation in 1983, an extension of its foreign exchange monopoly. Consequently, the PBOC had a clear run-in accumulating gold during the 1981–2002 bear market while China’s citizens were banned from owning both metals. In 2002, the Shanghai Gold Exchange was established and the ban on gold and silver ownership by the public was lifted. The Communist Party even advertised the benefits of owning precious gold, developing significant levels of public demand — hence public ownership estimated at 17,000 tonnes.</p><p>At the same time the State invested heavily in mining and refining. Consequently, from virtually nowhere China became the largest gold mining nation by far and has maintained that position ever since. No gold was permitted to be exported, and the only Chinese refined bars ending up at the Swiss refineries have been very few and believed to have been smuggled.</p><p>While we cannot be certain of the numbers, the evidence that the Communist Party has prioritised the accumulation of gold, and to a lesser extent perhaps silver, and now exercises a high degree of monopolistic control over Asian gold markets is irrefutable.</p><p>Similarly, President Putin has also prioritised the accumulation of gold, though his reasoning was partly driven by American and IMF sanctions in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Russia’s strategic vulnerability is in the payment for her energy sales, which is overwhelmingly in dollars — the currency of her enemy. Furthermore, under the correspondent banking system, the US has source intelligence of every dollar that is held by Russia and of all her dollar transactions. Putin’s response has been to unload dollars acquired through energy and commodity exports in favour of gold and other currencies.</p><p>Russia’s political strategy is to allay herself closely with China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and other Asian political groupings, to jointly control the Eurasian landmass, and therefore the bulk of the world’s population. As the swing energy provider to Western Europe, Russia is driving a wedge between America and the UK on one side, and their NATO partners on the other. Currently, she is sabre-rattling on Ukraine’s eastern flank, but the intention is more likely to exploit the interests of EU member nations and remove the EU from the US’s sphere of influence.</p><p>Similarly, China is rattling her sabres over Taiwan and the South China Sea. This is also designed to bring pressure to bear on America. The common factor is Russian and Chinese assessments of the Biden administration, which they appear to believe to be fundamentally weak.</p><p>With respect to gold and silver, we can summarise the current geopolitical position as follows. Between them, Russia, China, and their Asian allies have gone a long way towards cornering the world’s physical gold markets. They are now testing the Biden administration, and Putin has a clear intention to isolate America from Western Europe. Meanwhile, the Fed is pursuing monetary policies which, unless reversed (for which there is no conceivable mandate) will inevitably hand economic power to China and Russia because of their gold-friendly policies. And if America and her allies cut up rough, through their joint domination of physical gold and its markets, China and Russia have the means to destroy the unbacked, fiat dollar.</p><h3>Silver</h3><p>Silver appears to be badly mispriced. There are several factors that can only lead to this conclusion.</p><p>According to the Silver Institute, physical supply in 2021 increased over a depressed 2020 by 8% to 1,056 million ounces but remains below the output for 2014–2016. Meanwhile demand is up 15% this year at 1,033m oz leaving a marginal surplus of just 23m oz. The question obviously arises concerning demand patterns over the next few years at a time of accelerating investment in non-fossil fuel energy and electricity. For silver, increasing demand for electric vehicles and upgrading of mobile networks to 5G can be added to photovoltaic demand. Forecasting the balance of supply and demand is always difficult for silver because of substantial and unforeseen changes in usage (remember photography?), but it seems reasonable to assume that silver will be one of an elite group of beneficiaries from global environmental policies.</p><p>The mining industry faces additional cost burdens in many countries as they adjust their operations to comply with environmental, social and governance (ESG) regulations and guidance. International miners will be hampered in fund raising if they don’t comply, even for their mines in countries which have yet to formulate their ESG policies to Western standards. Higher costs such as those imposed by ESG compliance can be expected to force mines to extract higher grades to maintain cash flow, so only higher prices rising faster than costs will impart any value to lower grade ores. The effect of ESG is therefore likely to downgrade longer term mine supply forecasts.</p><p>Lithium Uranium and copper, three of the other beneficiaries of ESG, saw their prices rise in 2021. Lithium Carbonate prices are up 520% since January, Uranium rose 54%, while copper rose 25% on top of a strong post-March 2020 rise. In silver’s case, a swing factor is investment in ETFs which for the last decade has varied between 200–300m oz. By way of contrast with lithium uranium and copper, the silver price declined this year by 15%.</p><p>But as a measure of total interest, physical silver demand is the tip of a far larger derivative iceberg. According to the Bank for International Settlements, outstanding forwards and swaps total roughly 3750m oz equivalent between bullion banks, and there are further liabilities between banks and their depositors with unallocated accounts. In addition, there are 715m paper ounces in the regulated Comex silver contract, which with other regulated exchanges suggests that there are at least 4,500m oz of added long positions in derivatives, which is 20 times estimated net physical investment demand for this year. And that ignores regulated and unregulated options.[vii]</p><p>While it appears that industrial demand for silver is set to increase significantly, the pricing of silver in fiat currencies at one eightieth that of gold is also anomalous at a time of accelerating price inflation, more correctly understood as currency debasement. Mismanagement of monetary policies now virtually guarantees the death of fiat currencies, and the only salvation will be to replace or change them into credible gold substitutes, because most central banks have at least some gold in their reserves.</p><p>That being so, physical silver will reacquire a monetary role as supporting coinage. Its abundance in the earth relative to gold is said to be less than ten times, and its historical relationship under bimetallic standards was approximately fifteen to one. The demise of fiat currencies is likely to guide the gold-silver ratio towards these ratios, so the current ratio of eighty times is a blatant anomaly.</p><p>In the absence of an immediate crisis for the fiat currency regime, changes to the way banks treat derivatives for balance sheet purposes are likely to lead to a contraction of open positions. The introduction of the net stable funding ratio under Basel 3 regulations is designed to curtail derivative risk generally. The withdrawal over time of banks from trading activities because of the NSFR will reduce liquidity in both OTC and regulated derivatives, leading to greater price volatility. And the contraction of paper silver outstanding is likely to translate diminishing paper supply into increased physical demand.</p><p>Anecdotal evidence is that order books for silver from the refiners currently run into the middle of 2022, with large industrial consumers scrambling to secure supplies. Any surge in monetary demand is therefore set to have a disproportionate effect on silver prices to the upside.</p><h3>Summary and outlook</h3><p>The year just ending has been a bad one for investors in precious metals, but stackers expecting the next financial crisis will be rejoicing at the unexpected windfall from bullion banks suppressing prices. Naïve investors, if they had a rudimentary understanding of monetary inflation, were directed into cryptocurrencies, leaving gold and silver to those seeking genuine protection from upcoming monetary and economic developments. Furthermore, policy planners and their epigones managing markets have demonstrated a reluctance to embrace the facts about inflation or alternatively are simply clueless.</p><p>The establishment has provided a window of opportunity for ordinary folk to insure against the financial and economic events now so obviously ahead of them. Those who have a grasp of basic economics and deploy common sense understand that interest rates will now rise, and soon. And with extraordinarily high negative bond yields, financial markets are more mispriced for this eventuality than in any time in recorded history.</p><p>There can be little doubt in dealing with the inevitable market shock ahead that central banks will continue to issue increasing quantities of their currencies in a vain attempt to stabilise their economies and to ensure government deficits are covered. And with the increasingly likely collapse of the Eurosystem and its commercial banks, we can expect a “whatever it takes” inflationary response from the ECB.</p><p>As their world collapses around them, central bankers will act like bulls in a china shop, destroying their credibility and currencies even more as their panic increases. Against this background, buyers of physical gold and silver will do so not because they expect to profit from it, but to preserve something from the chaos in prospect, which will be triggered by rising, and then soaring interest rates as currency time preferences escalate and their purchasing power collapses.</p><p><strong>For the latest analysis and interpretation of the precious metal markets, be sure to subscribe to </strong><a href="https://www.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights"><strong>Goldmoney Insights.</strong></a></p><p>[i] From “There are bad times just around the corner”. The couplet was that misery’s here to stay but it is an apt description of the effects of inflation.</p><p>[ii] At the time of writing M2 for November had not been released. It is therefore assumed to have risen moderately from the October figure.</p><p>[iii] See FLASH (Dec 10) at www.shadowstats.com</p><p>[iv] The Eurosystem’s balance sheet, that is the ECB’s plus those of the national central banks, has increased from €4,500bn in December 2019 to € 8,500bn today.</p><p>[v] ICMA European repo market survey No. 38.</p><p>[vi] The Euro system’s combined central banking balance sheet shows “Securities held for monetary policy purposes” totalling €3.694 trillion, and “Liabilities to euro area credit institutions related to monetary policy operations…” totalling €3.489 trillion at end-2020. Repo and reverse repo transactions are included in these numbers, and on the liability side represent an increase of 93% over 2019. It is evidence of escalating liquidity support for commercial banks, much of which is through repo markets, evidence that outstanding repos are considerably higher than at the time of the ICMA survey referenced above.</p><p>[vii] See BIS OTC derivative totals at https://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/d5.2</p><p><em>The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect those of Goldmoney, unless expressly stated. The article is for general information purposes only and does not constitute either Goldmoney or the author(s) providing you with legal, financial, tax, investment, or accounting advice. You should not act or rely on any information contained in the article without first seeking independent professional advice. Care has been taken to ensure that the information in the article is reliable; however, Goldmoney does not represent that it is accurate, complete, up-to-date and/or to be taken as an indication of future results and it should not be relied upon as such. Goldmoney will not be held responsible for any claim, loss, damage, or inconvenience caused as a result of any information or opinion contained in this article and any action taken as a result of the opinions and information contained in this article is at your own risk.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e74f47dc5dfe" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney/gold-and-silver-prospects-for-2022-e74f47dc5dfe">Gold and silver prospects for 2022</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney">Goldmoney</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The credit cycle and zombies’ downfall]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/goldmoney/the-credit-cycle-and-zombies-downfall-28c67497bf19?source=rss----18b9cc76e9e5---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/28c67497bf19</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Goldmoney]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Dec 2021 08:06:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-12-17T08:06:13.939Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*U8S8RCAoIJZRI3UYT5gKxg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>By Alasdair Macleod</p><p><strong>Leading central banks like to think that through careful interest rate management, they have tamed the economic cycles which lead to regular economic downturns. Instead, they have only managed to bury the evidence.</strong></p><p>To appreciate the extent of their delusion one must understand the source of economic instability. In modern times it has always been driven by a cycle of bank credit. In this article the role of commercial banking in this regard is explained. The effect on non-financial economic sectors in the context of Hayek’s triangle under today’s currency regime is re-examined.</p><p>With cyclical variations in the economy buried under a tsunami of currency, market participants are oblivious to the dangers of a cyclical downturn in bank lending and the consequences that flow therefrom.</p><p>This article gives the problem its economic and monetary context. It concludes that the global banking system is horribly over-leveraged and, with empirical evidence as our guide, on the edge of a bank credit contraction of historic proportions, likely to undermine the entire fiat currency system.</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Readers of articles that dissent from the mainstream media’s complacency might be aware that there are many zombie corporations which only exist courtesy of low interest rates or government support. The story often goes further. These are businesses loaded to the gunwales with unproductive debt, vulnerable to being swamped and sunk by higher interest rates. The extent of the problem is undoubtedly greater than most people think.</p><p>We have arrived at this point with economies around the globe cluttered with unproductive businesses which would otherwise have been cleared out in an unsuppressed interest rate environment. Schumpeter’s process of creative destruction would have done its work. Without it, the current situation presents enormous dangers now that with price inflation rising, interest rates will almost certainly increase in the coming months. Central banks appear to be conscious of this danger, given their evident reluctance to permit rates to rise, even fractionally. Rising interest rates also blow holes in their narrative, that they have succeeded in managing economic cycles out of existence.</p><h3>Austrian business cycle theory</h3><p>It appears that central bankers and their advisors are unaware of Austrian business cycle theory or deem it irrelevant. While the effect is manifest over an economic cycle, the root of it is credit expansion, and I’ve always maintained that for this reason it should be described as a credit cycle — a repetitive cycle of bank credit expansion and contraction, rather than as a trade cycle (Mises) or a business cycle (modern Austrians). The primary cause can be firmly attributed to the human behaviour of a commercial bank cohort reacting to events and information. But bankers are not the only party involved. Austrian school economists, such as von Mises and Hayek explained how businesses were affected. And Hayek also taught us that it could be explained by means of a triangle, with production time to market for consumer goods on the x-axis and immediate consumer spending on the y-axis. the swing-factor being the ratio between immediate and deferred consumption (savings), which sent vital signals to industry about consumer behaviour. This is illustrated in Figure 1.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/859/1*dgYYYZ7ul9iu6jqZCVe91w@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>At any given time, investment is made at the expense of consumption, because investment in production is funded through savings, or consumption deferred. It therefore follows that an increase in savings leads to a fall in consumer spending and an increased availability of capital. In turn, other things being equal, the increased supply of capital reduces interest rates, fundamentally altering business calculations.