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        <title><![CDATA[Logos Network - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Logos Network: The hyperscalable, low-cost and secure platform ushering the future of payments, today. - Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/logos-network?source=rss----92543331824d---4</link>
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            <title>Logos Network - Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/logos-network?source=rss----92543331824d---4</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 02:18:19 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Joining Ripple’s Xpring]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/logos-network/joining-ripples-xpring-e018943a256d?source=rss----92543331824d---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e018943a256d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[xpring]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ripple]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Zochowski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 27 Sep 2019 16:46:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-28T03:25:37.492Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We are excited to announce that we joined Ripple this week, where the Logos team will continue working on the cutting edge of blockchain technology as part of the company’s Xpring initiative. Xpring helps innovative blockchain projects grow through partnerships and investment and builds the best crypto infrastructure to grow the XRP ecosystem.</p><p>Since the Logos project was launched almost two years ago, we have continually pushed the envelope of blockchain speed and scalability, and we are eager to bring that same energy and passion to the Xpring team.</p><p>Ripple has always been highly visible to us as one of the original innovators in crypto and fintech. Over the past few months and as we met the broader team, we have been repeatedly impressed by the scope of expertise and clarity of vision present at all levels of the organization. Ripple offers a peerless platform in the blockchain space, and the opportunity to contribute to and shape its growing ecosystem of projects is unparalleled.</p><p>While this chapter of Logos is closing, the ideas and spirit behind Logos will continue in our work at Xpring. We have not yet finalized the plans for the Logos core technology, which has continued to set the bar for blockchain performance, but we hope to have exciting news to share in the near future.</p><p>As we look ahead to our next chapter at Ripple, we expect that our team will work on a variety of projects at all levels of the Xpring platform, with a particular focus on enabling a wide range of DeFi applications. We continue to strongly believe that the future of payments and finance lies in blockchain and decentralization, and Ripple is the perfect place for us to help build that future.</p><p>We’re excited to work with you along the way!</p><p>The Logos Team</p><p>For more information on the deal, please see <a href="https://medium.com/xpring/welcoming-logos-3586dd8cb552">Xpring’s blog post</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e018943a256d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/joining-ripples-xpring-e018943a256d">Joining Ripple’s Xpring</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network">Logos Network</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Logos R2 Testnet Release]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/logos-network/logos-r2-testnet-release-5e9ae21b98e4?source=rss----92543331824d---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5e9ae21b98e4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[token]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tyler Storm]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 30 Apr 2019 22:58:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-01T00:55:54.184Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WcmNFn_Pk316hvKmk3dWGA.png" /><figcaption>Example of a Token on the Logos Blockchain Explorer</figcaption></figure><p>Today marks the release of the R2 build to the Logos testnet. This is a major development milestone and is the first significant release since the initial launch of the first testnet back in December.</p><p>There are several notable achievements included in the R2 release. Most notably among them is <strong>token support</strong>. Here are some highlights from the R2 release.</p><p><strong>Tokens.</strong> Logos’s token capability provides a superset of ERC-20 capabilities at the protocol level, making it as easy as possible to release fungible tokens natively on the Logos platform.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*drgODy03YV6uyk1YJR-mEA.png" /><figcaption>A list of a couple of tokens that have been created on the testnet</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Forge</strong> is part of the Logos blockchain explorer that allows anyone to participate in the testnet without any requirements. You can create and send tokens to all of your friends with the speed and scalability that Logos is known for. <a href="https://pla.bs/forge">Try it out!</a></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FhOlo0FK9v7I%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DhOlo0FK9v7I&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FhOlo0FK9v7I%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="640" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/843f6fb62311db14cc7a5e2d683304a0/href">https://medium.com/media/843f6fb62311db14cc7a5e2d683304a0/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Epoch Transition.</strong> Epoch transition is a major dependency of governance and staking that are actively in development and coming in R3. Epoch transition is the system of handling the hot swapping of delegates in and out of the delegate pool without any downtime.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*A7BRb0U2uZR_cpp8a7vKMg.png" /><figcaption>Logos Mobile Wallet with Token Support</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Mobile Application Updates</strong> The Logos iOS wallet was also updated to support tokens. If you haven’t already downloaded the wallet you can <a href="https://testflight.apple.com/join/FX7itRuq">download the iOS testflight app</a>.</p><p><strong>Test infrastructure.</strong> We performed functional, boundary case, exhaustive, and stress testing of the network, along with integrity testing of the databases. We will continue expanding the testing methodology going forward.</p><p>With R2 now completed we have most core features implemented, with the remainder already being developed and put into place in R3. We’ll continue to release additional features on the testnet for integrations and testing. If you have any questions or just want to be more involved in the Logos development processes join us on <a href="https://discord.gg/YVXfW5A">discord</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/LogosPayments">twitter</a>, <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/logospayments">reddit</a>, and <a href="http://t.me/logosofficial">telegram</a>!</p><p>We will continue to send out development updates going forward. Stay tuned!</p><p>Thanks,</p><p>Everyone @ Logos</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5e9ae21b98e4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/logos-r2-testnet-release-5e9ae21b98e4">Logos R2 Testnet Release</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network">Logos Network</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Benchmarking Hash and Signature Algorithms]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/logos-network/benchmarking-hash-and-signature-algorithms-6079735ce05?source=rss----92543331824d---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6079735ce05</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[algorithms]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[research]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Zochowski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 Mar 2019 21:26:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-27T21:28:51.281Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>By Peng Wang, Carl Hua, and Michael Zochowski</em></p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Hash and signature algorithms are the cornerstone of blockchain and crypto networks. Among other uses, they enable unforgeable identification and messaging, immutable recording of transactions, and efficient data storage. These properties make them a critical part of consensus, transaction verification, and, in proof-of-work networks, mining.</p><p>With the exception of proof-of-work (which, aside from extreme cases, is decoupled from the hash algorithm performance), the performance of the chosen hash and signature algorithms in a network has a major impact on performance. Every block and each transaction contained therein requires multiple signature verifications, hash verifications, and — for validators — a signature production. We estimate that the average crypto network node spends 25–65% of its CPU usage for hashing and signing, excluding mining. Optimizing these functions is one of the best ways to boost overall network performance, including transaction capacity and confirmation latency.</p><p>When we were architecting the Logos system, we were faced with the question of what signature and hashing algorithms best match our needs for high performance and minimal overhead. While there are many benchmarking results available on the web, they can vary significantly depending on the exact system environment. In particular, Logos uses proof-of-stake and a heavily optimized PBFT consensus scheme. We require multisignatures for efficient consensus, single signatures for transaction approval, and hashing for message digests, Merkle Trees, hashchains, and other data structures.</p><p>We therefore tested the performance of several hash algorithms and signature algorithms in our development environment last summer. For this benchmarking, we used AWS t2.2xlarge instances with 8 vCPUs from an E5–2686 v4 CPU at 2.30GHz running Ubuntu 16.04 with kernel 4.4.0.</p><p>In this article, we summarize those benchmarking findings. You can find the raw code we used published on our Github <a href="https://github.com/LogosNetwork/crypto-function-benchmark">here</a>. This article is intended to be a technical overview and assumes familiarity with the various concepts and algorithms we tested.</p><h3>Hash Algorithms</h3><p>We tested some of the hash algorithms available in Openssl’s libcrypto, version 1.1.1. The figure below is the per byte time (nanoseconds) of the hash algorithms with different message sizes. The x-axis is in log scale. The table underneath is the raw data, sorted by the column of message size 1024 bytes.</p><p>We can see that (1) for smaller messages up to 3KB, the cost per byte decreases when the message size increases, and for larger messages, the cost per byte is constant; and (2) the sha256 and sha512 have good performance, and blake2b512 is even faster.</p><p>Please note that sha1 and md5 were included only for reference, and they were not considered for use in Logos due to their <a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2017/02/announcing-first-sha1-collision.html?">security issues</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qYBP92aytBNAXDIM" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*HU4-Dnjuk2Z10158" /></figure><p>Messages in Logos are typically in the range of 512B to 2KB. The next figure shows the cost of hashing 512B, 1KB, and 2KB messages. Please note the y-axis is per message time. This clearly confirms the intuition that when the message size doubles, cost also roughly doubles.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8vJKBDaDkErwlAR0" /></figure><p>We chose blake2 for Logos’s hashing algorithm due to its speed. We specifically use blake2b256 because it targets 64 cpu architecture and provides 128-bit security.</p><p>In addition to its use in data structures and message digests, hashing algorithms are used in Logos for a minor proof-of-work spam prevention mechanism. For this role, we additionally considered Scrypt, Balloon, and Argon2id, but exclude them here for simplicity.</p><h3>Signature Algorithms</h3><p>We tested the performance of the following signature algorithms: ECDSA (Openssl), EdDSA (Nano), EC-Schnorr (Zilliqa), and BLS (Keep).</p><h4>Single signatures</h4><p>First, we show the cost of single signatures in the figures below. Similar to the previous section, we have the “Time per byte” figure for all message sizes, its raw data table, and the “Time per message” figure for 512B, 1KB, and 2KB messages, where time is measured in microseconds. We can see that (1) EdDSA is very fast, (2) for any algorithm, the cost of signing (verifying) 512B, 1KB, or 2KB messages are about the same.</p><p>In general, a signature algorithm signs the digest of messages. I.e., a message is hashed to a fixed size digest, then the signature is computed on the digest. So the cost includes two parts (1) hashing cost which grows with message size, (2) signature operation cost which is constant. This is clearly shown in the last figure in this section. For this reason, we included blake2b512 in all the figures as a reference. In general, the cost of (2) significantly dominates that of (1).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*4BpTLXSassJ7imEi" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*xo__pAv0tLB07mV5" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*V96aVVId3nVuE2Xw" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*bnTmgoQSm9f2qwi0" /></figure><p>We decided to use EdDSA for Logos since it was the most efficient signature scheme and has a number of robust, open source implementations.</p><h4>Multisignatures</h4><p>Transaction validation in Logos involves a set of 32 elected delegates running consensus instances in parallel. Each consensus instance involves a batch of transactions and is run by a primary delegate with 31 backups. A supermajority (greater than ⅔) of delegates must sign off on each batch of transactions for them to be confirmed. Safety is strongly guaranteed through a combination of mathematically proven distributed algorithms and game theory.</p><p>If Logos were to implement this system using single signatures, validating that a batch (and thus the contained transactions) is valid as well as storing the network history would be extremely inefficient in both CPU and storage space since each batch involves at least 22 signatures. We therefore use a multisignature scheme to make signature size constant, regardless of the number of individual signatures it contains.</p><p>We tested three multisignature algorithms. The Schnorr multisignature is a two-round interactive algorithm. The BLS_Diff_Msg is a simple aggregation algorithm included in herumi’s code “<a href="http://github.com/herumi">github.com/herumi</a>”. It does not have a public key aggregation algorithm and is not secure when the messages could be the same. The BLS_Same_Msg is built on top of herumi’s code. It has a public key aggregation algorithm, and it requires all the messages are the same.</p><p>In this section, all the messages are 512B, since we already know message sizes only affect the hashing cost of signatures, from the previous section. The figure below shows the time cost of the operations. Some observations:</p><ol><li>“Public key aggregation” cost is small, and is a one time cost for the same set of delegates.</li><li>The Schnorr algorithm’s signing operation is a bit higher than BLS.</li><li>BLS_Diff_Msg’s signature aggregation cost is very low and BLS_Same_Msg’s signature aggregation cost is much higher.</li><li>The signature verification cost of BLS_Diff_Msg is very high.</li><li>No matter which algorithm, if some of the input to the signature aggregation function are corrupted, the cost of finding the corrupted ones (marked as Response Verify in the figure) is very high.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*cSBxiG-LfmHZXim5" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*WRiP5GzlDMBfaAan" /></figure><p>The next figure is the cost of the delegates of one multi-signature generation. We considered two cases, (A) all 31 delegates returned good individual signatures (or equivalent in Schnorr) to the primary, (B) some (&lt;1/3) individual signatures are corrupted. Other cases such as missing signatures, or too many corrupted signatures which resulted in a failed round should have less cost as compared to cases (A) and (B).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*c9wuMTRQQ41C-QSu" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*yotKROdBhFuSdwDF" /></figure><p>Thus, Schnorr outperforms BLS in CPU space, but BLS is within an order of magnitude. What these results do not show is the cost of messaging. In particular, a Schnorr multisignature requires one more round of messages between the aggregator and single signers than BLS, which complicates the core consensus protocol and imposes a significant time overhead due to latency and communication. Assuming a 200ms latency (a multisignature is limited by the highest latency signer), the Schnorr multisignature would have an additional latency of 200,000 microseconds. This means that BLS is drastically more time efficient than Schnorr in a real world setting. In addition, BLS requires only half the data as Schnorr for the equivalent security level. For example, the signature size of Schnorr multisignature scheme is 64 bytes for 128-bit security, while the signature size of BLS is only 32 bytes.