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        <title><![CDATA[Lights on Innovation - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Blog series on Energy Innovation — Policy and Regulation. - Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Public Policy Fails]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/why-public-policy-fails-719891913f5a?source=rss----f0bc72654070---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/719891913f5a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[public-policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FSR Energy&Climate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2020 16:47:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-16T12:34:28.845Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Bernardo Mueller, University of Brasilia</p><p><em>The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Florence School of Regulation.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*onWsxRxe5T1KjRHObUYVdA.png" /></figure><p>The public policy fails. It fails often and fails everywhere. From small tasks, such as keeping the streets free of potholes, to massive endeavors such as providing healthcare, it seems that public policy continually comes up short of expectations. In <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1517758019300931?via%3Dihub"><em>Why Public Policies Fail: Policymaking under Complexity</em></a> I discuss the reasons why policies so systematically underperform. The main reasons are probably not those that you imagine.</p><p>Before getting into the determinants of underperformance the article provides three examples to make the point that it is not just the occasional ill-conceived, poorly-planned and shoddily implemented policy that disappoint, but rather that the problem goes beyond inexperience, incompetence and malfeasance. These are examples of policy approaches that have had wide acceptance by experts, academics and society in general, and have been accepted as innovative, smart and rigorous ways to solve problems and get things done. But that, nevertheless, have, more often than not, proved disappointing.</p><p>The first is the idea of microcredit to reduce poverty. It involves small loans to extremely poor people organized in tight-knit groups, who would not otherwise have access to credit. It is conceived to stimulate entrepreneurship by giving the poor a boost towards building human, social and financial capital. The idea was praised by academics, international organizations, governments, NGOs and others as an innovative way to get at one of mankind’s greatest problems. The United Nations declared 2005 as the International Year of Microcredit. It was widely adopted across the world. Yet, when the first policy evaluations came in, the impacts on individuals and communities proved disappointing. <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20140287">Banerjee et al (2015)</a>, for example, found very little evidence of transformative effects. Relative to expectations, microcredit has thus far failed.</p><p>The second example is the approach to managing fish stocks, as well as other resources, through individual transferable quotas (ITQs). Fish stocks across the world have been collapsing in the past decades and traditional policies have failed to avert the impending disaster. ITQs create a market for property rights over fish that would not otherwise exist due to the problem of open access. The right to fish can be traded, which leads to a better allocation of effort and resources, as the least efficient sell their rights to those with lower costs and greater skill. These schemes were enthusiastically embraced by economists as an idea well-rooted in economic theory that leverages the power of markets to provide good incentives and internalize externalities. But here, once again, there was disappointment. ITQ’s have been widely implemented across the world but have had little impact. Evaluations by <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/321/5896/1678">Costello et al (2008)</a> in <em>Science </em>and by <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-2979.2008.00313.x">Chu (2009)</a> in <em>Fish and Fisheries</em>, while finding some modest impact in terms of reducing stock loss, still paint a disappointing picture relative to the expectations that the approach once elicited.</p><p>The third example refers to the surprisingly large share of global economic activity that is concentrated in a small number of mega-projects. These are “large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost US$1 billion or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of people” (<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261411676_What_You_Should_Know_About_Megaprojects_and_Why_An_Overview">Flyvbjerg</a>, 2014 , p. 6). <a href="https://www.visualcapitalist.com/worlds-largest-megaprojects/">Examples of mega-projects</a> are the International Space Station (estimated cost US $ 150 billion), Dubailand (an amusement park in Dubai, US $ 64 billion), and the Hong-Kong-Macau bridge (US $ 10.6 billion). Spending on mega-projects makes up 8% of world GDP and is growing. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261411676_What_You_Should_Know_About_Megaprojects_and_Why_An_Overview">Flyvbjerg</a> (2014: 11) analyzed all mega-project to date in order to ascertain how well such a large part of the world’s economic resources are being used:</p><p>Success in megaproject management is typically defined as projects being delivered on budget, time, and benefits. If, as the evidence indicates, approximately one out of ten megaprojects is on budget, one out of ten is on schedule, and one out of ten is on benefits, then approximately one in a thousand projects is a success, defined as on target for all three. Even if the numbers were wrong by a factor two — so that two, instead of one, out of ten projects were on target for cost, schedule, and benefits, respectively — the success rate would still be dismal, now eight in a thousand.</p><p>These are just three examples, but the claim that public policies fail is more general. A glance at today’s newspaper should make the point. The question is: why do public policies fail so ubiquitously?</p><h3><strong>Why do public policies fail?</strong></h3><p>Part of the explanation for why public polices so often, leading to inefficiency, disappointment and waste, is obvious. All phases of making public policy, conception, projection, implementation and operation, are permeated by incompetence, ignorance, corruption, excessive optimism, self-interest and transaction costs. They are hard to do and full of perverse incentives. However, the central argument here is that even if we manage to resolve or drastically mitigate all of these problems, it still remains the case that projects and policies will largely fail. More data and information, better governance, better experts, more transparency, nobler public spirit and political will, checks and balances, etc. can usually improve things. But these eventually run into decreasing returns and there always remains an irreducible level of failure that is impervious to even the best attempts at getting things right.</p><p>This irreducibility comes from the complex system nature of most public policies and the environments in which they operate. Complex systems are characterized by the interaction of many, diverse, agents, leading to the emergence of system-wide phenomena that are not designed or intended by any of the parts. The system is different from the sum of the parts. In these situations, the traditional approach by economists and public policy-makers to improve public policy is not appropriate. The traditional approach is linear, reductionist, Gaussian, static, ergodic (it assumes that the future will be the same as the past) and largely ignores the interactions that are the source of the problem. Decision theory, for example, which is one of the cornerstones of these approaches, requires comparing the costs and benefits of all situations that may occur, taking into account the probabilities of each state in the world. But in a complex system, not only is it not known what will happen, but it is not known what can possibly happen.</p><h3><strong>How to deal with public policies in complex domains?</strong></h3><p>Given the uselessness of much of our knowledge to improve the performance of public policies, what can be done? Could new information technologies like Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, Machine Learning, blockchain, neural networks, in addition to who knows what will emerge in the future, be the solution? Many of these techniques and processes have characteristics that make them good tools for dealing with complex systems. In “<a href="https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S1517758019300931?token=B3ACD777D28EA2D232400E5F24462E7A3B2EE3B48A0D422E8284D140E4AFD5C3F6B07E0921607B0416E29482C21E5B85"><em>Why Public Policies Fail</em></a>” I describe some modern approaches that seem promising to deal with this problem because they do not need to forecast or control the system. However, my conclusion there is that even if these techniques and instruments are able to improve our ability to create, implement and manage public policies, we never have the level of control and predictive ability that the traditional approach supposes to be possible. Even with more appropriate approaches to complex systems, there are limits to what can be achieved. In the end, it will be necessary to adopt a posture of greater epistemological modesty and recognize our limitations, admitting that the level of control and agency that we usually aim for cannot be achieved.