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        <title><![CDATA[Martijn Theuwissen - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Martijn is an entrepreneur and co-founder of DataCamp. He is criticized for not maintaining a work-life balance, and not endorsing a work-life balance (it’s a harmony!). - Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/martijn-theuwissen?source=rss----9c0a3b316473---4</link>
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            <title>Martijn Theuwissen - Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[WHY WE DECIDED TO GIVE UP 10% OF OUR REVENUE]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/martijn-theuwissen/why-we-decided-to-give-up-10-of-our-revenue-6c9fbe7d4f81?source=rss----9c0a3b316473---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Martijn Theuwissen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 28 Sep 2019 12:35:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-16T13:02:24.388Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When we started <a href="https://www.datacamp.com/">DataCamp</a>, we offered a $29/month regular plan (a plan we still offer today) and a $9/month academic student plan. The academic plan had the same exact functionality as the regular plan, but at a much lower price point. This way, we wanted to give students with low available capital to spend the opportunity to learn Data Science through DataCamp as well.</p><p>The academic student plan quickly became a success. Professors that wanted to modernize their teaching methods, decided to spend part of their classroom budget on buying DataCamp access for all their students for the semester. The number of subscribers on the $9/month grew steadily, and eventually made up a healthy 10% of our total revenue.</p><p>Then, at the end of 2016, we decided to give it all up. We had many long debates on it, but eventually we went with what felt like the right thing to do, so we decided to offer DataCamp to classrooms for free. 10% of our revenue gone…</p><p>Some of the key reasons that informed our decision to move ahead with this:</p><ul><li><strong>Education as a Basic Right: </strong>Growing up in a country with near-to-free education (Belgium), and moving to a country with nowhere-near-to-free education (USA), you learn to appreciate the value of easy access to education independent of background. With DataCamp we had the ability to provide a similar experience to students worldwide.</li><li><strong>Democratizing Data Science: </strong>A key driver behind founding DataCamp was to democratize data science to everyone in the world (<a href="https://www.jonathancornelissen.com/post/why-we-started-datacamp"><em>read more on why we started DataCamp</em></a>). We felt that making our academic program free, was a major step towards realizing that part of our mission.</li><li><strong>Students Should Not Be Cash Cows: </strong>DataCamp was never founded with the idea to make exorbitant amounts of money from young, cash-strapped students.</li></ul><p>Giving up 10% of our revenue was scary. Certainly as a young company with &gt;25 employees that needs to show sustainable and rapid growth towards employees, current investors and future investors. Also, as far as I know, we are one of the few online education providers that offer this type of free service (DuoLingo &amp; Khan I believe have a similar offer for students), and I know of no ed-tech company that ever made a switch similar to ours.</p><p>Luckily, it has proven to be a wise business / economic decision as well. It increased our exposure as some of the professors who signed-up for our free classroom account promoted the collaboration with DataCamp via the website of the class, their social media, … and similarly for students. They liked the experience which in turn created a lot of additional word of mouth. Besides the exposure benefit, it also benefited the long term economic value of our learner base. We strongly believe in continuous education and lifelong learning, especially in a fast moving field like Data Science. By bringing a data science enthusiast in contact with DataCamp early in their journey, they stick with DataCamp for a longer time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2Z5jIGdEVy2XTr6nXpYWzQ.png" /></figure><p>Looking back, it was 100% worth it. By making it free, we managed to provide free data science education to over 200,000 students in 180 countries, and supported over 10,000 academic classrooms &amp; professors. These numbers are well beyond our wildest expectations, and excite many of our employees (including myself) to come to work everyday. <em>(A more detailed blog post on these numbers will be launched soon.)</em></p><p><em>Want to participate yourself? Apply today at </em><a href="https://www.datacamp.com/groups/education"><em>DataCamp for the Classroom program</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6c9fbe7d4f81" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/martijn-theuwissen/why-we-decided-to-give-up-10-of-our-revenue-6c9fbe7d4f81">WHY WE DECIDED TO GIVE UP 10% OF OUR REVENUE</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/martijn-theuwissen">Martijn Theuwissen</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[On The Importance Of Urgency]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/martijn-theuwissen/on-the-importance-of-urgency-5205e1275694?source=rss----9c0a3b316473---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[organizational-culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup-lessons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Martijn Theuwissen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Sep 2019 12:43:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-19T12:39:44.256Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On August 21 2019 I shared the following message with all <a href="https://www.datacamp.com/">DataCamp</a> employees via Slack:</p><p><em>Hi All! I could not help but noticing that when talking about “time units to get things done” we are more and more defaulting to “weeks”: e.g. “We can get this done in maybe 3 weeks”. At the beginning, our default time unit communicated for deadlines was “hours”. For some reason it became “days”, and now the standard seems to be “weeks”. My prediction is that if we don’t stop this trend together we’ll soon be speaking in “months”, “quarters”, “years”, “decades”, … There is an important psychological element to this that tricks us into thinking we are moving fast (21 days sounds a lot more as 3 weeks).