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        <title><![CDATA[OpenLaw - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[The commercial operating system for blockchain. - Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Unpacking The LAO ]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/openlawofficial/unpacking-the-lao-e463f7357b4b?source=rss----1b0006cdcfa3---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[smart-contracts]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The LAO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Sep 2019 14:58:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-23T20:46:49.879Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The LAO has generated tremendous interest since it was announced several weeks ago. We address some common questions and criticisms below.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/0*TMo_2J0jYH6aF0Z-" /></figure><p>Several weeks ago, <a href="https://openlaw.io/">OpenLaw</a> announced that it will be providing software to help create <a href="https://medium.com/openlawofficial/the-lao-a-for-profit-limited-liability-autonomous-organization-9eae89c9669c"><em>The LAO</em></a>, a for-profit limited liability decentralized organization, which will enable its members to invest in early-stage Ethereum ventures and share in the profits. So far the response has been tremendous, and we’re deeply gratified by the coverage and offers by members of the Ethereum community to help bring this exciting idea to life.</p><p>At its core, <em>The LAO</em> aims to resurrect <em>The DAO</em> — the first grand experiment of Ethereum — but in a way that limits the liability of LAO-members and complies with US law. Just like how Coinbase legitimized cryptocurrency exchanges in the US — in the wake of Mt. Gox — we hope to do the same thing with for-profit DAOs, bringing digital organizations to the masses.</p><p>The history of DAOs is just beginning, but we believe the general approach of blending together traditional legal agreements with smart contract-based governance mechanisms hits the right tone and will ensure the responsible development of the greater DAO ecosystem. By way of analogy, from the beginning, Netflix wanted to bring streaming video to the masses, but it needed to start by sending DVDs through the mail (due to technical and legal restrictions — i.e., it needed to obtain licenses from content owners). We believe in open and permissionless DAO structures but will start by supporting a structure to a limited number of accredited investors through a public sale, which hopefully blossoms into an ecosystem of independent, member-managed LAOs that can rapidly make funding decisions.</p><p>Despite the promise of <em>The LAO</em> — and what we believe is a measured approach to delivering such structures — <em>The LAO</em> has already generated some responses, most notably from Preston Byrne’s in his article, “<a href="https://prestonbyrne.com/2019/09/03/the-lao-demystified/"><em>The LAO, demystified</em></a>,” as well as other more measured critiques like “<a href="https://medium.com/tokendaily/the-uphill-battle-laos-will-face-6c57f5090e3"><em>The Uphill Battle LAOs Will Face</em></a>” by Mohamed Fouda.</p><h4><strong>The LAO is a Familiar Structure With Novel Smart Contract-Based Governance.</strong></h4><p><em>The LAO</em> will (hopefully) be a large-scale experiment in using a limited liability entity managed by smart contracts to organize for-profit commercial endeavors. We’re bringing to life ideas that have been percolating around the Bitcoin and Ethereum ecosystems over the past seven years.</p><p>A predicate to the generalized notion of a DAO, was proposed by Dan Larimer in <a href="https://letstalkbitcoin.com/is-bitcoin-overpaying-for-false-security">2013</a>, when he began to describe Decentralized Autonomous Corporations (DACs), that relied on blockchains and smart contracts to organize commercial affairs. The Ethereum Whitepaper extensively referenced Larimer’s work, when it was released in early 2014, presenting a more formalized and generalized version of the DAC with the more generalized concept of a <a href="https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper">Decentralized Autonomous Organization</a>.</p><p>Despite the long lineage of blockchain developers, who have described and explored DAO-structures, commentators on <em>The LAO</em> have suggested that these structures have already been built. One criticism is that the first time a LAO was built was in “<a href="https://hplusmagazine.com/2014/06/17/eris-the-dawn-of-distributed-autonomous-organizations-and-the-future-of-governance/"><em>in 2014</em></a><em> [sic], when [Monax employees]proposed linking a DAO — properly, just some software that automated organizational governance using a permissioned Ethereum template — to a private organization, specifically a 501(c)(6) non-profit trade association.”</em></p><p>We scratched our heads a bit at this criticism, because the referenced entity was never launched from what we can gather.</p><p>In any event, the novelness of <em>The LAO </em>does not rest on linking smart contracts to legal agreements for purposes of developing a not-for-profit. It rests on the fact that <em>The LAO </em>will be engaged in for-profit endeavors in ways that limit the legal risk of members and aims to comply with US law. <em>The LAO</em> will modify well established organizational documents to accommodate smart contract-based corporate governance mechanisms, while working within the current confines of the law.