</p><p>This does not mean that there is nothing that can be done. Complex systems can be influenced and swayed to avoid some types of results and induce others, even if it is not possible to impose finer tuning. The important thing is to recognize the nature of a complex system when dealing with one, and to use the interventions proper for a system with such characteristics, which sometimes can be simply doing nothing.</p><h3><strong>Leap in the dark or epistemological humility?</strong></h3><p>In the 1960s Albert Hirschman noticed a pattern in several projects that he visited in different countries on his travels as a development economist. Many countries embarked on large and ambitious projects, such as dams or new industries, with a naive optimism that did not see the complexity and difficulty inherent in the undertaking. He coined the expression “<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/06/24/the-gift-of-doubt">Hiding Hand Principal</a>” to refer, in an allusion to Adam Smith, to this tendency for policymakers and project managers to underestimate the level of uncertainties and complications inherent in the project they had taken on (<a href="https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198787310.001.0001/acprof-9780198787310-chapter-4">Hirschman</a>, 1967). According to him, if this cold reality were not masked by the simplistic optimism of the actors, few projects would be attempted. And although the projects often did not achieve their goals, they did many times put the country to an unanticipated situation that allowed flashes of creativity to adapt the project for other purposes that proved viable along the journey and sometimes even turned out to be better than the original idea.</p><p>Hirschman’s attitude matches in part with the argument presented here. Although he did not use complex systems theory in his analysis, the idea that there is fundamental uncertainty behind public projects and policies is similar. However, the policy recommendation is quite different. While Hirschman reacts to the impossibility of predicting the future and controlling a complex system by suggesting a leap into the dark with the hope that in the end everything will work out, I am suggesting to be more realistic with what can be achieved and adapt the scope and nature of the intervention to this reality, even if it means that we cannot do everything we would like to do.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=719891913f5a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/why-public-policy-fails-719891913f5a">Why Public Policy Fails</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation">Lights on Innovation</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why should be thinking about disruptions in the energy sector?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/why-should-be-thinking-about-disruptions-in-the-energy-sector-d2c0d3ece106?source=rss----f0bc72654070---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d2c0d3ece106</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FSR Energy&Climate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Feb 2020 14:18:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-26T14:18:08.889Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by Michelle Hallack and David Lopez</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Dt_qm4hDL5lPFkGemuIljQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The exercise of thinking about scenarios and disruptions in the energy sector is not a new exercise. How should we look at the interaction of public policies and technological trajectories when the trajectories are not known?</p><p>Shell produces comprehensive scenarios since 1970. A well-functioning energy industry depends on long term investments, and for that, it is important to think about how demand (culture, economics, industrial changes) and policies will evolve. Some would say that in the 70’s one of the main variables were the oil shocks, in the 80’s the political transformation associated with the decline of Soviet Union, in the 90’s the rise of environmental concerns (the restrictions for CO2 emissions), in the 2000’s the dynamics of recessions (Shell, 2013). From the policy side, one can say that we had two important movements in the industry organization, associated with technology transformation, but mainly driven by political trends: (1) the post-war trend associated with centralization of the power systems in a vertically integrated monopoly, often a public utility strongly associated with the increasing scale economy of electricity generation (for instance, large hydro, coal and nuclear plants), (2) after the 80’s there is a liberalization movement, with increasing introduction of competition, smaller but still utility-scale technologies such as CCGTs, Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (Percebois and Hassen, 2017).</p><p><strong>We are probably on the verge of a new transformation in the energy industry, even if it is not clear exactly its dimension and the possible paths that it might follow. </strong>Either social and political trends are interconnected with this transformation, the current energy industry uncertainty is strongly associated with what will be the technological path that the power industry will follow. In this context, the innovation dynamic becomes central.</p><p>Decentralized energy through rooftop generation is undeniable, and it will change the functioning of the power system. See for instance Mejdalani et al (2018) for an example of the recent exponential increase of PV solar generation and some of the potential in LAC. Nevertheless, this transformation in the power system may require changes in policies and regulation. Especially, two regulatory challenges emerge from it:<strong> cost allocation problem and disruption potential.</strong></p><p>The first one is straight forward and has been broadly discussed in the literature, the cost allocation problem assumes that the power flows will be bi-direction and users will use the system as a back-up. A consequence of it is an urgent change in the way to price the network, especially for many countries where the tariffs are volumetric and have no location nor time signals. The fixed costs associated with the system should be allocated through fixed charges. The commonly held idea that the grid and energy were necessarily complementary products may lead to perverse incentives and flourish the famous utilities’ death spiral. Under these circumstances, there is a general call to decrease cross-subsidies in the tariff structure.</p><p>This trend has also a technological and disruptive counterpart. New technologies decrease the measurement costs of energy consumption and production, and thus decreases the costs of implementing locational and time signals, in other words it is less expensive to allocate better the costs to users. However, it may raise some income distribution problems, which may not be minor, as we are seeing in many countries’ social demonstrations against programs increasing tariffs or changing tariffs structures. This kind of policies needs to be carefully considered, explained, negotiated and compensated. The tricky part here, is that, the costs of energy can strongly impact not just the expenditure of low-income families (usually the focus group for compensation policies) but also the middle-income population. In the same group of pricing discussion and logic, there are other challenges brought by the implementation of new technologies, such as how to price electrical vehicles charge stations? Or how to price the smart metering services and how to allocate costs? (It is just two of several pricing transformations will be seeing).</p><p><strong>Pricing adaptation is an important challenge and policy maker and regulators will need to tackle it.</strong> <strong>However, is this stream of reasoning enough to tackle the potential transformation of new technologies in the power sector? Is it the only (or main) challenge for policy makers? </strong>If the transformation of the technology is strong enough to provoke a disruption in the industry organization, the answer is no. Price should not be the only key variable to trace a public policy strategy for the future. The coordination problem in the new emerging industry is much larger than just prices, it should contemplate the new services specificities and players in the field. How would then interact? What will be the new services? What are the economic characteristics of the new services? In this context, the main regulatory variable here is to prepare institutions to adapt regulation while keeping credibility and predictability (see for instance Vazquez and Hallack, 2018 and Vazquez et al 2017).</p><p>The big problem of disruptions is that even if we do not know what will happen, we know that it will not keep the previous trends. Transformations like the one caused by cell phone for telecommunication industry or streaming for the music industry are just a couple of industry disruptions examples. Today, the cost of off-grid solutions is still huge if compared with an integrated system, and it is just efficient to some marginal cases (access to isolated communities for instance). Moreover, imagine the consumer will trade energy, or even say that their wash machine will trade energy seems too awkward. And it will not happen if there is no disruption, if the costs have a linear format, and if technology does not pass to the tip point of becoming exponential. But, just for fun, let’s imagine if the cost of the battery shut down (lithium, or even some kind of hydrogen), let’s imagine the efficiency of the PV solar panels raise, or even the technologies associated with building constructions (as painting, roof and construction material can evolve to cheaply include power generation), let’s imagine that your Alexa (or another virtual assistant) is able to communicate with other Alexas in the neighbourhood and optimize the wash machines schedule. This would not just change the way to price the system, but it would question the system. How far are we? Is it worth to think about it?