</em></p><p><em>Given our size, “hours” is not realistic, but I do suggest we reverse the trend and stop using weeks and go back to “days”. Myself included. Given our current growth stage and competitive landscape, we need to be a fast-moving company that understands the importance of urgency in delivering value (NSM) and bringing ourselves to profitability ($$). It is Day 1 every day:</em><a href="https://bit.ly/2nId2a0"><em> https://bit.ly/2nId2a0</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><em>(Open to answer questions on this at tomorrow’s bi-weekly if any)</em></p><p>This sparked interesting debate internally <em>(Way more vs what I expected, but I believe debate is healthy and the more intense the better.)</em>, and it was fascinating to see how the message was interpreted by different people in different departments and offices. Some felt more responsible for this as they should, and visa versa.</p><p>I decided to clarify my message with a longer post to all team members. By sharing the post publicly, I want to give insight into how we try to think about creating a culture we believe helps DataCamp <a href="https://www.jonathancornelissen.com/post/why-we-started-datacamp">to achieve its long term goals</a>.</p><p>Given our current growth stage and competitive landscape, we need to be a fast-moving company that understands the importance of urgency in delivering value (North Star Metric) and bringing ourselves to profitability eventually ($$).</p><blockquote>It is about operational efficiency, growing revenue, becoming profitable and building a world class platform, and together we need to figure out how we can sharpen the pencil on those.</blockquote><p>DataCamp is now larger, which has resulted in things moving substantially more slowly than they used to. Along with the company growing larger and securing funding, there is naturally more of a sense of security, which can lead to complacency that we must fight against. (<a href="https://hbr.org/2008/08/harvard-business-ideacast-106.html">If success goes up, urgency goes down, and it’s a killer</a>).</p><blockquote>We must be cautious of shrugging our shoulders and saying, well, “the company is now bigger so this is the new normal” and instead retain the same mentality that got us to where we are.</blockquote><p>As a company we need to be sure we retain our sense of urgency to “win”. Some things that demonstrate a healthy sense of urgency:</p><ul><li>Asking tough questions (at our bi-weekly all hands or elsewhere) and not ignoring the “elephant in the room”</li><li>Making sure there is a high ROI on each new team member we hire.</li><li>Maintaining laser focus on the things that matter most. Even at the expense of stakeholder requests.</li><li>Being critical on our product when competitors launch a new feature/course that could potentially make DataCamp no longer the preferred way of learning for our customers.</li></ul><p>I think there have been fewer questions and debates like this in the past months, indicating to me urgency is going down. There can be multiple reasons for this pattern, and I encourage you to share them with me. To be clear, It’s not just about working hard, staying late or putting in “crazy hours”. It’s about working on the right things, in the right order, at the right speed. High-velocity decision making is crucial.</p><blockquote>Urgency does NOT necessarily mean “crazy hours”.</blockquote><p>By referencing <a href="https://bit.ly/2nId2a0">day 1</a>, I wanted to be clear that we should at all times ask ourselves the question “what can we do in 5 days that is close enough?” vs spending months on something that might not work. The ask is not to translate 2 months of engineering time into days. It is about delivering value via throughput as one Engineering Lead correctly pointed out to me, not about project estimation. Without throughput there is no value created nor is there any feedback.</p><p>I realize this is a hard problem, but that is why we are at DataCamp :-) If it wasn’t hard, it wouldn’t be worth it. We have to take a decade worth of success and do it in half the time, but committing to incredibly short timelines — is what we do in growth companies. That’s not a DataCamp thing — it’s a business thing.</p><blockquote>Remember — we are burning cash. That phase will end like it does for every growth company. This is why we talk about operational efficiency and accelerating all things possible — because these are things we control. It’s up to us to find a way to win.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5205e1275694" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/martijn-theuwissen/on-the-importance-of-urgency-5205e1275694">On The Importance Of Urgency</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/martijn-theuwissen">Martijn Theuwissen</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[What World War 2 Can Teach You About Product Management]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/martijn-theuwissen/what-world-war-2-can-teach-you-about-product-management-3053138f8be8?source=rss----9c0a3b316473---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[product-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[product-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Martijn Theuwissen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Aug 2019 23:35:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-11T17:51:14.733Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Leading product at a fast growing company (<a href="https://www.datacamp.com/">DataCamp</a>) and being interested in history, I often find that the stories of World War 2 provide me with useful insights for my daily problems. Today, I wanted to focus on how the Western Allies’ better product management led to their victory.