</p><p>For these reasons, among others, we decided to use BLS multisignatures in Logos. To enable signature aggregation, we extended publicly available implementations based on <a href="https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/papers/BLSmultisig.html">Boneh et al.</a> We’ll release that implementation publicly when we open-source the Logos core codebase.</p><h3>More Benchmarking Data: eBACS</h3><p>While it’s always important to test out the algorithms in the specific context you wish to deploy them, ECRYPT Benchmarking of Cryptographic Systems (<a href="http://bench.cr.yp.to/">eBACS</a>) is a great source of general benchmarking results of many cryptographic algorithms.</p><p><strong>If you’d like to keep up with what we are doing:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/142/1*SLSkqLl-9Rb04qw_NMD53Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Follow us</strong>: <a href="https://twitter.com/LogosPayments">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://discord.gg/BB9CQwn">Discord</a> | <a href="https://web.telegram.org/#/im?p=@logosofficial">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/LogosPayments/">Reddit</a></p><p><strong>Read</strong>: <a href="https://www.logos.network/whitepaper">White paper</a> | <a href="https://www.logos.network/">Logos website</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6079735ce05" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/benchmarking-hash-and-signature-algorithms-6079735ce05">Benchmarking Hash and Signature Algorithms</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network">Logos Network</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The PoS Cash Flow Valuation Model or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Velocity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/logos-network/the-pos-cash-flow-valuation-model-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-velocity-cb4c240791cd?source=rss----92543331824d---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cb4c240791cd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Zochowski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Mar 2019 17:35:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-12T17:35:55.546Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BgGmLq0IL-6ZfRe4grH3tw.jpeg" /></figure><p>In our <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/velocity-and-demand-for-money-models-e5bf71333934">last valuation article</a>, we explored more sophisticated frameworks for thinking about velocity, in particular inventory models of demand for money such as Baumol-Tobin. While an interesting theoretical extension, we ultimately concluded that such models are not particularly useful in a practical valuation context due to: (1) significant uncertainty in economic literature around model metaparameters such as the income elasticity of money demand; and (2) replacing one variable (velocity) with multiple new variables that are equally, if not more, ambiguous.</p><p>Given this rather unsatisfying conclusion, we must turn to other approaches for estimating velocity. We’ve previously discussed how both <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/empirical-velocity-estimates-and-artificial-volumes-in-ethereum-9aa3d93bb60">empirical observations</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/cryptoasset-valuation-2-the-velocity-problem-8bbb4111c9c7">first principles arguments</a> both suggest that velocity will not become arbitrarily high but instead will stick in the 1 to 100 range. However, given the uncertainty around and immaturity of decentralized networks generally, we must consider the possibility that our arguments are incorrect and that velocity does indeed diverge.</p><p>The obvious question that arises is: <em>What are the implications for cryptoasset value if velocity is arbitrarily high?</em></p><p>In my <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/cryptoasset-valuation-2-the-velocity-problem-8bbb4111c9c7">first article on velocity</a>, I sketched a counterexample to the claim that cryptoassets would have arbitrarily low value with an arbitrarily high velocity based on cross-sectional transaction volumes. This showed that the commonly held “doomsday” arguments around velocity levels are misleading.</p><p>In this article, we more formally consider this scenario through an alternative valuation model specific to proof-of-stake (PoS) networks that decomposes network value into a variety of sources, several of which are independent from velocity. As we shall see, the end result establishes that networks can accrue significant value, even with huge velocities. Formalizing this valuation framework enables analysts to better understand value accrual and stakeholder dynamics in decentralized networks and increase the precision of estimates.</p><h3>The PoS Cash Flow Model</h3><p>For lack of a better alternative, we’ll call this new model the Proof-of-Stake Cash Flow Model. The key idea behind the model is that staking validators in a proof-of-stake network (as a group) earn recurring revenues from network fees. The value of this cash flow, and thus the value of the tokens staked to earn that cash flow, can easily be analyzed by standard financial analysis.</p><p>This model has been touched on by a few papers and industry commentators,¹ but it is far less prominent than the EoE model. Furthermore, it is valid for a much narrower range of networks than the EoE model and has some additional limitations that we will touch on below. Nevertheless, it is very useful in understanding the true drivers of value in a staking-based network. In this article, we will add in a few wrinkles to the basic model and formalize some of the key concepts behind it.</p><h4>Model Setup</h4><p>For simplicity, we will make a number of assumptions around the structure of the network. All of these simplifying assumptions can be relaxed without impacting the high level conclusions, but doing so significantly increases the mathematical complexity of the model.²</p><p>Our idealized network will be a payments network with two tokens: a base utility token and a stablecoin pegged to $1 per token. The base utility token is used to pay for transaction fees, while the stablecoin serves as the unit of account and medium of exchange in transactions. There are a fixed number of utility tokens in the system, <em>N</em>.</p><p>Transactions are validated by a group of validators that are paid pro rata to the number of tokens they stake out of the pool of transaction fees. There is no inflation in the system, so fees consist solely of direct fees paid by transactors. Assume that in period <em>t</em> (e.g. a year) the network processes <em>Y_t </em>transaction volumes (measured in dollars), and that validators receive <em>c*Y_t </em>in fees. Here, the fee <em>c</em> is a fraction of transaction size, but we could easily reparameterize to a constant fee per transaction by making assumptions around average transaction size. We assume that cost of validation is zero (which is reasonable in a PoS network), but any costs can be incorporated into <em>c</em> by netting.</p><p>Assume further that both fees and transactions grow at a constant rate <em>g</em>. This will be useful for defining the basic model, but note that we can explicitly model out future growth into discrete periods plus a terminal growth rate, akin to a standard DCF analysis.</p><p>In addition to the validator staking, there are two additional sources of utility token sinks. First, users hold utility tokens as working capital for fee payments, represented without loss of generality as a fraction of total transaction fees <em>h*c*Y_t</em>. Here, <em>h</em> roughly corresponds to average holding period, and thus is inversely proportional to velocity. We can substitute in a more detailed model such as Baumol-Tobin to solve for money demand, but as noted previously these models tend to complicate without edifying the model.</p><p>Second, each account on the system requires a small deposit (denominated in dollars) <em>d</em>. In addition to tying up tokens proportional to network use (and thus adding value to the network independent of velocity), this deposit mechanism is primarily useful as an anti-spam measure. If each account transacts <em>y</em> dollars per year, then there are <em>Y_t / y * d </em>dollars tied up in deposits.</p><p>Note that all cash flows and deposits are paid in tokens but are valued in dollars. This is the most natural way to look at things, as we are evaluating the value of validation as a USD-based business. In particular, the fees <em>c*Y_t</em> paid are independent of token value — as token value changes, so too does the number of tokens required for each fee, but the fee itself per transaction does not change. This reflects the operating reality of a standard business, where both revenue and expenses are measured in a single fiat currency like USD.</p><p>Most importantly, we assume that the network has achieved some equilibrium value, <em>V_t</em>, at time <em>t</em>. While non-trivial, it is also not an overly restrictive assumption. For example, the equilibrium value could be $0. This equilibrium value is valid for time <em>t</em>, and thus the model defines a cross-sectional snapshot of value at some period rather than a time-varying solution.</p><p>Let the fraction of tokens held by validators in this equilibrium be <em>φ</em>, the fraction held by transactors as working capital be <em>θ</em>, and the fraction held as account deposits be <em>δ</em>. In other words, the utility token value held by validators is <em>V_t*φ. </em>Assuming economic efficiency, these three uses of the network utility tokens are comprehensive, so:</p><p><em>φ + θ + δ = 1</em></p><p>Lastly, we need to specify the discounting rate, <em>r</em>, that encapsulates the risk free rate, opportunity cost of capital, and any risk premium in the system.</p><h4>Model specification</h4><p>We now can solve for the value corresponding to the three uses of utility tokens and derive overall equilibrium value <em>V_t</em>.</p><p>First, the validators. In period <em>i</em>, validators receive fees with net present value</p><p><em>c*Y_t * ((1+g)/(1+r))^i</em></p><p>Adding up all the periods <em>i </em>in perpetuity gives a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geometric_series#Formula">geometric series</a> that corresponds to a standard <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annuity">annuity</a> or <a href="http://macabacus.com/valuation/dcf/terminal-value">DCF terminal value</a>. Its value is equivalent to</p><p><em>V_t*φ = c*Y_t / (r — g)</em></p><p>Second, we have the working capital holders, whose holdings value we have defined as</p><p><em>V_t*θ = h*c*Y_t</em></p><p>Third, we have the account deposits, which we defined as</p><p><em>V_t*δ = Y_t / y * d</em></p><p>Solving this system of equations yields a simple closed form solution for <em>V_t</em>:</p><p><em>V_t = Y_t * (c/(r-g) + h*c + d/y)</em></p><p>A few notes on this result. Analyzing the variables in isolation (i.e. holding all others constant) conforms with prior expectations. As overall transaction volumes <em>Y_t</em> increase, so too does value. Value also increases with fee level <em>c</em>, growth rate <em>g, </em>holding period <em>h</em>, and deposit <em>d</em>, while it decreases with discount rate <em>r</em> and transaction volume per account <em>y</em>. Note that these relationships are not necessarily true in practice, where changes in one variable impact other variables.</p><p>The valuation formula very nicely does not depend on future value <em>Y_t</em>′. Otherwise, we would need to use more advanced statistics to account for the stochasticity of this process.</p><p>Velocity is captured indirectly by holding period, its inverse. As expected, as velocity increases, holding period decreases, and network value decreases. However, only one of the three sources of value accrual is impacted by velocity. <strong>If velocity rises arbitrarily and <em>h</em> converges to zero, <em>V_t </em>does not converge to zero. Decoupling overall value from velocity is the key contribution of the model.</strong></p><h3>A Worked Example</h3><p>Let’s assume a reasonably efficient transaction network has the following values:</p><ul><li>It processes <em>Y_t </em>= $100 billion in transaction volumes per year</li><li>Constant growth rate in volumes is 5% per year</li><li>Discounting rate (including risk premium) is 10% per year</li><li>Validators earn an average of <em>c = </em>10 basis points per transaction</li><li>Holding period for users’ working capital of utility tokens is <em>h = </em>1 week ≈ 0.02 (corresponding to a velocity of 50)</li><li>Network mandated account deposits are <em>d = </em>$1 per account</li><li>Average transaction volume per account per year is <em>y = </em>$1000</li></ul><p>Plugging these in gives network value:</p><p><em>V_t = $100 billion * ( 0.1%/(10%-5%) + 0.02*0.1% + $1/$1000) = </em>$2.1 billion</p><p>We can further decompose this value into its components:</p><ul><li>Validator value = <em>V_t*φ = $100 billion * 0.1%/(10%-5%)</em> = $2 billion</li><li>Working capital value = <em>V_t*θ = h*c*Y_t = $100 billion * 0.02 * 0.001 = </em>$2 million</li><li>Account deposit value = <em>V_t*δ = Y_t / y * d = $100 billion * $1/$1000 = </em>$100 million</li></ul><p>This corresponds to the following breakdown of network tokens between the groups:</p><ul><li><em>Φ = 95.14%</em></li><li><em>θ = 0.01%</em></li><li><em>δ = 4.75%</em></li></ul><p><strong>So only 0.01% of network value is contingent on a reasonable velocity!</strong> Even if velocity were infinite, value would be substantially unchanged. This is an extreme example — it is a 2 token system where the value-accruing token does not denominate transactions, and a velocity of 50 is 10x what we see empirically — but it fits the narrative of valuation skeptics.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Despite its limitations, the PoS Cash Flow Model offers a significant improvement on the vanilla EoE model in several ways by cleanly separating out the sources of value accrual in a network. First, this decomposition allows for more nuanced analysis and isolation of assumptions of variable values that have high uncertainties. Second, it enables network designers to better understand the impact of features like account deposits on network value. Third, it greatly improves precision of business and valuation models as we move increasingly into a proof-of-stake paradigm.</p><p>The most important issue addressed by the model, though, is challenging the conventional wisdom, held by many, that velocity will erode any meaningful network value. As shown in these results, that presumption is categorically false, provided that the network is designed in an intelligent way to provide for value sinks like staking. The design process should always be bottoms-up and aimed at maximizing network utility rather than value, but luckily there is heavy overlap between the two objectives.</p><p>In future articles, we will explore more advanced versions of this model, in particular decomposing the value into discrete time periods where we can model out network volumes and TAMs as well as adding in stochasticity to model features like inflation.</p><p>[1] For a recent example, see section 7.1 <a href="https://dtr.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/2019-01-16-Decentralized-Payment-Systems-Principles-and-Design.pdf">here</a>.</p><p>[2] In particular, removing the simplifying assumptions typically requires adding stochasticity to the model.</p><p><strong>If you’d like to keep up with what we are doing:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/142/1*SLSkqLl-9Rb04qw_NMD53Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Follow us</strong>: <a href="https://twitter.com/LogosPayments">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://discord.gg/BB9CQwn">Discord</a> | <a href="https://web.telegram.org/#/im?p=@logosofficial">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/LogosPayments/">Reddit</a></p><p><strong>Read</strong>: <a href="https://www.logos.network/whitepaper">White paper</a> | <a href="https://www.logos.network/">Logos website</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cb4c240791cd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/the-pos-cash-flow-valuation-model-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-velocity-cb4c240791cd">The PoS Cash Flow Valuation Model or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Velocity</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network">Logos Network</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Velocity and Demand for Money Models]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/logos-network/velocity-and-demand-for-money-models-e5bf71333934?source=rss----92543331824d---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e5bf71333934</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Zochowski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Mar 2019 15:56:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-07T19:59:11.664Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Written by </em><a href="https://medium.com/@mzochowski"><em>Michael Zochowski</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://medium.com/@joe_29624"><em>Joe Alie</em></a></p><p>We’ve <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/cryptoasset-valuation-1-improving-the-equation-of-exchange-model-6525aa748d28">talked in the past</a> about using the quantity theory of money or (a.k.a. Equation of Exchange) model to value cryptoassets. We labeled this the “base” model, since it is broadly applicable to all networks that have transactions denominated in a native token, which covers almost all networks.