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        <title><![CDATA[Devi Dumbadze’s Blog - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Art, Political Analysis &amp; Philosophy - Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Devi Dumbadze’s Blog - Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[March of Georgians: A Breakthrough for the Country’s Identitarian Groups]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/march-of-georgians-a-breakthrough-for-the-countrys-identitarian-groups-68225ae763af?source=rss----674d45c71bd6---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/68225ae763af</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[identitatrian-groups]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eastern-orthodoxy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[xenophobia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Devi Dumbadze]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Aug 2017 14:50:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-08-07T14:50:42.139Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*EUpoS3hzdlAxCYMvTR9yEg.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church Ilia II meeting with the organizers of March of Georgian, July 24, 2017, Sno.</figcaption></figure><p>On July 14, several hundred agitated participants of the “March of Georgians” — a loose alliance of identitarian political groups, some of them self-proclaimed “fascists” (<a href="https://www.facebook.com/events/1515154265203663/">Facebook.com</a>, July 14) — rallied along Aghmashenebeli Avenue, in central Tbilisi (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ex5ilpUjgoA">YouTube</a>, July 14). The political mainstream of the country largely ignored the happening. And initially, the ruling party, Georgian Dream–Democratic Georgia (GDDG), issued no official statements in reaction to the event.</p><p>The demonstration was initiated by Sandro Bregadze, the deputy state minister for diaspora issues under the GDDG from 2014 to 2016, and the leader of the “Erovnulebi” (“The Nationals”) movement. In a Facebook post, Bregadze called “all those whose heart beats for the homeland” to join in, also issuing an “ultimatum” for “all illegal foreigners (Iranians, Arabs, Africans, etc.) to leave the territory of Georgia by July 14” (<a href="https://www.facebook.com/sandro.breg/posts/2002111303147722?pnref=story">Facebook.com</a>, June 29).</p><p>“This is our response to a 51-year-old Iranian having raped Georgian children (boys)!!! We will clean our streets of foreign criminals!!!” Bregadze exclaimed, referring to a recent case of alleged rape as well as a number of arrests of foreign citizens in Georgia for other alleged sexual offenses (<a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/84376">EurasiaNet</a>, July 15). Nonetheless, labeling this rally as targeted merely against “Muslim immigrants” is misleading. Some active participants of the “March” stressed their rejection of all illegal or criminal aliens notwithstanding their faith — the second scandalous case was in fact purportedly committed by Indian citizens, whose confessional affiliation is unclear — as well as their staunch opposition to Russia (<a href="https://www.facebook.com/sandro.breg/posts/2002111303147722?pnref=story">Facebook.com</a>, June 29).</p><p>The March was supported by the opposition party Alliance of Patriots: Member of Parliament Emzar Kvitsiani joined the demonstrators on the streets (<a href="http://netgazeti.ge/news/207459/">Netgazeti.ge</a>, July 14), as did one of the party’s leaders, Konstantine Morgoshia. Other activists included Gia Korkotashvili of the movement “Georgian Mission,” Mikheil Amisulashvili of “Erovnulebi,” businessman Ramaz Gagnidze, as well as Giorgi Oniani, a contributor to the TV station <em>Obieqtivi</em> (<a href="http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/122045-vin-emuqreboda-jgufuri-gaupatiurebit-tatia-dolidzes">Tabula.ge</a>, July 17). However, the organizers’ claims that the March would be a “peaceful protest” was quickly undermined when the latter five activists staged a slur-filled verbal attack in a public Facebook post, which was later deleted. Its target was former Georgian Youth Delegate to the United Nations Tatia Dolidze (<a href="http://netgazeti.ge/news/207665/">Netgazeti.ge</a>, July 17), whom the five threatened to gang-rape. Dolidze — who had criticized the March of Georgians, saying it was destabilizing the country and, thus, “grist for Russia’s mill” (<a href="https://www.facebook.com/tatia.cornelia.doldorf/posts/10207752435048322?pnref=story">Facebook.com</a>, July 14) — reported the incident to the police, leading the Ministry of Internal Affairs to start an investigation into online harassment claims (<a href="http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=30274">Civil Georgia</a>, July 17).</p><p>The scandal continued as Lado Sadghobelashvili, yet another co-organizer of the March and the founder of the non-governmental organization “Free Generation,” posted photographs showing Tatia Dolidze in a friendly embrace with an “Ossetian separatist and FSB [Federal Security Service] officer” Timur Tskhurbaty (<a href="http://intermedia.ge/%E1%83%A1%E1%83%A2%E1%83%90%E1%83%A2%E1%83%98%E1%83%90/87237-%E1%83%9A%E1%83%90%E1%83%93%E1%83%9D-%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%93%E1%83%A6%E1%83%9D%E1%83%91%E1%83%94%E1%83%9A%E1%83%90%E1%83%A8%E1%83%95%E1%83%98%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98-%E1%83%98%E1%83%AA%E1%83%9C%E1%83%9D%E1%83%91%E1%83%93%E1%83%94%E1%83%97-%E1%83%A5%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%97%E1%83%95%E1%83%94%E1%83%9A%E1%83%97%E1%83%90-%E1%83%9B%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%A8%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%9B%E1%83%A2%E1%83%94%E1%83%A0%E1%83%A1/21/">Intermedia.ge</a>, July 19). The photographs were intended to be incriminating, allegedly proving that Dolidze was a “Sorosist” and “liberast” (a derogatory slang term stigmatizing liberals as homosexuals), in cahoots with the leader of the pro-Western opposition party Movement for Liberty–European Georgia (MLEG), Giorgi Bokeria, and courting a known murderer of Georgians during the 2008 war in the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Dolidze retorted that the photo of her and Tskhurbaty, which she herself supplied to a <em>Palitra TV</em> documentary, originated from a series of civil society gatherings she had taken part in, whereby Georgian diplomats met with their South Ossetian and Abkhazian counterparts in order to foster mutual dialogue (<a href="https://www.palitravideo.ge/yvela-video/akhali-ambebi/87511-realurad-ra-urthierthoba-aqvs-thathia-dolidzes-os-separatistebthan-saarqivo-kadrebi-romelic-akhlakhans-gavrcelebul-fotoebs-nathels-hfens.html">Palitravideo.ge</a>, July 19).</p><p>Simultaneously to the March of Georgians, a group of civil activists organized a protest against yet another move by Russia in the process of so-called “creeping occupation.” Earlier this summer, the Russian military removed border posts near the village of Bershueti, at the de facto border with South Ossetia, grabbing some additional 700 meters of territory for the separatist region (<a href="http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=30272">Civil Georgia</a>, July 15; see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/russia-intensifies-military-pressure-georgia/">EDM</a>, July 10). However, calls to the March organizers to join this protest against the Russian occupation were met with no response. Other civil society organizations, such as the Women’s Movement and the Coalition for Equality, issued statements condemning attacks against Dolidze, while MLEG and its candidate for mayor of Tbilisi, Elene Khostaria, announced a rally in the capital (on July 23) in response to both the March itself and the Dolidze incident (<a href="http://pirveliradio.ge/?newsid=88484">Pirveliradio.ge</a>, July 19).</p><p>All in all, the March of Georgians marks a certain breakthrough for identitarian and avowed fascist movements in Georgia. It is the first instance in recent years of such a public demonstration by these groups that succeeded in independently drawing considerable media attention. Usually, the identitarian and fascist groups attach themselves to large public events held by other, more authoritative organizations, such as the Georgian Orthodox Church, thus maintaining a relatively low profile in the public eye. Such was the case, for instance, with the annual “Family Day,” held this year on May 17, which was notably attended by various identitarian groups. Though both the rhetoric and form of activism of the groups behind the March of Georgians resembles the practice of their European counterparts, it remains to be seen what actual trans-border links or networks may exist between them.</p><p><em>The story originally appeared in the Jamestown Foundation’s </em><a href="https://jamestown.org/program/march-of-georgians-a-breakthrough-for-the-countrys-identitarian-groups/"><em>Eurasia Daily Monitor</em></a><em>, July 26, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=68225ae763af" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/march-of-georgians-a-breakthrough-for-the-countrys-identitarian-groups-68225ae763af">March of Georgians: A Breakthrough for the Country’s Identitarian Groups</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni">Devi Dumbadze’s Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Georgian-Chinese FTA: A Trade Agreement With Caveats]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/georgian-chinese-fta-a-trade-agreement-with-caveats-915bd668a44d?source=rss----674d45c71bd6---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/915bd668a44d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[one-belt-one-road]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Devi Dumbadze]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jul 2017 12:45:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-18T11:15:02.905Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yZseOcksAibgy4XRZhq2nQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>An oftentimes ignored aspect of Chinese geopolitical advances in South Caucasus: People’s Liberation Army in the background of economic relations &amp; trade agreements; at parade 2015. Image: Los Angeles Times.</figcaption></figure><p>When the Minister of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Zhong Shan and Georgia’s Minister of Economy Giorgi Gakharia signed a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in Shanghai, on May 13, it all looked good on paper. Following a seven-month-long process of final-stage negotiations, which culminated in the signing, the Georgian government was quick to announce that the FTA — China’s second such deal with any country in Eurasia, after Switzerland — opens the world’s largest market of about 1.4 billion consumers to Georgian goods. Ninety-four percent of Georgian exports to China will now be tax free (<a href="https://www.amerikiskhma.com/a/georgia-and-china-sign-free-trade-agreement/3852730.html">Amerikiskhma.com</a>, May 16). “Georgia has a steadily growing export to China. We see a great potential in concluding free trade agreements with big economies such as China,” Gakharia noted. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili enthused about “moving towards a higher level of cooperation” (<a href="http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=30091&amp;search=china">Civil Georgia</a>, May 14).