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        <title><![CDATA[INDRA Networks - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[We primarily report on news related to Indian Armed Forces, Homeland and International Security affairs. - Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[GNSS Denial in 21st Century and the End of Uncontested Space]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/indra-networks/gnss-denial-in-21st-century-and-the-end-of-uncontested-space-e769ceed3fa5?source=rss----f904e32dee05---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[drone-jamming]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gnss]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gps]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jamming-drone-signals]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[spoofing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shwetabh Singh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 28 Feb 2026 21:30:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-01T00:43:47.722Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*l4ITL3K-Id-5skMNGE_fzg.jpeg" /></figure><blockquote>“In peace, prepare for war. In war, prepare for peace.”</blockquote><p>Sun Tzu probably wasn’t thinking about Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) when he wrote that, but the sentiment holds. For three decades, we’ve treated Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) — or “GPS” — as a divine right. It is the invisible utility, the silent heartbeat of everything from 5G grids to the exact moment your bank realizes you’re overdrawn. But the era of uncontested space is dead, and we are currently waking up to a massive, systemic hangover.</p><blockquote>“The Sky is no longer a Sanctuary.”</blockquote><p>In the summer of 1999, during the high-altitude skirmishes of the Kargil Conflict, the Indian military faced a realization that would alter its strategic trajectory for decades: the dependence on a foreign-controlled Global Positioning System (GPS) was a direct compromise of national sovereignty. When the United States reportedly denied access (an intentional degradation of GPS that used to be called Selective Availability and was later withdrawn in 2000) to high-precision GPS data in the region, it exposed the fundamental fragility of a modern military’s “invisible utility.” This was the catalyst for the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS/NavIC), but it was also a microcosm of a much larger, global vulnerability.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/singhshwetabh71/status/1700480194446762100&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/6787e7a3976ad763957a7cc069cf3b13/href">https://medium.com/media/6787e7a3976ad763957a7cc069cf3b13/href</a></iframe><p>For the last four decades, Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) have served as the silent heartbeat of the 21st-century world. They synchronize 5G telecommunication networks, manage the phase of national power grids, and underpin the precision-strike capabilities of every modern aerospace power. However, as we move into an era of high-intensity, peer-to-peer contestation, the assumption of uncontested space-based PNT (Position, Navigation, and Timing) is dead. The findings of recent operational analysis lead to a singular conclusion: the future of resilient navigation is not a better satellite, but a <strong>Hybrid Architecture</strong>.</p><p>A small tangent about NavIC I want to make before the larger discussion about PNT. GNSS position is solved using what we call pseudorange equation, and it incorporates all the measurable and unmeasurable errors that would introduced in the measurement of the range from the satellite. One of big sources of error that needs to be solved for is atmospheric modelling and errors introduced by Ionosphere and Troposphere, with Ionosphere contributing a lot more. NAVIC smartly solves that problem by using 2 bands instead of one as usual (L5 and S), and thus you can remove the errors without introducing a complex atmospheric model.</p><p><strong>1| The Physics of Vulnerability: Jamming vs. The Sophisticated Lie</strong></p><p>The vulnerability of the MEO (Medium Earth Orbit) constellations — GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, and BeiDou — is rooted in basic physics. These satellites transmit from an altitude of approximately 20,000 kilometers. By the time the signal reaches a ground-based receiver, its power is roughly equivalent to a 100-watt lightbulb viewed from several hundred miles away. This inherent weakness makes GNSS the “low-hanging fruit” of electronic warfare.</p><p><strong>GNSS Jamming</strong> remains the most common form of denial. It is a brute-force approach, involving the emission of high-power noise in the L1, L2, or L5 frequency bands to drown out the satellite signal. While disruptive, jamming is overt. A receiver recognizes the loss of signal lock and can enter a “fail-safe” mode. In modern conflicts, we see jamming being used not just as a localized tactical tool, but as a strategic “blanket” covering hundreds of square kilometers.</p><p><strong>GNSS Spoofing</strong> represents a significantly higher order of threat. Instead of blocking the signal, a spoofer utilizes Software-Defined Radios (SDRs) to broadcast counterfeit structures that mimic authentic GNSS data. The objective is to deceive the receiver’s tracking loops into locking onto an attacker-controlled signal. This is a “surgical lie.” A successful spoofing attack can “drag-off” a platform’s position estimate without triggering any immediate alarms, leading autonomous systems or human operators to make navigational decisions based on a demonstrably false reality.</p><p>It is also critical to recognize that GNSS denial is not a ubiquitous or permanent state; it is inherently localized in both time and space. Adversaries do not “extinguish” the GNSS constellation; they create localized “denial bubbles” or “interference windows” designed to protect specific high-value assets or contest specific geographical corridors. This transient and spatial nature of the threat reinforces the “Hybrid Imperative”: a platform does not necessarily need to operate without GNSS indefinitely, but it must be resilient enough to bridge the gap as it traverses these contested zones.</p><p><strong>2| The Defensive Layers: Resurrecting the RF Link</strong></p><p>Maintaining navigational integrity in a contested environment requires a defense-in-depth strategy. The first layer is the hardening of the primary GNSS link itself.</p><p>Modern “all-in-view” receivers have largely moved away from single-constellation reliance. By fusing data from multiple constellations and operating across triple-frequency bands (L1, L2C, L5), receivers can mitigate localized interference. However, hardware-level mitigation is where the real gains are made.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/787/1*F2TVI9EJJtjinrjLqw8Zow.png" /></figure><p><strong>Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPA)</strong> and <strong>Phased Array Antennas (PAA)</strong> utilize the geometry of the incoming RF energy to defend the link. Since most jammers and spoofers are ground-based emitters, these antenna arrays can identify the threat’s direction and “null” that specific lobe, effectively ignoring the interference while maintaining lock on the satellites above. Furthermore, software-level protections like <strong>Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM)</strong> use redundant measurements to statistically identify and exclude “outlier” signals — a critical check against spoofing.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/168/0*mfOCuMt6S1F17E4z" /><figcaption>A Chinese CRPA on a Russian Geran 2/Shahed 136</figcaption></figure><p><strong>3| Alt-Nav: The Escape Hatches of Navigation</strong></p><p>When the RF environment becomes too saturated for GNSS, the system must transition to <strong>Alternative Navigation (Alt-Nav)</strong>. These systems provide PNT data through channels that are geographically or electromagnetically independent of the MEO constellations.</p><p><strong>eLORAN (Enhanced LORAN)</strong> is a compelling terrestrial example. Operating in the low-frequency (100 kHz) spectrum with high-power ground transmitters, eLORAN provides a signal that is virtually unjammable by standard GNSS denial tools. It provides exceptional penetration in urban canyons and within buildings, offering an independent source of timing and position through Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) methods.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=twitter&amp;url=https%3A//x.com/singhshwetabh71/status/1893706016463684085%3Fs%3D20&amp;image=" width="500" height="281" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/47a92ef176c65e7aec2f78b9a8d74ba3/href">https://medium.com/media/47a92ef176c65e7aec2f78b9a8d74ba3/href</a></iframe><p>We are also seeing the emergence of <strong>Signals of Opportunity (SoP)</strong>. This involves utilizing the existing “ambient” RF environment — 5G cellular towers, Wi-Fi networks, and digital television broadcasts — to derive a positional fix. While less precise than GNSS, SoP requires no new capital investment and provides a “good enough” solution for urban navigation when the sky is denied.</p><p><strong>4| Sensor Fusion: The INS Core and Physical Observables</strong></p><p>The foundation of resilient navigation remains the integration of an <strong>Inertial Navigation System (INS)</strong> with external aiding data. An <strong>Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)</strong> composed of accelerometers and gyroscopes is inherently “unspoofable.” It does not “listen” to external signals; it simply measures physics.</p><p>The challenge is <strong>drift</strong>. Every IMU, from the common MEMS (Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems) found in drones to the high-end <strong>Fiber Optic Gyros (FOG)</strong> or <strong>Ring Laser Gyros (RLG)</strong> found in fighter jets, accumulates error over time. To counter this, we employ sophisticated non-linear filtering — most commonly the <strong>Extended Kalman Filter (EKF)</strong> or the <strong>Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF)</strong> — to fuse IMU data with additional “observables.”</p><p>In a GNSS-denied scenario, the aiding data must come from the environment itself:</p><p><strong>Visual Inertial Odometry (VIO) and Vision based Navigation:</strong> Utilizing RGB or thermal cameras to estimate 3D position by comparing live frames against satellite imagery (V-SLAM). Vision based Navigation is one of the more proliferated alt-nav technologies, due to the easier availability of satellite RGB maps, of very decent resolution. VIO handles the short-term relative “smoothness,” while Map-Matching provides the “absolute” position confirmation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/850/0*uK2w7zBDGudcQpe2.png" /></figure><p><strong>Magnetic Anomaly Navigation (MagNav):</strong> Using magnetometers to map local variations in the Earth’s magnetic field against a pre-surveyed crustal map. This is passive, robust, and virtually impossible to jam.</p><p><strong>Gravity Gradiometry (GravNav):</strong> Mapping mass anomalies to determine position — a method primarily used for underwater navigation where RF is non-existent.</p><p><strong>5| The Quantum Horizon and the AI Integration</strong></p><p>The ultimate frontier of PNT lies in the physics of the atom. <strong>Quantum Navigation</strong> promises a future of “zero-drift” sensors. Passive systems, such as atomic gyroscopes and accelerometers, use atomic interference to measure rotation and acceleration with a precision that exceeds current RLG technology by orders of magnitude. Once miniaturized, these sensors will allow platforms to maintain high-integrity navigation for weeks without a single external update, rendering the concept of “denial” obsolete.</p><p>Simultaneously, <strong>Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML)</strong> are revolutionizing how we handle sensor fusion. AI models are now being trained to detect the subtle “fingerprints” of spoofing attacks by analyzing signal-to-noise ratios and pseudo-distance errors in real-time. These <strong>aware </strong>systems can autonomously discount a compromised GNSS signal and shift the navigational weight to inertial or magnetic sensors without human intervention. AI is also being used to predict synthetic GNSS corrections during an outage, significantly extending the coasting period of an INS.</p><p><strong>6| The Hybrid Imperative</strong></p><p>The era of uncontested space and “free” PNT is over. The transition to a multi-layered, hybrid framework is no longer a luxury of advanced research; it is a strategic imperative. We must master the proximity advantage of LEO, the independence of terrestrial RF, and the physics of the atom.</p><p>To secure the foundation upon which the 21st-century world operates, we must build systems that are as diverse and resilient as the threats they face. In the final analysis, the most effective countermeasure to GNSS denial is not a better satellite, but a system that is smart enough to navigate without one.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e769ceed3fa5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks/gnss-denial-in-21st-century-and-the-end-of-uncontested-space-e769ceed3fa5">GNSS Denial in 21st Century and the End of Uncontested Space</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks">INDRA Networks</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[India’s Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Arsenal: Deadly Diversity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/indra-networks/indias-anti-ship-cruise-missile-arsenal-deadly-diversity-a1c43bd8b59b?source=rss----f904e32dee05---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a1c43bd8b59b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[anti-ship-missiles]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-navy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shwetabh Singh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 14 May 2023 04:00:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-14T03:59:05.788Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*K_Ec8irdSo4jJcxN.jpeg" /><figcaption>P15 class destroyer with BrahMos</figcaption></figure><p>Indian Navy has 5 different modern anti-ship missiles in service today from 4 different countries with very different performance parameters. Indian armed forces are big on variety, and they bring in 5 of the most advanced anti-ship missiles used worldwide with a bunch of local options being developed to supplant or supplement them going forward. If you work in the supply chain industry, you will ask about economies of scale and high costs. The thing is, while costly it brings in a unique capability where the Indians have so many options, they can fine tune mission packages based on enemy vessels. Adversary is going to have a tough time countering so many potential munitions.</p><p><strong>What is an Anti-Ship Cruise Missile?</strong></p><p>Before we dive into mission packaging, let us discuss what an anti-ship missile is. As the name suggests, an AShM is launched from a standoff range towards a naval target. It is launched towards a target in the general direction with rough estimates of range, target signatures and location. Post launch, the missile flies towards the target following one of two trajectories below.</p><p>1. High — Low profile: Post launch from ship or submarine platform, the missile climbs to its optimal altitude for generally 2/3rds of the distance to target. It is followed by a dive to a wave top level of 5–10 m for the remaining distance. This profile allows for the max range, which is the range you see when looking at missiles online.</p><p>2. Low — Low profile: Post launch from ship or submarine platform the missile flies the entire way at very low level to the target. Generally, the range in this profile is between 40% to 50% of maximum advertised range if the flight profile is not clarified.</p><p>There are other options too, modern missiles offer either pop-up top attack on the target which can expose a missile to the target’s CIWS or other onboard gun systems but cause super structure damage. Or, the missile can stay at wave top altitude and hit the hull causing more internal damage. Depending on the target, you can use either flight profiles or final approach profiles or a mix of all to create maximum mayhem.</p><p><strong>Mission Packaging</strong></p><p>Mission packaging is a difficult task, you need to study about the enemy’s defense and plan a load out to achieve mission success. The process is very complicated and requires a lot of information and intelligence to carry out. The rough beats of the process are as follows.</p><p>1. In this case what kind of SAMs, jamming, ESM and decoys do enemy surface vessels have.</p><p>2. Identify gaps in defenses (for eg. only short-range SAM, no short-range SAM, very high minimum engagement range for SAM, weak or no CIWS etc.)</p><p>3. Select munitions based on the target (for eg. In case of single vessel with short range SAM, select an Anti-Ship missile with higher low level final approach range, incase of a flotilla with more potent ships, select a missile with longer low-low range to allow for platforms to launch and exit without detection).</p><p>4. Select numbers needed to break through defenses (rule of thumb atleast 8 AShMs per modern naval combatant).</p><p>5. Select Archers i.e. launch platforms and their numbers.</p><p>6. Plan mission path.</p><p>7. Plan mission contingencies.</p><h3><strong>India’s Current Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Arsenal</strong></h3><h4><strong>BrahMos</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AJwpIbXLqzCZcWgG.jpg" /><figcaption>INS Kolkata firing a BrahMos AShM.</figcaption></figure><p>Developed as an Indo-Russian joint venture, this missile was interestingly based on the P-800 with work shared between the two countries. India has developed and tested guidance, seeker, and propulsion locally which means they can carry on without Russian support in current environment. What is interesting to me is that P-800 can hit targets 800 km away while sharing exact same dimensions and metrics as BrahMos. India’s advertised tested range for this missile is 450–500 km, means there is a massive scope for growth in performance over current numbers. Generally, this just needs development and validation of software and hardware at that range which is relatively easy to do if not done already.</p><p>It can carry a 200 -300 kg warhead at Mach 2.8 to Mach 3 speed towards the target. Modern SAM systems have only recently gained ability to reliably intercept subsonic missiles (eg Ukraine). Supersonic ones bring far lower reaction times meaning while some could be intercepted, a few will certainly break through. Given their 200 km low level range, these missiles are best suited against top-of-the-line surface vessels. The ability to launch from so many platforms allows for tight and precise mission packaging.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3eHZxDvGE5P39JpJ5UBQ6Q.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Klub</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*EZPW1iE-nPuMiRc4.jpg" /><figcaption>INS Sahyadri firing a 3M54TE Klub AShM.</figcaption></figure><p>Klub is a very interesting missile by itself. The missile has subsonic cruise phase which allows for a longer range while also having a Mach 3 terminal phase with its 200 kg warhead. It can be launched from surface and sub-surface vessels in Indian service. I am not sure if India was able to get the non-MTCR range for these after becoming part of the group and hence the ranges listed below are those for export variants.</p><p>Low cruise speeds mean this missile spends a lot of time in the air making it easier to intercept and thus these missiles are better suited for second line vessels like older destroyers and frigates. Planners need to ensure that the wave top range at Mach 3 needs to be higher than SAM ranges or very close to minimize chance of shoot down.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O2lWT1BRCV2jJyCw0BtHsQ.png" /></figure><p>The missiles below are all subsonic and relatively easy to intercept. Intercept-ability is made worse by their relatively low ranges (for older Kh-35s and Exocet). Their low ranges make it difficult for the launch platform to stay at a standoff distance during launch (except Kh-35U and Harpoons). But these are still very useful against OPV, corvettes, or older frigate class vessels. There are a few other uses too, listed below.</p><p>1. To fill in bulk of mass attacks with BrahMos/Klub and make it difficult to intercept BrahMos/Klub.</p><p>2. Their flight patterns could be better suited for a particular SAM/CIWS system on a naval vessel.</p><p>3. Their seekers could have specific modes or jamming resistance making it easier to hunt a particular target.</p><p>4. It is the closest missile to the adversary.