</p><p>One issue with the Equation of Exchange model is that it depends on assumptions around velocity and its relationship with the other variables in the formula <em>M*V = P*Q</em>. Typically, some constant velocity or functional form that is independent of the other variables is assumed. Note that this is not an unusual assumption for economic analysis, but it does impose some limitations on the model. Here’s what noted economist Greg Mankiw says about constant velocity:</p><blockquote>“As with many of the assumptions in economics, the assumption of constant velocity is only a simplification of reality. Velocity does change if the money demand function changes. For example, when automatic teller machines were introduced, people could reduce their average money holdings, which meant a fall in the money demand parameter k and an increase in velocity V. Nonetheless, experience shows that the assumption of constant velocity is a useful one in many situations.”¹</blockquote><p>The admitted difference between this standard economic analysis and forecasting done in the EoE cryptoasset valuation model is that the former has pretty high confidence around predominant levels of all the variables, while the latter involves substantially more uncertainty.</p><p>It’s been noted in several places, including <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/empirical-velocity-estimates-and-artificial-volumes-in-ethereum-9aa3d93bb60">one of our recent articles</a>, that empirically observed velocities of cryptoassets are quite low, particularly when accounting for “self churn” transactions — often lower than fiat currency velocity, despite arguments to the contrary. Nevertheless, we are still in the extreme early stages of crypto adoption and infrastructure, so current empirical estimates have limited utility in informing our posterior expectations.</p><p>We’ve also <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/cryptoasset-valuation-2-the-velocity-problem-8bbb4111c9c7">argued before</a> from first principles that there are many reasons to believe that velocity will not become arbitrarily high but instead will stick in the 1 to 100 range. While I believe there is little empirical or logical evidence for another result, such arguments are inherently informal.</p><p>The natural question that arises is: <em>Are there any more rigorous models that can give us more insight into realistic values of velocity going forward?</em></p><p>In this article, we’ll explore some common economic models for demand for money (which directly determines velocity), empirical evidence for these models in real economies, and implications for crytpoasset valuations.</p><h3>Transaction Models of Monetary Demand</h3><p>Velocity ultimately is determined by the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demand_for_money">demand for money</a>. Demand for money is a well-studied topic in economics, with a variety of proposed approaches. The most directly relevant class of models for the purposes of modeling cryptoasset velocities are inventory models for transactions demand.</p><h4>The Baumol-Tobin Model</h4><p>The most commonly used inventory model is the <a href="http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~jneri/Econ330/files/ch22apx1.pdf">Baumol-Tobin model</a>. <a href="https://medium.com/blockchannel/on-value-velocity-and-monetary-theory-a-new-approach-to-cryptoasset-valuations-32c9b22e3b6f">Alex Evans</a>, among others, has previously proposed the Baumol-Tobin model as a means of estimating velocity.</p><p>The idea is that individuals who know they are going to spend <em>Y</em> dollars over a period will optimize the amounts held in their interest-bearing savings account and in cash.² The money in the savings account earns interest <em>i</em>, while each withdrawal costs <em>C</em> (with the biggest component of cost typically being the value of someone’s time). Given this parameterization, we can use calculus to solve for the optimal number of withdrawals, <em>N</em>.</p><p>The end result of the Baumol-Tobin model is the average money holdings (adjusted for price level):</p><p><em>H = M/P = (C* Y / (2 * i))^(½)</em></p><p>The logic around an individual decision maker can be generalized to the entire economy, assuming uniform behavior (more on this in a bit), so the above equation also applies generally to a token GDP of <em>Y = P*Q</em>.</p><p>Given the average money holdings, we can easily solve for velocity by dividing <em>Y</em> by <em>H</em>.</p><p>There are a couple of issues with using Baumol-Tobin and other models. First, it recasts a single variable (V) in the M*V = P*Q model into multiple variables (C, i) for which we don’t necessarily have higher estimate precision. Second, the meta-assumptions of the Baumol-Tobin model — and any other monetary demand model, for that matter — end up being quite large and impactful in any conclusions. Of particular consequence is the income elasticity of demand, as noted by Greg Mankiw:</p><blockquote>“The Baumol–Tobin model, for example, makes precise predictions for how income and interest rates influence money demand. The model’s square-root formula implies that the income elasticity of money demand is 1/2: a 10-percent increase in income should lead to a 5-percent increase in the demand for real balances. It also says that the interest elasticity of money demand is 1/2: a 10-percent increase in the interest rate (say, from 10 percent to 11 percent) should lead to a 5-percent decrease in the demand for real balances. Most empirical studies of money demand do not confirm these predictions. They find that the income elasticity of money demand is larger than 1/2 and that the interest elasticity is smaller than 1/2. Thus, although the Baumol–Tobin model may capture part of the story behind the money demand function, it is not completely correct.”³</blockquote><p>The effect of these meta-assumptions is that Baumol-Tobin can give some crazy velocity numbers in a cryptoasset valuation model. In <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1a1SzF2H1Y3twTvqAlGAwm8Q2jG-CPnP1Q-7qopN-4LE/edit#gid=428912142">Alex Evans’s model</a>, for example, velocity ranges from 105 to 37,962!</p><h4>Income Elasticity of Money Demand</h4><p>What exactly is going on here? It turns out that income elasticity of money demand is a relatively poorly understood economic variable, and model-indicated values often differ substantially from empirical evidence in mature economies. Ultimately, it is this discrepancy that limits the value of these models — we are trying to develop better precision around velocity, but we’re no better off if the model we introduce has even less certainty!</p><p>Understanding the implications of income elasticity of money demand requires a bit of math. Elasticities measure the percentage change in a dependent variable <em>Y</em> for a unit percentage change in another variable <em>X</em>. This allows us to measure the unitless sensitivity of an output to its inputs.</p><p>Mathematically, elasticity is the <a href="https://economics.stackexchange.com/questions/13910/why-are-elasticities-defined-as-logarithmic-derivatives">partial derivative of the logarithmic variables</a>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/538/0*I956IX_TA1eQNrif" /></figure><p>With any exponential function <em>Y = X^b</em>, similar to the Baumol-Tobin money demand equation referenced earlier, elasticity will be equal to the exponent <em>b</em>. Solving the above equation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/641/0*_6BrZHjRMeBNmrnw" /></figure><p>Transforming the Baumol-Tobin equation <em>H = (C*Y / 2*i)^(½)</em> into logarithmic terms gives</p><p><em>log(H) = (½)log(Y) + (½)log(C) — (½)log(2i)</em></p><p>The income elasticity of money demand in the Baumol-Tobin model is given by the coefficient of log(Y), and therefore the model implies an income elasticity of ½. Other variants of the inventory model (e.g. Miller &amp; Orr 1966) suggest an income elasticity range between ⅓ and ⅔, yet empirical observations of income elasticity of money demand indicate much higher levels (see chart below, <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.578.9410&amp;rep=rep1&amp;type=pdf">A Meta-Analysis of Money Demand</a>).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/470/0*JAXoVmeryZCxuxHy" /><figcaption>Empirically observed ranges for income elasticity of money demand. <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.578.9410&amp;rep=rep1&amp;type=pdf">Source</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>We can therefore conclude a reasonable range for income elasticity is ⅓ on the low end (given by analytical models) and 1.34 on the high end (given by empirical observations for the EU). This seems to be a relatively small range, but, as we will see in the next section, even small differences in assumed income elasticity lead to massively different estimates of velocity.</p><p>We can adjust the Baumol-Tobin equation to reflect this range in income elasticity by exponentiating Y by the desired elasticity <em>ε</em> rather than the constant ½.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/169/0*xeh_a-xDyrJRAO9W" /></figure><h4>Velocity under different inventory model assumptions</h4><p>The following table shows velocities implied by the range of model-derived and empirically observed income elasticities of money demand.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*5k0Zx2K3gpFD_-kJ" /><figcaption>Velocity sensitivity: income elasticity of demand vs transaction volume</figcaption></figure><p>As we can see, velocity is extremely sensitive to the income elasticity of demand. While the model-derived elasticities suggest velocities that are very high, empirically observed elasticities suggest velocities that are extremely low. This variance in velocities directly corresponds to high variance in modelled cryptoasset value since value is inversely proportional to velocity.</p><p>We can replicate this analysis for other input variables in the Baumol-Tobin model, such as the cost of conversion from reference asset to cryptoasset, <em>C</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*zSBR_UW9YbzhbXhF" /><figcaption>Velocity sensitivity: income elasticity of demand vs transaction cost</figcaption></figure><p>What causes these outsized changes in velocity for small changes in income elasticity? Elasticity manifests itself as an exponent in money demand models, which means it is extremely sensitive to small perturbations in elasticity.</p><p>Incidentally, the <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M1V">velocity of the U.S. M1 Money Supply</a> has hovered between 5 and 10, which is roughly in line with the implied velocities corresponding to the USA Empirical income elasticity of 0.84 in the sensitivity tables above.</p><h3>Conclusions</h3><p>Due to the large uncertainty around what level of income elasticity is appropriate to use (let alone other assumptions like conversion costs and interest elasticity) and the extreme sensitivity of the model to this assumption, it is quickly apparent that money demand models are very limited in their ability to provide additional insights into velocity. In addition to the sensitivity, these models are further limited due to the fact they replace one uncertain variable (velocity) with multiple, equally or more uncertain variables.</p><p><strong>At best, they can providing cross-validation and a sanity check of prior assumptions around velocity.</strong></p><p>[1] N. Gregory Mankiw, <em>Macroeconomics</em>, 2010, Section 4–2.</p><p>[2] The model logic can easily be extended to two return-generating alternative assets.</p><p>[3] Mankiw, Section 19–2.</p><p><strong>If you’d like to keep up with what we are doing:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/142/1*SLSkqLl-9Rb04qw_NMD53Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Follow us</strong>: <a href="https://twitter.com/LogosPayments">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://discord.gg/BB9CQwn">Discord</a> | <a href="https://web.telegram.org/#/im?p=@logosofficial">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/LogosPayments/">Reddit</a></p><p><strong>Read</strong>: <a href="https://www.logos.network/whitepaper">White paper</a> | <a href="https://www.logos.network/">Logos website</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e5bf71333934" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/velocity-and-demand-for-money-models-e5bf71333934">Velocity and Demand for Money Models</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network">Logos Network</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Empirical Velocity Estimates and Artificial Volumes in Ethereum]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/logos-network/empirical-velocity-estimates-and-artificial-volumes-in-ethereum-9aa3d93bb60?source=rss----92543331824d---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9aa3d93bb60</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Zochowski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 Feb 2019 22:21:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-26T22:21:39.432Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Eliminating self-churn from Ethereum transactions.</em></p><p>In a <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/cryptoasset-valuation-2-the-velocity-problem-8bbb4111c9c7">previous article</a>, we discussed token velocity and its impact on token valuation. In particular, I argued qualitatively that there are many costs associated with swapping tokens that make it unrealistic to expect velocities above 100. This can be quantified with a demand-for-money model such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baumol%E2%80%93Tobin_model">Baumol-Tobin</a>, but ultimately we end up relying on several murky assumptions. Furthermore, there are key considerations around the correlation or dependence between velocity and token GDP that complicates an analytical approach.</p><p>A more revealing, if less intellectually satisfying, approach is to empirically observe velocities of different assets. The easiest point of comparison is the US dollar, for which velocity data is <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M1V">readily available</a>. Recently, M1 USD velocity has hovered around 5.5. Since the Federal Reserve has pretty good insight into USD transactions, these estimates are likely accurate.</p><p>Similarly, we can naively estimate cryptoasset velocity in a relatively straightforward manner. It is easy to observe total Bitcoin transaction volumes and total Bitcoin supply and take their ratio, arriving at a velocity of around 2.1. However, there are a few issues with this calculation. For example, large numbers of Bitcoins are “hodl’d”, meaning they are effectively removed from circulation. This tends to artificially depress velocity. On the other hand, many Bitcoin transactions are not real transactions where one person is sending value to another person (more on this in a bit). This tends to artificially increase naive velocity.</p><p>Can we do better? Yes! Many of the issues arising from using Bitcoin as a reference arise because it is quite a poor payment rail (for target transaction use cases) right now — fees are high, finality times are slow, the currency is volatile, and so on. Luckily, we now have many better assets to reference — stablecoins. Since there is no possibility of their price increasing, there are no rational “hodl’ers” to account for.¹ Furthermore, they are more directly akin to true money, where holders are plausibly using it in real transactions.</p><p>To eliminate any further noise, it makes sense to set aside Tether — recognizing that there is some controversy around some of Tether’s funds, without commenting on the validity of these claims — and algorithmic stablecoins like DAI — where there are complicating factors around creation, redemption, and loans. We are then left with the audited full reserve stablecoins. Now that they all have existed for a few months, we have good, but still limited, data for <a href="https://etherscan.io/token/0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48">USDC</a>, <a href="https://etherscan.io/token/0x056fd409e1d7a124bd7017459dfea2f387b6d5cd">GUSD</a>, <a href="https://etherscan.io/token/0x8e870d67f660d95d5be530380d0ec0bd388289e1">PAX</a>, and <a href="https://etherscan.io/token/0x0000000000085d4780B73119b644AE5ecd22b376">TUSD</a>.