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        <title><![CDATA[nonce vcva - Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Perspectives in the Anthropology of Money]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/nonce-vcva/perspectives-in-the-anthropology-of-money-2fea5dc4a49a?source=rss----b35c1bbbdc7f---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[anthropology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Simon Posner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 18 Jun 2019 10:04:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-18T10:01:49.371Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In much of the anthropological record of money, scholars have rehearsed a distinction between modern money and primitive money. Setting modern money aside as a seamless abstraction, anthropologists have generated important insights about the curious worlds of primitive money and its varied uses and meanings. Later on, anthropologist would use the accounts of primitive money to approach modern money, unsettling the distinction between modern and primitive money-forms and revealing how modern money itself takes on variegated expressions. In this post, I’ll look at a few of these accounts, starting with primitive money.</p><p><strong>Karl Polanyi</strong></p><p>The pivotal work of Karl Polanyi (1968) makes a clear and teleologically-oriented distinction between modern money and primitive money. Modern money is like a language with its own uniform grammar. It is a system that is applied consistently across all situations of exchange. It is all-purpose money. In contrast, primitive money is fragmented: it comes in an array of forms that each apply in specific situations, none of which are commensurable with the other. That is, different money-uses are institutionalized separately from one another.</p><p>Primitive money is not only about exchange. It is special-purpose money, defined by its specific uses. Aside from use for exchange, which was very rare in archaic societies, money is used for two other purposes: payment and hoarding. In archaic societies, debt is determined by non-economic factors, such as status, kinship, legal obligation. Money is used here to pay for one’s debts. Hoarding also relates to payment: accumulation is intended for use if one must pay. This includes staples or treasure. For Polanyi, the notion that money has always served as a means of exchange or as a standard of value is to elide the complex history — the “great transformation” — out of which money arose as we find it in the contemporary world.</p><p><strong>Paul Bohannan</strong></p><p>In guise of the same distinction with a focus on primitive money, Paul Bohannan (1955) examines three dimensions of Tiv ideas of exchange and investment: ideas of exchange expressed in language; traditional modes of exchange and investment; and the impact of Western economic elements brought into the local economic relations of the Tiv. First, Bohannan notes a distinction the Tiv make between “market” and “gift.” Gifts should not be calculated or haggled over because they have no explicit or precise exchange value. In contrast, markets are impersonal and demonstrate a dimension of exchange value.</p><p>Second, Bohannan notes three categories of exchangeable items. The first category consists of foodstuff including chickens, goats and cookware, which relates to subsistence. The second category includes slaves, cattle and metal bars, relating to prestige. The final category consists of rights in human beings, in particular rights over women (other elements like service and labor can be classified as generosity or obligation while land is not exchangeable). Bohannan demonstrates that these three categories constitute a moral hierarchy wherein subsistence ranks lowest and rights rank highest. Trade across the same category consists of <em>conveyances</em>, while trade between different categories comprises <em>conversion</em>. The object is to convert from lower to higher, and this endeavor sets the conditions for Tiv motivation. They seek to climb from subsistence to prestige and finally to marriage.</p><p>In the last part of his article, Bohannan examines how Western economic integration has disturbed the Tiv’s traditional mode of exchange and investment. There are basically two central problems Bohannan outlines that revolve around the introduction of Western money, as a mechanism that sets itself as the common denominator for all forms of exchange. First, some Tiv merchants aim to accumulate money (M-C-M) by purchasing a commodity and exporting it to another market to sell at a higher price. This makes it such that means of subsistence are being shipped away in order to accrue profit. Second, exchange marriage has been outlawed by Western colonial powers and has been replaced with the purchase of brides. The only motivational factor left therefore is the accumulation of money, which leaves even less foodstuffs for the locality. The Tiv basically sell their foodstuffs to get rich quick and get married, but as competition rises for wives, the availability of foodstuffs vanishes. Bohannan’s is an example of the outside forces of capital penetrating a local system and disturbing it, but he also demonstrates, in his illustrations of Tiv modes of exchange, the extent to which examining the stuff of exchange can elucidate important insights about the actions and motivations of a group of people.</p><p><strong>George Dalton</strong></p><p>George Dalton (1965) aims to create further distance between modern and primitive money by illustrating the ways in which the imposition of Western economic models when examining primitive money forms elides the latter’s complexities and distinctions and ultimately assumes that money, in all forms, has only one transhistorical expression: market exchange. He divides his articles into three parts: Western money and economy; primitive money and economy; and a case study of Rossel Island money.</p><p>First, the basic characteristic of Western economic models is that money serves a general purpose under which all forms of transaction are derived from market exchange in a fully integrated society. Money is the direct or indirect medium of all forms of exchange. Non-commercial exchanges, such as tax payments or gift-giving, are all fundamentally derived from the private market norm. We think that market integration is the only form of ‘money-ness.’ All other forms are not money and therefore irrelevant to economic analysis. Western money is anonymous, where exchange takes place between two faceless, status-less actors.</p><p>Second, in contrast to modern money, primitive money-stuff is not bundled into a unified economic framework. There can be multiple and coexisting economic systems distinct from one another. Dalton outlines three basic economies. First, marketless economies are marked by reciprocity and redistribution where land and labor are not for sale. These are subsistence economies. Second, peripheral market economies have markets, but the bulk of income does not come from market sales. Third, market-dominated (peasant) economies are similar to Western economies but they don’t have large-scale machine technology and retain traditional social organization.