</p><h4><strong>Kh-35: </strong>145 kg warhead</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*LizEl01SS5QlwbcF" /><figcaption>MiG 29 onboard INS Vikrant — R-73 WVRAAM, R-77 BVRAAM, and Kh-35 AShM.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YRRFq0b8l-c4iEvws5Y7qg.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Harpoon: </strong>200 kg warhead</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/0*i-LfE-7q_ZbqpoHD.jpg" /><figcaption>P8I with underwing Harpoon AShM.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UT-7ma87m2dZnaXiMjxmzg.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Exocet: </strong>160 kg warhead</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/966/1*FgTJmhoaQycxDXUr9I9s4g.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Future of Indian Anti-Ship Missile Arsenal</strong></h3><p>Following is a list of new missiles in development in India and some special mentions that interest me. BrahMos is here to stay and new variants with new seekers are being developed to further increase the number of platforms that can deploy it. These new missiles are for niche roles for particular platforms to increase the number of options.</p><ul><li><strong>BrahMos NG</strong>: Miniaturized BrahMos for other IAF and IN air platforms or corvette level vessels will be a game changer allowing more platforms to deploy the missile.</li><li><strong>BrahMos 2</strong>: Hypersonics are the new buzz word in missiles, especially due to Zircon. While SAM systems mature to reliably intercept supersonic missiles, the next step is to go hypersonic.</li><li><strong>NASM-SR</strong>: Helicopter launched 55 km subsonic AShM can help provide under armed corvettes or aircraft carriers with offensive capability on their helicopters. The warhead is large at 380 kg, smaller warhead can help the missile go farther.</li><li><strong>NASM-MR</strong>: This missile will be a subsonic surface and air launched option for Indian vessels slotting beneath BrahMos thus giving the commanders a cheaper option to engage targets vs BrahMos. At 150 kg, its warhead is small but ~300 km range is in line with other subsonic offerings India has.</li><li><strong>Nirbhay</strong>: Called India’s Tomahawk, this 1,500 km subsonic missile with a 200–300 kg warhead needs a software and sensor update which I am pretty sure DRDO is already working on for AShM role. Its massive loiter capability allows for creative mission flight plans to the target to minimize launch platform exposure.</li><li><strong>SMART</strong>: You will say that this is an ASW weapon. It can drop its torpedo near an adversary, thereby reducing the window to intercept and creating a new worry. Another thing is, using SMART in conjunction with BrahMos can overload a crew with managing so many threats in one attack.</li></ul><p>About Writer: Epsilon</p><p>The writer has been writings about mil-topics on their website <a href="http://battlemachines.org/">battlemachines.org</a> and Facebook page Battle Machines. For more India associated articles from the writer visit <a href="http://battlemachines.org/">battlemachines.org</a> or heck out this article from them.</p><p><a href="https://battlemachines.org/2015/06/27/arjun-indias-first-mbt/">https://battlemachines.org/2015/06/27/arjun-indias-first-mbt/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a1c43bd8b59b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks/indias-anti-ship-cruise-missile-arsenal-deadly-diversity-a1c43bd8b59b">India’s Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Arsenal: Deadly Diversity</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks">INDRA Networks</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[LCA Tejas timeline]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/indra-networks/lca-tejas-timeline-a3ce71bce417?source=rss----f904e32dee05---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a3ce71bce417</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ada]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-air-force]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shwetabh Singh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Jan 2023 03:58:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-15T23:26:06.706Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>LCA Tejas Timeline</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*SJwGQmCVfNH9S-2g.jpg" /></figure><p>This is a very compact version of the timeline of the LCA Tejas Program from inception to current status.</p><p><strong>1969 </strong>— A Committee on Aeronautics, chaired by former Defense Minister C Subramaniam, recommended that India prepare a roadmap for the development of aeronautics, with a specific focus on an indigenous fighter aircraft</p><p><strong>1975–76</strong> — LCA was perceived as a replacement for Gnat, with Ajeet having not come up to expectations</p><p><strong>1978–79</strong> —</p><ul><li>A draft Air Staff Target was prepared by Air HQ, HAL and R&amp;D.</li><li>November 1978: A preliminary design of the LCA was presented to the IAF in Bengaluru, and the response was positive.</li><li>Following a chance meeting, Dr. Raja Ramanna suggested that a five-member team — consisting of representatives from the IAF, HAL, DRDO, and the Government of India — should tour Europe to seek opinions on the LCA concept. This team visited Germany, France, the UK, and Sweden. During this trip, they met with companies such as Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) in Munich, Dassault in France, and British Aerospace in the UK, and were even invited to join Sweden’s Gripen program</li></ul><p><strong>1979–82</strong> — AST draft was upgraded from a low cost tactical aircraft to replace Gnat, to a sophisticated high performance state of the art LCA.</p><p><strong>1982–84 </strong>— A technical team of experts headed by Dr S R Valluri, and then DCAS visited various design firms/manufacturers in Italy, Germany, France, UK and Sweden and later even USA to explore ToT and JVs for their own LCA design studies being conducted, like MBB’s TKF90, Dornier ND102 or BAe’s P.106 etc.</p><p><strong>1983 </strong>—</p><ul><li>The Government of India invited a committee of experts, headed by Dr SR Valluri, to carry out a detailed feasibility study on the implementation of the program. This committee also visited the same five companies in Europe that the 1978 team had visited</li><li>July 16: The Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) officially accorded approval for the design and development of the Light Combat Aircraft program. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi supported the project, giving it the highest priority for cost-effectiveness</li><li>OKBs from USSR pitched their design studies for the LCA requirements as well, which apparently met all requirements but were heavier.</li></ul><p><strong>1984 </strong>—</p><ul><li>ADA was created as an autonomous independent agency under SecDef R&amp;D to oversee the LCA development program, while HAL was designated as the principal partner.</li><li>July 2: The first meeting of the General Body of the ADA took place, chaired by then Raksha Mantri Shri PV Narasimha Rao.</li></ul><p><strong>1985 </strong>—</p><ul><li>January 30: The LCA program was formally launched, accompanied by a financial sanction of Rs 560 crores by the Government of India.</li><li>October: AST 201 was decided and the IAF issued the formal Air Staff Requirement (ASR) 2/85.</li><li>Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi went on an official visit to the United States and asked President Ronald Reagan for help with the LCA program. The request was agreed to, and the US Air Force (USAF) was designated to help DRDO develop the fly-by-wire flight control system. F404 engine was offered for the program.</li></ul><p><strong>1987</strong> — ADA purchased 11 General Electric F-404 engines at the cost of nearly US $11 million.</p><p><strong>1988 </strong>—</p><ul><li>Project Definition studies were carried out by an ADA team in technical consultation with Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation (AMD-BA) from France. This collaboration helped narrow down the configuration choices to a tail-less compound delta wing platform and was submitted to Air HQ in September. A timeline was formalized with 2 phases.</li><li>A massive 1000-page Project Definition Phase (PDP) report was produced by the combined ADA and HAL team. The external configuration of the aircraft was officially frozen in this document as a pure double delta wing with no tailplane or canards.</li><li>Following the submission of the PDP document, Air Headquarters sent back a 300-page report to ADA expressing serious doubts about the indigenous capability to design a digital fly-by-wire control system, composite structures, and a mission computer.</li></ul><p><strong>1989 </strong>—</p><ul><li>May 31 — August 29: A high-level committee, headed by Prof Narasimha and including Dr Kota Harinarayana, held six meetings to resolve the IAF’s doubts. There was no unanimity on the way forward, and two IAF members wrote a separate report detailing their apprehensions regarding the technology development timeframe and cost.</li><li>October 3: Prof Narasimha wrote to Dr Arunachalam stating that despite the lack of consensus, it was his assessment that a technology development program with two prototypes should be initiated to demonstrate critical technologies.</li><li>Dr Arunachalam attempted to convince the US to collaborate on a digital quadruplex fly-by-wire system, but they refused and insisted on a complete collaboration. The French were also approached, but they pushed for a hybrid system.</li><li>The Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) took up a limited project with technical assistance from Allied Signal Aerospace Company, USA, to study the feasibility of developing an all-digital flight control system</li></ul><p><strong>1989–90</strong> — Phase 1 of the program was underway, with a host of R&amp;D facilities and equipment being procured and developed. 80 work centers were identified and established, with the likes of HAL,NAL, DRDO’s labs, IITs, IISc etc.</p><p><strong>1990 </strong>— Design had been finalized and frozen.</p><p><strong>1991 </strong>— A high fidelity 1:6 scaled high speed model with movable control surfaces was fabricated and handed over to ADA in June. Model was then sent to Arnold Engineering Development Center by ADA. Further data was complemented from 1:15 models tested at Calspan, NAL, and 1:6 model sent to TsAGI for external store loads and pressure data. Amidst a massive national economic crisis and political turmoil following Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, Defense Minister Sharad Pawar appointed a high-level committee featuring industry stalwarts like Ratan Tata and Rahul Bajaj to review the LCA program. After visiting ADA and witnessing technology demonstrations, the committee highly recommended that the work should proceed</p><p><strong>1992 </strong>— ADE/DRDO signed an agreement with Martin Marietta Corporation (Now Lockheed Martin) for assistance in developing quadruplex digital FBW.</p><p><strong>1993</strong> —</p><ul><li>After a trying period of waiting due to a severe paucity of government funds, Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao finally approved funding for the program. During a meeting with Dr APJ Abdul Kalam, an investment of Rs 2188 crores was cleared to manufacture two technology demonstrator (TD) aircraft.</li><li>Air Cmde P Rajkumar, then DASR, Air HQ, carried out a risk review and cleared the program to develop a mission computer.</li></ul><p><strong>1995</strong> — TD1 (KH2001) rolled out on 17 November.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/371/0*vAc62putY53EABf4" /></figure><p><strong>1997</strong> —</p><ul><li>In January, an ADA team went to CSIR-CSIO Chandigarh to check on HUD development progress.</li><li>Dr Kota invited a team from Defense Evaluation &amp; Research Agency, UK to visit ADA and provide advice on route to be followed for clearing the flight control system and aircraft for flight.</li><li>A expert team of 6 came and spent a week reviewing all the work done till that point.</li><li>Two points were made by the team, 1. There was no need for digital back up and first block of flights had to be flowing with flight controller in fixed gain mode.</li><li>Based on the recommendation, the development of digital back up was dropped by CLAW team.</li></ul><p><strong>1998</strong> —</p><ul><li>March: The first phase of engine ground runs commenced.</li><li>May 11: India conducted nuclear tests at Pokhran. In response, the United States imposed technological sanctions, recalling Lockheed Martin scientists who were assisting with the flight control system (FCS). This forced the Indian team to develop the highly complex quadruplex digital fly-by-wire system entirely indigenously. Service engineer of GE, supporting the maintenance of F404s was also withdrawn.</li><li>Dr Kota convened an emergency meeting and it was decided that it was possible to continue the LCA program till the TD phase was completed. Smaller projects were started to develop critical LRUs and a special budget of Rs 100 crores was sanctioned by Dr Kalam, then DG ADA.</li></ul><p><strong>1999 </strong>—</p><ul><li>February 17: TD-1 successfully underwent its first low-speed taxi tests at HAL.</li><li>November: Pilot-in-the-loop tests commenced on the Iron Bird simulator</li></ul><p><strong>2000</strong> —</p><ul><li>March: The second phase of engine ground runs was carried out.</li><li>November: Pilot-in-loop tests on the Iron Bird were completed, giving the team the confidence needed in the fly-by-wire system.</li><li>December: TD-1 finally emerged from the hangar for its last round of taxi trials and extensive Electro Magnetic Interference/Compatibility (EMI/EMC) checks</li></ul><p><strong>2001 </strong>—</p><ul><li>January 4: The maiden flight of Technology Demonstrator-1 (TD-1) took place, flown by Wg Cdr Rajiv Kothiyal.</li><li>February 7: TD-1 successfully performed a brief fly-past on the opening day of Aero India 2001.</li><li>September/November: Following the 9/11 attacks, the US lifted the technology sanctions imposed on India. In November, the Indian government sanctioned Phase 2 of the project with an outlay of Rs 3301.78 crores, which included manufacturing more prototypes (PV-3, PV-4, PV-5) and setting up infrastructure for eight Limited Series Production (LSP) aircraft</li></ul><p><strong>2002</strong> —</p><ul><li>Few more EGR and low speed taxi tests of TD2 by February. Hydraulic leaks detected, plumbing had to be redone.</li><li>FRRB cleared, in May, TD2 for flight. TD2 makes its maiden flight on 6th June.</li><li>LSP order for LCA was placed.</li><li>Post sanctions, a new contract for FCS actuators was placed with Lockheed Martin, for actuators ordered in 1998, with delivery timeline starting from 2004.</li><li>In September, talks with Russian side regarding the CCM for LCA breakdown due to sudden cost increase.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/841/0*pAKjOj5ECewEjedx.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>2003</strong> —</p><ul><li>TD1 flew again on February 3. PV1(KH2003) conducts its first flight on 25 November.</li><li>August 1: Tejas broke the sound barrier for the first time, achieving Mach 1.08 during an envelope expansion flight</li></ul><p><strong>2004</strong> —<strong> </strong>The Technology Demonstration phase officially concluded after 202 sorties in March.</p><p><strong>2005</strong> — PV2(KH2004) conducts its first flight on 1 December.</p><p><strong>2006</strong> — PV3(KH2005) flew for the first time 1 December. PV2 went supersonic with weapons</p><p><strong>2007</strong> — LSP1(KH2011) makes its first flight on 25 April with F404-F2J3. PV2 and 3 went sea level trials at INS Rajali. PV1 fired an R73 for the first time in October.</p><p><strong>2008</strong> — LSP2(KH2012) makes its first flight on 16 June with F404-IN20. PV3 made the first night sortie.</p><p><strong>2009</strong> — 2 seater PV5(KH-T2009) trainer variant makes its first flight. 1000 sorties had been completed by other frames till now. Production sanctioned.</p><p><strong>2010</strong> — LSP3(KH2013) flies for its first time. LSP4(KH2014) in Mk1 standard flies for the first time with MMR, IFF, and CDS. LSP5(KH2015) in IOC standard flies for the first time. 2 seater First Naval prototype NP1(KHN-T3001) rolled out.</p><p><strong>2012</strong> — LSP7(KH2017) flies for the first time on 9th March. NP1(KHN-T3001) flies for the first time on April 27.</p><p><strong>2013</strong> — LSP8(KH2018) final production standard flies for the first time in March.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*U6AFFfd9NFoYdCbC.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>2014–2016</strong> —</p><ul><li>September 30, 2014: The first Series Production Tejas aircraft, SP-1 (LA 5001), successfully flew.</li><li>February 7, 2015: Naval Prototype 2 (NP-2) made its first flight.</li><li>July 1, 2016: Formation of the first Tejas squadron, as the first aircraft officially joined the Indian Air Force flee</li></ul><p><strong>2018</strong> —</p><ul><li>February 8: The inaugural flight of the fifth serial production aircraft (LA 5005), which was the first aircraft produced under the newly formed dedicated LCA Tejas Division at HAL.</li><li>Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR) capability was successfully completed, placing India in an elite club of only six nations with this indigenous technical capability</li></ul><p><strong>2019</strong> — LCA gets FOC.</p><p><strong>2020</strong> — Naval LCA lands and takes off from INS Vikramaditya. Second LCA sqn becomes operational. In Aug, No 45 gets deployed in Western Sector operationally.</p><p><strong>2021 </strong>—</p><ul><li>LCA Mk1 fired Python 5 CCM and I-Derby ER BVRAAM. 87 LCA Mk1A order (73 single seater + 10 dual seater) signed on Feb 3.</li><li>LSP2 and LSP3 were fitted with Uttam AESA radar prototypes for testing.</li></ul><p><strong>2022</strong> — LCA Mk1A first flight in May.</p><p><strong>2023 </strong>—NP5 (3005), third LCA Navy prototype conducted first flight. First Flight test of Astra BVRAAM from Tejas, by LSP — 7. By August, original IOC and FOC deliveries of 32 Tejas LCA Mk1 (excluding trainers) was completed. First production trainer, LT5201, completes maiden flight.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Fh3XIxpVf8T_eeK5" /></figure><p><strong>2024 </strong>—</p><ul><li>LCA Mk1 participated in flyover on Republic day. LCA Mk1A prototype LSP-7 successfully completed sortie with local Digital Flight Control Computer (DFCC).</li><li>On 28 March 2024, the first production series Mk1A aircraft, LA 5033, conducted first flight.</li><li>First ever Tejas Mk1 crash on 12 March due to oil pump malfunction.</li><li>In March, high-altitude testing for On-Board Oxygen Generating System centric Life Support System (OBOGS-ILSS) of Tejas was successfully completed by DRDO</li><li>In September, the original contract for 20 Mk1 frames was finally completed.</li><li>On 12 April MoD issued tender to HAL for 97 Tejas Mk1A.</li></ul><p><strong>2025</strong> —</p><ul><li>Last FOC standard trainer, LT-5208, took its first flight from the order of first 40 planes.</li></ul><p><strong>References</strong></p><ol><li>Rajkumar, Air Marshal P.R &amp; Srikanth, B.R. Radiance in Indian Skies — The Tejas Saga (2021).</li><li>Rajkumar, Air Marshal P.R. The Tejas Story — The Light Combat Aircraft Project (2008).</li><li>Gole, Air Marshal C.V. The Giant Leap: Ajeet to Tejas. Vayu Aerospace V/ 2021.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a3ce71bce417" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks/lca-tejas-timeline-a3ce71bce417">LCA Tejas timeline</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks">INDRA Networks</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[SALE AND DELIVERY OF C-119’S TO INDIA]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/indra-networks/sale-and-delivery-of-c-119s-to-india-2c0153f16b?source=rss----f904e32dee05---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2c0153f16b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-air-force]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[usaf]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shwetabh Singh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 04 Jun 2022 03:57:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-02T12:33:59.079Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is an excerpt from Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations from 1961, USA.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JCKxhNSgqFft9iduCkXi0Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>First of C119Gs landing in India</figcaption></figure><h4>Participants</h4><p>Mr Andrews — George W Andrews. Alabama (Democrat)</p><p>General Wilson — Major General Winston P. Wilson, Assistant Chief of the National Guard Bureau for Air National Guard</p><p>General Friedman — Major General RJ Friedman, Director of Budget, HQ, USAF</p><h3>Transcript</h3><p><strong>Mr. ANDREWS.</strong> You told us several weeks ago that some of your men<br>flew some C-119’s, I believe, to India.</p><p><strong>General WILSON.