</p><p>But there are still issues with the artificial transactions. If a user sends money between 2 addresses he owns, those transactions shouldn’t be counted in our volume numbers. Before diving into the data, then, it is worth first clearly defining our goal for calculating velocity.</p><h3>The Goal: Real Economic Transactions</h3><p>What do we want in our estimate of velocity? Most superficially, we are looking for the value that makes the basic M*V = P*Q true.² At a deeper level, P*Q represents the real economic transactions that are denominated in a money asset, such as the stablecoin. Regular users of the money asset will hold on to some inventory, and a marginal user that wishes to acquire the asset to transact will increase the value of M (whether through additional token issuance or value appreciation). Given that we can observe M, what we want is an accurate estimate of P*Q — the <em>bona fide</em> economic transaction volume on the network.</p><h3>The Problem: Self Churn and Artificial Volume</h3><p>As mentioned previously, the naive analysis is complicated by the fact that we know that many of the transactions observable on a blockchain are <em>not</em> real economic transactions.</p><p>The most common example of a transaction that we want to exclude is what has been dubbed “<em>self churn</em>”. In a UTXO network like Bitcoin, transactions have a change output that represents funds returned to the sender. Similarly, users will often consolidate or sweep their outstanding UTXOs into a single UTXO to clean up their wallet. Obviously, none of these transactions should be accurately counted as part of P*Q.</p><p>Self churn was perhaps first formalized by <a href="https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~smeiklejohn/files/imc13.pdf">Meiklejohn et al.</a> in 2013. Subsequently, it has become common for analysts to use heuristics to remove self churn from the system. For example, <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1709.02489.pdf">BlockSci</a> (section 3.4) proposes to eliminate (1) outputs controlled by an address linked to an input address (eliminates change transactions) and (2) outputs that are spent within <em>k</em> blocks. Similar heuristics have been used by <a href="https://www.blockchain.com/charts/n-transactions-excluding-chains-longer-than-100">Blockchain.com</a> and <a href="https://coinmetrics.io/introducing-adjusted-estimates/">Coinmetrics</a>.</p><p>Note that the heuristics are just that, and they are subject to false positives and false negatives; nevertheless, they are very useful in deriving order-of-magnitude estimates for transaction volume and velocity. BlockSci, for example, found that the naive method overstates BTC velocity <em>by a factor of 4</em>!</p><p>There is an issue when trying to apply these same heuristics to our selected stablecoins — the heuristics only work for a UTXO token, but the stablecoins are all ERC-20 tokens running on Ethereum, which uses an <a href="https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Design-Rationale#accounts-and-not-utxos">account system</a>. This means there is no way to trace individual coins through the system, and we can’t know if a particular send/receive within <em>k</em> blocks used the same tokens.</p><p>There has been very little work on how to identify self churn and other artificial volume in Ethereum or other account-based tokens. Coinmetrics proposed a “<a href="https://coinmetrics.io/realized-capitalization/">virtual UTXO</a>” mapping, but this is not sufficiently deterministic to apply the UTXO heuristics. Coinmetrics also published a case study on <a href="https://coinmetrics.io/introducing-adjusted-estimates/">eliminating transactions attributable to the mixer</a> that dominated transactions in 2017, but none of the stablecoins we are interested in were active during that period, and, besides, it does not actually eliminate many other sources of artificial transactions.</p><p><strong>The goal of this article is to lay out a methodology for identifying the artificial volumes in ERC-20 stablecoins that can give us better estimates of P*Q and V.</strong></p><h3>The Data: BigQuery</h3><p>All transaction data for decentralized networks can be downloaded from a full node, but that can take days (and is expensive) to download. A better alternative is to use Google BigQuery, which contains <a href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/data-analytics/ethereum-bigquery-public-dataset-smart-contract-analytics">SQL-ized Ethereum data</a> updated on a daily basis.</p><p>Here’s an example of how you can scrape all PAX transactions:</p><pre>SELECT</pre><pre>DATE(block_timestamp) as TxDate,</pre><pre>token_transfers.*</pre><pre>FROM</pre><pre>`bigquery-public-data.ethereum_blockchain.token_transfers` AS token_transfers</pre><pre>WHERE</pre><pre>token_transfers.token_address = ‘0x8e870d67f660d95d5be530380d0ec0bd388289e1’</pre><pre>ORDER BY</pre><pre>block_number</pre><pre># GUSD: 0x056fd409e1d7a124bd7017459dfea2f387b6d5cd</pre><pre># PAX: 0x8e870d67f660d95d5be530380d0ec0bd388289e1</pre><pre># TUSD: 0x8dd5fbce2f6a956c3022ba3663759011dd51e73e</pre><pre># USDC: 0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48</pre><p>You can find the token addresses on <a href="https://etherscan.io/token/0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48">Etherscan</a>.</p><p>From there, it’s easy to download the data into a CSV or pull it directly into your preferred data analysis environment (I like Python).</p><h3>Identifying Artificial Volume In Ethereum Stablecoins</h3><p>While none of the UTXO heuristics work directly with Ethereum’s account system, we can adapt several of them to filter out many of the artificial transactions. Furthermore, we can dig into the specific stablecoin ecosystem to identify some additional sources of inflated volume.</p><p>I have uploaded a <a href="https://github.com/mczochowski/articles/blob/master/velocity/stablecoin_velocities.py">Python script</a> to my Github that shows how these filters can be applied in practice. It is also handy for exploring stablecoins data generally. There are many cool insights that we may write about later, including inventory churn, transaction sizes, daily active users, and more.</p><h4>Filter 1: Remove self-sends</h4><p>There are a small number of transactions whose sending and receiving addresses are the same. By definition, no funds have changed hands, so we cut these transactions out.</p><h4>Filter 2: Remove Minting and Burning Activity</h4><p>All the stablecoins of interest have minting and burning features. When a user deposits fiat at the stablecoin issuer, an equivalent number of stablecoins are minted and delivered to the user. Similarly, when a user sends stablecoins to the issuer, the stablecoins are burned and an equivalent value of fiat is credited to their account.</p><p>This minting and burning activity appears as a real transaction in the blockchain, but it should not be counted for our purposes. In reality, it is just an exchange of one form of money for the other, but ownership never changes. As an extreme example, imagine a user mints and then immediately burns $1mm repeatedly 1000 times. That apparent $2bn in volume (both minting and burning are counted) is obviously not related to P*Q.</p><p>We can easily identify minting and burning transactions by those that are sent from or to the root address (0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000), respectively.</p><h4>Filter 3: Identifying Intermediate Mints and Burns</h4><p>Stablecoin issuers typically keep a “working capital” supply of stablecoins to make creation and redemption smoother. Thus, the lifecycle of a new coin involves minting by the token issuer to an intermediate address controlled by the issuer, and then a send to the user. As a result, the direct minting and burning filter only captures half the artificial volumes. While the token issuer effectively “finances” the stablecoins initially, it still is just a user switching from one form of USD to another rather than any real economic transactions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/478/0*jeJJ3BWQPi9v-v88" /><figcaption>Minting and burning addresses for various stablecoins</figcaption></figure><p>As shown in the table, the number of unique minting and burning addresses for all four stablecoins is minuscule compared to the total number of unique addresses involved in all transactions.</p><p>We can remove this artificial volume by removing any transactions sent from the intermediate minting addresses and any sent to the intermediate burning addresses.</p><h4>Filter 4: Exclude Known Exchanges</h4><p>Deposits into and withdrawals from exchanges cause multiple sources of artificial volume that do not reflect actual economic transactions.</p><p>First, a send into or withdrawal from an exchange is just moving money from one account to another controlled by the same user. While the stablecoin is then typically used to trade against other tokens, none of these transactions reflect those we are interested in — payment for a real good or service. Similarly, we don’t count brokerage account deposits or stock trading volumes in estimates of the USD M1 velocity or US GDP. There is some potential for false positives when people use the exchange as their liquid transactional wallet, but on a volume weighted basis these should be small compared to normal exchange usage.</p><p>Second, exchanges typically generate unique addresses for a particular user to deposit into (to make it easy for the exchange to track user activity), and then they are immediately sent to a consolidated, commingled account. See, for example, <a href="https://etherscan.io/token/0xa0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb48?a=0x5b273629b9fe1ac6ac013aa2370ceb4539dbe27f">these deposits of USDC into Huobi</a>. These clearly are spurious transactions for the purposes of calculating P*Q.</p><p>Third, there has been an idiosyncratic arbitrage opportunity related to how exchanges handle stablecoins and competitive practices of stablecoin issuers that has led to additional artificial volumes, particularly for GUSD and PAX. You can find a summary of these issues <a href="https://medium.com/@neutralproject/a-case-study-on-husd-752b16a2d1f8">here</a> and <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/stablecoin-crypto-price-war-paxos-gemini">here</a>.</p><p>Given these issues, we can justify eliminating all transactions involving known exchange addresses. Since exchanges generate unique addresses for specific users, it’s difficult to identify all addresses, but some of the later heuristics will help. Even some of the commingled addresses are not correctly identified. We can conclude that our estimates of volumes, therefore are generous, and the resulting estimates of velocity are conservative (biased high).</p><p>TokenAnalyst gives <a href="https://medium.com/tokenanalyst/classifying-ethereum-users-using-blockchain-data-dd6edb867de3">some background</a> on identifying exchange addresses, but I decided to rely on Etherscan’s <a href="https://etherscan.io/accounts/1?&amp;l=Exchange">exchange mapping</a>.</p><h4>Filter 5: Remove Temporary Addresses</h4><p>The last heuristic aims to replicate the standard UTXO assumption of removing temporary UTXOs.</p><p>We do so by finding all addresses that currently have a balance of 0 and the time difference between its first receive and its last send is less than <em>k</em> blocks. Here <em>k</em> must be larger than in Bitcoin due to the faster blocktime. I choose 60 blocks, or about 15 minutes, which is a standard confirmation wait time in Ethereum.</p><p>This heuristic will have more false negatives than its UTXO equivalent due to the structure of addresses. For example, an exchange deposit address (unique to the user) that is used twice, one day apart, and whose balance is immediately swept into a commingled address will not be flagged. Nevertheless, it is difficult to distinguish between these false negatives and legitimate addresses. Further work could explore matching up IN and OUT transactions and percentage of life at zero balance.</p><h3>Result: Adjusted Stablecoin Velocity Estimates</h3><p>The charts below show the rolling 30 day velocity estimates (in annualized terms) estimated first under the naive methodology (total volume / outstanding supply) and second using the self-churn filters.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/484/0*b55alziC3TJlTREP" /><figcaption>Velocities without removing self-churn appear to be ~10x USD velocity.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/498/0*nMPE9n9e0ec8XWiN" /><figcaption>Velocities with self-churn removed are in line with or lower than USD velocity.</figcaption></figure><p>The difference is quite stark. <strong>While the naive method indicates velocities ranging from 25 to 60, removing the artificial volumes shows a range of 2 to 10</strong>, in line with historically observed values for USD.</p><h4>Why the high velocities early?</h4><p>One interesting feature on both charts is the tendency for velocity to spike soon after the stablecoin debuts. There are a number of reasons for this unrelated to any real economic velocity.</p><p>Once the token is launched, significant quantities are minted and sent to early partners. While our minting filter can eliminate the initial transaction, it is very possible that those early partners then shifted around or tested the functionality of the tokens.</p><p>Additionally, token supply has historically been lowest at launch. Any transfer has an outsized impact during this period versus later periods. Partners that are testing integrations or even the stablecoin issuer itself sending test transactions will have their transactions magnified, and our filters cannot catch most of this activity.</p><p>In our internal models, we mitigate this issue by weighting by outstanding supply. Alternatively, the measurements can be smoothed by calculating total volume divided by average supply over the window. For simplicity, though, we stick with the basic calculation in this article and instead focus on the filters.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Velocity and token GDP are critical inputs to valuation models, and analytical models have led to wildly variable and unrealistic estimates. While data is limited, we can look at empirical evidence to get a better idea of what values velocity might take. Stablecoins are the closest asset we have to real-world use and eliminate many of the confounding factors like “hodl’ing”, and so they are the best source of empirical estimates.</p><p>Nevertheless, most of the transactions are not of interest in a velocity estimate for an economic valuation model. While some work has been done to identify such artificial volumes in Bitcoin and UTXO systems, little research has been done into account based systems like Ethereum and ERC-20-based stablecoins. We present a set of heuristic filters that can eliminate many, but not all, “self churn” transactions. We further estimate that these heuristics are conservative (more false negatives than false positives), meaning that velocities are overestimated. In spite of this, the filters are able to remove up to 90% of transaction volumes from the estimate.</p><p>There is a caveat to drawing definitive conclusions from these velocity estimates of 2 to 10. Ethereum and, by extension, its stablecoins have very limited usefulness for most real economic transactions. High fees, slow confirmation times, user experience frictions, and relative immaturity are all significant barriers.</p><p>Indeed, our conservative heuristics reveal that almost all transactions are not real economic transfers, and I would not be surprised if <em>bona fide</em> volumes are close to zero. This meshes with what we hear from the stablecoin issuers — right now, they are targeting traders and the nascent (but basically non-existent) smart contract payout economy rather than real payments until better platforms are found.</p><p>Going forward, ecosystem infrastructure will continue to improve, while networks like Logos will make transfers vastly more efficient, cost effective, and rapid, opening up many real-world payments use cases. These advances will plausibly reduce user frictions and increase velocity. As the cost of converting decreases, demand for working capital and thus average holding period decreases.</p><p>Nevertheless, we can confidently say that empirical evidence currently shows that decentralized stablecoins so far do not have meaningfully higher velocities than fiat currencies. To the extent that conclusions can be drawn, data supports the low velocity camp rather than the high velocity camp. The primary contribution of the article, the framework to eliminate artificial volumes in account-based systems, will be useful in monitoring changes as the ecosystem matures.</p><p>[1] This is a generalization; near stablecoin creation, there are potentially unanticipated nuances resulting from the issuer bootstrapping the network.</p><p>[2] Even if you are skeptical of projecting velocity values, accurately estimating P*Q should be of interest independent of model choice.