</p><p>Considering these disruptions are costly, because it demands policymakers and regulators to think about scenarios (even with low probability), promote regulatory impact assessment the potential under multiple scenarios and promote a dynamic of periodic <em>ex-post</em> evaluation. It means to empower regulators with a new set of tools to allow adaptation while keeping credibility and predictability. Not considering it and keeping the <em>status quo </em>of the regulatory tools, however, can become also largely costly if unexpected innovation comes. It can generate technology and organization lock-in and stranded assets.</p><p>Moreover, these choices may generate a perverse logic for developing countries. Countries with a lower level of innovation, where there is lower lobby from innovative firms to push transformation in regulation and policy, may evaluate that the cost for an institutional preparation for a potential disruption too high, as it seems too far away. It means that for these countries the disruption costs would be probably higher. The countries with a higher level of innovation (often the more developed countries) usually have more players interested in adaptation, it included adapting to rules and policies. As a consequence, it is expected lower disruption costs. In other words, probably the countries with higher benefits for innovation will have also lower adaptation costs, as it will be smoother. The countries with lower innovation will probably have higher adaptation costs.</p><p>This is the result of thoughts and discussion among the authors; thus it is their own responsibility. It does not reflect any form of institutional view or perspective.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d2c0d3ece106" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/why-should-be-thinking-about-disruptions-in-the-energy-sector-d2c0d3ece106">Why should be thinking about disruptions in the energy sector?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation">Lights on Innovation</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Agent-based models as tools to design coherent energy policies in a context of strong uncertainty]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/agent-based-models-as-tools-to-design-coherent-energy-policies-in-a-context-of-strong-uncertainty-d4848d5daa9b?source=rss----f0bc72654070---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d4848d5daa9b</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FSR Energy&Climate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Feb 2020 14:15:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-25T16:28:58.583Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*niqzkr1IOzfegXdB5FV1BQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>by Miguel Vazquez and Gustavo Andreão</p><p><strong>In this article, we will discuss possible ways to operationalize the study of energy policies within fundamentally uncertain environments.</strong> To that end, our standpoint is Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework. <strong>In this context, our focus is on understanding the relationship between policy-makers’ beliefs (their simplified interpretations of reality) and policy results.</strong> More specifically, we aim at understanding the relationship between policy decision-making (and its adaptation over time) and technology diffusion.</p><p>The technological side of energy transitions builds on renewable energy sources (RES). RES are characterized, from the technological development point of view, by an increasing number of patent applications. Solar PV encompasses the largest number of patent applications among RES, being appropriate for both utility-scale and distributed generation, with low O&amp;M costs and progressively lower costs overall. Wind turbines industry is a mature industry, with a significant number of local and global players worldwide. Biomass is closer in electricity generation to traditional fossil-based power plants, but it also accounts for significant spill-overs to biotechnology and bioenergy.</p><p>A fundamental element of policies supporting RES is the financing dimension of those projects, so we aim to analyze the interactions between banks (public and private), energy providers, technology providers, energy users and policy makers. This is a typical application of Complex Adaptive Systems modelling. In particular, we are looking at the complex system made of policies and the technological trajectories interaction, so we set up an agent-based model (ABM) because ABMs are a useful analytic tool for the analysis of non-linear processes, e.g. technology, innovation and environment. In this sense, our analysis may capture that co-evolutionary process without taking one the processes as given: they evolve following certain conditions, although they affect each other, are affected by the context and in turn affect their context. Moreover, we may represent within this model how deliberate changes in parts of the institutional or technological levels affect the system as a whole.</p><p><strong>Such ABM aims to emphasize feedbacks between agents’ decisions and industry outcomes, which in turn create non-linear, heavily uncertain dynamics</strong>. Agents can choose between actions that reinforce the current <em>status-quo</em> or challenge the <em>status quo</em> in force. The model would work like this. We represent five cash-flow support policies: Feed-in tariffs, feed-in premium, quotas, long-term PPAs and carbon tax. Policy makers define the rules of support policies, whereas public and private banks define the rules for agents to access their funds, i.e., the two agents define the rules for accessing cash flow and financing incentives respectively. Energy providers make investment decisions. Banks decide their propensity to financing fossil-fuel, wind, solar PV or biomass technology individually, with development banks having more than the base probability besides lower interest rates and more amortization time. Technology providers may innovate based on the more their individual technology is used. Moreover, technology providers may also imitate competitors. Besides, there are three financing scenarios: with focus on public financing, with focus on private financing, and with public banks acting as a catalyst for the entry of private financing.</p><p>We are analyzing coherence between beliefs (simplified models used to represent the environment) and results; more specifically the focus is on coherence between policies and technology diffusion. <strong>The ABM’s focus, in this case, is to understand network creation between banks, energy providers and technology providers</strong>. Banks finance the acquisition of generation technology and the use of a specific technology prompts innovation, therefore ultimately banks are financing innovation. To that end, we may use a multiplex network with each layer being comprised of a certain RES technology. In this context, we would observe and analyze the evolution of different network configurations in relation to each source. For example, we may compare the innovative activity and technology diffusion of solar PV to fossil in relation to a carbon-tax only scenario and a FiT scenario. Another example would be to assess the level of support that distributed solar PV would need in order to become a locked-in technology displacing traditional energy providers, as well as to analyze the changes in the network that would come from such change.</p><p>The bottom line of this article is to show the need for modelling tools that capture the dynamics of a Complex Adaptive System. <strong>One of the key messages of this exercise is that relatively simple rules (energy policies) can create extremely complex, non-linear dynamics</strong>. This, in turn, means that market participants will react to those relatively simple rules in non-foreseeable manners. Consequently, the strategy to understand the relationship between policies and innovative activities should be more related to understanding the dynamics of the system, and not so much to understanding isolated individual behaviour. Our proposal would be to understand the dynamics of the network made up by industry relationships. We believe that this is a very compact representation of the interaction among the various stakeholders’ beliefs. In that sense, <strong>we analyze the coherence between policy makers’ beliefs and the beliefs of other agents that are necessary for certain technology pathways to occur</strong>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d4848d5daa9b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/agent-based-models-as-tools-to-design-coherent-energy-policies-in-a-context-of-strong-uncertainty-d4848d5daa9b">Agent-based models as tools to design coherent energy policies in a context of strong uncertainty</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation">Lights on Innovation</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How should we look at the interaction of public policies and technological trajectories]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/how-should-we-look-at-the-interaction-of-public-policies-and-technological-trajectories-4674f2f3328?source=rss----f0bc72654070---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4674f2f3328</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FSR Energy&Climate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Feb 2020 17:16:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-25T16:26:11.182Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>(When the trajectories are not known?)