</strong> That was the Air Force Reserve; yes, sir.</p><p><strong>Mr. ANDREWS.</strong> You did not know at that time who gave the aircraft<br>to the Indians or anything about it except that you people flew them<br>over there.</p><p><strong>General WILSON.</strong> Yes, sir; that is right.</p><p><strong>Mr. ANDREWS.</strong> Have you learned anything since that time about it?</p><p><strong>General WILSON.</strong> Since that was primarily the Air Force Reserve<br>and not the Air National Guard, I believe General McCarty furnished<br>that for the record.</p><p><strong>Mr. ANDREWS.</strong> Do you know anything about why the gift was made!</p><p><strong>General WILSON.</strong> No, sir.</p><p><strong>Mr. ANDREWS.</strong> How many did we send over there and leave?</p><p><strong>General WILSON.</strong> I do not have those figures, Mr. Andrews.</p><p><strong>General FRIEDMAN.</strong> Twenty-nine aircraft.</p><p><strong>Mr. ANDREWS.</strong> All you know is that you flew them over there and<br>left them?</p><p><strong>General FRIEDMAN.</strong> It was under the mutual security military sales<br>program. Those aircraft were excess to the Air Force, and the sale<br>included some equipment on board, such as multi-man life rafts, to go<br>along with them.”</p><p><strong>Mr. ANDREWS.</strong> Did the mutual security program reimburse the Air<br>Force for those planes?</p><p>General FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; aircraft in the best possible condition<br>were selected, and the Government of India agreed to accept the air-<br>craft in an “as is, where is” condition.</p><p><strong>Mr. ANDREWS. </strong>I wish you would insert in the record for me the<br>original cost of those planes and the total amount realized by the Air<br>Force for the 29 that were turned over to the Indian Government.<br>General FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.</p><p>(The information requested follows:)<br>COST OF C-119 AIRCRAFT SOLD TO INDIA<br>During June and July 1960, Air Force Reserve crews ferried 21 of the 29<br>C-119 aircraft delivered to India. These aircraft were excess to the needs of<br>the U.S. military services and were purchased by the Indian Government from their own resources, under the mutual security military sales program. The purchase price was $3,552,268 plus $300,000 paid for the cost of ferrying. The total amount of $3,852,268 has been reimbursed to the Air Force.<br>The original cost to the Air Force for these aircraft (computed on an average unit flyway cost of $703,000) was $20,387,000.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2c0153f16b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks/sale-and-delivery-of-c-119s-to-india-2c0153f16b">SALE AND DELIVERY OF C-119’S TO INDIA</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks">INDRA Networks</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Missile Test tracker — India]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/indra-networks/missile-test-tracker-india-c63c14fab3d6?source=rss----f904e32dee05---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c63c14fab3d6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[missile]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shwetabh Singh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Apr 2022 13:33:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-26T21:03:57.524Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Missile Test tracker — India</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*sa-T0agFhdWyIiXN.jpg" /><figcaption>VL SRSAM being tested</figcaption></figure><p>This list has been depreceted as of July 2026. All further update and tracking will be done at <a href="https://sierra711.github.io/indian-missile-test-tracker/">https://sierra711.github.io/indian-missile-test-tracker/</a> as it is an easier and more comprehensive tool to track launch cadence.</p><p>This list will track various declared missile tests conducted by Indian Armed Forces and DRDO, both independent and in-conjunction for research and academic purposes. This primarily going to be Indian Missiles and mostly development tests, but would also include any BrahMos test, even if live fire of inducted missile.</p><h4>Uncertain 2023</h4><ul><li><strong>Akash NG </strong>— Flight trial conducted against a Banshee target from the Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha. Revealed in the <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1989502">Year End Review of MoD</a>.</li><li><strong>NGCCM (Next Generation Close Combat Missile)</strong> — First fired in 2023. The date and nature of test aren’t clear and were revealed in the <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1989502">Year End Review of MoD</a>.</li><li><strong>MPATGM</strong> — Flight test was conducted for a range of 2.5 Km at NOAR (National Open Air Range), Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh. Fired with cooled IIR seeker. Revealed in the <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1989502">Year End Review of MoD</a>.</li><li><strong>VL-SRSAM</strong> — Flight Tested at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha. Could be an overcount from last year’s test. Revealed in the <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1989502">Year End Review of MoD</a>.</li><li><strong>SFDR </strong>— Fifth Test. Revealed in the <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1989502">Year End Review of MoD</a>.</li><li><strong>QRSAM </strong>— User trials. Revealed by DRDO as part of <a href="https://x.com/DRDO_India/status/1742551039977427129?s=20">end of year review video.</a></li><li><strong>SAMHO </strong>— Revealed by DRDO as part of <a href="https://x.com/DRDO_India/status/1742551039977427129?s=20">end of year review video.</a> Fired at KK Ranges at Ahmednagar, Maharashtra.</li><li><strong>LR-AShM</strong> — First test flight. Revealed in the <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1989502">Year End Review of MoD</a>.</li></ul><h4>Uncertain 2022</h4><ul><li><strong>Astra Mk2</strong> — Tested in 2022. The date and nature of test weren’t officially disclosed, but a video of a part of trial was released by Indian Air Force as part of a <a href="https://youtu.be/fIGIy0mxaAg?t=266">promotional video</a>, thus confirming the trials with the missile.</li></ul><h4>June 2026</h4><ul><li>RudraM 2 — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2268099&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=1">June 2 </a>— Extreme release conditions test from a Su30MKI.</li><li>AD1 — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2272374&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=1">June 10&amp;11</a> — DRDO demo’d multi-layered defence against long range ballistic missiles. 3 test flights</li><li>AD2 — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2272374&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=1">June 10&amp;11</a> — DRDO demo’d multi-layered defence against long range ballistic missiles. 3 test flights</li><li>NASM-MR — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2272374&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=1">June 13</a> — Maiden flight test. Ground based launcher.</li></ul><h4>May 2026</h4><ul><li>Agni V MIRV — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2259380&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=1">May 9</a> — Successful flight-tests from Dr APJ Abdul Kalam island off the coast of Odisha.</li><li>ULPGM V3 — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2263045&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=1">May 19</a> — Completed the final deliverable configuration development trials in in Air-to-Ground and Air-to-Air modes. Tested at DRDO test range near Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh</li><li>Agni 1 — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2264317&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=1">May 22</a> — Successfully test-fired from the Integrated Test Range in Chandipur, Odisha. Under the aegis of SFC. Note — could be a cover for an announced test.</li></ul><h4>April 2026</h4><ul><li>NASM-SR — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2256722&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=1">April 29 </a>— Salvo launch of 2 missiles from a single Naval Sea King helicopter. Off the coast of Bay of Bengal in Odisha</li></ul><h4>February 2026</h4><ul><li>SFDR — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2222635&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=1">February 3</a> — Successfully test-fired from the Integrated Test Range in Chandipur, Odisha</li><li>Agni 3 — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2224636&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=1">February 6 </a>— Successfully test-fired from the Integrated Test Range in Chandipur, Odisha. Under the aegis of SFC.</li><li>VSHORADS — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2233776&amp;reg=48&amp;lang=1">February 27</a>–3 successive flight-trials from the Integrated Test Range in Chandipur, Odisha. Tests were carried out in final deployment configuration, where target acquisition &amp; missile firing were carried out by field operators</li></ul><h4>January 2026</h4><ul><li>MPATGM — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2213690&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">January 11</a> — Tested against a moving target in KK Ranges, Ahilya Nagar, Maharashtra</li></ul><h4>December 2025</h4><ul><li>Akash NG — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2207971&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">December 23</a> — User evaluation trials successful, paving way for induction.</li><li>Pinaka LRGR 120 — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2209588&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">December 29</a> — Maiden flight test conducted successfully at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur. Tested for its maximum range of 120 kms.</li><li>Pralay — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2210128&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">December 31</a> — Salvo launch of two Pralay missiles in quick succession from the same launcher as part of user evaluation trials.</li></ul><h4>September 2025</h4><ul><li>Agni Prime — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2170979&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">September 24</a> — Successful launch from a Rail based Mobile launcher system, under a full operational scenario, under SFC.</li></ul><h4>August 2025</h4><ul><li>Agni V — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2158574&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">August 20</a> — Successfully test-fired from the Integrated Test Range in Chandipur, Odisha. Under the aegis of SFC.</li><li>IADWS — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2160257&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">August 24</a> — Maiden flight-tests comprising all indigenous Quick Reaction Surface to Air Missiles (QRSAM), Advanced Very Short Range Air Defence System (VSHORADS) missiles and a high-power laser-based Directed Energy Weapon (DEW).</li></ul><h4>July 2025</h4><ul><li>Astra Mk1 — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2144118&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">July 11 </a>— Flight test from Su30MKI. Local RF seeker upgrade. Fired off the coast of Odisha, near ITR.</li><li>ET LDHCM — <a href="https://zeenews.india.com/india/meet-india-s-mach-8-missile-et-ldhcm-hits-karachi-in-10-minutes-evades-all-defence-systems-2999131.html">July 14 </a>— First flight test reported in unofficial sources.</li><li>Prithvi-II &amp; Agni-I — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2145662&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">July 17</a> — Successfully test-fired from the Integrated Test Range in Chandipur, Odisha. Under the aegis of SFC. Note — could be a cover for an announced test. Prithvi and Agni notifications are routinely used to cover for more sensitive or experimental tests.</li><li>ULPGM V3 — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2148320&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">July 25 </a>— Successful flight-trials of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Launched Precision Guided Missile (ULPGM)-V3 at the National Open Area Range (NOAR) test range in Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh. Fired from NRT Beluga UAV.</li><li>Pralay — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2149610&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">July 28–29</a> — Two consecutive successful flight-tests from Dr APJ Abdul Kalam island off the coast of Odisha.</li></ul><h4>May 2025</h4><p><strong>As the list is supposed to cover missile tests, Operation Sindoor (being a combat operation) will be outside the scope of this list.</strong></p><h4>April 2025</h4><ul><li>MRSAM — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2118918&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">April 3–4</a> — Four successful flight-tests of the Army version against high-speed aerial targets from Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island.</li><li>BrahMos — April 25 — INS Surat test fired.</li></ul><p><strong>March 2025</strong></p><ul><li>Astra Mk1 — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2111068&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">March 12 </a>— Successful test firing from a LCA Mk1 against aerial target. Unofficial sources mention unsuccessful trials from Tejas Mk1A.</li><li>VL SRSAM — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2115509&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">March 26</a> — Successful flight test from the Integrated Test Range (ITR), Chandipur at about 1200 hrs . The flight-test was carried out from a land-based vertical launcher against a high-speed aerial target at very close range and low altitude.</li></ul><h4>February 2025</h4><ul><li>VSHORADS — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2098784&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">February 1</a> — Three successive flight-trials from Integrated Test Range (ITR), Chandipur against high-speed targets flying at very low altitude.</li><li>NASM SR — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2106482&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">February 25</a> — Successful flight-trials from Integrated Test Range (ITR), Chandipur from Indian Navy Seaking IN529.</li></ul><h4>January 2025</h4><ul><li>Nag Mk2 — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2092585&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=1">January 13</a> — Field Evaluation Trials successful. Missile ready for induction. At Pokhran</li><li>BrahMos — January 15 — Salvo launch of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles by Kharga Crops of Western Command at Andaman &amp; Nicobar islands.</li></ul><h4>December 2024</h4><ul><li>SFDR — December 13</li></ul><h4>November 2024</h4><ul><li>LR-LACM — November 12 — Maiden LR-LACM test</li><li>Pinaka — November 14 — Guided Pinaka final tests</li><li>LR-AShM — November 16 — First reveal of the missile, Second Flight test</li><li>K4 — November 27 — First operational launch from INS Arighaat</li></ul><h4>October 2024</h4><ul><li>VSHORADS — October 3 &amp; 4–3 Successful flight tests of miniaturized version</li></ul><h4>September 2024</h4><ul><li>VLSRSAM — September 12 &amp; 13 — Indian Navy flight tests</li></ul><h4>July 2024</h4><ul><li>AD1 — July 24 — Phase 2 BMD interceptor test</li></ul><h4>May 2024</h4><ul><li>SMART — May 01 — Third flight test</li></ul><h4>April 2024</h4><ul><li>Agni P — April 03 — Night trial with SFC</li><li>MPATGM — April 13 — Warhead Flight Trials</li></ul><h4>March 2024</h4><ul><li>Agni V — March 11 — First MIRV test</li></ul><h4>February 2024</h4><ul><li>VSHORADS — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2010345">February 28 &amp; 29 </a>— Flight tests from a ground based portable launcher. Flight Tested at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>January 2024</h4><ul><li>Akash NG — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1995445">January 12</a> — High speed Low altitude flight test against a target. Flight tested by DRDO. Flight Tested at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>December 2023</h4><ul><li>Akash — <a href="https://x.com/SWComd_IA/status/1740739358658101592?s=20">December 29</a> — User training launch. Fired by Indian Army. Fired at Gopalpur Seaward Firing Range, Odisha.</li><li>Akash — <a href="https://x.com/DRDO_India/status/1736349594362278140?s=20">December 17 </a>— User test. Test fired against 4 target simultaneously using command guidance. Fired by Indian Air Force and DRDO.</li><li>Agni 1 — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1983750">December 7</a> — User training launch. Fired under the aegis of SFC. Fired at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>November 2023</h4><ul><li>Pralay — <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-successfully-test-fires-pralay-missile-off-odisha-coast/article67507783.ece">November 8</a> — Third launch test. Fired at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li><li>NASM-SR — <a href="https://twitter.com/indiannavy/status/1726869839657255406?t=TVSrQZk5F-Ua4mNzvFWG-w&amp;s=19">November 21</a> — Successful guided flight trial by Indian Navy and DRDO. The missile was tested for a range of 35 km, using an indigenous IR Seeker for its Terminal Guidance in ‘Lock-on after Launch’ mode. Fired from a modified Sea King 42B IN529. Flight Tested at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li><li>Brahmos ER — <a href="https://x.com/IN_WNC/status/1727180987065585679?s=20">November 22</a> — First firing from INS Imphal. Fired by Indian Navy. Fired in Arabian Sea.</li></ul><h4>October 2023</h4><ul><li>Brahmos ER ALCM — October 18 — ER version of ALCM. Test fired by Indian Air Force. Fired at Bay of Bengal.</li><li>Brahmos — Fired by Indian Army. Fired at Andaman and Nicobar Islands.</li><li>Brahmos — Fired by Indian Army. Fired at Andaman and Nicobar Islands.</li><li>Brahmos — October 10 — Surface to surface version. Test fired by Indian Air Force under the aegis of ANC. Fired at Andaman and Nicobar Islands.</li><li>Brahmos ER — October 10 — ER version. Test fired by Indian Army. Fired at Andaman and Nicobar Islands.</li><li>LR-AShM — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1989502">October 6 </a>— First test flight. Flight Tested at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>August 2023</h4><ul><li>Astra Mk1 — <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/india/indigenous-astra-missile-tested-from-tejas-8906435/">August 23 </a>— First test flight from the LCA platform. Fired off LSP-7.</li></ul><h4>July 2023</h4><ul><li>K 15 — July 1 — Training launch. Fired at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>June 2023</h4><ul><li>Agni 1 — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1929176">June 1</a> — Training launch. Fired by Strategic Forces Command. Fired at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li><li>Agni-P — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1930689">June 8</a> — First pre-induction night flight test by Strategic Forces Command. Fired at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>May 2023</h4><ul><li>BrahMos — <a href="https://twitter.com/IN_WNC/status/1657593651134881792">May 14</a> — Anti-ship variant fired from INS Mormugao. Fired in Arabian Sea.</li></ul><h4>April 2023</h4><ul><li>Sea-Based Endo-Atmospheric Interceptor — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1918799">April 21 </a>— Maiden flight test of Naval BMD capability conducted by Indian Navy with DRDO. Fired off coast of Odisha.</li></ul><h4>March 2023</h4><ul><li>BrahMos — <a href="https://twitter.com/indiannavy/status/1632356640233254913?s=20">March 5</a> — Flight test of variant with local booster and seeker. Fired in Arabian Sea by an Kolkata class destroyer.</li><li>MRSAM — <a href="https://twitter.com/indiannavy/status/1632945232882077697?s=20">March </a>6 — Operational validation flight test. Fired from INS Visakhapatnam.</li><li>VSHORAD — <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1906915">March 14 </a>— Two successful flight tests conducted. Development flight tests. Fired at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li><li>AMOGHA III — <a href="https://twitter.com/bharat_dynamics/status/1640669737872142337">March 26</a> — Successful test firing of the system.</li></ul><h4>February 2023</h4><ul><li>ITCM — <a href="https://twitter.com/TheHemantRout/status/1627933038255702017?s=20">February 21</a> — Developmental flight test with new seeker and local Manik engine. Fired off coast of Odisha.</li><li>SLCM — <a href="https://x.com/ANI/status/1725894448092197332?s=20">February </a>— Successful first developmental flight test.</li></ul><h4>January 2023</h4><ul><li>Prithvi II — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1890129">January 10</a> — Training launch. Fired at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li><li>Akash — <a href="https://twitter.com/westerncomd_IA/status/1618431446783524865?s=20&amp;t=cLWjg_rYBe80ohXN8i9Zgw">January 25 </a>— Training launch by Western Command. Fired at Seaward Ranges, Gopalpur.