</p><p><strong>If you’d like to keep up with what we are doing:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/142/1*SLSkqLl-9Rb04qw_NMD53Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Follow us</strong>: <a href="https://twitter.com/LogosPayments">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://discord.gg/BB9CQwn">Discord</a> | <a href="https://web.telegram.org/#/im?p=@logosofficial">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/LogosPayments/">Reddit</a></p><p><strong>Read</strong>: <a href="https://www.logos.network/whitepaper">White paper</a> | <a href="https://www.logos.network/">Logos website</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9aa3d93bb60" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/empirical-velocity-estimates-and-artificial-volumes-in-ethereum-9aa3d93bb60">Empirical Velocity Estimates and Artificial Volumes in Ethereum</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network">Logos Network</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Proof-of-Work Is Not Viable in the Long-Term]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/logos-network/why-proof-of-work-is-not-viable-in-the-long-term-dd96d2775e99?source=rss----92543331824d---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dd96d2775e99</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[network]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[algorithms]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Zochowski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Feb 2019 19:24:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-19T19:45:02.631Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>A literature review of the challenges facing Nakamoto Consensus.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RCwrJu7mG8AsmA85zQEU0w.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>Note: Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) are not consensus algorithms but rather Sybil control mechanisms that are compatible with a variety of consensus algorithms. For the sake of simplicity, in this article we will stick with popular convention and use PoW as a synonym for Nakamoto Consensus and PoS as a synonym for staking coupled with consensus algorithms like PBFT.</em></p><p>The success of Bitcoin and its pioneering Nakamoto Consensus based on proof-of-work showed incontrovertibly that decentralized networks can work and accrue value for users and network stakeholders by solving key problems such as Sybil control and economic incentivization. Nevertheless, it has been plagued in recent years by performance issues and inefficiencies, even with only marginal real-world adoption. Simultaneously, newer consensus models that promise greater efficiency and effectiveness have emerged, challenging proof-of-work’s hegemony as the choice for decentralized consensus.</p><p>In the face of these alternatives gaining traction, Bitcoin maximalists have become increasingly entrenched and dogmatic in their views, to the exclusion of reasonable discourse and empirical and mathematical evidence that challenges their views. Nevertheless, there is a growing pile of results that suggest that proof-of-work is not viable in the long-term for a healthy, mature network. While it served a key role as a proof-of-concept, it is strictly inferior to newer systems across all important aspects — security, cost, efficiency, performance.</p><p>In this article, I summarize the key issues that proof-of-work faces, both currently and as the network matures. For the sake of accessibility, I will keep things high level but will reference papers or articles that give additional technical details and proofs.</p><p>I will also keep the focus on proof-of-work and its challenges rather than its competitors, but the comparison throughout (whether explicitly or implicitly) is to proof-of-stake. For a more detailed discussion of PoS, I refer the reader to the myriad papers and articles that mathematically show how PoS improves on PoW, such as the<a href="https://www.logos.network/whitepaper"> Logos white paper</a>.</p><h3><strong>1. PoW has weak security compared to PoS and may be unstable at maturity</strong></h3><h4><strong>1a.</strong> PoW has poor economic/game theoretic security that results in instability</h4><p>Any trustless network must answer two questions: (1) what is the Byzantine security level (e.g. the network is secure assuming an attacker holds less than 50% of power), and (2) what is <strong>the probability that security level is met</strong>. Most projects answer (1), but (2) is just as critical. Distributed algorithm analysis gives us the Byzantine security level, but that alone is insufficient as it begs the question, <em>what is the probability a validator becomes malicious</em>? This is fundamentally a <em>game theory</em> question and can be answered via an analysis of the economic incentive system.</p><p>Nakamoto Consensus has a relatively weak economic model, and so incentive alignment for validators is quite poor. This is due to several reasons, including:</p><p><strong>1.</strong> Inability to harshly penalize validators (like in slashing). Since mining is inherently anonymous and open, it is impossible to blacklist a malicious validator from participating in the network, and there is no way to confiscate their mining equipment as punishment for misbehaving.</p><p><strong>2.</strong> Low correlation between the network value and the economic collateral of the validator. Mining equipment typically has a low “beta” (less than 1) to the value of the underlying network. While there is secular exposure, an attack on any particular network is unlikely to meaningfully impact the payout of a potential attacker. Ironically, the efforts of networks to thwart ASICs, which contribute to centralization (as discussed below), reduce this correlation to very low levels. Together with the lack of a direct penalization mechanism, this means that an attacker has only weak economic incentives to behave honestly.</p><p><strong>3.</strong> High variance of validator payoffs. PoW has a lottery effect: either you get a big reward by chance (block rewards and transaction fees), or you get nothing. This variance in payout leads to unstable economic equilibria and perverse incentives.</p><p><strong>4.</strong> Transaction finality is probabilistic, not guaranteed. After a transaction is included in a mined block, there is always a chance that a longer chain comes along and reverses the transaction, although this probability decreases as additional blocks are added.</p><p>These features lead to several known attack vectors and likely many more that are currently unknown that undermine the security and stability of the PoW system at maturity. Unfortunately, none of the root causes of these issues are correctable in PoW, which means that, even with increasing awareness of these attacks, there is no way to harden the system against most of them.</p><h4><strong>Original selfish miner attack</strong>:</h4><p>The first major game theoretic attack that can compromise the long-term viability of PoW consensus is the<a href="https://www.cs.cornell.edu/~ie53/publications/btcProcFC.pdf"> selfish miner attack</a>. Cornell researchers found that miners are economically incentivized to hide blocks they mine from the rest of the network to maximize their own payout. The idea is that only the selfish miner has the longest chain and so is advantaged in finding subsequent blocks; if another block is found on the old chain, the selfish miner can release their block and trigger a race condition that they might win.</p><p>This has major implications for both network decentralization and security:</p><blockquote>“We present an attack with which colluding miners obtain a revenue larger than their fair share. This attack can have significant consequences for Bitcoin: Rational miners will prefer to join the selfish miners, and the colluding group will increase in size until it becomes a majority. At this point, the Bitcoin system ceases to be a decentralized currency.”</blockquote><p>By hiding their blocks from the rest of the network, the selfish miners also reduce the effective hash power of the network since other miners are mining a stale chain and not contributing to the security of the network. If every miner is selfish, then effective hash power will only be a small fraction of deployed hash power. None of this requires miners to be outright malicious, just economically rational!</p><h4><strong>Selfish miner attack is way worse than previously thought</strong>:</h4><p>The original selfish miner paper proposed a modification to PoW that would eliminate the selfish miner attack for mining pools that control less than 25% of the hash rate. Nevertheless, subsequent research from Princeton found<a href="https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~smattw/CKWN-CCS16.pdf"> additional selfish miner problems</a> that occur when transaction fees grow relatively larger than the block rewards (<a href="https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2016/10/21/bitcoin-is-unstable-without-the-block-reward/">summary</a>). The paper outlines several deviant miner strategies that are economically rational, whereby miners undercut each other by promoting forks to capture large transaction fees:</p><blockquote>“Bitcoin provides two incentives for miners: block rewards and transaction fees. The former accounts for the vast majority of miner revenues at the beginning of the system, but it is expected to transition to the latter as the block rewards dwindle. There has been an implicit belief that whether miners are paid by block rewards or transaction fees does not affect the security of the block chain. We show that this is not the case. Our key insight is that with only transaction fees, the variance of the block reward is very high due to the exponentially distributed block arrival time, and it becomes attractive to fork a “wealthy” block to “steal” the rewards therein. <em>We show that this results in an equilibrium with undesirable properties for Bitcoin’s security and performance, and even non-equilibria in some circumstances</em>. We also revisit selfish mining and show that it can be made profitable for a miner with an arbitrarily low hash power share, and who is arbitrarily poorly connected within the network.”</blockquote><p>Thus, the economic equilibrium in a PoW network involves miners continuously undermining one another, leading to weaker network security and a centralization tendency. These perverse incentives are exacerbated at network maturity to the point that PoW networks will have seriously compromised security.</p><h4><strong>Hash renting minimizes the cost of a 51% attack:</strong></h4><p>These issues are made even worse by the growing ability of attackers to rent hash power rather than purchasing the equipment themselves. This means that the attacker’s exposure, however weak, to the correlation between mining equipment and network value, is eliminated. Combined with the tendency of miners to work against one another, resulting in lower effective network hash power, the cost of attacking a network via a 51% attack is much lower than typically thought.</p><p>Of course, as a whole, the owners of the mining equipment have some economic incentive to prevent such an attack. However, this is an economically irrational expectation in the absence of an enforcement mechanism (impossible in a pseudo-anonymous, decentralized network) due to the<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free-rider_problem"> free rider</a> and<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tragedy_of_the_commons"> Tragedy of the Commons</a> phenomena. The dominant <em>unilateral </em>strategy of any single miner is to rent out their hash rate for a better return, resulting in globally suboptimal Nash equilibrium.</p><p>Traditional security analysis of PoW assumes the attacker has fixed hash power, but, in reality, hash power can be acquired if economically rational. The resulting analysis shows that <em>transaction security against a 51% attack is far weaker than typically assumed</em>.</p><p>While the original Bitcoin white paper showed that the risk of a successful reorg attack for an attacker with less than 50% hash power declines <em>exponentially</em> with the number of blocks since validation, a<a href="https://www.bis.org/publ/work765.pdf"> recent BIS paper</a> shows that the game theoretic risk of an attack from <em>renting a majority of hash power</em> declines only <em>linearly</em> and depends highly on block fees/reward. This means that the required number of blocks for probabilistically secure transactions is much higher than anticipated, and oftentimes prohibitively long:</p><blockquote>“Equation (8) documents the high cost of decentralised payment security. For example, say that Bitcoin users are on average prepared to pay transaction costs of 1%, that rented hash power is twice as expensive as the underlying price of equipment and electricity for honest miners, and that bitcoin would lose one third of its value after a successful attack. Then, the required waiting time is 50 blocks (over eight hours). But if the average transaction cost is 0.1%, the required waiting time is 500 blocks, ie around three and a half days! … If users wait for six blocks or fewer (about one hour), the required average transaction costs (as a percentage of the transaction amount) are about 8.3%!”</blockquote><p>So the higher the transaction fee (or block reward), the better the security. Unfortunately, this has a perverse interaction with the selfish miner attacks, whereby miners’ incentive to undermine each other increases as miner fees increase!</p><p>Additionally, there is yet another free rider problem with how users decide on transaction fees that results, at equilibrium, in untenable finality times:</p><blockquote>“The key result is that the fee set on a decentralised basis is much lower than the optimal fee, resulting in extreme waiting times… With the above example of an attacker disadvantage of 1/2, 1,000 transactions, and a cost of waiting of 1% per block, the optimal fee is set at 7.07% of the payment … (resulting [waiting time is] around seven blocks), while it is set at 1%/1000=0.001% in the decentralised game. The resulting waiting time is 50,000 blocks, equivalent to almost a year!”</blockquote><p>The key implication of these attacks is that: (1) Unless the block reward dominates transaction fees (meaning inflation is high), rational economic miners will undermine the network security; (2) unless miner rewards are very high (and transactions are very expensive), then wait time to finality will be prohibitive; and (3) proof-of-stake systems with proper incentive structures will very easily exceed the security level of Bitcoin/proof-of-work. All of these tradeoffs render PoW prohibitively limited for store-of-value, payments, and other use cases</p><h4><strong>Empirical evidence of poor economic security: Successful 51% attacks</strong></h4><p>It is becoming increasingly easier to<a href="https://www.crypto51.app/"> rent</a><a href="https://medium.com/@HusamABBOUD/the-realistic-lucrative-case-of-ethereum-classic-attack-with-1mm-today-8fa0430a7c25"> hash power</a> to attack a PoW network, even in Bitcoin (less than $300k for a 1 hour attack). This has resulted in several successful 51% attacks over the past 18 months (and<a href="https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=332584.0"> historically</a>).</p><p>Victims include:</p><p>— <a href="https://blog.coinbase.com/ethereum-classic-etc-is-currently-being-51-attacked-33be13ce32de">Ethereum Classic</a></p><p>— Verge<a href="https://www.ccn.com/1-1-million-malicious-miner-exploits-verge-network-for-seven-figure-payday/"> 1</a><a href="https://www.ccn.com/privacy-coin-verge-succumbs-to-51-attack-again/"> 2</a><a href="https://blockexplorer.com/news/third-times-a-charm-verge-suffers-51-attack-yet-again/"> 3</a></p><p>— <a href="http://fortune.com/2018/05/29/bitcoin-gold-hack/">Bitcoin Gold</a></p><p>— <a href="https://www.ccn.com/vertcoin-hit-by-51-attack-allegedly-lost-100000-in-double-spending/">Vertcoin</a></p><h4>1b. PoW has an inherent inclination toward centralization</h4><p>There are several strong factors that result in a heavy incentive to centralize in any proof-of-work consensus:</p><p>— High cost of mining and sensitivity to operating and input costs like electricity price lead to huge economies of scale. Geographic differences exacerbate this phenomenon.</p><p>— Validators are inherently in a race with one another, which has resulted in the development of specialized<a href="http://bitcoinfibre.org/"> relay networks</a> between cartels of miners.</p><p>— Selfish miner attacks incentivize economically rational miners to form large cartels that can undermine other miner groups.</p><p>— The lottery effect of miner rewards leads to high variance of payout, incentivizing miners to consolidate or form pools that are centrally directed. This idea can be quantified by noting that a miner’s risk adjusted returns (analogous to<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharpe_ratio"> Sharpe ratio</a>) are monotonically increasing with share of mining power: <em>x/sqrt(x*(1-x))</em>. This means that it is <em>always</em> better unilaterally to consolidate.