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eI81jv5Ll4B12P1MogRTmA.jpeg" /></figure><h3>The energy transitions and the Internet industry: mapping the co-evolution</h3><p>by Miguel Vazquez and Vinicius Manhaes</p><p>Energy industries are considering with increasing interest the idea of digital energy market places. Although definitions are still in a fluid state, it is a reasonable consensus that energy transitions are going to rely considerably on the Internet of Things. So<strong>, from energy industries, we are dependent on the technological developments in the internet industry and the needs of adapting energy regulation.</strong></p><p>But the telecommunication industries rely also heavily on regulation to produce efficient results. Consequently, <strong>regulation of telecommunication industries are going to define the internet of the future, and the internet of the future is going to define the energy systems of the future.</strong> To put forward a specific example: net neutrality rules have an influence on the development of the internet, which in turn defines the possible uses in the energy sector. But the contrary is also true: the definition of uses in the energy sector may define the needs of the future internet, and hence condition the implementation of net neutrality rules.</p><p>Net neutrality emerged in the 2000s decade as an important information policy issue, drawing the attention of the Internet Service Providers, Content Providers, the academic community, policy makers, and more recently also the civil society. The net neutrality debate arose in response to fears that Internet Service Providers could use their monopolistic standing to try to extract more consumer surplus by restricting and/or tiering the access to the Internet; therefore, creating market failures and inefficiencies. This situation was also perceived as a threat both to the free and open Internet and to equal access to information. Most of these fears were the fruit of multiple lawsuits between ISPs and CPs in the USA throughout the 2000s decade.</p><p>On the other hand, over the last decade, the Internet industry was reshaped main by the introduction of hardware innovations such as mobile Internet (3G and 4G technologies), and smartphones; while the horizon is already pointing to the 5G and Internet of Things (IoT) technologies, which are already considered at centre stage in energy transitions.</p><p>Most of these hardware innovations are being developed by the same firms (Qualcomm, Samsung, LG, Huawei, etc.). The hardware firms develop and sell hardware such as modems, smartphones (or only the microchip) to ISPs and Internet users. Internet Service Providers need to buy equipment from hardware firms to build, expand or improve their infrastructure so they can sell internet access to Internet users and Content Providers. While the Content Providers develop Internet content to sell it, directly or indirectly (advertising), to the internet users.</p><p>In that sense, our concern is understanding how regulatory frameworks should coevolve with industrial dynamics. While net neutrality proved to be an efficient rule in an environment where many small CPs needed to be protected from a natural monopolistic position of the ISP, this situation changed and the relationship between ISPs, CPs and Hardware Firms is becoming ever more intertwined. Nowadays the content provision market is much more of an oligopoly controlled by powerful companies such as Google, Microsoft, Netflix, Facebook, etc. than it was in the past. These CP firms, however, depend on new hardware technologies and stable Internet provision to be able to develop new content and services. On the other hand, hardware firms such as Qualcomm, Samsung, Apple, Huawei, LG, show clear incentives to continue developing new technologies to sell either to the ISPs and Internet users.</p><p>It is possible to perceive a trend followed by the hardware companies to introduce new devices with access to the Internet, as soon as the current dominant device market matures. The laptop boom can be credited to the introduction of the home wireless Internet, while the smartphones would probably not have succeeded if there was no 3G or 4G Internet available. The 5G push is being directly connected with the Internet of Things (IoT) advances too. Even though it is not possible to predict how the 5G will impact the industry at the moment, it is pretty clear to perceive the intention of these hardware firms to offer an entire new portfolio of products either for the ISPs (5G routers and modems) and for end-users alike (smartphones, laptops, and other electronics with access to 5G). Note that among the main users of these products will be probably energy systems.</p><p>Consequently, this is important to be understood because it can affect the ISP strategies. If the hardware firms develop and advertise new technologies at a very fast pace, the ISP may be pressured to make new investments either in expanding the infrastructure to accommodate higher demand or in adopting new technologies (such as the 5G). This can lead to increased costs if the rate of investment is faster than the time needed to amortize it and can also lead to congestion problems. On the other hand, the introduction of new devices with Internet access may present new possibilities of price discrimination, which can lead to increasing prices for the Internet user. Moreover, it is not clear how much monopoly power the ISP may wield in this situation since Internet users are becoming ever more dependent of the ISPs, but the ISPs are also becoming more dependent of the CPs and Hardware Firms.</p><p><strong>Given this scenario, we point out that this new industrial dynamics requires a new regulatory framework, therefore the analyses should be broader than a search for the short-term efficiency effects of net neutrality.</strong> It should analyze the new problems posed by these new technologies and search for design mechanisms that would help solving them. And this includes looking simultaneously at the energy and telecommunication industries (another sector coupling).</p><p><strong>From the energy industries’ viewpoint, rules in principle not very related to them (such as net neutrality) have a relevant impact on the development of hardware innovations that are required for energy transitions using the Internet of Things.</strong> Understanding internet technological trajectories is an important piece of the analysis of energy transitions, and those trajectories are not independent of the rules governing telecommunication markets.</p><p><strong>As pointed out by Elinor Ostrom, an institutional analyst should evaluate the outcomes that are being achieved as well as the likely set of outcomes that could be achieved under alternative institutional arrangements.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4674f2f3328" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/how-should-we-look-at-the-interaction-of-public-policies-and-technological-trajectories-4674f2f3328">How should we look at the interaction of public policies and technological trajectories</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation">Lights on Innovation</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Blockchain and smart contracts]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/blockchain-and-smart-contracts-517b7ba50eee?source=rss----f0bc72654070---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/517b7ba50eee</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FSR Energy&Climate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Jul 2019 15:24:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-25T13:42:30.010Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1fxt06w9Dt5lZE6DwyeV_g.png" /></figure><p>by Miguel Vazquez</p><h4>One of the central ideas that come from most energy transition conversations is the concept of the innovation landscape.</h4><p>At the same time, there is a point that is considerably less discussed: what is the vehicle to travel such a landscape?</p><p>The main objective of this article is putting together the policy discussion on digitalization and the technical discussion on IoT. To do that, we pursue the strategy of studying smart transactions (contracts). I will discuss a particularly important tool, in my view, to link digital technologies and digital transactions: the connection between distributed ledgers (say blockchain) and smart contracts. This is useful because, as we know from Institutional Economics, we can think of a broad economic perspective and talk about transactions instead of just contracts.</p><p>The difference I wanted to highlight is that innovation (new technologies) may just increase the efficiency of the system, or it may radically transform it. To transform the industry, innovation needs to change the way the industry is organized and for that, it should transform the way players (consumers, prosumers, services provides) interact. An actual transition to an industry driven by consumers’ decision making should travel the path from smart technologies (which any utility may implement by themselves to manage their assets) to smart transactions (all players using technology to improve the coordination of the industry).