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        <title><![CDATA[misinfosec - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[work on the boundary between misinformation and information security - Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Who handles misinformation outbreaks?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/misinfosec/who-handles-misinformation-outbreaks-e635442972df?source=rss----14aefc862c70---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[misinformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[misinformation-ecosystem]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[journalism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sara-Jayne Terp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Dec 2019 04:41:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-08-03T19:42:50.079Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/">Misinformation attacks</a>— the deliberate and sustained creation and amplification of false information at scale — are a problem. Some of them start as jokes (the ever-present <a href="https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2017/aug/28/blog-posting/there-are-no-sharks-swimming-streets-houston-or-an/">street sharks in disasters</a>) or attempts to push an agenda (e.g. right-wing brigading); some are there to make money (the “<a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/spooksandspin/the-secret-players-behind-macedonias-fake-news-sites">Macedonian teens</a>”), or part of ongoing attempts to destabilise countries including the US, UK and Canada (e.g. Russia’s Internet Research Agency using troll and bot amplification of divisive messages).</p><p>Enough people are writing about why misinformation attacks happen, what they look like and what motivates attackers. Fewer people are <strong>actively </strong>countering attacks. Here are some of them, roughly categorised as:</p><ul><li>Journalists and data scientists: Make misinformation visible</li><li>Platforms and governments: Reduce misinformation spread</li><li>Communities: directly engage misinformation</li><li>Adtech: Remove or reduce misinformation rewards</li></ul><p>Throughout this note, I want to ask questions about these entities like “why are they doing this”, “<a href="https://medium.com/@Aegist/we-wont-solve-the-misinformation-problem-with-systems-which-adjudicate-on-truth-or-on-who-to-trust-bb02c835395">how could we do this better</a>” and “is this sustainable”, and think about what a joined-up system to counter larger-scale misinformation attacks might look like (I’m deliberately focussing on sustained attacks, and ignoring one-off “sharks in the streets” type misinformation here).</p><h3>Make Misinformation Visible</h3><p>If you can see misinformation attacks in real time, you can start to do something about them. Right now, that can be as simple as checking patterns across a set of known hashtags, accounts or urls on a single social media platform. That’s what the Alliance for Securing Democracy does, with its dashboards of artefacts (hashtags, urls etc) from suspected misinformation trolls in the US (<a href="http://dashboard.securingdemocracy.org/">Hamilton68</a>) and Germany (<a href="http://dashboard-germany.securingdemocracy.org/">Artikel38</a>), what groups like <a href="https://botsentinel.com/trending-topics">botsentinel</a> do with artefacts from suspected botnets, and sites like <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/what-is-the-newstracker">newstracker</a> do for artefacts from Facebook.</p><p>In almost real-time, there are groups tracking and debunking rumours: <a href="https://www.snopes.com/">Snopes</a> and similar fact-checking organisations, small-scale community groups like <a href="https://www.poynter.org/news/wechat-rogue-fact-checkers-are-tackling-apps-fake-news-problem">no melon</a> and Georgia’s <a href="http://www.mythdetector.ge/en">Myth Detector</a>, and state-level work like the <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/2116/questions-and-answers-about-east-stratcom-task-force_en">European External Action Service East Stratcom Task Force</a>’s <a href="https://euvsdisinfo.eu/about/">EU vs Disinfo</a> campaign and US State Department’s <a href="https://www.polygraph.info/">polygraph.info</a>.</p><p>For some events, like US elections, there are many groups collecting and storing message-level data, but that work is often academic, aimed at learning and strategic outputs (e.g. advocacy, policy, news articles). Some work worth watching includes <a href="https://twitter.com/d1gi">Jonathan Albright</a>’s <a href="https://data.world/d1gi">event-specific datasets</a>; Kate Starbird’s work on <a href="https://medium.com/hci-design-at-uw/information-wars-a-window-into-the-alternative-media-ecosystem-a1347f32fd8f">crisis misinformation</a>; Oxford Internet Institute’s <a href="http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/">Computational Propaganda project</a> (e.g. their <a href="http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/09/Polarizing-Content-and-Swing-States.pdf">2016 USA elections</a> work) and <a href="http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/component/tags/tag/dfr-lab">DFR Lab</a>’s #electionwatch and <a href="https://www.digitalsherlocks.org/">#digitalsherlocks</a> work.</p><p>Real-time misinformation monitoring is costly to set up accurately, and is usually tied to a geography, event, group of accounts or known artefacts, and a small number of platforms. That leaves gaps (were there any dashboards for the recent Ontario elections?) and overlaps, and there’s a lot of scope here for real-time information-sharing (oh god did I just volunteer for yet another data standards body?) across platforms, countries and topics, because that’s where the attackers are starting to work.</p><p>Simple things like checking a new platform for known misinformation artefacts, e.g. the US House Intelligence Committee’s <a href="https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/facebook-ads/">datasets</a> [<a href="https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/hpsci-11-1/">“Exhibit A”</a>] of Russia-funded Facebook advertisements, and checking for links to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fake_news_websites">known fake news sites</a> have already unearthed new misinformation sources. We’re already seeing multi-platform attacks and evolution in tactics to make detection and responses harder, and really good techniques (the evolutions of early <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/mar/17/us-spy-operation-social-networks">persona management</a> software into large-scale natural language posts) haven’t really been used yet. When they do, our tracking will need to get broader and more sophisticated, and will need all the artefacts it can get.</p><p>More tracking projects are listed in <a href="https://misinfocon.com/catalogue-of-all-projects-working-to-solve-misinformation-and-disinformation-f85324c6076c">Shane Greenup’s article</a>, and it’s worth watching <a href="https://twitter.com/DisinfoPortal">Disinfo Portal</a>, which reports on other anti-misinformation campaigns.</p><h3>Reduce misinformation spread</h3><p>Large-scale misinformation is a pipeline. It starts in different places and for different reasons, but it generally needs a source, content (text, images, video etc), online presence (websites, social media accounts, advertisements, ability to write comments or other user-generated content in sites and fora etc), reach (e.g. through botnet or viral amplification), and end targets (community beliefs, people viewing advertising etc) to succeed.</p><p>The source is a good place to start. I’ve had success in the past asking someone to remove or edit their misinforming posts, but that’s not our use-case here: we’re looking at persistent and often adversarial content. Attacking a creator’s intent, or using other less-savory methods to dissuade them is perhaps something from a bad spy novel, but these have also been known to happen in real life. The creators of fake news sites are often there to make money, and either removing the promise of cash (see below) or making it riskier to obtain that money (e.g. by penalising the site creators) might work. The creators of social media-based misinformation attacks often have other incentives, getting quickly into the realm of politics and diplomacy (also see below).</p><p>The next place is the platforms that host misinformation. These are typically websites (e.g. “<a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/spooksandspin/the-secret-players-behind-macedonias-fake-news-sites">macedonian fake news sites</a>” ) and social media platforms, but we’ve also seen misinformation coordinated across other user generated content hosts, including comment sections and payment sites.</p><p>Websites typically use internet service providers, domain name providers and advertising exchanges (for monitisation). Internet service providers could and have removed sites that violate their terms of service (e.g. <a href="https://variety.com/2017/digital/news/daily-stormer-heather-heyer-white-supremacist-neo-nazi-hosting-provider-1202526544/">GoDaddy removed the Daily Stormer</a> and other sites have been <a href="https://hoax-alert.leadstories.com/3468901-fake-news-website-conservative-stamp-banned-by-hosting-provider.html">removed for stealing content</a>), but we haven’t seen them remove reported “fake news” sites yet (we’d love to be corrected on that). Sites can be removed for <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniform_Domain-Name_Dispute-Resolution_Policy">domain squatting or names similar to trademarks</a>, but most fake news sites steer clear of this. Advertising exchanges and their customers do keep blacklists of sites that include fake news sites — that’s covered in more detail below. It’s also possible to disrupt views to fake news sites, by changing search engine results using sites with similar text, squatting on domains with similar names etc.</p><p>Misinformation on social media can be original content (text, images etc), pointers to fake news sites, or amplification of either of these through repetition, use of popular hashtags and usernames, or other marketing techniques to get sources and messages more attention. One area of much interest recently has been amplification of misinformation by trolls, <a href="https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/identifying-viral-bots-and-cyborgs-in-social-media">bots</a> and brigades (e.g. coordinated 8chan users); we’re starting to see these adapt to current detection techniques and are looking at ways they’re likely to evolve as artificial intelligence techniques improve (that’s for a different post).</p><p>Social media platforms have tried a variety of ways to stop misinformation spreading.