</li><li>HSTDV — <a href="https://twitter.com/livefist/status/1618906728715919360?s=20&amp;t=cLWjg_rYBe80ohXN8i9Zgw">January 27</a> — Second flight test. Fired at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>December 2022</h4><ul><li>Pinaka — <a href="https://m.timesofindia.com/city/jaipur/drdo-army-conduct-trials-of-upgraded-pinaka-rockets/amp_articleshow/96123859.cms">December 7&amp;8</a> — Mk 1 EPRS tested by DRDO and Indian Army. Tested at Pokhran ranges at Jaisalmer, Rajasthan.</li><li>Hypersonic Vehicle — <a href="https://twitter.com/isro/status/1601162953264230400">December 9 </a>— ISRO and HQ, Integrated Defence Staff conducted trials.</li><li>Agni 5 — <a href="https://twitter.com/ANI/status/1603381778198450181?s=20&amp;t=i8ITyDh5e4rTjx9JeMduVw">December 15</a> — Full range flight test with new incorporated technologies. Fired at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li><li>BrahMos ALCM — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1887335">December 29</a> — Extended Range variant successfully fired against a ship target. Fired from a Su 30MKI. Fired in Bay of Bengal region.</li></ul><h4>November 2022</h4><ul><li>AD-1 — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1873179">November 2</a> — Maiden flight test of BMD Phase II interceptor. Flight-test was carried out with participation of all BMD weapon system elements located at different geographical locations. Fired at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li><li>Agni 3 — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1878370">November 23</a> — Training launch. Fired under aegis of the Strategic Forces Command. Fired at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li><li>BrahMos — <a href="https://twitter.com/AN_Command/status/1597571925747724288?s=20&amp;t=-Gg3NadYRRd3RqQb67Uwug">November 29</a> — Surface to surface ER version fired under the aegis of ANC, by Western Command Indian Army, as part of user validation of in-service missile. Fired at Andaman and Nicobar Islands.</li></ul><h4>October 2022</h4><ul><li>K-15 SLBM — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1867778">October 14</a> — Training launch. Fired from INS Arihant. Fired in Bay of Bengal.</li><li>Pinaka Mk1 Enhanced — <a href="https://twitter.com/GmOfaj/status/1582706162004549634">October 18&amp;19</a> — Test fired as part of High Altitude Area PSQR Validation Trials. Fired at KNF Firing Ranges at Dras, Ladakh.</li><li>Agni-P — <a href="https://twitter.com/ANI/status/1583380106034049024?s=20&amp;t=libDp1GWId4iKVq77hwCHQ">October 21</a> — Third flight test. Flight tested at maximum range. Successful MIRV technology demonstrated. Fired at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li><li>ITCM — <a href="https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/odisha/2022/oct/29/homegrown-cruise-missile-system-hit-by-technical-snag-2512880.html">October 28 </a>— Flight test unsuccessful after indigenous STFE failed to start after launch.</li></ul><h4>September 2022</h4><ul><li>QRSAM — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1857724">September 08 </a>— Evaluation trials by Indian Army. Six flight tests successfully conducted under various conditions in final deployment configuration. Fired at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li><li>VSHORAD — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1862617">September 27</a> — Maiden flight tests. Two successful flight test from a ground based portable launcher. Fired at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>August 2022</h4><ul><li>SAMHO — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1848497">August 04</a> — Flight tested at two ranges. Fired in conjunction with Indian Army. Successfully test fired from Arjun MBT. Fired at KK Ranges at Ahmednagar, Maharashtra .</li><li>VL-SRSAM — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1853841">August 23 </a>— Flight test from a modified Indian Naval Ship, INS Rana against a high speed unmanned aerial target for demonstration of vertical launch capability. Fired at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>June 2022</h4><ul><li>Agni 4 — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1831654">June 06</a> — Training launch. Fired under aegis of the Strategic Forces Command. Fired at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li><li>Prithvi II — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1834376">June 15 </a>— Training launch. Fired at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li><li>VL-SRSAM — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1836721">June 24 </a>— Flight test from a modified Indian Naval Ship, INS Rana. Fired at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li><li>SAMHO — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1837753">June 28 </a>— Minimum range flight test. Successfully test fired from Arjun MBT. Fired at KK Ranges at Ahmednagar, Maharashtra .</li></ul><h4>May 2022</h4><ul><li>BrahMos ALCM — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1824795">May 12 </a>— Extended Range variant fired from a Su 30MKI. Fired in Bay of Bengal region.</li><li>NASM-SR — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1826257">May 18 </a>— Fired from a modified Sea King helicopter IN529. Maiden Flight Test at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>April 2022</h4><ul><li>SFDR — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1814813">April 8</a> — Fourth test. Booster tested at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li><li>Pinaka — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1815236">April 9</a> — Mk1 EPRS and Area Denial Munition, at Pokhran ranges at Jaisalmer, Rajasthan.</li><li>HELINA — April <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1815644">11</a>&amp;<a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1815979">12</a> — High Altitude trials for User Validation, at Ladakh<strong>.</strong></li><li>BrahMos ALCM — <a href="https://twitter.com/IAF_MCC/status/1516404584784138241?s=20&amp;t=eaPJF-ppXJwa4r2anPKbAg">April 19</a> — Live firing from a Su 30MKI on a decommissioned Indian Navy ship in coordination with Indian Navy. Fired at Eastern seaboard.</li><li>BrahMos — <a href="https://twitter.com/indiannavy/status/1516450775941414912">April 19</a> — Fired from INS Delhi after MLU from an ‘Upgraded Modular Launcher’.</li><li>BrahMos — <a href="https://twitter.com/AN_Command/status/1519680674248155138?s=20&amp;t=Kvk1MZz7fmpQPDWholU66g">April 27</a> — Anti-Ship version fired under the aegis of ANC as part of user validation of in-service missile. Fired at Andaman and Nicobar Islands.</li><li>Akash Prime — <a href="https://twitter.com/dd_vaishnav/status/1519556059240697856?s=20&amp;t=AmdlHcd_OWb1G3SXwVNuPA">April 27</a> — Joint Indian Army and DRDO flight test. Fired at Pokhran ranges at Jaisalmer, Rajasthan.</li><li>Akash Mk1 — <a href="https://twitter.com/SWComd_IA/status/1520339936662024192?s=20&amp;t=8z98b050C4pEykSGEEtr9A">April 30</a> — Live firing of an in-service missile for user validation. Fired at Pokhran ranges at Jaisalmer, Rajasthan.</li></ul><h4>March 2022</h4><ul><li>BrahMos — <a href="https://twitter.com/indiannavy/status/1500015602865680390?s=20&amp;t=buMfpLI-3jjb574rBDJZfw">March 5 </a>— ER variant fired from INS Chennai by Western Fleet. Fired at Andaman Sea</li><li><em>BrahMos — </em><a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1805148"><em>March 9 </em></a><em>— “Accidental” firing in Pakistan¹.</em></li><li>BrahMos — <a href="https://twitter.com/AN_Command/status/1501519179245289474?s=20&amp;t=Kvk1MZz7fmpQPDWholU66g">March 9 </a>— Fired from INS Chennai under the aegis of ANC (AN deployment of Western Fleet). Fired at Andaman and Nicobar Islands.</li><li>BrahMos — <a href="https://twitter.com/AN_Command/status/1506616013411917834">March 23</a> — IAF’s BrahMos ER fired under the aegis of ANC as part of user validation of in-service missile. Fired at Andaman and Nicobar Islands.</li><li>MRSAM — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1810241">March 27</a> — Indian Army version at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, against two targets.</li></ul><h4>February 2022</h4><ul><li>BrahMos — <a href="https://twitter.com/AN_Command/status/1488750640461664256">February 2</a> — User validation firing of an in service missile by ANC. Fired at Andaman And Nicobar Islands.</li><li>BrahMos — <a href="https://twitter.com/livefist/status/1494519413030416384?s=20&amp;t=buMfpLI-3jjb574rBDJZfw">February 18 </a>— ER variant fired from INS Vishakhapatnam. Fired at Bay of Bengal.</li></ul><h4>January 2022</h4><ul><li>MPATGM — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1789153">January 11</a> — Flight tested in final deliverable configuration.</li><li>BrahMos — <a href="https://twitter.com/DRDO_India/status/1480812866940784643?s=20&amp;t=buMfpLI-3jjb574rBDJZfw">January 11</a> — ER variant fired from INS Vishakhapatnam.</li><li>BrahMos — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1791199">January 20</a> — Enhanced Capability(Range) and increased local content at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>December 2021</h4><ul><li>VL-SRSAM — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1778966">December 7 </a>— Flight tested against an electronic target at very low altitude. Fired at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li><li>BrahMos ALCM — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1779134">December 8</a> — Cleared for serial production. Fired at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li><li>Pinaka — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1780412">December 11</a> — Mk1ER and ADM and indigenously developed fuses were tested at Pokhran ranges at Jaisalmer, Rajasthan.</li><li>SANT — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1780481">December 11</a> — Flight test at Pokhran ranges at Jaisalmer, Rajasthan.</li><li>SMART — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1780944">December 13</a> — Full range flight test. Fired at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li><li>Agni-P — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1782960">December 18</a> — Second Flight test at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li><li>Pralay — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1784515">December 22&amp;23</a> — Two flight tests at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>November 2021</h4><ul><li>SAAW — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1769241">November 3</a> — Two flight tests of two configurations (SatNav and EO versions). Fired at Chandan ranges at Jaisalmer, Rajasthan.</li></ul><h4>October 2021</h4><ul><li>Agni 5 — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1767034">October 27 </a>— Fired at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li><li>SAAW — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1769241">October 28</a> — Two flight tests of two configurations (SatNav and EO versions). Fired at Chandan ranges at Jaisalmer, Rajasthan.</li><li>Long Range Bomb — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1767567">October 29</a> — Fired at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>September 2021</h4><ul><li>Akash Prime — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1758711">September 27</a> — Maiden Flight Test at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>July 2021</h4><ul><li>MPATGM — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1737529">July 21</a> — Minimum range flight test.</li><li>Akash NG — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1737532">July 21</a> — Second flight test at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li><li>Akash NG — <a href="http://at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur.">July 23</a> — Flight test to prove all weather capability. Fired at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>June 2021</h4><ul><li>122 mm — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1730350">June 25 </a>— Flight test of enhanced range 122mm rockets at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li><li>Pinaka — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1730354">June 25 </a>— Enhanced Pinaka tested. Fired at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li><li>Agni P — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1730828">June 28</a> — Maiden flight test. Fired at Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>March 2021</h4><ul><li>SFDR — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1702670">March 5</a> — Third Flight test. Fired at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>February 2021</h4><ul><li>HELINA — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1699376">February 19 </a>— User trials by Indian Army. Five mission launches. Ready for induction.</li><li>Dhruvastra — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1699376">February 19</a> — User trials by Indian Air Force. Five mission launches. Ready for induction</li><li>VL-SRSAM — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1700039">February 22 </a>— Two flight tests, for minimum and maximum range. Fired at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li></ul><h4>January 2021</h4><ul><li>SAAW — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1691176">January 22</a> — Captive and release trial from a Hawk(I). Fired off the coast of Odisha.</li><li>Akash NG — <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1692258">January 25 </a>— Maiden flight test. Fired at Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Odisha.</li></ul><p><em>(Months not mentioned did not see any missile tests happen.)</em></p><ol><li>Its a joke obviously but who knows</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c63c14fab3d6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks/missile-test-tracker-india-c63c14fab3d6">Missile Test tracker — India</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks">INDRA Networks</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Akbar Nama]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/indra-networks/akbar-nama-4af0ab48d095?source=rss----f904e32dee05---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4af0ab48d095</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-air-force]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mi-35]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mi-25]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-army]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shwetabh Singh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Mar 2022 01:45:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-06-11T14:58:07.113Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The story of Mil Mi 25/35 and Indian Air Force</h4><h3>1. Introduction</h3><blockquote>“On 26th October 1987, Flight Lieutenant Atanu Guru flew in a mission ex-Jaffna to search and destroy militants’ vehicles operating on the Jaffna Karaitivu causeway. Five vans were located on the causeway while attempting to flee towards Karaitivu. With extraordinary accuracy and commendable professional calmness, he destroyed these vehicles and killed all the militant personnel aboard these vehicles.”</blockquote><p>This was the first mentioned incident on <strong>Ft Lt Atanu Guru’s Vir Chakra</strong> citation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/684/1*CaBaMqWI336ZC2Yp-g72WA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Mi 25 of Indian Air Force flying over Sri Lanka</figcaption></figure><p>The Mi 25s of No 125 Helicopter Squadron were flown into Sri Lanka, under the command of <strong>Sqn Ldr Rajbir Singh</strong>, around October 23, 1987, in the aftermath of the disastrous<strong> Jaffna Helidrop Operation</strong>.</p><p>The first strike mission on 26 October was flown by<strong> Ft Lt Atanu Guru</strong> in a lone Mi 25. 5 LTTE heavy transports carrying ammo and explosives were moving on the Jaffna Karaitivu causeway, the concentrated fire by Ft Lt Atanu Guru’s Mi 25 resulted in the death of over 100 LTTE cadres and an explosion that could be heard 30 kms away. The gunships were particularly effective in their role, immediately restricting LTTE’s movement to only night-time. It is said that LTTE feared the Hinds of IAF the most, giving them the nickname <strong>Mudhalais </strong>(“alligator” in Tamil) (Subramaniam ).</p><p>Indian Air Force wasn’t new to the idea of offensive helicopters, as in 1960s Indian Air Force when it was first being equipped with <strong>Chetak </strong>Helicopters (SA316B), IAF received Chetaks equipped with the<strong> AS11B1</strong> ATGMs (A2S version of SS11B1 ATGMs), with <strong>No 116 Helicopter Unit </strong>being one of the first ones to receive Chetaks in an offensive role, and getting the nickname ‘Tank Busters’. The AS11 gave new capabilities to the Indian Armed forces, but early generation ATGMs still lacked in range, accuracy and efficiency, the need for a dedicated Attack helicopter with newer ATGMs arose (Sachdev). Thus enters the picture, Mil Mi 25s, Crocodiles procured amidst the biggest modernising drive of Indian Armed forces in 1980s.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*5u8fccu9mgv98Cg3MsKejA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Chetak equipped with 4 AS11 ATGMs</figcaption></figure><p>The Crocodiles of the Indian Air Force are mysterious beings, with not a lot of literature to track their journey with the Indian Air Force. In this piece, I hope to track their history with the Indian Air Force to the best of my abilities.</p><h3>2. History</h3><h4>Development of the Flying Tank</h4><p>Although not the first one to use Helicopters in an Air Assault role, the United States was definitely the one that shaped and matured the concept. The US was amidst a very intense war in Vietnam in the 1960s. As the transport helicopters kept getting shot while landing, modified Huey gunships were used. When they couldn’t satisfactorily perform in the face of the emerging threat against infantry landing, the first AH1 was developed.</p><p>In the eastern theatre, the USSR was also tip-toeing the same line. Initially arming Mi 8s with rocket pods in limited armed roles, but as they would also go on to realise the need for a dedicated attack helicopter, the first Mi 25 would be born. Mikhail L Mil, of which the Mil OKB bore the name, would pitch his ‘flying IFV’ concept to the Soviet leadership, having gained some experience with armed helicopters in the form of armed Mi 4s and 8s. Initially reluctant, with even then Defence Minister of the USSR, Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky, against the concept (Gordon).</p><p>In 1966, approximately 1 year after the first flight of what would become AH1 Cobra, Mil OKB had released a mockup called V24 (V = Vertolyot = Heptr) based on the utility V22 design. It shared a lot of visual similarity with the armed UH1, and was nicknamed ‘Hueyski’. In 1967, Mil through a lot of effort convinced the Defence Minister’s First deputy Marshal Andrey A Grechko, to establish a committee to study the concept. By March 1967, Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR, or VPK issued a RFP to Mil to design a battlefield support helicopter (Gordon).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*a5ZxB2KsHZGduhiGktsKYw.jpeg" /><figcaption>3 Mi 35s in a flypast of Indian Air Force</figcaption></figure><p>After getting clearance in 1968, the OKB started work on a mockup called “Yellow 24”, or the internal designation ‘Izdeliye 240’. Mil OKB decided to speed things up by taking components like engines, main &amp; tail rotors, swashplate, parts of the powertrain from Mi 14, which was itself developed from Mi 8 family. Thus the first true attack helicopter of the East started taking shape. The helicopters much like AH1 would come out a lot different than its Utility counterpart, with the OKB focusing on reducing drag and changing the fuselage, getting fully retractable landing gear etc. A lot of attention by the OKB was focused on survivability of the aircraft and crew protection, with bulletproof windscreens, armour plating, single pressurised cell for crew and troop cabin (Gordon).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*cUqoY_rH1AnkFBD1" /><figcaption>Yellow 24 under development (Gordon).</figcaption></figure><p>The helicopter’s development was completed well ahead of development of its weapons package, so during the initial testing the Izdeliye 240 was tested with K4V weapons systems, which had service with Mi 4V and Mi 8TVs, consisting of 4 9M17M Falanga M ATGMs, which were a contemporary of the SS11 ATGMs. The nose gun was a Afanasev A-12.7 on a NUV-1 gimballed mount taken from a Mi 4V.</p><p>Flight tests of the type began in September of 1969, which included 2 initial prototypes and 10 from a pre production batch. Testing went as expected, except for a hiccup in the form of a crash of a frame in front of higher command while showing the agility of the new type. The crew of Pilot, test engineer and flight engineer were all killed. The State acceptance trials began in 1970, going on for the next year and a half. Testing resulted in lessons learnt and some major changes to the helicopter were made before production of Mil Mi 24A or Izdeliye 245 (Gordon).