</p><p>Simplistically, the longer it takes for a product to be produced, the higher the cost of financing its production. A pre-existing production facility can be financed in cashflow terms by current production; but a new production proposal takes time to set up, which until the final product is rolling off the production line can take several years. Reducing the interest rate, which is the consequence of increased savings, allows an entrepreneur to consider longer-term business strategies, such as the building of a completely new factory rather than adapting an existing facility.</p><p>The longer timeframe permitted by higher savings levels is illustrated by the pecked line in Figure 1. On an economy-wide basis, the whole production profile of a nation changes, placing greater emphasis on earlier stages of production and less on the final. Thus, sales of intermediate production goods and technology aimed at improving product quality and reducing costs benefit relative to retailing, which suffers from the fall in direct consumption. Even in these inflationary times, a grasp of the Hayekian concept explains the relative post-war successes of the German and Japanese economies, which relative to the Anglo-Saxons were savings-driven economies versus the Keynesian policy of waging war on savings.</p><p>In today’s heavily financialised world, perhaps Hayek’s triangle might seem less relevant than the sounder monetary background to the 1930s when Hayek was teaching at the London School of Economics. Furthermore, increasing quantities of bank credit are now taken up by consumers themselves. And industrial financing has shifted in recent credit cycles from a dependency on bank credit and corporate bonds to equity participation, facilitated by the evolution of financial markets over the last forty years.</p><p>In addition to these evolutionary changes in bank lending there has been the expansion of base money by the central banks, and on this current credit cycle, banks have increasingly expanded credit in favour of the state as opposed to commercial debt.</p><p>The world of currencies and credit has evolved from the days when there was a gold standard of sorts, and people behaved as if their currencies were fundamentally sound. That was when Hayek devised his triangle to explain the Austrian theory of business cycles. Even though there have been significant changes in the economic and monetary environment the motive forces driving cycles of credit still exist — it’s just that they are somewhat different.</p><p>In this article I cover the various aspects of the credit cycle relevant today, looking at them from the interests of the principal economic parties involved: businesses, the commercial banks, and central banks. And with these parties, the rest of us will also be profoundly affected.</p><h3>The origin of changes in bank credit</h3><p>Like any other human, a commercial banker is driven by not only plain commercial factors but subjective ones as well. With respect to lending policies the balance of fear of losses and greed for profit varies in accordance with his view of lending risk at any one time. He also pays close attention to the actions of his competitors, cementing a high degree of groupthink into his banking strategy. Fear of losses is always greatest when there has been a downturn in the economy, putting the bank’s capital at risk. In describing a banker’s response to changing conditions, we shall use the end of a downturn in business activity as our cyclic starting point.</p><p>A commercial banker’s perception of risk changes over a complete credit cycle, and is summed in the following sequence:</p><p>At the depth of the recession a bank will be nursing bad debts which will have been magnified as losses suffered by the bank’s shareholders due to balance sheet gearing. If the bank survived the downturn, it will have been because it had restrained its operational gearing before economic conditions had fully deteriorated in the previous credit cycle. Perhaps it had called in loans before its competitors, thereby benefiting from the liquidation of loan collateral before financial asset values had materially declined. A cautious approach to lending would have led to a bank being in a strong position relative to its competitors at the bottom of the business cycle.</p><p>A process of capital reallocation from loss-making businesses to more profitable deployment begins. Company doctors, experts in insolvency work and corporate restructuring, propel this process. And those with an established track record are sought after by the banks to retrieve some value from their bad and doubtful debts. To facilitate the process, banks begin to be persuaded by company doctors to extend credit to back refinancing operations. Other than in these instances, banks are generally unwilling to extend extra credit, even in the form of short-term working capital to industrial borrowers.</p><p>The process of reallocation of capital from unprofitable to potentially more profitable restructured enterprises leads to the contraction of bank credit ceasing and the beginning of the earliest stages of its expansion. Bankers are still reluctant to make credit more widely available, but the gradual stabilisation of lending conditions leads to the first signs of lending optimism returning. Large established businesses are the first to benefit, being judged to be the least risky proposition. Financing of capital restructuring operations evolves into corporate takeover activity, which encourages stock markets to recover and ends the bear market. It is signs such as these that begin to encourage bankers to think the worst is behind them and to contemplate lending opportunities with increasing confidence.</p><p>With investment banking beginning to see a sustainable upturn in business on the back of takeover activity, normal lending for working capital purposes becomes more widely available. The previous crisis is now forgotten, and in reflecting initial increases in demand for credit, interest rates stabilise and begin to reflect a firmer tendency. Improved lending margins allow banks to begin to compete for lending business, even cutting margins to get corporate borrowers on the books in the interest of future lending and investment banking prospects. Consequently, large, and more aggressive borrowers can now shop around for the best rates for bank credit, which they were previously unable to do.</p><p>By now, on the back of increasing bank credit, economic recovery appears to be well underway. This is when more aggressive banking reaps its rewards, with banks’ share prices rising and their balance sheets expanding. Instead of having a ratio of assets to equity of perhaps five or six, banks begin to expand to eight times or even more. All bankers are doing it, and no banker can afford not to expand his balance sheet for fear of being accused by his shareholders of underperforming his peers. Confirmation bias holds full sway. Under the influence of this credit expansion, the economy appears to be increasingly strong, further encouraging bankers to throw all lending caution to the winds.</p><p>But credit expansion begins to lead to demand for production inputs that cannot be easily satisfied. Banks find that their borrowers are having to pay up for the factors of production, including raw materials, intermediate goods, and labour. The right skills are in short supply. Prices for everything have begun to rise because of supply constraints and a boom in consumer spending. The natural level of interest rates appears to be rising, and bankers begin to look for opportunities to increase their margins rather than to just compete for business. They maintain deposit balances by increasing deposit rates. Slowly, bankers begin to see risks beginning to emerge, realising that the gearing on their balance sheets now exposes their banks to potential risks from deteriorating lending conditions.</p><p>Finally, rising interest rates begin to undermine bank customers’ business models and increasing numbers of them request loan extensions and increased borrowing facilities. More prescient bankers, who have experienced several credit cycles, recognise the signs of a lending downturn early and take action to control risk exposure. Collateral values will have already begun to decline, driven by the rise in interest rates. And any borrower unable or unwilling to provide extra loan cover will be speedily foreclosed. With surprising rapidity, the lending environment changes with all bankers beginning to replace their former greed for geared profits with a new fear of losses. And as outstanding bank credit begins to contract the economic outlook begins to look exceedingly grim, with the more highly leveraged banks facing the prospect of escalating bad and doubtful debts that could require a state bail out.</p><p>It is the balance of fear and greed over the lending cycle driven by the banks’ response to the economic conditions which leads to the expansion and contraction of bank credit. The expansion of credit is as inflationary as the expansion of currency by an issuing central bank. The subsequent contraction of bank credit is suddenly deflationary. It is a cycle of remarkable consistency, both in its consequences and duration.</p><p>While we can identify common factors, the way successive cycles of bank credit expansion terminate depends on where the expansion was previously focused. In 2000–2002 it was the collapse of the dot-com bubble. In 2008–09 it was the boom and bust of residential property. Today, financial speculation evidenced by otherwise worthless cryptocurrencies and non-fungible tokens is probably at the highest levels ever recorded. This time the credit contraction is shaping up to be a wider collapse of financial assets, driven by rising interest rates undermining valuations —perhaps a repeat of the 1929–1932 bear market being the initial effect. The difference from the Wall Street crash ninety years ago is in the money: that crash happened under a sound money standard; this time currencies are pure fiat, as flaky as Germany’s paper mark in the early 1920s and unlikely to survive such a substantial economic shock.</p><h3>How relevant is the Hayekian triangle today?</h3><p>Another feature of the credit cycle that has evolved since Hayek devised his triangle is the growth of consumer debt. It has partly neutralised Hayek’s model by interfering with the simplistic ratio of consumption to savings, which through interest rates coordinates consumer demand with production. Hayek was effectively saying that a higher savings ratio was an economic signal to manufacturers of goods that those which take longer to produce will be profitable, because lower interest rates are significantly less costly for longer-term projects. And while the signal from the decline in immediate consumption was to the disadvantage of retailers and businesses close to the consumer, it would be those remoter business activities that would benefit from investment. It therefore follows that if a central bank suppresses interest rates it sends a false signal to producers, leading to malinvestments.</p><p>But a greater interference comes from state-driven currency inflation. Governments and their central banks use the expansion of fiat currency to replace savings as the source of capital in the economy. Today, the character of the credit cycle has taken on a new form, with borrowers increasingly borrowing to take advantage of the wealth transfer effect of depreciating currencies at rates which rob depositors of their purchasing power.</p><p>This is borrowing for borrowing’s sake, rather than to deploy capital for commercial purposes. In recent decades it has led to the financialisation of Western economies. And when one considers the US dollar personal savings rate illustrated in Figure 2 below, the trend increase recorded since 2005 from about 2.6% to the latest 7.3% owes more to income being put aside for speculation in financial assets and is the counterpart of consumer borrowing for speculation rather than what the classic Hayekian assumption about deferred consumption represents.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/882/1*B-sh0Y4_2GjKKMJkgYjq4Q@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>With personal savings being increasingly diverted into financial speculation, not only do Hayekian signals appear irrelevant in our corrupted currency system but increasingly we find capital for production is being sourced from the state through its monetary policies. It accords with the Concluding Notes in Keynes’s General Theory, where he expressed a wish for the euthanasia of the rentier (saver) and for “an increase in the volume of capital until it ceases to be scarce”.[i]</p><p>The consequence of undermining business calculations has been an indefinable, but no doubt substantial increase in unproductive debt. And now that fiat currency debasement has accelerated everywhere to record levels, the logic hidden behind the Hayekian triangle might come back to bite everyone. This is because time preference factors determined by markets are sure to drive interest rates up, exposing borrowers at suppressed rates as having made fatal errors in their business calculations.</p><p>Nowhere will this be truer than in jurisdictions with negative interest rates. Large corporations in the Eurozone and Switzerland have even been able to borrow at marginally negative nominal rates, an incentive for non-financial businesses to take out debt for debt’s sake instead of for productive purposes. The same will be true of Japanese corporations borrowing yen. And because of zero US dollar rates, the same is also true in the US, if only marginally less so.</p><p>Even in China, where state-managed interest rates have been kept well away from the zero bound, things are unravelling in the property sector with Evergrande, the second largest developer by sales now insolvent. Insolvencies in property development are a reliable signal of the end of a bank credit cycle, confirming its timing, at least in China. State control over private sector activity is far greater than in Western democracies and the Communist Party has greater control over outcomes. Whether they manage to supress the evidence of the end of the credit cycle in China should not fool us: on a global basis the financial system is set up for a contraction in outstanding bank credit.</p><p>The falling economic tide waits for no man, exposing him to the consequences of earlier actions. Rising interest rates will turn the bank credit cycle into its contraction phase, exposing unproductive borrowing indiscriminately. Zombie corporations will no longer walk the earth but be forced into their graves. We must then consider the time-honoured effects on the banks, which have unwisely expanded their credit on the back of central bank and bank regulators assurances that it has been safe to do so. Table 1 below shows the relationship between total assets and equity for the global systemically important banks — the G-SIBs — the largest international banks most capable of spreading a global banking crisis beyond their home jurisdictions. It should be noted that the thousands of smaller more domestically oriented banks around the world will include some with even higher leverage ratios.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/679/1*7sUic2EZfd32fti3mf-b8Q@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>The high level of gearing for many of these major banks is ignored in US-centric commentary because, in general terms, US banks are less geared than in other jurisdictions. Furthermore, with the exceptions of Wells Fargo and Citi, US G-SIBs have a price to book ratio of more than one, which indicates that markets, with these two possible exceptions, are not immediately concerned about the banking sector’s financial health.</p><p>The same cannot be said of Eurozone G-SIBs. With banks sporting asset to equity ratios of up to thirty times (Credit Agricole), only one (ING Groep) is close to book value, while the others are at deep discounts, market ratings that seriously question their survivability.</p><p>China’s G-SIBs are slightly more geared than those of the US, but their shares are at substantial discounts to book value. China appears to have acted to curb speculation in financial markets, and furthermore these banks are an extension of the state. The deep discount to book value probably reflects these factors as well as the likely kleptocracy of the state in the event of a financial crisis.</p><p>Japan’s three G-SIBs are the most highly leveraged as a group and they have price to book ratios of about 44%, a worryingly deep discount. British banks are similarly of concern and the two Swiss banks are also highly leveraged.</p><p>As we have seen in our analysis of bankers’ crowd psychology above, the turn of the credit cycle will undoubtedly lead to a swift change in bankers’ attitudes. There can be no doubt that they will seek to reduce their balance sheet gearing to as little as possible in a stampede to protect their shareholders. The collapse of Evergrande in China indicates that the state-controlled banks there, if they were operating in the same market and regulatory conditions of their G-SIB counterparts, are already on the edge of a bank credit contraction. This is not yet a visible condition elsewhere.</p><p>Prices of commodities, labour, intermediate products, goods, and services are rising everywhere. As I write, it is announced that the US producer price index has risen 9.6% year-on-year. Last week we heard that the US consumer price all-items index rose 6.8% in the year to end-November. These figures represent a fall in the dollar’s purchasing power, and when taken in conjunction with evidence that they under-represent the true situation there can only be one outcome: the markets will force interest rates to rise, or else the purchasing power of the dollar and other fiat currencies will accelerate the pace of their loss of purchasing power.