</p><ul><li>Early work focussed on the reader of misinformation, e.g. adding credibility markers to messages, adding fact-check buttons and notifying people who engaged with known bots/trolls (this is included in Facebook’s <a href="https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/facebook-and-information-operations-v1.pdf">list of possible actions</a>). Whilst reader education is important in combatting misinformation, user actions are difficult to obtain (which is why advertisers set a high monetary value on clicks and actions) and some actions (e.g. Twitter check marks) added to reader confusion.</li><li>The most-discussed platform actions are identifying and removing fake accounts. In an adversarial environment, this needs to be done quickly, e.g. remove botnets whilst misinformation attacks are happening, not after, and that speed increases the potential for collateral damage including misclassification and platform friction for users. Removing accounts is also not without risk to the company: Twitter <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/twitter-suspended-70-million-accounts-2018-7">suspended 70 million accounts</a> recently, which had very little effect on the active botnets being tracked (most of the accounts removed were inactive), but did <a href="https://money.cnn.com/2018/07/09/technology/twitter-account-suspensions/index.html">damage Twitter’s share price</a>: Twitter, like many social media platforms, <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/08/twitter-is-suddenly-making-money-and-wall-street-likes-it-a-whole-lot/">makes most of its revenue from advertising</a>, and also has to manage perception of the company (a good example of this is the drop in transactions after <a href="https://digiday.com/uk/appnexus-filters-65-percent-impressions-fraudulent/">AppNexus’s 2015 bot cleanout</a>).</li><li>People are good pattern and nuance detectors: users can and do flag fake accounts and hate speech in messages to platforms, but this both creates a queue to be managed, and a potential for abuse itself (several of my female friends have had their social media accounts reported by abusers online). Abuse reports appear to go into ‘black holes’ (many of the well-documented botnet accounts are still active), and misinformation messages are often carefully crafted to create division without triggering platform hate speech rules, but there may still be some merit in this.</li><li>A softer way to reduce the spread of misinformation is to limit the visibility of suspected misinformation and its promoters, and increase the operating cost (in terms of time and attention) for accounts thought to be parts of botnets. We’ve seen <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/08/01/what-is-shadowbanning">shadowbans</a> (making content invisible to everyone except its creator) and requests for account verification (e.g. by SMS) on bot accounts with specific characteristics recently: whilst reverifying every account in a 1000-bot network can be done, it takes time and adds friction to the running of a misinformation botnet.</li><li>The end point of misinformation is its target demographic(s). Since <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_media_reach">reach</a> (the number of people who see each idea or message) is important, anything that limits either reach or the propagation speed of misinformation is useful. There are spam filter-style tools at this end point (e.g. <a href="https://twitter.com/blocktogether">BlockTogether</a>) that highlight suspicious content in a user’s social media feeds, but platforms don’t yet have coordinated blocking at the user end point.</li><li>Large-scale misinformation attacks happen across multiple platforms, any one of which might not have a strong enough signal for removing messages on its own. There are meetings but not much visible response coordination across platforms yet, and the idea of <a href="https://misinfocon.com/infrastructure-against-misinformation-9d4c9dda0860">an EFF-style watchdog</a> for the online providers that misinformation flows through is a good one if it’s backed up with coordinated real-time response. This is where standards bodies like <a href="https://credibilitycoalition.org/">the Credibility Coalition</a> are valuable, in helping to improve the ways that information is shared.</li></ul><p>Stopping misinformation at the platform level can be improved by borrowing frameworks and techniques from the information security community (which yes, is also a post in its own right), including techniques for adversarial environments like creating ‘red teams’ to attack our own systems. Facebook has, encouragingly, set up a <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alexkantrowitz/facebook-hired-a-team-of-ex-intel-officers-researchers-and#.iw5zgKKP">red team for misinformation</a>; it will be interesting to see where that goes.</p><p>Stopping misinformation at the platform level also needs new policies, to provide a legal framework for removing offenders, and to align misinformation with the business interests of the platforms. One solution is for platforms to extend their existing policies and actions for hate speech, pornography and platform abuses. Removing misinformation comes with financial, legal and social risks to a platform, and if it’s to get into policies and development plans, it needs strong support. This is where governments can play a large part, in the same way that GDPR data privacy regulations forced change. There are already regulations in <a href="https://www.cjr.org/watchdog/europe-fights-fake-news-facebook-twitter-google.php">Germany</a>, and <a href="https://www.poynter.org/news/guide-anti-misinformation-actions-around-world">similar activity in other countries</a> that look very similar to the pre-GDPR discussions on data privacy and consent; unfortunately, misinformation regulations are also being discussed by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/22/world/europe/russia-fake-news-law.html">countries with a history of censorship</a>, making it even more important to get these right. A sensible move for platforms now is to create and test their own policies and feed into government policy, before policy is forced on them from outside.</p><h3>Reducing misinformation rewards</h3><p>Misinformation attacks usually have goals, ranging from financial profit to creating favorable political conditions (approval or confusion: both can work) for a specific nationstate and its actions.</p><ul><li>Online advertising is a main source of funding for many misinformation sites. Reducing misinformation advertising revenues reduces the profits and economic incentives of “fake news” sites, and the operating revenue available to misinformation campaigns. Adtech companies keep blacklists of fraudulent websites: although very few of them (e.g. <a href="https://www.konspiratori.sk/en/">online advertisers in Slovakia</a>) explicitly blacklist misinformation sites, misinformation sites and bots are often blacklisted already because they’re correlated with activities like <a href="https://www.appnexus.com/blog/viral-content-fake-news-and-ad-fraud">click fraud</a>, bitcoin mining and gaming market sentiment (e.g. in <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/heres-how-scammers-are-using-fake-news-to-screw-with-bitcoin#.ikXKm306aQ">cryptocurrency groups</a>). Community campaigns like <a href="https://www.adweek.com/agencies/the-daily-caller-names-founder-of-sleeping-giants-which-organized-breitbart-advertiser-boycotts/">Sleeping Giants</a> have been effective in creating adtech boycotts of political misinformation and hate speech sites. Other work supporting this includes <a href="https://www.disinformationindex.com/">collection and analysis of fake news sites</a>.</li><li>Political misinformation is part of a larger information warfare / propaganda game: fewer politicians have played it better than Macron’s election team creating <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/world/europe/hackers-came-but-the-french-were-prepared.html">false information honeypots and responses to their disclosure</a> before the election blackout started in France. Social media is now a part of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2018/05/03/cyber-warfare-the-threat-from-nation-states/#300c7c141c78">cyberwarfare</a>, so we’re likely to see (or not see) <a href="http://observer.com/2017/05/stratcom-2017-prague-vladimir-putin-disinformation/">more</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/europe-has-been-working-to-expose-russian-meddling-for-years/2017/06/25/e42dcece-4a09-11e7-9669-250d0b15f83b_story.html?noredirect=on&amp;utm_term=.5ae4de168748">skillful responses like this online</a>.</li></ul><p>Ultimately when we respond to misinformation attacks by reducing rewards, we’re not trying to completely eradicate the misinformation — as with all good forms of conflict reduction, we’re trying to make it prohibitively costly for any but the most determined attackers to have the resources and reach to affect us.</p><h3>Engaging misinformation online</h3><p>Even if platforms work to remove misinformation botnets and limit the reach of trolls, misinformation will still get through. It’s not clear who’s responsible for countering misinformation attacks at this point: it’s made it past the platforms’ controls, but still has the potential to damage belief systems and communities (increasingly in real life, as evidenced by trolls setting up opposing protests at the same locations and times).</p><p>At this point, it’s appropriate to engage with the material and its creators, limiting the reach of bots and trolls whilst being mindful of personal and community safeties. This engagement can happen at most points in the misinformation pipeline, and this is another area where the infosec mindset of creatively adapting systems can be useful. Some recent notable examples include:</p><ul><li><a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-baltic-elves-taking-on-pro-russian-trolls">Lithuanian and Latvian ‘Elves’</a>: roughly 100 people who respond to Russian-backed misinformation with humour and verified content, in “Elves vs. Trolls skirmishes”.</li><li>VOST work (in Spanish) on tagging disaster misinformation with links to verified updates, and retweeting misinformation with “Falso” stamps.</li><li>Overwhelming misinformation hashtags with other content (beautiful recent examples: a right-wing hashtag suddenly filled with news about a swimming contest, and <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23qanon%20kabir">an Indian guru using the Qanon hashtag</a>).</li><li>Using search engine optimisation and brigading to move other stories above misinformation pages and <a href="https://medium.com/s/trustissues/how-trump-voters-decide-who-to-trust-4e66fc7b6d27">related search terms</a> in search and news results.</li></ul><p>Engaging with bots and trolls has risks, including <a href="http://lithuaniannews.net/lithuanian-elves-launch-online-database-pro-russian-trolls-tackle-propaganda/">doxxing</a>, which should be carefully considered if you’re planning to do this yourself.