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        <title><![CDATA[Hive Intelligence - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Collaboration, cybersecurity &amp; information security from Australia&#39;s fastest growing cybersecurity firm - Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[It’s alright, It’s ok?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hivint-blog/its-alright-it-s-ok-82aaec125cd4?source=rss----f6356645f7e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/82aaec125cd4</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Arun Raghu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2020 00:45:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-30T01:41:10.172Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>It’s alright, It’s ok? Or should we look the other way? Navigating the FUD and Stayin’ Alive with COVIDSafe</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/602/1*XcGwZsRhLnlaLeZaG5v1kw.png" /><figcaption>The COVIDSafe App has attracted significant attention — both good and bad — in the last two weeks</figcaption></figure><p>On Sunday evening April 26th, the Australian Government officially released its COVID-19 contact-tracing smartphone app (known as ‘COVIDSafe’) for download on the Apple and Google Play stores.</p><p>Given the flurry of debate which has dominated public discourse over the last two weeks regarding the app, it’s likely that many Australians would be getting lost in the noise being generated about it, and/or stuck in ‘analysis paralysis’ as to whether or not they should install it.</p><p>The appropriateness of using the app from a security and public policy perspective is something that is unlikely to ever reach anything approaching a broad universal consensus. However, given the rapidly evolving nature of the pandemic and the Government’s stated ambitions to have at least 40 percent of the population — roughly 10 million people — using the app for it to be sufficiently effective, it’s important that people feel comfortable to make a decision sooner rather than later<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a>.</p><p>And, with little else in the news at the moment outside of COVID-19, it’s likely that many of the security and privacy concerns around the app are being amplified even more than they would normally, just as has been the case with Zoom and the security concerns expressed around its use.</p><p>So, let’s take a look at the debate a bit more closely, and try and put some of the common arguments and threads of discussion in perspective.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/602/1*tPGiYFbilh6ndajWegLgdw.png" /><figcaption>A screenshot from COVIDSafe</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The basics</strong></p><p>Many readers will already know the basics regarding the app. While this article isn’t intended as a detailed technical analysis of its inner workings, in brief:</p><ul><li>Once a user downloads and installs the app, they are asked to provide their full name, postcode, mobile number and the age range they fall within. The user’s phone number is then verified, after which the user’s registration information is stored encrypted in a central database.</li><li>A temporary unique ID is generated for each user, which is stored on their phone and updated every two hours. The app uses Bluetooth to identify any other phones in the vicinity with the app installed that are also sending out a corresponding Bluetooth signal. When a signal is detected, that information (including each user’s unique ID) is recorded as a ‘digital handshake’ and stored on each user’s phone in an encrypted file for a period of 21 days.</li><li>Beyond this, the app does not collect any location information about users and their movements.</li><li>If a user uninstalls the app, all digital handshakes recorded on their phone are deleted. However, if they have come into contact with someone using the app, their ID will still be captured on that other user’s phone for 21 days.</li><li>When a user of the app tests positive, that user can consent to all details regarding digital handshakes recorded on their phone for the previous 21 days to be uploaded to the central database. The unique IDs captured in the handshakes are used to identify the registration information (already in the database) of users who came into contact with the person who tested positive (i.e., within 1.5 metres) . Currently only handshakes that represent a contact risk — that is, involve 15 minutes of contact at 1.5 metres, will be flagged<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a>. This information is decrypted and provided to health officials for contact tracing efforts<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a>.</li></ul><p>The design of COVIDSafe has been led by the Digital Transformation Agency, and is understood to be based on Singapore’s version of the app, known as <a href="https://www.tracetogether.gov.sg/">TraceTogether</a>.</p><p><strong>The concerns</strong></p><p>Some of the concerns being expressed around potential security and privacy risks to people’s data from the COVIDsafe app are probably quite fair. It is however difficult to precisely quantify the level of that risk at this point in time, given that:</p><ul><li>While the government has committed to releasing the source code for the application, this will not occur for another 14 days, and in the meantime, Australians are being encouraged to download the app and start using it;</li><li>The security and privacy risk to the community arguably increases proportionate to the degree of take up and therefore number of Australians who have their data captured by the app, and at this stage we aren’t clear what the take up will be.</li></ul><p>Unsurprisingly, the Government has pointed to the potential public health benefits of the app as the key reason Australians should download it. But countering this is the following:</p><ul><li>The degree to which the community has chosen to use the application will take some time to become clear; but reaching a 40% usage rate appears to be extremely ambitious given that Singapore only had a take-up rate in the order of around 20%, and — broadly speaking — trust in the government there is likely significantly higher than it is here. So, quantifying the actual public health benefit that will accrue from the use of the app is difficult, and there are no clear cases of international success with contact tracing apps we can refer to;</li><li>There are probably a number of theoretical security risks which we cannot precisely quantify the magnitude of at this time — for example, the potential for Digital Handshakes to be manipulated through false Bluetooth beacons that attempt to mimic a legitimate installation of the COVIDSafe app;</li><li>Rightly or wrongly, the current Government does not have the most enviable perceived track record when it comes to technology initiatives that have security and privacy implications. These difficulties have spanned the My Health Record episode (in which over 2 million Australians opted out of having an e-health record), the controversy surrounding the introduction of the Access and Assistance Bill of 2018<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> concerning encrypted communications, the <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/d3310114.nsf/Home/Assuring+Census+Data+Quality">Census drama of 2016</a>, and mandatory metadata retention laws that were introduced in 2014. Together, these episodes have undoubtedly created a degree of cynicism about the Government’s perceived regard for and ability to safeguard the security and privacy of Australians — particularly where they are storing information about people’s interactions in a centralised database;</li><li>Google and Apple are <a href="https://www.apple.com/au/newsroom/2020/04/apple-and-google-partner-on-covid-19-contact-tracing-technology/">partnering together</a> on a contact tracing solution that will be natively built into their smartphone operating systems, and which relies on a decentralised model for storing user data until such time as someone reports a positive test. This would allay some of the privacy and security concerns associated with the Government’s centralised database approach. Some people may also feel both companies have a better track record in advocating for user privacy and security, but that is a rabbit hole in and of itself…</li></ul><p>In addition, some of the messaging that has been put forward in support of the COVIDSafe app has probably served to hinder rather than help the Government’s cause. For example, in mid-April, the Deputy Chief Medical Officer hinted at the possibility of considering requiring <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-17/paul-kelly-coronavirus-tracing-app/12158854">mandatory use of the app</a> if voluntary take up proved insufficient. While the Prime Minister backed down from these remarks the following day, it immediately put privacy and security advocates on alert. Similarly, having the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-18/prime-minister-rules-out-making-coronavirus-app-mandatory/12161126">Minister for Government Services make public assurances around the privacy and security of the app</a>, while likely well-intentioned, probably didn’t help the situation when only a matter of days earlier he had incorrectly attributed crashes of the MyGov website to a denial of service attack, rather than to the demand for Centrelink payments caused by the government’s closure of a number of businesses in response to the pandemic.</p><p><strong>The upside</strong></p><p>The upside is clear: if the app works, it will aid contact tracing efforts significantly, slow the spread of the virus and save lives. It may also help with easing current restrictions on social and economic activity. The Government has committed to putting in place a range of measures to protect the privacy and security of Australians as an added incentive to encourage users to download the app. These include:</p><ul><li>The source code for the application will be released in the next two weeks to enable more detailed independent analysis. Ideally this would have happened sooner, but it is better than not at all;</li><li>Interim mechanisms have been introduced under the emergency declaration provisions of the <em>Biosecurity Act 2015</em> to ensure the data collected by the app is not at risk of ‘scope creep’ — that is, the data cannot be used for purposes other than those related to contact tracing. These will soon be replaced by strict legislative provisions to formalise these protections;</li><li>Only State and Territory Health Officials will have access to the data;</li><li>The Government, through the Department of Health, has commissioned a comprehensive <a href="https://www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/covidsafe-application-privacy-impact-assessment">Privacy Impact Assessment</a> of the COVIDSafe app, <a href="https://www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/covidsafe-application-privacy-impact-assessment-agency-response">has agreed either in whole or part</a> to the recommendations made in it, and taken steps to implement them.</li></ul><p><strong>The bottom line</strong></p><p>There are undoubtedly security and privacy risks associated with COVIDSafe that are not negligible. However, when we are discussing the security and privacy issues associated with any new technology, system or application, it’s important to try and bring a degree of rationalism to the table. This becomes particularly challenging when there is a strong societal dimension involved, as is clearly the case with COVID-19. It becomes even more difficult in the current environment where COVID-related news dominates the media, meaning that the discussion of security and privacy concerns is prone to being disproportionately aggrandized<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a>.</p><p>In an ideal world, we’d seek to eliminate the security and privacy risks associated with the Government’s contact-tracing app. Realistically, however, we are faced with competing constraints — just like we are in any typical cyber risk assessment exercise. In this case, the rapidly evolving nature of the pandemic means there isn’t the luxury of a lot of time to eliminate those risks. And so, as a matter of practicality, the focus needs to shift from one of risk elimination to one of risk mitigation. In this context, the Government has done a reasonable job of trying to facilitate this through its introduction of regulatory protections and committing to release the app’s source code.