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*3m60QaP0PSkUcpev" /><figcaption>Mil Mi 24A</figcaption></figure><p>While changes needed were observed on the Mil Mi 24A, the OKB would start working on a development of Mi 24B, with a new gun, sighting system and 9M17P Falanga P SACLOS ATGMs. Izdeliye 241 as was the internal designation would go on to complete the OKB’s trials but would be abandoned and the development used for what would go on to the feared Flying Tank, in the form of the Mil Mi 24D and Mi 24V (Gordon).</p><p>Suffering from cockpit visibility issues in Mi 24A, which was in service with VVS, a new redesign of the frontal fuselage happened in 1971. The cockpit was now divided in two, separate ones for pilot and WSO (Gordon).</p><p>Amongst the other structural and electronic changes made to the type, one thing that was lacking was still the original weapon systems envisioned in the form of the 9K114 Shturm ATGMs. So the OKB decided to fit the weapons package developed for Mi 24B onto this new airfare and designated it Mi 24D. Two prototypes were converted to the type in 1972 from Mi 24A and state acceptance trials began soon in 1973 concluding in 1974. Mi 24D entered production at Plant No 168, Rostov Helicopter Factory (Gordon). It was Mi 24D’s export version which was offered to the Indian Air Force in late 1970s and early 80s, and it would be this version only, designated Mi 25, which would be inducted in the Indian Air Force in 1984.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Emw3N55GZPCC4pR6XfHANw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The next step in development came in the form of Mi 24V or Izdeliye 242, whose export version would be designated Mi 35, which would again be inducted with the Indian Air Force later (Gordon).</p><p>It was in 1972 finally that the weapons package planned for the Mi 24 family finally became available. The missile was designated 9K114 Kokon was being developed by Kolomna OKB which had and was working on a lot of missile systems for the USSR. The availability of 9K114, resulted in Mi 24V finally coming out. Trials of 9K114 were completed in 1974. The newer version differed from Mi 24D in having a newer uprated engine TV3–117V, a new ASP- 17V gunsight, new communication equipment amongst other things. Mi 24V would complete its acceptance trials in 1975, yet both Mi 24D and Mi 24V would be inducted in the VVS at the same time in 1976, although quite some Mi 24Ds had already been delivered till then, and Mi 24V started production in 1976 (Gordon).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8tcKgQBJ2ooKs8IkijdPMA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Tail no. Z3137 Mi 24VU/Mi 35U of Indian Air Force. Notice the smooth chin.</figcaption></figure><p>A trainer version was made for Mi 24D in the form of Mi 24DU or Izdeliye 249, which would appear in 1980, quite some time after both Mi 24D and 24V had already been inducted. Visually it differed from the Mi 24D/MIi 25 in having a very smooth nose instead of the USPU 24 gun barbette. The trainer version of Mi 24V/Mi 35 however did not ever exist for the VVS, yet when Indian Air Force ordered Mi 24V/Mi 35, the order consisted of newer trainers as well. The trainer version seems to be custom built for the Indian Air Force, and were ordered in 1990 with 20 frames including the <strong>Mi 24VU/ Mi 35U</strong> (a designation that doesn’t exist per se) and Mi 35s were supplied (Gordon).</p><h3>Shwetabh Singh Rajput on Twitter: &quot;[On Mil Mi 24/25/35]Air Cav originated in Vietnam, with the first use of heptrs in not only trspt of troops but also fire support, seeing not only deployment of experimental weaponised transport heptrs like UH1 and Mi 8, but also development of first true attack heptrs like AH 1 pic.twitter.com/gOWznQ3dTl / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>On Mil Mi 24/25/35]Air Cav originated in Vietnam, with the first use of heptrs in not only trspt of troops but also fire support, seeing not only deployment of experimental weaponised transport heptrs like UH1 and Mi 8, but also development of first true attack heptrs like AH 1 pic.twitter.com/gOWznQ3dTl</p><h4>Akbar comes to India</h4><p>The Mi 25’s story with the Indian Air Force, technically begins in the late 1960s with the induction of Armed Chetaks. But after that prelude was over, it was in the late 1970s, around 1979, that the Mi 25 was first offered to the Indian Air Force. Indians would take up on the offer, and the first evaluations of the type would go on to happen in 1981, and the type was promptly ordered in 1983 for 12 frames (Gordon)(Singh).</p><p>It was on <strong>November 1, 1983</strong> that the first Mi 25 dedicated attack helicopter unit was raised with the Indian Air Force, <strong>No 125 Helicopter Squadron ‘Gladiators’</strong>, now boasted some of the most impressive firepower in the subcontinent, carrying loads somewhat equivalent to the fighter planes that the skies of the subcontinent saw approximately a decade ago. The first Mi 25 would then go on to land at <strong>Pathankot </strong>AFB, home of the No 125, in mid 1984 (Singh).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/704/0*cKrc3Cu7WsCTq-19" /><figcaption>First Mil Mi 25 of No 125 Helicopter Squadron landing at Pathankot in mid 1984. Credits: AM P K Roy’s personal collection</figcaption></figure><p>The first teams of technicians and pilots would go on to leave for the USSR for training in 1983. Much like their fighter brethren, they went to <strong>Frunze</strong> close to <strong>Logovaya</strong>, Kyrgyzstan SSR. Indian Air Force had been here before, as early as 1962, when the first batch of 8 pilots had left to convert on the legendary <a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks/mig-21-and-the-indian-air-force-c765834443e3"><strong>MiG 21F13s</strong></a> that Indian Air Force had then procured.</p><p>Another source claims that the Mi 25s were actually tested only after having already been inducted in the Indian Air Force and only <strong>8 Mi 25s</strong> were ever ordered (Roy).</p><p>First the technical tradesmen along with 5 Technical officers went for training. Pilots — initial message to 10 officers to be on standby, they were received in April 1983. Thereafter they were attached to Air HQ for briefing and finally departed for the USSR in mid-September, around 15–16 September, 1983. Training for both technical tradesmen and pilots at Frunze close to Lugovaya where the MiG 23 pilots were trained. 6 months training for the technical tradesmen and 3 months of training was parted to the pilots. Three Indian Air Force training teams were simultaneously present in the USSR at the time, training for the upcoming inductions of An 32s, Il 76s and Mi 25s (Roy).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/701/1*BZdpMrAa5aWm6NuvF9A83g.jpeg" /></figure><p>On the morning of October 8, 1984, Indian Air Force was celebrating the Air Force Day, and in New Delhi were displayed two of the most recent acquisitions of the Indian Air Force. An An 32 transport plane, and 2 Mi 25s in yellow green drab that it became famous with. During the subsequent parade, then <strong>COAS ACM LM Katre</strong> remarked the Indian Air Force had entered “<strong>combat helicopter age</strong>”.</p><p>Due to the absence of any attack helicopter experience and SOPs, in 1984–85 9 Mi 25 pilots were sent to <strong>TACDE</strong> (Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment, Indian Air Force’s version of Top Gun) for the first ‘Attack Helicopter Course’. As even TACDE lacked any attack helicopter pilots, the instructors were pulled from the fighter pilot stream and through trial-and-error, working with the student pilots they developed the first SOPs for the Abkars and any other future attack helicopters (Roy).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/644/1*8bKf_qBA-ns8gThRBhbqJg.jpeg" /></figure><p>No 125 was also pitched in one of the largest exercises ever conducted by the Indian Army, <strong>Operation Brasstacks</strong> in 1987, within 4 years of its inception. The Mil Mi 25s of the Indian Air Force were purchased in coordination with the Indian Army. While the ownership remained in the hands of Indian Air Force and Indian Air Force pilots flying the type, the helicopters were meant to serve the Indian Army and hence were under their operational command (Ganapathy).</p><h4>Firebirds join the fray</h4><p>As the Mi 25s of No 125 were in the heat of the field, honing their skills in actual combat, another batch of pilots were leaving India to train for the incoming <strong>Mi 35</strong>s.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*glCD6mj52Gp7UzJQZEj__A.jpeg" /><figcaption>№104 Heli Squadron after their first test firing exercise of the Shturm PGM at Pokhran in Feb 1990. Photo taken at Jaisalmer. Standing in center is Wg Cdr Unni Kartha. Pic Credits — Bharat Rakshak</figcaption></figure><p>As the Mi 25 was integrated with the Indian Army and Indian Air Force, the need for more attack helicopters was felt. Around 1987–88, it was announced that the Indian Air Force was looking for more attack helicopters and had already evaluated Augusta A 129 Mangusta, MBB Bo 105 and Mi 28, and although the Indian Army prefers the Western offers, the Soviet offer might be chosen due to economic constraints (From Vayu Aerospace Review Issue V/1988). The Mi 28 had completed acceptance trials in 1984 and entered production in 1987 (Gordon).</p><p>It might be the case that it was actually the Mi 35 that was trialed by the Indian side, since there was initial media confusion on believing Mi 35 to be an export version of Mi 28, instead of Mi 24V.</p><p>The existence of the Mi 24V’s export version, Mi 35 was apparently revealed to the Indian side around 1988 and an order for 20 Mi 35s (including trainers) was secured by the USSR during a visit of <strong>Soviet Defence Minister</strong> <strong>Marshal Dimitry Yazov </strong>in October of 1988 (40 Years of VAYU)(From Vayu Aerospace Review Issue V/1988).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*nEK0Oj2rAMrt4SLV" /><figcaption>A pair of Hinds on patrol</figcaption></figure><p>Another source claims that the order for Mi 35s came as a normal follow on after the experience of Mi 25s, and there was no competition held to acquire newer attack helicopters (Singh).</p><p>After the collapse of USSR, the breakaway republics had Mi 35s in stock, that either were redundant to requirements or simply were not economically feasible. A few of them were pitched to India. Teams from the Indian Air Force did visit the ex-USSR states like Belarus to take note of the conditions of the Mi 35s and determine air-worthiness. Although they wouldn&#39;t be procured to operate with the Indian Air Force, IAF looked at them for spares.(Ganapathy).</p><p>In April of 1990, No 104 Helicopter Unit (then a unit, later converted to a helicopter squadron in 1992) was formally inducted with the newer Mi 35s. In June 1990, after the induction of the type with No 104, No 125 which was still operating the Mil Mi 25, was supplemented with the newer Mi 35s as well.</p><p>No 104 Helicopter squadron is the only active squadron in the Indian Air Force with the modernised Mil Mi 35s. No 125 squadron has been fully converted to AH 64E since 2019.</p><h3>3. Major Ops</h3><p>The flying tanks of the Indian Air Force saw combat pretty early on in their career, while the Indian Air Force and the Indian Army were still trying to figure out how the piece filled into the larger picture. India had lacked any dedicated attack helicopters till now, and SOPs needed to be developed at various levels before they were pitched to the field. Aside from the conflict on India proper, Mi 25s/35s have been pitched on a lot of major operations in the subcontinent and beyond.</p><h4>IPKF</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*VNK9-srr_DgSNxwBNTL4ow.jpeg" /><figcaption>No 125 in Sri Lanka. Pic Credits — Bharat Rakshak</figcaption></figure><p>Mil Mi 25s were baptised with fire pretty soon after their induction. No 125 was already trying to develop joint mechanisms to work with ground based forces in a conventional field war setting with Operation Brasstacks, and they were called upon into combat in an unconventional guerilla type war with Operation Pawan in 1987.</p><p>As already mentioned it was under Wg Cdr SC Malhan that the No 125 was deployed in Sri Lanka to participate in Jaffna operations, quickly after the Jaffna helidrop. Initially it is believed that 6 helicopters were deployed in operations, with the squadron rotating on stations later. The number of frames deployed very well depends on the number of Mi 25s inducted, 8 or 12, which show the level of confidence of the Indian Army and Indian Air Force in the type.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/695/1*qPiSpgqFoFgD0LKXP88Gpg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Their induction in the theatre of war provided much needed air support to the troops. Their roles throughout the war also changed from recon and suppressive fire to bombing,to armed escort to CAS.</p><p>Mudhalais in their search and strike role during the initial phase of the operations were particularly effective, limiting the movement of LTTE road and water transports to nighttime conditions. Later as the war converted to an insurgency, the utility of Akbar started waning (Pillarisetti).</p><p>Nevertheless within two and a half years, from October 1987 to March 1990 withdrawal, the No 125 Squadron earned two VrCs and two YSM for its contribution to Operation Pawan as the sole attack helicopter squadron (Pillarisetti).</p><h4>UN Ops</h4><p>The HInds of the Indian Air Force had a taste of foreign soil very early in their journey and would keep having it multiple times. Due to the close coordination with the Indian Army, they have been deployed at least twice in UN supported missions, once in Sierra Leone and later in Congo.</p><p>UNAMSIL was one of the largest peacekeeping deployments by the Indian armed forces with 3000 personnel in the mission. While initially deployed with Mi 8s and ground troops, by May 2000 it became clear that air support would be required. Promptly on 2nd June, 2000 3 Mi 35s were loaded on An 124 and shipped to Sierra Leone (Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/599/1*bFoW054-STUjJ39dEtHi9g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Mi 8 being escorted by 3 Mi 35s in Sierra Leone</figcaption></figure><p>They would go on to participate in the famous Operation Khukri to liberate the peacekeepers kept hostage by the RUF rebels. The Mi 35s undertook armed action, providing accurate suppressive fire, which allowed troops to be inducted from Mi 8s, while Chetaks acted as mobile command posts directing both Mi 8s and Mi 35s (Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone).</p><p>Around 2004, Indian Armed Forces Contingent with the UN mission in Congo, MONUC was supplemented with 4 upgraded Mi 35s No 104 Firebirds for CAS and recon missions. They were based at Goma and proved immensely valuable in the region to peacekeeping forces.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*kDAmjUSceqh89Vag.jpg" /><figcaption>2 Mi 35s of No 104 in Congo. Pic Credits — Bharat Rakshak</figcaption></figure><p>They were deployed in various roles over the course of deployment from CAS, recon to escort duties. One of the highlights of the deployment of the Mi 35 in the region was when a rebel group named CNDP tried attacking Goma, where the unit was stationed, twice, once in 2006 and again in 2008. Both the times Mi 35s proved invaluable in repelling these attacks by determining exact locations of rebels and providing air support in form of rockets and concentrated machine gun fire.</p><p>The sensors aboard the Mi 35s, like the FLIR also helped in targeting and relaying targeting locations to the ground troops for coordinating a response (Dorn).</p><p>The unit was nicknamed ‘Vipers’ while deployed in Congo.The unit also when deployed in the Goma region first in 2006, logged an astonishing 1000 flight hours within 10 months of their induction in the region.</p><p>At least 1 Mi 35U/24VU was also stationed in the region, Tail no Z3129.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XCy-apdsXWVnlutHof6xww.png" /><figcaption>Tail no Z3129/ UN-859 at Kinhasa</figcaption></figure><h4>4. Entering the 21st century</h4><p>Mi 25s and Mi 35s although very capable in their duties suffered from limitations. As Gp Cpt Pradeep Mulay mentioned that “It would’ve been an ideal aircraft if it had night vision”. The Hinds of the Indian Air Force suffered from the lack of navigational aids and night vision. This need was noted and when the Hinds entered the 21st century, plans to modernise were put in place (Ganapathy).</p><p>In 1998, Indian Air Force signed a $US20 million contract with IAI to further upgrade 25 of the newest frames of the total lot of Mi 25/35s with the Mission 24 upgrade package.</p><p>It was based on Tamam’s helicopter multi-mission optronic stabilised payload (HMOSP) and weighed around 30kgs. The upgrade package provides day/night observation capabilities and targeting through TV and FLIR sensors with variable FOV (between 2.4º and 29.2º on the FLIR) and in-built automatic tracking. Other changes included pilot NVGs with flight data and map projected on one eye piece, an integrated self protection suite, and data handling systems. The navigation equipment got an upgrade by including a GPS system that works in parallel to the doppler navigation. The HMOSP and the chingun were slaved to the pilot’s line of sight, and a new mission computer (Chauhan).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*FvP9gUGMWeGYi0_3.jpg" /><figcaption>Mi 35 and AH 64E of Indian Air Force. Pic Credits- Wg Cdr Indranil Nandi</figcaption></figure><p>Post Balakot, the Indian Air Force wanted to equip its Mi 35s, now with No 104, with the latest ATGMs and hence ordered an undisclosed amount of 9M120 Ataka ATGMs. The contract was reportedly with Rs 200 Crore. 9M120 is a development of the original Shtrum ATGMs. The exact variant of Ataka ordered remains unknown.</p><h3>5. Conclusion</h3><p>Hinds have been in the subcontinent since the 80s, and have served the Indian Air Force for approximately 4 decades, although not the same air frames. With even the Mi 35s having served for 3 decades now. The space left by retiring Mi 25s was filled with the induction of a much more advanced type in the form of the AH 64E Apaches. The Indian Army and Indian Air Force have already inducted ALH-WSI Rudra in an attack helicopter capacity. The forces are already looking to induct another dedicated attack helicopter in form of the LCH, whose LSP models in both Indian Army and Indian Air Force livery have been spotted as the time of writing. Mi 35s have also been used to test new generation of Indian ATGMs like SANT which have a better standoff range than the existing Shtrum ATGM used.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*V1C57NAYFDEQY7FQ.jpg" /><figcaption>Mi 35 of Indian Air Force with Shtroom ATGMs</figcaption></figure><p>The first true combat helicopter of the Indian Air Force has had an amazing legacy of operations and roles, and is surely ageing a lot faster and would be replaced. The quagmire of control of such CAS assets still is a point of contention between the forces. The problem was initially tackled by having ownership by one arm and operational control by the other, but it seems both arms are diverging on the issue seeking to procure their own armed helicopters.</p><h3>References</h3><ol><li>Chauhan, Himanshu.”The Mil Mi-35 Upgrade”.n.d. Online. February 2022.&lt;<a href="http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/aircraft/current/609-mi35-himanshu.html">http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/aircraft/current/609-mi35-himanshu.html</a>&gt;</li><li>Dorn, Walter.<em> Keeping Watch: Monitoring Technology and Innovation in UN Peace Operations</em>. 2011. 10.18356/c3365c39-en.</li><li>Ganapathy, PR host. “Flying the lethal Mi-35 Gunship.”. The Blue Skies Podcast, season 1, episode 11. Interviewee Gp Cpt Pradeep Mulay. &lt;https://blueskiespodcast.com/episodes&gt;.</li><li>Gordon, Yefim, and Dmitriy Komissarov. <em>Mil Mi-24 Hind Attack Helicopter</em>. Airlife Pub., 2001.</li><li>Pillarisetti, Jagan. “Chapter 5 : Crocodiles into the Attack — Mi-25s of 125 Heli Squadron”. October 05, 2009. Online.Accessed February 2022.&lt;http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/1026-Chapter05.html&gt;</li><li>Roy, AVM PK. Personal interview. 8 February 2022.</li><li>Singh, Angad. Personal Interview. 5–8 February 2022.</li><li>“Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone”.n.d.Online. February 2022.&lt;<a href="http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/history/2000s/1054-sierra.html">http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/history/2000s/1054-sierra.html</a>&gt;</li><li>Sachdev, Gp Capt AK. “Apache and Chinook: Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Helicopter Fleet.”