</p><h3>The ecosystem, in general</h3><p>Many of the players countering misinformation are working on a small scale. This can be effective, but we’re looking at an issue that will probably be part of the internet for the foreseeable future, and from my experience running crisismapping deployments, I know that without more support, these efforts might not be sustainable in the long term.</p><p>The social media platforms have a great deal of leverage on this problem — they could shut down misinformation almost overnight, but that would be at great potential cost to them, both in audience and in financial cost (e.g. the cost to share price of ad-supported platforms removing ad viewings). Reducing money supplies (e.g. adtech) and other misinformation incentives is another good avenue of approach, and we’ve seen some working community responses but they might be difficult to scale over time.</p><p>Misinformation attacks aren’t going away. Today they’re nation-state backed and personal attacks; tomorrow those skills could be scaled with AI and applied to companies, groups and other organisations. We need to think about this as an ecosystem, using similar tools and mindsets to information security. We also need to create more joined-up, cross-platform responses.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e635442972df" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec/who-handles-misinformation-outbreaks-e635442972df">Who handles misinformation outbreaks?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec">misinfosec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[We’re not at war — we’re just doing infosec]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/misinfosec/were-not-at-war-we-re-just-doing-infosec-fff1d25fbcd1?source=rss----14aefc862c70---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[misinformation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sara-Jayne Terp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Dec 2019 04:41:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-11-29T22:30:03.491Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>We’re not at war — we’re just doing infosec</h3><p>I read three connected things today: <a href="https://www.ribbonfarm.com/2018/11/28/the-digital-maginot-line/">the digital Maginot line</a>, about how we’ve been in a digital “warm war’ for the past few years, <a href="https://medium.com/trust-media-and-democracy/why-influence-matters-in-the-spread-of-misinformation-e92a041fa3d3">why influence matters in the spread of misinformation</a>, and <a href="https://medium.com/@dtunkelang/are-ads-really-that-bad-1c3d315f6689">are ads really that bad?</a>.</p><p>The first one tells a story that I’ve told myself over the past few years — that the age-old drive to gain territory and power has moved from turning up with weapons and fighting (‘kinetic warfare’) to get other countries to hand them over, to using social media channels to persuade those countries’ people to either welcome the new overlords, or persuade their own politicians to not interfere when their neighbouring countries get overrun.</p><p>I’ve sounded warnings because I believe I’ve lived in a uniquely fragile country in uniquely fragile conditions at a uniquely fragile time. I don’t however believe that that’s always going to be the case, and I think the answers to that lie in both past and recent history, and across articles like these three. Bear with me because I’m still gathering my own thoughts (into, amongst other things, a practical book) and hadn’t meant to write so much background yet.</p><p>Every country in the world has been trying to influence every other country that it interacts with since before there have been countries: it’s geopolitics. It tries to influence populations: it’s own through politics, others through propaganda and other more benign forms of outreach and image manipulation.</p><p>What social media buys an aggressor country is reach and scale. The same thing that lets me chat with friends in Kenya, or you see that not everyone in Peru is living on a farm with 10 llamas also allows anyone anywhere to insert themselves into an influence network in any language on any topic anywhere else on the planet. And there’s the power, right there.</p><p>One way to stop playing a game is to step outside of the game. Widespread user-generated content is relatively new: so what’s to stop defending countries from putting up their own digital firewalls, China-style, and collapsing the troublesome parts of the internet on themselves? Perhaps it’s that the entities that are massively powerful have changed, and countries are small in power now, compared to large global companies. And that gets me to a small glimmer of hope. Because those companies’ power is rooted in ad money. And ads are shown to humans. And despite all our globalisation, all our progress, all our ability to buy our Christmas decorations from Norway, I’ve seen the data, and people are still very geographically rooted in their ad clicks. It will be interesting to see what countries do.</p><p>It’s also interesting to see what people do. Because without users, a social media company becomes — is Myspace still around? And without people who can be manipulated, an influence campaign is just more conspiracy-laden shouting (how *is* qanon doing these days btw?). I said when I started that I’ve lived in a uniquely fragile country in uniquely fragile conditions at a uniquely fragile time. I think we’re still there, but I’m starting to see signs of resilience that give me hope.</p><p>Yes, we have work to do, but FWIW I don’t think we’re at war. I do think we need a new layer of information security and, <a href="https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/11/information_att.html">amongst others</a>, I’m working on <a href="https://posts.specterops.io/whats-in-a-name-ttps-in-info-sec-14f24480ddcc">tactics, techniques and procedures</a> for that. We’re perhaps at the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Cuckoo%27s_Egg">Cuckoo’s Egg</a> part of the journey, and this is forever work, not a quick set of fixes, but it’s worth it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fff1d25fbcd1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec/were-not-at-war-we-re-just-doing-infosec-fff1d25fbcd1">We’re not at war — we’re just doing infosec</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec">misinfosec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Security frameworks for misinformation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/misinfosec/security-frameworks-for-misinformation-d4b58e4047ec?source=rss----14aefc862c70---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d4b58e4047ec</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[misinformation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sara-Jayne Terp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Dec 2019 04:40:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-11-30T01:28:57.420Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Someone over in the <a href="https://aivillage.org/">AI Village</a> asked about frameworks for testing misinformation attacks. Whilst the original question was perhaps about how to simulate and test attacks — and more on how we did that later — one thing I’ve thought about a lot over the past year is how misinformation could fit into a ‘standard’ infosec response framework (this comes from a different thought, namely who the heck is going to do all the work of defending against the misinformation waves that are now with us forever).</p><p>I digress. I’m using some of my new free time to read up on security frameworks, and I’ve been enjoying Travis Smith’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=io4vCTBLa78">Leveraging Mitre Att&amp;ck</a> video. Let’s see how some of that maps to misinfo.</p><p>First, the Gartner adaptive security architecture.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*fznk00pV5cAY-OD6.png" /></figure><p>It’s a cycle (OODA! intelligence cycle! etc!) but the main point of the Gartner article is that security is now continuous rather than incident-based. That matches well with what I’m seeing in the mlsec community (that attackers are automating, and those automations are adaptive, e.g. capable of change in real time) and with what I believe will happen next in misinformation: a shift from crude human-created, templated incidents to machine-generated, adaptive continuous attacks.</p><p>The four stages in this cycle seem sound for misinformation attacks, but we would need to change the objects under consideration (e.g. systems might need to change to communities) and the details of actions under headings like “contain incidents”. 9/10 I’d post-it this one.</p><p>Then the SANS sliding scale of cyber security</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Mc1sx0doIhSn7jib.png" /></figure><p>AKA “Yes, you want to hit them, but you’ll get a better return from sorting out your basics”. This feels related to the Gartner cycle in that the left side is very much about prevention, and the right about response and prediction. As with most infosec, a lot of this is about what we’re protecting from what, when, why and how.</p><p>With my misinformation hat on, architecture seems to be key here.I know that we have to do the hard work of protecting our base systems: educating and inoculating populations (basically patching the humans), designing platforms to be harder to infect with bots and/or botlike behaviours. SANS talks about compliance, but for misinformation there’s nothing (yet) to be compliant against. I think we need to fix that. Non-human traffic pushing misinformation is an easy win here: nobody loves an undeclared bot, especially if it’s trying to scalp your grandmother.</p><p>For passive defence, we need to keep up with non-human traffic evading our detectors, and have work still to do on semi-automated misinformation classifiers and propagation detection. Misinformation firewalls are drastic but interesting: I could argue that the Great Firewall (of China) is a misinformation firewall, and perhaps that becomes an architectural decision for some subsystems too.</p><p>Active defence is where the humans come in, working on the edge cases that the classifiers can’t determine (there will most likely always be a human in the system somewhere, on each side), and hunting for subtly crafted attacks. I also like the idea of misinformation canaries (we had some of these from the attacker side, to show which types of unit were being shut down, but they could be useful on the defence side too).</p><p>Intelligence is where most misinformation researchers (on the blue team side) have been this past year: reverse-engineering attacks, looking at tactics, techniques etc. Here’s where we need repositories, sharing and exchanges of information like misinfocon and credco.</p><p>And offense is the push back — everything from taking down fake news sites and removing related advertisers to the types of creative manoeuvres exemplified by the Macron election team.