</p><p>At the outbreak of WW2, Nazi Germany seemed to have the winning hand: a rising empire, military victories at Blitzkrieg speed, superior weaponry, and Europe at its knees. Five years later, they had nothing. Germany was a crippled country with no resources left.</p><p><strong>Shipping and Logistics Are Everything — How Germany’s Scope Creep and Inability to Scale Accelerated the Allied Victory</strong></p><p>During World War 2 Nazi Germany propagandized the “Wunderwaffe” or “Miracle Weapon” that could tip the scales of war to the benefit of Germany.</p><p>Believing more advanced technology would yield a higher return on investment (a thesis that probably sounds familiar if you hang out in today’s start-up and scale-up scene), Germany started developing advanced weaponry, ranging from the first rocket powered airplane to aircraft carriers and nuclear bombs.</p><p>However, they did not ship. And in the occasions they did, it took a lot more time than expected.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/562/1*8t-zmgj5L3vBjqfnpDu7RA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Messerschmitt Me 163</figcaption></figure><p>The first rocket-propelled plane (the Messerschmitt Me 163) came out at a time that the Allies already had total dominance of the airspace, and the aircraft carriers and nuclear bombs never even made it “to production”. A similar fate was reserved for the Horten Ho 229, one of the first stealth bombers ever to be developed.</p><p>In product managerial lexicon, Nazi Germany had “Scope Creep”: projects that grow into infinite complexity, that undergo iteration over iteration, that eat up resources, to eventually die or launch too late at a time when your competitors have already divided the pie.</p><p>If, as a product manager, you don’t ship your product or product feature quickly enough, it does not matter. The other side will win.</p><p>But what if your competitor’s “Miracle project” does make it to the end stage? Time to panic?</p><blockquote>“Amateurs think tactics. Generals think strategy. Winners think logistics.”</blockquote><p>The German Tiger I and II tanks are an example of a “Wunderwaffe” that did make it to the battlefield. They were far superior to their enemy counterparts, and toe to toe the Allies stood no chance. However, they were a logistic disaster. The Tiger tanks were hard to produce, costly in resources, and unreliable on the battlefield (a consequence of Scope Creep).</p><p>At the other side, the Allies war machine was build for scale. Instead of focussing on “Miracle projects”, they focused on logistics. Their tanks were practical and able to be produced quickly, cheaply and en masse. During the time Germany produced 2000 Tiger tanks, the Americans manufactured 40,000 M4 Sherman tanks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*LVaudPOX-MGXK9alDBpzVQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Eventually, the Nazi Germany’s failure to scale caught up with them. While they kept inventing new and superior technologies, the Allies realized that a focus on logistics and productivity was far more important than individual asset strength.</p><p>At <a href="https://www.datacamp.com/">DataCamp</a>, individuals and businesses pay a monthly fee to have access to our course library of interactive online courses. The game is to have as many high-quality courses as possible in the library, and certainly more than our competitors.</p><p>So, to win our competitive war, we need to build the infrastructure that supports content creation of interactive courses at scale. Therefore, we have, for example, a team of 3 engineers that solely focuses on making our authoring tool easier and more productive to use.</p><p>Similarly, when creating new learning interfaces, we think about the entire “production line”: what will be the fastest way to build content, how can we scale it rapidly across the technologies we offer, what features will require too much maintenance resources, etc.</p><p>We know that to win, our focus needs to be on making it scale.</p><p><strong>The Product Manager’s Lesson of History</strong></p><p>At the end of the day, as a product manager, sophisticated but hard-to-maintain and unscalable technology matters little. Part of your job as a product manager is to recognize when a pattern of Scope Creep emerges. Ideally, before it is too late and your competitors out-scale you.</p><p>Once you have product-market fit, logistics and building the tools to support capacity (“make it scale”) are what matter. It is not always the coolest or biggest weapons/features that win, but the most effective. As a product manager, you need to bring that message to your team.</p><p>And don’t worry when you see your next competitor launch their “Miracle project”. Winners think logistics ;-)</p><p>(<a href="https://www.datacamp.com/careers">We are hiring!</a>)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3053138f8be8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/martijn-theuwissen/what-world-war-2-can-teach-you-about-product-management-3053138f8be8">What World War 2 Can Teach You About Product Management</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/martijn-theuwissen">Martijn Theuwissen</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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