.July 15, 2021. Accessed February 2022. &lt;http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/apache-and-chinook-enhancing-the-effectiveness-of-the-helicopter-fleet/&gt;</li><li>Subramaniam, AVM Arjun.”The Indian Air Force, Sub-Conventional operations and Balakot: A practitioner’s perspective.”.Online. February 2022.&lt;https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-indian-air-force-sub-conventional-operations-and-balakot-a-practitioners-perspective-50761/&gt;</li><li>Tiwary, AVM A K. “Helicopter Operations in Sri Lanka.n.d.Online. February 2022.&lt;<a href="http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/helicopter-operations-in-sri-lanka/">http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/helicopter-operations-in-sri-lanka/</a>&gt;</li><li>“40 Years of VAYU.” <em>Vayu Aerospace &amp; Defence Review</em>, 2014, p. 103.</li><li>“From Vayu Aerospace Review Issue V/1988.” <em>Vayu Aerospace &amp; Defence Review</em>, 2013, p. 163.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4af0ab48d095" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks/akbar-nama-4af0ab48d095">Akbar Nama</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks">INDRA Networks</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Sino-Soviet split]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/indra-networks/sino-soviet-split-fb8a4a32b5e1?source=rss----f904e32dee05---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fb8a4a32b5e1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cold-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[korea]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shwetabh Singh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Nov 2021 23:52:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-08T23:52:07.848Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Sino-Soviet split in Asia</h3><h4>How the leadership of Korea and Vietnam navigate the Sino- Soviet split.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*5A0ECMOKB9LvR0ql.jpg" /></figure><h4>Introduction</h4><p>After the Chinese Civil war, from 1945–49, the power of China came into the hands of the Chinese Communist party. There was rejoice amongst communists worldwide, for another country, and that too as large as China, had adopted communism as its political philosophy. China being neighbored by the USSR, the leader of the communist world, only increased the ecstasy. CCP was supported by the Soviet Union during the Chinese civil war, and hence after the war they became natural partners. But this relationship was short lived. Throughout the 50s, the relationship between the two communist behemoths started going south, but both of them at least publicly still maintained a facade of socialist solidarity. The fractures although finally became public during the 60s, when both countries started engaging in a war of words, and later at the end of 1960s, during the peak of the split, both of them engaged in a seven month long border skirmish that caused military casualties on both sides. Although the casualties were very low, it marked a new low for Sino-Soviet relationship.</p><p>During the split, two major wars happened where both the countries although beginning to grow apart found themselves at the same side, Korean War (1950–53) and Vietnam war (1955–75). This paper attempts to explain how the communist leadership of the two countries (Korea and Vietnam) where the war was happening, tried to navigate the split between the two major communist powers in the region.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*3GWaqoqrIREiDshC.jpg" /></figure><p>Before understanding how both the leaderships juggle both Chinese and Soviet support, one must understand why these two wars are important. During the cold war, the communist bloc was trying to expand their sphere of influence by supporting communist revolutions in various countries. After CCP grabbed power in China, a Chinese model of revolution came into place, and Chinese wanted to help export it. So, Soviets and Chinese communists decided to divide spheres of influence, with Europe and other western countries under the influence of USSR and eastern Asia under the influence of CCP (Jian).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qkqDJS9E9N4r7Lwu.jpg" /></figure><p>Chen Jian argues the seeds of the split were sown just before and during the Korean War itself. He mentions in his book “China’s Road to the Korean War”, that after meeting with Stalin, in 1949, Mao didn’t want to play the role of his junior while directly interacting with Soviets, especially in face-to-face discussions with Stalin himself. He argues this personal feud and in some sort inferiority being felt by Mao with respect to Stalin in personal discussions led to the origins of the fracture during the Korean war that would later become a full-fledged split between the nations and an ideological split.</p><p>The origins of Korean war, as Jian states in his book, lie with the North Korean premier Kim Il Sung’s decision to invade the South. He mentions, Kim spent most of 1949 and early 1950 discussing his plans to invade the south with the Soviets. Kim and North Korean leadership, at least in the early days of the Korean war, were tilted more towards Soviet Union than China.</p><p>The first instant of juggling between the two countries by the Korean leadership appears here, as mentioned by Jian that Kim went ahead with his plans after securing an agreement with Stalin and a promise of reinforcements, if needed, in a secret meeting in the April of 1950, and only after that went to meet Mao in mid-May, one month before he declared war on the South (Jian). Jian argues Kim only came to Beijing only to get Chinese approval on the direction of Stalin himself. This argument is supported by the fact Kim during this visit didn’t reveal any details of either his plan or date of action, only that he wished to use force to unify his country. He did reveal that Stalin had approved of his plan but didn’t mention the request for reinforcements from the Soviets. He further reveals that when Mao asked whether he would require Chinese support and proposed to send three Chinese armies along Chinese-Korean border, Kim arrogantly, possibly a little too sure in his discussions with Stalin about reinforcements, rejected the idea, claiming that they North Korean forces along with Communist guerrillas in South could “solve the problem” on their own (Jian).</p><p>Kim was wrong in his estimation, he believed that Americans although supported the South, but they wouldn’t commit troops for its defence and even if they would, by the time they would land on Korean peninsula, his forces would have achieved total victory on the ground. He was wrong, Americans had come to South’s defence and under the UN’s banner held a defensive perimeter around Busan (Jian). Then to flank the North Korean forces, came the Inchon landing. North Korean forces were on the defensive now. The war’s tide had turned.</p><p>The direct American action had threatened both Chinese and Soviets. Chinese had already ordered the creation of a border defence army, to push troops in Korea if need be. In September, Kim sent a letter to Stalin, asking for direct Soviet military help, and if not possible assist in creation of international people’s volunteer units like in China to help. Stalin, unwilling to force a direct confrontation between USSR and USA, liked the second idea, and suggested they must consult their Chinese comrades (Jian). Stalin later in a meeting with Chinese would make it clear that he had no intention of sending Soviet troops to Korea, but promised material help and air cover(that too not immediately but at some later point in the war) if the Chinese were to enter the war on North Korea’s behalf, and to defend new China’s territories if need be (Jian).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*KJ_1J0RtuVvBk7Y9.jpg" /></figure><p>Stalin would go on to backtrack his promise of air cover, informing Chinese that Soviet Air Forces would not cross the Yalu river (which was present on Chinese Korean Border). This decision would anger the CCP leadership and leave a strong mark on their relationship (Jian). Chinese terming it ‘betrayal’ decided to continue with their push in Korea, without air cover, and still trying to convince Stalin to send air cover to Korea (Jian).</p><p>The majority of the war would be fought by the Chinese and North Korean on their own without the direct Soviet help. The viewpoint of Korean leadership went from dismissing Chinese help before the war and starting on their own to welcoming and even Kim Il-Sung personally requesting for Chinese intervention in the war. The ‘betrayal’ by Soviet Union would not go unnoticed by the Chinese and Mao and other CCP leadership would go on to reexamine their alliance with USSR and foreign policy, focusing on ‘self-reliance’ (Jian).</p><p>The same decade as Korean war saw another communist revolution in Asia, but things were quite different. In Korean War, since the seeds of split were being sown between China and USSR, they still maintained an allied outlook, promising to help each other, but by the Vietnam war, the Sino-Soviet Split was far more in open and would reach its peak during the duration of the war itself.</p><p>In the early years of the war, when the split was still happening, the CPV aiming to retain support from both communist blocs tried to not take sides in the split, but rather use the competition for maximum output (Lawrence). From the beginning of the Vietnam war, from Vietnamese perspective it was about Anti-American struggle. Vietnam would use everything at their disposal to help their objective, from military to diplomacy, especially diplomatic struggle or ‘dau tranh ngoai giao’ to secure support from friendly countries (Asselin).</p><p>Ideologically Asselin, in his paper <em>“We Don’t Want a Munich”: Hanoi’s Diplomatic Strategy, 1965–1968</em>, argues that Hanoi was initially way more tilted towards PRC, having quoted the Romanian charge d’affaires in Hanoi as having said that “this did not mean that [VWP leaders] were permanently sold out to China” implying the heavy tilt, just as North Korea was initially tilted towards the USSR, and just like Korea, Vietnam would also later go on to be a bit more flexible, having realised later that any sole dependence on either USSR or PRC would hinder their struggle.</p><p>Asselin provides evidence of this juggling of alignment in his piece by mentioning the Chinese increasing their military aid to Vietnam during the height of the split to nudge them away from the USSR. Chinese would go on to supply material, and even units to help in local construction so that Vietnamese troops could concentrate on fighting the war (Lawrence). He also mentions when Vietnam realised PRC’s equipment won’t win them the war, they started being cautious to publicly align with CCP’s line, to gain Soviet support (Logevall). Initially Hanoi would go on to support Chinese stance in calling Khruschev’s USSR having swayed to a revisionist position, but after realisation of the need of Soviet help, CPV would go on to censor any criticism of Soviets (Asselin). This would bear fruits as by early 1965, Soviets would publicly acknowledge their obligation to help a socialist ally by helping them build economic and public defense capabilities (Asselin). We can see this as example of how Vietnamese aware of the split, diplomatically played it for their benefit.</p><p>Vietnam had just come out of the First Indochina war against the French, before they had to deal with another superpower at their doorstep. It wasn’t all military conflict though, in the backdrop was running long standing political discussions first with the French and later Americans to find a political settlement and stop the fighting and diplomatic movement to attain help form allies and friendly countries (Asselin)(Lawrence). The effect of Sino-Soviet split was seen in these political negotiations as well. Asselin argues that although the Soviets agreed to help build North Vietnamese defense capabilities, they didn’t wish for a showdown with the USA in Vietnam. He quotes Le Duc Tho admitting to a French journalist that Soviets don’t “”do not believe in our victory and this pushes them to search for a resolution of the Vietnamese question by way of negotiations.” (Asselin). Soviets would go on to push Vietnam for a negotiations-based solution, but Asselin also states they were careful in this endeavour for their pressure on Vietnam would be used by CCP to attack them for bowing down to the western powers (Logevall). Later realising that this would only diminish their influence in Vietnam, Soviets too would go on to lift pressure about diplomatic solutions on Vietnam. In 1968, Vietnamese would go on to open themselves for peace talks, much to the pleasure of Soviets and Chinese anger. This would also temporarily strain their relationship with the Chinese, as it seemed they had agreed to the Soviet policy of peaceful co-existence, which was much criticized by Chinese till now (Asselin). Vietnamese realizing Soviet material help was much valuable and advanced than Chinese, had played that gamble (Logevall).</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Both of these wars speak volumes about the perceived role of ideology in the Cold war. The Cold war, which is seen as this mammoth clash of ideologies, capitalism vs communism, wasn’t as black and white as is often stated, and these two wars depict this exact caveat. In both the wars, we see initially a bigger emphasis on ideology while choosing allies, like Vietnam earlier with PRC, but after the onset of the war, we see more practicality start appearing in countries foreign policy and choice of ally, as seen with Korea and Vietnam’s choice of support once the fighting started. This effect is not only seen in North Korea and Vietnam with respect to the USSR and PRC, but rather in PRC as well with respect to the USSR, when post-Korean war, PRC realised that it can’t keep depending on the USSR for help and must follow a trend of self-dependence (Jian).</p><p>We also see ideology, which was supposed to unify a bloc, appearing to fail in the job even when all the countries held to the similar ideologies with dear life. The Sino- Soviet split pitted traditional allies against each other, while, at least for a while appearing, to pursue similar foreign policy goals of assisting newly emerging socialist countries, but the different brands of socialism in both the countries didn’t help in saving the relationship. While the other socialist countries, also largely following their own brand of socialism, tended to align themselves with either country, yet experience forced them to be a bit more open to making friends and accept support from wherever they can. Hanoi was more experienced than Korea in the matter, and although parroted CCP’s lines in criticizing USSR, quickly decided to warm the relationship in order to receive aid which might help them in their struggle against Americans. So, although the ideology as a whole helped forming the blocs as a whole, and countries with similar ideologies would band together for similar goals, though through different means, it couldn’t out do with the internal conflicts, for example both PRC and USSR wanted to help Vietnam against USA, but both would get angry at the help received by the client from the other side.</p><h3><strong>References</strong></h3><p>Asselin, Pierre. “‘We Don’t Want a Munich’: Hanoi’s Diplomatic Strategy, 1965–1968.” <em>Diplomatic History</em>, vol. 36, no. 3, 2012, pp. 547–581. <em>JSTOR</em>, <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/44376189.">www.jstor.org/stable/44376189.</a> Accessed 17 Dec. 2020.</p><p>Jian, Chen. <em>China’s Road to the Korean War The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation</em>. Columbia University Press, 1994.</p><p>Lawrence, Mark Atwood. <em>Vietnam War: A Concise International History</em>. Oxford University Press, 2008.</p><p>Logevall, Fredrik. <em>Origins of the Vietnam War</em>. Routledge, 2015.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fb8a4a32b5e1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks/sino-soviet-split-fb8a4a32b5e1">Sino-Soviet split</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks">INDRA Networks</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[War for Sale: Private Military Companies and International Relations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/indra-networks/war-for-sale-private-military-companies-and-international-relations-f3353463977d?source=rss----f904e32dee05---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f3353463977d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pmc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shwetabh Singh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Nov 2021 23:26:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-08T23:43:04.491Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8RTyHAy4A6rGPyGy.jpg" /></figure><h4><strong>Introduction</strong></h4><p>Metal Gear Solid is a very famous video game series by Hideo Kojima with a cultish following. The series is known for its innovation in gameplay and the themes it covers, both political and philosophical. It is one of those many themes that the series focuses on that I wished to discuss in my paper. The series involves controlling a special operations soldier protagonist operating behind enemy lines with the objective of defeating a super weapon called Metal Gear. Throughout the series the protagonist sees a change in his fealty, from being an American soldier to being an international mercenary and then forming his own Private Military Companies later and fighting towards completely different objectives in opposition to his older fealties.</p><p>His exploits with the PMCs serve as a very good template for understanding how video games approach the idea of PMCs in the 20th and 21st Century. Being the one of the oldest still on-going video game series, the franchise itself has grown and has incorporated a lot of new realities, concerned with the topic at hand, especially in its latest installment, Metal Gear Solid V : Phantom Pain which deals, in detail, with one such PMC formed by the protagonist called Diamond Dogs. The game served as a motivation to discuss how these private military groups feature into the eternal quagmire that is International relations.</p><p>Although mercenaries have existed as long as the history of warfare itself, the 20th Century saw the resurgence of mercenary groups when states in the aftermath of WW2 and in the background of the Cold War were skeptical to get their hands dirty in smaller conflicts. The emergence of a lot of newly independent nations in Africa led to an increasing amount of conflict in the region. Countries not wanting to intervene, gave PMCs an option to make good trade from those conflicts. African theatre saw a lot of PMCs getting involved at the behest of, and a lot of them against local governments hired by former colonial powers to consolidate their interests (Adams). Hence their romanticisation happened in the media, including video game series like Metal Gear Solid. It was also this time when an important distinction between mercenaries and PMCs arose, and so rose PMCs as a separate identity due to the multiple negative connotations attached with the word.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*SJfILi1rDaXUEndt.png" /><figcaption>Diamond Dogs, a PMC featured in MGS V Phantom Pain</figcaption></figure><p>PMCs, although operationally appearing similar to a band of mercenaries, have some significant differences. As Adams points out in his article, Private Military Companies: Mercenaries for the 21st Century, “traditional mercs were more or less <em>ad hoc </em>collections of former soldiers who provided experience, leadership, small arms and an occasional armored car. Their organizations were as ephemeral as the causes they fought for.” PMCs differ primarily from mercenaries by their professionalism, and focusing on the domain as a serious business, with its members wearing both business suits and camouflage equally (Adams).</p><h4><strong>What Modern PMCs are?</strong></h4><p>Modern Private Military Companies are a professional force, available to be hired for a variety of mission profiles, ranging from training forces, to even participating in active combat. PMCs don’t only serve individual interests but are also hired by national governments for either assisting the national armed forces in a conflict, or in place of armed forces when tasks don’t demand their participation. PMCs are a recent phenomenon, with the first modern PMC, Watchguard, being registered in 1967, by David Sterling, a co-founder of British Special Forces SAS (Jefferies).