</p><p>Economic analysis of these factors suggests that<a href="https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2015/5/cj-v35n2-12.pdf"> mining is a natural monopoly</a>.</p><p>Centralization tendencies have proven to be empirically true in<a href="https://btc.com/stats/pool?pool_mode=week"> Bitcoin</a>,<a href="https://www.etherchain.org/charts/topMiners"> Ethereum</a>, and other proof-of-work networks, where large pools dominate hash power. This has been confirmed by<a href="http://hackingdistributed.com/2018/01/15/decentralization-bitcoin-ethereum/"> academic</a><a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.03998.pdf"> researchers</a>:</p><blockquote>“Both Bitcoin and Ethereum mining are very centralized, with the top four miners in Bitcoin and the top three miners in Ethereum controlling more than 50% of the hash rate. The entire blockchain for both systems is determined by fewer than 20 mining entities. While traditional Byzantine quorum systems operate in a different model than Bitcoin and Ethereum, a Byzantine quorum system with 20 nodes would be more decentralized than Bitcoin or Ethereum with significantly fewer resource costs. Of course, the design of a quorum protocol that provides open participation, while fairly selecting 20 nodes to sequence transactions, is non-trivial.”¹</blockquote><p>This practical centralization has led to substantial agency and governance problems, such as in the Bitcoin Cash/Bitcoin SV fork.</p><p>Ultimately, centralization carries a high risk for any decentralized network whose security relies on assumptions of good validator behavior. Even though miners (for the most part) have acted relatively benignly, they are entirely unregulated and far less trustworthy than traditional institutions. Replacing an established, regulated, public system with an unregulated, anonymous one where the miners can arbitrarily attack the system is a poor tradeoff. This is particularly an issue due to the lack of economic incentives in place to police behavior.</p><p>The factors that result in a centralized equilibrium in proof-of-work either do not exist or are substantially attenuated in proof-of-stake.</p><h4>1c. Nakamoto Consensus is not fully Byzantine fault tolerant; even with modifications it can only provide probabilistic guarantees</h4><p>A basic requirement of a trustless network is that it provides a sufficient level of Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT); otherwise, how can you trust a network with potentially malicious participants? It has been known for several years that vanilla Nakamoto Consensus (as used by Bitcoin)<a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/765.pdf"> is not truly BFT</a>, even <em>probabilistically</em>:</p><blockquote>“It is easy to see that Validity cannot be guaranteed with overwhelming probability unless the hashing power of the adversary is negligible compared to the honest players, i.e., t/n is negligible. This is because in case the adversary finds a solution first, then every honest player will extend the adversary’s solution and switch to the adversarial input hence abandoning the original input. While one can still show that Validity can be ensured with non-zero probability (and thus the protocol fails gracefully assuming honest majority), [Nakamoto Consensus] falls short from providing a solution to BA [Byzantine Agreement].”</blockquote><p>See also<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Science-Blockchain-Roger-Wattenhofer-ebook/dp/B01B5WMUT0/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&amp;qid=&amp;sr=&amp;dpID=51d7kmvFpzL&amp;preST=_SY445_QL70_&amp;dpSrc=detail"> Wattenhofer, R. The Science of the Blockchain</a>, which argues that Bitcoin’s security properties are quite weak.</p><p>It has been shown that Nakamoto Consensus can be modified to provide probabilistic BFT (albeit with a 33% BFT, rather than the oft-quoted 51%), but given the governance issues with Bitcoin, it seems unlikely that any attempt to majorly change the protocol will be unsuccessful.</p><p>While Bitcoin has not suffered major double spend attacks yet (that we know of), relying on the benevolence of unregulated and low trust miners is an exceedingly poor security model. Who is to say they won’t attack the system going forward?</p><h4>1d. Even ignoring the correlation issue, the economic power securing PoW is lower than in the equivalent in PoS</h4><p>While Bitcoin appears to have a huge lead in economic security based purely on the value of the mining equipment behind it, <em>in expectation</em> an equivalently valued PoS network would have much more security, even ignoring any incentive alignments.</p><p>This is most easily seen from an investment lens. A validator on a PoW and PoS network both need to make an economic investment to gain validating power: mining equipment in the former, stake in the latter. The aggregate investment by the validators on the network must correspond to an economically efficient return on investment (ROI) for a given total validator reward (inflation + transaction fees), taking into account the costs of validation and risk (including variance of income).</p><p>PoS comes out ahead across all of these factors, thus ensuring that a PoS network will have more economic value securing the network than a PoW network, <em>ceteris paribus</em>. PoW has substantially higher costs due to the depreciation of assets and PoW security: as better miners develop, the value of existing miners falls, and the electricity costs that contribute to the security of historical blocks also falls (because it costs less to replicate that same work). Conversely, PoS stake does not depreciate <em>per se</em> (although it does have market exposure). PoW also has substantially higher income variance compared to a well-structured PoS network that eliminates the lottery effect present in PoW.</p><p>It is also relatively easy for a new staking-based network to bootstrap quickly to very high economic security and overcome the security advantage of Bitcoin. Specifically, the very existence of network value (and any subsequent accrual) confers security immediately without additional capex. In other words, mining hash power is definitively <em>not</em> a “killer feature”, as some claim.</p><p>Putting all these factors together in an example, let’s say a new network with PoS + slashing + classical non-probabilistic consensus is worth $100mm (at market price). It is plausible that validators could stake $30mm. If the network is tolerant of up to 1/3 malicious validators by stake, then the economic security of a particular transaction is $10mm. Conversely, as stated previously, a double spend in Bitcoin (by far the most valuable PoW network) could be plausibly achieved for well less than $1mm by renting sufficient hash power for several hours. This is a <em>6,300x difference in security</em> when normalizing for network value!</p><h4>1e. Practical security issues: Simple Payment Verification</h4><p>The vast majority of users on any network cannot be expected to run full nodes and maintain complete local copies of the entire network state. Instead, such users will rely on light wallets that connect to third-party full nodes and ask for updated network information. When the user receives a payment and wishes to confirm that it was processed correctly, they can ask the node for the latest chain and look for the transaction in the appropriate block. This is called simple payment verification (SPV).</p><p>While a full node does not need to trust its peers on the network (assuming non-pathological connectivity) because it is monitoring the blockchain real-time, a SPV user in a PoW network does need to trust that the full node did, in fact, send the longest chain and not some false fork. This can be mitigated by asking several nodes for the longest chain and calculating which has the most accumulated work. While the probability of successful duping decreases exponentially with the number of nodes queried (unless attackers have overloaded the user’s peer table, which is far easier in a SPV context than in a full node), verifying the work is an expensive process on limited hardware.</p><p>There has been some research into making this process more efficient (see, for example,<a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/963.pdf"> proofs-of-proof-of-work</a>), but the problem remains the same: unless you are running a full node, there is some trust required. This is a consequence of the unpredictability of who will add the next block to the chain and the probabilistic consensus. In a PoS context (when properly constructed), a recipient of a transaction can verify that the transaction is completely final and genuine with a simple certificate showing the appropriate validator signatures.² This problem cannot be fixed in PoW, only mitigated, while it can be solved in PoS.</p><h3>2. Severely limited scalability</h3><p><em>Note: here, using PoW and Nakamoto consensus interchangeably gets a bit awkward. There are some PoW-compatible consensus algorithms that mitigate some of the scalability issues with Nakamoto consensus, such as </em><a href="https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity16/sec16_paper_kokoris-kogias.pdf"><em>ByzCoin</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1159.pdf"><em>SPECTRE</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/992.pdf"><em>Prism</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/917.pdf"><em>Hybrid Consensus</em></a><em>. Nevertheless, these systems all suffer from all the issues presented in other sections and still have suboptimal performance due to using PoW insofar as resources used to compute PoW (which dominates overall computations) could otherwise be used for direct transaction validation. Nakamoto consensus networks like Bitcoin and Litecoin are the primary subjects of this section.</em></p><h4>2a. Inherent mathematical limits on scalability due to block propagation before security guarantees break down</h4><p>Proof-of-work has mathematical limits on scalability that are substantially lower than hardware limits. Specifically, <em>the combination of block frequency and block size must be bounded to maintain security</em>. This bounds throughput to low hundreds of TPS, <strong>far below requirements for many practical applications</strong>. These bounds <em>cannot</em> be avoided in proof-of-work, but they can in proof-of-stake. Attempts to increase capacity by decreasing the block time or increasing the block size very quickly become unintentional but serious threats to security.</p><p>The fact that PoW is inherently bound by architecture rather than hardware was first rigorously demonstrated mathematically by a<a href="https://fc16.ifca.ai/bitcoin/papers/CDE+16.pdf"> consortium of researchers in 2016</a>:</p><blockquote>“We analyze how fundamental and circumstantial bottlenecks in Bitcoin limit the ability of its current peer-to-peer overlay network to support substantially higher throughputs and lower latencies. Our results suggest that reparameterization of block size and intervals should be viewed only as a first increment toward achieving next-generation, high-load blockchain protocols, and major advances will additionally require a basic rethinking of technical approaches.”</blockquote><p>The basic idea is that security in PoW relies on as many miners as possible working on the longest chain. Otherwise, they will be working on competing or stale chains (i.e., forks of the true longest chain) and not contributing to the network security. This, in turn, limits the network throughput according to the speed at which data can propagate sufficiently through the peer-to-peer gossip network. Based on empirical observations of full node hardware and propagation speeds, it is possible to estimate reasonable limits on maximum safe throughput and latency:</p><blockquote>“Observation 1 (Throughput limit) Given the current overlay network and today’s 10 minute average block interval, the block size should not exceed 4MB. A 4MB block size corresponds to a throughput of at most 27 transactions/sec.</blockquote><blockquote>Observation 2 (Latency limit) Given today’s overlay network, to retain at least 90% effective throughput and fully utilize the bandwidth of the network, the block interval should not be significantly smaller than 12s.”</blockquote><p>These results were also nicely summarized in the<a href="https://bloxroute.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/bloXroute-whitepaper.pdf"> bloxRoute whitepaper</a>:</p><blockquote>“An attempt to increase the block size (B) by a factor of 10, which would increase system capacity to ∼ 30 TPS, would increase the propagation time to t90th = 116 seconds. This in turn would increase the probability for a fork to occur to P(fork) = 17.58%, which is unacceptable for real-world usability. More importantly, it would increase the probability for a fork to remain unresolved for 6 blocks by a factor of 600,000, and users will have to wait for 14 blocks to be mined to maintain the same level of confidence. <em>Scaling the system to ∼ 300 TPS, which is at least one order of magnitude too small for wide real-world adoption, would keep the blockchain at a continuous state of fork</em>.”</blockquote><h4>2b. Nakamoto Consensus requires a strict synchronicity assumption that bounds performance</h4><p>To ensure basic security properties such as consistency, Nakamoto consensus requires confirmation times to be proportional to a conservative upper bound on network delay. In practice, this upper bound must be large, <strong>substantially limiting potential performance</strong>.</p><p><a href="http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2017/8004/pdf/LIPIcs-DISC-2017-39.pdf">Pass and Shi</a> summarized the issues that this presents in practice (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>“Remarkedly, the famous Nakamoto blockchain (that underlies Bitcoin) also works only in the synchronous model where the protocol must know an a-priori upper bound of the network delay (henceforth denoted ∆). Otherwise, if a delay upper bound ∆ is unknown, Pass et al. [<a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/454.pdf">link</a>] shows that Nakamoto blockchain’s security can be broken. Pass et al. also show that the expected block interval of Nakamoto’s blockchain must be set to be, roughly speaking, a constant factor larger than ∆ for consistency.</blockquote><blockquote><em>Relying [on] a synchronous model, however, can be undesirable in practice</em>. Since the synchrony parameter ∆ must be set conservatively to leave a sufficient safety margin, in practice the actual network’s delay is typically much better than this pessimistic upper bound. <em>Unfortunately, any protocol that must wait for at least one synchronous round (or one blockinterval) for transaction confirmation cannot benefit from the network’s actual performance</em>.”</blockquote><p>This strong synchronicity requirement is not only an issue with performance, but also with security. <a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/578.pdf">Gervais et al.</a>, for example, demonstrated several potential attack vectors related to the need for fast propagation of blocks in Bitcoin:</p><blockquote>“We show that current scalability measures adopted by Bitcoin come at odds with the security of the system. More specifically, we show that an adversary can exploit these measures in order to effectively delay the propagation of transactions and blocks to specific nodes — without causing a network partitioning in the system. <em>We show that this allows the adversary to easily mount Denial-of-Service attacks, considerably increase its mining advantage in the network, and double-spend transactions in spite of the current countermeasures adopted by Bitcoin</em>.”</blockquote><h4>2c. Practical incompatibility with scaling layers like Lightning and Sharding</h4><p>Given the impossibility of safely scaling the first layer, much excitement has been centered around second layers and payment channels like Lightning Network as a way of achieving scalability while using the first layer as primarily a settlement layer for opening and closing channels.</p><p>There are several fundamental issues with assuming Lightning and other second layers will be a silver bullet solution for all payments needs. These include channel drift towards merchants, centralization concerns,<a href="https://twitter.com/el33th4xor/status/1011296476637605890?s=21"> routing difficulties for non-trivial payment amounts</a>, and lockups of value in channels for extended periods of time. While these solutions are very promising for some targeted use cases (e.g. micropayments), in general they are a very incomplete solution for general payments, including some of the most compelling use cases like point-of-sale.</p><p>Since this result is generally well established, it is more important to note that first layer scalability is required for even these narrow use cases from both practical and security perspectives. That is, higher-layer throughput is a function of first layer capacity, not independent as many assume, and claims of “infinite scalability” fail to recognize this reality. As such, Bitcoin/proof-of-work is not <em>practically </em>compatible with second layer scalability.