</p><h3>Where the downturn in bank credit leads</h3><p>There can be no doubt that with interest rates around the world rising from negative and zero rates, credit conditions will be changed substantially. And with a preponderance of zombie corporations the world over, bankers will become acutely aware of the risks. It will not be long before loans are called in, and collateral sold into the markets.</p><p>This article concludes that with rising interest rates now inevitable, they will lead to a bear market in financial assets, which can only accelerate the contraction of bank credit. The operational gearing in global G-SIBs is at record levels and is truly alarming. There must be no doubt that higher interest rates and the scramble to contain the fall-out will make the collapse of Austria’s Credit-Anstalt in May 1931 seem a relatively minor failure in comparison.</p><p>We also must not doubt that the reaction of the monetary authorities will be to rescue failing banks because they have no alternative. The consequences are that the central banks will be damned if they do and damned if they don’t. Therefore, anyone wholly committed to preserving wealth in the fiat currency system risks losing everything and should take out some insurance by owning some real uncorruptible money — physical gold and silver.</p><p><strong>For the latest analysis and interpretation of the precious metal markets, be sure to subscribe to </strong><a href="https://www.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights"><strong>Goldmoney Insights.</strong></a></p><p>[i] See Keynes’s The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Concluding Notes II.</p><p><em>The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect those of Goldmoney, unless expressly stated. The article is for general information purposes only and does not constitute either Goldmoney or the author(s) providing you with legal, financial, tax, investment, or accounting advice. You should not act or rely on any information contained in the article without first seeking independent professional advice. Care has been taken to ensure that the information in the article is reliable; however, Goldmoney does not represent that it is accurate, complete, up-to-date and/or to be taken as an indication of future results and it should not be relied upon as such. Goldmoney will not be held responsible for any claim, loss, damage, or inconvenience caused as a result of any information or opinion contained in this article and any action taken as a result of the opinions and information contained in this article is at your own risk.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=28c67497bf19" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney/the-credit-cycle-and-zombies-downfall-28c67497bf19">The credit cycle and zombies’ downfall</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney">Goldmoney</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Returning to sound money]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/goldmoney/returning-to-sound-money-ab31fe33bc1f?source=rss----18b9cc76e9e5---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ab31fe33bc1f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gold]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[macroeconomics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Goldmoney]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 19 Nov 2021 23:47:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-19T23:47:47.643Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*BroIKOFUcaqxSHNS5RumbA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>By Alasdair Macleod</p><p><strong>With the threat of dollar hyperinflation now becoming a reality it is time to consider what will be required to stabilise the currency, and by extension the other fiat currencies which regard the dollar as their reserve.</strong></p><p>This article takes its cue from Ludwig von Mises’s 1952 analysis of what was required to return to a proper and enduring gold standard —metallic money, particularly gold, having been sound money for thousands of years, to which everyone has always returned when government fiat currency fails.</p><p>When Mises wrote his 1952 article the dollar was nowhere near the state it is in today. But Mises had had practical experience of what was involved, having advised the Austrian government during and after its hyperinflation of the early 1920s, making his analysis doubly relevant.</p><p>As a remedy for the developing collapse of the dollar, this article can do little more than address the major issues. But it shows how an economic and monetary collapse of the dollar can be turned to advantage — the opportunity it creates through the destruction of Keynesian and other inflationist fallacies to secure long-term economic and monetary stability under which economic progress can be maximised.</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>There are two charts which sum up why the dollar and fiat currencies tied to it will collapse if current monetary policies persist, shown in Figure 1.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6LwINhEabe3U2KU0zD2aDQ@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>The growth in the M1 quantity since February 2020 has been without precedent exploding from $4 trillion, already an historically high level, to nearly $20 trillion this September. That is an average annualised M1 inflation of 230%. It is simply currency debasement and has yet to impact on prices fully. Much of the increase has gone into the financial sector through quantitative easing, so its progress into the non-financial economy and the effects on consumer prices are delayed — but only delayed — as it will increasingly undermine the dollar’s purchasing power.</p><p>The more immediate impact on the High Street is also alarming, shown in the second chart. A combination of the covid lockdowns and Federal Government money ending up in consumers’ pockets has driven their liquidity relative to goods purchases to unprecedented and unaccustomed heights. This is the more worrying chart because it quantifies the immediate fuel for a potential crack-up boom. A crack-up boom is the condition whereby consumers finally discard the currency, spending it to just get rid of it. We are not there yet, but clearly, if consumers take the view en masse that prices will continue to rise, then they will attempt to reduce their cash balances all at once by bringing their future purchases forward, thereby driving prices up even further and more rapidly, and therefore the purchasing power of the currency down. But for the moment, it is mostly creating a scramble for real assets, such as housing, which for the moment can be bought with mortgage finance fixed at deeply suppressed interest rates.</p><p>Given supply constraints, rising commodity prices, and other production costs rising as well as unaccustomed levels of consumer liquidity, the rise in prices can only accelerate. Unless there is a fundamental change in monetary policy, which requires the expansion of currency to be stopped completely, there will come a point where consumers finally realise that it is not prices rising but the purchasing power of the currency falling. This is a difficult concept for most people to grasp because they are used to regarding currency as always possessing the objective value in their transactions. The history of monetary inflations confirms that ordinary folk have always been reluctant to understand that the currency is declining until too late. But today, a significant minority of the population has already been alerted to this development by their participation in or observation of cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin. And if the wider population learns the same lesson and acts accordingly all hope for the currency will be lost.</p><p>The reason that changes in the quantity of currency recorded by narrow measures such as M1 must be closely watched is that it is the underlying base upon which bank credit is expanded. When interest rates inevitably begin to rise, rates paid to bank depositors are likely to lag, improving lending margins for banks. Improved lending margins will encourage the banks to expand credit, for the benefit of government and agency bonds, and for speculators such as hedge fund managers looking to arbitrage the difference between borrowing rates and the dollar’s future purchasing power. The narrow currency quantity therefore has a multiplier effect with respect to bank credit when it begins to expand.</p><p>A dispassionate consideration of these established facts leads the independent observer to conclude that unless today’s fiat currency system is secured with a sound money regime a collapse of everyone’s circulating medium is inevitable. Putting to one side minor central banks, the most egregious debaser of currency is the Fed, as the charts above attest. But with the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, where the dollar goes, so will all the other western currencies. Fixing the dollar must be the priority.</p><p>In a revised 1952 edition of his The Theory of Money and Credit, Ludwig von Mises added a section on The Return to Sound Money. Mises, who had cut his teeth as an economist dealing with Austria’s 1920s inflation made proposals which are still relevant. Under the influence of Keynesianism, the monetary situation facing America today is rapidly deteriorating towards the circumstances faced by Austria in 1920–22, but with technical differences. This article attempts to update Mises’s section on the return to sound money for current conditions to provide a framework for the benefit of monetary stability and long-term prosperity.</p><h3>The intractability of current inflationism</h3><p>Central banks and their governments like to say that the reasons for an acceleration of monetary expansion are short-term and justified by being expedient. But these policies, often termed extraordinary measures to validate them, become normal as we have seen with quantitative easing. We can reasonably assume therefore that no meaningful attempt to rein in currency debasement will occur, more extraordinary measures will be invented, and that the explosion in the M1 quantity is far from over.</p><p>Changing the official mindset is proving an impossible task so long as currency expansion is available. The Federal Government relies on it as a growing source for its funding, which allows it to ignore budget deficits. The state employs bureaucrats who agree with this policy and is advised only by economists who are prepared to justify it. The whole establishment is in groupthink mode and brooks no criticism over its inflationism. Furthermore, the administration has been democratically elected on a platform of continuing to provide free and easy money.</p><p>This is not a sudden phenomenon, being progressively ingrained in the establishment’s mindset for a century. It commenced with the establishment of the Fed before the First World War, which then fuelled an artificial boom in the 1920s after the brief post-war recession. The American state gradually subsumed control over money, removing it from transacting individuals and finally replacing it with completely fiat dollars in 1971. The course that the state had set itself was bound to lead to where we are now; the expansion of dollar currency getting out of control.</p><p>Nowhere in the Fed’s regular FOMC statements is there any mention of monetary policy per se. It is as if the quantity of currency in circulation is irrelevant to its purchasing power. It is an important cover-up, because if the relationship between the quantity of money and its purchasing power was admitted, then the Fed would have to exercise control over it. And not only would an admission of the relationship be a public acknowledgement of currency mismanagement, not only would the US Treasury come down on the Fed like a ton of bricks for jeopardising its source of non-fiscal revenue, but inflation of the currency would no longer be freely available as a policy tool.</p><p>One likes to think that there are policy makers with an understanding that inflation is of the quantity of dollars in circulation and not its effect on prices. But for a long time, it has not been in anyone’s interest to think this way — anyone who did so has been re-educated, sacked, or left the building. This is the essence of groupthink. It is worth noting that elsewhere, Jens Weidmann who is a well-known inflation hawk is resigning from the Bundesbank. And Andy Haldane has resigned as Chief Economist from the Bank of England, with a parting shot on inflation. Both these gentlemen appear to have decided it is a fight they cannot win.</p><p>The only chance of reform is from circumstances leading to the final abandonment of the neo-Keynesian policies that have promoted statism over free markets. And that is unlikely to occur before economic and currency destruction has become too obvious for anyone in control of economic and monetary policy to ignore.</p><p>We cannot be certain that this realisation in official circles will occur before the public finally loses all confidence in the currency. But so long as any hope for its recovery lingers, it seems unlikely that monetary policy will be reformed. To statist economists, the argument for sound money and its adoption would not only be a negation of everything they have come to believe, but it will be seen as destroying all their so-called scientific progress, particularly since the adoption of Keynes’s General Theory as the economists’ vade mecum.</p><p>Additionally, the use of statistics to guide policy, particularly of GDP and CPI, will have been found to have badly misled policy makers and markets. Along with statist management of the dollar, they must be abandoned. They are primarily tools for imposing state control on economic activity. The objective of the reformed approach is to return to free markets and sound money, which means handing responsibility for their actions back to economic actors, those who divide their labour and use money as the bridge between their production and consumption.</p><p>These are a volte-face from current policies and are sure to be strongly resisted even in the face of contrary evidence. Monetary reform is bound to be delayed until the last possible moment. The state’s preference is always to retain and build on the control it already has. This is why there are plans to introduce central bank digital currencies, which, it must be noted, are designed to continue with inflationary stimulation by other means. But as revolutionary France discovered, the substitution of one fiat (the assignat) by another (mandat territoriaux) merely leads to the more rapid failure of the second. Once public trust in the state to not debauch the first currency is gone, it cannot be restored for a succeeding unbacked state currency.</p><p>We can only assume that at some point in the dollar’s descent towards worthlessness the US Treasury will be prepared to mobilise its gold reserves to stop it becoming completely worthless. We shall now look at the measures that are required from that point to return to sound money, that is to back the dollar credibly with metallic money, only gold and silver coinage — anything less will not be a permanent solution.</p><h3>Initial actions to stabilise the currency</h3><p>At the time when monetary stabilisation becomes a practical proposition, interest rates and bond yields will have already been driven to previously unimagined levels, reflecting the currency’s collapse thus far. Write-offs from non-performing loans and losses on bond valuations will have almost certainly wiped out all the equity of weaker banks, and the survivability of the stronger ones will have become questionable as well. The Federal deposit insurance limit of $250,000 will have become meaningless and a banking crisis will become integral to the currency collapse as depositors attempt to flee from bank deposits into goods and gold.</p><p>A collapse of the fiat banking system was not a material factor when Mises tackled the problem in 1952. He was absorbed with preventing the currency’s collapse in the future, a future which was some way off but is now almost upon us.</p><p>The first action must be for the Fed to cease expanding the quantity of money and to introduce regulations to stop the expansion of total bank credit. The former is a simple task. In practice, controlling bank credit is also not difficult. If one bank increases its balance sheet, the increase must be matched by a decrease in the balance sheets of the other banks. This means that new loans can only be extended with the permission of the central bank centralising the information on bank and other licenced credit providers’ balance sheets. And net drawdowns of existing credit facilities must similarly be matched by repayments of others.</p><p>This is intended as an interim measure pending further reform of the banking system. But the consequences for surviving banks will be significant and immediate. The stabilisation of the currency will lead to increased savings. The allocation of these increased savings to investment capital will be routed through bond markets instead of across the collective balance sheets of the banking system. It will be up to savers and their agents to decide individual borrowing terms. And all taxes on savings must be removed to enable them to recirculate into productive investment. However, these measures will be consistent with the plans for subsequent bank reform described below.