</p><p>It is true that the PRC is now the third most important destination for Georgian exports, after Russia and Turkey, according to data from January–March 2017. Moreover, China already occupies the fourth position — after Turkey, Russia and Azerbaijan — in imports. Indeed, Georgian exports to China increased sevenfold from $25.7 million in 2012 to $169.6 million in 2016, with Chinese imports — at their highest point in 2014 at about $733 million — dropping to $547.5 million in 2016 (<a href="https://www.amerikiskhma.com/a/georgia-and-china-sign-free-trade-agreement/3852730.html">Amerikiskhma.com</a>, May 16). However, this dynamic demonstrates a persistent negative foreign trade balance between the countries in recent years, which in 2016 still stood at 52.7 percent in China’s favor (<a href="http://commersant.ge/?m=5&amp;news_id=51342&amp;cat_id=5">Commersant.ge</a>, May 17). Likewise, between January and May of 2017, Georgia sent $82.3 million in exports to China and took in $226 million of Chinese imports, thus continuing the significant trade deficit trend, equaling 45.6 percent to the detriment of the Georgian side (<a href="http://geostat.ge/cms/site_images/_files/georgian/bop/FTrade__05_2017_GEO-with%20cover.pdf">Geostat.ge</a>, June 26).</p><p>Economist Gia Khukhashvili believes that due to the sharply unequal economic development of the two countries, the Georgian-Chinese FTA will, in fact, likely exacerbate the pre-existing, large import-export gap (<a href="http://commersant.ge/?m=5&amp;news_id=51342&amp;cat_id=5">Commersant.ge</a>, May 17). This is even though China represents the second-largest market in the world for a crucial Georgian agricultural export — wine (<a href="https://www.amerikiskhma.com/a/georgia-and-china-sign-free-trade-agreement/3852730.html">Amerikiskhma.com</a>, May 16). “We do not have the same quantity of export products as China,” Khukhashvili stressed. “Hence an expansion of Chinese products [in Georgia] is inevitable.” Furthermore, the FTA will displace potential direct investments in Georgia’s real economy: more inexpensive Chinese products could drive out competing investors, who may lose interest in Georgia due to Chinese low prices. Thus, the real economy will fail to further develop, Khukhashvili warned, noting that the vast majority of European countries do not have FTAs with China specifically because of this possibility. Yet, the Georgian government has dismissed the possible negative consequences, and for the foreseeable future it is preferencing liberalizing trade with China over its direct investments in local production.</p><p>Most experts can only point to potential future benefits from the FTA for Georgia, be they economic or political, rather than immediate gains. The political scientist Nika Chitadze holds that the anticipated launch of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railroad, as well as the planned construction of a new commercial seaport in Anaklia, will allow Georgia to gradually replace its dependence on the Russian market by elevating the country to an important transportation hub within China’s One Belt, One Road transcontinental transit initiative. This would, Chitadze argues, foster trade not only with China, but also with Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore (<a href="http://www.resonancedaily.com/index.php?id_rub=2&amp;id_artc=36978">Resonancedaily.com</a>, June 19). However, this analyst, too, concedes that the much higher transportation costs of Georgian goods to China and other Asian countries in comparison to neighboring Russia undermine such an optimistic outlook.</p><p>Politically, Chitadze believes, “from the point of view of trade policy, Asian countries are more attractive to Georgia because from them there will be no danger that, for instance, China or Japan would close their market to our country due to political reasons, which is quite possible in the case of Russia” (<a href="http://www.resonancedaily.com/index.php?id_rub=2&amp;id_artc=36978">Resonancedaily.com</a>, June 19). Yet, including the PRC in the same category with Japan in this circumstance appears hardly warranted. Beijing has, in the past, also proven itself to be quite keen, when it sees a need, to use economic and cultural leverage to achieve desired political goals. Most recently, in the aftermath of the United States’ deployment of THAAD missiles to South Korea, China has aggressively pressured South Korea to remove them. As a result, a number of economic, educational and cultural Sino–South Korean ties were severed (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/south-koreas-presidential-election-implications-china/">China Brief</a>, April 20). Presumably, nothing precludes Beijing from applying a similar tactic against its newest free-trade partner Georgia, if the political situation were to require it in the future (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/georgias-weak-opposition-looks-ruling-party-flirts-china/">EDM</a>, November 28, 2016).</p><p>In the aftermath of the FTA signing, on May 14, Georgia’s Minister of Finance Dimitri Kumsishvili announced, in Beijing, the establishment of a new Chinese “Georgian Development Bank,” co-founded by China Energy Company Limited and Eurasian Invest LLC. The bank has declared capital of $1 billion, but fulfilled capital of $300 million. The Georgian finance minister welcomed this institution as “important for the banking system” and “private sector development” (<a href="http://netgazeti.ge/news/193936/">Netgazeti</a>, May 14). Still, even experts who view such developments in the context of the FTA favorably are likely to acknowledge that, though the free trade deal with the PRC offers Georgia a formal opening, the South Caucasus country in facts lacks the potential, in terms of both the quantity and quality of its goods, to tip the scales of the trade balance in its favor. At the same time, China has obtained additional leverage to flex its economic muscle without much to hold it back in the Georgian market. Despite the slight improvement in the first half of 2017, the trade deficit between 2012 and 2016 — i.e., even before the introduction of trade liberalization to and from China — comprised 78.6 percent on average. Considering the PRC’s overwhelming production and trade resources, the FTA is likely to further benefit the expansion of its already long-present trade dominance over Georgia.</p><p>The economist Paata Sheshelidze’s words tellingly sum up the heart of the matter: “A certain window has been opened, and, in the future, talented people will emerge. They will have an opportunity to enter new fields to sell their products. Who can make use of this, is secondary” (<a href="http://commersant.ge/?m=5&amp;news_id=51342&amp;cat_id=5">Commersant.ge</a>, May 17). The positive prospects from the FTA for Georgia are rather vague, while China is free to continue to grow its economic footprint in Georgia, which raises uncertain political and security risks and consequences.</p><p><em>This article originally appeared in Jamestown Foundation’s </em><a href="https://jamestown.org/program/georgian-chinese-fta-trade-agreement-caveats/"><em>Eurasia Daily Monitor</em></a><em>, June 26, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=915bd668a44d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/georgian-chinese-fta-a-trade-agreement-with-caveats-915bd668a44d">Georgian-Chinese FTA: A Trade Agreement With Caveats</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni">Devi Dumbadze’s Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Extradition Cases of Azerbaijani and Turkish Citizens Raise Ire in Georgia]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/extradition-cases-of-azerbaijani-and-turkish-citizens-raise-ire-in-georgia-f304c372e863?source=rss----674d45c71bd6---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f304c372e863</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[turkey]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Devi Dumbadze]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 09 Jun 2017 16:04:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-06-19T16:17:54.415Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/870/1*OrahtP9KD_eXI8KgvfPkvg.png" /><figcaption>Journalists at the Georgian Parliament protesting ‘abduction’ of Afgan Mukhtarli, June 6, 2017. Source: Liberali.ge</figcaption></figure><p>“I do not know whom we should ask: [magicians David] Copperfield or [Zurab] Vadachkoria? How can it happen that a person disappears from point A and appears at point B?” wondered Georgia’s President Giorgi Margvelashvili, on June 2, in response to reports about the puzzling “disappearance” of Azerbaijani journalist Afgan Mukhtarli in Tbilisi (<a href="https://www.president.gov.ge/ka-GE/pressamsakhuri/siakhleebi/%E2%80%8Bgiorgi-margvelashvili-khelisufleba-krizisis-menej.aspx">President.gov.ge</a>, June 2). Mukhtarli, a known critic of the current Azerbaijani government, was last seen in downtown Tbilisi on May 29. The following day, May 30, Mukhtarli surfaced in Azerbaijan, where he was taken into custody, charged with illegally crossing the border, smuggling, and resisting border guards. He was placed under three-month preliminary detention in Baku.</p><p>The journalist’s Georgian and Azerbaijani lawyers claim, based on conversations with their defendant, that Mukhtarli was kidnapped by four Georgian-speaking persons, three of whom were wearing law enforcement uniforms. According to the lawyers, Mukhtarli was put in an Opel-make car, handcuffed, and a bag was placed over his head. Mukhtarli was physically abused, after which he was driven to Azerbaijan and transferred to Azerbaijani authorities, who allegedly planted $10,000 on him to frame him for smuggling (<a href="https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/muckhtarlis-gatacebashi-pormianebi-monacileobndnen/28526656.html">Radiotavisupleba.ge</a>, June 3).</p><p>The incident sparked numerous protest rallies by journalists and human rights groups in Tbilisi and Batumi. Mukhtarli’s passport was found at his Tbilisi apartment, and his wife and co-activist, Leila Mustafaeva, accused Georgian authorities of having orchestrated an abduction in collaboration with their Azerbaijani counterparts (<a href="http://1tv.ge/ge/news/view/163291.html">1tv.ge</a>, June 1). Living in Georgia since 2015, and seeking political asylum there, Mukhtarli and Mustafaeva conducted critical investigative reporting on Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev and his family business for the Internet platform <em>Meydan TV</em>.</p><p>International organizations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, Janos Herman (the head of the European Union Delegation to Georgia), as well as the US Department of State have all issued statements urging the Georgian side to carry out a rapid and thorough investigation of the alleged abduction (<a href="https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/06/271551.htm">State.gov</a>, June 3). Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili ruled out any involvement of the government in the incident (<a href="http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=30149">Civil Georgia</a>, June 1). Kvirikashvili addressed the president of Georgia with a request to expedite granting Georgian citizenship to Mukhtarli’s wife and daughter, which, however, Mustafaeva refused, demanding instead due punishment of the perpetrators (<a href="http://netgazeti.ge/news/198895/">Netgazeti.ge</a>, June 3).</p><p>Opposition party Movement for Liberty–European Georgia stated that, according to its information, “high officials from the Security Service of Georgia and Ministry of Internal Affairs were involved in the crime” (<a href="http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/120713-kaxidze-vakenebt-sakitxs-rom-sus-is-ufrosi-da-shs-ministri-parlamentshi-gamocxaddnen">Tabula.ge</a>, June 3). Whereas, Salome Samadashvili, of the formerly ruling United National Movement party, demanded that the heads of both government agencies be removed from their posts due to the failure to prevent the alleged high-profile kidnapping (<a href="http://www.unm.ge/ge/videos/ertiani-nacionaluri-mozraoba-azerbaijaneli-zhurnal">Unm.ge</a>, June 1). Yet, this incident is not the first instance of Georgian authorities being confronted with charges of failing to properly exercise the functions of a sovereign and democratic state: either by preventing an alleged politically motivated abduction or by not withstanding pressure from neighboring states to extradite their political opponents.