</p><p>For what it’s worth, the idea of legally-recognized digital organizations, with presumed legal agreements standing behind them, stretches far back well before 2014 and the fantastic Monax team. Take for example the sci-fi imaginings of Charles Stross in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accelerando"><em>Accelerando</em></a> (2005):</p><p><em>“The divested Microsoft divisions have automated their legal processes and are spawning subsidiaries, IPOing them, and exchanging title in a bizarre parody of bacterial plasmid exchange, so fast that, by the time the windfall tax demands are served, the targets don’t exist anymore, even though the same staff are working on the same software in the same Mumbai cubicle farms. Welcome to the twenty-first century . . . . Today’s increasingly automated corporations don’t understand mortality.”</em></p><h4><strong>The LAO Will Streamline Venture Financing for Ethereum Startups.</strong></h4><p>A second exciting aspect of <em>The LAO</em> is that it’ll handle many of the operational issues related to entering into and financing a startup. As part of that process, The LAO will require that young Ethereum startups begin their journey “digitally native,” relying on organizational documents that are largely standardized in Silicon Valley but also modified to permit — and provide legal effect — to tokenized stock.</p><p>The use of tokenized stock in these companies will hopefully, over time, create fertile ground to explore concepts currently swirling around the blockchain ecosystem in relation to tokenized securities (STOs), including real-time dividend and royalty payments. With companies starting with their life with tokenized stock — on open and permissionless blockchains — the Ethereum ecosystem will finally have a reason to build more advanced market infrastructure to handle the custody and trading of these important financial assets in a more standardized fashion. In our view, digital assets will likely be adopted in a bottom-up, as opposed to a top-down, manner. And as Ethereum-based startups grow in size and importance, it will force Wall Street and more established financial actors to accommodate and adopt blockchain technology.</p><p><em>The LAO</em>, despite strongly-worded assessments,<em> </em>is not a rediscovery that “<em>a Delaware corporation’s back office can be run with software.</em>” <em>The LAO </em>will ideally serve as an important piece of infrastructure for the Ethereum ecosystem — one that isn’t based on a proprietary database or company, like Carta. <em>The LAO</em> will create a generation of digitally native companies, many of whom are hopefully successful. Data related to these companies shouldn’t be owned by one centralized entity, but should exist on open, secure, and permissionless financial infrastructure.</p><p>Likewise OpenLaw, as the administrator of <em>The LAO</em>, will not “serve as a law firm,” rather it will provide projects (and their independent counsel) easy to use tools to build digitally native companies. Unfortunately, starting a business today is still hard and expensive. We want to make starting a digitally native business exceptionally easy.</p><h4><strong>The LAO Will Be Member-Managed, Because US-Based LLCs Do Not Need a Manager, and Members Will Enjoy Limited Liability.</strong></h4><p><em>The LAO</em> is a new experiment in crowdfunding investment decisions — an express homage to <em>The DAO</em>. With the first version of <em>The LAO</em>, the wisdom of the crowd will be tested and members will manage investment decisions and the entire proposal process. Unlike other for-profit venture funds, there will be no general partner or managing members and we’re building tools to enable members to delegate their votes to other members.</p><p><em>The LAO</em> can be legally formed in the US (without a managing-member) and will not require that OpenLaw manage the affairs of the enterprise. Instead, OpenLaw will simply provide the software and additional tooling necessary to operate the fund, while all substantive decisions are democratically managed.</p><p>As many corporate lawyers know, this is the default way that LLCs and other limited liability pass-through entities work in many states in the US. In Delaware, for example, under Section 18–402, of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, “<em>the management of a limited liability company [is] vested in its members . . . . Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, each member and manager has the authority to bind the limited liability company.” </em>Questions related to what liability members owe to one another (fiduciary or otherwise) can be varied via the entity’s operational agreements and will be enforced by Delaware law. <em>See, e.g.</em>, Miller v. HCP &amp; Co., 2018 WL 656378 (Del. Ct. Ch. Feb. 1, 2018) (noting the axiomatic principle under Delaware Law that LLC or LLP agreements can “eliminate fiduciary duties that members or managers would otherwise owe to one another,” because Delaware Law gives “maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company agreements.”)</p><p>Accordingly, criticisms that <em>The LAO</em> “can really only work <em>if there is one LLC manager — OpenLaw or a delegate — or if all the LLC members are managing members” </em>isn’t supported by the default rules of Delaware corporate law and certainly won’t be the case here<em>.