</p><p>The US Treasury will be competing for savers’ savings and will no longer have unrestricted access to bank credit. A bank wishing to increase its exposure to Treasury stock be able to do so by disposing of other assets, Alternatively, if other banks reduce their balance sheets permission might be obtained from the Fed on the lines described above. Whether buying Treasuries is a sensible commercial decision must be left to the individual bank, and Basel-originated regulations designed to give preference to government bills and bonds over other classifications of assets must be repealed. The objective is to permit the government and its agencies to borrow but only on a non-inflationary basis, with the investment decision purely decided by investors, their agents, and bankers making their own risk assessments without regulatory bias.</p><p>It is doubtful at this stage of the hyperinflation that economic activity would suffer overall from the loss of state intervention. The economy will already be in the deepest slump in living memory, with interest rates at unimaginable heights and beyond the Fed’s control. Anyone going bust will have most probably done so already.</p><p>In these conditions there cannot be a better time to ensure the state withdraws from economic and monetary intervention and to introduce plans to stabilise the currency. But on their own measures to halt currency and credit expansion would be insufficient to stabilise the dollar and dollar interest rates beyond a temporary basis without further measures, which must be our next consideration.</p><h3>The return to a gold standard</h3><p>To stabilise the dollar the US Treasury must recognise that gold is money and the dollar an inferior currency. Accordingly, all taxes on physical gold and silver must be removed, and both metals be permitted to be freely exchanged by the public for dollars. Given that the circumstance of the reintroduction of a gold standard are likely to be those of a last resort, we can assume that the market will have already repriced the dollar in gold terms. That being the case, the exchange ratio between gold and the dollar can be fixed along with the arrangements permitting gold coin and the dollar to circulate together, with the dollar and dollar-credit being converted into reliable gold-backed substitutes.</p><p>Legislation would have to be enacted to enshrine gold convertibility as an inalienable property right, never to be taken away from the public in future. This must also remove future devaluations as a government option, and even in the event of a crisis, such as a war, full convertibility must be maintained. A new body must be established, or the role of the Exchange Stabilisation Fund amended to act only as the custodian for the relationship between dollars and gold, with the nation’s gold reserves transferred to its control. We shall call this fund the Exchange Stabilisation Fund (ESF) hereafter. Dealing in foreign currencies and SDRs by the ESF must cease, and no other government or central bank entity be permitted to deal in gold. After acquiring its initial reserve from the Treasury, the ESF cannot be permitted to initiate gold transactions. Only dealings initiated by the public, exchanging gold for dollars or dollars for gold are to be permitted. Thenceforth, the expansion of dollars in circulation must be backed 100% by gold to be held transparently in a special account for that purpose.</p><p>The basis of convertibility must be on coins freely demanded by holders of dollars without limitation. Legislation must be passed for gold coins to be struck in suitable currency denominations to ensure their practical circulation. Silver coins must also be reintroduced by law for smaller amounts, and the issuance of paper notes suited for smaller purchases must be rescinded to ensure that silver coins and the smaller gold coins circulate.</p><p>The purpose of coin circulation is to permit the public to continually vote on the government’s adherence to the new rules. The slightest indication that it is considering breaking them will, in accordance with Gresham’s Law, drive the good money out of circulation: in other words, gold coin will be hoarded, and its paper substitutes disposed through spending. The knowledge that this is so will discourage politicians from considering watering down the standard.</p><p>The gold/silver ratio should be struck to give silver coins a minor premium over their bullion value to ensure they remain in circulation and are not diverted for industrial use or arbitraged into gold. This will avoid the pitfalls that plagued bimetallic standards in the past.</p><p>The introduction of a working gold coin standard on these lines will lead to a rapid fall in borrowing rates from their hyperinflation highs. The sooner it is operating and the currency stabilised, the quicker the economy can return to normality, which will be an obvious benefit for those persuading the public the merits of sound money. Interest rates will then correlate with the general level of wholesale prices. The reason for this correlation is that sound money allows producers to calculate for their business plans with a high degree of certainty about final prices. [i] With that certainty in mind, they can then assess the rate of interest they are prepared to pay savers for an enterprise to be profitable.</p><p>The disciplines of a working gold coin standard will also require other changes to take place.</p><h3>Government reform</h3><p>The time during a currency collapse when it might be adapted into a proper gold standard is also the most dangerous politically. The population will be suffering real hardships and dangerously disaffected from the establishment that steered them onto the economic and monetary rocks. The middle and professional classes will have lost nearly everything. It is a political situation ripe for violent revolution. It drove the French revolution and following the First World War drove Germany into Nazism.</p><p>It is the setting described by Hayek in his The Road to Serfdom. The departure from proper economics and the move towards increasing state control over the people militates for yet more socialism and violence, with a total monetary collapse being the excuse for total oppression of the people by the state. If that happens, the outcome is a different course of events from the constructive one proposed here.</p><p>But we must assume that the great American nation, for all its recent faults and having lost its way with economics and socialist drift, pulls back from the brink of the abyss. Unlike Germany following its hyperinflation of the 1920s, America’s population is ethnically diverse, comprised in the main of the descendants of refugees from political and economic oppressions elsewhere. We should accept that when the outlook is darkest, a Hayekian-described dictator might not emerge, but a statesman instead, like an Erhardt, who emerged for Germany in the late 1940s. Paradoxically, public support for a reform of the American currency system probably offers a better chance of success than similar measures taken elsewhere.</p><p>We must proceed with that assumption. The popular mandate for the role of government in the economy to be radically revised will therefore become available. Without the cover of inflationary financing, an economy based on sound money is more obviously incompatible with a high-spending government, which must then reduce its burden on the productive economy to the minimum possible. At its most fundamental, its obligation to provide mandated welfare must be strictly curtailed. The ambition is to reduce the role of government to framing and upholding the law and maintaining national defence — not to be confused with funding military adventures abroad. Foreign policy must return to that of Britain in the days of Liverpool, Castlereagh, and Wellington following the Napoleonic Wars: never to interfere in another nation’s internal affairs. And regulations must be rescinded to permit free markets to regulate themselves.</p><p>It will require economic understanding, statesmanship and perhaps a few years to fully achieve all these objectives. But given that the purchasing power of the dollar will have already depreciated substantially, the costs of welfare, such as state pensions and unemployment benefits, will have already degenerated in real terms. Furthermore, the population will be staring into an economic and monetary abyss, reducing their opposition to substantial cuts in state spending. Only in these circumstances will it be possible to take the necessary action, and the opportunity will be there. An initial target of reducing Federal government spending to under 20% of GDP and cutting taxes accordingly should be followed by a target of less than 15% of GDP in due course.</p><h3>Banking reform</h3><p>Following extensive debate between the currency and banking schools, England’s Bank Charter Act of 1844 was the watershed that validated bank credit cycles. The destabilising effect of these cycles led to Walter Bagehot’s concept of the role of The Bank of England being the lender of last resort, the excuse for central banks in the future to increase their powers of intervention.</p><p>By the time of the 1844 Act, banking law and double entry bookkeeping had established the method of credit creation, which is different from that which is commonly understood. A bank commences the expansion of bank credit by making a loan to a customer, which appears on its balance sheet as an asset. At the same time, double entry bookkeeping demands a contra entry, which is achieved by the bank crediting the customer with a matching deposit, which continues to balance as the loan is drawn down. The bank’s balance sheet has expanded without its own capital being involved.</p><p>The expansion of credit is monetary inflation, which eventually feeds through to rising prices, leading to increasing interest rates. Economic calculations made earlier in the credit cycle begin to go awry, and bankers eventually become cautious, contracting their balance sheets mindful of the gearing ratio between their equity and total liabilities. Alternatively, carried away by the apparent improvement in trading conditions, banks speculate in areas where they lack expertise or became overexposed and lack an exit. These were the respective reasons that Overend Gurney in 1866 and Barings in 1890 failed. Whatever the cause of their contraction, these cycles of bank credit lasted about a decade on average.</p><p>A reformed gold coin standard must be complemented by the elimination of bank credit cycles. To eliminate it entirely would require banking to be segregated into two distinct functions, one to act as a custodian of deposits with ownership remaining with the depositor, and the other to act as an arranger of finance for fees or commission. This would eliminate bank credit entirely.</p><p>The evolution of modern finance has led to the development of shadow banking, some of which has led to the creation of credit off-balance sheet by the banks or by unregulated entities. Measures should be taken to identify and end these practices. But given that shadow banking is the product of the interaction between the growth of fiat money and purely financial activities, shadow banking is likely to decline, or possibly even disappear with the end of fiat and the introduction of a gold standard.</p><p>Furthermore, the speculative bubble in cryptocurrencies, whose rationale is purely to hedge against the relative expansion of fiat currencies, will lose the reason for their existence beyond the purely technical innovations, such as the blockchain, that they bring. The ending of these speculative activities generally will reduce even further the perceived need for bank credit expansion, particularly for those banks funding purely financial activities.</p><p>Once the public and foreigners are confident that the dollar’s gold standard is firmly established it is likely that gold will flow back into the Exchange Stabilisation Fund, giving it yet more cover for future dollar redemptions and therefore credibility for the standard.</p><h3>The benefits and workings of a new gold standard</h3><p>With the dollar on a credible gold standard, there can be little doubt that other fiat currencies will develop similar monetary policies. The whole world works with the dollar as the international currency, even Russia whose energy earnings are paid to her in dollars, and China whose raw materials from abroad are sourced nearly entirely in dollars.</p><p>The replacement of fiat dollars with dollar-denominated gold substitutes will change currency priorities for all other nations. They will confront the same issues that faced the European nations in the second half of the nineteenth century, when Britain with her empire dominated global trade. Not only was there a drift towards free trade (for example, the Cobden-Chevalier Trade Treaty between France and Britain in 1860) but the European nations adopted similar gold standards. If America establishes a credible gold standard, any nation not following suit is likely to see its currency collapse.</p><p>Critics may say that instead of operating their own gold standards, other nations will simply operate dollar currency boards, throwing the burden on America to provide a global monetary standard. This would not be a problem, so long as the rules of 100% backing are followed by America. A country adopting a dollar standard for its own currency will have to acquire dollars, which it can only do for gold submitted to the Exchange Stabilisation Fund. By providing a simple solution to other national currency problems the ESF would therefore see substantial gold inflows, further securing its domestic and international currency position. The key is for the ESF to administer the new monetary rules, enshrined in law, to the letter.</p><p>Once the new gold standard is fully established, demand for circulating dollars will be set by markets and can be met by the ESF issuing dollars only on a 100% gold backed basis. Imports must be paid for in gold-backed dollars, and because monetary discipline will force government deficits to become a thing of the past, trade deficits will tend to be as well.</p><p>Changes to gold’s domestic purchasing power might be expected through changes in the savings rate, being the allocation between consumption and deferred consumption. Variations in the savings rates may be expected to drive price differentials between nations, but this would be an error. This is because a rise in domestic savings will tend to reduce domestic prices and increase exports, leading to an importation of gold. But the extra gold or gold-backed dollars in circulation from an export surplus will have a contrary effect, supporting prices so that there would be little change.</p><p>By way of contrast, a fall in the savings rate would be expected to lead to a tendency for domestic prices to rise and therefore to an increase in imports, and a corresponding outflow of gold. But the outflow of gold will then tend to act to reduce domestic prices, thus stabilising the effects of increased domestic consumption. In terms of cross-border trade, the benefit of a gold standard and its associated rules is to eliminate trade imbalances and price differentials as a cause of economic disruption, depoliticising global trade and promoting overall price stability. The peoples of individual nations can therefore set their savings preferences without affecting the general price level. It permits producers to make business calculations with a high degree of certainty of output prices, not only for domestic markets, but international ones as well.</p><h3>Gold supply factors</h3><p>Unlike proposed distributed ledger cryptocurrencies acting as the future form of money, the merits of a working gold standard are found in its flexibility. The growth of the amount of above-ground gold has tended to match the increase in the world’s population over time. But not all gold is held for monetary use, with more than half of it being estimated to be in jewellery, and a smaller amount allocated to industrial use. But much of the gold jewellery is quasi-monetary, being regarded as a reserve store of monetary value particularly among the populous Asian nations. There is, therefore, a flexible stock of non-monetary gold available through market mechanisms to support a global monetary standard.</p><p>The difference between a gold or gold exchange standard and fiat currencies is that the allocation of gold between its uses is determined by people through markets, and not by governments and their monetary policies. This means that the course of prices both generally and for individual products are set only by supply and demand. Price stability is the outcome, with competition, improved production methods and technology tending to reduce prices over time and rising living standards for all. This is the background which encourages savers to put aside some of their earnings, knowing that their savings’ purchasing power will be maintained, and even likely to increase over time.