</p><p>About a week before the Mukhtarli case, Turkish national Mustafa Emre Çabuk — a founding partner of Turkish Schools in Georgia and a manager of Demirel College — was arrested on May 24 and placed in pre-extradition custody in Tbilisi. This occurred on the basis of a warrant presented to Georgia by the Turkish authorities for Çabuk’s alleged connection to the Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü (FETÖ) “terrorist organization” (<a href="http://georgiatoday.ge/news/6645/Manager-of-the-Demirel-College-Arrested-in-Georgia">Georgiatoday.ge</a>, May 28). The private Demirel College is associated with the Çağlar educational network, led by Fethullah Gülen, the Turkish cleric living in the United States. Gülen is accused by Turkey of having initiated the military coup in 2016. Moreover, Ankara has labeled Çağlar a cover for FETÖ and a “Parallel State Organization” (Paralel Devlet Yapılanması — PDY) (<a href="http://accent.com.ge/ge/news/details/34759">Accent.com.ge</a>, May 30).</p><p>Attorneys for Çabuk, who has lived and worked in Georgia for the last 15 years, deny the allegations. They point to the imminent danger of political repression and possible torture, were Çabuk to be extradited to Turkey. They request that he be granted political refugee status (<a href="http://accent.com.ge/ge/news/details/34759">Accent.com.ge</a>, May 30). According to legal expert Lia Mukhashavria, Çabuk’s pre-extradition detention is a mere “gesture” by Georgia to appease Turkey and, “in the final analysis, the extradition will be rejected.” However, last February, Georgia already revoked the operational license for Batumi Şahin Friendship School, which is also part of the Çağlar network (<a href="http://oc-media.org/shutdown-of-gulen-school-in-batumi-may-leave-340-children-without-classes/">Oc-media.org</a>, February 10). Further complying with Turkish demands, Tbilisi placed the remaining five Çağlar-member facilities under investigation by the financial police (<a href="http://accent.com.ge/ge/news/details/34759">Accent.com.ge</a>, May 30).</p><p>On May 4, another Turkish national, Sinan Sarac, who has lived in Georgia with his family since 2016, after fleeing post-coup Turkey, was detained by Georgian law enforcement at the request of Turkish authorities. Ankara accuses Sarac of financing FETÖ/PDY (<a href="http://netgazeti.ge/news/198801/">Netgazeti.ge</a>, June 3). Sarac now also faces extradition. Notably, Georgia does not recognize Turkey’s claims that FETÖ/PDY represent military organizations. And yet, Jihan Akin, who owns a 60 percent stake in the Demirel schools, and is a German national of Turkish origin, was also denied entry into Georgia during the protests accompanying the closing of the Şahin School (<a href="http://netgazeti.ge/news/198801/">Netgazeti.ge</a>, June 3).</p><p>The Georgian government’s response to Baku’s pressure also predates the aforementioned Afgan Mukhtarli case. Indeed, on April 20, Jamal Ali, a musician and activist from Azerbaijan, who lives in exile in Berlin due to his criticism of the Aliyev regime, was denied entry to Georgia “without any explanations.” And on March 21, Dashgin Aghalarli, an Azerbaijani opposition activist in Georgian exile since 2015, was ordered by the Appellate Court to leave Georgia after being refused political asylum on the recommendation of the Georgian government (<a href="http://netgazeti.ge/news/198801/">Netgazeti.ge</a>, June 3).</p><p>Currently, it seems, the Georgian government is offering little legal or practical resistance to pressure originating from Turkey, which has been accused of seeking to persecute alleged supporters of the 2016 attempted coup living abroad, including in Georgia, or to attempts by Azerbaijan to suppress the activities of its political opponents who may have found refuge on Georgian soil, however temporarily. This situation has now pushed the Georgian president to at least voice certain concern about Georgia seemingly diminishing its “prestige and the security of its citizens” (<a href="http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=30146">Civil Georgia</a>, May 31). It remains to be seen whether such rhetoric and growing political pressure from the opposition will eventually lead to a policy reversal by the ruling government.</p><p><em>This story originally appeared in </em><a href="https://jamestown.org/program/extradition-cases-azerbaijani-turkish-citizens-raise-ire-georgia/"><em>The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor</em></a><em>, June 5, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f304c372e863" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/extradition-cases-of-azerbaijani-and-turkish-citizens-raise-ire-in-georgia-f304c372e863">Extradition Cases of Azerbaijani and Turkish Citizens Raise Ire in Georgia</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni">Devi Dumbadze’s Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Embrace of Iranian Overtures Undermines Georgia’s Counter-Terrorism and NATO Integration Efforts]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/embrace-of-iranian-overtures-undermines-georgias-counter-terrorism-and-nato-integration-efforts-2c75217d5587?source=rss----674d45c71bd6---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2c75217d5587</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Devi Dumbadze]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 May 2017 16:12:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-31T16:12:00.203Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/739/1*6jTK9nTH5b4WRbsGRsjfqQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Houseini Mosque in Marneuli, Georgia, built 2016 by Iran’s Shahristani Foundation</figcaption></figure><p>Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili recently visited the United States. And the main tangible result of his delegation’s meetings with US President Donald J. Trump, Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was the signing of the General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA), on May 9 (<a href="http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=30085">Civil Georgia</a>, May 9). The GSOIA creates a legal basis for mutual sharing of intelligence between Georgia and the US. Specifically, it is supposed to “strengthen counterterrorism cooperation” between the two countries, as the Department of State elaborated (<a href="https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/05/270754.htm">State.gov</a>, May 9).</p><p>The initiation of the GSOIA was prompted by an understood need to boost bilateral cooperation on counter-terrorism intelligence gathering in the country and the region. And in some ways it has confirmed the weak counter-terrorism efforts in Georgia to date, despite the threats the country faces (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/georgias-state-security-service-annual-report-downplays-countrys-terrorist-threat/">EDM</a>, March 29). Moreover, this weighty agreement — along with other measures envisioned by the two sides to further “transform [Georgia’s] military and pave the way for future security agreements between the United States and Georgia” (<a href="https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/05/270754.htm">State.gov</a>, May 9) — appears to stand in blunt contrast with Georgia’s attempts to simultaneously buttress its ties with the most prolific state exporter of terrorism in the Middle East and beyond: the Islamic Republic of Iran.</p><p>In recent months, Georgia and Iran have exchanged numerous official delegations at a rapid pace (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/iran-builds-soft-power-georgia-foster-tighter-nexus-russia/">EDM</a>, March 29). On April 18, the largest to date state delegation, headed by Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, arrived in Georgia for a two-day visit, during which about 100 participants attended the Georgian-Iranian Business Forum in Tbilisi (<a href="http://radiotavisupleba/">Radiotavisupleba.ge</a>, April 18). Zarif and his Georgian counterpart, Mikheil Janelidze, as well as Prime Minister Kvirikashvili discussed tourism, trade and economic cooperation, placing emphasis on the railroad “corridor between the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf.” Azerbaijan and Iran recently concluded a necessary railway link connecting the two countries as part of this broader transit corridor project (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/will-north-south-transport-corridor-overshadow-baku-tbilisi-kars-railway/">EDM</a>, April 24).</p><p>Janelidze was quick to insinuate that Iran is primarily interested in obtaining access to the European Union market, which has become more accessible to Georgia in light of visa liberalization achieved with the EU this year. Given the unabashed interest of leading European countries such as Germany and France to swiftly expand their capital markets in Iran (<a href="http://parstoday.com/de/news/iran-i24366-deutschland_ist_f%C3%BChrend_bei_investitionen_in_iran">Parstoday.com</a>, March 1), this intent by Tehran does not come unexpected. However, it is at least as obvious that, as Zarif pointed out, “the low price of transportation gives us a good opportunity to include Iran, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia” in new multilevel interregional cooperation initiatives (<a href="https://imedinews.ge/ge/saqartvelo/10631/zaripikvirikashvilis-shekhvedraze-hijabis-matarebeli-vizitorebis-shemotsmebaze-isaubres">Imedinews.ge</a>, April 20). The ultimate goal of this endeavor — to link Iran with Russia by way of increasing its soft power in Georgia — was made explicit once again during President Hassan Rouhani’s recent meeting with Vladimir Putin in Moscow (<a href="http://tass.com/world/938043">TASS</a>, March 28).</p><p>The Islamic Republic certainly does not pass up on chances to carve out a deeper area of influence in Georgia. The <em>Tehran Times</em> reported that, during his talks with Kvirikashvili, Zarif “[urged] Georgia to recommit [its] respect for Iranian tourists” (<a href="http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/412752/Zarif-urges-Georgia-to-recommit-respect-for-Iranian-tourists">Tehran Times</a>, April 19). The newspaper alleged that “an Iranian Muslim woman has been forced to take away [sic] her hijab by Tbilisi airport security for frisking.” Zarif reportedly raised this issue with Kvirikashvili, who, according to Tehran, “expressed surprise” about the offense and promised an “immediate investigation into the incident.” “I cannot imagine that Muslim women are offended in Georgia,” Kvirikashvili is quoted as saying, seemingly implying a readiness to randomly exempt Iranian Muslim women from standard security procedures at the Georgian border. The government of Georgia did not dispute the reporting on the incident. It merely issued a brief statement that Georgian officers checking travelers “act in full accord with the demands of the aviation security provision program,” thus not explicitly clarifying whether the officials abstain from searching Iranian women wearing hijabs (<a href="http://1tv.ge/ge/news/view/157702.html">1tv.ge</a>, April 20).