</p><p>Third, having outlined the distinction between modern and primitive economic systems, Dalton illustrates how approaching primitive economies with modern economic models in mind is problematic. To demonstrate his case, Dalton critiques Armstrong’s analysis of Rossel Island money. Armstrong is an economist who ethnocentrically superimposes a Western economic model onto the local economy. He claims that <em>ndap</em> shells can be counted like money and that they are part of a unified economic system. In fact, as Dalton shows, these shells are part of two separate systems, subsistence and prestige, that are both incommensurable with one another. Armstrong’s analysis is an example of how not to do anthropology: he has elided local distinctions and made it appear as though the Western money form was the only form to have ever existed. Dalton closes by pointing out that money has no essence but is rather defined by the ways in which it is used in relation to its specific economic system. The insights Dalton provides are interesting because, while he reifies a difference between primitive and modern money, he also establishes a wide array of uses of money and that similar objects may have incommensurably different uses. Both Bohannan and Dalton demonstrate variation in the use of money, even if observed in economies explicitly categorized as primitive.</p><p><strong><em>Complicating the separation between primitive and modern money</em></strong></p><p><strong>Viviana Zelizer</strong></p><p>Viviana Zelizer (1989) throws into question the basic assumption that capitalist money is a completely abstracted, singular form of exchange. She basically brings the anthropology of primitive money into the Western context to demonstrate that modern money is not only about market exchange but can be defined in multiple ways, with different uses and with different words. She calls her approach an alternative model of “special monies.” She divides her discussion into three section: modern money; special monies; and a case study of domestic money.</p><p>First, Zelizer examines Max Weber and Georg Simmel’s approaches, who she claims addressed money as a force that neutralizes the world and turns its qualitative traits into quantitative elements that can be traded in the market. Zelizer outlines five assumptions about modern money: 1) money is defined strictly in economic terms; 2) all monies are the same in modern society; 3) money is neutral; 4) money commodifies and corrupts; and 5) money has a unilateral relation in transforming the world. Presumably, money changes and shapes the world, but the world does not shape it. Zelizer intends to complicate this.</p><p>Zelizer aims to take Polanyi’s notion of “special purpose money” into the Western context. Anthropologists of money have examined primitive money but have not used those same analytical tools in the Western context, thereby establishing a distinction between modern money and primitive money. For Zelizer, modern money is only different in degrees and not in kind from primitive money. Zelizer challenges the utilitarian model of money with the following five counter-assumptions: 1) money does not only exist in the sphere of the market; 2) there is a plurality of qualitatively distinct monies, market money being only one among many; 3) a more inclusive model is needed to take these differences into account; 4) money can be a personal and unique object; and 5) money shapes society and is shaped by society.</p><p>Zelizer then discusses a case study to demonstrate the extent to which gender and class shape the meanings, uses, and names of money as these change over time. She demonstrates that family money was set apart from the market, that it was nonfungible. Her exploration of domestic money elucidates the limitations of the rationalized model of market economy. Zelizer’s overall aim is to challenge neoclassical economic theory by provincializing market money as one among many forms and expressions of money. Modern money is no longer the abstract all-powerful form it once was; it is indeed powerful, but it is also subject to the same varied uses as primitive money once was imagined to be. The primitive/modern distinction therefore no longer holds.</p><p><strong>Bill Maurer</strong></p><p>In his important review article on money, Bill Maurer (2006) aims to settle the notion that there are no distinctions between forms of money, Western or nonwestern. For Maurer, we can never really attain the representation of money, its true and fundamental essence, especially not a modern abstracted form. Whatever we claim to say is true about money is always a particular representation that cannot conform congruently to reality. So, approaching money as a “great equalizer” will always elide other ways in which money is used. Rather than aiming to claim the true nature of money, Maurer recommends we focus on its uses and pragmatics, which are always already bound to symbolic and social systems, to elucidate all the different ways in which money shapes and is shaped by the world.</p><p>The opening of Maurer’s article gives an overview of the anthropology of money. This subdiscipline has examined the particular uses of money in nonwestern contexts but not in Western contexts. It has also examined ways in which modern money is integrated into nonwestern contexts. The basic assumption is always the same: modern money is money that has undergone a “great transformation.” It is always approached as disembedded from the world and becomes a world shaping force. This approach reproduces an “us/them” distinction tied with a moral dimension against the ravages of modern money. According to the ethnographic record, modern money is integrated in all sorts of ways. Sometimes it fits well with a new context, sometimes it has little impact, if any. The point is modern money is not a “great equalizer;” it operates in all the same and distinct ways primitive money does. We can set aside Marx and the moral dimensions of modern money to look deeper into the manifold specificities of its pragmatics and uses.</p><p>The same could be said about calculation and numbers. With modern money, calculation does not become something disembedded from the world. It is not something that comes to exist in the idealic realm of “mind.” Cognitive operations are always part of context that involve all sorts of concerns and other ongoing activities. There is no such thing as pure calculation of the world.</p><p>The quantitative models of finance are also not disembedded from the world. They certainly do perform and enact reality in specific ways and have real consequences in the world, but they also have other effects not immediately related to markets. Models can also be felt affectively, they can be related to people’s personal biographies, for example. In this sense, there never was a “great transformation” to the fullest degree. Money always exceeds its representations through the surprising ways in which it is deployed. Maurer contends that we should thus “reorient the anthropology of money from meanings to repertoires, pragmatics, and indexicality” to consider “the gaps between representation and reality and sign and substance, and their “unresolved antagonisms’” (30).