</p><p>There is of course the risk that a security breach involving data extracted from the app and stored centrally could occur, causing embarrassment and potential harm to the Government and millions of Australians. However, it’s important to acknowledge that those in the security industry do tend to look at things with a degree of paranoia and purism that colours our view and probably over-amplifies the magnitude of those risks — or at least causes some neglect of the factors that may offset them, such as the potential health-protecting and life-saving benefits that the enhanced contact tracing measures of the app may be able to facilitate.</p><p>Further, these are obviously extraordinary times. That means we simply don’t have the luxury of being able to expect or demand perfection in the circumstances. There’s also probably merit in suggestions that much of the data we would be sharing with the Government in using this app is no more sensitive than the data we share about ourselves online on different platforms day-to-day.</p><p>Given these considerations, and while it is certainly highly advisable for each person to make a decision that they are comfortable with rather than blindly following the pack mentality, there is nothing per se that causes sufficient concern in the circumstances to suggest that people <em>should not, </em>as a blanket rule, download the app.</p><p><strong>What could be done better</strong></p><p>While initial uptake of the app has been encouraging, it is likely that a good proportion of end users who have downloaded the app to date will have been in the section of the population that has fairly strong views that favour the public benefits the app can bring which may have overridden their concerns around the government’s track record in the security and privacy space.</p><p>Ultimately, this widespread concern may have more impact in the coming days as people who are ‘on the fence’ about installing the app make a decision one way or the other as to whether to do so, particularly when Google and Apple are developing their own solution and in many respects competing for the trust of those same end users. It remains to be seen whether these factors will ultimately curtail the ability to achieve the desired 40% benchmark for overall use of COVIDSafe across the community. There are however some measures that the Government could introduce to try and enhance the level of trust in the community to help the situation:</p><ul><li>Introducing transparent and regular reporting mechanisms for whenever COVIDSafe data is accessed, and by whom, would be a good start;</li><li>While the Government has assured the data will only be accessed by State and Territory health officials, ensuring independent oversight is in place to guarantee this will be critical.</li><li>Additionally, having independent assurance and endorsements from parties with sufficient security and privacy expertise of the app will be crucial. Releasing the source code in 14 days may help with this, but by that stage most Australians are likely to have already made up their mind one way or the other.</li></ul><p><strong>Addendum</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/571/1*i5ffaem8g_5dtsOMVsr5Ig.png" /></figure><p>As a point of interest, in a survey we ran internally of our own staff, just under half of those who participated indicated they would download and use the app — but would be doing so in spite of their relative lack of trust of government. This is particularly interesting in a security company, where people will naturally look at these sorts of issues through a particular lens that has a natural bias towards privacy and security concerns.</p><p>Despite this, and while there were clear indications from some they would not download the app, the majority of those who participated in the survey indicated they would do so, or would at least seriously consider doing so. Interestingly, while the option was available in the survey, no one indicated they would download and install the app <em>because </em>of their trust of the Government in this space. This is probably reflective of the broader community as well, and indicates our leaders have some way to go to re-establish trust in the community when it comes to their approach to privacy and security related issues.</p><p><em>Arun is a Principal Security Advisor at Hivint / Trustwave.</em></p><p><em>These are not the official views of Hivint / Trustwave.</em></p><p>— — — — —</p><p>[1] As of Monday evening 27 April, 2 million Australians had downloaded the app.</p><p>[2] Note that given current social distancing restrictions, it is likely that for many people there will not currently be many handshakes that equate to a contact risk. If and when these restrictions are relaxed, it’s likely more handshakes would fall into the contact risk category.</p><p>[3] A good breakdown of how the app is understood to work is provided in the Department of Health’s Privacy Impact Assessment, available at https://www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/covidsafe-application-privacy-impact-assessment</p><p>[4] Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018</p><p>[5] We’ve seen this unfold already in recent times with the massive publicity given to security concerns around the use of Zoom during the pandemic.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=82aaec125cd4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog/its-alright-it-s-ok-82aaec125cd4">It’s alright, It’s ok?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog">Hive Intelligence</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Zoom Boom and the harbingers of Doom]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hivint-blog/zoom-boom-and-the-harbingers-of-doom-1a62d15a9fc?source=rss----f6356645f7e---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zoom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Pinkerton]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2020 23:40:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-22T02:15:29.209Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There has been a plethora of articles in the media recently about security issues in the Zoom platform, which have seemingly led to numerous organisations, and governments banning its use. Is Zoom’s security really a car crash of biblical proportions, and should you be banning it too, or might something else be going on here?</p><p>Around mid-March, the world went into lock-down, and as tough as this has been for all of us, spare a thought for the poor journalists out there. Not only are they trying to file stories whilst working from home, but a world in lock-down there is a lot less happening. COVID-19 has had a monopoly over the news cycle, and we are all yearning to read about something else; as a result, news editors across the globe have been desperate for anything that is not directly coronavirus related that can grab public interest.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qrrDbdH0wjrl0_IJGvEkOA.png" /></figure><p>Enter stage left, Zoom.us the <em>enfant terrible</em> of the video conferencing world.</p><p>I was zooming, you were zooming, our kids were zooming, celebrities were zooming, even Boris Johnson the UK PM was zooming<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a>. This was down to the fact that Zoom has a secret sauce that has eluded many of its competitors:, it’s cheap, it’s easy to use, and most remarkably it works, even in the post COVID-19, WFH lock-down world.</p><p>Most impressive was Zoom’s remarkable achievement of managing to engineer itself clear of a meteoric jump from 10 to 220 million users within 3 months.</p><p>Zoom has historically been no stranger to security issues, for example in July last year a security issue affecting the Apple Mac version was identified which potentially allowed an attacker to force a victim to join a call with the camera enabled, even after the application had been uninstalled. Whilst Zoom did eventually address this, the time taken was not considered in-line with the severity of the issue; for this Zoom’s CEO was forced to issue a Mea Culpa<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a>. There were further issues, with calls being mistakenly routed through China, and the fact that the company’s claim about end-to-end encryption were simply untrue.</p><p>By now Zoom is not just another video conferencing app, in a few short weeks it evolved into our children’s classroom, the new venue for our water cooler chats, our after work drinks, our GP’s consulting room, a Yoga studio, Martial Arts Dojo, it’s even a place of worship and so much more; so of course any suggestion that it is insecure or a risk to our privacy is not only newsworthy, but a sure fire click generation machine.</p><p>First came the stories of ‘Zoombombing’: the world’s kids and trolls had found a great cure to the boredom of lock-down, and were setting up Discord channels and the like to share details of upcoming meetings that were subsequently gate-crashed. There were an array of outcomes, ranging from the hilarious, to the downright offensive. Zoom countered with an array of protections, from passwords to virtual lobbies, reducing the problem to one of user education.</p><p>With the added scrutiny that a multi-million user base uptick brings, a number of other issues came to the fore. For example the Windows 10 version was vulnerable to a UNC path injection attack, where a user clicking on a link in the chat window could have their Windows credentials exposed<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a>. At the same time, we started to read about privacy issues, such as the discovery that the iOS version of the app was funneling data off to Facebook.</p><p>With the taste of blood in the water, stories blasting Zoom’s terrible security practices became a new obsession, and with those stories came a flood of stories about the number of organisations that were banning it, or at the very least strongly discouraging its use over the reported security issues.</p><p>SpaceX banned Zoom due to “significant privacy and security concerns”. Google sent an email to employees who were Zoom users, warning them that Zoom would cease to work for them citing “security vulnerabilities”. Next were the governments banning it’s use for official business: Taiwan, Singapore, US, Germany, India. Even the Australian Defence Force banned it, after they were hilariously joined in an official meeting by a well-known Australian comedian<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a>.</p><p>Many organisations have a very simplistic view of security, and it’s easy to imagine that blocking unsanctioned tools will encourage the use of the tools you have sanctioned. By preventing a user connecting to one tool, they will simply switch to another. The reality is that the key to Zoom’s success is that it actually worked, while many of its competitors were struggling to scale-up, or dealing with impaired-by-bandwidth contention issues. Many of the alternatives were simply not effective whereas Zoom demonstrated it’s strength in calls with large numbers of dispersed external users; generally, the higher the number of people you are inviting to a call, the lower the number of available options there are likely to be.</p><p>As our interest in Zoom’s insecurities seemed to wane, we saw a surge of more questionable content; mostly click bait, pitched as yet more Zoom failings, for example stories about 1000s of Zoom video’s being exposed, or 1000s of Zoom user accounts appearing on the dark web. The former turned out to be a revelation that searching unsecured S3 buckets using the naming format of Zoom videos yielded results. The latter appeared to be the result of a credential stuffing attack with previously exposed credentials that happen to be a match for Zoom accounts, both arguably not failings on Zoom’s part, in fact failings that apply to almost any large-scale platform use.</p><p>For its part, Zoom it seems was working really hard to try and counter these stories, with the positive result that it actually appears to have matured its security posture in an extraordinarily short time frame, for example:</p><ul><li>Updating their Privacy Policy<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a></li><li>Issuing numerous software updates to address issues<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></li><li>Publishing a guide to help prevent Zoomboming<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a></li><li>Unveiling a 90 day plan to bolster key privacy and security initiatives<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a></li><li>Hiring Alex Stamos as an advisor<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a></li><li>Engaging with Luta Security to run a bug bounty<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a></li></ul><p>So if you are a CISO, and you want to know if you should also be banning Zoom, then we have the following considerations.