</p><p>For these savers, financial asset values will no longer be driven by excessive quantities of fiat currency. With the infinite feed of fiat currency removed, outright speculation will become a thing of the past, replaced by genuine risk assessments of individual bond issuers and of equity participations. The expansion of fiat currency will no longer be available as the principal fuel driving financial asset values.</p><p>It will be a different monetary environment, where capital will be scarce and therefore valued. Capital will be less wasted on spurious projects. It will be the basis for recovering economic progress, so sadly lost at an increasing pace since the dollar became purely a fiat currency.</p><p>It is apt to end by quoting von Mises’ concluding paragraph to his 1952 addition on currency reform in his The Theory of Money and Credit, the inspiration for this article:</p><p>“Cynics dispose of the advocacy of a restitution of the gold standard by calling it utopian. Yet we have only the choice between two utopias: the utopia of the market economy, not paralysed by government sabotage on the one hand, and the utopia of totalitarian all-round planning on the other hand. The choice of the first alternative implies the decision in favour of the gold standard.”</p><p><strong>For the latest analysis and interpretation of the precious metal markets, be sure to subscribe to </strong><a href="https://www.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights"><strong>Goldmoney Insights.</strong></a></p><p>[i] See the explanation for Gibson’s paradox, here: https://www.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights/the-futility-of-central-bank-policy</p><p><em>The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect those of Goldmoney, unless expressly stated. The article is for general information purposes only and does not constitute either Goldmoney or the author(s) providing you with legal, financial, tax, investment, or accounting advice. You should not act or rely on any information contained in the article without first seeking independent professional advice. Care has been taken to ensure that the information in the article is reliable; however, Goldmoney does not represent that it is accurate, complete, up-to-date and/or to be taken as an indication of future results and it should not be relied upon as such. Goldmoney will not be held responsible for any claim, loss, damage, or inconvenience caused as a result of any information or opinion contained in this article and any action taken as a result of the opinions and information contained in this article is at your own risk.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ab31fe33bc1f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney/returning-to-sound-money-ab31fe33bc1f">Returning to sound money</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney">Goldmoney</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The futility of central bank policy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/goldmoney/the-futility-of-central-bank-policy-4f5452a5494e?source=rss----18b9cc76e9e5---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4f5452a5494e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[research]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[macroeconomics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Goldmoney]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Nov 2021 06:29:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-12T06:29:12.213Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*U8S8RCAoIJZRI3UYT5gKxg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>By Alasdair Macleod</p><p><strong>It is only now becoming clear to the investing public that the purchasing power of their currencies is declining at an accelerating rate. There is no doubt that yesterday’s announcement that the US CPI rose by 6.2%, compared with the longstanding 2% target, came as a wake-up call to markets.</strong></p><p>Along with the other major central banks, the Fed’s reaction is likely to be to double down on interest rate suppression to keep bond yields low and stock valuations intact. The alternative will lead to a major financial, economic and currency shock sooner rather than later.</p><p>This article introduces the reader to some of the basic fallacies behind state currencies. It explains the misconceptions policy planners have over interest rates, and how central banks have become contracyclical lenders, replacing commercial banking’s credit creation for non-financial activities.</p><p>In effect, narrow money is being used by the major central banks in a vain attempt to shore up government finances and economic activity. The consequences for currency debasement are likely to be more immediate and profound than cyclical bank credit expansion.</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>It is becoming clear that there has been an unofficial agreement between the US Fed, Bank of England, the ECB and probably the Bank of Japan not to raise interest rates. It is confirmed by remarkably similar statements from the former three in recent days. When, as the cliché has it, they are all singing off the same hymn sheet, those of us not party to agreements between our monetary policy planners are right to suspect they are doubling down on a market rigging exercise encompassing all financial markets.</p><p>That these policy planners are clueless about money and economics escapes nearly everyone affected. It is assumed the so-called experts know what they are doing. But for nearly a century, universities have promoted statist beliefs on their economics courses to the exclusion of reasoned theory leading to the current situation. In modern times it started with Georg Knapp’s Chartalist movement in Germany before the First World War. And it really took off with Keynes’s General Theory published in 1936. The essence of it has been state attempts to dehumanise economics; to turn economic actors, that is you and me, into predictable components in a mathematical economy.</p><p>The infamous failure of communism’s command economies in the Soviet Union and Maoist China bear testimony to the futility of these policies. But while Western capitalists felt vindicated by communism’s failure, they failed to understand its similarities with their own economic policies. For the truth was that western economies were and remain highly socialistic, with the unfettered relationships between transacting individuals being increasingly interfered with by their relevant governments. The triumph of capitalism over communism was hubris, little more than a power play, an opportunity for the Western Alliance to move its missile bases into newly liberated eastern Europe.</p><p>The propaganda that the state’s primary function is to control human activity has been so pervasive and effective that it is no longer questioned. Capitalism, in the sense that corporations exist for profit, is unanimously declared to be a necessary evil and reluctantly tolerated. This is even believed by those who are cast by the media as the agents of capitalism themselves: leaders in big business, the bankers, and in fossil-burning oil megaliths. With their social consciouses they subscribe to a new form of Marxist philosophy. They attend gatherings to plan for a better world — their world. The COP26 conference in Glasgow is the latest manifestation of it with private participants seemingly unconscious that travelling in 118 private jets to do so is inconsistent with their professed green credentials.</p><p>The wellspring of this self-importance is ignorance of economics. Universities have turned out highly intelligent students who know nothing other than mathematics and statistics and think it makes them economists. They ignore their own life experiences in fields such as the division of labour, promoting instead macroeconomics — mainly a Keynesian invention. Its origin arose from Keynes’s denial of Say’s law, a cast-iron definition of the division of labour and the role of the medium of exchange:</p><p>“That Say’s law, that the aggregate demand price of output as a whole is equal to its aggregate supply price for all volumes of output, is equivalent to the proposition that there is no obstacle to full employment. If, however, this is not the true law relating the aggregate demand and supply functions, there is a vitally important chapter of economic theory which remains to be written and without which all discussions concerning the volume of aggregate employment are futile.”[i]</p><p>By dismissing in the first sentence a proposition without proper explanation (the few paragraphs preceding it are irrelevant), in the second sentence Keynes proposes his new science of macroeconomics, which then becomes the subject of his General Theory. It marks the formal separation between classical free market economics as a social science and the new statist mathematical macroeconomics masquerading as a natural science.</p><p>But Keynes’s proposition is preceded by a conditional conjunction, a supposition for which there is no evidence. To the contrary, the evidence is clear: we specialise in our work to maximise our output which we exchange for all the other things that satisfy our needs and wants, and the role of money is to make the transactions involved as efficient as possible. And anyone not so employed and lacks savings to draw upon must be carried by someone else — fully employed is a red herring.</p><p>The few words that follow Keynes’s conditional “if” are the mainspring driving modern socialism and the belief held by statists and the super-rich alike that their contribution in the fields of economics and money is for the general good. It has seen the establishment ignore the similarities between the new economics and Karl Marx’s megalomania.</p><p>Given the motives and statist beliefs prevalent in the corridors of power it is hardly surprising that monetary policy is badly flawed. And when, as it now appears, there is collusion between the major central banks to keep interest rates heavily supressed, we should at least suspect that all is not well, and that everything might be about to unravel.</p><h3>Central bank interest rate errors</h3><p>Statists have long held the belief that interest rates are usuary imposed on borrowers by wealthy savers. By casting savers as the greedy party and borrowers as the victims they constructed a moral case for suppressing interest rates.</p><p>In pursuing their moral case, statists have ignored the reality behind what they and borrowers perceive to be the cost of money. A lender parting with money’s utility is justified in expecting compensation for the loss of that possession. When a lender is promised instant access to his money, then compensation becomes a fitting reimbursement for risk, comprised of the sum of currency and counterparty risks. Nowadays, money has been replaced with a reserve currency, so a lender will often think of currency risk as being the difference between the dollar and that of his national currency.</p><p>When a lender parts possession with money for a defined period, an additional time-preference element is introduced, compensating him for loss of possession for the time agreed with the borrower. Therefore, the normal condition for yield curves plotted against a basis of time is positive, with longer maturities yielding greater interest that shorter ones.</p><p>A borrower is bound to view interest differently. For an entrepreneur it is the cost of obtaining financial capital for investment in a project. He must perform an economic calculation which involves all his anticipated costs from initial capital investment until final production output, which with his estimate of the value of final production allows him to calculate a margin for profits. He might refine his calculations as the project progresses, which could lead to it being abandoned, and he might have difficulty in repaying the lender. A lender must also allow for these implied risks in his calculations of what interest compensation he requires. And when an agent, or a financial arranger, acts for the lender that agent will make these calculations on his behalf.</p><p>These are the basic factors which determine interest rates in free markets with sound money. There is the further consideration behind setting them, and that is whether it is the lenders or the borrowers who take the lead in setting interest rates. Do lenders, as Keynes assumed, seek to obtain the maximum return on their capital, forcing borrowers to pay up needlessly, or do borrowers bid up interest rates in order to attract the capital necessary to proceed with a business project? Which party drives the rate?</p><p>The evidence from free markets before central banks managed or imposed interest rate policies upon them is provided to us by Gibson’s paradox. Figure 1 covers the time from Lord Liverpool’s introduction of the gold sovereign as circulating coinage up to the outbreak of the First World War, when the gold coin standard was abandoned. It compares the wholesale price index with the yield on Consols stock, undated government bonds that provide a pure yield indication without the distortion of maturity factors.</p><p>An estimate of final values of production is necessary for a borrower to estimate in his calculations how much interest he can afford for an investment to be profitable. By ensuring a high degree of price stability, sound money backing the circulating currency allows the calculation to be made. This explains why free market interest rates for borrowers tracked wholesale prices under the gold standard and the two correlated well.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/896/1*o8YBadRqvBhKk127eVjD3A@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>There were times of moderate price volatility, but these were mainly due to the cycle of bank credit expansion which led to extra currency being in circulation, followed by periodic banking crises and credit contractions roughly every ten years. But the overall price stability provided by the gold standard still allowed businesses to continue to make the relevant calculations.</p><p>In the early days of the gold standard, domestic considerations had a greater impact on wholesale prices than later. This can be seen in a relative price instability between 1820 — 1850 compared with later. In the second half of the nineteenth century the combined benefits of free trade (the Cobden — Chevalier Anglo-French free trade agreement was signed in 1860), the adoption of gold coin standards by Britain’s trading counterparties and the increasing ownership of gold coins by the general public all led to greater price stability.[ii]</p><p>The importance of the spread of gold coin standards is underlined by statistical evidence in Tables 5 and 6 in Timothy Green’s report (referenced in endnote 2) which showed that gold coins in public circulation increased substantially between 1873 — 1895. Total minted worldwide between these dates was 5,809 tonnes, of which the combined production of Australian and UK sovereigns was 1,395 tonnes, 24% of the world total. The British and Australian minted amounts were in addition to coin production from 1817 representing an additional 1,500 tonnes for a total of nearly 2,900 tonnes, the equivalent of 396 million sovereigns. Some of these coins would have been taken in for reminting and to that extent there is double counting.</p><p>By way of contrast, leading central banks and government treasury departments for UK, France, Germany Italy, Russia, and the US between them held only 2,013 tonnes in 1895, one quarter of the quantity minted into circulating coins during the previous twenty-two years. These statistics show that gold coins in circulation made up a significant amount of the combined quantities of money and narrow measures of currency supply, which with free trade provided international price stability at a time of rapid global industrialisation and technological progress.</p><p>By way of contrast with the correlation between prices and wholesale borrowing costs, Figure 2 shows the relationship between the inflation rate of prices and wholesale borrowing costs. There is no correlation between the two. It tells us that the assumption held by central bank policy makers, that inflation, by which they mean changes in the general level of prices, can be managed by varying interest rates, is incorrect.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/889/1*zS1aBz6l_R4VQve5xe_Eiw@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>This was the essence of Gibson’s paradox, which plainly showed the opposite to be true of what was expected by statist economists, none of which were able to resolve the paradox. It was never, to my knowledge, addressed by the Austrian School, which was probably generally unaware of it, only being named after Gibson by Keynes who then proceeded to ignore it. A search of all Ludwig von Mises’ writings tuns up nothing on Gibson, and the only two references to Thomas Tooke, who was credited with first seeing the unexplained relationships in the nineteenth century, refer only to his involvement with the banking school.</p><h3>Monetary policy objectives</h3><p>Having examined the role of interest rates in unfettered free markets we can now turn our attention to the consequences of central bank interest rate policies. By resolving Gibson’s paradox, we have a starting point; the knowledge that attempts to manage the rate of price inflation by interest rate policies are flawed at the outset. But the interest rate policies of central banks have another motivation for price management, which is to reduce the cost of borrowing at the expense of savers.