</p><p>In that context, let me state firstly the question I am trying to deal with:</p><h4>Are smart contracts substituting all traditional contracts?</h4><p>This question has two parts, and both are important for my reasoning: I<strong>s that substitution possible? Is that substitution efficient?</strong></p><p>Most of what it is discussed nowadays has to do with the first question: distributed ledgers are a new technology that allows registering P2P trade in a much cheaper manner (that is, decentralized trading becomes cheaper). In that context, the main challenges are related to the data side of the question: <strong>how to deal with either a large number of transactions or a large number of payments.</strong></p><p>But what I want to discuss today is the second part of the question, do we want all trade decentralized? In that sense, let me note a very important characteristic of <strong>the kind of contract we find today in energy markets: they are not complete contracts</strong>. That is, we do not have contracts that specify a response for every contingency that may happen in the future. This difficulty in developing complete contracts account for a large portion of transaction costs. And one very efficient way of dealing with these costs is centralization. So one may wonder: will DLT change the nature of transaction costs? I will argue that the fact that we encode contractual responses will not make the associated contingencies easier to foresee. Differently put, encoding will not change the elementary purpose of a contract: to deal with conflict.</p><p><strong>In order to understand the question, let me think first about financial markets. </strong>My aim is to get some insights and identify challenges associated with certain contracts and see how it can help us to understand smart contracts in energy markets. In order to understand better what may be the meaning of decentralized trade, consider the case with more potential for decentralization: financial derivatives. Simply put, derivatives are instruments with an income stream that depends on a “contingency”. Very often, this contingency is a price (as in futures, options, etc). Sometimes, contingencies are events. Think of weather derivatives contingent on snowfall. Craig Pirrong puts forward an interesting case example. The case of credit default swaps includes both of these kinds of contingency: income streams depend on a price (the price of defaulted debt) and an “event” (bankruptcy). Let me analyze both of them, because both may have lessons for energy smart contracts.</p><p><strong>The price contingency is difficult because markets for corporate debt are illiquid, and it has been typical the use of auctions to define such price</strong>. For energy markets, this is clearly the case, as many of the efforts to implementing continuous trading have been substituted lately by specific auctions. This may point at a need of creating specific mechanisms to define the underlying price trigger (as an auction). This does not mean that after the price is created it is not possible to use it for other smart contracts.</p><p><strong>But let me turn to the most challenging issues in my view. </strong>The bankruptcy claim is difficult because defining the event is not straightforward. In order to understand the challenges, consider this: the “bankruptcy event” may be engineered in order to trigger payments. Without describing this in detail (it was an issue in the credit default swap market), the basic idea is that investment firms may have been creating artificial defaults by not paying bonds even when they were not in financially stressed situations. With that strategy, they have been creating “failure to pay” situations, thus triggering payments from credit default swaps. For our purposes, the most interesting part of this case is that, because of this alleged manipulation, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association proposed that failure to pay a bond should not trigger payment from a CDS. That is, the ISDA, which is the industrial organization governing non-standard products, proposed that “there must be a causal link between the non-payment and the deterioration in the creditworthiness or financial condition of the reference entity”.</p><p><strong>From the smart contract perspective, there is an interesting lesson to be learned. </strong>There is an inherent difficulty associated with trying to encode “a causal link between the non-payment and the deterioration in the creditworthiness or financial condition of the reference entity”. Doing it automatically may be highly inefficient because this kind of complex contingency (or “trigger”) depends on the interpretation of the context. They need a powerful governance structure (as the ISDA in this case).</p><p><strong>One would argue that this kind of complex trigger may be pervasive in energy industries</strong>. It may be useful to remember the case of the reliability adders in the original GB pool, which motivated the reform of the GB market. The pool was based on very complex payments rules (associated with income streams when bids were cleared). They included additional payments triggered when plants were available for dispatch. As the calculations were done day-ahead, plants declared themselves unavailable day-ahead, and then re-declared available within a day to trigger the now higher payment. As we can observe, this is a very similar strategy as the CDS case commented above. Similarly, the governance structure of the GB market (in this case the regulator) intervened to reduce the incentives to pursue that strategy. Again, the automatization of this “trigger” was not always deemed the most efficient way of organization. For instance, the GB reform in the 2000s travelled down an almost opposite path.</p><p><strong>So, when we talk about decentralization, we need to understand all the things a contract do</strong>. Contracts are registers for trade, ok, but what else? Depending on whether those other functions of a contract are relevant, decentralization would be a more or less strong force.</p><p><strong>Differently put, even if the trading is centralized through a platform, complex contingent claims, that by definition cannot be automated, may represent better risk allocation mechanisms</strong>. And of course, the definition of the governance structure is highly relevant. As we have observed in financial markets, relying on private organizations for performing governance functions may result in fragile systems. Consequently, even for those simpler claims that can be automated and traded through a platform, the governance of the platform must be looked at carefully.</p><p>Interested in the topic?</p><p>Learn more about our Innovation Area at the Florence School of Regulation: <a href="https://fsr.eui.eu/energy-innovation/">https://fsr.eui.eu/energy-innovation/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=517b7ba50eee" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/blockchain-and-smart-contracts-517b7ba50eee">Blockchain and smart contracts</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation">Lights on Innovation</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Renewable energy investment risks are dynamic]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/renewable-energy-investment-risks-are-dynamic-ef48a2118d95?source=rss----f0bc72654070---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ef48a2118d95</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FSR Energy&Climate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jan 2019 15:57:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-28T16:00:09.529Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-3BuvOJ3x1bbm9K2poY4bA.png" /></figure><p><em>by Florian Egli (ETH Zurich)</em></p><p><em>Florence is a Mecca for foodies. When I enter a restaurant in Florence, I can be sure they offer some of my favourite Italian dishes. Moreover, they may also feature less known specialities, such as the </em><a href="https://en.julskitchen.com/first-course/tuscan-panzanella-tomato-bread-salad"><em>Panzanella</em></a><em> — a Tuscan bread salad. </em><strong><em>The choice I make, my well-known favourite or a surprising speciality, reveals something about my risk preferences.</em></strong><em> As a risk taker, I may go for the surprise, potentially offering a higher reward too; as a risk-averse person, I may stick to my favourite.</em></p><p>Investors weigh options similarly. The literature has established a <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/university/concepts/concepts1.asp">strong correlation between risk and return</a> (i.e., reward). For riskier investments, investors seek compensation in higher expected returns. Consequently, public policies that lower risks are particularly successful in attracting investment (cf. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.11.098">this review paper</a>) because they lower the financing cost of a project. This finding is particularly important in the case of renewable energies because private markets may not deliver deployment levels that the society would demand to avoid dangerous levels of climate change.