</p><p>To me, Gartner is tactical, SANS is more strategic. Which is another random thought I’d been kicking around recently: that if we look at actors and intent, looking at the strategic, tactical and execution levels of misinformation attacks can also give us a useful way to bucket them together. But I digress: let’s get back to following Travis, who looks next at what needs to be secured.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*oBQ2n2u_vLFZ9mZz.png" /></figure><p>For infosec, there’s the SANS Top 20, aka <a href="https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download">CIS controls</a> (above). This interests me because it’s designed at an execution level for systems with boundaries that can be defended, and part of our misinformation problem is that we haven’t really thought hard about what our boundaries are — and if we have thought about them, have trouble deciding where they should be and how they could be implemented. It’s a useful exercise to find misinformation equivalents though, because you can’t defend what you can’t define (“you know it when you see it” isn’t a useful trust&amp;safety guideline). More soon on this.</p><p>Compliance frameworks aren’t likely to help us here: whilst <a href="https://www.cisecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Poster_Winter2016_CSCs.pdf">HIPAA is useful to infosec</a>, it’s not really forcing anyone to tell the truth online. Although I like the idea of writing hardening guides for adtech exchanges, search, cloud providers and other (unwitting) enablers of “fake news” sites and large-scale misinformation attacks, this isn’t a hardware problem (unless someone gets really creative repurposing unused bitcoin miners).</p><p>So there are still a couple of frameworks to go (and that’s not including the 3-dimensional framework I saw and liked at Hack Manhattan), which I’ll skim through for completeness, more to see if they spark any “ah, we would have missed that” thoughts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*jIveOzKtMUx9CNJb.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/documents/cyber/LM-White-Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf">Lockheed-Martin cyber kill chain</a>: yeah, this basically just says “you’ve got a problem”. Nothing in here for us; moving on.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*YNS3GW9Zgd7DbHKA.jpg" /></figure><p>And finally, MITRE’s <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/">ATT&amp;CK framework</a>, or Adversarial Tactics, Techniques &amp; Common Knowledge. To quote Travis, it’s a list of the 11 most common tactics used against systems, and 100s of techniques used at each phase of their kill chains. Misinformation science is moving quickly, but not that quickly, and I’ve watched the same types of attacks (indeed the same text even) be reused against different communities at different times for different ends. We have lists from watching since 2010, and pre-internet related work from before that: either extending ATT&amp;CK (I started on that a while ago, but had issues making it fit) or a separate repository of attack types is starting to make sense.</p><p>A final note on how we characterise attacks. I think the infosec lists on characterising attackers make sense for misinformation: persistence, privilege escalation, defence evasion, credential access, discovery, lateral movement, execution, collection, exfiltration, command and control are all just as valid if we’re talking about communities instead of hardware and systems. Travis’s notes characterising response also make sense for us too: we also need to gather information each time on what is affected, what to gather, how the technique was used by an adversary, how to prevent a technique from being exploited, and how to detect the attack.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d4b58e4047ec" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec/security-frameworks-for-misinformation-d4b58e4047ec">Security frameworks for misinformation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec">misinfosec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Practical influence operations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/misinfosec/practical-influence-operations-760b03f8a493?source=rss----14aefc862c70---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/760b03f8a493</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[misinformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[influence-operations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hybrid-warfare]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sara-Jayne Terp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Dec 2019 04:38:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-08T15:41:18.189Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/538/1*2sthI6pMdoItHB0qKREtQw.jpeg" /></figure><p>[edit: added <a href="https://www.slideshare.net/bodaceacat/practical-influence-operations-presentation-at-sofwerx-dec-2018">slideset</a>]</p><p><a href="https://www.sofwerx.org/">Sofwerx</a> are the US Special Operations command’s open source innovations unit — it’s where scarily fit (but nice) military people, contractors, academics and people with green hair, piercings, dodgy pasts and fiercely bright creative minds come together to help solve wicked problems that need extremely unconventional but still disciplined thinking (don’t ever make the mistake of thinking hackers are just chaotic; given a good problem, they are very very focussed and determined). This week, Sofwerx gathered some experts together to tell other parts of the US government about <a href="https://www.sofwerx.org/weaponsummit/">Weaponized Information</a>.</p><p>I was one of the experts. I’m low on green hair and piercings, but I do have about 30 years practice in the defense innovation community, am lucky enough to speak at <a href="https://www.blackhat.com/us-18/briefings/schedule/index.html#from-bot-to-robot-how-abilities-and-law-change-with-physicality-11361">Black Hat</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXSiExdfMKU">Defcon</a> about things like how algorithms control humans and the ethics of adversarial machine learning, and I really get interested in things. Like how autonomous vehicles and people team together. Or how agencies like FEMA and the UN use data in disasters. Or, for the past couple of years, how to counter attacks on human belief systems. Here are some notes from my talk whilst I wait for the amazing media team to make me look elegant in the video (please please!).</p><p>I spoke at the end of the day, so my talk is rightly one of a pair of talks, with David Perlman and myself bookending the day. After a military introduction (waves to Pablo), David opened the day by describing the landscape of misinformation and other large-scale, internet-enabled influence operations; expert talks during the day built out from that, explaining lessons we can learn from earlier operations against Jihadis (Scot Terban), deep dives into specific technologies of interest (Matthew Sorrell and Irene Amerini on countering deepfakes and other multimedia forensics), then me pulling those back together with a talk setting out a framework from which we (and by we I meant the people in front of us in the room plus a discipline created from the skills of a very specific set of experts) could start to respond to the problems, before passing it back to the military in the form of Keith Dear from the RAF.</p><p>So. Lots of people talk about the problem of misinformation, election hacking, influence operations, Russia, the internet research agency blah blah blah. Very few of them talk about potential solutions, including difficult or unconventional solutions. The analogy I used at the start was from my days playing rugby union for my university. Sometimes we would play another side, and the two sides would be completely matched in power and ballskill and speed, but they just didn’t understand the tactics of the game. And the other side would score again and again to the point of embarrassment against them, because they knew the field and had gameplay and the other side didn’t. And that is what recent history has felt like to me. If you’re going to talk about solutions, and about handling misinformation as a someone has to do this, and someone is going to have to do this forever because this is just like spam and isn’t going to go away thing, you’re going to need processes, you’re going to need your own gameplay, and you’re going to need to understand the other side’s gameplay so you can get inside and disrupt it. Play the game. Don’t just stand on the field.</p><p><strong>Offense</strong></p><p>So first, offense. Usually I talk a lot about this, because I’ve spent a lot of time in the past two years raising the alarm with different communities, and asking them to frame the problem in terms of actors with intents, targets, artefacts and potential vulnerabilities. This time I skimmed over — mentioned the Internet Research Agency in Russia as the obvious biggest player in this game, but that despite their size they were playing a relatively unsubtle unsophisticated game and that more interesting to me were the more subtle tests and attacks that might be also happening whilst we were watching them. I defined misinformation as deliberately false information with an objective that’s often money or geopolitical gain and ranges from the strange (“Putin with aliens!”) to the individually dangerous (“muslim rape gangs in Toronto”). I also pushed back o the idea that influence operations aren’t the same as social engineering; to me, influence operations are social engineering at scale, and if we use the SE definition of “psychological manipulation of people into performing actions or divulging confidential information”, we are still talking about action, but those actions are often either in aggregate or at a remove from the original target (e.g. a population is targeted to force a politician to take action), with the scale being sometimes millions of people (Russian-owned Facebook groups in the 2016 Congress investigation had shares and interactions in the 10s of millions, although we do have to allow for botnet activities there).</p><p>Scale is important when we talk about impacts: these can range from individual — people caught up in opposing-group demonstrations deliberately created at the same place and time, to communities — disaster responses and resources being diverted around imaginary roadblocks (e.g. fake “bridge out” messaging) to nationstate (the “meme war” organizing pages that we saw with QAnon and related groups’ branding for the US, Canada and other nations in the past year).