</p><p>A growing trend has also been seen, where PMCs have been hired by a national government to train the professional armed forces of another country to build a local and organic security capacity. They are often organised and led by former military veterans, and thus derive legitimacy from either the leader’s service records or even from the reputation of the organization which the owner/leader served with. Although dealing in the domain of security, PMCs’ primary focus is on conducting business rather than conducting combat operations, and hence a lot of their operations might not involve actual combat even if they deploy in contested regions. This is one of the important distinctions between them and mercenaries. PMCs focus on their dual identity, of being professional businessmen and professional combatants, actively putting pictures of their operatives in both three-piece suits and combat camouflage side-by-side on their websites, to actively promote this dual identity (Joachim and Schneiker).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/0*LP8WpiLIUHLibauN.jpeg" /><figcaption>EO personnel in Sierra Leone. Source: Reddit</figcaption></figure><p>PMCs differ from PSCs, or Private Security Companies, in the domain of operations, and type of clients they serve (Adams). PSCs and PMCs although hire from a similar talent pool of veterans of various militaries, yet PSCs tend to cater to smaller individual clients for primarily security type job profiles, while PMCs tend to cater to the bigger clients in the form of national governments and other bigger organizations.</p><p>PMCs also have a ‘transnational’ identity, most of them are registered in a parent country whose rules allow their existence, since not all countries allow the creation of PMCs, and have their headquarters there (Singer). Yet they mostly operate away from the soil of their parent nations, and in distant lands like MENA, South America etc.</p><p>It was in the late 90s that PMCs catched the public eye again, with multiple high value contracts being awarded to them like Croatian government hiring a US PMC, MPRI to professionalise their army, Angolan government hiring Executive Outcomes, a South African PMC, to help against rebels, or when British used Sandline International, a British PMC to help restore the government of Sierra Leone back to power, after a UN intervention in form of an embargo had failed (Adams). There was a meteoric rise in the number of PMCs operating and the market cap for such firms in the last two decades. The global market for PMCs has hence risen to more than $200 Billion in 2020.</p><h4><strong>What Modern PMCs Really are?</strong></h4><p>One of the most inclusive classification of various types of PMCs was provided by Peter Singer. He classified PMCs, through his Tip of the Spear model, in three major types based on the type of services various firms advertise to provide — military support firms, military consulting firms and military provider firms (Singer).</p><p>Military Support Firms tend to provide technical support services. They are not involved in the planning or execution of any military operation, rather they tend to stay back and provide their customers with technical support, with regards to various equipment, they are also involved in the logistical and transportation aspect of operations (Singer).</p><p>Then there are the Military consulting firms. These are possibly the most common type of PMCs to exist. As the name suggests, these firms tend to focus on providing training and advisory services to the customer. The members of such PMCs bring ample experience and advisory capacity due to their own experiences from their service. Aside from providing training, such firms also help in operation planning and organisational analysis for operations and armed forces as a whole (Singer).</p><p>Lastly we have the Military provider firms. These firms are the ones that engage in active combat on behalf of the customer and are at the foreground of conflicts they are contracted for (Singer). These groups due to their smaller size and high specialised nature, could in fact mimic special forces of the country, and be utilised in similar mission profiles but ones that don’t truly demand a Special Operations intervention.</p><p>Due to the nature of operations of PMCs that often require their ‘intervention’ in crises, at behest of a customer, and the operations not requiring offensive operations but rather in a humanitarian-esque role, like distribution of aid in combat active areas, protection of certain areas, groups etc. their lines might even get blurred with that of international humanitarian organizations. There the difference in definition of PMC, comes from their business end, they operate at a customer’s need rather than any humanitarian ideal. Although they do end up using said ideals for their advertising their activities in contested areas (Joachim and Schneiker).</p><p>PMCs also offer poorer or even newly independent nations with an interesting choice. Military capacity doesn’t come cheap, requiring a consistent budget, and in case there are potential hostilities, an ever increasing one at that. For poor countries to maintain their standing armies hence becomes difficult. It is not just the creation and maintenance of these armies that is expensive but also the training. A lot of African nations suffer from this issue, having created large standing armies which end up having worse success ratios in combat operations. Newly independent nations end up having the issues of not having training infrastructure at all, aside from the financial issues that might come with even recruiting and/or inducting military equipment. In such cases, PMCs offer these nations an encouraging choice to get hired help. A small professional force available worldwide to deal with any immediate threats, and even help with building capacity until the national armies get up on their feet.</p><h4><strong>The Case of Non-western PMCs</strong></h4><p>Due to the popular culture and the romanticisation of PMCs and ‘Mercenary’ culture in the 20th century, it might appear that PMCs are an entirely western phenomenon, which isn’t true. One of the most famous PMCs, Executive Outcomes, was based in South Africa. PMCs now aren’t exclusively an American and British phenomenon, as was the case during the majority of the 20th Century, except Executive Outcomes. A lot of other countries have seen the establishment of newer PMCs, like the Turkish SADAT Group, Russian PMCs like Wagner Group and Slavonic Corps, Peruvian PMCs like Defion etc and Chinese PMCs on the horizon.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*iKeTxaRsKS8t2PBo.jpg" /><figcaption>Russian PMC in Syria. Source : Google</figcaption></figure><p>Out of them, possibly the best known modern non western PMC is of Russian origin, the Wagner Group. Headed by a Russian oligarch,Yevgeny Prigozhin, rather than an Russian military veteran, the Wagner Group is the go to group for the Russian state to conduct operations where they don’t want their regulars to be seen (<em>Band of Brothers</em>).</p><p>The case of the Russian PMCs is quite interesting as both their connection to the state and their role in international politics is quite different. Hence, it becomes important to discuss them separately to fully encompass how PMCs have evolved and what happens when the relationship between them isn’t exclusively financial.</p><p>Western PMCs are employed under the ‘outsourcing’ policies, to save the cost of deploying state forces, Russian perspective is far more complex. Russian PMCs are viewed as a politico-military tool. Russian Chief of Staff Nikolay Makarov was noted to have publicly said that a network of Russian PMCs was needed to be used for ‘delicate missions abroad’. These PMCs offer a key feature to the Russian state in terms of international relations, one that of plausible deniability (Marten). This feature was most visible during the Russian campaign to annex Crimea, where ‘little green men’ without any identifying patches popped up throughout the Crimean peninsula, until the referendum took place.</p><p>In the last three years, Russian involvement in the African theatre has increased dramatically, primarily through indirect support by providing supplies and training and at times through direct support of their allies in the region by the Russian PMCs. Wagner Group hence falls in both military consulting and military provider firms under Peter Singer’s classification system. Everywhere in the African theatre, except Libya we have seen the involvement of Russian PMCs without any direct support from Russian Military, working simply as a military consulting firm but in Libya, it has been observed of Wagner Group working in a military provider profile in close conjunction with Russian armed forces (“Russia’s Escalating Use of Private Military Companies in Africa”).</p><p>Wagner Group also shares their homebase with a Special force Brigade of GRU, a highly unusual phenomenon for a PMC to share a facility with State’s forces, that too with an elite and highly secretive service’s units. Wagner Group isn’t the only Russian PMC, yet it is the most famous (Marten).</p><p>We can clearly conclude that the connection of Wagner Group with the Russian state is a deep yet an opaque one. Such a relationship of a PMC with the state brings up a very interesting question.</p><h4><strong>PMCs as Legitimate non-state actors?</strong></h4><p>We have now seen how the PMCs rose meteorically in the last two decades, and with more and more such firms being set up every year. While most of them have a financial relationship with various governments, the case of Russian PMCs are interesting, as they bring up an interesting question.</p><p>What if PMCs weren’t as private as they seemed and were imbued with the state’s foreign affairs as a tool? What if PMCs could be made an extension of the state itself, to undertake operations on their behalf? This question might seem a bit redundant after the discussion already had above in this article, yet it requires a little more nuance and hence needs to be discussed independently.</p><p>We already saw PMCs providing services to various states and a lot of the time their own states in foreign lands. The nuance here is that how should we perceive this new actor in international relations, if such Private Military Companies weren’t truly private ? In all other cases like US PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan, PMCs were working merely for financial gains, and hence didn’t feature into a state’s foreign policy. Russia demonstrates, with the Wagner Group, how such PMCs can be imbued with the state machinery itself, and hence attributed even as ‘semi-state’ forces. They can, thus, be used or ‘contracted’ by a state, to conduct operations, be it clandestine, offensive etc with plausible deniability to the rest of the world from any action, much like when we saw the involvement of Wagner group in annexation of Crimea.</p><p>Marten in his article, Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group, coined the term ‘semi-state forces’ for such PMCs, where the relationship is inherently non-capitalistic and rather invisible publicly, yet their involvement in conflicts carries resemblance to the Soviet and Chinese ‘volunteer groups’ during the cold war. Their existence, and hence characteristics, also differs from other PMCs by their apparent legality, as PMCs are illegal in Russia. Officially, the Wagner Group does not exist, yet we know it does, with the majority of its employees recent retirees from Russian state forces, and sometimes even pro-russian foreign fighters (Marten).</p><p>This type of semi-state supported groups could blur the lines between a modern PMCs and a future proxy-group. And once the line has been blurred can we ask ourselves whether we can refer to most proxy groups, official motivation aside, as simply PMCs of different order? Could one day semi-state forces be used as a direct proxy to fight out any smaller conflict on behalf of nations and various larger private groups even, like corporations?</p><p>The other issue is what if someday a PMC could challenge a state’s monopoly of violence? Much like in the game Metal Gear Solid, when the Foxhound PMC becomes strong enough, it tries to take the US hostage over a certain individual being released, one day PMCs as an industry might become strong enough to challenge a state’s monopoly over violence, as private consumer corporations have done since the last century. The biggest units to control the supply and demand of most consumer goods on the planet have come out to be large multinational corporations. Following their path, it wouldn’t be prudent to assume a scenario where a large transnational PMC might challenge a state, and wrestle the monopoly from them. Hence, the discussion on how that would affect the identity and sovereignty of the state seems to be required.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>With the global costs of warfare rising there has been a sudden and amazing rise in the emergence and market cap for the Private Military Industry. PMCs have brought about a niche role for themselves on the back of offsourcing warfare, with by the end of the Afghanistan war more PMC contractors were present on ground than US Army personnel. PMCs existence is a direct resultant of the world order that was inherited post WW2 and, not in a small part, due to the Cold War as well. With the emergence of newer states that lack the expertise in defensive and combat arts, PMCs have found themselves in a perfect position to thrive.</p><p>The modern face of mercenary-esque groups which project their image as a new amalgamation of warrior and a businessman, offer a lot of countries a lot of benefits, taking roles that a lot of states and powers are reluctant to undertake due to various constraints (Joachim and Schneiker). The profit seeking behaviour also gives a certain amount of predictability to such groups’ actions, we can assume a rational actor behaviour, something that can be expected of states only under the realist assumption. After all, their depiction as irrational actors only ruins their imagery which is highly necessary for a business that awards a lot of contracts based on reputation only (Cusumano). These groups, for better or worse, are becoming a major player in international relations due to the fact they can commit violence and compete with the state’s monopoly over it. We have seen PMCs undertake a variety of operations ranging from simple logistical work, to straight up getting involved in active operation and changing the geopolitical structure of a region, like the annexation of Crimea.</p><p>The existence of PMCs as semi-state forces, or as an extension of state rather than just private individuals undertaking contracts, making them more active in the domain of foreign policy and international relations. This type of evolution is more likely in countries that aren’t really known for their democratic institutions, and puts them on the path of becoming this extension of state, where their legality in the country of origin also plays an important part in the roles they undertake. One of the most famous PMC is the Russian Wagner Group, which isn’t the only PMC in Russia, but rather part of a larger network of PMCs that were created in last two decades by the Russian government, as semi-state forces to undertake operations on their behalf, drawing up members from Russian Armed forces.</p><h3><strong>References</strong></h3><ol><li>Adams, Thomas K. “Private Military Companies: Mercenaries for the 21st Century.” <em>Small Wars &amp; Insurgencies</em>, vol. 13, no. 2, Aug. 2002, pp. 54–67. <em>Taylor and Francis+NEJM</em>, doi:10.1080/09592310208559181.</li><li><em>Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State</em>. <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state.">https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state.</a> Accessed 19 May 2021.</li><li>Cusumano, Eugenio. “Private Military and Security Companies’ Logos: Between Camouflaging and Corporate Socialization.” <em>Security Dialogue</em>, vol. 52, no. 2, Apr. 2021, pp. 135–55. <em>DOI.org (Crossref)</em>, doi:10.1177/0967010620923586.</li><li>Jefferies, Ian D. “Private Military Companies — A Positive Role to Play in Today’s International System.” <em>Connections</em>, vol. 1, no. 4, 2002, pp. 103–25.</li><li>Joachim, Jutta, and Andrea Schneiker. “All for One and One in All: Private Military Security Companies as Soldiers, Business Managers and Humanitarians.” <em>Cambridge Review of International Affairs</em>, vol. 27, no. 2, Apr. 2014, pp. 246–67. <em>DOI.org (Crossref)</em>, doi:10.1080/09557571.2013.867300.</li><li>Marten, Kimberly. “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group.” <em>Post-Soviet Affairs</em>, vol. 35, no. 3, May 2019, pp. 181–204. <em>DOI.org (Crossref)</em>, doi:10.1080/1060586X.2019.1591142.</li><li>“Russia’s Escalating Use of Private Military Companies in Africa.” <em>Institute for National Strategic Studies</em>, <a href="https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/2425797/russias-escalating-use-of-private-military-companies-in-africa/">https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/2425797/russias-escalating-use-of-private-military-companies-in-africa/.</a> Accessed 19 May 2021.</li><li>Singer, P. W. “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security.” <em>International Security</em>, vol. 26, no. 3, Jan. 2002, pp. 186–220. <em>DOI.org (Crossref)</em>, doi:10.1162/016228801753399763.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f3353463977d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks/war-for-sale-private-military-companies-and-international-relations-f3353463977d">War for Sale: Private Military Companies and International Relations</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks">INDRA Networks</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[RUDRA OR LCH — Desi Rivalry?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/indra-networks/rudra-or-lch-desi-rivalry-c9ae5e1e2bfd?source=rss----f904e32dee05---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c9ae5e1e2bfd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iaf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lch]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rudra]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hal]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shwetabh Singh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 19 Sep 2021 22:09:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-09-20T03:22:07.823Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>RUDRA OR LCH — Desi Rivalry?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/964/0*pAxrT3olZzLWDiTu" /><figcaption>HAL LCH and ALH WSI together. Credits — Deb Rana</figcaption></figure><p>Kargil war of 1999 is one of the most difficult war fought in the history of the world, Indian army won a war fighting a literal uphill battle against a well dug in enemy which had the advantage of both element of surprise and geography. Despite the victory the cost at which we won the war also showed some critical deficiencies in Indian preparedness or strategy, 527 bravehearts had to make extreme sacrifice to win the war. One critical deficiency that was found was the lack of dedicated attack helicopters which could perform missions at such altitude, Indian airforce used Mi 24/35 attack helicopters which were sent towards Kargil but failed to cross the Srinagar area &amp; then it was decided to use Mi 17 transport helicopters, armed with rocket pods to attack the heights of Tololing &amp; on May 28 1999 , third of the four Mi 17 gunship formation was shot down by enemy stinger manpad which led to casualty of 4 crew members.</p><p><strong>After the end of Kargil it was clear that India requires an attack helicopter which was fast and agile even at high altitudes. The induction of HAL ALH aka Dhruv in 2002 boosted confidence &amp; then in 2006 HAL declared the intention to develop an attack helicopter based on Hal Dhruv which was termed LCH or light combat helicopter.</strong></p><p>Now as with every development there were delays in development of LCH as despite it being derived from Dhruv it saw major changes to the design and then armed forces which were using ALH decided that in meanwhile it would be a faster solution to develop an attack helicopter version of Hal ALH without comprehensive modifications to the structure of the helicopter itself. This version is what we know as HAL RUDRA or ALH MK IV. ALH MK IV got its IOC in 2012 &amp; production started in 2013.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8pacyUf3_wOTWpu6" /><figcaption>HAL ALH WSI Rudra <em>Night Flying</em>. Credits — Deb Rana</figcaption></figure><p>Now the advantage of this development is that instead of one today India has 2 indigenous attack helicopters which are HAL LCH &amp; HAL RUDRA, but this itself is also a problem. Today when HAL LCH is ready for production &amp; even being used by IAF in Ladakh where India has been pushed by CCP into a faceoff, we still are awaiting mass order for LCH, an order of about 180 LCH was envisioned in beginning which were to be shared between IA (114) &amp; IAF (65). The hesitation stems for various factors but one major factor is the presence and wide acceptance of HAL Rudra in force and IA &amp; IAF have about 90 or so helicopter already in service with total order being over 110 helicopters.