</p><p>In an upcoming paper, I investigate the dynamic changes in risks for renewable energy investments over time (<a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1p9gHtwmX0KQLzbZwgoLJ_MXr1saw5BrJ/view">slides here</a>). <strong>Strikingly, the research community knows a lot about investment risks in different contexts and for different technologies, but we know very little about how and why risks change</strong>. I use interviews with leading onshore wind and solar PV investors in Germany, Italy and the UK to show that there are five major investment risks. Of those five, technology risk and price risk changed most between 2009 and 2017.</p><p>Technology risk, i.e. the risk due to the technology’s novelty and unpredictability, used to be the most important risk in 2009 before its importance declined rapidly until 2017. Why did this happen? Investors were able to use their experience. They had access to performance data, they could rely on trusted partners (from developers to law firms) and, with time, they were able to build the in-house expertise required to evaluate those projects (especially as the technologies were new to most large investors).</p><p>Price risk, on the other hand, i.e. the exposure to revenue volatility, was one of the least considered risks in 2009 only to become the most important one in 2017. This change is mainly due to European policymakers discussing the phase-out of fixed renewable energy remuneration schemes (e.g., <a href="https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag_2018.pdf?file=1">Germany</a> or <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmenvaud/1450/1450.pdf">the UK</a>), which in turn means that investors have to factor in (uncertain) electricity prices over the next 20–30 years. Predictions of these prices hinge on assumptions about grid expansions, the use of electric vehicles and many more developments that are uncertain.</p><p>Besides these changes in risk types, overall investment risks in onshore wind and solar PV declined drastically. This is reflected in very low debt margins (i.e., the technology-specific premium a bank requires) in the range of 100 to 110 basis points for solar PV and onshore wind respectively. In fact, in a <a href="https://t.co/UR98508EsI">recent study on the German market</a>, we find that debt margins decrease along an ‘experience path’ similar to technology learning (e.g., approx. 11% reduction for every doubling of cumulative global investment).</p><p><strong>If investment risks are <em>dynamic</em>, reflect experience levels and respond to policy, more work is needed to understand why and by how much investors change their risk perception.</strong> To come back to the start, if I lived in Florence for a while, getting to know the local kitchen, I could learn from my experience and judge the menu better — potentially leading to less risk aversion. Whether and to what extent this happens in energy finance and hence allows for policy support to decline without hampering the deployment of renewable energies, today remains unknown. Improving this understanding is crucial to judge the potential effects of phasing out renewable energy support policies.</p><p><strong><em>Lights on Innovation</em> is the new blog series by the Energy Innovation area of the Florence School of Regulation (FSR)</strong></p><h3>Learn more about FSR Energy Innovation</h3><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ef48a2118d95" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/renewable-energy-investment-risks-are-dynamic-ef48a2118d95">Renewable energy investment risks are dynamic</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation">Lights on Innovation</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Regulating innovation and technology]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/regulating-innovation-and-technology-b00e31b700ec?source=rss----f0bc72654070---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b00e31b700ec</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FSR Energy&Climate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jan 2019 13:44:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-21T13:47:56.258Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cnghKWYHU_GMxdGin93oYA.png" /></figure><h4><strong>in pursuit of EU’s energy goals for 2030</strong></h4><p>by <strong><em>Gokce Mete</em></strong><em>, Research Fellow, University of Dundee</em></p><p><strong><em>Today, the most visible aspect of energy law is climate change.</em></strong></p><p><a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement">The Paris Agreement</a> prompts radical innovations to achieve the energy transition. As a consequence, technological, policy, regulatory and legal innovation becomes ever more important for economic prosperity. Indeed, the emergence of disruptive technologies needs to be guided by policies that facilitate a structural change and smooth out the process.</p><p><strong><em>The technology and regulation interface is a two-way street.</em></strong></p><p>The interface between technological innovation and regulation is mutual. Regulation directly affects the character of innovation setting the direction of travel for new technologies and services. At the same time, technological and service innovations have significant (often retrospective) impacts on regulation, necessitating adaptation to change.</p><p><strong><em>Energy law in the EU is already responding to the demands of technology.</em></strong></p><p>In 2018, the EU countries have agreed on a new 2030 Framework, based on the ‘<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/clean-energy-all-europeans">Clean Energy for All</a>’ legislative package which proposed a new set of legislation to take the climate change agenda a step further post-2020 and to place gradual targets for the reduction of GHG emissions up to 2050. The 2030 strategy sends a strong signal to the market, encouraging private investment in new and improved low-carbon technologies. Another landmark document that saw the light of day in 2018 is the Commission’s strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate-neutral economy by 2050. This set of legislative and policy measures is expected to have a transformative effect on all segments of the energy value chain.</p><p><strong><em>The Clean Energy Package and Energy Union objectives are headed in the right direction.</em></strong></p><p>The overarching aim of the Commission’s recent legislative package is twofold: to empower the European consumers putting them at the centre of market design, while at the same time, to retain the benefits of and strengthen integrated wholesale energy markets in Europe.</p><p><strong><em>Digital technologies play an increasingly important role in the energy sector both on the software and the hardware level.</em></strong></p><p>The Clean Energy Package, along with the <a href="https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/064a025d-0703-11e8-b8f5-01aa75ed71a1">European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET Plan)</a>, already allow us to paint a picture of future transformation in the energy sector. That said, there is more to come. A new policy frontier that will be developed further is about bringing together the Energy Union and Digital Single Market strategies. The merging of the two strategies could facilitate opening more avenues for digitalisation of the energy sector, both on the hardware (infrastructure) and the software (regulation and design of products and services) level. It is expected to boost synergies and exchanges of good practices between the energy and the telecoms industries.</p><p><strong><em>The energy sector to become increasingly more exposed to cybersecurity threats.</em></strong></p><p>Digitalisation of the sector comes with a number of opportunities and equally, a number of challenges. The increasing pace and scale of digital innovation would require new solutions to ensure cybersecurity, protecting the systems from information theft, blackouts and many more threats to system reliability. With the adoption of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.194.01.0001.01.ENG&amp;toc=OJ:L:2016:194:TOC">Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems</a> and the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32016R0679">General Data Protection Regulation</a>, the EU with its Member States is forming the basis for relevant cybersecurity provisions. The Clean Energy Package also acknowledges the importance of cyber security for the energy sector. It proposes the adoption of measures to prevent and mitigate the risks identified as well as the adaption of technical rules for electricity (i.e. a Network Code) on cyber-security.</p><p><strong><em>As the energy landscape is expected to be transforming at an increasingly fast pace, the bar for quality of regulatory changes is being set quite high.</em></strong></p><p>Regulators and policymakers would need to be able to calibrate new interventions in a way that enable innovation, facilitating consumer empowerment, and at the same time, allow retaining the benefits of the current market design.