</p><p><strong>Marcel Mauss</strong></p><p>Finally, my discussion on the theme of money ends with Marcel Mauss’ (1967) <em>The Gift</em>. Mauss’ essay is brief but contains a rich account of geographically and historically distinct societies. I will not summarize the book in detail but rather point to several relevant themes it covers. Mauss begins by introducing the gift as a “total social phenomenon,” that is, the practice of prestation (lending or reciprocal exchange) is weaved into and makes up multiple elements of a society’s fabric (religious, legal, moral, economic). In this way, Mauss contends that the market is a human product such that morality and economy cannot be separated, a basic principle that is present in every society, across time and space. The findings in the book are therefore common and generalizable, distinct only in degrees but not in kind. To demonstrate this, Mauss conducts a comparative analysis of different societies — based on the literary review of an array of ethnographic sources. The central question in the book is: what is the principle of reciprocity? What force in the thing compels the recipient to make a return?</p><p>The answer Mauss offers is that gifts must be received and returned because they are things charged with magic, mana, hau, a spirit, a part of the giver, and in this sense, the gift is alive. They are the vehicles of mana and demand that they be returned to their original owner in some other form. In this sense, they hold sway over the recipient, who is bound to return the gift to the initial giver. One is also required to receive because circulation is the nature of things. Things are meant to be in motion, and in this way, they must also always be given.</p><p>This, for many I think, would come across as a dubious set of claims. For Claude Levi-Strauss (1987) for example, Mauss appeared to have been taken by the object of his own analysis, which would have clouded his ability to perceive the essential processes below that govern appearances. Mauss took the gift as a personification that had its own independent agency in the world, but the notion that it was a fetish, a reified thing only makes sense in a dualist framework of thought (hence Levi-Strauss’ structuralism). For Mauss, the gift is its own singularity while also being part of a totality. There is nothing that separates the gift from the whole, while there is nothing that separates reality from abstraction. Along parallel lines, Mauss contended that gifts presuppose the fundamental institutions of exchange in a given society while simultaneously realizing them. He also countered Malinowski’s distinction between primitive and modern currencies by advancing that both served similar functions and therefore could be classed under the same “genus” (94). But what I have found most compelling about Mauss’ essay is that he approached the gift as an entry point to gain insights into the lifeworlds of different societies. The gift is therefore an effective analytical method that can lead to novel horizons of thought.</p><p>Gifts, finance, money, basically anything that circulates between people, can be an entry point for insights into the lifeworlds of different groups and scales. The object of research is not a thing to be defined, but rather a practice to be observed. And if we allow ourselves to be taken by the object of our study as Mauss was accused of doing, we can then extend these insights into our own versions of reality.</p><p><strong>REFERENCES</strong></p><p>Bohannan, Paul. 1955. “Some Principles of Exchange and Investment Among the Tiv.” <em>American Anthropologist</em> 57: 60–70.</p><p>Dalton, George. 1965. “Primitive Money.” <em>American Anthropologist</em> 67 (1): 44–65.</p><p>Levi-Strauss, Claude. 1987. <em>Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss</em>. Translated by Felicity Baker. London, UK: Routledge and Paul Kegan.</p><p>Maurer, Bill. 2006. “The Anthropology of Money.” <em>Annual Review of Anthropology</em> 35: 15–36.</p><p>Mauss, Marcel. 1967. <em>The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies</em>. Translated by Ian Cunnison. New York, NY: W. W. Norton &amp; Company.</p><p>Polanyi, Karl. 1968. “The Semantics of Money-Uses.” In <em>Primitive, Archaic, and Modern Economies: Essays of Karl Polanyi</em>, edited by George Dalton, 175–203. New York, NY: Anchor Books.</p><p>Zelizer, Viviana. 1989. “The Social Meaning of Money: ‘Special Monies.’” <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 95 (2): 342–77.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2fea5dc4a49a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/nonce-vcva/perspectives-in-the-anthropology-of-money-2fea5dc4a49a">Perspectives in the Anthropology of Money</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/nonce-vcva">nonce vcva</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Money and Violence]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/nonce-vcva/money-and-violence-c5af074ec141?source=rss----b35c1bbbdc7f---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c5af074ec141</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[anthropology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sovereignty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sociology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Simon Posner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2019 07:05:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-17T21:31:30.759Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this post, I’d like to discuss the section on violence in Nigel Dodd’s (2014) first chapter on the origins of money. This section basically discusses the works of Michel Aglietta and Andre Orléan. It strikes me as odd that this section is independent of the “Tribute” section (state theories of money) because in much of the literature in the anthropology of the state, state and violence are inseparable entities. Nevertheless, in the arena of money, Dodd writes, “mainstream theories of money posit violence as <em>extrinsic</em> to money… For this reason, violence usually features only on the periphery of monetary scholarship” (43). Let’s look at what Dodd writes about Aglietta and Orléan (heretofore AO).</p><p>AO root their theory of money in Rene Girard’s work. Girard posited that humans basically cannot choose something they want on their own. As fundamentally social creatures, we choose that which others around us want to possess. Our desires, therefore, come from wanting to possess what others want. Put more simply, we want to imitate others, what Girard called “mimetic desire.”</p><p>The problem here is that if we desire what others desire, we position ourselves as rivals to others around us. This is a pretty interesting claim because it smuggles in another assumption about humanity: that we are somehow inherently inclined to conflict with one another. So, we are social creatures because our desires arise from our relations with others, and because of those desires, we invariably rival one another. This is a pretty bold claim and strikes me as rather Hobbesian with regards to human nature. Be that as it may, AO decide to root their entire framework on Girard’s “mimetic desire.”