</p><p>Targeting is scaled too: every speaker mentioned human cognitive biases; although I have my favorite biases like familiarity backfire (if you repeat a message with a negative in it, humans remember the message but not the negative) there are hundreds of other biases that can be used as a human attack surface online (the cognitive bias codex lists about 180 of them). There’s sideways scale: many efforts focus on single platforms, but misinformation is now everywhere there’s user-generated content: social media sites like facebook, twitter, reddit, eventbrite, but also comment streams, payment sites, event sites: anywhere you can leave a message, comment, image, video, content that another human can sense. Influence operations aren’t new, but social media buys reach and scale: you can buy 1000 easy-to-find bots for a few dollars or 100 very hard to detect Twitter or Facebook ‘aged users’ for $150; less if you know where to look. There are plenty of botnet setup guides online; a large cheap set can do a lot of damage very quickly, and you can play a longer, more subtle online game by adding a little pattern matching or AI to a smaller aged set.</p><p>Actors and motivations pretty much divide into: state/nonstate actors who are doing this for geopolitical gain (creating discord or swaying opinion on a specific topic), entrepreneurs doing it for money (usually driving people to view their websites and making money from advertising on them), grassroots groups doing it for fun (e.g. to create chaos as a new form of vandalism) and private influencers for either attention (the sharks on the subways) or, sometimes, money. This isn’t always a clean-cut landscape: American individual influencers have been known to create content that is cut-and-pasted onto entrepreneurs’ websites (most, but increasingly not all, entrepreneurs don’t have English as their first language and the US is a large market); that messaging is often also useful to the state actors (especially if their goal is in-country division) and attractive to grassroots groups. This is a huge snurfball that people like Ben Nimmo do great work unravelling some of the linkages in.</p><p><strong>Defence</strong></p><p>One of the most insightful comments I got at a talk was “isn’t this just like spam? Won’t they just make it go away the same way?”. I didn’t appreciate it at the time, and my first thought was “but we’re the ‘they’, dammit”, but IMHO there are some good correlates here, and that one question got me thinking about whether we could treat misinformation the same way we treat other unwanted internet content like spam and ddos attacks.</p><p>I’ve looked at a lot of disciplines, architectures and frameworks (“lean/agile misinformation”, anyone?) and the ones that look closest to what we need come from information security. One of these is the Gartner cycle: deceptively simple with its prevent-detect-respond-predict. The good news is that we can take these existing frameworks and fit our problem to them, to see if there are areas that we’ve missed or need to strengthen in some way. The other good news is that approach works well. The bad news is that if you fit existing misinformation defense work to the Gartner cycle, we’ve got quite a lot of detect work going on, a small bit of prevent, almost no effective respond and nothing of note except some special exceptions (Chapeau! again to Macron’s election team for the wonderful con-job you pulled on your attackers) on predict.</p><p>Looking at “detect”: one big weakness of an influence operation is that the influencer has to be visible in some way (although the smart ones find ways to pop up and remove messages quickly, and target small enough to be difficult to detect) — they leave “artefacts”, traces of their activity. There are groups and sites dedicated to detecting and tracking online botnets, which is a useful place to look up any ‘user’ behaving suspiciously. The artifacts they use tend to split into content and context artifacts. Content artifacts are things within a message or profile: known hashtags (e.g. #qanon), text that correlates with known bots, image artifacts in deepfake videos, known fake news URLs, known fake stories. Stories are interesting because sites like Snopes already exist to track at the story level, and groups like Buzzfeed and FEMA have started listing known fake stories during special events like natural disasters. But determining whether something is misinformation from content alone can be difficult — the Credibility Coalition and W3C credibility standards I’ve been helping with also include context-based artifacts: whether users are connected to known botnets, trolls or previous rumors (akin to the intelligence system of rating both the content and the carrier), their follower and retweet/likes patterns and metadata like advertising tags and DNS. One promising avenue, as always, is to follow the money, in this case advertising dollars; this is promising both in tracking misinformation and also in its potential to disrupt it.</p><p>There are different levels of “respond”, ranging from individual actions to community, platform and nationstates. Individuals can report user behaviors to social media platforms; this has been problematic so far, for reasons discussed in earlier talks (basically platform hesitation at accidentally removing user accounts). Individuals can also report brands advertising on “fake news” sites to advertisers through pressure groups like Sleeping Giants, who have been effective in communicating the risk from this to the brands. Individuals have tools that they can use to collaboratively block specific account types (e.g. new accounts, accounts with few followers): all of these individual behaviors could be scaled. Platforms have options: they do remove non-human traffic (the polite term for “botnets and other creepy online things”) and make trolls less visible to other users; ad exchanges do remove non-human traffic (because of a related problem, click fraud — bots don’t buy from brands) and problematic pages from their listings.</p><p>Some communities actively respond. One of my favorites are the Lithuanian ‘Elves’: an anonymous online group who fight Russian misinformation online, apparently successfully, with a combination of humor and facts. This has also been promising in small-scale trials in Panama and the US during disasters (full disclosure: I ran one of those tests). One of the geopolitical aims of influence operations that was mentioned by several other speakers was to widen political divides in a country. A community that’s been very active in countering that is the peace technology community, and specifically the Commons Project, which used techniques developed across divides including Israel-Palestine and Cyprus with a combination of bots and humans to rebuild human connections across damaged political divides.</p><p>On a smaller scale, things that have been tried in the past years include parody-based counter-campaigns, SEO hacks to place disambiguation sites above misinformation sites in search results, overwhelming (“dogpiling onto”) misinformation hashtags with unrelated content, diverting misinformation hashtag followers with spoof messages, misspelt addresses and users names (‘typosquatting’), and identifying and engaging with affected individuals. I remain awed by my co-conspirator, who is a master at this.</p><p>All the above has been tactical because that’s where we are right now, but there are also strategic things going on. Initiatives to innoculate and educate people about misinformation exist, and the long work of bringing it into the light continues in many places.</p><p><strong>Adaptations</strong></p><p>I covered offense and defence, but that’s never the whole of a game: for instance, in yet another of my interests, MLsec (the application of machine learning to information security), the community divides its work into using machine learning to attack, using it to defend, and attacking the machine learning itself.</p><p>Right now the game is changing, and this is why I’m emphasizing frameworks. This time also feels to me like the moment Cliff Stoll writes about in The Cuckoo’s Egg, when one man is investigating an information security incursion, a “hack”, happening through his computers, and slowly finding other people across the government who were recognizing the problem too, before that small group grew out into the huge industry we see today.</p><p>We need frameworks because the attacks are adapting quickly, and it’s going to get worse because of advances in areas like MLsec: we’re creating adaptive, machine-learning-driven attacks that learn to evade machine-learning-driven detectors and rapidly heading from artefact-based to behavior-based to intent-based discussions. Already happening or likely to happen next include hybrid attacks where attackers combine algorithms and humans to evade and attack a combination of algorithms (e.g. detectors, popularity etc) and humans; a current shift from obvious trolls and botnets to infiltrating and weaponizing existing human communities (mass-scale “useful idiots”), and attacks across multiple channels at the same time masked with techniques like pop-up and low-and-slow messaging. This is where we are: this is becoming an established part of hybrid warfare that needs to be considered not as war, but certainly on a similar level to, say, turning up in part of Colombia with some money and a gunboat pointed at the railway station and accidentally creating a new country from a territory you’d quite like to build a canal in (Panama). Also of note is what happens if the countries currently attacking the US make the geopolitical and personal gains they required, stop their current campaigns and leave several hundred highly-trained influence operators without a salary. Generally what happens in those situations is an industry forms around commercial targets: some of this has already happened, but those numbers could be interesting, and not in a good way.</p><p>One framework isn’t enough to cover this. The SANS sliding scale of security describes, from left to right, the work needed to secure a system from architecting that system to be secure through passively defending it against threats, actively responding to attacks and producing intelligence all the way to “legal countermeasures and self-self-defense against an adversary”. We have some of the architecture work done. Some of the passive defence. Lots of intelligence. There’s potential for defense here. There’s going to need to be strategic and tactical collaboration, and by that I mean practical things like nobody quite knows what to call the state we’re in: it’s not war but it is a form of landgrab (later in the day I whispered “are we the Indians?” to a co-speaker, meaning this must have been what it felt like to be a powerful leader watching the settlers say “nice country, we’ll take it”), possibly politics with the addition of other means, and without that definition it’s really hard to regulate what is and isn’t allowed to happen (also perhaps important: it seems that only the military have limits on themselves in this space). With cross-platform subtle attacks, collaboration and information sharing will be crucial, so trusted third-party exchanges matter. Sharing of offensive techniques, tactics and processes matter too, so a misinformation version of the ATT&amp;CK framework for now (I tried fitting it to the end of the existing framework and it just doesn’t fit — the shape is good but there’s adjustments needed) with a SANS top 20 later (because we’re already seeing the same attack vectors repeating, misinformation versions of script kiddies etc etc). There’s a defense correlate to the algorithms+ humans comment on offense above: we will most likely need a hybrid response of algorithms plus humans countering attacks by algorithms plus humans. We will need to think the unthinkable, even if we immediately reject it (“Great Wall Of America”, nah). And we really need to talk about what offense would look like: and I don’t mean that in a kinetic sense, I mean what are valid self-self-defense actions.