</p><p>Firstly consider that Zoom and platforms of its ilk, in a COVID-19 lock down world, are not simply work collaboration and conferencing tools, they may be the underlying fabric that is holding your people’s lives together.</p><p>Your users are not simply using these apps to talk to each other during work hours, they are using them to talk to their families and friends in the evening, they are using them to keep fit, both mentally and physically, and in the coming months they may well be invited to attend christenings, weddings and funerals via these applications.</p><p>They are also communicating with your customers, so by banning Zoom outright, you may think that you are reducing your security and privacy risks, but at what cost if you are further isolating people at a time when they are at their most vulnerable? You could make the argument that this isn’t a valid issue if you’ve provided an alternative but then the question remains… if you have provided an alternative platform, why is your team still using Zoom?</p><p>So rather than banning Zoom outright, consider:</p><ul><li>Making your employees aware of the risks through good security awareness training;</li><li>Make sure your employees understand how to make use of Zoom’s security features,<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a> and employ good general security hygiene;</li><li>Encourage users to make use of your sanctioned platforms for sensitive meetings; and</li><li>Have a clear policy about not discussing highly sensitive topics during Zoom meetings.</li></ul><p>If you got this far, and are still considering banning Zoom, or any other specific collaboration tool then before you proceed, ensure that you:</p><ul><li>Fully understand why people were using that tool rather than others.</li><li>Wherever possible, provided an alternative solution that is as functional and reliable, and does not preclude other parties from connecting, i.e., only accessible by internal users, or users on certain platforms.</li><li>Really consider whether this is a major risk for you. And try to be clear on the risk you’re really worried about. Is it that someone is in your meetings without you detecting them? (Pretty unlikely); That someone finds a recording of your meeting? (Don’t record it); That a foreign state agent intercepts your video streams and watches them to gain market intelligence (Seriously? Imagine this scenario when you’re in your next 2 hour long management meeting and you’ll realise how little value there is for external agents in most of your discussions).</li></ul><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <a href="https://metro.co.uk/2020/03/31/boris-johnson-sparks-security-concerns-revealing-zoom-id-cabinet-meeting-12489236/">https://metro.co.uk/2020/03/31/boris-johnson-sparks-security-concerns-revealing-zoom-id-cabinet-meeting-12489236/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <a href="https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2019/07/10/security-update-and-our-ongoing-efforts/">https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2019/07/10/security-update-and-our-ongoing-efforts/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/hackerfantastic/status/1245133371262619654">https://twitter.com/hackerfantastic/status/1245133371262619654</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> <a href="https://www.pedestrian.tv/news/adf-banned-zoom-meetings-security-hamish-blake/">https://www.pedestrian.tv/news/adf-banned-zoom-meetings-security-hamish-blake/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> <a href="https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2020/03/29/zoom-privacy-policy/">https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2020/03/29/zoom-privacy-policy/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> <a href="https://zoom.us/docs/doc/Securing%20Your%20Zoom%20Meetings.pdf">https://zoom.us/docs/doc/Securing%20Your%20Zoom%20Meetings.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> <a href="https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2020/03/20/keep-uninvited-guests-out-of-your-zoom-event/">https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2020/03/20/keep-uninvited-guests-out-of-your-zoom-event/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> <a href="https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2020/04/08/update-on-zoom-90-day-plan-to-bolster-key-privacy-and-security-initiatives/">https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2020/04/08/update-on-zoom-90-day-plan-to-bolster-key-privacy-and-security-initiatives/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/former-facebook-cso-alex-stamos-to-join-zoom-as-outside-security-consultant/">https://www.zdnet.com/article/former-facebook-cso-alex-stamos-to-join-zoom-as-outside-security-consultant/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> <a href="https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2020/04/15/luta-security-katie-moussouris-zoom-bug-bounty/">https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2020/04/15/luta-security-katie-moussouris-zoom-bug-bounty/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/make-sure-your-zoom-meetings-are-safe-by-doing-these-10-things/?ftag=TRE49e8aa0&amp;bhid=26951096027850337934659581844989&amp;mid=12790476&amp;cid=1333632753">https://www.zdnet.com/article/make-sure-your-zoom-meetings-are-safe-by-doing-these-10-things/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1a62d15a9fc" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog/zoom-boom-and-the-harbingers-of-doom-1a62d15a9fc">Zoom Boom and the harbingers of Doom</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog">Hive Intelligence</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[rConfig 3.9.3 Unauthenticated Sensitive Information Disclosure]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hivint-blog/rconfig-3-9-3-unauthenticated-sensitive-information-disclosure-ead4ed88f153?source=rss----f6356645f7e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ead4ed88f153</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability-research]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rconfig]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hivint]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Mar 2020 22:22:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-19T22:23:25.541Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Advisory: rConfig 3.9.3 Unauthenticated Sensitive Information Disclosure</h3><p>Affected Vendor: rConfig<br>Affected Software: rConfig <br>Affected Version: Tested on version 3.9.3, possibly affecting earlier versions<br>Issue type: Incorrect Access Control <br>Release Date: 17 March 2020<br>Discovered by: Daniel Le Souef of Trustwave <br>CVE Identifier: CVE-2020–9425<br>Issue status: Fixed</p><p>Summary<br> — — — — — — — — <br>It is possible for an attacker to retrieve plaintext credentials from the ‘settings.php’ page whilst unauthenticated.</p><p>Description<br> — — — — — — — — <br>An authentication issue was discovered affecting rConfig versions before 3.9.4. Due to the application not ‘exiting’ after redirecting an unauthenticated user, the application continues to output the page contents alongside the redirect, in this case the application returns the ‘settings.php’ page which contains plaintext credentials alongside the redirect. <br>Impact</p><p>— — — — — — — — <br>An attacker is able to retrieve stored plaintext credentials whilst unauthenticated.</p><p>Proof of concept<br> — — — — — — — — <br>1. Run the following command:<br> ‘curl -X GET https://&lt;target&gt;/settings.php | grep “defaultNode”’ <br>2. Observe the values returned for the ‘defaultNodeUsername’ and ‘defaultNodePassword’.</p><p>Solution<br> — — — — — — — — <br>To remediate this vulnerability it is recommended that you upgrade to the latest version of rConfig (or any version &gt; 3.9.3).<br>Otherwise you can add an ‘exit()’ after the redirection in ‘includes/head.inc.php’, replacing lines 14–16 with the following:<br>if (!$session-&gt;logged_in) {<br> header(“Location: “ . $config_basedir . “login.php”);<br> exit();<br>}</p><p>Response timeline<br> — — — — — — — — <br>12 February 2020 — Vendor Notified<br>14 February 2020 — Vendor Acknowledged<br>25 February 2020 — Vendor fix pushed to github<br>17 March 2020 — Advisory posted</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ead4ed88f153" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog/rconfig-3-9-3-unauthenticated-sensitive-information-disclosure-ead4ed88f153">rConfig 3.9.3 Unauthenticated Sensitive Information Disclosure</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog">Hive Intelligence</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Advisory: Oracle Siebel CRM — Persistent Cross Site Scripting by Insecure File Upload…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hivint-blog/advisory-oracle-siebel-crm-persistent-cross-site-scripting-by-insecure-file-upload-58b590a4bb71?source=rss----f6356645f7e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/58b590a4bb71</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hivint Blog]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jul 2019 00:00:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-29T00:00:19.387Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Advisory: Oracle Siebel CRM — Persistent Cross Site Scripting by Insecure File Upload (CVE-2019–2857)</h3><p># Exploit Title: Oracle Siebel CRM — Persistent Cross Site Scripting by Insecure File Upload</p><p># Date: 17 July 2019</p><p># Exploit Author: Sarath Nair</p><p># Vendor Homepage: <a href="http://www.oracle.com/">www.oracle.com</a></p><p># Software Link: <a href="https://www.oracle.com/applications/siebel/">https://www.oracle.com/applications/siebel/</a></p><p># Version: Oracle Siebel CRM (UI Framework) Version 19.0 and prior</p><p># CVE-2019–2857</p><p># PoC Exploit: Persistent Cross Site Scripting by Insecure File Upload</p><p>— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —</p><p>#Vulnerable URL: <a href="http://%3cSiebel_Application%3e/finsadm_enu/start.swe?SWECmd=GotoView&amp;SWEView=Activity+Attachment+View">http://&lt;Siebel_Application&gt;/finsadm_enu/start.swe?SWECmd=GotoView&amp;SWEView=Activity+Attachment+View</a></p><p>#Steps to exploit the issue:</p><p>1. Login to the CRM application and navigate to ‘Activities’ and click on ‘All Activities’.</p><p>2. Edit one of the existing activity, or create a new one.</p><p>3. Use the ‘New File’ menu in ‘attachments’ section to upload an accepted file type.</p><p>4. Intercept the traffic and change the ‘Content-Type:’ HTTP header from “Content-Type: image/jpeg” to “Content-Type: text/html” and upload an HTML file with JavaScript payload.</p><p>5. JavaScript payload will be triggered/rendered upon the victim user views the attached file.</p><p># Description: The Siebel CRM application allows its users to upload any file types through their file upload functionality. The uploaded file can be viewed by another users with the appropriate privileges as part of the workflow. As such, it was possible to upload file with the “html” extension, (containing html and JavaScript code) thereby allowing a Persistent Cross Site Scripting attack.</p><p># Impact: Cross-Site Scripting attacks do not target the server but rather its users. An attacker could force other users to unknowingly execute malicious code saved on the server with XSS payload as part of the business process work flow. The impacts of such attack can range from disclosure of the users’ sensitive information to execution of arbitrary code on the target users’ system.