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qlSWjiaOyk8czWGh" /><figcaption>IAF’s Rudras. Credits — Deb Rana</figcaption></figure><p>The biggest factor is cost, HAL RUDRA costs about 140 crores or 20 million each, so if HAL can somehow bring down the cost of LCH to a near if not equal price then it would allow HAL to go ahead with pending sensor integration like integration of the radar mast, MAWS (Missile Approach Warning System) etc. If this happens at best the cost of fully equipped LCH will be just 30–40 % higher than the cost of ALH MK IV which is not really much.</p><p>Now the case comes to why we need to order LCH and why LCH is an even better option than an already great performing Rudra which is already inducted into forces in good number. Despite Rudra being an excellent platform &amp; being derived from same ALH platform both share many critical components like engine and have near identical endurance, service ceiling &amp; range there are certain advantages that LCH has over Rudra, these advantages come from fact that the basic ALH design was not specifically done for the role of an attack helicopter while the basic LCH design was done with exactly its attack role in mind.</p><p>Eliminating similarities and capabilities, certain advantages Hal LCH has over Hal Rudra are</p><ul><li>LCH has higher chance of survival against hostile enemy due to its sleeker design which was possible because of tandem cockpit configuration.</li><li>It is designed such that its IR &amp; acoustic signature is reduced compared to a more conventionally designed Rudra making LCH less susceptible to enemy MANPADS or IR SAM. Design is optimized even for RCS or radar cross section.</li><li>LCH is also a very agile platform, even more so than Rudra which itself is an impressive in agility. This agility is maintained even at high altitudes where LCH is unmatched, it is one of, if not the most agile attack helicopters in world.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qxfxe17J_Vy3VzDZ" /><figcaption>HAL LCH <em>during Aero India</em>. Credits — Deb Rana</figcaption></figure><ul><li>LCH is armoured and has a crash resisting tricycle wheel landing gear which minimizes the chances of pilot fatalities in case of crash.</li><li>LCH prototype TD-2 was first Indigenous craft which sported a digital camouflage pattern which with the sleeker stealthier profile of the fuselage of the helicopter reduces its EO signature as well making it difficult to spot for enemy combatants as well as EO systems.</li></ul><p>These are just few advantages or bonus features LCH has over the Rudra.</p><p>Now even if the final contractual price of LCH might be a tad bit higher than the Rudra then too we have to understand that it also has few overall advantages over the more conventional design &amp; as we know the <strong>Economic of Scale</strong> with a larger order size or lot size the manufacturing ecosystem gains further stability which leads to decline in price of production, so if ordered in adequate numbers the price of LCH will decline further, bridging price gap with Rudra which has enjoyed a quite large order size of over 110 helicopters has already exploited EOS.</p><p>Rudra &amp; LCH are sibling aircrafts and not rivals, they are meant to compliment each other &amp; serve the nation, these should not be seen as alternatives. Rudra is a great platform which has been inducted &amp; ordered in sufficient numbers &amp; is serving nation well, today we have an even better alternative in form of LCH &amp; we must support it.</p><p>Now leaving aside comparison of two Indian helicopters &amp; comparing them to the newest &amp; most potent attack helicopter in Indian armed force inventory US made Apache AH-64E which IAF has 22 &amp; IA has ordered 6.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*g5gdHm4S9PkOL4NI" /><figcaption>AH64E Apache of Indian Air Force. Credits — Deb Rana</figcaption></figure><p>Apache is a heavy attack helicopter with higher payload &amp; capabilities like Longbow radar but the same <strong>Apache costed Indian Army 930 million USD for 06</strong> attack helicopters (including spares &amp; support) but if we go into layman cost, costed IA over <strong>150 million $</strong> per piece, this is prohibitively more expensive than the indigenous helicopters. Neither IAF or IA in long term afford to procure or purchase Apache in large numbers &amp; if we do then the country will be dependent on America for future support, for a growing power like India this dependence is crippling &amp; unacceptable.</p><p>The high cost of Apache is one reason which keeps it out of reach of most nations inventory, even rich nations which have it in inventory are often lacking in numbers, LCH can be equally if not much more attractive offering from price point for not just Indian armed forces but also for world. LCH as a true attack helicopter can be the first major helicopter export by HAL, even beating the export success of HAL Dhruv which is in use by about half dozen countries in various capabilities and roles.</p><p>HAL LCH is ready to fly &amp; provide its much required service to the country, it very well aligns with the MAKE IN INDIA &amp; promises to make Bharat Aatmnirbhar, now instead of holding it down with red tapism &amp; doubts its high time we let it soar to new heights &amp; support it.</p><p>About the Author — Hitesh Adhikari is a mechanical engineer by education, worked in automotive sector for a brief period of time. A defence enthusiast who loves to read &amp; write on defence &amp; strategic subjects. Started DEFENCEGLOBE in 2015 to help armed force aspirants &amp; defence enthusiasts learn about systems &amp; give out his analysis of things. He tweets under the handle <a href="https://twitter.com/defenceglobe">@defenceglobe</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c9ae5e1e2bfd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks/rudra-or-lch-desi-rivalry-c9ae5e1e2bfd">RUDRA OR LCH — Desi Rivalry?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks">INDRA Networks</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Drones — Security, Sovereignty and Identities]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/indra-networks/drones-security-sovereignty-and-identities-93170f1c7dc?source=rss----f904e32dee05---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/93170f1c7dc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[drones]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dronestrikes]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shwetabh Singh]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Apr 2021 17:42:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-07-29T12:59:57.213Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Drones — Security, Sovereignty and Identities</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/890/0*g-tnO473YyNyslT9" /><figcaption>USAF’s RQ — 4 Global Hawk HALE UAV</figcaption></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Drone attacks entered the mainstream news and gained prominence around the very beginning of the 2010s decade their increased usage by the Obama administration, even though it wasn’t the first-time drones were used in the role. The use of drone strikes to eliminate supposed terrorist elements hurting the American War on Terror in Afghanistan in Pakistan and Afghanistan, saw the first widespread use of the technology in a combatant role, before which they were primarily employed in ISR (Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance) roles. As the amount of drone strikes increased in Pakistan, important questions from the purview of International Relations and Human rights began popping up. The public sentiment against the US in Pakistan took a nose-dive, after all how could a nation strike targets in an allied country, and after that does Pakistan even remain a US ally for supposedly harbouring declared enemies of the US? The sensors on Drones are physically limited by the heights at which they operate, and thus is any targeting at those heights credible? If the US had the impunity to operate in the FATA region and to strike anyone their analysts declared a credible target, was anyone in the region safe due to mistargeting, as Shaw (2013) had shown in his paper? This paper aims to chart the implications of drone strikes in the 21st century vis-a-vis the questions of sovereignty, security and identity.</p><h3>The question of Security</h3><p>Drones are seeing extensive usage in 21st Century warfare, and as time goes on, this usage only keeps on increasing. No recent conflict comes to mind where drones didn’t play a decisive role. Drones have evolved a lot since their mainstream popularisation during the Obama administration era, and now not only used for ISR and HVT elimination roles, which were highly specialized roles mostly used by Intelligence agencies, but now rather also being equipped en-masse with various militaries and have a direct combat capability as seen during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*6ALy5m9hDmr4CzZS.jpg" /><figcaption>A Turkish TB2 Bayraktar UCAV</figcaption></figure><p>A parallel in terms of evolution can be drawn with the advent of airplanes in the beginning of 20th Century and their early adoption in standard military operations. It is exactly due to the trajectory drones are following that they seriously challenge the idea of conventional security, much like air power had changed warfare in the 20th Century. Drones are cheap, small, able to pass through the gaps in security coverage and in numbers can overwhelm almost every defensive measure against them. Security of citizens, from the perspective of realist theory, is only followed by the security of state. The realist idea is challenged when considering the drone strikes as seen in Pakistan and Yemen, where citizens were targeted without targeting the state by the US, and hence even though the state itself was secure, the citizenry wasn’t. Although it might seem the drones themselves threaten the realist definition of security, their usage itself can be guided by realist principles and agree with it completely, as Campbell (2014) points out in his paper discussing Obama administration’s use of target killings using drones and comparing it with a liberal perspective. He concludes that although the administration would publicly hold on to the ideals of liberal international order, in practice the actions and rationale strongly align with the realist ideals.</p><p>As the proliferation of drones would increase and more and more states and non-state actors acquire them, everyone becomes a potential target. Drones also bring up an interesting challenge of non-reciprocation. As Renic (2019) points out in his paper, that wars till now involved platforms, usually manned (barring missiles), that could in turn be targeted back, and hence wars were based on the idea of immediate self-defence by both participants. Drones skew this arrangement by taking away the possibility of reciprocity and turn wars into mere one-sided homicidal events without any possibility of retaliation. Coupled with the expendable nature of drones, and both the anonymity and security of being geographically far away from the theatre of battle lends the aggressor more security than the recipient. When a weapon, touted as the most precise weaponry ever made, can pass through almost every national security grid, the idea of security of population within the states’ border starts being questioned.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*zyCeW5swAUj-Cghf.jpg" /><figcaption>Azeri owned Israeli Harop suicide drone</figcaption></figure><p>A constructivist approach to the problem could be that relationship of aggressor with the sovereign state in which the strikes are being conducted. Even though the US was targeting the Pakistani population within its borders, it was precisely because both the states were allied and the US was doing so with the Pakistani state’s approval, that the security was indeed still maintained for the population. The attack by the US would be supported by the Pakistani state as being against non-state actors that posed threats to not only the US, but also to Pakistan. Hence, the strikes contributed to increasing the security of general populace in the region.</p><h3>The question of Sovereignty</h3><p>If an actor can use drones to pass through a security grid and target a population with impunity, as the US has done in the past, it can essentially project its power in the said region without any serious repercussions. What then happens to the claim of sovereignty by the state in that region?</p><p>The question of a drone strike vis-a-vis the question of sovereignty is an interesting one. The recent 2019 Abqaiq–Khurais attack in Saudi Arabia can provide a great case study. The attack was claimed by Houthi Rebels, due to the Kingdom’s intervention in the Yemeni civil war. Saudi Arabia although blamed the attack on Iran. The attack which utilised swarm drones for the first time in modern history, was on Saudi owned Aramco’s oil processing facilities at Abqaiq–Khurais. The facilities were “the largest crude oil stabilization plant in the world”. The attack caused Saudi oil production to be cut in half temporarily. It was an attack of strategic importance. The response to the attack from Saudi Arabia is what interests us. Iran got off that engagement relatively scot-free, after projecting its power in an area which is irrefutably Saudi Arabia’s. Another example one could look at is the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. Azerbaijan’s decisive usage of drones in the conflict, gained them the upper hand in the war. The one and a half month long fighting stopped with Azerbaijan retaining the control of the territories during the war. Drones used by them had directly affected the sovereignty of Armenia. Drones had evolved from being largely used for targeting HVT (High Value Targets) to now being capable of rivaling standard military equipment like tanks and waging war.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1023/0*u_EyvBYMuUQXrGrL.png" /><figcaption>2019 Abqaiq–Khurais attack</figcaption></figure><p>Drones aren’t limited by geographical distance, the command and control relayed by satellites permit their operation from anywhere in the world. Historically the US has justified drone strikes in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq based on the assumption of the imminent threat posed by the HVTs and their associations. Citing drone strikes as an immediate self-defence measure, the US has, as Kindervater (2016) points out in her paper, effectively expanded the battlefield to the entire world, even where they have no jurisdiction. This prompted what Derek Gregory (Shaw 2013) called the ‘Everywhere war’. States can technically fight everywhere, simultaneously in multiple theatres, that too with relatively cheaper costs than deploying troops on ground.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*fzWpN21ujBcYd9sO" /><figcaption>Iranian drones</figcaption></figure><p>This was in turn aided by the de-facto ownership of almost all the military drones in the early 2000s. Since last decade, this asymmetry has been broken, and a lot of states like Turkey, China, Iran have produced top of the line drones and have shown ability to field them and proliferate them effectively to other states. As more and more war-capable drones are produced and deployed, the idea of sovereignty of contested or even assumed sovereign territories starts being questioned.</p><h3>The question of Identity</h3><p>Shaw (2013) tells the story of a family who were forced to once serve lunch to the Taliban, and later the house was targeted by drone strikes because CIA analysts concluded that the family was ‘affiliated’ with Taliban. The only son of the family was killed in the strike. This anecdote springs up our last question, one that of the identity and its relationship with the new way of waging war. Civilian casualties aren’t a new phenomenon, civilians have always been caught in the crossfire, but in the age of drones the question demands another look. The question of identity springs up with two focal points, identity of not only the recipient of the aggression but also the identity of the aggressor itself. To the aggressor, drones bring up the challenge of the question of the ‘blame’ or ownership. Who’s to be blamed for a human right violation or loss of life by misidentification of a target, like the one mentioned above? Currently the militaries around the world operate manned drones, but the technology of autonomous drones is fast catching up and might soon become the standard across the militaries. The question becomes more pronounced then, when say an algorithm causes a drone to either attack a non-combatant group, or mistakenly acquires allied groups as targets? When the target acquisition moves beyond the ‘Human’ element, who do you blame the attack on? Or say a terrorist attack happens using drones, and multiple groups claim responsibility. With the commercially available drones being as generic as possible, who’s to be blamed for the attack, who’s ownership is genuine? This is an extension of the ‘blame’ question, the identity of the operator/actor, and comes up in the light of recent attacks, and proliferation of drone technology. The 2019 Abqaiq–Khurais attack which was claimed by Houthis, is generally accepted to be Iran’s doing. A realist theory position would agree with the likes of Saudi Arabia and United States in putting the blame entirely on Iran, while a constructive position like that of UK, France etc would put a joint blame on Iran, because even though Houthis claimed the attack and might have executed it, the weapons originated from Iran. The identity of actors thus diverges when we consider situations such as this, which involve non-state actors.</p><p>Surely a more constructive approach regarding the identity of the actors makes sense when considering the threat perception by the states, similar to that with nuclear weapons. As Shaw (2013) mentioned in his paper, a Pakistani Official stated, with respect to the American strikes, that ‘it is the only thing militants fear’. So even though the US, an ally of Pakistan, was projecting power for its goals deep inside Pakistan, since the act was approved by the Pakistani establishment, it wasn’t considered a threat to the state or its sovereignty. And when the relations of Pakistani establishment started going sour in the late 2000s, and early 2010s with the US, the same drone strikes were now termed illegal and became a major point of contention between the two states. There the identity of the operator which was an ally played an important role.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Drones and drone warfare in the 21st century can be described as disruptive at best. The technology has disrupted and has brought in question some of the very fundamental understanding of International Relations theories, as seen throughout history whenever new methods of waging war come up, and it is indeed a new way of waging war.</p><p>The new way to wage war is to do so from very far away, with violence against the aggressor being inherently asymmetrical and non-reciprocal in nature and thus offer another advantage of being cheaper, both financially and in terms of overall human lives. It is a new type of legally backed war, conducted in the name of immediate self-defence, supported by the jurisdiction to conduct extra-territorial strikes. They also offer a relatively cheaper alternative to contest sovereignty of other territories, as Shaw mentions, in an ever expanding ‘everywhere war’, which spreads horizontally over different continents and vertically into Earth’s upper atmosphere. This quality also sets a very dangerous precedent regarding proliferation, as seen by Houthis against Saudi Arabia, which disrupts how we conventionally see security of both citizenry and the state itself.</p><h3>References</h3><p>Campbell, B. (2014). Realist or Liberal?: Theoretical Interpretations of the Obama Administration’s Counterterrorism Strategy. <em>International Studies</em>, 14, 48–48.</p><p>Kindervater, K. H. (2016). Drone strikes, ephemeral sovereignty, and changing conceptions of territory. <em>Territory, Politics, Governance</em>, <em>5(2)</em>, 207–221. doi:10.1080/21622671.2016.1260493</p><p>Renic, N. C. (2019). Justified killing in an age of radically asymmetric warfare. <em>European Journal of International Relations</em>, <em>25</em>(2), 408–430. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066118786776">https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066118786776</a></p><p>Shaw, I. G. (2013). Predator Empire: The Geopolitics of US Drone Warfare. <em>Geopolitics, 18(3)</em>, 536–559, doi: 10.1080/14650045.2012.749241</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=93170f1c7dc" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks/drones-security-sovereignty-and-identities-93170f1c7dc">Drones — Security, Sovereignty and Identities</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/indra-networks">INDRA Networks</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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