</p><p>I ended my presentation with a brief glimpse at what I’m working on right now, and a plea for the audience. I’m working half my time helping to build the Global Disinformation Index, an independent disinformation rating system, and the rest researching areas that interest me, which right now is that misinformation equivalent to the ATT&amp;CK techniques, tactics and procedures framework. My plea for the audience was to please not fight the last war here.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=760b03f8a493" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec/practical-influence-operations-760b03f8a493">Practical influence operations</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec">misinfosec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Misinformation readings]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/misinfosec/misinformation-readings-d29b62a60f10?source=rss----14aefc862c70---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d29b62a60f10</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[misinformation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sara-Jayne Terp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Dec 2019 04:38:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-10T16:54:54.358Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6_eXKGxkuukNyjVVn-OVrg.jpeg" /><figcaption>my misinformation bookshelf</figcaption></figure><p>I always tuck two books in my bag for travel , and was amused last week to see multiple <a href="https://www.sofwerx.org/events-calendar/">Sofwerx</a> speakers with the same yellow book (Singer and Brooking’s LikeWar). Other people were asking me for book recommendations, so here they are.</p><p>First, a caveat: these are not practical books (that’s why I’m busy writing one), and current literature on misinformation has a heavy focus on the 2016 US elections. That’s understandable: like the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the 2016 Russian attacks across US social media showed a previously-secure America fragilities it assumed that only other countries had (FWIW, my personal opinion is that the truth is more complex than “some brain hackers stole an election”, but there was definitely good craft there), and it makes a strong case study. So let’s start with those books.</p><ul><li>Benkler, Faris, Roberts “<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/40846641-network-propaganda">Network Propaganda: manipulation, disinformation, and radicalization in American politics</a>”. Example quote: <em>“Something fundamental was happening to threaten democracy, and our collective eye fell on the novel and rapidly changing — technology”</em>. A data scientists’ book, in that it looks at the systems in play, analyses the data available, and considers how insights from it could be applied in other situations. I’ve been recommending this to people who want to start building fixes.</li><li>Singer and Brooking “<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/38242140-likewar">LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media</a>”. Example quote: <em>“Narrative, emotion, authenticity, community, and inundation are the most effective tools of online battles”</em>. Clearly illustrates a lot of basic ideas in misinformation, written by people who’ve tracked its effects. Personally I find it over-hawkish: I know that we need to talk about information warfare, but one person’s infowars is sometimes another person’s politics, or advertising, or just plain interesting community or meme. I also found the pace slow, but that might be because I’ve lived through a lot of these things (some of the illustrations are events that I’ve worked myself). Could be a good introduction for someone completely new to the area.</li><li>Jamieson “<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/39507917-cyberwar">Cyberwar: how Russian hackers and trolls helped elect a president</a>”. Example quote: <em>“Outcome three: the former Secretary of State is elected and the country simply moves on, but the sabotage nonetheless has magnified cultural tensions and functioned as a pilot from which to birth later success — perhaps when she runs for a second term”</em>. A scholarly work with a lot of insight specifically on the fragility of American politics; the style reminds me of a three-letter-agency report. Useful if you want to understand how America got to where it is now; could be well matched with Heuer’s “<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/7818985-structured-analytic-techniques-for-intelligence-analysis">Structured Analytics Techniques for intelligence analysis</a>”.</li><li>Watts “<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/35068856-messing-with-the-enemy">Messing with the enemy: surviving in a social media world of hackers terrorists, Russians and fake news</a>”. Example quote: <em>“Having trained at the FBI academy and studied Soviet politics, military and intelligence at West Point, I recognized the technique as the digital update to age-old spycraft”</em>. First-person account from one of the people I call ‘trackers” — individuals who interact with terrorist and misinformation accounts and targets online. Useful if you want to understand what tracking misinformation online looks like in practice.</li></ul><p>The next part of my bookshelf is about how we got here in the first place.</p><ul><li>Denning “<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/597681.Information_Warfare_and_Security">Information Warfare and Security</a>”. Misinformation attacks are a form of hacking. If you really want to understand information warfare, and where the misinformation version of it might go next, Denning is the classic book. Read it.</li><li>Berger “<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/15801967-contagious">Contagious: why things catch on</a>”. If you want to understand misinformation, you need to understand belief systems, online belief transfer and specifically how we transfer beliefs through things like memes. This book helps.</li><li>Johnson “<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/12799077-the-information-diet">The information diet: a case for conscious consumption</a>”. A book focussed on the problem of online information overload, written at the time that crisis data teams first started seeing test misinformation messages appearing during disasters (Kate Starbird has detailed these in <a href="https://medium.com/hci-design-at-uw/tracing-disinformation-trajectories-from-the-2010-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-79e8116e08f4">her work</a>), by the person who managed Obama’s online campaign. I re-read this to remind myself of where we’ve come from online.</li><li>Tufekci “<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/32714239-twitter-and-tear-gas">Twitter and tear gas: the power and fragility of networked protest</a>”. A tool is a tool. The things that are useful to someone running a misinformation campaign are also useful to someone supporting an honest political campaign, or a popular revolution. The author understands well both parts of this, and works through the Arab Spring, algorithms and surveillance states as part of this new internet power.</li></ul><p>(that list was hard to build: McLuhan’s <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/2800.The_Mechanical_Bride">Mechanical Bride</a>, Schelling’s <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/317330.The_Strategy_of_Conflict">Strategy of conflict</a>, Holiday’s <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/13542853-trust-me-i-m-lying">Trust me I’m lying</a>, VanPutte’s <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/33528826-walking-wounded">Walking Wounded</a>, and Galloway’s <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/34427200-the-four">The Four</a> are just some of the great books in the reject pile).</p><p>And finally, a section on ‘next’. YMMV, but I like to keep these three books around to ground me:</p><ul><li>Brunton and Nissenbaum “<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/25796900-obfuscation">Obfuscation: a user’s guide for privacy and protest</a>”. Keeping yourself safe and private is hard work these days. This “how-to” book for individuals has lots of useful ideas that could be scaled and/or automated.</li><li>O’Neil “<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/28186015-weapons-of-math-destruction">Weapons of math destruction: how big data increases inequality and threatens democracy</a>”. Future campaigns will most likely be a combination of people and algorithms targetting people and algorithms. This book describes what happens when algorithms are applied to people’s lives without care, e.g. without checking for bias or discrimination in the data or models that they’re built with, but that lack of care could also be created through model poisoning and other algorithm-based attacks.</li><li>Saxe and Sanders “<a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/38213382-malware-data-science">Malware data science: attack detection and attribution</a>”. Misinformation, botnets, campaigns, trolls: to date they’ve been fairly crude, mostly manual or only lightly automated. That’s changing, and it’s worth keeping up with trends in the application of machine learning and artificial intelligence to hacking, to see what might be coming next. There aren’t many books on this subject yet: here’s a good one.</li></ul><p>That’s my basic booklist, and I’ve started <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/list/show/130450.Misinformation">a Goodreads list based on it</a> that I’d love people to add to.</p><p>The other books you read on your misinformation journey will depend on who you are: I’m looking across now at shelves containing everything from geopolitics and psychology to image processing and user experience, with a little cooking and bonsai thrown in for light relief. There are also websites, groups and people to follow — I keep <a href="https://github.com/bodacea/misinfolinks">a basic list of those</a> too.