</p><p># Solution: Apply the Oracle Siebel CRM patch released on 16 July 2019</p><p>########################################</p><p># Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline:</p><p>2017-December-23: Discovered vulnerability</p><p>2017-December-25: Vendor Notification</p><p>2017-December-27: Vendor Response/Feedback</p><p>2019-July-16: Vendor Fix/Patch</p><p>2019-July-17: Public Disclosure</p><p>########################################</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=58b590a4bb71" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog/advisory-oracle-siebel-crm-persistent-cross-site-scripting-by-insecure-file-upload-58b590a4bb71">Advisory: Oracle Siebel CRM — Persistent Cross Site Scripting by Insecure File Upload…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog">Hive Intelligence</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Advisory: Injection dangerous command into HARMAN AMX MVP5150 (CVE-2019–11224)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hivint-blog/advisory-injection-dangerous-command-into-harman-amx-mvp5150-cve-2019-11224-55bea4a03f3e?source=rss----f6356645f7e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/55bea4a03f3e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hivint Blog]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2019 04:48:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-08T04:45:46.702Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/550/1*fgcYhM3wolp-f3jSp66MZg.png" /></figure><p>Injection dangerous command into HARMAN AMX <br>=====================================<br>Affected Vendor: AMX — <a href="https://www.amx.com/">https://www.amx.com/</a> <br>Affected Software: MVP5150 Firmware <br>Affected Version: Tested on V2.87.13 <br>Issue type: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (‘OS Command Injection’) <br>Release Date: 07/05/2019 <br>Discovered by: Harold Zang, Hivint <br>CVE Identifier: CVE-2019–11224 <br>Issue status: Publish</p><p>Summary <br>=======================================<br>AMX (<a href="http://www.amx.com/">www.amx.com</a>) is part of the HARMAN Professional Division, and the leading brand for the business, education, and government markets for the company.</p><p>Description <br>=======================================<br>HARMAN AMX MVP5150 v2.87.13 devices are vulnerable to OS Command Injection.</p><p>Impact <br>=======================================<br>An attacker who is able to login to the AMX MVP5150 via Telnet service is able to inject and execute malicious OS commands.</p><p>Proof of concept <br>=======================================<br>1. Login to the device via Telnet. <br>2. Using the following command, perform a command injection: <br>ping 127.0.0.1;ls <br>3. Using the following command, observe it possible to bypass the disallowed space characte: <br>ping 127.0.0.1;HZ=$’\n’;ls$hz/bin/</p><p>Solution <br>=======================================<br>The vendor has informed that this product is obsolete and at this stage there is no product development expected around this product. However if there is any specific customer request for development then it can be considered based on the priority/ requirement.</p><p>Response timeline <br>=======================================<br>09/03/2019 — Found the issue. <br>09/03/2019 — Tried to notify vendor <br>03/04/2019 — Vendor notified. <br>07/05/2019 — Publish</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=55bea4a03f3e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog/advisory-injection-dangerous-command-into-harman-amx-mvp5150-cve-2019-11224-55bea4a03f3e">Advisory: Injection dangerous command into HARMAN AMX MVP5150 (CVE-2019–11224)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog">Hive Intelligence</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Advisory: Upload Malicious File in Kentico CMS (CVE-2018–19453)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hivint-blog/advisory-upload-malicious-file-in-kentico-cms-cve-2018-19453-36debbf85216?source=rss----f6356645f7e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/36debbf85216</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[kentico]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cve]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hivint Blog]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jan 2019 22:00:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-09T22:00:01.591Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*mHK-jqa3TGvo6XefQKcG0g.jpeg" /></figure><p>Upload Malicious File in Kentico CMS<br>====================<br>Affected Vendor: Kentico — <a href="https://www.kentico.com/">https://www.kentico.com</a><br>Affected Software: Kentico CMS<br>Affected Version: Tested on 11.0<br>Issue type: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type<br>Release Date: 08/01/2019<br>Discovered by: Harold Zang, Hivint<br>CVE Identifier: CVE-2018–19453<br>Issue status: Fixed (Hotfix 11.0.45)</p><p>Summary<br>======<br>Kentico CMS is a popular ASP.NET Content Management System (CMS) commonly used for building web-based sites and online stores, with multisite and E-commerce functionality.</p><p>Description<br>=======<br>Kentico CMS is vulnerable to an unrestricted file upload attack. It is possible for a malicious attacker to upload dangerous file types to perform attacks such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) attacks.</p><p>Impact<br>=====<br>An attacker is able to attach a file containing malicious JavaScript to the Kentico Forum and have this file stored in the application’s database. When application users request the attached file, the malicious JavaScript code will be executed within their browsers.</p><p>Proof of concept<br>=========<br>1. Create a sample malicious file with the file extension “.jpg” containing the following JavaScript: <br>&lt;html&gt;<br> &lt;script&gt;alert(/xss/);&lt;/script&gt;<br>&lt;/html&gt;<br>2. Navigate to the Kentico Forum<br>3. Then, click “New thread”<br>4. In the New thread, fill in the form, and select “Attach file(s)” and post the form.<br>6. Upload the sample file above as an attachment.<br>7. Intercept the traffic and change the “Content-Type:” HTTP header from “Content-Type: image/jpeg” to “Content-Type: text/html”.<br>8. Click on the attached file in the thread and observe the the JavaScript being executed.</p><p>Solution<br>=====<br>An immediate workaround, Kentico has recommended to set the “Attach files” permission to “Nobody” in the Forum’s security settings. The vendor has also released a Hotfix(11.0.45).</p><p>Response timeline<br>==========<br>18/11/2018 — Found the issue.<br>18/11/2018 — Vendor notified.<br>27/11/2018 — Patch available for 11.0 (Hotfix 11.0.45)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=36debbf85216" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog/advisory-upload-malicious-file-in-kentico-cms-cve-2018-19453-36debbf85216">Advisory: Upload Malicious File in Kentico CMS (CVE-2018–19453)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog">Hive Intelligence</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Tech Year in Review — 2017–18]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hivint-blog/the-tech-year-in-review-2017-18-e46c8c9200a?source=rss----f6356645f7e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e46c8c9200a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Arun Raghu]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Nov 2018 04:41:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-11-16T03:21:14.736Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Tech Year in Review — 2017–18</h3><p>Over the course of the 2017–18 financial year, Hivint completed 241 technical security assessments ranging from hardware testing to whole of organisation penetration tests for our clients. The purpose of this post is to provide statistics around this year’s testing activities in order to help enrich overall public domain data in this area, and to allow us (and others) to identify and analyse trends in the evolving nature of assurance activities.</p><p>This is the second year that we’ve provided this reporting (for reference, last year’s post is here: <a href="https://blog.hivint.com/hivints-2016-17-tech-year-in-review-5229a6f542b4">https://blog.hivint.com/hivints-2016-17-tech-year-in-review-5229a6f542b4</a>). This current post provides findings and observations from the current year’s findings, and where possible, comparison to last year.</p><h3>Engagements — Industries</h3><p>During the past two financial years, Hivint delivered security assessments to Australian and overseas clients across a wide range of industries. The following chart provides a breakdown of engagements across industries for the 2017–18 financial year (total of 241 assessments) as well as the 2016–17 financial year (117 assessments).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/838/1*JlIc0Ys5lc7LiGfeZ9FcyQ.png" /></figure><p>It’s clear that the number of technical security assurance activities has increased across all Industries with the exception of the finance sector. This is to be expected with the growth of Hivint (approximately doubling the number of staff in our technical security teams across Australia) meaning that we will naturally be able to deliver more projects, but also indicates that there is ongoing industry demand for these services.</p><p>As a testament to the dynamic nature of the security assurance industry, our main client sectors have changed in 2017–18 from the previous year. For the 2016–17 financial year our main clients were positioned within the Technology, Finance and Government sectors. While engagements in 2017–18 for the Technology and Government sectors saw a high level of growth, the number of engagements in the Finance sector decreased slightly compared to the previous year. Across this last year, we’ve witnessed a notable increase in the number and size of internal security testing teams across a number of Australia’s larger financial institutions, which may indicate that they are able to take on more security assurance work internally, as opposed to going to market for these services.</p><h3>Engagements — Assessment Types</h3><p>The 241 engagements were completed across a wide range of targets, using a range of assessment methods. To provide some representation of the type of engagements performed, we have attempted to categorise all engagements into one of eight different types. Categorisation of engagements was based on the primary assessment activity only (for example, an external network security testing activity may include an element of phishing as part of the assessment, however the engagement has been classified as external network testing only as that was the primary focus of the engagement).</p><p>Additionally, because there’s varying definitions across industry as to what constitutes a vulnerability assessment vs a penetration test vs a red teaming activity, we’ve not tried to categorise in this manner, but instead categorised based on the assessment type.</p><p>Additionally, with the exception of source code reviews, this list only includes activities where hands-on testing was performed. Activities such as design assurance assessments (where no technical vulnerabilities are identified, but instead design priorities / recommendations provided) as well as Hivint engagements such as incident response and forensics have been excluded.</p><p>We recognise that this is far from a perfect method, but the intent is to provide a general indication as to what assessment types are the most common for our business.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/639/1*dj2inaftPrCsvQ2JzKnkVg.png" /></figure><h3>Findings</h3><p>Through the 241 assessments undertaken in the 2017–18 financial year, a total of 1380 findings were identified. Findings which were deemed to not present a security risk (i.e. informational findings) are not counted in this set.</p><p>To assess the risk presented by our security findings, Hivint employs an ISO 31000 aligned risk assessment framework, considering common likelihood, impact and overall risk criteria. The tables below provide a breakdown of the number of findings per severity rating across both financial years, as well as percentage change from last year to this.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/813/1*YKEEhc2Oh-R2yUKRCnk3fg.png" /></figure><p>With a 106% increase in the number of assessments (from 117 to 241), and an 89% increase in the number of findings across these assessments (from 720 to 1380) between last year and this year, it would be reasonable to expect an approximate doubling in all risk severity types. However, this is clearly not the case with the volume of Very Low findings notably increasing.</p><p>From a review of these findings, we consider that this is most likely attributed to the significant increase in the number of web application security assessments undertaken in the 2017–18 financial year. Since the majority of Very Low findings were identified during web application security assessments (typically in areas such as unnecessary information disclosure) and because Hivint observed a considerable increase in the number of web application security assessments completed this year compared to the past two financial years, this increase is largely explained.