</p><p>By suppressing interest rates, central banks have brought about several destructive changes to trade and the economy in respect of money and credit. By expanding their balance sheets from a customary minimum reflecting mostly circulating currency and required reserves for commercial banks as central bank liabilities before the Lehman crisis, the sum of the Fed’s, the ECB’s, the BoE’s, and the BoJ’s balance sheets has expanded over six times from $4 trillion equivalent to $25.4 trillion currently. The Fed’s expanded about ten times, the ECB’s nearly five times, the BoJ’s over six times, and the BoE’s by nearly seven times.[iii]</p><p>In effect, central banks have subsumed the role of commercial banks with respect to credit expansion, directed at their respective economies with an important difference. Central bank credit expansion is countercyclical to commercial bank credit and directed mainly at financing government spending instead of industrial production. The stated objective is to support growth in the wider economy. But being countercyclical a more accurate policy description is to prevent credit-cleansing recessions and to cover government deficits. Commercial banks have refocused their credit expansion towards a combination of acquiring government bonds, which are deemed the lowest lending risk, and financing purely financial activities. For example, the Fed’s H8 form recording assets and liabilities of commercial banks in the US shows Commercial and Industrial Loans (line 10) to have declined every quarter since 2020 Q3.</p><p>To a degree, the decline in commercial lending reflects the offshoring of production. An optimist would point to the improvement in cash flows replacing debt finance, and bank credit expansion doesn’t include changes in the level of bond finance. These structural factors must be admitted, but they cannot adequately explain why credit to manufacturers is contracting at a time when consumer demand outpaces product supply. The logical answer is that far from an improving economic outlook, the outlook has been deteriorating in terms of lending risk. Headline GDP figures are therefore an unreliable guide to economic conditions, GDP being indirectly inflated by the expansion of central bank balance sheets.</p><p>Clearly, the countercyclical financing of the whole economy in all major jurisdictions is a valid description for the current actions of central banks. It takes no leap of the imagination to deduce that without central bank credit expansion all these major economies would be sinking into deep slumps. This is particularly true of the US, UK and EU, while the BoJ’s balance sheet total unlike the others has admittedly declined over the last year. Therefore, while current economic conditions persist, we can expect a continuing expansion of central bank balance sheets for no real economic benefit.</p><p>But monetary policy can never be commercial in nature. It is not the function of a bureaucratic body answerable only to the government to make commercial lending judgements. Central banks acting as countercyclical lenders, a role that requires the judgement of profit-seeking company doctors, cannot deliver a positive economic outcome. While the cycle of commercial bank credit expansion had its own evils, at least it involved institutions capable of commercial judgement. That has now been marginalised.</p><p>Monetary policy is now trapped with an ultimate failure looming. Without a change in policy the only outcome will be a further acceleration of inflation of the currency quantity led by its narrower measures. And as we saw in Figure 1, the consequences for prices of the cycle of bank credit expansion and contraction were broadly confined to consecutive periods of expansion and contraction. But there is no such limitation on the expansion of unbacked base currency, and the effect over recent times is shown in Figure 3.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*daBg3ZlwPh-m2acpGPbOrQ@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>This cannot be undone, and the debasement of currencies can only accelerate unless policymakers sum up the courage to face the consequences: a deliberate act to unwind all the distortions by stopping the printing presses, which will simply crash their respective economies.</p><p>This is as likely as the moon colliding with Mars, at least, that is, before the situation deteriorates to the point where central bankers are driven to consider backing their failing currencies with a gold coin standard. Meanwhile, by venturing into the business of contracyclical currency expansion central banks have entered dangerous territory. The commitment to continue suppressing interest rates is now greater than ever. But the consequences for the purchasing power of their fiat currencies are likely to be manifest far sooner than might be generally expected.</p><h3>The economic outlook will also rapidly deteriorate</h3><p>Besides the inability of intervening central bank policymakers to make commercial judgements, their actions also take their respective economies even further away from commercial progress. The relationship between currencies, credit and private sector enterprises can be expected to deteriorate more rapidly from here as time preference factors re-emerge. The model relationship between prices and borrowing costs in a successful sound-money economy illustrated by Gibson’s paradox has been destroyed by depreciating fiat. For too long, malinvestments driven by a widespread expectation of profits arising from interest rate suppression more than from genuinely profitable production have dominated economic activity. That is now set to be displaced by malinvestments arising from expectations of rising prices. It can only be stopped by letting free markets set interest rates. But no businessmen in the major economies believe in free enterprise anymore with good reason, only in profits from speculation, the root of which is currency debasement. They are all addicted to interest rate suppression and rising prices as mechanisms to get rich.</p><p>While monetary policymakers persist in believing in monetary stimulation the consequences are in fact horribly destructive. The following bullet points are not exhaustive:</p><p>Suppression of interest rates has encouraged businesses to borrow for projects which otherwise would have not been deemed profitable. When central banks have subsequently been forced to raise interest rates in response to rising prices these projects collapse or are rescued by the state. Every credit cycle, this burden on central bank policymaking accumulates.</p><p>Interest rate suppression transfers wealth from savers for the benefit of borrowers. Consequently, savers reduce their savings in favour of immediate consumption, while borrowers take advantage of interest rate suppression to benefit from the wealth transfer effect. A low propensity to save is associated with a tendency towards consumer price inflation and greater interest rate instability.</p><p>The increase of circulating currency is of most benefit to those who receive it first before it has driven prices higher due to the increase in its quantity. Those who benefit most are the issuer, the government, and licenced banks. As the extra currency is spent into circulation it drives prices higher, to the detriment of later receivers. The people who lose most are those who are distant from financial centres and those on fixed incomes, such as state pensioners and the low paid.</p><p>Since tax thresholds are not adjusted for the effects of inflation, inflation increases the tax burden on the productive economy, reducing its ability to prosper.</p><p>The Keynesian justification for inflationary financing was to stimulate the economy. It relies on economic actors being unaware of the increased quantity of currency and the effect on its purchasing power. Instead, the rise in prices for everyday goods and services is widely attributed to increased demand, giving the illusion of improved trading conditions. Inevitably, once the increased quantity of currency has been fully absorbed in general circulation, the effect passes and even reverses, and further stimulation is required to perpetuate the effect. But the more this trick is deployed, the more widely the consequences become understood and the less effective it becomes.</p><p>The more a government uses monetary inflation to finance its spending, the more difficult it is to control. Political practicalities force politicians to continue with inflationary financing, increasing the burden on private sector production. The interests of a government and its electors diverge, with governments increasingly desperate for the benefit of wealth transfer through currency debasement at the expense of economic progress.</p><p>Unless it is somehow stopped, the accelerating collapse of a currency whose decline yields progressively less value to its issuer destroys economic activity, leading to widespread destitution and political rebellion. These are the conditions that open the door to political instability, dictatorships, and extremism.</p><p>The first test as to whether any of the major central banks will see the light and tackle the inflation problem will take place in the coming few weeks as evidence of falling purchasing power for fiat currencies mount. The US Fed faced a shock yesterday with the consumer price index up 6.2% against expectations of 5.8%, and a mandated target of 2%. Its claims that inflation is “transient” is looking more preposterous by the day.</p><p>Investment managers have yet to challenge the Fed’s view, but with mounting evidence that it is incorrect, it is likely to be a matter of only weeks, possibly days, before yields on government bonds begin to reflect currency debasement. In assessing the situation, driven by macroeconomic theories investment managers in bond markets tend to think of inflation in terms of real yield, being the nominal redemption yield on a bond adjusted by the official rate of price inflation. The shock of a CPI rising at 6.2% adjusts the current yield on the 10-year US Treasury bond from the current 1.6% to a negative yield of 4.6%. The more fund managers making this calculation, the greater the threat to bond prices.</p><p>Usually with a lag, a rise in bond yields and the prospect of higher ones to come begin to undermine equity market valuations. This is important for the satisfaction of policy management objectives, which for some time, and certainly since the Lehman crisis thirteen years ago, has placed an emphasis on a healthy stockmarket to maintain economic confidence. For the Fed, the BoE and the BoJ this has been particularly important, and is the rationale for quantitative easing.</p><p>This brings us to the Rubicon: in the face of a currency’s loss of purchasing power, evidenced in a higher and rising general level of prices, will one or more of the major central banks abandon what has become an untenable monetary policy, calling a halt to further currency expansion?</p><p>Alternatively, will they all continue to combine efforts to suppress interest rates and accelerate currency expansion through increased QE to support financial markets and contain the financing costs on further government borrowing?</p><p>The former choice by just one of them would end all central bankers’ efforts of contracyclical expansion to support markets and the illusion that all is well in their underlying economies. It would end central bank control over markets and allow markets to reassert themselves with respect to currencies and the conditions for domestic and international trade. It would expose to the vote of the marketplace government finances for what they are. The abandonment to the marketplace of interest rate policies would bring about the crisis central banks have strived to prevent for decades.</p><p>The latter choice will involve central banks to overtly coordinate their attack on markets, an attempt to force them to accept continuing dominance of state currencies and the monetary policies that go with them. Further measures can be expected, such as a currency accord to ensure continuing stability against each other with increased swap arrangements. We can expect political policies in other spheres, such as capping energy prices and prices of other goods deemed politically sensitive.</p><p>These are all symptoms of an ultimate failure of the state. We have seen them repeated throughout history. The decision to choose to face the reality of the situation or to struggle on in accordance with the state’s self-sought mandate is a choice as to whether the looming crisis visits us sooner, or later.</p><p><strong>For the latest analysis and interpretation of the precious metal markets, be sure to subscribe to</strong><a href="https://www.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights/the-futility-of-central-bank-policy"><strong> Goldmoney Insights.</strong></a></p><p>[i] Keynes, General Theory, Book 1, Chapter 3.1.</p><p>[ii]See Central Bank Gold Reserves — an historical perspective by Timothy Green.</p><p>[iii] Yardeni Research, Nov 8 Monthly balance sheets. BoE figures additional from BoE.</p><p><em>The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect those of Goldmoney, unless expressly stated. The article is for general information purposes only and does not constitute either Goldmoney or the author(s) providing you with legal, financial, tax, investment, or accounting advice. You should not act or rely on any information contained in the article without first seeking independent professional advice. Care has been taken to ensure that the information in the article is reliable; however, Goldmoney does not represent that it is accurate, complete, up-to-date and/or to be taken as an indication of future results and it should not be relied upon as such. Goldmoney will not be held responsible for any claim, loss, damage, or inconvenience caused as a result of any information or opinion contained in this article and any action taken as a result of the opinions and information contained in this article is at your own risk</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4f5452a5494e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney/the-futility-of-central-bank-policy-4f5452a5494e">The futility of central bank policy</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney">Goldmoney</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Money, funny-money and crypto]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/goldmoney/money-funny-money-and-crypto-ed7318d4bc58?source=rss----18b9cc76e9e5---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ed7318d4bc58</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gold]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[currency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Goldmoney]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Nov 2021 08:27:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-05T08:27:02.996Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*aqannVqagxDnmASOk9YicQ@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>By Alasdair Macleod</p><p><strong>That the post-industrial era of fiat currencies is coming to an end is becoming a real possibility. Major economies are now stalling while price inflation is just beginning to take off, following the excessive currency debasement in all major jurisdictions since the Lehman crisis and accelerated even further by covid.</strong></p><p>The dilemma now faced by central banks is whether to raise interest rates sufficiently to tackle price inflation and lend support to their currencies, or to take one last gamble on yet more stimulus in the hope that recessions can be avoided.</p><p>Politics and neo-Keynesian economics strongly favour monetary inflation and continued interest rate suppression. But following that course leads to the destruction of currencies. So, how should ordinary people protect themselves from currency risk?</p><p>To assist them, this article draws out the distinctions between money, currency, and bank credit. It examines the claims of cryptocurrencies to be replacement money or currencies, explaining why they will be denied either role. An update is given on the uncanny resemblance between current neo-Keynesian monetary inflation and support for financial asset prices, compared with John Law’s proto-Keynesian policies which destroyed the French economy and currency in 1720.</p><p>Assuming we continue to follow Law’s playbook, an understanding why money is only physical gold and silver and nothing else will be vital to surviving what appears to be a looming crisis in financial assets and currencies.</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>With the recent acceleration in the growth of money supply it is readily apparent that government spending is increasingly financed through monetary inflation. Those who hoped it would be a temporary phenomenon are being shown to have been overly optimistic. The excuse that its expansion was only a one-off event limited to supporting businesses and consumers through the covid pandemic is now being extended to seeing them through continuing logistics disruptions along with other unexpected problems. We now face an economic slowdown which will reduce government revenues and, according to policy planners, may require additional monetary stimulation to preclude.