</em></p><p>Likewise, critiques that <em>The LAO </em>will not address any lingering questions related to who is “liable for discharging certain duties, both to the [<em>The LAO</em>] members and third parties with which it deals on their behalf” is simply false. The operating agreement for <em>The LAO </em>will articulate the ability of members to bind the entity and deal with obligations that members have to one another.</p><p>These questions, while important, obscure the importance of what <em>The LAO </em>is hoping to accomplish. With <em>The LAO</em>, members are using Ethereum for what it’s good for — serving as a generalized state to record and execute their decisions and transfer funds when consensus is reached.</p><p>If members don’t want to participate in the decision-making process, that’s completely fine. They will have the right to delegate their voting power to other members and will be expressly permitted to do so under <em>The LAO’s </em>organizational documents. As a result, members will be able to actively participate in funding decisions or give other members the authority to do so (without deputizing any one member a manager).</p><p>Equally important, if a member is not happy with the performance of <em>The LAO</em>,<em> </em>members will have the right to “rage quit” or redeem — at any time — any unallocated capital contributed to <em>The LAO</em>. Once a member exercises this right, the member’s pro-rata portion of any securities in <em>LAO-</em>funded startups that they are entitled to (based on their capital contribution) will be held in an escrow-like smart contract until they are permitted to be traded. The right to walk away provides strong protection for members and should further limit the risk of liability between members.</p><h4><strong>The LAO Will Receive Tokenized Stock in Exchange for Investment, Clarifying Tax Issues.</strong></h4><p>By providing funding, in exchange for tokenized stock, <em>The LAO </em>will hold in its shared account tokenized securities backed by binding legal documents. If all goes as planned, the value of those securities will go up in value and <em>The LAO </em>will be the go-to source of funding for generations of companies seeking to build on Ethereum. Like today’s venture capital funds, any proceeds from the sale of those securities will be distributed in accordance with <em>The LAO’s</em> underlying legal agreements (and OpenLaw will help administer the distribution of funds if they are not in crypto).</p><p>The criticism “<em>that LAO members would insist on ‘continuously claiming their fair share of profits’” </em>doesn’t make much sense, considering that <em>The LAO</em> will hold private company stock (which is subject to transfer restrictions). And because <em>The LAO</em> will be dealing with tokenized securities (backed by valid legally binding agreements), the tax consequences will be predictable.</p><p>It is true that, in the future, <em>The LAO </em>members may choose to accept other forms of securities, which permit real time dividend payments or other streams of payment (a fantastic blockchain-based use cases). But, if that eventuality occurs, members can decide whether they want to amend their organizational documents to accept these novel types of securities. Alternatively, a new LAO could be organized to expressly experiment with these new securities.</p><h4><strong>The Status of LAO Member Interests Is Far From Certain.</strong></h4><p>One of the beautiful things about <em>The LAO </em>is that it will be member managed and democratically governed. For many that’s a scary proposition because it’s new and untested. But, to us, it’s a logical reflection of the underlying architecture of blockchain-based networks and their supporting communities.</p><p>Some question whether this will be effective and those criticisms are fair — we are venturing into uncharted territory, but we believe the hypothesis is sound, especially when softened by delegated voting rights (noted above).</p><p>Legally, however, it also brings the status of <em>The LAO </em>membership interests into a gray area. Because <em>The LAO </em>is member-managed, there are open questions as to whether interests in <em>The LAO</em> will be classified as securities. Under US law, interests in limited liability entities that are member-managed often are not considered securities, unless there is a majority holder of the entity or a party that dominates decision making.</p><p>The reason for this is plain. Securities law fundamentally addresses informational asymmetries between managers and issuers, on the one hand, and members and shareholders, on the other. With members actively participating in the governance of a limited liability entity, the membership interests are generally not considered securities. <em>See, e.g.</em>, <em>Robinson v. Glynn</em>, 349 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 2003); <em>Ave. Capital Mgmt. II, L.P. v. Schaden</em>, 843 F.3d 876 (10th Cir. 2016).</p><p>The logic undergirding these decisions is even more applicable here because <em>The LAO </em>is entirely member managed (no one member will be able to hold more than 10% of the underlying voting power by default) and the entire operations of <em>The LAO </em>will be readily available to every member. That means that interests in <em>The LAO </em>very well may not be securities, depending on how actively members participate in these structures.