</p><p>Across industries, the charts below illustrate the breakdown of findings (From the Extreme down to Very Low risk severity) for both years.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/648/1*6geP8QDeIq2EvKD4qc__ZA.png" /></figure><p>Based on the ‘raw’ data, it’s clear that the majority of findings for both years are presented as Low risks, with the number of findings tapering off as the risk severity increases. The data also indicates that the relative increase in findings across both years have remained consistent across all risk severities with the exception of extreme risk findings. This can be attributed to the strict requirements for a finding to be classified as extreme. A finding is only classified as extreme if it has a considerably high likelihood of successful exploitation and if exploited may lead to catastrophic consequences.</p><p>It is acknowledged however that these ‘raw’ numbers may be skewed due to the number and type of engagements performed for that industry — such that if the technology sector underwent the most engagements, then it seems reasonable that it would have the highest number of findings. To reduce this potential skew, the following chart has been provided which includes an average of the number of findings (for each risk rating) across the number of engagements completed for all clients in each industry sector during the 2017–18 financial year.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/689/1*JPDioyDVVB20e7eI_5i08A.png" /></figure><p>With this normalised data, most industry sectors followed a fairly predictable pattern of having a very low number of extreme issues and gradually increasing to a maximum number of low-risk issues, before tapering off to smaller number of very low-risk issues. More mature industry sectors (such as Financial Services, Government and Technology) showed a much more rapid drop-off as the risk of issues increased. That is, for these sectors, High risk issues as a proportion of all issues, presented at a much lower rate. We interpret this as a reflection of the focus over recent years in closing off the higher risk issues in industries such as Government, Finance and Technology and the higher frequency with which tests have been completed against these systems.</p><p>A few outliers from the pattern are the sports, miscellaneous commercial sector and the education sector. The pattern of the miscellaneous commercial sector is abnormal since it has the highest number of very low-risk findings and a relatively lower number of low risk findings; the education sector due to the fact it has a higher number of high risk findings and a comparatively lower number of low risk findings, and the sports sector due to the overall higher volume of findings (per engagement) across most ratings.</p><h3>Monthly Breakdown</h3><p>Across the year (and similar to last year) there is a clear set of peaks by way of the number of security assessment engagements, and subsequently number of findings identified each month. The below chart presents the number of engagements and findings per month across the 2017–18 period as well as the 2016–17 period.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/716/1*C-yUMmxp0nRoENzh9IusNw.png" /></figure><p>The chart above contains a clear sequence of peaks by way of the number of security assessment engagements, and laterally the number of findings identified each month. The data flow in the chart is in line with our expectations in working in this industry, the peak periods tend to occur during the leadup to the end of the financial year and the calendar year, which (as noted last year) we attribute primarily to:</p><p>(1) the need to complete projects prior to the end of a forecast cycle (which in Australia is largely prior to the Christmas holiday period — “I need the project in by Christmas”), and</p><p>(2) the need to expend budget prior to the end of a financial cycle (which in Australia is primarily end of June).</p><p>Whilst overall engagements in each month in 2017–18 increased above the equivalent month in the previous year, there are two areas of particular difference:</p><p>(1) There was a considerable increase in the number of engagements across approximately October 2017 through to January 2018. Whilst we haven’t done extensive analysis to identify the reason here, we consider that it may be attributed to entities seeking increased security assurance prior to mandatory data breach notification<a href="#_edn1">[i]</a> requirements coming into effect in February 2018 (applicable to entities subject to the Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988). October is also cyber-security awareness month, which may serve to raise the profile for cyber-security activities (such as security assurance projects).</p><p>(2) The end of financial year peak in this year (April — June 2018) only saw a minor increase in overall engagements when compared to the same period in 2017. We found that across this period there was an increase in the volume of non-assurance type projects (e.g. security design activities), which would have come at a cost of a reduction in the number of security assurance projects.</p><h3>Common Weaknesses</h3><p>To categorise our findings, we follow the Web Application Security Consortium (WASC) Threat Classifications<a href="#_edn2">[ii]</a> where possible. This allows us to remain consistent between engagements, and provides for a transparent view of categorisation.</p><p>Out of 1380 findings across WASC categories, the top WASC categories comprised 90% of all findings. The illustration below visually represents the top 10 weakness categories that we found across the year.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/712/1*n703il_ITf7H9BbBxkzpLw.png" /></figure><p>The most common type of risk found was Insufficient Authentication followed closely by Application Misconfiguration. Insufficient Authentication usually occurs when an application lacks proper authentication procedures — and includes issues such as usage of default credentials, or if the application suffers from username enumeration. Application misconfiguration is generally encountered when an application is not configured with security in mind — and encompasses issues such as a lack of security headers or having default files disclose configuration details and application version information.</p><p>As with last year, the majority of findings relate to the insecure configuration of the target system (application, operating system, network device etc.), or failing to keep the system patched to address known security issues. Again, in-line with last year, in a large number of our assessments, the targets are off the shelf systems that do not include any custom development by the implementing organisation, only configuration. Whilst it is recognised that some of these security findings are outside of the control of the implementing organisation (vulnerabilities in the software itself), in the majority of instances if the implementing organisation was to follow vendor implementation guidance for secure configuration of the system (as well as any underlying infrastructure), and keep the system patched, then many of these findings would not exist.</p><p>The chart below provides a breakdown of the top ten findings categories across the 2017–18 financial year and the 2016–17 financial year, with the total number of findings shown as each bar, with the percentage of the total shown on top of each bar.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/695/1*VxXgxsBGfbzoBfq5ZH5vNw.png" /></figure><p>The data from the chart above indicates the top 10 finding categories have remained similar over the 2016–17 financial year and the 2017–18 financial year. An interesting change between years is Application Misconfiguration has been replaced as the most common finding by Insufficient Authentication in 2017–18. Whilst we aren’t certain as to the reason here, we consider that it could potentially be due to the introduction and availability of multiple new session management and authentication methods, which make it easier to deliver these functions in a secure manner.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The significant increase in technical security engagements and a relatively consistent number of findings per engagement shown in the analysis above demonstrates the growth and continuous maturing in the area of security assurance.</p><p>Anecdotally, we are starting see the results of industry developments and governing legislation such as the mandatory breach reporting in Australia and impacts on Australian entities stemming from the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation. These macro-level changes are gradually influencing the number and type of technical security activities that are executed.</p><p>We hope that the data presented here has provided you with some useful insight into our year’s technical assessment activities. And if you would like to see more material that we’ve shared from our engagements — such as security test cases, cheat sheets, common security findings and more — sign up for a free subscription to our collaboration portal at <a href="https://portal.securitycolony.com/register">https://portal.securitycolony.com/register</a>.</p><p>Feel free to get in contact with us if you have any further questions at info@hivint.com</p><p><a href="#_ednref1">[i]</a> Introduced through the Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data Breaches) Act 2017 and defined as the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme. Additional details here: <a href="https://www.oaic.gov.au/engage-with-us/consultations/notifiable-data-breaches/">https://www.oaic.gov.au/engage-with-us/consultations/notifiable-data-breaches/</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref2">[ii]</a> <a href="http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246978/Threat%20Classification">http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246978/Threat%20Classification</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e46c8c9200a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog/the-tech-year-in-review-2017-18-e46c8c9200a">The Tech Year in Review — 2017–18</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog">Hive Intelligence</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Introducing the Cyber Security Skills Career Guide]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hivint-blog/introducing-the-cyber-security-skills-career-guide-f38261f39adc?source=rss----f6356645f7e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f38261f39adc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hivint]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Aug 2018 00:53:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-08-16T00:53:37.349Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Entering the world of cyber security can be daunting. I don’t mean this in a “the weight of the world is on my shoulders” way, but more of a “where the hell do I even start?” way.</p><p>A lot of the talk around addressing the ‘cyber skills gap’ has focused on only one piece of the puzzle — quantity. What has been missing from the discussion is what should our next generation of security professionals study once they decide to pursue an occupation in the field. There are so many different courses, qualifications and certifications in the industry that finding the right course for a desired career path can feel like finding that one line of buggy code in an app that won’t stop crashing.</p><p>That’s why we’ve developed this Cyber Security Skills Guide. You can download it for free by creating an account at <a href="https://portal.securitycolony.com/">https://portal.securitycolony.com</a>.</p><p>It’s designed to be a Rosetta Stone of sorts, translating the myriad education options and highlighting which are most suited for particular positions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sIWUBkr-AOoCtuD0rVXe6A.png" /></figure><p>For example, if you want to be a Penetration Tester, OSCP is better than CISSP. Hopefully we all know that by now. Others are a bit fuzzier.</p><p>It is important, however, to understand that all skills, degrees, courses, and certifications are not set in stone. This document contains our suggestions, backed by an analytical methodology, and based on our own experience and the input of external industry experts.</p><p>You will disagree with some of our views. Hell, we disagree with some of our views. But we hadto start somewhere. Let us know what you think and if it makes sense, we’ll adapt.