</p><p>Along with never-ending budget deficits, for the foreseeable future monetary inflation at elevated levels is here to stay. The threat to the future purchasing power of currencies should be obvious, yet few people appear to be attributing rising prices to prior monetary expansion. David Ricardo’s equation of exchange whereby changes in the quantity of money are shown to affect its purchasing power down the line has disappeared from the inflation narrative and is all but forgotten.</p><p>That the users of the medium of exchange ultimately determine its utility is ignored. It is now assumed to be the state’s function to decide what acts as money and not its users. Instead, we are told that the state’s fiat currency is money, will always be money and that prices are rising due to failures of the capitalist system. Central to the deception is to call currency money, and to persist in describing its management by the state as monetary policy. And money supply is always the supply of fiat currency in all its forms.</p><p>That these so-called monetary policies have failed and continue to do so is becoming more widely appreciated. It is the anti-capitalistic attitude of state planners which absolves them from the blame of mismanaging the relationship between their currencies and economies by blaming private sector actors when their policies fail. Instead of acting as the people’s servants, governments have become their controllers, expecting the public’s sheep-like cooperation in economic and monetary affairs. The state issues its currency backed by unquestioned faith and credit in the government’s monopoly to issue and manage it. Seeming to recognise the potential failure of their currency monopolies many central banks now intend to issue a new version, a central bank digital currency to give greater control over how citizens use and value it.</p><p>Without doubt, the dangers from fiat currency instability are increasing. Never has it been more important for ordinary people, its users, to understand what real money constitutes and its difference from state-issued currencies. Not only are new currencies in the form of central bank digital currencies being proposed but some suggest that distributed ledger cryptocurrencies, which are beyond the control of governments, will be adopted when state fiat currencies fail, an eventual development for which increasing numbers of people expect.</p><p>The currency scene is descending into a confusion for which policy planners are unprepared. Fiat currencies are failing, evidenced by declining purchasing power. Not only is it the lesson of history; not only are governments resorting to the printing press or its digital equivalent, but it is naïve to think that governments desire monetary stability over satisfying the interests of one group over those of another. By suppressing interest rates, central banks favour borrowers over depositors. By issuing additional currency they transfer wealth from their governments’ electors. The transfer is never equitable either, with early receivers of new currency getting to spend it before prices have adjusted to accommodate the increased quantity in circulation. Those who receive it last find that prices have risen because of currency dilution while their income has been devalued. The beneficiaries are those close to government and the banks who expand credit by ledger entry. The losers are the poor and pensioners — the people who in democratic theory are more morally entitled to protection from currency debasement than anyone else.</p><h3>The true role of money</h3><p>In the late eighteenth century, a French businessman and economist, Jean-Baptiste Say, noticed that when France’s currencies failed during the Revolution, people simply exchanged goods for other goods. A cobbler would exchange the shoes and boots he made for the food and other items he required to feed and sustain his family. The principles behind the division of labour had continued without money. But it became clear to Say that the role of money was to facilitate this exchange more efficiently than could be achieved in its absence. For Keynesian economists, this is the inconvenient truth of Say’s law.</p><p>The division of labour, which permits individuals to deploy their personal skills to the greatest benefit for themselves and therefore for others, remains central to the commercial actions of all humanity. It is the mainspring of progress. A medium of exchange commonly accepted by society not only facilitates the efficient exchange of goods produced through individual skills but it allows a producer to retain money temporarily for future consumption. This can be because he has a surplus for his immediate requirements, or he decides to invest it in improving his product, increasing his output, or for other purposes than immediate consumption.</p><p>Whether it is a corporation, manager, employee, or sole trader; whether the product be a good or a service — all qualify as producers. Everyone earning a living or striving to make a profit is a producer.</p><p>Over the many millennia that have elapsed since the end of barter, people dividing their labour settled on metallic money as the mediums of exchange; recognisable, divisible, commonly accepted, and being scarce also valuable. And as civilisation progressed gold, silver, and copper were coined into recognisable units. These media of exchange in their unadulterated form were money, and even though they were stamped with images of kings and emperors, they were no one’s liability.</p><p>Nowadays, humans across the planet still recognise physical gold and silver as true money. But it is a mistake to think they guarantee price stability — only that they are more stable than other media of exchange, which is why they have always survived and re-emerged after alternatives have failed. This is the key to understanding why they guaranteed money substitutes, notably through industrial revolutions, and remain money to this day.</p><p>Britain led the way in replacing silver as its long-standing monetary standard with gold, relegating silver to a secondary coinage. In 1817 the new gold sovereign was introduced at the exchange rate equivalent of 113 grains (0.2354 ounces troy) to the pound currency. A working gold standard, whereby bank notes were exchangeable for gold coin commenced in 1821, remaining at that fixed rate until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.</p><p>By 1900, the gold standard had international as well as domestic aspects. It implied that nations settled balance of payment differences with each other in gold, although in practice this seems to have happened relatively little.</p><p>Many smaller nations, while having domestic gold circulation, did not bother to keep physical gold in reserve, but held sterling balances which, again, were regarded as being as good as gold. The Bank of England had a remarkably small reserve of under 200 tonnes in 1900, compared with the Bank of France which held 544 tonnes, the Imperial Bank of Russia with 661 tonnes, and the US Treasury with 602 tonnes. But even though remarkably little gold was held by the Bank of England, over 1,400 tonnes of sovereign coins had been minted in Australia and the UK and were in public circulation. Therefore, some £200m of the UK and its empire’s money supply was in physical gold (the equivalent of £62bn at today’s prices).[i]</p><h3>The relationship between gold and prices</h3><p>Metallic money’s purchasing power fluctuates, influenced by long-term factors such as changes in mine output and population growth. Gold is also held for non-monetary purposes such as jewellery though the distinction between bullion held as money and jewellery can be fuzzy. A minor use is industrial. The degree of coin circulation relative to the quantity of substitutes also affects its purchasing power, as experience from nineteenth century Britain attests.</p><p>The economic progress of the industrial revolution increased the volume of goods relative to the quantity of money and money-substitutes (bank notes and bank deposits subject to cheques), so the general level of producer prices declined, even though they varied with changes in the level of bank credit. That generally held until the late-1880s, when bank credit in the economy expanded on the back of increased shipments of gold from South Africa. Furthermore, a combination of rising demand for industrial commodities through economic expansion of the entire British empire and more currencies linking themselves to gold indirectly via managed exchange rates against pounds and other gold-backed currencies all contributed to reverse the declining trend of wholesale prices between 1894 — 1914.</p><p>Consequently, wholesale prices no longer declined but tended to increase modestly. This is shown in Figure 1.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/865/1*HhUZN9PybgBXOSD2AbkR3A@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Figure 1 also explodes the myth in central bank monetary policy circles that varying interest rates controls money’s purchasing power by “pricing” money.</p><p>Demand for credit is set by the economic calculations of businessmen and entrepreneurs, not idle rentiers as assumed by Keynes who named this paradox after Arthur Gibson, who pointed it out in 1923. The explanation eluded Keynes and his followers but is simple. In assessing the profitability of production, the most important variable (assuming that the means of production are readily available) is anticipated prices for finished products. Changes in borrowing rates, reflecting the affordability of interest that could be paid therefore do not precede changes in prices but follow changes in prices for this reason.[ii]</p><p>While fluctuations in the sum of the quantities of money, currency and credit affect the general level of prices, there is an additional effect of the value placed on these components by its users. History has demonstrated that the most stable value is placed on gold coin, which is what qualifies it as money. It has been said that priced in gold a Roman toga 2,000 years ago cost the same as a lounge suit today. But we don’t need to go back that far for our evidence. Figure 2 shows WTI oil priced in dollars, the world’s reserve currency, and gold both indexed to 1986. Clearly, the dollar is significantly less reliable than gold as a stable medium of exchange.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/955/1*QVYqXMVTx33YPmdLXsNKGA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>So long as gold is freely exchangeable for currency, this stability is imparted to currency as well. When it is suspected that this exchangeability is likely to be compromised, coin becomes hoarded and disappears from circulation. The purchasing power of the currency then becomes dependent on a combination of changes in its quantity and changes in faith in the issuer. Bank deposits face the additional risk of faith in the bank’s ability to pay its debts.</p><p>In summary, the general level of prices tends to fall gradually over time in an economy where gold coin circulates as the underlying medium of exchange, and when faith in the currency as its circulating alternative is unquestioned. The existence of a coin exchange facility lifts the purchasing power of the currency above where it would otherwise be without a functioning standard. Even when gold exchange for a fiat currency becomes restricted, the purchasing power of the currency continues to enjoy some support, as we saw during the Bretton Woods Agreement.</p><h3>The distinction between money and currency</h3><p>So far, we have defined money, which is metallic and physical. Now we turn to what is erroneously taken to be money, which is currency. Originally, the dollar and pound sterling were freely exchangeable by its users for silver and then gold coin, so state-issued currencies came to be assumed to be as good as money. But its exchangeability diminished over time. In the United Kingdom exchangeability of sterling currency for gold coin ceased with the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, though sovereigns still exist as money officially today. They are simply subject to Gresham’s law, driven out of general circulation by inferior currency. The post-war gold standard of 1925–32 was a bullion standard whereby only 400-ounce bars could be demanded for circulating currency, which failed to tie in sterling to money proper.</p><p>In the United States, gold coin was exchangeable for dollars in the decades before April 1933 at $20.67 to the ounce. Bank failures following the Wall Street crash encouraged citizens to exchange dollar deposits for gold, and foreign holders of dollar deposits similarly demanded gold, leading to a drain on American gold reserves. By Executive Order 6102 in April 1933 President Roosevelt banned private sector ownership of gold coin, gold bullion and gold certificates, thereby ending the gold coin standard and forcing Americans to accept inconvertible dollar currency as the circulating medium of exchange. This was followed by a devaluation of the dollar on the international exchanges to $35 to the ounce in January 1934.</p><p>The entire removal of money from the global currency system was a gradual process, driven by a progression of currency events, until August 1971 when President Nixon ended the Bretton Woods Agreement. From then on, the US dollar became the world’s reserve currency, commonly used for pricing commodities and energy on international markets. But following the Nixon shock, the dollar had become purely fiat.</p><p>Unlike gold coin, which has no counterparty risk, fiat currency is evidence of either a liability of an issuing central bank or of a commercial bank. It is not money. The fact that money, being gold or silver coin does not commonly circulate as media of exchange, cannot alter this fact. Since the dawn of modern banking with London’s goldsmiths in the seventeenth century, who deployed ledger debits and credits, most currency entitlements have been held in bank deposits, which are not the property of deposit customers, being liabilities of the banks and owed to them. It started with depositors placing specie with goldsmiths or transferring currency to them from other accounts on the understanding a goldsmith would deploy the funds so acquired to obtain sufficient profit to pay a 6% interest on deposits. To earn this return, it was agreed by the depositor that the funds would become the goldsmith’s property to be used as the goldsmith saw fit.</p><p>Goldsmiths and their banking successors were and still are dealers in credit. As the goldsmiths’ banking business evolved, they would create deposits by extending credit to borrowers. A loan to the borrower appeared as an asset on a goldsmith’s balance sheet, which through double-entry book-keeping was balanced by a liability being the deposit facility from which the borrower would draw down the loan. Thus, money and currency issued by banks as claims upon them were replaced entirely by book-entry liabilities owed to depositors, encashable into specie, central bank currency or banker’s cheque only on demand.</p><p>Through the expansion of bank credit, which is matched by the creation of deposits through double-entry book-keeping, commercial banks create liabilities subject to withdrawal as currency to this day. That there is an underlying cycle of expansion and contraction of bank credit is evidenced by the composite price index and bond yields between 1817 and 1885 shown in Figure 1 above. But so long as money, that is gold coin, remained exchangeable with currency and bank deposits on demand, fluctuations in outstanding bank credit only had a relatively short-term effect on the general level of prices. And as explained above, the expansion of the quantity of above-ground gold stocks from South African mines in the late 1880s contributed to the general level of prices increasing in the final decade of the nineteenth century until the First World War.</p><p>Following the Great War, the earlier creation of the Federal Reserve Board in the United States led to the expansion of circulating dollar currency, fuelling the Roaring Twenties and the Wall Street bubble, followed by the Wall Street crash and the depression. These calamities were the inevitable consequence of excessive credit creation in the 1920s. The error made by statist economists at the time (and ever since) was to ignore what caused the depression, believing it to be a contemporaneous failure of capitalism instead of the consequence of earlier currency debasement and interest rate suppression. From then on, this error has been perpetuated by statists frustrated by the discipline imposed upon them by monetary gold. The solution was seen to be to remove money from the currency system so that the state would have unlimited flexibility to manage economic outcomes.</p><p>With America dominating the global economy after the First World War, her use of the dollar both domestically and internationally had begun to dominate global economic outcomes. The errors of earlier currency expansion ahead of and during the Roaring Twenties, admittedly exacerbated by the introduction of farm machinery, led to a global slump in agricultural prices the following decade. And the additional error of Glass Stegall tariffs collapsed global trade in all goods.</p><p>Following the Second World War, secondary wars in Korea and Vietnam led to exported dollars being accumulated and then sold by foreign central banks for American’s gold reserves. In 1948, America had 21,628.4 tonnes of gold reserves, 72% of the world total. By 1971, when the facility for central banks to encash dollars for gold was suspended, US gold reserves had fallen to 12,398 tonnes, 34% of world gold reserves. Today it stands officially at 8,133.5 tonnes, being less than 23% of world gold reserves — figures independently unaudited and suspected by many observers to overstate the true position.