</p><p>Money enters here as a mediator for human rivalry, but this is insofar as money is a product of an outside authority: “As a symbol of an authority that originates beyond the market and that can nevertheless enforce marketplace rules, money diverts mimetic desire and deflects violent struggle by channeling rivalry into contract” (44). As an outside force, money regulates rivalry insofar as it is generally accepted as legitimate, but as it enters into social relations, it can be used to deploy violence (because violence is inseparable from social relations). All monetary systems have this central tension between, on the one hand, centralization and homogenization, and on the other hand, fragmentation and individualization. As Dodd writes, “This is the tension between <em>fractionnement</em> and centralization, two contradictory tendencies that must be reconciled in any viable monetary system” (45).</p><p>This is actually a pretty fun approach and appears to suggest two versions of sovereignty. Sovereignty is a loaded term and gets thrown around a lot these days. Perhaps the most common meaning of sovereignty refers to a government’s control over the territory within its borders. We also often see it today in blockchain literature when there’s talk of self-sovereign individuals who have independent control over their personal data, money, and other forms of private property. But the forms of sovereignty I see in AO refer to notions of sovereign power that emerged in political philosophy and related disciplines.</p><p>First, there’s the notion of a state with the power to make law while simultaneously standing outside the law. Correspondingly, AO’s state is one that regulates social relations in markets with money but is also independent of markets themselves. This is essentially divine sovereignty, a form of power that figures like Bataille, Bodin, Machiavelli, Schmitt proposed: a sovereign — prince or otherwise — that can make law and break it whenever they want. Foucault would later describe this as the right to kill or let live. A contemporary example of this would be capital punishment: the state can prohibit murder and legitimately commit murder at the same time. It would seem at least that AO conform to this kind of version of the state as one that regulates society yet exists outside society.</p><p>The second version of sovereign power shows itself in money. As a product of the state, money stands outside society, and because of this, it carries great potency. As it enters social relations, those that wield money can also become associated with the potency of money and exercise a certain degree of sovereign power over society.</p><p>Marshall Sahlins (2008) proposed this form of sovereign power in his observation that a large number of kings across history and geography have been foreign — “stranger-kings.” He suggests a principle to explain this phenomenon, one based on structural theories between the <em>inside</em> and the <em>outside</em>. Society needs the outside to survive (think of resources, people, etc.) but it cannot control the outside and therefore fears it. The stranger-king is a carrier of the outside — a place of necessity yet danger, and therefore bears potency and power over society. Sahlins’ argument is not really about stranger-kings but more about reflecting on the potency of the outside, or the foreign. As a more immediate example, we can refer to what it means to be “global” — a position that carries considerable prestige. Likewise, foreign products in many cases contain something additional about them than local products might. This is the potency of the outside. With respect to money, as something that arises from an extrinsic place to society, those within society that can wield money — individuals, corporations, etc. — can imbue themselves with the potency of the outside and exercise greater consequences across society.</p><p><strong>REFERENCES</strong></p><p>Dodd, Nigel. 2014. <em>The Social Life of Money</em>. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.</p><p>Sahlins, Marshall. 2008. “The Stranger-King Or, Elementary Forms of the Politics of Life.” <em>Indonesia and the Malay World</em> 36 (105): 177–99.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c5af074ec141" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/nonce-vcva/money-and-violence-c5af074ec141">Money and Violence</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/nonce-vcva">nonce vcva</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[On Georg Simmel’s Quantification]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/nonce-vcva/on-georg-simmels-quantification-820adfda633a?source=rss----b35c1bbbdc7f---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/820adfda633a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sociology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[anthropology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Simon Posner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 16 Jun 2019 08:49:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-06-16T14:58:26.275Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Simmel’s Quantification</strong></h3><p>In my readings in the anthropology and sociology of money, two figures have often stood out against whom contemporary scholars have mounted critiques: Karl Marx and Georg Simmel. While Marx advanced one of the most comprehensive analyses and critiques of capitalism, he’s often taken to have overly abstracted the capitalist economy from everyday life, to the degree that readers come to understand capitalism as having soaked through and colonized all aspects of life. As for Simmel, scholars have dismissed his analysis of money as reductive because of how he claimed that money objectifies the subjective dimensions of everyday life.</p><p>I’ve ventured into Marx’s writings but very little into Simmel’s, so up to this point, I’ve been fairly satisfied with a second-hand take on Simmel. That is, until Nigel Dodd (2014) has drawn on Simmel’s work in interesting ways. Dodd finds it unfortunate that scholars have focused on and critiqued Simmel’s view that “money transforms social life by reducing qualitative relations to quantitative ones” (30). But on the brighter side of things, Simmel’s viewpoint has invited and incited scholars to develop many “insights into the nature of money” (30).</p><p>While Simmel is the foremost thinker in Dodd’s book, Dodd does not read him as a rigid thinker who said that money objectifies everyday life. Rather, he reads Simmel as “a rich and multifaceted thinker” who had a much more fluid and flexible concept of society than most other sociologists (Dodd 2015, 438). Geoffrey Ingham’s (2004) approach to the nature of money, for example, represents a more traditional way of thinking about society because he seeks to establish a “general theory” that money is strictly and entirely a product of society.</p><p>Simmel, in contrast, proposed a <em>softer</em> notion of society, something akin to sociation or association. We can contrast Simmel to, say, Emile Durkheim’s notion of collective consciousness, the idea that society is greater than the sum of each individual. For Simmel, society is not a thing that exists elsewhere but is characterized as an ongoing process “which exists within and through myriad interactions” (Dodd 2015, 436). Society, that is, is the outcome of our collective associations (Simmel could be said to be Humean because society is <em>immanent</em> to human action and experience).