</p><p>This document is designed to be a ‘living’ document and its aim is to help the next generation further their careers in cyber security and grow the entire industry.</p><p>As well as provide guidance for students just embarking on their journey, this guide also includes suggestions for lateral career transition pathways. The idea is to encourage professionals with general information technology experience, or those occupying non-security related technical roles, to make the shift to cyber.</p><p>To this end, only relevant industry recognised cyber security courses — determined through canvassing industry and professional association websites, reviewing certification and qualification literature, researching job boards, and input from industry experts — have been included. The existence of alternative transition pathways is certainly acknowledged, and while none are discouraged, we simply provide one approach that is likely to be effective in consideration of time, effort and money.</p><p>In the years and decades to come, more experts will be needed to monitor and secure the emerging hyper-connected society. Hopefully this guide will bring more clarity to those who wish to join our ranks. Please take the time to review it and share it with anyone considering a career in cyber and, of course, let us know if you think we’ve got it wrong (or right).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f38261f39adc" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog/introducing-the-cyber-security-skills-career-guide-f38261f39adc">Introducing the Cyber Security Skills Career Guide</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog">Hive Intelligence</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Comparison of Cyber Security Regulation in the USA and Australia]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hivint-blog/a-comparison-of-cyber-security-regulation-in-the-usa-and-australia-5bdeb5c4c2df?source=rss----f6356645f7e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5bdeb5c4c2df</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hivint]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 May 2018 04:03:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-29T04:03:33.737Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Prior to the last decade, cyber security focused regulation around the world was relatively limited — likely, at least to some extent, due to the entire field being perceived by external observers as somewhat of a ‘dark art’ in which regulation may prove more of a hindrance than a help.</p><p>Naturally, that has changed as cyber security as a whole has become a more ‘topical’ issue — particularly in the context of the growing prevalence and reporting of cyber attacks and data leaks in the mainstream media. As a result, regulation in this space has grown substantially, and will continue to do so.</p><p>In this context, this article examines and compares the growing number of regulatory instruments being used to cover cyber security related matters in the United States and Australia. It also highlights contrasts in the way the two jurisdictions approach the topic of cyber security regulation. The intent is not to provide commentary on the merits of the respective regulatory models each employs, but simply raise awareness of the sorts of challenges that can arise in specific scenarios — for example, when an organisation is looking to expand its operations from one nation to the other.</p><h3>General Characteristics</h3><p>The United States has a matrix of regulatory measures that potentially influence a business’ cyber security practices and the way they respond to potential security breaches. The concept of regulation for cyber security related matters has been around for a longer period of time in the US than Australia, where cyber security related regulations have emerged more recently.</p><p>Characteristics of cyber security regulation in the US (vis-à-vis Australia) include:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/547/1*6-I2J1vZj0_W4sga8oaeJw.png" /></figure><p>In the remainder of this article, we look at specific areas where cyber security regulation has (or is starting to) emerged and look at the approaches taken in both jurisdictions.</p><h3>Cyber Security Information Sharing</h3><h3>USA</h3><p>One of the most significant pieces of legislation concerning cyber security came with the passing — after much debate and many preceding versions — of the <em>Cybersecurity Information Act of 2015 </em>(CISA)<em>.</em></p><p>In broad terms, CISA allows private companies to monitor their systems, implement defensive measures and share and receive information about cyber threats on a voluntary basis. Specifically:</p><p><em>The Act creates a framework for information sharing between and among the public and private sectors</em>. Essentially, it allows (but doesn’t compel) private companies to share cyber security threat related information with the federal government or other private companies. This includes:</p><ul><li>information that pertains to cyber security threats — among other things, this can include information a company has gained about a threat that describes or identifies methods of defeating security controls or exploiting security vulnerabilities</li><li>Information about defensive measures that can be applied to detect, prevent, or mitigate against a cyber security threat</li></ul><p>Businesses are required to remove any personally identifiable information from information that is shared with the government or other entities. Indeed, concerns around the potential for personal information to be shared with third parties has been one of the principal concerns of opponents to the introduction of a legislatively-backed cyber security collaboration regime in the USA. CISA also incentivizes cyber security collaboration by providing businesses who share or receive threat information with a range of liability protections.</p><p><em>The Act authorises companies to take defensive measures for cyber security purposes to protect the rights or property of networks</em>. These are measures aimed at detecting, preventing or mitigating a known or suspected cyber security threat or vulnerability. This does not permit a company to undertake offensive cyber security efforts such as ‘hacking back’ against another entity/organisation/individual.</p><p><em>The Act allows companies to monitor their own systems for cyber security purposes </em>— essentially allowing network operators to undertake surveillance of their networks with the goal of protecting from potential hacking, denial of service attacks, or exploitation of security vulnerabilities. It’s not confirmed, as the legislation is still fairly new and there is minimal case law to clarify its scope and operation, but it could potentially cover the monitoring of employee activities on a company network to prevent the potential unauthorised leaking of valuable/sensitive company information to third parties.</p><h3>Australia</h3><p>Australia has so far eschewed a legislated model for cyber security information sharing, but has still recognised its importance in improving the overall ability of the nation to protect and defend against cyber threats.</p><p>To that end, as part of the introduction of a new Cyber Security Strategy in 2016, the Australian Government established a cyber information sharing network, centred on the Australian Cyber Security Centre and supported by the establishment of new joint cyber security centres in each state<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a>. The intent of this network is to facilitate partnerships and collaboration between business, government and academia on cyber security related matters.</p><h3>Consumer Protection Laws</h3><p>Both the US and Australia have consumer protection laws that can potentially be used in response to cyber security incidents affecting consumers. To date, however, only the USA has seen much activity in this area.</p><h3>USA</h3><p>The Federal Trade Commission in the United States has powers conferred by it under an eponymous consumer protection law — the FTC Act of 1914 — to take action against businesses where they have engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices affecting commerce (section 5).</p><p>To date, there have been a number of cases in the US where the FTC has used this law to take action against businesses it has believed have engaged in deceptive acts when it comes to their cyber security practices — for example, by failing to adhere to security practices they claim to comply with in published privacy policies — or where businesses have simply failed to meet a satisfactory level of cyber security practice that has resulted in harm to the community. See, for example:</p><p>· <strong>The Wyndham Worldwide case</strong> — in which the FTC took action against one of the largest hospitality chains in the world following a series of security breaches in 2008–2009 which affected more than 619 000 customers<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a>.</p><p>· <strong>The Ashley Madison case</strong> — in which users of a website infamously known around the world for facilitating extra-marital affairs — had personal information leaked by hackers who compromised Ashley Madison’s IT infrastructure following lax security practices<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> (this case was also investigated jointly by the privacy authorities of Australia and Canada)<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a>.</p><h3>Australia</h3><p>Australia has a comprehensive set of consumer protection laws in place, principally covered in the <em>Competition and Consumer Act 2010. </em>Enforcement of this Act is overseen by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The Competition and Consumer Act has provisions in it which could conceivably be used in cases involving cyber security incidents that cause harm to consumers:</p><p>• Section 18 of Schedule 2 of the Act (known as the Australian Consumer Law) prohibits misleading or deceptive acts in trade or commerce</p><p>• Section 61 of the Australian Consumer Law ensconces a consumer guarantee that services supplied to consumers are fit for purpose.</p><p>There is a strong argument — particularly given the actions of the FTC under the corresponding consumer protection laws in the USA — that the ACCC could use either of these powers in an appropriate case to take action against an organisation that engages in a deceptive practice when it comes to cyber security (for example, making a false representation about the level of security it has in place), or fails to meet a ‘reasonable’ standard of cyber security to ensure a service supplied online is fit for purpose. To date, the ACCC has not used these laws for this specific purpose — but it is not beyond the realms of possibility this could occur at some point in the future.</p><h3>Sector Specific Regulation — USA</h3><p>The notion of applying sector-specific cyber security is relatively well ensconced in the USA. Primary examples include:</p><h3>Health</h3><p>The <em>Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996</em> (HIPAA) is a federal law in the US that puts in place a range of privacy and security protections for patient health information that health care providers need to comply with.</p><p>The HIPAA Security Rule in particular seeks to facilitate the protection of electronic patient health information from unauthorized access (whether the unauthorised access attempt comes from an internal or external source, and whether the information is stored or in transit), by requiring health care providers subject to the Act to implement technical safeguards (in addition to administrative and physical safeguards). These safeguards are determined by the relevant health care provider based on what is ‘reasonable and appropriate’ — which means that healthcare providers of different sizes would not necessarily need to put in place the same safeguards<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a>.</p><h3>Nuclear and Energy</h3><p>The Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR), which sits under the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, evaluates licensees (among other things, anyone operating, constructing or decommission commercial reactors) for their adherence to the provisions of a regulatory instrument known as 10 CFR 73.54: <em>Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks</em><a href="#_ftn6"><strong><em>[6]</em></strong></a><em>. </em>That regulation requires licensees to provide a high degree of assurance that digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with particular functions (such as safety, security, and emergency preparedness) are adequately protected against cyber-attacks.