</p><p>This episode highlights the multipronged efforts by Iran to gain a heavier soft power footing in Georgia. Yet, Iran — a country that militarily supports the beleaguered Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad — is a hard power adversary of some of the Georgia’s most important allies, including the United States. Tornike Sharashenidze at the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs claims that “Georgia does not have the luxury to choose its [regional] partners” (Author’s interview, March 23). This goes against common sense, since potential economic gains from regional neighbors may sometimes be trumped by their anti-democratic stance. And instead of asking about the ways in which Georgia could perhaps become more positively involved with its allies in resolving the Syrian conflict, the commentator Giorgi Khatiashvili simply stated that Georgia’s “support of the [April 7 Shayrat] airfield [cruise missile] bombing by Trump […] should not be an apple of contention, because we do not play any role in Syria.” Georgia is a “small country,” and thus it has to “implement a moderated policy,” Khatiashvili added (<a href="http://radiotavisupleba/">Radiotavisupleba.ge</a>, April 18), evoking the post-Communist narrative of national victimhood.</p><p>Against the background of such conciliatory rhetoric, Giorgi Kvirikashvili’s subsequent visit to Tehran — with yet another large Georgian delegation in tow, including the ministers of energy, economy, environment, agriculture, sport and foreign affairs — could not have transpired much smoother. After meeting with President Rouhani, Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri, and Majlis Chairman Ali Larijani, the Georgian prime minister signed memoranda of understanding and agreements focused on “the issue of [the] North–South corridor and connection of the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea through Iran-Armenia-Georgia or Iran-Azerbaijan-Georgia” (<a href="http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=30051">Civil Georgia</a>, April 24). Georgia also plans to initially import 40 million cubic meters of natural gas from the Islamic Republic (<a href="http://www.bm.ge/ka/article/iranidan-saqartveloshi-daaxloebit-40-mln-m3-komerciuli-bunebrivi-gazis-importi-igegmeba/11096">Bm.ge</a>, April 24), about 2 percent of its annual gas consumption of approximately 2.18 billion cubic meters (<a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2250rank.html">Cia.gov</a>, accessed May 15).</p><p>Mere weeks before signing the GSOIA with the US to improve counter-terrorism cooperation, Georgia, quietly but vigorously pushed to facilitate Iran’s multifocal efforts to boost its position in the South Caucasus — despite the Islamic Republic’s wide recognition as a state sponsor of terrorism. Since signing the GSOIA, there have been no signs that Tbilisi intends to revoke or scale back its ties to Tehran. Such a friendly posture toward Iran may end up undermining Georgia’s efforts to integrate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or to become recognized by the US as a “non-NATO ally,” a status the government in Tbilisi is purportedly pursuing.</p><p><em>This story originally appeared in Jamestown Foundation’s </em>Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 14 Issue: 65.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2c75217d5587" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/embrace-of-iranian-overtures-undermines-georgias-counter-terrorism-and-nato-integration-efforts-2c75217d5587">Embrace of Iranian Overtures Undermines Georgia’s Counter-Terrorism and NATO Integration Efforts</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni">Devi Dumbadze’s Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Georgia’s State Security Service Annual Report Downplays Country’s Terrorist Threat]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/georgias-state-security-service-annual-report-downplays-country-s-terrorist-threat-fb5a03c73b8e?source=rss----674d45c71bd6---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fb5a03c73b8e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Devi Dumbadze]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 May 2017 15:10:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-11T16:36:53.108Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*32DmFMtpmRq9xzjasynEOg.png" /><figcaption>Murad Margoshvili, or Muslim Abu al-Walid al-Shishani from Pankisi Gorge, commander of Junud al-Sham terrorist group, disbanded 2016</figcaption></figure><p>On April 12, the State Security Service of Georgia (SSG) released its annual report for 2016, assessing the country’s security threats (<a href="http://ssg.gov.ge/uploads/%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C%E1%83%92%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98%E1%83%A8%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98/angarishi2016.pdf">Ssg.gov.ge</a>, April 23). Unsurprisingly, the report states that “the existence of occupied territories” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains “the main challenge,” with the Russian military presence there constituting “an existential threat” to Georgia’s statehood (<a href="http://netgazeti.ge/news/186747/">Netgazeti.ge</a>, April 12). Moreover, the document focuses on covert foreign activities such as last August’s foiled attack on the Russia-Armenia natural gas pipeline near Saguramo (<a href="http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=30018">Civil Georgia</a>, April 13).</p><p>Once again, the SSG bluntly asserts that “Georgia does not belong to the countries with a high risk of terrorist attacks,” though acknowledging “certain challenges in the aforementioned direction” (<a href="http://ssg.gov.ge/uploads/%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C%E1%83%92%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98%E1%83%A8%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98/angarishi2016.pdf">Ssg.gov.ge</a>, April 23). Yet, this explicitly contradicts the US State Department’s updated “Georgia 2017 Crime &amp; Safety Report.” Along with the occupied territories, the State Department document qualifies the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, as “a high-threat location for terrorist activity directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests” (<a href="https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=21388">Osac.gov</a>, April 23). The SSG report thus seems to disregard the insights of its partner US intelligence agencies concerning Georgia’s domestic terrorist threat level.</p><p>The SSG contends that “the number of radicalized citizens willing to engage in terrorist activities has declined.” It reports that to prevent Georgians from traveling to Syria and Iraq to join terrorist groups, as well as to undercut non-citizen terrorist transit through Georgia, last year the authorities submitted 1,500 individuals to border control “and denied entry into Georgia to 750” (<a href="http://ssg.gov.ge/uploads/%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C%E1%83%92%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98%E1%83%A8%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98/angarishi2016.pdf">Ssg.gov.ge</a>, April 23). But the overall figures for 2015 were similar: 1,286 persons were submitted to border controls and 1,014 were denied entry (<a href="http://ssg.gov.ge/uploads/%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C%E1%83%92%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98%E1%83%A8%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98/SSSG%20REPORT.pdf">Ssg.gov.ge</a>, March 29, 2016) — in other words, only 50 fewer individuals suspected of terrorist activities or links to terrorist groups were submitted to border controls or denied entry in 2016 than in the previous year. The report did not specify whether any of those suspected of terrorist activities or links to terrorist groups were Georgians, whether they were staying in the country long term, with or without visas, or how many were transiting through the country toward other destinations.</p><p>Moreover, the report does not mention Georgians who continue to fight in the ranks of the Islamic State (IS) and other terrorist organizations. This is striking, as the 2015 report did admit to 50 such individuals. Independent experts claim that between 100 to several hundred Georgian fighters are active in the Levant. <em>Factcheck.ge</em> tracked 11 confirmed Georgian terrorists killed in 2016 alone. Crucially, an unknown number of prospective Georgian fighters has undergone radicalization after leaving for Turkey for work or education at Islamic <em>madrassas</em> (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/terrorist-threat-georgia-shifts-exporting-militants-homegrown-returning-fighters/">EDM</a>, January 20). The report lacks any information on whether Georgia cooperates with Turkey to track such cases.</p><p>Therefore, based on the SSG’s own conservative estimate, at a minimum about 40 terrorists from Georgia were active in 2016. Yet, their whereabouts are unaccounted for by the report. Nor does the document address the scenario of their return to Georgia with the potential aim to wage a decentralized jihad there. In light of the IS’s continued territorial losses in Syria and Iraq, the terrorist threat is expected to rise as international fighters return to their home countries to establish local terrorist cells for low-cost deadly attacks. A significant recent case of such a returning fighters’ cell was the “Khasavyurt Group” in Dagestan, bordering with Georgia (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/khasavyurt-group-new-watershed-islamic-state-activity-dagestan/">Terrorism Monitor</a>, February 10).</p><p>Other data provided by the SSG appears to also contradict its own assessment of “no high risk of terrorist attacks.” The SSG has identified “several persons linked to terrorist activities” in Georgia, without providing exact numbers. Last December, it began an investigation into a foreign citizen charged with developing a pro-IS terrorist group. Fifteen “foreign students” were also “subjected to lawful measures” for “ideologically aiding terrorism with extremist propaganda.” Additionally, “up to 20 citizens of foreign countries” were charged with funding terrorism. The SSG is investigating an unspecified number of Georgian expatriates allegedly disseminating pro-IS propaganda on social media.</p><p>Together, these facts suggest a threat of possible terrorist attacks at home. Nonetheless, Georgia’s opposition parties have so far failed to question these apparent discrepancies in the SSG document. The report’s committee-level hearing in the parliament was held behind closed doors and lasted only two hours (<a href="http://web1.rustavi2.ge/ka/news/73184">Rustavi2</a>, April 13).</p><p>The expert Giorgi Gobronidze claims “Georgia is not an attractive state for terrorists.” He assumes attacks on Georgian soil would not have “the same scale of informational impact as in Western Europe.” Moreover, he argues, Georgia lacks a “demographic structure” conducive to domestic terrorism unlike, for example, France, with its “large naturalized Islamic community” (<a href="http://accent.com.ge/ge/news/details/32573">Accent.ge</a>, April 12).</p><p>But comparing Georgia’s social fabric and preconditions for terrorism primarily with those of geographically and sociologically distant France makes little sense; and it is problematic to underestimate Georgia’s integration into global informational networks such as Facebook and Twitter. Russia and Turkey, both Georgia’s immediate neighbors, provide a much more self-evident and relevant point of comparison. In both countries, recent suicide attacks, in St. Petersburg and Istanbul, appeared to be motivated by their military involvement against the Islamic State, likely carried out by homegrown terrorists and aided by returning fighters (<a href="http://www.gazeta.spb.ru/2006807-1/">Gazeta.spb.ru</a>, April 21). Georgia, too, supports international military counterinsurgency efforts, currently in Afghanistan and, previously, in Iraq. It is a member of the Global Coalition Working to Defeat ISIS (<a href="http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=29959">Civil Georgia</a>, March 23). Should Georgia decide to also contribute kinetically to the anti-IS fight, this could further increase the risk of terrorist attacks on its soil.