</p><p>Nevertheless, in the abundance of caution, <em>The LAO </em>will limit its sale of interests to accredited investors to a limited number of members to get the ball rolling. There are enough challenges to tackle first before making a fulsome case for excluding memberships interests in <em>LAOs</em> from being classified as securities.<em> </em>We hope to make those arguments, once these structures are validated and launched. At that point, we can show actual successes and a meaningful impact.</p><p>It’s worth noting that when <em>The LAO</em> makes accredited investor checks it will aim to experiment with new ways to validate this information, checking to see if a potential member’s Ethereum address contains sufficient ether to meet the definition of an accredited investor in the US (using real-time pricing information provided by decentralized oracle services, like <a href="https://chain.link/">ChainLink</a>, to convert the value of the ether at time into US dollars).</p><p>Accredited investor requirements in the US can be satisfied, <em>inter alia</em>, if the: (a) member has a net worth, or joint net worth with that person’s spouse, which exceeds $1,000,000; or (b) is a non-excluded organization with assets over $5 million.</p><p>There is nothing under US law that precludes the use of digital assets to assess whether a potential member qualifies to join. Criticisms that “[t]his is not how accredited investor verification works” are not grounded in US law.</p><h4><strong>The LAO Will Provided Startups With Predictable Investment on Fixed Terms to Make it Easier for Members to Manage Their Pooled Assets.</strong></h4><p>As noted in our announcement, projects that seek funding from the LAO will be provided with investment on a take it or leave it basis. The investment terms will be standardized and there will be no negotiation on the part of <em>The LAO </em>members and projects. The reason for this is practical — group decision making is difficult — and we want to provide projects and members with a degree of predictability as to ongoing investments.</p><p>At any point in time, members will know how much capital (ether or dai) is being held by <em>The LAO </em>and thus criticisms that there will “Ethernomics” at play are a bit puzzling. If <em>The LAO</em> does not have sufficient assets to complete a funding, OpenLaw as the administer of <em>The LAO </em>can be deputized by members to wind down the entity and bring the experiment to a close.</p><p><strong>The LAO is a Grand Experiment That The Ethereum Ecosystem Needs.</strong></p><p>The Ethereum ecosystem has an astounding mix of ideas and talented developers — the likes of which we only saw during the first wave of the Internet. We’re committed to providing software to help create new, more democratic vehicles to better enable developers to build incredible companies and tools.</p><p><em>The LAO’s </em>structure will be disclosed in more detail over the upcoming weeks, as we work with counsel to finalize the nitty-gritty details and do our best to ensure that <em>The LAO</em> complies with the intricacies of US law<em>. </em>Some may argue that <em>The LAO</em> is one or more limited liability entities “<em>with some weird corporate governance arrangements that probably don’t work, and funky tax consequences</em>.<em>”</em></p><p>However, in reality, it will streamline a fairly cumbersome process today for early-stage Ethereum process and give members of <em>The LAO </em>greater control and access to companies that members collectively agree to invest in. <em>The LAO </em>is not “add[ing] another layer of complexity” or “cargo cult finance” but rather reducing complexity both for members and startups. The tax treatment should be predictable because The LAO will only hold securities and will be a structure that is not available on other “normal equity crowdfunding platform[s].”</p><p><em>The LAO </em>aims to build an Internet native Silicon Valley — one that can serve projects and developers regardless of background or location. If you’re interested in this vision, we’d love to hear from you. Shoot us a note at <a href="/service/mailto:hello@thelao.io">hello@thelao.io</a><em>.</em></p><p>👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾👾</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e463f7357b4b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/openlawofficial/unpacking-the-lao-e463f7357b4b">Unpacking The LAO 👾</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/openlawofficial">OpenLaw</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The LAO: A For-Profit, Limited Liability Autonomous Organization]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/openlawofficial/the-lao-a-for-profit-limited-liability-autonomous-organization-9eae89c9669c?source=rss----1b0006cdcfa3---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[smart-contracts]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The LAO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Sep 2019 19:23:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-05T15:32:38.224Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>OpenLaw will be launching the first limited liability for-profit DAO, named </em><a href="https://thelao.io/"><em>the LAO</em></a><em>. The LAO will enable members to invest in Ethereum new ventures and generate a profit. A new era of DAOs is beginning.