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d29b62a60f10" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec/misinformation-readings-d29b62a60f10">Misinformation readings</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec">misinfosec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Online infowar doesn’t have to use misinformation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/misinfosec/online-infowar-doesnt-have-to-use-misinformation-3d5cf5759ef3?source=rss----14aefc862c70---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3d5cf5759ef3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[information-warfare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[misinformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tactics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[journalism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sara-Jayne Terp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Dec 2019 04:37:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-08T16:40:44.646Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/530/0*ZE3eD2QUTNShPQVB.jpg" /><figcaption>Used in one of the Russian campaigns. And not wrong.</figcaption></figure><p>Reading through some of the DFRlab stories on <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/digitalsherlocks-happy-new-year-258630477792">2018’s election misinformation campaigns</a> (e.g. <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-russian-traces-in-facebook-takedown-767aac0a3483">this one</a>), and I get a familiar sinking feeling. I see the Russian posts about violence against black people, or immigrants doing jobs in conditions that non-immigrants won’t consider, and I find myself thinking “you know what, this is true, and yep, I agree with a lot of it”.</p><p>Just because I study misinformation doesn’t mean I’m immune to it, any more than knowing about the psychology of advertising makes me any less likely to buy a specific pair of shoes that I got repeatedly exposed to over the Christmas season (yes, yes, I know, but they’re gorgeous…). But this is interesting because it’s not misinformation in the content — it’s misrepresentation of the source, in this case a group called “<a href="https://medium.com/@ushadrons/this-space-is-a-repository-for-ads-from-the-russian-social-media-group-black-matters-us-da81a3d5902">Black Matters US</a>”, a Russian Internet Research Agency effort that, amongst other things, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/daily-202/2018/12/17/daily-202-russian-efforts-to-manipulate-african-americans-show-sophistication-of-disinformation-campaign/5c1739291b326b2d6629d4c6/?utm_term=.0c303c1494b9">organised anti-police-treatment rallies in the USA</a>.</p><p>And that’s the thing: one of the most common tactics being used in online information warfare isn’t to create beautiful big lies like pizzagate. It’s to take existing fractures in society, and widen them further. To keep pushing at our emotions til we’re angry or frightened and confused. And countering that tactic is going to need a combination of good provenance tracking, calm voices, and the long hard political work of healing the damage that made it possible.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3d5cf5759ef3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec/online-infowar-doesnt-have-to-use-misinformation-3d5cf5759ef3">Online infowar doesn’t have to use misinformation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec">misinfosec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Responses to misinformation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/misinfosec/responses-to-misinformation-885b9d82947e?source=rss----14aefc862c70---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/885b9d82947e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[misinformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sara-Jayne Terp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Dec 2019 04:36:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-08-08T00:23:48.633Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is no one, magic, response to misinformation. Misinformation mitigation, like disease control, is a whole-system response.</p><p><a href="https://misinfosecproject.github.io/related-work.html">MisinfosecWG</a> has been working on infosec responses to misinformation. Part of this work has been creating the <a href="https://github.com/misinfosecproject/amitt_framework">AMITT framework</a>, to provide a way for people from different fields to talk about misinformation incidents without confusion. We’re now starting to map out misinformation responses, e.g.</p><ul><li>At the technique level — <a href="https://github.com/misinfosecproject/amitt_framework/blob/master/techniques/T0025.md">T0025 leak altered documents</a> was <a href="https://www.niemanlab.org/2018/09/how-france-beat-back-information-manipulation-and-how-other-democracies-might-do-the-same/">countered in France during the Macron election</a>.</li><li>At the tactic level — we can create a <a href="https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/documents/cyber/LM-White-Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf">courses of action matrix</a> that lists ways to detect, deny, disrupt, degrade, deceive or destroy activities in each tactic stage.</li><li>At the procedure level — we can look at sequences of responses that may be more effective than individual responses in isolation.</li></ul><p>Today I’m sat in Las Vegas, watching the <a href="https://aivillage.org/blog/2019/7/31/r00tzbook-a-misinformation-ctf-for-kids">Rootzbook misinformation challenge</a> take shape. I’m impressed at what the team has done in a short period of time (and has planned for later). It also has a place on the framework — specifically at the far-right of it, in <a href="https://github.com/misinfosecproject/amitt_framework/blob/master/tactics/TA09.md">TA09 Exposure</a>. Other education responses we’ve seen so far include:</p><ul><li><a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0279-9">Immunisation through gameplay “pre-bunking”</a>, e.g. the game <a href="https://getbadnews.com/#intro">https://getbadnews.com/#intro</a></li><li>Education on specific techniques, e.g. <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dhs-says-foreign-meddling-is-divisive-as-pineapple-on-pizza/">the pineapple pizza education</a> on division tactics</li><li><a href="https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2019/05/europe/finland-fake-news-intl/">The Finnish education model</a></li><li>Other counters being explored by groups like the <a href="https://github.com/credcoalition/community-site/wiki/Credibility-Literacy">CredCo media literacy working group</a></li></ul><p>Education is an important counter, but won’t be enough on its own. Other counters that are likely to be trialled with it include:</p><ul><li>Tracking data providence to protect against context attacks (digitally sign media and metadata in a way that media includes the original URL in which it was published and private key is that of the original author/publisher)</li><li>Forcing products altered by AI/ML to notify their users (e.g. there was an effort to force Google’s very believable AI voice assistant to <a href="https://newatlas.com/google-duplex-controversy-ai-sounds-too-human/54579/">announce it was an AI</a> before it could talk to customers)</li><li>Requiring legitimate news media to label editorials as such</li><li>Participating in the Cognitive Security Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (ISAO)</li><li>Forcing paid political ads on the Internet to follow the same rules as paid political advertisements on television</li><li>Baltic community models, e.g. <a href="https://theconversation.com/countering-russian-disinformation-the-baltic-nations-way-109366">Baltic “Elves” teamed with local media</a> etc</li></ul><p>Jonathan Stray’s paper “<a href="http://jonathanstray.com/papers/Counter-disinformation%20Final.pdf">Institutional Counter-disinformation Strategies in a Networked Democracy</a>” is a good primer on counters available on a national level.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=885b9d82947e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec/responses-to-misinformation-885b9d82947e">Responses to misinformation</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec">misinfosec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Writing about Countermeasures]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/misinfosec/writing-about-countermeasures-1671d231e8a2?source=rss----14aefc862c70---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1671d231e8a2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[misinfosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[misinformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cognitive-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sara-Jayne Terp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Dec 2019 04:36:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-10T16:27:59.309Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <a href="https://github.com/misinfosecproject/amitt_framework">AMITT framework</a> so far is a beautiful thing — we’ve used it to decompose different misinformation incidents into stages and techniques, so we can start looking for weak points in the ways that incidents are run, and in the ways that their component parts are created, used and put together. But right now, it’s still part of the “admiring the problem” collection of misinformation tools -to be truly useful, AMITT needs to contain not just the breakdown of what the blue team thinks the red team is doing, but also what the blue team might be able to do about it. Colloquially speaking, we’re talking about countermeasures here.</p><h3><strong>Go get some counters</strong></h3><p>Now there are several ways to go about finding countermeasures to any action:</p><ul><li>Go look at ones that already exist. We’ve logged a few already in the AMITT repo, against specific techniques — for example, we listed a <a href="https://github.com/misinfosecproject/amitt_framework/blob/master/incidents/I00022.md">set of counters</a> from the Macron election team as part of incident I00022.</li><li>Pick a specific tactic, technique or procedure and brainstorm how to counter it — the MisinfosecWG did this as part of their Atlanta retreat, describing potential new counters for two of the techniques on the AMITT framework.</li><li>Wargame red v blue in a ‘safe’ environment, and capture the counters that people start using. The Rootzbook exercise that Win and Aaron ran at Defcon AI Village was a good start on this, and holds promise as a training and learning environment.