</p><p>Notably, Georgia also has about a 13 percent Muslim population, with a Shia majority in the south. This Shia community is actively courted by the Islamic Republic of Iran through soft power efforts (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/iran-builds-soft-power-georgia-foster-tighter-nexus-russia/">EDM</a>, March 29). Moreover, the Sunni minority of about 10,000 Kists who live in Pankisi Gorge has supplied the majority of Georgian foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq. The intent of suicide attacks by radical Islamist militants is primarily to seek a general destabilization of societies perceived as their enemies (Matthias Küntzel, <em>Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11</em>, New York, 2007). Georgia constitutes such an enemy, not only for its actual military involvement in counterinsurgency operations abroad, but also by the fact of its majority Christian population. To this one should add Georgia’s strategic position as an energy and commerce transit hub between numerous stakeholders.</p><p>The SSG report downplays both the number of Georgian terrorists in the Middle East, and the threat of returning fighters possibly preparing attacks in Georgia. In addition, it ignores the threat assessments by its purportedly closest allies, such as the US.</p><p><em>This article was originally published in Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor on April 26, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fb5a03c73b8e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/georgias-state-security-service-annual-report-downplays-country-s-terrorist-threat-fb5a03c73b8e">Georgia’s State Security Service Annual Report Downplays Country’s Terrorist Threat</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni">Devi Dumbadze’s Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Georgia’s Weak Opposition Looks on As Ruling Party Flirts with China]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/georgias-weak-opposition-looks-on-as-ruling-party-flirts-with-china-7422b5dcb5ba?source=rss----674d45c71bd6---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7422b5dcb5ba</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Devi Dumbadze]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 May 2017 14:41:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-08T16:04:18.660Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/675/1*OUiT1lLYrEn-XXgrFzDf0g.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Originally appeared at <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/georgias-weak-opposition-looks-ruling-party-flirts-china/">Eurasia Daily Monitor,</a> November 28, 2016</h4><p>While a split within the United National Movement (UNM) party threatens to sink the Georgian pro-Western opposition into political chaos, the ruling Georgian Dream–Democratic Georgia (GDDG), which enjoys a constitutional supermajority in the parliament, is readying to swiftly reorient Georgia’s foreign policy priorities. UNM’s leader and former president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, has launched a new opposition reformist movement in Ukraine (see EDM, <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/saakashvilis-resignation-start-ukrainian-parliamentary-election-campaign/">November 14</a>, <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/leaving-odesa-saakashvilis-political-future-even-uncertain-native-georgia/">16</a>). Appearing on the TV channel Rustavi 2, Saakashvili, speaking in Kyiv, effectively called for creating a comparable new political force in Georgia. In addition, he did not mince words in his criticism of the dissenting faction of UNM, de facto led by parliamentarian Giorgi Bokeria (<a href="http://rustavi2.com/ka/news/61378">Rustavi 2</a>, November 15). Indeed, the 27 UNM lawmakers who will enter the parliament following last October’s elections will have a difficult time standing up to or breaking through the GDDG’s domination of the national legislature. As such, the opposition’s critical role of questioning and checking the ruling party’s tendency toward centralization of power may be overshadowed by the tumultuous infighting within UNM.</p><p>One source of potential concern are the security policy implications of the rapidly growing economic presence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Georgia. The South Caucasus country is now firmly in the orbit of Beijing’s Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road projects. Labeled “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR), these strategic transit mega projects are estimated to cost $3–4 trillion over the next thirty years. China is primarily seeking to utilize the Kars–Tbilisi–Baku railway, to be completed in 2017, as its own transport corridor connecting Central Asia to Europe by rail and ferry, thus sidelining Russia. The PRC also expects to profit significantly from a new deep-water Black Sea port under construction by Anaklia Development Consortium, a joint venture of Georgian TBC Holding and the US-based Conti International (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/china-loses-bid-for-construction-of-georgian-deep-water-port-on-black-sea/">EDM</a>, February 26). China and Georgia further aim to ratify a new free-trade agreement by the end of year, which would allow both countries “to employ a zero tariff on the large majority of [imported] products” (<a href="http://civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=30656">Civil Georgia</a>, October 6; see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/free-trade-agreement-with-china-boosts-georgias-security-strategic-regional-importance/">EDM</a>, September 21).</p><p>Georgia’s exports to China have already grown by 59.1 percent in the first three quarters of 2016. Totaling $138.9 million, they displaced exports to Russia as the second-largest destination for Georgian good, after Turkey. Georgia’s exports to Russia have also experienced an upward trend — increasing by 17 percent (<a href="http://civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=30714">Civil Georgia</a>, October 22). The current $551.6 million trade turnover between China and Georgia can be expected to outgrow Georgia’s total trade with Russia, currently equal to $612.27 million, after the Sino-Georgian free trade agreement begins to operate in 2017. Notably, however, the overall levels of Georgia’s exports and imports have been on a downward trend. They have shrunk by 8 percent and 3 percent, respectively, in part due to the continued troubling fall of the Lari — reaching 2.52 per $1 (<a href="http://www.interpressnews.ge/ge/sazogadoeba/405992-zog-komerciul-bankshi-erthi-dolaris-ghirebuleba-252-laria.html?ar=A">Interperssnews.ge</a>, November 11).</p><p>The state-owned “Partnership Fund” investment fund, associated with the informal leader of GDDG, Bidzina Ivanishvili, continues regular meetings with Chinese officials, most recently, representing the Silk Road Chamber of International Commerce, to foster exports of Georgian wine and silk (<a href="http://www.fund.ge/geo/view_news/916">Fund.ge</a>, October 28), as well as Chinese companies investing in Georgia’s tea industry (<a href="http://eugeorgia.info/ka/latestarticle/202/chinuri-kompaniebi-qartuli-chais-warmoebashi-investirebas-gegmaven/">Eurogeorgia.info</a>, October 20). A first transit cargo train from China, headed to Turkey, arrived in Tbilisi in December 2015 (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BjzFhaN9074">YouTube</a>, December 15, 2015). Some experts enthusiastically proclaim that this economic “win-win” comes with an additional bonus in the security sphere. Presumably, Russia would not “dare” to “mess” with its “strong partner” China’s “new protégé” Georgia due to Beijing’s interest in Georgian infrastructure, trade and tourism (<a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/georgia-the-key-to-chinas-belt-and-road/">The Diplomat</a>, April 28).</p><p>However, if the next United States presidential administration under Donald Trump follows through on his campaign promise to label China a currency manipulator, this could trigger a trade war. And given Beijing’s increasing tough talk about a “New Cold War” in Asia and beyond (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/beijing-talks-tough-new-cold-war-asia/">China Brief</a>, October 4), US-Chinese economic tensions could spill over into other theaters. Namely, in retaliation, China might try to use its newly attained economic weight in Georgia to extract from it concessions in order to thwart US interests in the South Caucasus — in concert rather than in conflict with China’s ally Russia. It seems a fallacy to neglect that what unites the arguably distinct geopolitical interests of both Russia and China in Georgia is their common anti-Western and particularly anti-US stance.</p><p>Georgia’s ruling party is largely ignoring the security implications of Beijing’s energetic moves in the country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no document assessing the potential security risks and opportunities associated with this notable trend (<a href="http://www.mfa.gov.ge/MainNav/ForeignPolicy/BilateralRelations/%E1%83%A9%E1%83%98%E1%83%9C%E1%83%94%E1%83%97%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%AE%E1%83%90%E1%83%9A%E1%83%AE%E1%83%9D-%E1%83%A0%E1%83%94%E1%83%A1%E1%83%9E%E1%83%A3%E1%83%91%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98%E1%83%99%E1%83%90.aspx">Mfa.gov.ge</a>, accessed November 16). Chinese operatives of OBOR in the South Caucasus openly stress they want to install strictly Chinese management of all infrastructure to be used by Chinese companies and assets on the ground (<a href="https://www.csis.org/events/south-caucasus-reconnecting-eurasia">Csis.org</a>, October 11). Moreover, there have already been a handful of cases in which Chinse firms have transferred substandard labor practices to Georgia. A highly publicized incident occurred in the village of Zvare (Kharagauli region): management representatives of Chinese Railroad’s Bureau 23 assaulted several Georgian construction workers, resulting in the arrest of three Chinese citizens (<a href="http://primenewsgeorgia.ge/com/news/view/13141">PrimeNewsGeorgia</a>, November 3). And as Washington turns inward over the next year to work through the consequences of the US presidential election, this may open up more opportunities for the PRC to more forcefully attempt to maximize its economic relationship with Georgia. Such deepening economic cooperation, in turn, will likely translate gradually into growing political influence. It is difficult to forecast which political faction in Georgia, if any, will turn out to have an adequate response to this new emerging challenge for the country’s foreign relations.</p><p>After failing to deliver on its promise to generate rapid economic growth (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/new-economic-data-show-georgias-deepening-economic-malaise/">EDM</a>, February 2), the Georgian Dream government appears ready to further embrace the Chinese Tiger. It remains to be seen whether a regrouped pro-Western Georgian opposition will be able to formulate a sound policy that clearly champions Georgia’s integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions, while offering workable remedies for China’s potential growing political involvement.