[iii]</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/854/1*5OfkyDRtPajVIaF3XoEmYg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>The consequences of currency expansion for the relationship between money and currency since the two were completely severed in 1971 is shown in Figure 3.</p><p>Since 1960 (the indexed base of the chart) above-ground gold stocks have increased from 62,475 tonnes by about 200% to 189,000 tonnes — offset to a large degree by world population growth.[iv] M3 broad money has increased by 70 times, the disparity in these rates of increase being adjusted by the increase in the dollar price of money, with the dollar losing 98% of its purchasing power relative to gold. By basing the chart on 1960 much of the currency expansion which led to the collapse of the London gold pool in the mid-1960s is captured, illustrating the strains in the relationship that led to the Nixon shock.</p><h3>The rival status of cryptocurrencies</h3><p>Over the last decade, led by bitcoin cryptocurrencies have become a popular hedge against fiat currency debasement. Bitcoin has a finite limit of 21 million coins, having less than 2¼ million yet to be mined. And of those issued, some are irretrievably lost, theoretically adding to their value.</p><p>Fans of cryptocurrencies are unusual, because they have grasped the essential weakness of state-issued fiat currencies ahead of the wider public. Armed with this knowledge they claim that distributed ledger technology independent from governments will form the basis of tomorrow’s money. It has led to a speculative frenzy, driving bitcoin’s price from a reported 10,000 for two pizzas in 2010 (therefore worth less than a cent each) to over $60,000 today. If, as hodlers hope, bitcoin replaces all state-issued fiat currencies when they fail, then the increase in its dollar value has much further to go.</p><p>In theory there are reasons that bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies can become media of exchange in a limited capacity, but never money, the basis that all currencies referred to for their original validity. Indeed, some transactions following the original pizza purchase have occurred since, but they are very few.</p><p>The reasons bitcoin or rival cryptocurrencies are unlikely to be accepted widely as currencies, let alone as a replacement for money, are best summed up in the following bullet points.</p><p>To replace money, as opposed to currencies, bitcoin would have to be accepted as a replacement for both gold and silver. Beyond the imagination of tech-savvy enthusiasts, making up perhaps less than one in two hundred transacting humans,[v] it is impossible to see bitcoin achieving this goal, because they represent a vanishingly small number of the global population. There can be little doubt that if fiat currencies lose their utility the overwhelming majority of transacting individuals will desire physical money, and not another form of digital media, which currencies in the main and cryptocurrencies have become.</p><p>Despite the advance of technology not everyone yet possesses the knowledge, media, or the reliable electricity and internet connections to conduct transactions in cryptocurrencies. Remote theft of them is easier and more profitable than that of gold and silver coin. Cryptocurrencies are too dependent on undefinable risk factors for transactional ubiquity.</p><p>The number of rival cryptocurrencies has proliferated. It is estimated that there are now over 6,800 in existence compared with 180 government-issued currencies. They represent both an inflation of numbers and values, which if unsatisfied already makes the seventeenth century tulip mania look like to have been a relatively minor speed bump in comparison. In only a decade they have grown to $750 billion in value based on an unproven concept stimulating unallayed human greed at the expense of considered reason.</p><p>By way of contrast, gold’s strength as money is its flexibility of supply from other uses combined with its record of ensuring price stability. As we saw in Figure 1’s illustration of the relationship between prices and borrowing costs, assuming the factors of production are available the stability of prices under a gold standard permits an assessment of final product values at the commencement of an investment in production. There is no such certainty with bitcoin or rival cryptocurrencies because a strictly finite quantity would make it impossible to calculate final prices at the end of an investment in production. Without providing the means for economic calculation, any money or currency replacement will fail.</p><p>Unless they disappear with their currencies, central banks will never sanction distributed ledger currencies beyond their control acting as a general medium of exchange. This is one reason why they are working to introduce their own central bank digital currencies, allowing them to maintain statist control over currencies while extending powers over how they are used. Furthermore, central banks do not own cryptocurrencies, but they do officially own 35,554 tonnes of gold, having never discarded true money completely.[vi] Events have proved that they are even reluctant to allow monetary gold to circulate, not least because it would call into question the credibility of their fiat currencies. But if there is a fall-back position in the demise of fiat, it will be based on central bank gold and never on a private-sector cryptocurrency.</p><p>We should also consider what happens to cryptocurrencies in the event of a fiat currency collapse. The point behind any money or currency is that it must possess all the objective value in a transaction with all subjectivity to be found in the goods or services being exchanged. It requires the currency to be scarce, but not so much that its value measured in goods is expected to continually rise. If that was the case, then its ability to circulate would become impaired through hoarding.</p><p>We are left with questioning whether bitcoin can ever possess a purely objective value in transactions. Their potential role as a transacting currency will also evaporate along with fiat because these will be the circumstances where all currencies which cannot be issued as credible gold substitutes will become valueless, because if any currency is to survive the end of the fiat regime it will require action by central banks combined with new laws and regulations which can only come from governments. The nightmare for crypto enthusiasts is that central banks will be forced eventually to mobilise their gold reserves to back credibly what is left of their currencies’ collapsing purchasing power.</p><p>We are providing an answer to another question over the fate of cryptocurrencies in the event that central banks are forced to mobilise their gold reserves, turning fiat currencies into credible money substitutes. Admittedly, it is unlikely to be a simple decision with the problem beyond the understanding of statist policy advisers and with competing interests seeking to influence the outcome. But, there can be only one action that will allow the state and banking system to retain control over currencies and credit, which is to back them with gold reserves, preferably with a gold coin standard.</p><p>When that moment is anticipated, cryptocurrencies as potential circulating currencies will become fully redundant. They are then likely to lose most of or all their value as replacement currencies. Furthermore, it is hard to find anyone who currently holds a cryptocurrency who does not hope to cash in by selling them at higher prices for their national currencies. They have been bought for speculation and investment with little or no intention of ultimately spending them. Therefore, we can assume that the demise of fiat currencies, far from inviting replacements by bitcoin and its imitators, will also mean the death of the cryptocurrency phenomenon in a general return towards a money standard, which always has been physical and metallic.</p><h3>The progression towards currency destruction</h3><p>In last week’s article for Goldmoney I suggested four waypoints to mark the route towards the ending of the fiat currency system. The similarity of current events with those of John Law’s inflation and subsequent collapse of the Mississippi bubble and of the French livre so far is striking, but this time it’s on a global scale. The John Law experience offers us a template for what is already happening to financial assets and currencies today — hence the four waypoints[vii].</p><p>Briefly described, John Law was a proto-Keynesian money crank who operated a policy of inflating the values of his principal assets, the Banque Royale and his Mississippi venture, by issuing shares in partly paid form with calls due later. Ten per cent down translated into fortunes for early subscribers as share prices rose from L140 in June 1717 to over L10,000 in January 1720, fuelled by a bitcoin-style buying frenzy. But when calls became due in January 1720 and a scheme to merge the Banque Royale with the Mississippi venture was proposed, shares began to be sold to pay the calls and take up rights to new issues. Law used his position as controller of the currency to issue fiat livres to buy shares in the market to support prices, measures that finally failed in May. Priced in livres, the shares fell to under 3,500 by November. In sterling, they fell from £330 in January to below £50 in September. After October, there was no exchange rate for livres against sterling implying the livre had lost all its exchange value.[viii]</p><p>By injecting cash into investing institutions in return for government bonds, central banks are following a remarkably similar policy today. Quantitative easing by the US’s central bank, which since March 2020 has injected over $2 trillion into US pension funds and insurance companies to invest in higher risk assets than government and agency bonds, is no less than a repetition of John Law’s policy of inflating asset values to ensure a spreading wealth effect, while ensuring finance is facilitated for the state.</p><p>Last night (3 November) the Fed was forced to announce a phased reduction of quantitative easing to allay fears of intractable price inflation. The question now arises as to how many months of QE reduction it will take to deflate the financial asset bubble. And what will then be the Fed’s response: will QE be increased again in a repetition of the John Law proto-Keynesian mistakes?</p><p>There comes a point where the prices of goods reflect the increased quantity of currency in circulation. Increases in the general level of prices inevitably lead to rising levels for interest rates, and the creation of credit in the main banking centres begin to go into reverse. John Law found that share prices could then no longer be supported, and the Mississippi bubble burst in May 1720; a fate which equity markets today will almost certainly face, because price rises for goods and services are now proving intractable.</p><p>The outcome of Law’s proto-Keynesianism was a collapse in Mississippi shares, and the complete destruction of the livre. The similarity with the situation in financial markets today is truly remarkable. There are now no good options for policy makers. Hampered by similar neo-Keynesian errors and beliefs, central bankers and politicians lack the resolve to stop events leading inexorably towards the destruction of their currencies. The first waypoint in last week’s article for Goldmoney is now being seen: a growing realisation that major economies, particularly the US and UK, face the prospect of a combination of rising prices accompanied by an economic slump, frequently diagnosed as stagflation.</p><p>Stagflation is a misnomer. Monetary inflation is a con which in smaller doses provides the illusion of stimulus. But there comes a point where the transfer of wealth from the productive economy to the government is too great to bear and the economy begins to collapse. While it is impossible to judge where that point lies, the accumulation of monetary inflation in recent years now weighs heavily on all major economies.</p><p>The conditions today closely replicate those in France in late-1719 and early 1720. Prices were rising in the rural areas as well as in the cities, impoverishing the peasantry and asset inflation was running into headwinds, about to impoverish the beneficiaries of the bubble’s wealth effect as well.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>If central banks decide to protect their currencies, they must let markets determine interest rates. With prices rising officially at over 5% in the US (more like 15% on independent estimates) the rise in interest rates will not only crash all financial asset values from fixed interest to equities, but force governments to rein in their spending to eliminate deficits. This will involve greater cuts than currently indicated, because of loss of tax revenues. Indeed, mandatory spending will put socialising governments in an impossible position.</p><p>But even these measures are unlikely to protect currencies, because of extensive foreign ownership of the US dollar. Foreigners hold total some $33 trillion in financial assets and bank deposits, much of which will be liquidated or lost in a bear market. Long experience suggests that funds rescued from overexposure to foreign currencies will be repatriated.</p><p>Alternatively, attempts to continue the inflationary policies of Keynesian money cranks will undermine currencies more rapidly, but this is almost certainly the line of least policy resistance — until it is too late.</p><p>It has never been more important for the hapless citizen to recognise what is happening to currencies and to understand the fallacies behind cryptocurrencies. They are not practical replacements for state-issued currencies and are likely to turn out to be just another aspect of the financial bubble. The only protection from an increasingly likely collapse of the fiat money system and all that sails with it is to understand what constitutes money as opposed to currency; and that is only physical gold and silver coins and bars.</p><p><strong>For the latest analysis and interpretation of the precious metal markets, be sure to subscribe to</strong><a href="https://www.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights"><strong> Goldmoney Insights.</strong></a></p><p>[i] Quoted in Central Bank Gold reserves, an historical perspective since 1845 by Timothy Green (published by the World Gold Council, November 1999)</p><p>[ii] The confusion over the relationship between interest rates and prices is reflected in Gibson’s paradox, which defied explanation by Keynes and other statist economists. A fuller explanation of the phenomenon is found at https://www.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights/gibson-s-paradox</p><p>[iii] Goldmoney estimate in 2012 and extrapolation of mone production since. See https://www.goldmoney.com/images/media/Files/Old_GM_WP/theabovegroundgoldstock.pdf</p><p>[iv] Generously assuming that there are as many as 35,000,000 souls globally willing to use cryptocurrencies for daily transactions. Admittedly, they may be pockets of them in places like California, but if its lack of supply means that their value rises, they will be hoarded and not spent.</p><p>[v] Caution should be exercised over the actual figure, derived from IMF statistics, because the IMF allows swapped and leased gold to be included in them, leading to an unknown degree of double counting.</p><p>[vi] See https://www.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights/waypoints-on-the-road-to-currency-destruction-and-how-to-avoid-it</p><p>[vii] See Antoine E Murphy’s Richard Cantillon — Entrepreneur and Economist (Oxford University Press) for a financial account of Law’s Mississippi bubble and its bursting.</p><p>[viii] World Gold Council figures.</p><p><em>The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect those of Goldmoney, unless expressly stated. The article is for general information purposes only and does not constitute either Goldmoney or the author(s) providing you with legal, financial, tax, investment, or accounting advice. You should not act or rely on any information contained in the article without first seeking independent professional advice. Care has been taken to ensure that the information in the article is reliable; however, Goldmoney does not represent that it is accurate, complete, up-to-date and/or to be taken as an indication of future results and it should not be relied upon as such. Goldmoney will not be held responsible for any claim, loss, damage, or inconvenience caused as a result of any information or opinion contained in this article and any action taken as a result of the opinions and information contained in this article is at your own risk.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ed7318d4bc58" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney/money-funny-money-and-crypto-ed7318d4bc58">Money, funny-money and crypto</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/goldmoney">Goldmoney</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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