</p><p>I explained these practical and theoretical issues of second layers in a PoW context, where the first layer cannot provide adequate supporting capacity, in<a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/second-layers-are-not-the-scalability-silver-bullet-a9d262bc816c"> a previous article</a>, to which I refer readers for more detail.</p><p>First layer scalability solutions also present a challenge. Most notably, sharding has proven to be very difficult under the legacy crypto model (blockchain + proof-of-work consensus), and the outlook for viable sharding is bleak without drastic changes (e.g. proof-of-stake with a more sharding compatible data structure). Regardless, sharding can only<a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/sharding-how-many-shards-are-safe-bc361c487083"> safely scale a first layer 10–50x given statistical realities</a> (despite claims to the contrary that assume the wrong statistical distribution), and thus is inadequate in and of itself.</p><h3>3. Other Issues</h3><h4>3a. Energy inefficiency</h4><p>The environmental issues with proof-of-work are well known. Less appreciated is the practical usability impact it has. By requiring a large amount of energy per transaction, the fee per transaction (either direct or indirect via inflation) must be high enough to make up for that real cost. Lowering the energy per transaction of course commensurately lowers the security of each transaction. This makes proof-of-work far less efficient than proof-of-stake.</p><p>A<a href="https://www.cell.com/joule/pdf/S2542-4351(18)30177-6.pdf"> recent economic analysis</a> contextualized this energy inefficiency (emphasis added):</p><blockquote>“The Bitcoin network consumes at least 2.55 GW of electricity currently, and that it could reach a consumption of 7.67 GW in the future, <strong>making it comparable with countries such as Ireland (3.1 GW) and Austria (8.2 GW)</strong>. Additionally, economic models tell us that Bitcoin’s electricity consumption will gravitate toward the latter figure. A look at Bitcoin miner production estimates suggests that this figure could already be reached in 2018. With the Bitcoin network processing just 200,000 transactions per day, this means that the average electricity consumed per transaction equals at least 300 kWh, and could exceed 900 kWh per transaction by the end of 2018 … Bitcoin has a big problem, and it is growing fast.”</blockquote><h4>3b. Expense</h4><p>The inefficiency of the Bitcoin in terms of energy and other factors results in a significant cost: the average Bitcoin transaction costs about $25 in total validator reward. The bulk of this cost is paid indirectly via inflation, but it is a real cost nonetheless, as I discussed in a <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/crypto-transaction-fee-economics-primer-948d1d93a4f5">recent article</a>. As many validators have recently halted their activity due to price declines, we can be pretty sure that the current cost is close to the marginal cost of validation, i.e. there is no economic rent paid to miners. This means that we would not expect, at a mature equilibrium, substantially lower fees.</p><p>This expense is prohibitive for the vast majority of potential use cases and severely limits the usability of Bitcoin or any other successful PoW network.</p><h4>3c. Confirmation latency</h4><p>PoW consensus is, by construction, probabilistic. That is, a transaction is not finalized when it is included in a block since there is always a chance that an alternative chain overtakes it. The rule of thumb in Bitcoin is to wait 6 blocks — waiting any less puts the recipient at serious risk of becoming a victim of a double spend attack. As stated previously, this analysis is faulty in that it assumes constant attacker power; more robust, game-theoretic analysis suggests that the appropriate waiting time (at a mature state of the network) is far longer.</p><p>Regardless, even at just 6 blocks, Bitcoin requires recipients to wait 1 hour for a transaction to be confirmed in expectation. Since accumulated hash power is linear in time, increasing the block time (as in Ethereum) does nothing to decrease the latency for a given security level.³</p><p>While latency on the order of 15 minutes to 1 hour is fine in some contexts (wires, remittances, etc), it is prohibitive in many practical payments contexts that could benefit the most from DLT. Furthermore, even for those use cases where such a wait time is acceptable, there is a potentially large cost of exposure to the volatility of Bitcoin or network token, which cannot be minimized below this confirmation window.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>While Bitcoin and proof-of-work has proven invaluable in bootstrapping the public’s understanding and acceptance of the concept of cryptocurrencies, it is critically hamstrung as the backbone of a viable, long-term solution.</p><p>There are serious security issues inherent in proof-of-work, and the traditional framework for parameterizing risks has proven to be woefully inadequate given increased understanding of the game theory of crypto networks. This is exacerbated by poor economic incentive alignment and the rise of a robust hash power market, both of which make it relatively inexpensive to pull off a 51% attack. Even in the absence of malice, the variance of miner incentives and lack of a punishment mechanism make PoW unstable without significant, long-run inflation, calling into question its viability even just as a pure store of value. Other factors, such as centralization tendencies and questionable mathematical basis of Byzantine fault tolerance, further undermine security.</p><p>PoW also suffers from performance issues that are not correctable given our current understanding. The first layer is inherently limited by consensus rather than hardware at very low capacities of (generously) low hundreds of TPS or less, while first layer scaling solutions like sharding are largely incompatible with PoW. The limited capacity of the first layer in turn makes PoW networks unsuitable for second layers due to both practical and security considerations. Confirmation latency similarly is constrained at high levels of 15 minutes or more, without any way to meaningfully shorten it.</p><p>Finally, inefficiencies such as energy usage lead to high costs per transaction, even with relatively weak security.</p><p>Given the evidence, it is hard to conclude anything other than that Bitcoin and proof-of-work is not the long-term answer for the decentralized applications of tomorrow. An alternative solution that solves all of these issues is non-trivial to construct, but it is certainly possible. Currently, the most promising approach involves a proof-of-stake Sybil control mechanism coupled with a non-probabilistic, classical consensus algorithm with a strong economic incentive system that includes features like slashing and low reward variance. Such a system can dramatically improve capacity, reduce confirmation latency, and minimize fees and is compatible with additional scaling solutions like second layers and sharding.</p><p>Unfortunately, due to the value at stake, the crypto space has become increasingly ideological and loathe to accept results that challenge established views. It is critical that participants and stakeholders move beyond tribalism and reembrace the spirit of cooperative innovation that characterized the early days of crypto in order to deliver on the transformative potential that Bitcoin originally promised.</p><p>[1] This is what Logos achieves.</p><p>[2] For a concrete example, see the<a href="https://www.logos.network/whitepaper"> Logos white paper</a>.</p><p>[3] Increasing the block time does not decrease expected wait time in minutes at a given security parameter, but it does decrease variance.</p><p><strong>If you’d like to keep up with what we are doing:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/142/1*SLSkqLl-9Rb04qw_NMD53Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Follow us</strong>: <a href="https://twitter.com/LogosPayments">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://discord.gg/BB9CQwn">Discord</a> | <a href="https://web.telegram.org/#/im?p=@logosofficial">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/LogosPayments/">Reddit</a></p><p><strong>Read</strong>: <a href="https://www.logos.network/whitepaper">White paper</a> | <a href="https://www.logos.network/">Logos website</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dd96d2775e99" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/why-proof-of-work-is-not-viable-in-the-long-term-dd96d2775e99">Why Proof-of-Work Is Not Viable in the Long-Term</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network">Logos Network</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Community Spotlight: Joe Alie, Director of Business Development]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/logos-network/logos-community-spotlight-7113a4d36fa1?source=rss----92543331824d---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7113a4d36fa1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance-and-banking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[team]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Logos Network]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Feb 2019 14:20:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-19T17:14:09.477Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Z9hj_GvIhvtRv-UFen24mg.png" /></figure><p>For this week’s <strong>Community Spotlight</strong>, we’re joined by our <strong>Director of Business Development, Joe Alie</strong>. Joe brings financial analysis and business development expertise from his time in the mergers &amp; acquisitions group at Evercore and private equity group at Audax. It was exciting to hear how he made the transition from private equity to blockchain and why he believes the cryptocurrency industry can move from speculation to mainstream adoption.</p><p><strong>Hi Joe! Thanks for joining us today. Could you give the readers some background on yourself?</strong></p><p>Great to be here! My professional experience from the mergers &amp; acquisitions group at Evercore and private equity group at Audax includes financial analysis, investing, and business development. As an investment associate at Audax, I led diligence processes for platform investments and add-on acquisitions across multiple asset classes and industry sectors. In this capacity, I also worked hand-in-hand with portfolio company executives to evaluate market opportunities, monitor financial performance, and execute on strategic initiatives.</p><p>Prior to entering the workforce, I received a B.A. in Economics from Harvard University, where I was a member of the wrestling team and actively involved in several finance organizations on campus.</p><p><strong>What got you into blockchain technology, and, more importantly, what excited you about Logos?</strong></p><p>I began researching blockchain technology more closely during the bull run in 2017, but was hesitant to enter the industry full time as the existing decentralized networks were unable to compete with centralized networks in terms of transaction capacity, speed, and cost.</p><p>However, when Logos’ founder and a classmate of mine at Harvard, <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/team-member-spotlight-michael-zochowski-founder-and-ceo-9ed9187de0bf">Michael Zochowski</a>, introduced me to his project, I was blown away by the initial test results of the <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/alpha-implementation-benchmarking-and-demo-d1c4d9dbba8f">prototype</a> and its potential to outperform existing credit card networks. Out of the many projects that crossed my desk, this was the first that I believed would gain real-world traction as a payments network and transaction infrastructure for the future. Given all this, I couldn’t wait to jump on board!</p><p><strong>As you are coming from a more traditional finance background, could you speak to how cryptocurrency and blockchain technology is viewed within that industry, and do you think those views are evolving?</strong></p><p>As an alternative payment solution, a network like Logos can save businesses 1–3% in credit card fees. Putting on my private equity lens, this translates to a massive improvement in margin and cash flow profiles, which is an attractive value-add to any active investor.</p><p>Achieving these savings is as simple as adding Logos as a payment option with a few lines of website code and transacting with digital U.S. dollars (i.e. stablecoins). It should really be a seamless user experience where folks are abstracted from the underlying blockchain technology but are still able to reap its benefits. The cost to implement is low and the upside in savings, efficiency, and security is high, which I believe will drive widespread adoption among PE-backed businesses in the near future.</p><p><strong>How do you think your previous private equity skills will transfer to a relatively new industry that is encompassed in speculation and help drive mainstream adoption for Logos?</strong></p><p>Translating an investment thesis into real-world growth requires a holistic understanding of a company’s go-to-market strategy, including product differentiation, addressable markets, value chain dynamics, competitive landscape, and consumer preferences. Private equity does an exceptional job of evaluating these key components to growth via a comprehensive diligence process, and then providing ongoing support for their portfolio companies in order to drive these goals to fruition.</p><p>A similar degree of financial and business sophistication is required to advance the cryptocurrency industry from one of speculation to mainstream adoption. I hope to bring this same approach to Logos where we will actively support our strategic partners and users so that they can finally realize the value-add economics and operational efficiencies of this distributed ledger technology.</p><p><strong>Lastly, any advice for someone trying to get into the field from a traditional finance background?</strong></p><p>Blockchain is an attractive and growing industry that has historically focused on the technology/engineering but is actively transitioning to a more business-minded model in order to drive adoption and strategic partnerships. I think people with traditional finance backgrounds can play a critical role in driving this transition and increasing the level of sophistication within the crypto world.</p><p>In fact, The Block has done a great job of documenting employees who have left Wall Street jobs at <a href="https://www.theblockcrypto.com/2018/11/30/from-banks-to-bitcoin-goldman-sachs-employees-that-have-left-wall-street-for-the-crypto-world/">Goldman Sachs</a> and <a href="https://www.theblockcrypto.com/2018/12/05/from-banks-to-bitcoin-j-p-morgan-employees-who-have-left-wall-street-for-the-crypto-world/">J.P. Morgan</a> for the crypto world, so the transition is well underway!</p><p><strong>Within Logos:</strong> Joe is the Director of Business Development overseeing Logos’ strategic partnerships, go-to-market strategy and other functional departments, including FP&amp;A, investor relations and content development. He is also in a leading role in enabling a stablecoin platform on top of the Logos Network in order to facilitate many of the initial use cases.</p><p><strong>If you’d like to keep up with what we are doing:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/142/1*SLSkqLl-9Rb04qw_NMD53Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Follow us</strong>: <a href="https://twitter.com/LogosPayments">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://discord.gg/BB9CQwn">Discord</a> | <a href="https://web.telegram.org/#/im?p=@logosofficial">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/LogosPayments/">Reddit</a></p><p><strong>Read</strong>: <a href="https://www.logos.network/whitepaper">White paper</a> | <a href="https://www.logos.network/">Logos website</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7113a4d36fa1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/logos-community-spotlight-7113a4d36fa1">Community Spotlight: Joe Alie, Director of Business Development</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network">Logos Network</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Logos Tech Update]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/logos-network/logos-tech-update-fa115ffef7ab?source=rss----92543331824d---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fa115ffef7ab</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[software-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[payments]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Carl Hua]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2019 22:29:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-15T18:29:51.100Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uTUkrVSm-h8eSsjauVKpKg.