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7422b5dcb5ba" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/georgias-weak-opposition-looks-on-as-ruling-party-flirts-with-china-7422b5dcb5ba">Georgia’s Weak Opposition Looks on As Ruling Party Flirts with China</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni">Devi Dumbadze’s Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Terrorist Threat in Georgia Shifts From Exporting Militants to Homegrown and Returning Fighters]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/terrorist-threat-in-georgia-shifts-from-exporting-militants-to-homegrown-and-returning-fighters-46d770a7ced8?source=rss----674d45c71bd6---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/46d770a7ced8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Devi Dumbadze]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Apr 2017 15:21:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-05T14:36:06.462Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/688/1*E3YrPsqylDPXuubA1eA3QQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Mukhammad Khangoshvili from Pankisi Gorge, Georgia</figcaption></figure><p>Mukhammad Khangoshvili, a 24-year-old inhabitant of the village of Duisi, in Pankisi Gorge, Georgia, was killed, on November 7, 2016, in a bombing of the Islamic State’s (IS) positions in the Iraqi city of Mosul (<a href="http://news.ge/ge/news/story/199660-isis-is-tsevri-iyo-da-tarkhan-batirashvilis-datsvashi-msakhurobda-siriashi-saqartvelos-moqalaqe-daighupa">News.ge</a>, November 8, 2016). Khangoshvili previously served as a bodyguard for Tarkhan Batirashvili (a.k.a. Abu Omar al-Shishani), who was the Georgian commander of IS operations in Syria, until the latter was killed last year (<a href="http://1tv.ge/ge/videos/view/167455/328.html">1tv.ge</a>, July 14, 2016). Khangoshvili is officially identified as the most recent Georgian citizen to be killed in Syria while fighting for the Islamic State. His cousin, Ramzan Pareulidze, from the village of Birkiani, died there as well, in January 2016 (<a href="http://factcheck.ge/article/25-e-mokluli-teroristi-saqarthvelodan/">Factcheck.ge</a>, November 11, 2016).</p><p>As of November, the official total number of Georgian citizens killed in Syria in 2016 spiked to 11. In the previous four years, 14 fighters have been reported killed altogether (<a href="http://factcheck.ge/article/25-e-mokluli-teroristi-saqarthvelodan/">Factcheck.ge</a>, November 11, 2016). The last annual report by Georgia’s State Security Service, released in April 2016, covered a time period only until the end of 2015. It claims that about 50 known citizens of Georgia have departed the country to join terrorist groups abroad (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/number-of-georgian-citizens-who-leave-to-join-islamic-state-has-abruptly-dropped/">EDM</a>, April 8, 2016). The Security Service monitored 1,286 persons; 1,014 were denied entry into the country, while 40 were stopped from leaving it (<a href="http://www.civil.ge/files/files/2016/SUSreport-March2016.pdf">Civil Georgia</a>, retrieved January 16).</p><p>Terrorism expert Mamuka Areshidze believes that the number of active Georgian fighters is at least double the official number (Author’s interview, January 17, 2017). Areshidze points out that many become radicalized while working or studying at religious centers in Turkey. Thus, their mobility is not always trackable for the Secret Service of Georgia. Local media from Pankisi Gorge reported that up to 100 young men left to fight in Syria during 2011–2015 from this region alone (<a href="http://www.ick.ge/articles/22683-i.html">ICK.ge</a>, July 6, 2015). Another Georgian source estimates the number at “several hundred fighters” (<a href="http://www.resonancedaily.com/index.php?id_rub=2&amp;id_artc=28568">Resonancedaily.com</a>, March 24, 2016).</p><p>Areshidze does state, however, that the count of radicalized Georgian citizens leaving to join foreign terrorist groups continues to decline. Partly, he attributes this to IS’s setbacks after the Mosul offensive and the growing number of deaths of Georgian fighters. Together, these factors are discouraging potential new recruits (Author’s interview, January 17, 2017). Yet, in some cases, deaths of jihadists are celebrated as righteous martyrdoms, which, conversely, attract new fighters.</p><p>Secondly, Areshidze cites a lack of charismatic leaders, stressing that “only one major figure from the region plays a significant role as a field commander: Murad Margoshvili of the Nusra Front (group more recently renamed Jabhat Fateh al-Sham). However, Chechen mercenaries continue to fight in the area of Aleppo in Syria under the command of another Georgian, Peizulla Margoshvili, or Salahaudin Shishani, and a few others (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/chechens-fighting-islamic-state-mosul/#sthash.DT11DcFx.dpuf">EDM</a>, December 14, 2016).</p><p>According to Areshidze, the third factor contributing to the decline in new Georgian recruits is domestic: namely, an internal split that has developed in the community of Kists, the 10,000-strong Chechen minority of Pankisi. In 2015, a new local imam — Bekkhan Pareulidze, a 29-year-old student of Islamic Philology at the Saudi King University — was elected in the village of Duisi (<a href="http://www.ick.ge/articles/22683-i.html">ICK.ge</a>, July 6, 2015). Duisi’s Wahhabist Islamic community under Pareulidze rejected a pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State. Whereas, Imam Aiyup Borchashvili, from the village of Jokholi, which rivals Duisi in regional ideological influence, was arrested for swearing an oath of <em>bayat</em> (allegiance) to the Caliphate. The Kists enjoy a paragon position with regard to radicalizing Muslims from Georgia’s other regions of Adjara and Guria.</p><p>Official data on the possible decline or rise in numbers of radical fighters and their border crossings in 2016 is missing. The National Security Service has not issued any further reports. A question by this author was not returned (January 16). The US State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security rates the terrorist threat in Georgia itself as “high” (<a href="https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=19076">Osac.gov</a>, January 17). Citing the general change in the Islamic State’s strategy toward globally dispersed terrorist acts — which aligns with its losses of territory in Syria and Iraq — expert Irakli Maisaia claims that “a well-trained unit of 600–700 fighters” was formed by the IS “with the main goal to conduct attacks in Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus,” including Georgia (<a href="http://www.resonancedaily.com/index.php?id_rub=2&amp;id_artc=29663">Resonancedaily.com</a>, June 22, 2016).</p><p>Areshidze agrees that terrorist attacks on transportation hubs in Georgia cannot be excluded (Author’s interview, January 17). Maisaia points to a recent pattern of attacks in the South Caucasus region and Central Asia, including in Dagestan, where 5 soldiers were killed and 20 wounded, as well as Kazakhstan, which suffered 17 victims last June in the city of Aktobe (<a href="http://www.resonancedaily.com/index.php?id_rub=2&amp;id_artc=29663">Resonancedaily.com</a>, June 22, 2016). The terrorist attack in Aktobe disrupted an important transit node of the transcontinental Silk Road network, which also extends to Georgia. Another threat, which Georgia shares with other Western countries, is the return of fighters back to their homeland, where they can blend in to prepare new, decentralized attacks. Areshidze also underlines that this risk of a homegrown type of <em>jihad</em> in Georgia, including by returning fighters, is tangible (Author’s interview, January 17).</p><p>To date, official information by Georgian security agencies to either confirm or deny such threats is absent. The recent series of terrorist attacks in neighboring Turkey, including the June 2016 Istanbul airport bombing claimed by the Islamic State as well as the killing of the Russian Ambassador and the attack on a night club in December, indicate a new volatility also to the south of Georgia.</p><p>The novel threat seems to be the shift from the export of regional terrorists to Syria and Iraq toward a refocusing of terrorist activities in the off-the-battleground areas hitherto considered relatively safe from terrorism by local governments. As the Islamic State, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups continue to experience setbacks in their “safe havens” in the Middle East, recent attacks in France, Germany, Belgium and the United States have proven that relatively low-cost acts of terrorism in regions of the West with low-level readiness become more attractive. More modest levels of actual involvement in the international fight against terrorism by particular countries do not seem to significantly reduce the risk of attacks. Meanwhile, Georgia continues its contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) counter-terrorism efforts, including the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan (<a href="http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=29779">Civil Georgia</a>, January 17), which, if anything, increases such risks.</p><p><em>This article was originally published in Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 2, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=46d770a7ced8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/terrorist-threat-in-georgia-shifts-from-exporting-militants-to-homegrown-and-returning-fighters-46d770a7ced8">Terrorist Threat in Georgia Shifts From Exporting Militants to Homegrown and Returning Fighters</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni">Devi Dumbadze’s Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Iran Builds Soft Power in Georgia to Foster Tighter Nexus With Russia]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/iran-builds-soft-power-in-georgia-to-foster-tighter-nexus-with-russia-57cc9c92655a?source=rss----674d45c71bd6---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/57cc9c92655a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[soft-power]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Devi Dumbadze]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 23 Apr 2017 00:00:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-04-23T00:00:52.698Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/859/1*r4XKRbSwLDos-3gnx-X2hw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Participants of the Iran-sponsored conference “Healthy Family — Healthy Society,” Tbilisi, Georgia, March 20, 2017</figcaption></figure><p>“I appreciate that Georgia has [a governmental] agency that directly works on religious affairs and with religions. I am very pleased that thanks to the efforts of Georgian government representatives, different religions and ethnic groups peacefully coexist here. That is exactly how it is also in Iran,” said the Islamic Republic’s Ayatollah Kazem Seddiqi — the Temporary Friday Prayer Imam of Tehran — during his recent meeting with the head of Georgia’s State Agency on Religious Affairs, Zaza Vashakhmadze (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i9Yk6hNPaSo">GPB</a>, March 21). Seddiqi assured local media that the main purpose of his three-day visit in Georgia is nothing less than “to promote the fight against terrorism and violence, and for peace and culture in our societies” — a statement that contrasts sharply with the United States Secretary of Defense James Mattis’ recent reiteration of Iran’s status as the “number one terrorist state” in the Middle East (<a href="http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2017/02/06/509365/Russia-Peskov-US-Trump-Iran-accusation">PressTV</a>, February 6).