</p><p>On the energy front, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (whose jurisdiction covers the US, Canada and parts of Mexico) has implemented a Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Program to provide a level of assurance around the security of the North American power grid. The Program requires covered entities, through a series of 11 different standards, to secure infrastructure against cyber attacks through a combination of risk assessments of critical assets, protective measures (including firewalls and monitoring tools), and the development of comprehensive contingency plans for cyber attacks.</p><h3>Finance</h3><p>The New York Department of Financial Services has introduced a new regulation that sets <a href="http://dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsrf500txt.pdf">cyber security standards for banks</a>, insurance companies, and other financial services organizations across the state. It requires covered organisations to, among a range of requirements:</p><p>· Maintain a board-approved cyber security program to protect information systems against cyber attacks</p><p>· Appoint a Chief Information Security Officer</p><p>· Conduct periodic cyber security risk assessments and annual penetration tests</p><p>· Have a detailed security incident response plan</p><p>· Notify regulators within 72 hours of a cyber security incident</p><p>· Provide a certification from senior officers at the company that its security controls are adequate.</p><p>Sarbanes-Oxley<strong> </strong>(The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act 2002) is also worth mentioning. In 2002,<strong> </strong>in response to a number of financial accounting scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley law (SOX) was introduced in the US in an aim to ensure more accurate financial reporting by all US public companies and accounting firms. There are a couple of provisions in SOX that have implications from a cyber security perspective:</p><p>· Company CEOs and CFOs need to certify the accuracy of financial reports, and that internal controls around financial reporting are sufficient and effective (section 302). This includes internal controls covering cyber security insofar as they support accurate financial reporting.</p><p>· The controls in place need to be verified for effectiveness, including by a 3rd party auditor<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a></p><h3>Australia</h3><p>While sector-specific regulation is more nascent in the Australian context, it is starting to emerge in specific areas.</p><h3>Telecommunications</h3><p>On 18 September 2017, the Australian parliament passed a series of reforms to telecommunications sector security which will be implemented over a 12 month period. These are contained in the <em>Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2017</em> and are designed to improve the overall security of critical telecommunications infrastructure. At a broad level, the reforms require:</p><p>• Telecommunications carriers and carriage service providers to “do their best” to protect networks and facilities they own, operate or use from unauthorised interference or access;</p><p>• Carriers and nominated carriage service providers are to notify the Government of planned changes to systems and services that are likely to have a material adverse effect on their ability to protect networks and facilities they own, operate or use from unauthorised interference or access (for example, outsourcing the management of part of their network or facilities)</p><p>The concept of requiring carriers and carriage service providers to ‘do their best’ in the first point above is relatively unprecedented from a cyber security standpoint, and it will be interesting to see how the enforcement of this requirement unfolds in practice.</p><h3>Banking and Insurance</h3><p>The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), in March 2018, released its first draft prudential standard on information security. The proposed new standard would require regulated entities<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a> to, among other things:</p><p>· Have robust mechanisms in place to detect and respond to cyber security incidents in a timely manner;</p><p>· Define security roles and responsibilities of the board, senior management and individuals;</p><p>· Maintain a security capability commensurate with the size and extent of the cyber threats faced by the entity’s information assets;</p><p>· Notify APRA of material security incidents.</p><p>This is a significant step up from the existing Prudential Practice Guide 234<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a> developed by APRA to cover the management of security, elevating cyber security to a dedicated standard.</p><h3>Data Breach Laws</h3><p>In the United States, data breach notification is covered by separate laws in each state. In Australia, there is a single national law covering data breach notification which was introduced in 2018.</p><h3>USA</h3><p>Forty-eight of the states, plus Washington, DC, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have some sort of legislation covering reporting of security/data breaches. There is no national requirement, so businesses need to comply with the legal requirements of each state they do business in. This can create complexities where a business suffers a data breach that affects individuals who reside in multiple states, because laws across the US differ in terms of:</p><p>· The scope of definition of personal information</p><p>· The definition of a breach</p><p>· Whether a threshold applies before notification needs to occur — some states only require notification where there is a risk of harm to affected individuals, whereas other states require notification in the event of unauthorised access to personal information regardless of whether there is a risk of harm</p><p>· Some states require organisations to notify external entities (such as state attorney general or another state agency) of a breach — but this is not the case across every state.</p><p>Many of the laws in the various states are <em>reactive </em>in nature — they cover what needs to be done in the event of a security/data breach<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a>.</p><p>However, it is also worth noting that in some states, laws extend beyond this to also imposing requirements on how businesses are to secure personal information. California, for example, requires that businesses that own or license personal information about California residents implement and maintain reasonable security procedures to protect the information from unauthorised access, use, disclosure, destruction or modification. Massachusetts has also introduced a similar law.</p><h3>Australia</h3><p>In February 2018, Australia had its first data breach notification laws commence operation. These laws apply to organisations subject to the existing Australian Privacy Principles in the <em>Privacy Act 1988</em> (generally, includes Australian Government agencies, businesses and not-for profit organisations that have an annual turnover of more than $3 million, private sector health service providers, credit reporting bodies, credit providers, entities that trade in personal information and tax file number (TFN) recipients).</p><p>The laws apply across Australia — so, unlike the USA, there is a single threshold that applies in each state and territory for when breaches need to be reported. The laws cover personally identifiable information and require organisations subject to them to report, both to affected individuals and the Australian Information Commissioner, where they experience a data breach that is likely to result in serious harm to individuals to whom the information relates<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a>.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>It is clear that cyber-security related regulation is growing in prevalence in both the US and Australia, and is here to stay. What will be interesting to observe over the next several months and years is how the merits and challenges associated with different approaches to this type of regulation emerge. In particular:</p><p>· Are regulations which have a high level of specificity when it comes to expected cyber security practices for organisations preferable, or are regulations that are less prescriptive, and rely on notions of what is ‘reasonable’ in the circumstances more practical?</p><p>· Does the application of different security benchmarks for different business sectors have merit?</p><p>· What are the advantages of both state-based, and federal regulations when it comes to cyber security?</p><p>Hivint will continue to monitor and report on developments in this area.</p><p><em>—</em></p><p><em>Arun Raghu is a Principal Security Advisor at Hivint.</em></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <a href="https://www.cert.gov.au/jcsc">https://www.cert.gov.au/jcsc</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1023142-x120032/wyndham-worldwide-corporation">https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1023142-x120032/wyndham-worldwide-corporation</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/12/operators-ashleymadisoncom-settle-ftc-state-charges-resulting">https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/12/operators-ashleymadisoncom-settle-ftc-state-charges-resulting</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> <a href="https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/commissioner-initiated-investigation-reports/ashley-madison">https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/commissioner-initiated-investigation-reports/ashley-madison</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Note that the Health Information Trust Alliance Common Security Framework (HITRUST CSF) has been developed to provide organizations with a framework of security controls for, among other things, the protection of ePHI and PHI data in the healthcare industry. See <a href="https://hitrustalliance.net/">https://hitrustalliance.net/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part073/part073-0054.html">https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part073/part073-0054.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> A new bill, the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5069/text%20">Cybersecurity Systems and Risks Reporting Act</a>, was proposed to amend the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 “to protect investors by expanding the mandated internal controls reports and disclosures to include cyber security systems and risks of publicly traded companies.”</p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> APRA regulates entities in the following industries: banks, credit unions, building societies, general insurance and reinsurance companies, life insurance, private health insurance, friendly societies and most members of the superannuation industry</p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> <a href="http://www.apra.gov.au/crossindustry/documents/ppg_ppg234_msrit_012010_v7.pdf">http://www.apra.gov.au/crossindustry/documents/ppg_ppg234_msrit_012010_v7.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> A good breakdown of state-by-state laws for data breach notification in the US is available here: <a href="https://www.dwt.com/statedatabreachstatutes/">https://www.dwt.com/statedatabreachstatutes/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> For more information see <a href="https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/privacy-act/notifiable-data-breaches-scheme">https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/privacy-act/notifiable-data-breaches-scheme</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5bdeb5c4c2df" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog/a-comparison-of-cyber-security-regulation-in-the-usa-and-australia-5bdeb5c4c2df">A Comparison of Cyber Security Regulation in the USA and Australia</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog">Hive Intelligence</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Widespread Misconfiguration Exposes Stored Source Code on Thousands of Servers]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hivint-blog/exposed-git-repos-on-the-ipv4-address-space-61cf8838e424?source=rss----f6356645f7e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/61cf8838e424</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[git]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cameron Stokes]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Apr 2018 00:30:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-10T08:21:22.479Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>In the last couple of years, many inexperienced web application developers have been found to inadvertently leave key components of their Git repositories publicly accessible — potentially giving anyone access to sensitive source code, access keys, passwords and more. In this article, Hivint Technical Specialist Cameron Stokes outlines how he developed his own tool to research this problem further, and his findings as to how common publicly exposed repositories are ‘in the wild’.