</p><p>Simmel’s approach to society corresponds to the way he thinks of the economy. The economy is not something that exists out there but is immanent to the act of exchange. And the same goes for the world of value. Simmel defined value as demand: the intensity for which one desires an object (Dodd 2014, 27). Value arises <em>in</em> the process of exchange when two owners give one another what the other possesses. Exchange then is a “mutual sacrifice:” “to <em>gain</em> something, we must simultaneously <em>lose</em>” (27–28).</p><p>For Simmel, value corresponds to the distance between a person and the object they desire, and this distance is proportional to the sacrifice required to possess this object. Value, therefore, “accrues to the desired object by virtue of the sacrifice needed to acquire it in exchange” (Dodd 2014, 28). Value is <em>not</em> the property of objects themselves, but the <em>distance</em> between the person and the object.</p><p>Simmel argued that while value arises in the relation between person and object, “value comes to appear as an objective property of things themselves” (Dodd 2014, 28). This occurs when we desire more than one object. In a world of many objects of desire, we come to compare them and <em>quantify</em> their value. Value then appears as though it were a property of objects rather than a relation between persons and objects. Quantification conditions the possibility for money, and for value itself to become <em>price</em>: “The monetary price of an object is the external manifestation of the sacrifice that is offered in exchange for it: it is a quantitative objectification of that sacrifice” (29).</p><p>Simmel was not simply interested in how value arose and how it came to be quantified by money. He had a larger scope of interest: “he sought to understand how money brings order to a world in which objects and values are in perpetual flux” (29). This relates to Simmel’s notion of society and economy, where each is made through ongoing associations. Money, he thought, established consistency and flatness to the unfoldings and variations of social life.</p><p>For Simmel (2002), human life depends on differences, that our minds are “stimulated by the difference between present impressions and those which have preceded” (11), and he worried that as money circulates more and more across society, it would come to increasingly quantify the qualitative differences in everyday life. In the money economy, we become indifferent “towards the distinction between things” (14). As Simmel wrote, “the meaning and the value of the distinctions between things, and therewith of the things themselves, are experienced as meaningless” (14). This essentially rational “intellectualist” manner of social relations was not for Simmel a product of money, as though money were shaping us into rational actors, but rather intellectualism was the manner in which modern people — specifically those living in large cities where the money economy occupied the virtual totality of urban space — sought to protect their inner lives. This is a crucial point from Simmel: money is not that which shapes us but rather that which brings us to adopt a “blasé attitude” to protect our values and uniqueness from money — “the frightful leveler” (14). Simmel, therefore, never departs from his conception of society and economy: both domains are immanent to everyday social interaction and association.</p><p>In Simmel’s approach to large cities, where the money economy proliferated — indeed, both city and money would appear to be co-constitutive for Simmel — he observed that residents engaged in activities that made them stand out (18). This is because our need for difference demands expression, and the metropolis, alongside the money economy, have given rise to a whole array of specializations and variations. If we extend Simmel’s observations to the notion of modern money, we find a contradiction, or a dialectic: modern money is an object that reduces difference to make all things commensurable and therefore tradeable with one another, but it incites the further proliferation of particularities and differences.</p><p>REFERENCES</p><p>Dodd, Nigel. 2014. <em>The Social Life of Money</em>. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.</p><p>Dodd, Nigel. 2015. “Redeeming Simmel’s Money.” <em>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</em> 5 (2): 435–41.</p><p>Ingham, Geoffrey. 2004. <em>The Nature of Money</em>. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.</p><p>Simmel, Georg. 2002. “The Metropolis and Mental Life.” In <em>The Blackwell City Reader</em>, edited by Gary Bridge and Sophie Watson, 11–19. Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=820adfda633a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/nonce-vcva/on-georg-simmels-quantification-820adfda633a">On Georg Simmel’s Quantification</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/nonce-vcva">nonce vcva</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Some notes on Nigel Dodd’s first chapter: Origins]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/nonce-vcva/some-notes-on-nigel-dodds-first-chapter-origins-861d453c4cbf?source=rss----b35c1bbbdc7f---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/861d453c4cbf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[anthropology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sociology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Simon Posner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Jun 2019 22:12:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-13T05:35:55.180Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nigel Dodd’s (2014) first chapter presents several challenges and I would like to suggest a framework that can help us understand him more clearly. Dodd introduces a difficult approach to the study of money because he doesn’t take a firm position. He is not saying that money is one thing. As he writes in the conclusion of his chapter, “I want to open a line of argument about <em>monetary diversity</em>… Money is a <em>remarkably diverse phenomenon</em>” (47–48, italics added).</p><p>Dodd is not looking to finish or conclude the argument about what money is but rather open it up. To put this in very simple terms: if you say that something is this, and that’s your final answer, then that thing cannot be anything else. It has to be that one thing, and that one thing only. So, if you say that money is this and nothing else, then you won’t be open to think about money in other ways. As Dodd writes, money’s “variance is an opportunity, not an impediment” (48). Approaching money as something multiple, as something that comes in many forms, feeds the <em>imagination</em>. It is an approach that can lead to thinking about money in new ways. And with the explosion of money forms over the last decade (Bitcoin, etc.), this is a very timely and useful approach.</p><p>To give more clarity to Dodd’s approach, I’ll compare him with Karl Menger (1892) and Geoffrey Ingham (2004).</p><p>Menger and Ingham are opposed to one another about the origins of money. They are part of a long-standing debate between <em>economic</em> and <em>sociological</em> approaches to the origins of money, which come from the difference between the individual and society. Here’s a table to illustrate:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/874/1*zi0ygUrEmpjeE9UKMxRFGg.jpeg" /></figure><p>While economics and sociology are on opposite sides, they are both trying to give THE final answer to the debate in the origins of money. For the economist, the individual made money through market transactions, and for the sociologist, money arose from payments to religious and political authorities. These authorities are greater than the individual; they are institutions that were made by a collective of people, that is, society.