</p><p><a href="http://fsr.eui.eu/energy-innovation/">Learn more about FSR Energy Innovation</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b00e31b700ec" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/regulating-innovation-and-technology-b00e31b700ec">Regulating innovation and technology</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation">Lights on Innovation</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[FSR Energy Innovation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/fsr-energy-innovation-ab5e1ea57a0c?source=rss----f0bc72654070---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ab5e1ea57a0c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FSR Energy&Climate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Nov 2018 08:53:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-11-27T10:08:28.144Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/791/1*s_6y6Oa7xKw4LyvAFrqykw.png" /></figure><p>The innovation wave of the last years adds a new dimension to shape the evolution of the electricity industry: innovation policies. Transitions imply disruptive innovations and should be guided by policies that facilitate structural change and smooth out the process. The research of the <a href="http://fsr.eui.eu/energy-innovation/"><strong>Energy Innovation Area</strong></a> at the Florence School of Regulation focuses on the interplay among innovation, energy and climate policies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0i6j519JiLv-bh2QLek9pA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Electricity industries will enter new worlds of regulation, which need to be explored. To what extent do energy and innovation policies form a coherent vision for a transition towards sustainable energy systems? How do regulations respond to such policies? How do regulations adapt to the evolution of industrial and market processes in energy? From the forefront of knowledge and public debate, the Energy Innovation Area will share articles on the main policy and regulatory issues in the electricity sector.</p><h3><strong>Check out the blog series:</strong> <a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation"><strong>Lights on Innovation</strong></a></h3><p>Join the discussion on <strong>#FSREnergyInnovation</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ab5e1ea57a0c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/fsr-energy-innovation-ab5e1ea57a0c">FSR Energy Innovation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation">Lights on Innovation</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Regulation in times of innovation: regulating the unknown]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/regulation-in-times-of-innovation-regulating-the-unknown-a580c2e94b43?source=rss----f0bc72654070---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a580c2e94b43</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FSR Energy&Climate]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Nov 2018 17:05:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-11-23T17:20:27.415Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ETvDqIx1HuBS26bH7KzaiQ.png" /><figcaption>Mariko Mori, Invisible Dimension</figcaption></figure><p>by <a href="http://fsr.eui.eu/people/miguel-vazquez/">Miguel Vazquez</a> (<a href="http://fsr.eui.eu/energy-innovation/">FSR Energy Innovation Area)</a></p><h3>Complexity and the Design of Institutions</h3><p><em>When I was studying electrical engineering, conversations revolving around electricity were usually about some kind of household electrical problems. Nowadays, the changes electricity industries are experiencing are centre stage, even making the front page of newspapers. Why? I would like to think that finally, the science-fiction-like scenarios that we discussed at the university are taking shape and interesting people. It is more likely, however, to be related to the fact that big and/or high-tech corporations are investing in technologies that are dramatically changing the meaning of electricity services.</em></p><p><em>In any case, it is difficult to deny that there is a feeling of uncertainty in the industry. But where does this uncertainty come from? Are there tools to help us make better sense of it? How can we build an analytical framework?</em></p><p><strong>What we want to justify in this article is that energy transitions are not only about a singular issue such as market design, or innovation policy. We need to account for the fact that energy transitions are a combination of a very large set of policies.</strong></p><p>Consider this: technology is rapidly evolving, so market design has to keep up. If market designs do not adapt quickly they may affect technological trajectories…it is difficult to think that nowadays electricity industries are “predictable”. In that context, what kind of reasoning we can develop if, as Schumpeter said, we have “<em>a chaos that is not in analytical control</em>”?</p><blockquote>Taking the argument to the extreme: <strong>If everything is evolving and uncertainty is inevitable, what is the purpose of thinking policies? Should we just relax and let the future unfold?</strong></blockquote><p>Our proposal is to consider systems that are in-between: we want to study systems that are not in equilibrium nor in total chaos (statistically regular). In that sense, we use complexity science to help with the challenge. This kind of system is often called a complex adaptive system. More precisely, it is a network made up of diverse entities, who interact among themselves, whose actions are interdependent, and who have the ability to adapt and to learn.</p><p>But this changes our problem. Within complex systems reasoning, we “[…] ask how individual behaviours might react to the pattern they together create, and how that pattern would alter itself as a result<a href="http://fsr.eui.eu/complexity-and-the-design-of-institutions/#_ftn1">[1]</a>.” Moreover, and this is key to our reasoning, we know from complexity science that those systems are able to produce a large set of phenomena, including emergence and novelty.</p><p>Why is this relevant to our original question? The reasoning goes as follows: if we want novelty and emergence (science-fiction-like scenarios), we need some degree of complexity. How do we measure complexity? By the four characteristics identified in the complexity science tradition, which made our definition: diversity, connectedness, interdependency, adaptiveness.</p><p>So in these “complex” electricity industries, agents control almost nothing but affect almost everything. This means that our policies will have difficulties targeting outcomes. If we cannot target outcomes, what can we do? Are we still facing “<em>a chaos that is not in analytical control</em>”?</p><p>No, if we consider that we can target functions of the system. How do we do that? As a first step, we need a broad view on the kinds of policies affecting our industry. To that end, let me divide the problem into three levels (micro- meso- macro-level):</p><ul><li><strong>Firm-level policies</strong>: agents at the micro-level, typically firms</li><li><strong>Sector policies</strong>: specific industries, technologies, regions…</li><li><strong>Framework policies</strong>: Economy-wide regulations, intervention in macroeconomics…</li></ul><p>Our second step is to associate policies with the four complex systems dimensions:</p><ul><li><strong>Connectedness</strong>: related to the ability to form connections, so in that sense is the ability to coordinate productive resources. Hence, investment is a central concern</li><li><strong>Interdependency</strong>: to what extent does the problem of one agent change when another agent decides. The main situation in this context is the management of conflict (incentives and transaction costs)</li><li><strong>Diversity</strong>: the need for diverse entities is closely related to innovation</li><li><strong>Adaptiveness</strong>: policies need to contribute to the ability of the system to change, and hence they need to learn as well</li></ul><p>The table below provides some additional detail:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/786/0*7LNRB5HWo88oUqzr.png" /></figure><p>Our reasoning builds on the idea that to get emergence and novelty, we need complexity. And to get complexity, we need the four dimensions. The last step is understanding the associated policy implications. In short, we will not have a complex adaptive system if the four dimensions are not addressed.</p><p>Applied to the design of policies, this means that, for example, focusing all our efforts on creating diversity and facilitating interdependency will not be enough to create novelty. Designing mechanisms for the adaptation (learning) of institutions will be a crucial element in the creation of novelty in electricity industries. Understanding the change of rules as a static effort that happens at one point in time will make our electricity industries unable to create new configurations to adapt to new environments.</p><h3>The role of market design in the (non-)choice of the technology for Energy Storage Systems</h3><p>Some years ago, I was discussing gas market design at the FSR, where Michelle Hallack and I were involved in the discussions around the development of the Network Codes. The core idea of our analysis was relatively simple: most decisions concerning market design have to do with the allocation of flexibility. One of our favourite applications was the decision on line-pack services: on the one hand, line-pack provided time flexibility, i.e. arbitrage between different periods (for example, store gas now to consume in the future); on the other hand, it provided spatial flexibility i.e. arbitrage between different locations (for example, the entry-exit system allows players to buy in A and sell in B without extra cost).