</p><p>Seddiqi is only the latest in a string of top Iranian religious leaders to visit Georgia since the Iran nuclear deal was reached in 2015. In May 2016, Ayatollah Sayyid Jawad Sahrestani — the Iranian representative of Iraq’s highest Shia cleric, al-Uzma Sayyid Sistani — attended the opening of a new mosque and a hospital for the Shia Islamic community in the southeastern Georgian city of Marneuli. These were largely subsidized by the foundation operating in Georgia under Ayatollah Ahrestani’s name (<a href="http://www.ipress.ge/new/31928-marneulshi-imam-huseinis-sakhelobis-akhali-mecheti-gaikhsna">iPress.ge</a>, May 13, 2016). The Sahrestani Foundation, which cooperates with the Governing Body of All Muslims of Georgia, also actively funds other facilities, events and cultural projects for Georgia’s predominantly Azerbaijani Shia minority. This month, Seddiqi, who came to international renown in 2010 after claiming that earthquakes are caused by women, also visited Marneuli, met with the Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church Ilia II, and attended a sponsored conference on “Healthy Family — Healthy Society” (<a href="http://amag.ge/index.php/news/item/389-2017-03-20-10-46-49">Amag.ge</a>, March 20). For several years now, Iran has been combining a successful strategy of cash infusions to interest organizations with a comprehensive media and charity blitz to accumulate soft power in Georgia. The westernmost South Caucasus country increasingly finds itself one of the focal points of interest in Tehran’s foreign policy in the region.</p><p>Last year, the Center for Development of Georgia-Iran Business promised “100,000 new tourists from Iran in 2016” (<a href="http://www.commersant.ge/?m=5&amp;news_id=32571&amp;cat_id=6">Commersant.ge</a>, February 10, 2016). Reality outperformed predictions: 147,915 Iranian tourists actually visited Georgia in the past year (<a href="http://www.for.ge/view_news.php?news_id=66996&amp;news_cat=0">For.ge</a>, March 20). This growth was facilitated by Georgia lifting visa requirement for Iranian citizens on February 15, 2016 (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/oscillating-between-israel-and-iran-will-georgia-tilt-toward-the-islamic-republic/">EDM</a>, July 20, 2016). The further 438 percent increase of the number of Iranian entries in January and February 2017, in comparison to the same months in 2016, indicates a strong overall upward trend of cooperation in the domain of tourism (<a href="http://www.economy.ge/ge/media/news/saqartvelos-mimdinare-wlis-or-tvesi-755-080-saertasoriso-mogzauri-ewvia">Economy.ge</a>, March 1). Other economic sectors are also looking to catch up. The Georgian-Iranian Technology Transfer Center opened in the Scientific Technological Park of the Iranian city of Yazd in order to attract new, more diverse and innovative investors from Iran to Georgia (<a href="http://www.info9.ge/politika/167541-iazdshi-iranul-qarthuli-teqnologiuri-gadacemis-centri-gaikhsna.html?lang=ka-GE">Info9.ge</a>, March 10).</p><p>Shortly before Seddiqi’s visit, Tbilisi Mayor Davit Narmania met with the new ambassador of the Islamic Republic in Georgia, Seyed Javad Ghavam Shahidi to discuss joint urban projects between Tbilisi and Tehran (<a href="http://accent.com.ge/ge/news/details/30979">Accent.ge</a>, March 17). Notably, Ambassador Shahidi also met with Minister of Defense Levan Izoria, who underscored that “developing friendly relations with Iran is an important foreign policy priority for Georgia” (<a href="http://accent.com.ge/ge/news/details/30915">Accent.ge</a>, March 16). This may indicate that possible cooperation in security matters could once again resurface on the bilateral agenda. At the same time, Georgian Foreign Minister Mikheil Janelidze visited his counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif, in Tehran, in January, focusing on bilateral “regional transportation and energy projects” (<a href="http://iran.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&amp;sec_id=323&amp;info_id=40010">Mfa.gov.ge</a>, January 11); the same issues were raised at a follow-up meeting of the deputy foreign ministers in Tbilisi (<a href="http://www.mfa.gov.ge/News/davit-zalkaliani-iranis-sagareo-saqmeta-ministris.aspx?CatID=5">Mfa.gov.ge</a>, March 20). However, the volume of direct investment to Georgia from Iran has dramatically declined from $92.3 million in 2015. The full extent of this shrinking investment is unclear as Iran does not even appear on the list of the nine largest foreign direct investment (FDI) countries to Georgia in 2016: according to preliminary data, Azerbaijan tops the chart with $578 million in FDI last year, while the ninth-largest country, Cyprus, invested just $38 million (<a href="http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&amp;p_id=2231&amp;lang=eng">Geostat.ge</a>, March 23).</p><p>This drop in Iranian FDI may stem from the general lack of industrial diversification in Georgia’s foreign investment economy, with only 7 percent of overall FDI flowing into manufacturing, while transportation and communications (39 percent) and the energy sector (12 percent) top the list. It seems that Iran, too, is now shifting its emphasis to tourism, education, transportation and energy, especially given the mutual plan with Russia and Armenia to establish the first free trade zone in Armenian Meghri, which would boost commerce of the Eurasian Economic Union with the Islamic Republic (<a href="http://www.info9.ge/politika/167541-iazdshi-iranul-qarthuli-teqnologiuri-gadacemis-centri-gaikhsna.html?lang=ka-GE">Commersant.ge</a>, March 19). This agreement is expected to be signed during Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s visit with Vladimir Putin in Moscow this week (March 28–29) (<a href="http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2017/03/27/515785/Iran-Russia-Syria-Middle-East-Hassan-Rouhani-JCPOA-terrorism-Bushehr">PressTV</a>, March 28). In light of this plan, Georgia and Armenia’s initially undisclosed aspirations to grant Russia new transportation routes via the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would fit into a larger strategy of forging closer economic and political ties between Russia and Iran (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/russia-progressively-pulls-georgia-tighter-orbit-way-new-transit-routes/">EDM</a>, March 7). Tehran can use Georgian territory as a corridor to counteract Washington’s efforts to drive a wedge between it and Moscow (see <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/russia-iran-us-obtuse-triangle/">EDM</a>, February 14).</p><p>Hamed Kazemzadeh, of the Center for East European Studies, at the University of Warsaw, believes that “Iran does not oppose Georgia’s efforts to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]” (<a href="http://accent.com.ge/ge/news/details/30730">Accent.ge</a>, March 13). While Tornike Sharashenidze, of the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs, views the current developments as part of “normalization” with Iran that, he claims, began already after 2008 (Author’s interview, March 23). Indeed, thus far, the Islamic Republic does not seem to have a reason to go beyond an application of soft power to enlarge its sphere of influence in Georgia; it encounters only fertile soil on both ends of the Georgian political spectrum, the ruling party and the opposition. Yet, the new US administration is apparently seeking to isolate Iran anew. And if, in alliance with Israel and its other regional partners, the US is ultimately successful in undercutting Iran’s efforts at dominance in the Middle East, Tehran may easily counteract by utilizing its accrued soft power in Georgia. The Islamic Republic could then potentially transform this soft power capital into hard power by actively fomenting religious unrest and destabilizing violence among Georgian minority communities.</p><p><em>The story originally appeared in Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor on March 29, 2017</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=57cc9c92655a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/iran-builds-soft-power-in-georgia-to-foster-tighter-nexus-with-russia-57cc9c92655a">Iran Builds Soft Power in Georgia to Foster Tighter Nexus With Russia</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni">Devi Dumbadze’s Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ფარმაკონის სახლში. თეა ჯორჯაძე, Projects 103, MoMa PS1]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/%E1%83%A4%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%9B%E1%83%90%E1%83%99%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9C%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%AE%E1%83%9A%E1%83%A8%E1%83%98-%E1%83%97%E1%83%94%E1%83%90-%E1%83%AF%E1%83%9D%E1%83%A0%E1%83%AF%E1%83%90%E1%83%AB%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-projects-103-moma-ps1-%E1%83%A8%E1%83%98-cc1537b277e5?source=rss----674d45c71bd6---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cc1537b277e5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[installation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[moma]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[thea-djordjadze]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Devi Dumbadze]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Dec 2016 01:08:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-07T17:06:19.693Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/676/1*81wnYGuiFkB1ihGIeTqOuA.jpeg" /><figcaption>ვარძია, »წამლის სახლი«, მე-12 საუკუნე</figcaption></figure><p><em>გამოფენა ნიუ-იორკის თანამედროვე ხელოვნების მუზეუმში (</em><a href="http://momaps1.org/exhibitions/view/404"><em>Museum of Modern Art, PS1</em></a><em>) 2016 წლის 3 აპრილიდან 26 აგვისტომდე შედგა.</em></p><p>ლეგენდა ცნობილია. მომავალი დედოფალი, ბავშვი, მამა-მეფეს კლდოვან უდაბნოში ნადირობისას დაეკარგა. შიშით აღსავსე ეძება, ვერსად იპოვა. სასოწარკვეთილი რჩებოდა, სანამ ერთ-ერთი მსახურის ძახილზე, ბავშვმა არ უპასუხა: »აქ ვარ, ძია!« დედოფალი თამარი იმ გამოქვაბულში იპოვეს, სადაც მამამ, ხსნის აღსანიშნავად, მონასტრის აშენების აღთქმა დადო.</p><p>თეა ჯორჯაძის ინსტალაციას ეს ლეგენდა მოტივად არ ემსახურება. კავშირი ვარძიის ერთ სპეციფიკურ ოთახთანაა; ასევე, მის იმ წარმოსახვით კონოტაციასთან, რომელიც ცივ, ბნელ, უკაცრიელ ჯურღმულში დაკარგვას უკავშირდება. გოგონა ჯერ უნდა თავად დარჩეს სიმარტოვეში. დაუცველობა ნამდვილი გამოცდილება უნდა იყოს. გოგონა მხოლოდ იმის შედეგად შეძლებს საკუთარი თავის დახსნას, რაც, მარტოსული, თავად გამოთქვამს კერძო ადგილის <em>ნამდვილ სახელს</em>.</p><p>ხალხური თქმულებით, »ვარძია« კლდოვანი ლანდშაფტის მართებული სახელი აღმოჩნდება. მონასტერი იხარებს. მას თავად თამარი დალოცავს, 1203 ოთახიდან კი 600-მდე დღესაც შემორჩენილია. ადამიტური სახელდების კონცეფციაზე ვალტერ ბენიამინი წერს.[1] მისი იდეა ის არის, რომ მითოლოგიისაგან გათავისუფლებულ ლოცვაში, მუსიკაში, ხელოვნების ნაწარმოებში, ინდივიდუალური საგნის არაიგივეობრივ თვისებებს საკუთარი სახელი ისევე ზუსტად ენიჭება, როგორც ბიბლიური სამოთხის ადამის სიტყვები მართლაც სწვდებოდა საგანთა არსს.[2] დღეს კი სახელდება გაშუალებული და ფუნქციონალიზებურია; ადამიტური კი, თუ ის ხელოვნების სეკულარიზებულ მაგიაში არსებობს, ცდილობს იმას, რომ ობიექტისათვის სუბიექტის მიერ ინსტრუმენტული თვალსაზრისით თავსმოხვეულ ცნებებს გასცდეს. ამ დროს, ადამიტური სახელდება ცნებებზე უარს არ ამბობს. მაგრამ ის მათ არც ბუნებაზე გაბატონების ავტომატიზებურ იარაღებად არ იყენებს. ადამიტური სახელდება მიმეტურია, უფრო ზუსტად კი, ონომატოპოიეტური.[3]</p><p>თუ ეს კონცეფცია ძალაშია ხელოვნების ნაწარმოებისათვის, მაშინ, გადმოცემის თანახმად, ბავშვი თავად უბრუნებს მის მაძებარს იმ ინდივიდუალური ადგილის ჭეშმარიტ სახელს, სადაც ის დაიკარგა და მარტოსული აღმოჩნდა. იგი ტერორს დაძლევს, მარტოდ დარჩენის დაუსრულებელ ტკივილს. ამ შიშით გამოწვეული შეძახილი ადგილის ესთეტიზაციას ახდენს. მაგიურად, ეს შეძახილი სახელად იქცევა და მას შემზარავ ნაკვთებს ართმევს, გარდასახავს რა მათ ბავშვური პასუხის კეთილჟღერადობაში. გამოქვაბული, ჯერ ნომინალურად, წარმოსახვაში, შემდეგ კი რეალურად, მშენებლობით, სახლად იქცევა — »წამლის სახლად«.</p><p>»წამლის სახლს« კი <a href="http://momaps1.org/exhibitions/view/404">ჯორჯაძის კომპოზიცია უკვე ღიად იხმობს</a>. ვარძიის უძველესი აფთიაქის ქვის კედლებში 265 თანაბარზომიერი ნიშაა გამოკვეთილი, ბრტყელი ძირებით, რკალისებრი თაღებით. ისინი ამდენივე ვიწრო საკურთხეველია, თუმცა მათი დანიშნულება საკულტო არაა. მაგია ვარძიის პერიოდში უკვე რა ხანია, გადასულია პრაქტიკულ სამკურნალო მეცნიერებაში. ნიშებში განსხვავებული წამალი ინახებოდა — ფარმაკონი.