</li><li>Run a machine learning algorithm to generate random countermeasures until one starts looking more sensible/effective than the others. Well, perhaps not, but there’s likely to be some measure of automation in counters eventually…</li></ul><h3><strong>Learn from the experts</strong></h3><p>So right. We get some counters. But hasn’t this all been done before. Like if we’re following the infosec playbook to do all this faster this time around (we really don’t have 20 years to get decent defences in place — we barely have 2…) then shouldn’t we look at things like courses of action matrices? Yes. Yes we should…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/722/1*Up-HyEK_XBWBg1A9TGmc-Q.png" /><figcaption>Courses of Action Matrix [1]</figcaption></figure><p>So this thing goes with the Cyber Killchain — the thing that we matched AMITT to. Down the left side we have the stages; 7 in this case; 12 in AMITT. Along the top we have six things we can do to disrupt each stage. And in each grid square, we have a suggestion of an action (I suspect there are more than one of these for each square) that we could take to cause that type of disruption at that stage. That’s cool. We can do this.</p><p>The other place we can look is at our other parent models, like the ATT&amp;CK framework, the psyops model, marketing models etc, and see how they modelled and described counters too — for example, the mitigations for <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193/">ATT&amp;CK T1193 Spearphishing</a>.</p><h3><strong>Make it easy to share</strong></h3><p>Checking parent models is also useful because this gives us formats for our counter objects— which is basically that these are of type “mitigation”, and contain a title, id, brief description and list of techniques that they address. Looking at <a href="https://docs.oasis-open.org/cti/stix/v2.0/csprd01/part2-stix-objects/stix-v2.0-csprd01-part2-stix-objects.html#_Toc476230929">the STIX format for course-of-action</a> gives us a similarly simple format for each counter against tactics — a name, description and list of things it mitigates against.</p><p>We want to be more descriptive whilst we find and refine our list of counters, so we can trace our decisions and where they came from. A more thorough list of features for a counter list would probably include:</p><ul><li>id</li><li>name</li><li>brief description</li><li>list of tactics can be used on</li><li>list of techniques can be used on</li><li>expected action (detect, deny etc)</li><li>who could take this action (this isn’t in the infosec lists, but we have many actors on the defence side with different types of power, so this might need to be a thing)</li><li>anticipated effects (both positive and negative — also not in the infosec lists)</li><li>anticipated effort (not sure how to quantify this — people? money? hours? but part of the overarching issue is that attacks are much cheaper than defences, so defence cost needs to be taken into account)</li></ul><p>And be generated from a cross-table of counters within incidents, which looks similar to the above, but also contains the who/where/when etc:</p><ul><li>id</li><li>brief description</li><li>list of tactics it was used on</li><li>list of techniques it was used on</li><li>action (detect, deny etc)</li><li>who took this action</li><li>effects seen (positive and negative)</li><li>resources used</li><li>incident id (if known)</li><li>date (if known)</li><li>counters-to-the-counter seen</li></ul><h3><strong>“Boundaries for Fools, Guidelines for the Wise…”</strong></h3><p>At this stage, older infosec people are probably shaking their heads and muttering something about stamp collecting and bingo cards. We get that. We know that defending against a truly agile adversary isn’t a game of lookup, and as fast as we design and build counters, our counterparts will build counters to the counters, new techniques, new adaptations of existing techniques etc.</p><p>But that’s only part of the game. Most of the time people get lazy, or get into a rut — they reuse techniques and tools, or it’s too expensive to keep moving. It makes sense to build descriptions like this that we can adapt over time. It also helps us spot when we’re outside the frame.</p><p>Right. Time to get back to those counters.</p><p><em>References:</em></p><p><em>[1] Hutchins et al “</em><a href="https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/documents/cyber/LM-White-Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf"><em>Intelligence-driven computer network defense informed by analysis of adversary campaigns and intrusion kill chains</em></a><em>”, 2011</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1671d231e8a2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec/writing-about-countermeasures-1671d231e8a2">Writing about Countermeasures</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec">misinfosec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Short thought: The unit should be person, not account]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/misinfosec/short-thought-the-unit-should-be-person-not-account-81c48002aaa?source=rss----14aefc862c70---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/81c48002aaa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[identity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sara-Jayne Terp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Dec 2019 04:35:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-18T02:46:25.232Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I’ve been thinking, inspired partly by Amy Zhang’s paper on mailing lists vs social media use <a href="https://twitter.com/amyxzh/status/1173812276211662848?s=20&amp;fbclid=IwAR0v8m7rT9wRDn47HUsEaN7YyFc5fmH0vKIZZ7oxtujz0weMXS7iLb7frW0">https://twitter.com/amyxzh/status/1173812276211662848?s=20</a></p><p>We have a bunch of issues with online identity. Like, I have at least 20 different ways to contact some of my friends, send half my life trying to separate out people being themselves from massive coordinated cross-platform campaigns, and dozens of issues with privacy, openness (like do we throw a message into the infinite beerhall that’s twitter or deliberately email to just a few chosen peeps). How much of this has happened because our base unit of contact has changed from an individual human to an online account?</p><p>I’m wondering if there’s a way to switch that back again. <a href="https://twitter.com/zeynep/status/1174134856806215687?s=20">Zeynep Tufecki said </a>that people stayed on Facebook despite its shortcomings because that’s where the school emergency alerts, group organisation etc were. What if we could make those things platform-independent again? I mean we have APIs, yes? They’re generally broadcast, or broadcast-and-feedback, yes?</p><p>I guess this is two ideas. One is to challenge the idea that everything has to be instant-to-instant. Yeah, sure, we want to chat with our friends. But do we really need instant chat on everything? If we drop that, can we build healthier models?</p><p>The second idea is to challenge the account-as-user idea. Remember addressbooks? Like those real physical paper books that you listed your friends, family etc names, addresses, phone numbers, emails etc in? What if we had a system that went back to that, and when you sent a message to someone it went to their system of choice in your style of choice (dm, group, public etc). I get that you’re all unique etc, and I’m still cool with some of you having multiple personalities, but this 20 ways to contact a person — that’s got old, and fast.</p><p>The third (because who doesn’t like a fourth book in a trilogy) is to give people introvert time. Instead of having control over our electronic lives by putting down the electronics, have a master switch for “only my mother can contact me right now”.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=81c48002aaa" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec/short-thought-the-unit-should-be-person-not-account-81c48002aaa">Short thought: The unit should be person, not account</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec">misinfosec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[At Truth&Trust Online, someone asked me about the overlaps between misinformation research and IoT…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/misinfosec/at-truth-trust-online-someone-asked-me-about-the-overlaps-between-misinformation-research-and-iot-a69772aba963?source=rss----14aefc862c70---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a69772aba963</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[disinformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cognitive-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[misinformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iot]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[misinfosec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sara-Jayne Terp]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Dec 2019 04:34:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-10-06T07:01:23.829Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At Truth&amp;Trust Online, someone asked me about the overlaps between misinformation research and IoT security. There’s more than you’d think, and not just in the overlaps between people like Chris Blask who are working on both problem sets.</p><p>I stopped for a second, then went “Oh. I recognize this problem. It’s exactly what we did with data and information fusion (and knowledge fusion too, but you know a lot of that now as just normal data science and AI). Basically it’s about what happens when you’re building situation pictures (mental models of what is happening in the world) based on data that’s come from people (the misinformation, or information fusion part) and things (the IoT, or data fusion part). And what we basically did last time was run both disciplines separately - the text analysis and reasoning in a different silo to the sensor-based analysis and reasoning - til it made sense to start combining them (which is basically what became information fusion). That’s how we got the *last* pyramid diagram - the DIKW model of data under information under knowledge under wisdom (sorry: it’s been changed to insight now), and similar ideas of transformations and transitions in information (in the Shannon information theory sense of the word) between layers.</p><p>We’ll probably do a similar thing now. Both disciplines feed into situation pictures; both can be used to support (or refute) each other. Both contain all the classics like protecting information CIA: confidentiality, integrity, accessibility. I tasked two people at the conference to start delving into this area further (and connect to Chris) - will see where this goes.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a69772aba963" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec/at-truth-trust-online-someone-asked-me-about-the-overlaps-between-misinformation-research-and-iot-a69772aba963">At Truth&amp;Trust Online, someone asked me about the overlaps between misinformation research and IoT…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/misinfosec">misinfosec</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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