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*wLfnDrwQm4w4GFPY" /><figcaption><strong>The LAO: A For-Profit, Limited Liability Autonomous Organization</strong></figcaption></figure><p>Since first proposed in <a href="https://letstalkbitcoin.com/is-bitcoin-overpaying-for-false-security">2013</a>, the notion of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) has animated the dreams of blockchain developers. For many, these Internet-native organizations represent the next step in the evolution of social and economic coordination, with blockchain technology and smart contracts streamlining voting, decision making, and the allocation of digital assets.</p><p>The notion of a DAO did not emerge in a vacuum. Instead, these organizations build on a long lineage of technical and legal innovation. The Romans devised a variety of commercial entities, such as the <em>societas peculium</em> and <em>societas publicanorum</em>, that enabled parties to share in an enterprise’s profits and losses while also providing limited liability. During the Middle Ages, Italians pioneered early versions of a limited partnership to finance maritime trade. Joint-stock companies emerged in England and the Netherlands in the 1600s, providing organizations state-granted monopolies to engage in productive commercial enterprises. The modern corporation took root in the United States in 1811, when New York granted private parties the power to form their own corporate structures without an extensive approval process.</p><p>These legal innovations helped modernize the globe, allowing individuals from different backgrounds to align incentives towards a common goal. They created a framework for funding new ventures, managing risk, and creating opportunities for profit, which in turn, fueled generations of innovation and wealth creation.</p><p>For many, the power of DAOs roots in their ability to reduce transaction costs. As described by Ronald Coase in his landmark 1937 article “<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1506378">The Nature of the Firm</a>,” people exhibit a natural tendency to organize into more or less formalized institutions — associations, partnerships, companies, corporations, or other types of organizations referred to by economists as “firms” when the costs of engaging in market transactions are too high. There are often transaction costs involved in entering into market transactions, including the cost of finding another party to trade with, the cost of negotiation, and all costs related to ensuring that an agreement is performed and, if necessary, enforced. As a result, pulling together different parties to engage in economically beneficial activity can sometimes grow too complex to be handled efficiently through market operations.</p><p>While markets often excel at assisting with the rapid exchange of goods or services, they are less useful when an economic activity requires extensive coordination and an ongoing relationship between parties, or when it involves a high degree of complexity or uncertainty. Transaction costs increase when individuals deal with untrusted parties in a marketplace, thus pushing people to organize activity through collaborative endeavors.</p><p>By forming an organization, parties reduce transaction costs. Organizations decrease the overall number of operations to complete certain social or economic tasks. And they lower the costs generated by uncertainty, opportunism, and complexity by serving as repeat players in markets and through the creation of agreements that govern the relationships between managers and other members of firms.</p><p>The hope with DAOs is that they enable groups to operate more efficiently by relying on smart contracts to govern and coordinate certain actions and behavior. Through the use of smart contracts, parties can automate certain aspects related to the way organizations and groups operate, reducing operational costs and improving internal controls while simultaneously increasing the overall transparency of an organization.</p><p>Today, enterprises and corporations are governed and managed mainly or exclusively by legal rules and written documents. With a blockchain, organizations can implement all or parts of the organization’s rules and procedures into code.</p><ol><li><strong>The DAO and Its Shortcomings</strong></li></ol><p>One of the first substantive experiments with the use of smart contracts to manage and coordinate economic activity was <em>The Decentralized Autonomous Organization</em> (known as <em>The DAO</em>). In early May 2016, The DAO was launched on Ethereum, animating the thoughts and imagination of developers and technologists around the globe. The DAO aimed to operate as a venture capital fund for the crypto and decentralized space. The lack of a centralized authority reduced costs and in theory provided more control and access to the investors.</p><p>At the beginning of May 2016, a few members of the Ethereum community announced the inception of The DAO, which was also known as <em>Genesis DAO</em>. It was built as a smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain. The coding framework was developed in open source by the Slock.It team, but it was deployed under “The DAO” name by members of the Ethereum community. The DAO had a creation period during which anyone was allowed to send Ether to a unique wallet address in exchange for DAO tokens on a 1–100 scale. The creation period was an unexpected success as it managed to gather 12.7M Ether (worth $150M at the time), making it the biggest crowdfund ever. If still running, The DAO today would manage assets north of $2 billion.