</p><p>So, we have two opposed positions: the individual vs society. Since these two positions have been part of a long debate, a lot of people wrote a lot about this. It seems debate and the need to be right motivates people to think of a lot of stuff. Economists and sociologists often try to preempt what the other side will say. For example, Ingham writes, “the evidence leads to the conclusion that private transfer outside the command economy comprised an insignificant part of the total financial transactions” (96). As for Menger, he wrote, “Money has not been generated by law… Sanction by the authority of the state is a notion alien to it” (255).</p><p>Now, while Menger and Ingham, economics and sociology, are opposed, they are actually fundamentally <em>equivalent</em>. This is because they are after the same thing: THE final answer. And this is different from the way Dodd thinks about money. To illustrate this difference, I’ll draw on an older discord between David Hume (1995 [1748]) and Immanuel Kant (2004 [1783]) on metaphysics, or the nature of how we understand reality. For the sake of argument, I’ll give a simplified version of the two sides.</p><p>Kant outlined two dimensions to reality. The <em>material</em> world we see around us is the <em>appearance</em> of reality. It is what appears to us through our senses (sight, touch, smell, etc.). The <em>formal</em> world is composed of the rules that govern reality. These rules are commonly known as “the laws of nature,” the <em>real</em> world that exists beneath the appearances of the material world.</p><p>Let’s take an example. If I have a pen in my hand and then I open my hand, the pen will fall to the ground. I will see the pen fall and I will hear it hit the ground. Why did the pen fall? Because gravity pulled it down. This is the law of gravity, and it is universal in the sense that if I release the pen one hundred times, all other variables aside, the pen will fall to the ground. Pretty straightforward.</p><p>Kant wrote about metaphysics in response to Hume, who proposed something completely different, which Kant took to be an attack on science (if we define science as the study of nature’s laws). Hume, like Kant, outlined two dimensions. <em>Impressions</em> are experiences we have in the world, while <em>ideas</em> emerge when we have had many impressions of the same experience. Let’s return to the example of the pen.</p><p>I drop the pen and see it fall. The experience of seeing the pen fall to the ground is a single impression of this event. Now, if I drop the pen ten times and the same things happens, I will form an idea that the pen falls when I release it. Kant will say that this is the law of gravity, and it happens whether I like it or not, but not Hume. For Hume, the falling pen is not a law but an idea, an idea that is composed of the accumulation of impressions I have experienced from dropping the pen ten times. But there is no way to know with certainty that the pen will drop an eleventh time if I release it from my hand.</p><p>I know, Hume is strange, and also totally awesome. What he’s saying is that there is nothing that exists outside human experience. In more formal terms, the difference between Kant and Hume is that Kant’s approach is <em>transcendental</em> while Hume’s is <em>immanent</em>.</p><p>Transcendence means that there is a reality beyond what people do. There is a fundamental, universal truth independent of the existence of humans. Immanence, on the other hand, means that reality is made by people in their experiences in the world. There is no outside to experience; what you see is what you get, or more precisely, what you experience is what you get.</p><p>If we return to Menger and Ingham, while, again, both are opposed in their economic and sociological positions, they are both Kantians. For Menger, there is no society; there is the market and rational actors exchanging with one another. The experience of the rational actor is irrelevant. People are rational actors because that is their transcendental nature. For Ingham, individuals don’t really matter. What matters is society, a transcendental collective that shapes and governs the actions of individuals.</p><p>Dodd, in contrast, is Humean. There is no transcendental truth to the nature of money, there is only what people do with it, and they do all kinds of different things. Dodd provides six different way of considering money to illustrate its various forms in the world.</p><p>Dodd’s six approaches are NOT <em>interpretations</em>. An interpretation is a Kantian term. It is to say that we are looking at an object from different angles, as though that object was a transcendental thing at the center. An interpretation implicitly assumes that there is a universal, objective truth beneath the interpretation (see for example Mol 2002).</p><p>A more effective way to consider Dodd is to think of each of his suggestions as ways of <em>foregrounding</em> different dimensions of money. Each approach brings closer to the light some aspects of money and leaves out other aspects. We can layer and manipulate Dodd’s suggestions as we like. Again, they are suggestions, so have fun with them.</p><p>Dodd’s method takes advantage of several philosophical approaches. Let’s consider a few. Theodor Adorno (1973) suggested the notion of “nonidentity.” This is the space between the thing and the concept, or the world and how we understand it. The gap will always be there, so it’s best to make friends with it. In the case of money, whatever definition we give to this thing will always be insufficient. Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) wrote that the human mind cannot capture the complexity of the world. There’s just too much going on, and you’d have to think of yourself a god to claim to understand the world in its totality. Marc Augé suggests the notion of “overabundance” to characterize the world. It’s an overwhelming place, and whatever understanding we provide brings together a few pixels of the whole image. These authors suggest <em>analytical modesty</em> rather than <em>definitive resolution</em>.</p><p>These philosophical approaches, along with Dodd’s suggestions, don’t lead to nihilistic ends, as if to say, “well, if we can’t understand the world, then what’s the point of even trying.” Rather, it’s to say, “look at all the marvels that await us out there!” The world is not a disenchanted place; it is a place that conjures the imagination, but only if you let it.</p><p>Another way to think of this method is to <em>withhold</em> from deducing general or universal conclusions from particular events. Yes, there are trends, consistencies, and patterns in the world, but it is by leaving room for <em>doubt</em> that we can then notice that things can always be otherwise, and that the world maintains the capacity to surprise us.