</em></p><p><strong>What is Git and what are the potential security issues?</strong></p><p>Git is a distributed version control system commonly used to address the challenge of having multiple developers working on the same project simultaneously. It allows source code versions to be managed in a logical manner and tracks changes through different ‘forks’ and ‘branches’. A Git repository contains all this information and, as a distributed version control system, any host that synchronises to the repository also receives copy of the historical information. One of the common uses of a Git repository is to manage websites. These can span from single page “brochureware” sites with static content, all the way through to large enterprise Content Management System (CMS) installations. Using Git to manage these is an efficient way to synchronise development and production systems and is not inherently insecure; however, publicly exposed Git repositories can lead to serious security issues.</p><p>Once an attacker (or penetration tester) gains access to a Git repository, they also gain access to the secrets within, which can include source code, sensitive configuration files, and even credentials.</p><p>An example of the security implications can be seen in this twitter thread by Hanno Böck, which showed the telecommunications company T-Mobile Austria exposed credentials in configuration files that were able to be obtained by retrieving exposed Git repositories: <a href="https://twitter.com/hanno/status/982530027135922179">https://twitter.com/hanno/status/982530027135922179</a></p><h3>hanno on Twitter</h3><p>As it is fixed now I guess I can share this piece of &quot;amazing Security&quot; at @tmobileat :</p><p>As such, scanning for and retreiving exposed Git repositories is a key component of a web application penetration test. However, many of the publicly available tools to achieve this are relatively slow and not suited to large repositories. To address this (and to learn a bit more about the problem), I developed my own tool that achieved the same results much faster.</p><p><strong>How widespread is the problem of publicly exposed Git repositories?</strong></p><p>Over time, I noticed that publicly exposing Git repositories was a common mistake for developers to make — but the question was, <em>how common</em>? To try and answer this, I undertook a scan of the internet, and was fairly surprised to find some large companies exposing fairly sensitive information in the Git configuration files alone.</p><p>When I first encountered this issue, I found a blog post from <a href="https://en.internetwache.org/dont-publicly-expose-git-or-how-we-downloaded-your-websites-sourcecode-an-analysis-of-alexas-1m-28-07-2015/">Internetwache.org</a>. It indicated that a substantial number of repositories were available when analysing the Alexa top 1 million domains at the time, even if the percentage is quite low (9700, or less than 1%).</p><p>Some of the sites identified as being vulnerable were surprising, with a number residing in the government and banking sectors. Another alarming finding was that exposed Git ‘config’ files were often found to contain HTTP basic authentication credentials. As these credentials are stored in plaintext, any Git repositories where write access is permitted with those credentials could be targeted by attackers inserting malicious backdoors into the codebase.</p><p>Pillaging Git repositories is nothing new — penetration testers and attackers have been doing so for a number of years. There are many freely available tools to assist with dumping Git repositories, as well as others for analysing and extracting secrets from the dumps. Tools are not required to retrieve repositories when the .git folder allows directory indexing, as it’s possible to simply recursively download all files.</p><p>However, retrieving repositories where indexing is not available, while still possible (as the .git/index file keeps track of most of the important repository objects, and this is where the dumping tools are required), is a slightly more complicated process, and can be considerably slower — especially when used against larger repositories.</p><p><strong>My own tool for retrieving exposed repositories is born…</strong></p><p>To solve this issue, I developed a tool in Golang that performs the same tasks as the existing tools that can be used for retrieving exposed repositories, but <a href="https://github.com/c-sto/gogitdumper">in a much faster timeframe</a>. My version simply downloads the index file (which is a catalogue of Git ‘object’ files), parses it, and then uses multiple threads to retrieve any referenced files recursively. It’s like Gobuster for exposed Git repos.</p><p>From my experience, I knew that the most interesting results would be obtained through analysing accidentally exposed website back ends and development sites, not generally found on the Alexa listed domains. To further the research undertaken by Internetwache.org, I decided to scan the entire public IPv4 space to identify any servers that have an exposed Git repository. The scan was performed as follows:</p><p>1. Masscan was used to identify servers with either port 80 or 443 open;</p><p>2. For all servers identified in the step above, a (unreleased) custom tool was used to send a HEAD request for http(s)://ip.ad.dre.ss/.git/index; and</p><p>3. If the HEAD request showed that it was likely a git repository, a GET request was sent for http(s)://ip.ad.dre.ss/.git/config.</p><p>Across all servers that were identified to have port 80 or 443 open, approximately 0.2% were found to be hosting a vulnerable Git repository. Although this may seem like a small number; to put it into context, it equates to approximately two exposed Git repositories for every thousand servers that have either port 443 or port 80 open on the Internet. This equates to just short of 200,000 servers.</p><p>It is also worth noting that this was a simple a root directory search and that there are likely to be significantly more repositories that are not stored in the root directory (for example, if the repository was stored in a ‘dev’ directory on the web server, the path would look like https://ip.ad.dre.ss/dev/.git). This scan also did not reveal any potentially vulnerable sites that are on shared hosting or require a host header for access.</p><p>Retrieving the config file helped to identify the hosting repository and to gain insight into what the repository may contain, as the config file is used to configure repository options such as upstream servers, and store certain variables used by Git to manage the repository (and in some cases passwords). Targeting this file was also useful to filter out false-positives due to the presence of predictable values. One of the more sensitive configurations that is possible to set in this file is basic authentication to remote repositories (for example -http://username:password@github.com/user/repo.git). In the retrieved config files, approximately 2500 contained basic authentication credentials. As previously noted, this could lead to the compromise of a repository, as an attacker can easily commit malicious backdoors into the codebase.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/939/1*tLvA6Ih_u-FoV3ymvUn5eQ.png" /><figcaption>Basic Authentication Credentials can be located in Git config files</figcaption></figure><p>In addition to sensitive information being hosted within the publicly reachable Git config files, the names of upstream or origin repositories in several of these indicated that some servers likely contained sensitive information. Several government addresses were identified as well as a handful of other unnamed entities that very likely should know better.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/939/1*xh0Kb3m5txi08M5Eo0Ur_g.png" /><figcaption>Government websites were also found to be vulnerable</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/675/1*xWdHjbfGJQGjqPBDwiGf6Q.png" /><figcaption>It is unlikely the bankingsystem repo was intended to be made public</figcaption></figure><p>Several repository names also indicated content that might be of high value to a potential attacker, such as the repository named ‘investigation’ in the following example:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/697/1*kA3xFTJGh4jCv1Yys9xvFQ.png" /><figcaption>A repository was located that was titled ‘investigation’</figcaption></figure><p>In the process of performing these scans, I was contacted by Andrew Morris from <a href="https://greynoise.io/">GreyNoise</a> who almost immediately identified that I was scanning for exposed Git repos. After a brief discussion he kindly provided some historical data about other entities scanning for Git repositories on a large scale. Over the past 90 days, IP addresses geolocated to Korea, the Netherlands, USA, China, Russia and Spain have sent GET requests for Git config files, to large portions of the internet. Interestingly, 3 addresses with an RDNS pointing to the <a href="https://scan.lol/">NYU Internet Census</a> were tracked collecting config files directly. 22 unique IP addresses were tracked potentially scanning for repositories (excluding my own), with a range of different user agents. This information shows that there are definitely entities out there that already have this information or are already looking for it.</p><p>During the process of parsing the collected config files, I have independently contacted organisations that had particularly sensitive information exposed, or where I have contacts that would take the matter seriously. Given the substantial volume of data, it won’t be possible to contact all affected hosts.</p><p><strong>What is the solution to this problem?</strong></p><p>Simple — don’t expose any Git repository files. Even if you believe your Git repository does not contain sensitive information, you must ensure that none of the files in the .git folder are publicly exposed. How to do this will depend on the hosting server, but keep in mind that simply disallowing directory indexing is not enough. Some more guidance depending on the platform is provided below.</p><p><strong>Apache:</strong></p><p>Include this line in the apache config:</p><blockquote>RedirectMatch 404 /\\.(svn|git|hg|bzr|cvs)(/|$)</blockquote><p><strong>IIS:</strong></p><p>Use the hidden segment feature in the web.config file:</p><blockquote>&lt;configuration&gt;</blockquote><blockquote>&lt;system.webServer&gt;</blockquote><blockquote>&lt;security&gt;</blockquote><blockquote>&lt;requestFiltering&gt;</blockquote><blockquote>&lt;hiddenSegments&gt;</blockquote><blockquote>&lt;add segment=”.git” /&gt;</blockquote><blockquote>&lt;add segment=”.svn” /&gt;</blockquote><blockquote>&lt;/hiddenSegments&gt;</blockquote><blockquote>&lt;/requestFiltering&gt;</blockquote><blockquote>&lt;/security&gt;</blockquote><blockquote>&lt;/system.webServer&gt;</blockquote><blockquote>&lt;/configuration&gt;</blockquote><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Exposed git repositories have been around for a long time and the risks they pose are unlikely to be addressed without more awareness and action amongst administrators and the security community. We should place greater emphasis on ensuring development artifacts don’t enter production systems due to the sensitive information potentially exposed, and relatively simple techniques for collecting it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=61cf8838e424" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog/exposed-git-repos-on-the-ipv4-address-space-61cf8838e424">Widespread Misconfiguration Exposes Stored Source Code on Thousands of Servers</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hivint-blog">Hive Intelligence</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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