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>February: Kick off, token capability, Logos Web Wallet SDK</em></p><p>For us at Logos, our community means a great deal, and we’d like to include you in the conversation and progress of what our team is doing. On a regular basis, we’ll be publishing our updates, so check back in, inquire about our process, and ask questions — we welcome all feedback!</p><p>And without further ado….</p><p>After a string of major development milestones coming in at the end of 2018 — the conclusion of the R1 build in November and the launch of the permissioned test net in December — we have hit an intermediate period where we are heads down working on the <strong>R2 build, to be completed by the end of February.</strong></p><p>In the meantime, the engineering effort has had several notable achievements. Prime among them was <strong>the release of the core software development kit (SDK) in early January</strong>, which has enabled us to work on integrations with some of our early partners. Since we last recapped our progress, there have been several additional developments:</p><ul><li><strong>Token Capability</strong> is under active development and is to be released with R2. Logos’ token capability provides a superset of ERC-20 capabilities at the protocol level, making it as easy as possible to release fungible tokens natively on the Logos platform.</li><li><strong>Initial release of Logos Web Wallet SDK.</strong> This enables developers to interact with the Web Wallet API to develop additional integrations and tools.</li><li><strong>Planned permissioned test net upgrade.</strong> Bug fixes and performance enhancements. Continuously deployed.</li><li><strong>Automated distributed test infrastructure implementation kickoff.</strong> We are converting the prototype into a streamlined automated test infrastructure to better perform sanity checks during integrations.</li></ul><p>After R2, we will have most core features implemented, with the remainder to be put into place in R3, due in May. We’ll continue to release additional features on the test net for integrations and testing. If you are not already using the test net and would like access, please contact us and we’ll be happy to get you connected!</p><p>We’ll continue to send out development updates going forward as part of the regular newsletter. Stay tuned!</p><p>Onward,</p><p>Carl</p><p><strong>If you’d like to keep up with what we are doing:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/142/1*SLSkqLl-9Rb04qw_NMD53Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Follow us</strong>: <a href="https://twitter.com/LogosPayments">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://discord.gg/BB9CQwn">Discord</a> | <a href="https://web.telegram.org/#/im?p=@logosofficial">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/LogosPayments/">Reddit</a></p><p><strong>Read</strong>: <a href="https://www.logos.network/whitepaper">White paper</a> | <a href="https://www.logos.network/">Logos website</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fa115ffef7ab" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/logos-tech-update-fa115ffef7ab">Logos Tech Update</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network">Logos Network</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Monthly Newsletter #6: What Does “Crypto Winter” Mean to the Industry, Crypto Transaction Fee…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/logos-network/monthly-newsletter-5-introducing-the-logos-software-development-kit-cryptoasset-valuation-c00f207876bb?source=rss----92543331824d---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c00f207876bb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[payments]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[newsletter]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[software-development]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Logos Network]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2019 18:01:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-27T12:51:09.993Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Monthly Newsletter #6:<br>What Does “Crypto Winter” Mean to the Industry, Crypto Transaction Fee Primer, Logos Events, Tyler Storm Spotlight</h3><p><em>*** *** *** *** *** Logos February Newsletter *** *** *** *** *** ***</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FQK8fh0HPoAJGfkscgXpvg.png" /></figure><h3>WELCOME TO THE LOGOS NEWSLETTER</h3><p>Blockchain and digital currencies have become a priority topic in almost all enterprises, including traditional finance. Just over ten years after their inception, cryptocurrencies have emerged from obscurity to capture the imagination (and a dose of skepticism) of the public, media, traditional institutions, and regulators. However, despite the hype and investor frenzy, we still have not seen the blockchain revolution and mass adoption of the tech that was originally trumped. On the other hand, as the market steadily matures past the bloated ICOs and over-hyped projects, many do see a clearer path to success.</p><p>At Logos, we wanted to dive deeper into what to look out for when evaluating projects that will pave the way for blockchain making its way into our everyday life — from fintech to supply chain in fashion and consumer goods to social impact — and changing how we look at privacy, consumer rights and ownership of information.</p><p>We will also explore whether the much written about concept of “crypto winter” is an advantage or hindrance for the industry.</p><p>On <strong>February 21st</strong>, we are putting together our first event to discuss this very topic. I will be joined by <strong>Carl Hua, our Head of Engineering,</strong> and <strong>full stack engineer, Tyler Storm,</strong>who will be conducting an <strong>onsite workshop training</strong> for Logos’ JavaScript Software Development Kit (SDK).</p><p>This will be followed by a Q&amp;A session with all the speakers and an attendee spotlight feature, where the audience can have a turn at the mic to showcase their projects.</p><p>If you are interested in joining us at our brand new offices in downtown Manhattan, please <a href="https://network.us18.list-manage.com/track/click?u=70e1bdf32d8cf5be67927cdef&amp;id=215e230b3e&amp;e=11bd575b38">sign up here.</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/144/0*l3w0x_AQ4bOITQLL.png" /></figure><p><strong>Michael <br>Zochowski</strong></p><p>Founder | Logos</p><h3>Logos Tech Update</h3><p>After a string of major development milestones coming in at the end of 2018 — the conclusion of the R1 build in November and the launch of the permissioned test net in December — we have hit an intermediate period where we are heads down working on the <strong>R2 build, to be completed by the end of February.</strong></p><p>In the meantime, the engineering effort has had several notable achievements. Prime among them was <strong>the release of the core software development kit (SDK) in early January</strong>, which has enabled us to work on integrations with some of our early partners. Since we last recapped our progress, there have been several additional developments:</p><ul><li><strong>Token Capability</strong> is under active development and is to be released with R2. Logos’ token capability provides a superset of ERC-20 capabilities at the protocol level, making it as easy as possible to release fungible tokens natively on the Logos platform.</li><li><strong>Initial release of Logos Web Wallet SDK.</strong> This enables developers to interact with the Web Wallet API to develop additional integrations and tools.</li><li><strong>Planned permissioned test net upgrade.</strong> Bug fixes and performance enhancements. Continuously deployed.</li><li><strong>Automated distributed test infrastructure implementation kickoff.</strong> We are converting the prototype into a streamlined automated test infrastructure to better perform sanity checks during integrations.</li></ul><p>After R2, we will have most core features implemented, with the remainder to be put into place in R3, due in May. We’ll continue to release additional features on the test net for integrations and testing. If you are not already using the test net and would like access, please contact us and we’ll be happy to get you connected!</p><p>We’ll continue to send out development updates going forward as part of the regular newsletter. Stay tuned!</p><h3>Logos Reads: Crypto Transaction Fee Economics Primer</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/465/0*8z7onGoWN4Lb7PL-" /></figure><p>Our founder, Michael, did a deep dive to explain the economics behind crypto transaction fees and the optimal fee model on our <a href="https://network.us18.list-manage.com/track/click?u=70e1bdf32d8cf5be67927cdef&amp;id=2808b97e5e&amp;e=11bd575b38">Logos Medium</a> channel.</p><p>This foundational primer discusses how steep transaction costs are proving to be a large hurdle to the broad adoption of cryptocurrency.</p><p>Agree/disagree, have comments, or want to learn more — throw us a like, follow us, or spark a discussion. Full article: <a href="https://network.us18.list-manage.com/track/click?u=70e1bdf32d8cf5be67927cdef&amp;id=a923702ba8&amp;e=11bd575b38">Crypto Transaction Fee Economics Primer.</a></p><h3>Team Member Spotlight: Tyler Storm, Full Stack Engineer</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/594/0*g3gw-oq06mi9KGba.png" /></figure><p>For this week’s Community Spotlight, we sat down with one of our full stack developers, Tyler Storm, to hear his thoughts on the Logos project, the blockchain industry, and the coming year. For the full interview, take a peak at the video below.</p><p><strong>Hi Tyler! Thanks for joining us today. Could you give the readers some background on yourself?</strong></p><p>Great to be here! I’m a full stack engineer here at Logos Network, and my primary mission is to make Logos easier to use than credit cards or fiat.</p><p>I’m a recent college graduate from the University of Cincinnati. While there, I worked for Always Education, a start-up that blends social networking with context-based tools. While working there, I helped create a web application for large-scale educational institutions and businesses from scratch, utilizing Node.js and Angular.js.</p><p><strong>What got you into blockchain technology, and, more importantly, what excited you about being part of the technological build out of Logos?</strong></p><p>I first got into blockchain technology through Bitcoin back in 2011 when I was running a Minecraft server in high school. One of the players on my server donated me a Bitcoin to cover the costs of running the server, and, from there, my interest was born. In 2017, I finally started to get involved in the more technical details of Bitcoin and the technology that was behind it.</p><p>When looking at cryptocurrency projects, I tend to focus on two things. The first is making sure the technology is decentralized, innovative, and solves the problems that face other cryptocurrency networks and the industry as a whole. I look into how the project will acquire the mass adoption needed in order to be successful. While reading the Logos white paper, I was impressed with the mathematical rigor that was shown in proving the capabilities of the technology and its clear architectural structure to help solve real-world problems.</p><p>The second thing I look at is the team behind the project. Are they professional and qualified? The team members on a cryptocurrency project should be experts in their domains and have the right backgrounds. After checking out the Logos team, I was blown away by the quality of the people working on the project. The engineering team is truly out of this world, coming from backgrounds including NASA JPL, LimeWire, and 3M.</p><p><strong>Within Logos: </strong>Tyler is a full stack engineer focused on building Web Applications such as the Block Explorer, Workbench, Webwallet SDK, and the Javascript RPC SDK. Tyler also participates in the design discussions over parts of the Logos protocol.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/851/0*klgnAJVQ8zGwX5FN.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://network.us18.list-manage.com/track/click?u=70e1bdf32d8cf5be67927cdef&amp;id=c5a2c455ab&amp;e=11bd575b38"><strong>READ MORE</strong></a></p><h3>Logos in the News</h3><p><a href="https://network.us18.list-manage.com/track/click?u=70e1bdf32d8cf5be67927cdef&amp;id=c88d5ddc0c&amp;e=11bd575b38">PoW Will Struggle to Grow to Broader Adoption, Claims Michael Zochowski</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/752/0*eMnasb_oigXZYV5T" /></figure><p>BlockPublisher reporter, Shehryar Hasan, sat down with Michael to discuss his thoughts on the Proof-of-Work protocol and the flaws relating to this function.</p><p><a href="https://network.us18.list-manage.com/track/click?u=70e1bdf32d8cf5be67927cdef&amp;id=40324f14f9&amp;e=11bd575b38"><strong>READ MORE</strong></a></p><h3>Upcoming Events</h3><p>We have two exciting events coming up and hope to see you there! Please register as space will be limited.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*t4h52sFx0OzzoMWT.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>Crypto Winter — media myth or reality?</strong> <br><strong>Thursday, February 21st</strong> <br><strong>Time: 6:30pm — 8:00pm</strong></p><p>In this event, we will explore whether this concept is a myth or an industry reality, and what to look for when distinguishing between blockchain projects, specifically around their utility, strength and validity of tech architecture, and practical adoption — no matter how much hype and attention a project is getting.</p><p><a href="https://network.us18.list-manage.com/track/click?u=70e1bdf32d8cf5be67927cdef&amp;id=ed0146e944&amp;e=11bd575b38"><strong>SIGN UP HERE</strong></a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*PNu_jQMYUAovr5nj.png" /></figure><p><strong>Doubters vs. Die-Hards: Blockchain Battle of the Minds</strong> <br><strong>Thursday, March 7th</strong> <br><strong>Time: 7:00pm — 9:00pm</strong></p><p>A deep dive with both pro- and anti-blockchain experts, to reach across the aisle and wrestle with the industry’s foundational questions:</p><ul><li>Is cryptocurrency the future of money, and will we have only one coin?</li><li>Is blockchain in 3019 or does it have practical application right now?</li><li>Will it make as much impact as was originally promised?</li><li>Will everything move to encryption and decentralized networks?</li><li>What’s next for the technology?</li></ul><p><a href="https://network.us18.list-manage.com/track/click?u=70e1bdf32d8cf5be67927cdef&amp;id=bfa6b403e7&amp;e=11bd575b38"><strong>SIGN UP HERE</strong></a></p><h3>Open Roles (we love referrals!)</h3><p>We are a rapidly-growing team and looking for more talent to join us. In particular, we are currently recruiting for the following positions:</p><ul><li><a href="https://network.us18.list-manage.com/track/click?u=70e1bdf32d8cf5be67927cdef&amp;id=3652e54403&amp;e=11bd575b38">Senior Software Engineer in Test</a></li><li><a href="https://network.us18.list-manage.com/track/click?u=70e1bdf32d8cf5be67927cdef&amp;id=271de0ac77&amp;e=11bd575b38">Senior Software Engineer — Network Infrastructure</a></li><li><a href="https://network.us18.list-manage.com/track/click?u=70e1bdf32d8cf5be67927cdef&amp;id=f617e1a67d&amp;e=11bd575b38">Research Engineer: Distributed Systems/Blockchains</a></li><li><a href="https://network.us18.list-manage.com/track/click?u=70e1bdf32d8cf5be67927cdef&amp;id=9a280f054f&amp;e=11bd575b38">Senior Software Engineer: Database</a></li><li><a href="https://network.us18.list-manage.com/track/click?u=70e1bdf32d8cf5be67927cdef&amp;id=e21fd9df8d&amp;e=11bd575b38">Marketing Associate</a></li><li><a href="https://network.us18.list-manage.com/track/click?u=70e1bdf32d8cf5be67927cdef&amp;id=c497a39347&amp;e=11bd575b38">Chief Compliance Officer</a></li></ul><p>If you know of someone who’d be a skill/Logos culture fit who is looking for create meaningful impact in the space with their work, we’d love to chat!</p><p><a href="https://network.us18.list-manage.com/track/click?u=70e1bdf32d8cf5be67927cdef&amp;id=95b5e15468&amp;e=11bd575b38"><strong>READ MORE</strong></a></p><p><strong>If you’d like to keep up with what we are doing:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/142/1*SLSkqLl-9Rb04qw_NMD53Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Follow us</strong>: <a href="https://twitter.com/LogosPayments">Twitter</a> | <a href="https://discord.gg/BB9CQwn">Discord</a> | <a href="https://web.telegram.org/#/im?p=@logosofficial">Telegram</a> | <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/LogosPayments/">Reddit</a></p><p><strong>Read</strong>: <a href="https://www.logos.network/whitepaper">White paper</a> | <a href="https://www.logos.network/">Logos website</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c00f207876bb" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/logos-network/monthly-newsletter-5-introducing-the-logos-software-development-kit-cryptoasset-valuation-c00f207876bb">Monthly Newsletter #6: What Does “Crypto Winter” Mean to the Industry, Crypto Transaction Fee…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/logos-network">Logos Network</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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