</p><p>So, if we return to Menger and Ingham and approach them through Dodd’s framework, we get a different picture. Menger and Ingham’s stories of the origins of money are not final answers but perspectives that allow us to ask questions in certain ways and focus on different dimensions of money. This approach also allows us to get by the <em>impasse</em> in the debate between state and market. This is a tired debate, considering it arguably began with Adam Smith and continues on today. Freed from questions of right or wrong, Dodd’s approach allows us to embrace the diversity of money. The four additional perspectives in his chapter offer other ways of considering money, and we’ll get to these in more detail in the coming weeks.</p><p><strong>REFERENCES</strong></p><p>Adorno, Theodor. 1983. <em>Negative Dialectics</em>. Translated by E. B. Ashton. New York, NY: Continuum.</p><p>Augé, Marc. 1995. <em>Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity</em>. Translated by John Howe. New York, NY: Verso.</p><p>Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. 1987. <em>A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia</em>. Translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.</p><p>Dodd, Nigel. 2014. <em>The Social Life of Money</em>. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.</p><p>Hume, David. 1995 [1748]. <em>An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding</em>. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.</p><p>Ingham, Geoffrey. 2004. <em>The Nature of Money</em>. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.</p><p>Kant, Immanuel. 2004 [1783]. <em>Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science</em>. Translated by Gary Hatfield. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.</p><p>Menger, Karl. 1892. “On the Origin of Money.” <em>The Economic Journal</em> 2 (6): 239–55.</p><p>Mol, Annemarie. 2002. <em>The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice</em>. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=861d453c4cbf" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/nonce-vcva/some-notes-on-nigel-dodds-first-chapter-origins-861d453c4cbf">Some notes on Nigel Dodd’s first chapter: Origins</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/nonce-vcva">nonce vcva</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Sociological and Anthropological Perspectives of Monetary Economics and Cryptocurrency]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/nonce-vcva/sociological-and-anthropological-perspectives-of-monetary-economics-and-cryptocurrency-cfd4124dc458?source=rss----b35c1bbbdc7f---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cfd4124dc458</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[readinglist]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[monetary-economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jongseung(Jonathan) Kim]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Jun 2019 13:40:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-12T13:41:14.221Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Description</h3><p>The 2008 economic downturn, alongside broad-scale information and communication technologies have led to a proliferation of imagination in the money form and its uses. This new imagination has brought many observers to reflect on basic yet exceptionally complex questions, such as: what is money? What are its everyday uses? And how have cryptocurrencies changed perceptions and uses of money?</p><p>This seminar addresses these questions by exploring sociological and anthropological perspectives of society and economy through various theoretical, historical, and ethnographic studies of money and cryptocurrency. Our discussions will include origins and sociologies of money, money as a commodity and as a form of credit, and money as a quantifiable and governable object. In the final weeks, we will look at various ways in which cryptocurrencies weave together society and economy as well as explore how governing institutions are attempting to make sense of this new money form.</p><h3>Objectives</h3><ul><li>Understand the historical and social backgrounds of money and monetary theories</li><li>Gain a more in-depth understanding of the many forms of currency that exist today</li><li>Expand knowledge to develop more well-rounded approaches to cryptocurrency projects</li></ul><h3>Session 1 : Introductions</h3><ul><li>‘Anthropology of Money’ Introduction</li><li>‘Genealogy of Monetary Economics’ Introduction</li></ul><h3>Session 2 : Origins of Money</h3><h4>Required Readings</h4><ul><li>Ingham, Geoffrey. 2004. <em>The Nature of Money — </em>Chapter 5: The Historical Origins of Money</li><li>Dodd, Nigel. 2014. <em>The Social Life of Money — </em>Chapter 1: Origins</li></ul><h4>Supplement Readings</h4><ul><li>Menger, Carl. 1892. <em>On the Origin of Money</em></li><li>Keynes, John Maynard. 1930. <em>A Treatise on Money</em> — Chapter 1: The Classification of Money</li><li>Hayek, F. A. 1931.<em> Prices and Production — </em>Lecture 1: Theories of the Influence of Money on Prices</li><li>Mauss, Marcel. 1950. <em>The Gift — </em>Introduction, Chapter 1: The Exchange of Gifts</li><li>Ingham, Geoffrey. 2004. <em>The Nature of Money — </em>Chapter 4: Fundamentals of Theory of Money</li><li>Aglietta, Michel. 2018. <em>Money: 5,000 Years of Debt and Power — </em>Chapter 3: From Ancient Empires to the Gold Standard</li><li>Skidelsky, Robert. 2018. <em>Money and Government — </em>Chapter 1: The Mysteries of Money</li></ul><h3>Session 3 : Sociologies of Money</h3><h4>Required Readings</h4><ul><li>Ingham, Geoffrey. 2004. <em>The Nature of Money — </em>Chapter 3: Money in Sociological Theory</li><li>Dodd, Nigel. 2014. <em>The Social Life of Money — </em>Chapter 7: Culture (Simon)</li></ul><h4>Supplement Readings</h4><ul><li>Simmel, Georg. 1900. <em>Philosophy of Money — </em>Chapter 1, Section 3: Economic Value as the Objectification of Subjective Values</li><li>Schumpeter, Joseph. 1912. <em>The Theory of Economic Development</em></li><li>Bohannan, Paul. 1955. <em>Some Principles of Exchange Among the Tiv</em></li><li>Dalton, George. 1965. <em>Primitive Money</em></li><li>Polanyi, Karl. 1968. <em>The Semantics of Money-Uses</em></li><li>Lachmann, Ludwig. 1978. <em>Capital and Its Structure</em></li><li>Preface, Chapter 1: The Order of Capital</li><li>Zelizer, Viviana. 1989. <em>The Social Meaning of Money: ‘Special Monies’</em></li><li>Parry, Jonathan and Maurice Bloch. 1989. <em>Money and the Morality of Exchange — </em>Introduction: Money and the Morality of Exchange</li><li>Schumpeter, Joseph. 1991. <em>Money and Currency</em></li><li>Maurer, Bill. 2005. <em>The Anthropology of Money</em></li><li>Hénaff, Marcel. 2010. <em>The Price of Truth: Gift, Money, and Philosophy — </em>Chapter 8: Ceremonial Money and Commercial Money</li><li>Bindewald, Leander. 2018. <em>The Grammar of Money — </em>Chapter 3: Conceptual framework - Money as a discursive institution</li></ul><h3>Session 4 : Money as Commodity</h3><h4>Required Readings</h4><ul><li>Ingham, Geoffrey. 2004. <em>The Nature of Money — </em>Chapter 1: Money as a Commodity</li><li>Dodd, Nigel. 2014. <em>The Social Life of Money — </em>Chapter 2: Capital (Simon)</li></ul><h4>Supplement Readings</h4><ul><li>Marx, Karl. 1867. <em>Capital Volume I — </em>Chapter 1, Section 3: The Form of Value or Exchange Value, Chapter 3, Section 3: Money</li><li>Taussig, Michael. 