</p><p>დღეს კლდოვანი ქვები მოლიპულია, ასობით სათავსი ძველი წამლის სენაკში გამოცარიელებული და გაშავებული. მაგრამ მრავალი ნიშის ღრუ მზერას მით უფრო იწოვს. დღეს თუ შეავლებს მათ მავანი თვალს — იქნებ, ბავშვობაში, შესაძლოა, სასკოლო ექსკურსიაზე? — შიშმა შეიძლება გაიღვიძოს. საიდან ეს სიცარიელე? შესაძლოა, წარმოსახვამ წარიტაცოს აზრი და ბავშვი კვლავ შეკრთეს. წარსული ნანგრევის წინაშე დღეს ყველა დამთვალიერებელი ბავშვის პოზიციაშია. ის, რაც ეს შენობა ოდესღაც იყო, და განკურნვის რა საშუალებებსაც არ ინახავდა ის საკუთარ თავში პოტენციის სახით, რა ხანია, გამქრალია. მაყურებელი შიშობს: ხელი რომ შევყო, ხომ არ ჩამითრევს? რა მოხდება? უფუნქციოდ ქცეული მცირე ქვის კამერები მას ამ ბუნდოვანებით იზიდავს. ამავე დროს, ისინი მას რაღაცას აღუთქვამენ კიდეც. რაღაც განუსაზღვრელს. წამალი ხომ ის »ფარმაკონია«, რომელსაცც, პლატონის »ფედროსიდან« მოყოლებული, ფილოსოფიური თვალსაზრისით, ორი ურთიერთსაწინააღმდეგო აზრი აქვს: ის არის განკურნების საშუალებაც და ნარკოტიკული თუ ფარმაცევტული შხამიც. ეს ფარმაკონი ახლა არსად ჩანს წამლის სახლში. გაურკვეველია, თუ რას პირდება გამოღრუებული თაროები დამკვირვებელს: წამლის ხსნას თუ შხამის წარწყმედას?</p><p>თავის თაროებს, უკვე სრულიად თეთრს, ხისგან დამზადებულს და მრავალგზის გადიდებულ მართკუთხედებად გაზრდილს, თეა ჯორჯაძე <em>Projects 103</em>-ის ინსტალაციაში ოდნავ ასიმეტრიულად საგამოფენო სივრცის ოთხივე კედელზე ათავსებს. ამით მაყურებელი, ძალაუნებურად, კონსტრუქციის შუაგულში ექცევა. ინსტალაცია წითელი აგურით აშენებული ყოფილი სკოლის ორსართულიან გალერეაში გამოიფინა, რომელიც დღეს ქუინზში <em>MoMa</em> <em>PS1</em>-ს ეკუთვნის. ქვედა სართულის კიბეზე ჩასულს, ფანჯრების პირდაპირ დამდგარს, მარცხნივ კედელზე ოთხი თეთრი მართკუთხედი ხვდება, ერთმანეთის თავზე დაკიდებული. კიდევ ოთხი კოლოფი მარჯვნივ, მოპირდაპირე მხარეზეა მოთავსებული, ორიც გვერდი-გვერდ, წინა კედელზე, მათ თავზე ფანჯრების რიგი კი გამოქვაბულის ნათელ გასასვლელებს გვაგონებს. ბოლო ორი თარო უკანა კედელზეა დამაგრებული. ეს მათი განმეორიბით-ხაზოვანი განლაგება მინიმალისტურია. ამ ნიშნით, ასევე, გამოყენებული მასალის ინდუსტრიულობით, კოლოფები, მაგალითად, მინიმალისტი დონალდ ჯადის »უსათაურო« სერიებთან გადაძახილია. თუმცა, ჯორჯაძის კოლოფები გაცილებით უფრო საგნობრივია.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/550/1*eBoKyfMZqtSmcpGaqe8yLw.jpeg" /><figcaption>თეა ჯორჯაძე, Projects 103-ის ინსტალაცია, დეტალი, 2016</figcaption></figure><p>ჯორჯაძის ინსტალაციის ორგანიზებული სივრცე იმის მცდელობაა, რომ წამლის სახლის ზმანება, ერთგვარად, გამოცანასავით, რეკონსტრუირდეს და, ამავე დროს, ამოიხსნას კიდეც. თუმცა, ეს მიიღწევა იმის ონტოგენეტიკური თვალსაზრისით ისტორიულ გახსენებაში, <em>რასაც ჯერ ადგილი არ აქვს</em>. კომპოზიციის ელემენტები შინაარსობრივად განსაზღვრულ ნაგებობად შეკვრას ესწრაფვის. მაგრამ, ეს არ ხდება არქიტექტურულად ზუსტი თვალსაზრისით, არამედ, სიმბოლურ-ფუნქციურად. განსხვავება და მათი თავისებურება კი სწორედ ის არის, რომ ეს ელემენტები ასეთ ნაგეგობად, ამავე დროს, არც იკვრება. ინსტალაცია არ არის არც უბრალოდ მინიმალისტური, მაშასადამე, მხოლოდ სპეციფიკური ობიექტების კერძო მატერიალურობით დაინტერესებული, შინაარსობრივად უკავშირო, როგორც ეს ხდება, მაგალითად, იმავე ჯადთან. და ის არც პერფორმაციულად არაფრის ინსცენირებას არ ახდენს: არ არის ძილში ქრობადი სიზმრის სცენა, რომელშიც განსაზღვრული ფიგურები, ვით ზმანების პერსონაჟები, წამიერად იელვებს. ამისათვის სივრცის კონტურები ზედმეტად განუსაზღვრელია.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/385/1*dtj2wKLQX7iu67zzE5yPSg.jpeg" /><figcaption>დონალდ ჯადი, “უსათაურო”, 1968</figcaption></figure><p>თუ ჯორჯაძის ურთიერთდაკავშირებული ნაწილობრივი ობიექტები საერთოდ კონკრეტულ სივრცეს იხმობს, მაშინ ეს ასოციაციურად სწორედ აფთიაქისა იქნება. თუმცა, წამლის სახლიდან ის სახლის აფთიაქად იქცა, ისე, თითქოს, ვიღაცამ — არ ვიცით ვინ, მზრუნველმა მშობელმა, ნათესავმა, საყვარელმა — მის სათავსოებში რაღაც შეინახა, შესაძლოა, სიმბოლურადაც ჩაწერა, რაც, მართალია, უხილავია და <em>რის ხილვადად ქცევაც შეუძლებელიც იქნებოდა</em>. მარცხენა ოთხიან რიგში თეთრი ყუთები ნაწილობრივ ნახევრადგამჭვირვალე პლექსიგლასის ზედაპირებით იფარება. წინა მხარეს დამონტაჟებული შუშის კიდეები ალაგ-ალაგ ყვითლით, ჟანგიანი ფერით — იქნებ ოქრითაც კი? — ოდნავ შეფერილია, მათი ზედაპირები წვრილად დაკაწრული. სულ ქვემოთ გამჭვირვალე პანელი იატაკამდე გრძელდება; ამგვარად გაორმაგებული, იგი ლილვაკის მონასმებით ღია ცისფრით ფოროვნად არის გადაღებილი. კონსტრუქცია არც სრულიად უშინაასროა, მაგრამ ის არც რეპრეზენტაციული ფუნქციისათვის საკმარისად განსაზღვრული არ არის.</p><p>მთელი აგებულების სანახავად შესაფერი სკალა, როგორც ჩანს, სწორედ ქვემოდანაა. შეიძლება მეორე სართულზე ასვლაც და აივნიდან, მაშასადამე, ინსტალაციის გარედან მისი დათვალიერება. თუმცა, მაშინ სახლი მიტოვებულია. მაგრამ თუ ქვემოთ გაჩერდება მაყურებელი და მის შემადგენელ ნაწილებს დააკვირდება, შუშის საფარები ოდნავ ციმციმსაც იწყებს. ქვემო რეგისტრზე დატანებული გადღაბნილი ღია ცისფერი გაუმჭვირვალე რჩება. თვალს ის, ერთგვარად, ისხლეტს, მზერა კი მოძრაობას განაგრძობს, შესაძლოა, მარჯვნივ, წინა კედლისკენ. აქ განლაგებულ სათავსოთაგან მარცხენაში ორი მსხვილი თუნუქის პირამიდაა, შუაგანაკვეთზე წაჭრილი თავებით, ერთი მეორის რევერსით გვერდ-გვერდ ჩამოკიდებული. ესეც ამსხლეტი ადგილებია, ერთი შიგნით მიმართული, მეორე გარეთ ამოტრიალებული — შესაძლოა, აფთიაქის ჯამ-ჭურჭლის ალეგორია. მომდევნო პლასტმასის ფირფიტა მარჯვნივ თითქმის მთლიანად თბილი თეთრი ფერითაა დაფარული. აქ არაფერი დასანახი არაა; მაგრამ, არც განსამარტავი. უფრო საალბათოა, რომ ეს თეთრი მართკუთხედები მათი საერთო ზემოქმედებით კონკრეტულ ილუზიას ესწრაფვის. ეს ესთეტიკური მოჩვენება მათი გაერთიანებული ფორმიდან წარმოიშობა. ის, თითქოს, მაყურებლისთვისაც კი არ არის განსაზღვრული; ეს კი, თავის მხრივ, ასევე, ქანდაკებისადმი მინიმალისტური დამოკიდებულების მახასიათებელია.</p><p>მარჯვენა კედელზე სამი ხის უჯრა ჩანს, კედელზე ძირით მიმაგრებული. მათგან უკიდურესი ყავისფერ-ყვითელია, მის გვერდით, ისევე, როგორც ქვედა კოლოფში, თეთრი, ოთხკუთხედი დაფაა მიყუდებული. ყველა ასეთი გეომეტრიული ელემენტი გამოცანის ნაწილად წარმოსდგება—თითქმის გეომეტრიულად მეთოდურ ცდად იმისა, რომ გახსენების ენიგმა ამოიხსნას. თუმცა, მოგონება, რომელიც ამ კომპოზიციის საორგანიზაციო პრინციპად მოქმედებს, ამავე დროს, არ არის მხოლოდ ხელოვანის ინდივიდუალური მეხსიერების ნაყოფი. ის ცდილობს, რომ გამოხატულება უპოვოს ზოგად ინტენსიას: ისტორიულ-ცნებით შიდაარსს.</p><p>ამ მარჯვენა კედელზე, მესამე მართკუთხედს შუაში ჩარჩოში ჩასმული თეთრი ფერის დაფა ამშვენებს. როგორც მოსალოდნელია, ისიც არ არის ნახატი—და ვერც იქნებოდა. ეს კოლოფიც მთლიანი კონსტრუქციის უბრალო ნაწილია. ერთგვარად, არაფრისმთქმელი — და არც არაფრის თქმის მოსურნე — ფერის გამეორებით, ეს ელემენტი თავისი სპეციფიკურობის დაკარგვას უსვამს ხაზს და, ამის შედეგად, გახსენებული ადგილის განზოგადებასაც. კოლოფების ქვემოთ, უმდაბლეს რეგისტრზე, თუნუქის ფირფიტებია მიმაგრებული. ეს სიმეტრიულად ამოჭრილი, შემთხვევითი მართკუთხა ფიგურებია; ერთ-ერთი, მაგალითად, კვადრატია.</p><p>დაბოლოს, მეოთხე კედელზე, კოლოფებს ქვედა კიდის გასწვრივ კონტურად რუხი ნაჭერი მიჰყვება. ერთ-ერთ ნიშაში მოპირდაპირე მხარეს განთავსებული პირამიდის მსგავს აღნაგობას ვხედავთ. ის ლითონის ბადისგან არის დამზადებული და ასევე წაჭრილი წვეტი აქვს, დაუსრულებელია. ინსტალაციის ერთადერთი არაგეომეტრიული წარმონაქმნი პაპიემაშეს პატარა ნაგლეჯია. ის მარცხნივაა განთავსებული და დიაგონალურად წინ არის წამოწეული. ასეთი დეტალები, ასევე, წამლის დასამზადებელ აღჭურვილობასა და ბალახებს უთითებს. მის გვერდით ლითონის შავი ტანსაცმლის ჩამოსაკიდებელია მიკრული; კიდევ უფრო ქვემოთ: ბნელი, მსხვილი, მძიმე პანელი რამდენიმე სახელურით; ის თითქოს კარია, მაგრამ არც არის. იატაკზე კედელს ორიოდ მუქი ლურჯი ფირფიტაა მიყუდებული, ამოტვიფრული რკალით.</p><p>ინსტალაციის ყველა ასეთი თითოეული დეტალის თავისებურება ფუნქციაზე მინიშნებაა, თუმცა, ისე, რომ ეს ფუნქცია იქვე უარიყოფა კიდეც და, ამდენად, უბრალოდ მოჩვენებად წარმოჩნდება.</p><p>კონკრეტული შინაარსთან ასეთი მიახლოვება და შემდეგ მისგან კვლავ დაშორება ამ ინსტალაციას თავისებურებას ანიჭებს. ურთიერთმიმართებაში მყოფი დეტალები მაცდურია, რადგან განსაზღვრულ მთელად ისინი არ იკვრება. საბოლოოდ, ინსტალაცია არც სახლის აფთიაქის სცენას არ წარმოსახავს. თუმცა, სრულიად უშინაარსო ეს სივრცე მაინც არ არის. სწორედ ეს არის ნაწარმეობის მაკონსტიტუირებელი განუსაზღვრელობა.</p><p>ჯადთან სკულპტურა სწორედ მაშინ კარგავს ილუზიის ელემენტს, როცა მისი ესთეტიკური მოჩვენება კითხვა »რატომ?«-ის ზედმეტად დაჟინებული დასმით ირღვევა. ჯორჯაძის მნემონიკურ საექსპერიმენტო მოწყობილობაში კი მხოლოდ ხელის ცეცებით აგებული რეკონსტრუქციის »როგორ?« არსებობს. ეს »როგორ?« არის ფორმის ცდა. ის არის იმის დამხსნელი გახსენებისა— და, ამავე დროს, წინასწარმეტყველი სურვილის წარმოდგენის — მცდელობა, რომ, ერთხელაც, ფარმაკონის მრავალტიხრიან სახლში, დაკარგულობის განუჭვრეტელი სიცარიელით გამოწვეული შიშის შედეგად, მაინც რაღაც მხსნელი გამოჩნდეს. ეს შიშია ის, რაც სანუკვარ ფარმაკონს ასე ორმნიშვნელად არხევს წამალსა და საწამლავს შორის. კომპოზიციის ინდივიდუალური ფორმა ფსევდომაგიური ხსნის გენეტიკური ელემენტია.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*IGwrA2-NckbmQue05rhHBg.jpeg" /><figcaption>ვარძია, საერთო ხედი, მე-12 საუკუნე</figcaption></figure><p>ვარძიის ისტორიული აფთიაქის ქვის თაროები მას ისევე მიემართება, როგორც აფთიაქი—მთლიან გამოქვაბულების ქალაქს: ფრაქტალურად სკალირებული სახით, თავად წამლის სახლი ერთ-ერთ სათავსედ წარმოჩნდება ასობით სხვა გამოქვაბულ კამერას შორის. ვარძიას 365 ოთახი უნდა ჰქონოდა, რათა დედოფალს ყოველ დღე ეცვალა ბინა და მტრისგან დაცული დარჩენილიყო. — გაურკვეველია, აღმართავს თუ არა პროექტი 103 რაღაც დამცავ ზონას. თუმცა, ჯორჯაძის განუსაზღვრელის აღმთქმელი ფარმაკონის სახლში ხელოვნების ის სეკულარული მაგია, რომელსაც თეოდორ ვ. ადორნო აღწერს, სასოწარკვეთით, ნამდვილ ხსნას, ტანჯვისაგან გათავისუფლებასა და, საბოლოოდ, სიკვდილისაგან დაცვას მოელის. ჯორჯაძის ინსტალაციას ის სურს, რომ ონტოგენეტიკურად და, ასევე, ფილოგენეტიკურად განსაზღვრული კერძო—შესაძლოა, ქართული ისტორიის გახსენების პარტიკულარიზმიც—არაგარანტირებული შერიგების ზოგად, თუ არა უნივერსალურ ხატში გადაიყვანოს.</p><p><em>წყაროები</em></p><ol><li>Walter Benjamin: »Über Sprache überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen«. In: Gesammelte Schriften, Frankfurt am Main 1985. Bd. II.1, S. 140–57.</li><li>იხ. მაგალითად, Theodor W. Adorno: »Über das gegenwärtige Verhältnis von Philosophie und Musik«. In: Gesammelte Schriften, Frankfurt am Main 1997, Bd. 18, S. 154: »In der utopischen und zugleich hoffnungslosen Anstrengung um den Namen liegt die Beziehung der Musik zur Philosophie, der sie eben darum in ihrer Idee unvergleichlich viel näher steht als jede andere Kunst« | »სახელის უტოპიურსა და, ამავე დროს, უიმედო მცდელობით მუსიკა უკავშირდება ფილოსოფიას და მას, სწორედ ამის გამო, საკუთარი იდეის თანახმად, შეუდარებლად უფრო უახლოვდება, ვიდრე ნებისმიერი სხვა ხელოვნება«.</li><li>Walter Benjamin: »Über das mimetische Vermögen«. In: Gesammelte Schriften, Frankfurt am Main 1985. Bd. II.1, S. 212 | On the Mimetic Faculty. In: Selected Writings. Vol. 2, part 2, 1931–1934, Cambridge 2005, p. 721.</li></ol><p><em>ილუსტრაციები</em> | Images via <a href="http://www.art-it.asia/u/admin_expht/SxCt7Q3BcEyf0PNpWObM">art-it.asia</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/550/1*Ozmio4QYfrqWajr6yqbWBQ.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/412/1*iMiPY9YsWotL_CH87wY9tQ.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/412/1*7GaMRhIJAB7_JGroBXGilQ.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/550/1*d4-z5Mi5JMZWzRag3g8-vg.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/550/1*a3n3t3KxTZD2tF3V5CRH8g.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/550/1*R2VSoYDYEzfAvs10dmD-kQ.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/550/1*NbsKYbVSNHawIR5x2tLxkw.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/550/1*eBoKyfMZqtSmcpGaqe8yLw.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/550/1*hkV3LP0Y1D68b1QA0lojrA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/550/1*sylzgF7Sxl4rHSrcZC0diA.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cc1537b277e5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni/%E1%83%A4%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%9B%E1%83%90%E1%83%99%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9C%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%AE%E1%83%9A%E1%83%A8%E1%83%98-%E1%83%97%E1%83%94%E1%83%90-%E1%83%AF%E1%83%9D%E1%83%A0%E1%83%AF%E1%83%90%E1%83%AB%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-projects-103-moma-ps1-%E1%83%A8%E1%83%98-cc1537b277e5">ფარმაკონის სახლში. თეა ჯორჯაძე, Projects 103, MoMa PS1</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/iliko-ilarioni">Devi Dumbadze’s Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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