</p><p>Recently our discussion on time and spatial flexibility has reappeared within the electricity sector: Energy Storage Systems (EES) imply essentially the same situation. Analogous to our previous discussion, there are two relevant “arenas” for EES services:</p><ul><li><strong>TIME flexibility: </strong>Buy and sell energy in different periods (including energy related to ancillary services)</li><li><strong>Spatial flexibility: </strong>Avoid the need to transport energy from one point to another, i.e. the need to use transmission and/or distribution networks</li></ul><p>Consequently, this involves <strong>two kinds of regulatory challenges</strong>, because storage competes with different types of services: the services provided by the Market design (buying and selling energy) and services provided by network regulation (how network constraints are considered). Why is this important from a technological perspective? Not all EES offer the same kind of service. Consider Li-Ion Batteries and Fuel Cells, only the former can provide grid services in a consistent manner; but only the latter may offer significant seasonal storage, which is important for behind-the-meter applications. Consequently, systems favouring the remuneration of grid services may hamper innovation in Fuel Cells, and thus facilitating lock-in to Li-Ion technologies.</p><blockquote><strong>So what are the consequences of considering time and spatial flexibility as the elementary variables to consider?</strong></blockquote><h3>Wholesale market design</h3><p>Flexibility services can be sold in “competitive” wholesale markets (energy, ancillary services, etc.); hence, markets rules should allow storage services to compete in a non-discriminatory manner with other services (e.g. utility-scale storage vs. CCGTs).</p><p>As in gas markets, flexibility can be used to increase the homogeneity of the product traded (commoditization), which increases liquidity. The tendency observed in the early 2000s in the EU (the trend to switch from centralized to bilateral trading) was challenged by the combination of increased penetration of intermittent renewable generation and lack of significant storage capabilities. This motivated a more centralized trading system (e.g. market coupling) and more locational pricing (e.g. more than one price zone). Most of US markets rely on significantly centralized trading systems. This choice may be challenged, as one of its main motivations (lack of storage) may change with energy storage systems. That is, what would be the market design with more flexibility coming from storage (but also demand response)? In a situation where markets do not need to be so “instantaneous”, and hence closer to other commodities (e.g. gas), the choice between centralized vs bilateral trading become less straightforward.</p><h3>Regulation of energy networks</h3><p>Storage services may avoid the use of “regulated” networks; consequently, network rules should allow them to compete “fairly”. We may identify three dimensions for the challenge: I) Capacity /commodity split; II) Revision of long-term locational signals; III) Need to introduce commitments for network access.</p><p>Grid tariffs are hop-on-hop-off tariffs, based on the assumption that “users had nowhere else to go” (infinite commitments). This assumption is being challenged by the increasing potential to leave the market. Dismantling or mothballing of CCGT and self-consumption (solar, biomass) are becoming pressing issues. Energy storage systems play a major role in this regard.</p><ul><li>Ideally, connecting to the grid should imply a commitment to pay for many of the network costs caused. Let us consider, just as an example, a typical scheme for a private regasification facility. In it, the access fee is charged on contracted capacity, which in turn implies a commitment for a fixed period of time, e.g. 10 years. How would this contract be managed? If the demand for gas transmission is stable, then reselling in the secondary market would be feasible with no loss. If the demand for gas transmission is reduced, then players should not leave without paying the network costs incurred for them.</li><li>Hence, the previous logic means that power markets, including retail markets, may need to charge access according to reserved capacity. From this point of view, the starting point of a tariff definition based on capacity reservation would be the definition of the network services that would be offered through contracts: different tariffs imply different services. Consequently, contracts to define different preferences for capacity reservation would need to be implemented. Those contracts would have specifications on at least: I) Location in the grid; II) Use of the system (flexibility); III) Contract duration.</li></ul><p><strong>Summary in the table below:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/854/0*-JWG_dF4-UnZ1s4i.png" /></figure><p>The mechanisms for arbitrage between different points in space and time is central to the definition of any market. A new layer of complexity is added when we include new technologies. Simplifications that were not relevant may become central to the market design. Moreover, those simplifications may impact the development of the technology itself. They might even create technological lock-in.</p><h3>Convergence of telco and power systems, and the formation of knowledge networks</h3><p>Modernization of the electricity grid may deeply change the economic properties of electricity systems. Part of these changes have been discussed in recent years within the context of smart grids: a potential end-state of system evolution is a platform where all resources (distributed or not) could be connected and be part of a multi-layered optimization (which we may call a Smart Grid).</p><p>An additional step in the evolution of electric networks is to consider the convergence with ICT networks, which also involves the creation of a unique network (sharing resources and a common architecture), with the aim of making possible new transactions. The telco industry has experienced this kind of process, where the convergence of voice, data and video has created value and facilitated innovation. In this more evolved example, we would have a very different playing field with an ecosystem made up of startups and incumbents, energy and non-energy players, and, in general, energy and telco assets that enable energy and broadband flows.</p><p>In this context, what are the effects of the regulatory rules that define the products that can be commercialized in the final knowledge network?</p><p>Consider, as in (De Martini and Taft, 2015), <strong>three basic business models in future electric networks</strong>:</p><ol><li><strong>The ‘current-path’ system</strong>, where the unidirectional use of the distribution system is assumed and advanced technologies are used to improve reliability, resiliency, safety and efficiency;</li><li><strong>An intermediary-based system</strong> where a platform enables exchange (e.g. Amazon);</li><li><strong>A network where profit is based on the collective value of an ecosystem</strong> (e.g. Cisco’s Internet of Everything).</li></ol><p>These three business models imply different knowledge networks. To illustrate that, let me consider elementary kinds of networks. In particular, let me compare “small world” to “scale-free” networks. The former are networks with many of the nodes connected to their neighbours (close nodes) and with a few connections with distant nodes. The latter are networks where few of the nodes are very connected, and most of the nodes are not very connected (i.e. nodes’ number of connections follows a power law).</p><p>Our concern, nonetheless, is not only what the final topology of the network is but what the characteristics of network formation are. Small-world networks are formed primarily by combining random attachment with homophily (preference for attachment to a close node). If we consider that, in our application to electric networks, homophily means the preference for transacting with a similar agent, it would represent a tendency to decentralization. In that sense, small-world networks would be a system made up predominantly by the connection of local networks (e.g. micro-grids).</p><p>On the other hand, scale-free networks are formed by considering, besides homophily, <em>preferential attachment </em>(preference for attachment to a “good” node). In the context of electric networks, preferential attachment would mean advantages associated with the connection to distribution systems, or “aggregators” in general, as opposed to off-grid solutions.</p><p>With the previous reasoning, we may begin answering our original question (the effects of regulation on the creation of knowledge networks). Market designs favouring off-grid solutions (as the ones associated with facilitating the participation of distributed resources in all market transactions) will strengthen homophily mechanisms, and hence they will promote small-world networks.</p><p>In that view, market designs promoting “behind-the-meter” transactions (e.g. Germany) will be examples close to the previous strategy. On the other hand, market designs which are driven by distribution companies (e.g. California’s trend to channel storage investments through utilities) will favour scale-free networks.</p><p>Therefore, the design of regulatory rules may have extreme impacts on the creation of knowledge networks in electric systems.</p><p><em>This essay was originally published as a series of fully referenced blog posts on the FSR website which can be read </em><a href="http://fsr.eui.eu/type/topic-of-the-month/"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a580c2e94b43" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation/regulation-in-times-of-innovation-regulating-the-unknown-a580c2e94b43">Regulation in times of innovation: regulating the unknown</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/lights-on-innovation">Lights on Innovation</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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