1977. <em>The Genesis of Capitalism Amongst a South American Peasantry: Devil’s Labor and the Baptism of Money</em></li><li>Smithin, John, ed. 2000. <em>What is Money? — </em>Heinsohn, Gunnar and Otto Steiger. Chapter 4: The Property Theory of Interest and Money</li><li>Nabilou, Hossein and André Prüm. 2018. <em>Ignorance, debt and cryptocurrencies: The old and the new in the law and economics of concurrent currencies</em></li></ul><h3>Session 5 : Money as Credit</h3><h4>Required Readings</h4><ul><li>Ingham, Geoffrey. 2004. <em>The Nature of Money — </em>Chapter 6: The Development of Capitalist Credit-Money</li><li>Dodd, Nigel. 2014. <em>The Social Life of Money — </em>Chapter 3: Debt</li></ul><h4>Supplement Readings</h4><ul><li>Keynes, John Maynard. 1930. <em>A Treatise on Money — </em>Chapter 2: Bank-Money</li><li>Schumpeter, Joseph. 1934. <em>The Theory of Economic Development — </em>Chapter 3: Credit and Capital</li><li>Ingham, Geoffrey. 2004. <em>The Nature of Money — </em>Chapter 7: The Production of Capitalist Credit-Money</li><li>Peebles, Gustav. 2010. <em>The Anthropology of Credit and Debt</em></li><li>Graeber, David. 2014(2nd Edition).<em> Debt: The First 5,000 Years — </em>Chapter 2: The Myth of Barter</li><li>Lazzarato, Maurizio. 2015.<em> Governing by Debt — </em>Chapter 2: The American University - The Model of the Debt Society</li><li>Pettifor, Ann. 2017. <em>The Production of Money: How to Break the Power of Bankers — </em>Chapter 2: The Creation of Money</li><li>BitMEX Research. 2018. <em>Bitcoin Economics</em></li></ul><h3>Session 6 : The Quantity Theory of Money and Monetarism</h3><h4>Required Readings</h4><ul><li>Skidelsky, Robert. 2018. <em>Money and Government — </em>Chapter 3: The Quantity Theory of Money: From History to Science, Chapter 7: The Theory and Practice of Monetarism</li></ul><h4>Supplement Readings</h4><ul><li>Thornton, Henry. 1802. <em>An Inquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain — </em>Chapter 3: Of circulating Paper</li><li>Fisher, Irving. 1911. <em>The Purchasing Power of Money: its Determination and Relation to Credit, Interest and Crises — </em>Chapter 2: Purchasing Power of Money as Related to the Equation of Exchange</li><li>Keynes, John Maynard. 1923. <em>A Tract on Monetary Reform — </em>Chapter 3, Section 1: The Quantity Theory of Money</li><li>Friedman, Milton. 1956. <em>The Quantity Theory of Money — A Restatement</em></li><li>Friedman, Milton. 1992. <em>Money Mischief: Episodes in Monetary History — </em>Chapter 2: The Mystery of Money, Chapter 8: The Cause and Cure of Inflation</li><li>Burniske, Chris. 2017. <em>Cryptoasset Valuations</em></li><li>Evans, Alex. 2018. <em>On Value, Velocity and Monetary Theory — A New Approach to Cryptoasset Valuations</em></li><li>Ganesarajah, Sath. 2018.<em> Building a Framework for Digital Currency Valuation</em></li><li>Mishkin, Frederic. 2019(12th Edition).<em> The Economics of Money, Banking and Financial Markets — </em>Chapter 15: The Money Supply Process, Chapter 20: Quantity Theory, Inflation, and the Demand for Money</li></ul><h3>Session 7 : Money, the State, and ‘Modern Money Theory (MMT)’</h3><h4>Required Readings</h4><ul><li>Ingham, Geoffrey. 2004. <em>The Nature of Money — </em>Chapter 2: Abstract Value, Credit, and the State</li><li>Wray, L. Randall. 2015(2nd Edition). <em>Modern Money Theory — </em>Chapter 2: Spending by Issuer of Domestic Currency</li></ul><h4>Supplement Readings</h4><ul><li>Knapp, George Friedrich. 1924. <em>The State Theory of Money — </em>Chapter 1: Payment, Money and Metal</li><li>Hart, Keith. 1986. <em>Heads or Tails? Two Sides of the Coin</em></li><li>Wray, L. Randall. 2015(2nd Edition). <em>Modern Money Theory — </em>Chapter 6: Modern Money Theory and Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes</li><li>Mitchell, William, L. Randall Wray and Martin Watts. 2016. <em>Modern Monetary Theory and Practice: An Introductory Text — </em>Chapter 6: Introduction to Sovereign Currency: The Government and its Money</li><li>Dalio, Ray. 2019. <em>It’s Time to Look More Carefully at “Monetary Policy 3(MP3)” and “Modern Monetary Theory(MMT)”</em></li></ul><h3>Session 8 : The Embeddedness of Cryptocurrencies</h3><h4>Required Readings</h4><ul><li>Maurer, Bill, Taylor Nelms, and Lana Swartz. 2013. <em>‘When Perhaps the Real Problem Is Money Itself!’: The Practical Materiality of Bitcoin</em></li><li>Dodd, Nigel. 2018. <em>The Social Life of Bitcoin</em></li></ul><h4>Supplement Readings</h4><ul><li>Karlstrom, Henrik. 2014. <em>Do Libertarians Dream of Electric Coins? The Material Embeddedness of Bitcoin</em></li><li>Swartz, Lana. 2017. <em>Blockchain Dreams: Imagining Techno-Economic Alternatives After Bitcoin</em></li><li>Zimmer, Zac. 2017. <em>Bitcoin and Potosi Silver: Historical Perspectives on Cryptocurrency</em></li><li>Finn, Ed. 2017. <em>What Algorithms Want: Imagination in the Age of Computing — </em>Chapter 5: Counting Bitcoin</li><li>Corradi, Fiammetta. 2018. <em>The Double Embeddedness of Bitcoin: Insights from Old and New Economic Sociology</em></li><li>Swartz, Lana. 2018. <em>What Was Bitcoin, What Will It Be? The Techno-Economic Imaginaries of a New Money Technology</em></li><li>Calvao, Felipe. 2019. <em>Crypto-Miners: Digital Labor and the Power of Blockchain Technology</em></li><li>Bauwens, Michel and Vasilis Kostakis. 2019.<em> Peer to Peer: The Commons Manifesto — </em>Chapter 3: P2P and New Socio-technological Frameworks</li></ul><h3>Session 9 : Cryptocurrency and Monetary Policy</h3><h4>Required Readings</h4><ul><li>Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús. 2018.<em> Cryptocurrencies: A Crash Course in Digital Monetary Economics</em></li><li>Kang, Kee-Youn, and Seungduck Lee. 2019. <em>Money, Cryptocurrency, and Monetary Policy</em></li></ul><h4>Supplement Readings</h4><ul><li>Hayek, F. A. 1976.<em> The Denationalization of Money — </em>Chapter 18: Monetary Policy Neither Desirable Nor Possible</li><li>Davidson, Sinclair, Primavera De Filippi, and Jason Potts. 2018. <em>Blockchain and the Economic Institutions of Capitalism</em></li><li>Berg, Chris, Sinclair Davidson, and Jason Potts. 2018. <em>Capitalism after Satoshi: Blockchains, Dehierarchicalisation, Innovation Policy, and the Regulatory State</em></li><li>Claeys, Grégory, Maria Demertzis, and Konstantinos Efstathiou. 2018. <em>Cryptocurrencies and Monetary Policy</em></li><li>Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús, and Daniel Sanches. 2018. <em>On the Economics of Digital Currencies</em></li><li>Perkins, David. 2018. <em>Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and Selected Policy Issues</em></li><li>Danielsson, Jon. 2018. <em>Cryptocurrencies: Policy, Economics and Fairness</em></li><li>Georgeson, David A. 2018. <em>Cryptocurrencies as an Alternative to Fiat Monetary Systems</em></li><li>Davis, Douglas, Oleg Korenok, Peter Norman, Bruno Sultanum, and Randall Wright. 2019. <em>Playing with Money</em></li><li>Benigno, Pierpaolo. 2019. <em>Monetary Policy in a World of Cryptocurrencies</em></li><li>Shilling, Linda and Harald Uhlig. 2019. <em>Some Simple Bitcoin Economics</em></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cfd4124dc458" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/nonce-vcva/sociological-and-anthropological-perspectives-of-monetary-economics-and-cryptocurrency-cfd4124dc458">Sociological and Anthropological Perspectives of Monetary Economics and Cryptocurrency</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/nonce-vcva">nonce vcva</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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