</p><p>In essence, the platform would allow anyone with a project to pitch their idea to the community and potentially receive funding from The DAO. Anyone with DAO tokens could vote on plans, and would then receive rewards if the projects turned a profit. With the financing in place, things were looking up.</p><p>Despite the potential promise of The DAO to fund promising projects in the Ethereum ecosystem. The DAO lacked a legal structure and ran afoul of U.S. securities laws. As outlined by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in a <a href="https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-131">21(a) report</a>, the offer and sales of digital assets by “virtual” organizations are subject to the requirements of the federal securities laws.</p><p>In the case of The DAO, the SEC found that The DAO tokens were securities and therefore subject to the federal securities laws. The tokens were offered by a core organization and held out the promise of a profit. As a result, future DAOs that seek to provide members with the opportunity for profit, in general, will need to register offers and sales of such securities unless a valid securities law exemption applies. Any tokens related to the ownership interest of a for-profit DAO must trade on registered exchanges, unless they are exempt, to protect investors and to make sure they receive appropriate disclosures. The SEC reiterated that laws do not evaporate just because an organization relies on blockchain technology.</p><p>Separate and apart from the concerns flagged by the SEC, The DAO had other lingering issues. Due to a (now) infamous <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/10kTyCmGPhvZy94F7VWyS-dQ4lsBacR2dUgGTtV98C40/edit#">technical flaw</a>, one or more hackers were able to drain The DAO of a portion of its assets creating confusion as to both the liability of the hacker, as well as the liability of The DAO members to one another. Because The DAO was organized as a for-profit venture, in many jurisdictions (including the US), The DAO likely would have been considered an unincorporated partnership, creating knotty <a href="http://cardozolawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/METJAHIC.39.4.pdf">legal</a> questions about liability for the loss of funds.</p><p><strong>2. Next Generation DAOs</strong></p><p>Despite these technical and legal challenges, the luster of DAOs has not dulled. Over the past several years, we’ve seen a number of projects seeking to organize as decentralized autonomous organizations and increased tooling (from <a href="https://aragon.org/">Aragon</a> and others) to make organizing and managing these entities easier and simpler. Developers are experimenting with new governance models and new bottom-up approaches to organizing social and economic activity.</p><p><a href="https://concourseopen.com/blog/moloch-dao-explained/">Moloch</a> is one such <a href="https://twitter.com/MolochDAO/status/1166078592360558592?s=20">emerging blockchain-based governance model</a> that has narrowly focused its technical and game theory design choices to coordinate charity grants for Ethereum projects, pushing its core governance to a vote-weighted multi-signature smart contract with a “<em>ragequit”</em> mechanism that allows its membership to opt-out and receive a proportion of the <a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x211a94468ba1e379236b45ca42dc63ee93139c7e#tokentxns">custodied funds</a> equal to their voting weight at any time.</p><p>In this way, participating Moloch DAO members are able to retain control over their contributions and resist attacks with additional protections, such as anti-dilution scripts that ensure that the combination of a proposal and related Moloch ragequitting will not cause greater than three times the dilution to any member.</p><h3><strong><em>Introducing the LAO</em></strong></h3><p>At OpenLaw, <a href="https://medium.com/@OpenLawOfficial/the-era-of-legally-compliant-daos-491edf88fed0">we’ve been actively studying</a> the implications of these tools and their ability to create borderless and more scalable online cooperation. These initial use cases highlight that DAOs thus far have been deployed to <a href="https://medium.com/@simondlr/the-moloch-dao-collapsing-the-firm-2a800b3aa2e7">coordinate grants</a> in digital assets to fund public goods like open-source software and harden <a href="https://ethresear.ch/t/explanation-of-daicos/465">post-ICO treasury management</a>, leveraging Ethereum smart contracts to custody and enforce governance outcomes over pooled ether and ERC20 digital tokens.</p><p>Yet, the current models for DAOs is limited. Under current laws, DAOs that are solely governed by smart contracts are restricted in their ability to pool assets from various members and generate a profit. If DAOs are organized for profit they run into securities laws issues, limiting their application and ability to fund ecosystem development and deploy capital efficiently. Even if DAOs are organized for charitable or social purposes, they run into legal gray areas where members may be considered partners and thus each member individually liable for the activity of the organization.</p><p>OpenLaw’s tooling helps solve these issues. OpenLaw is the first fully expressive <a href="https://iang.org/papers/ricardian_contract.html">Ricardian</a> contracting system — the bridge between traditional legal regimes and the Ethereum world. OpenLaw can be used to create binding legal agreements and tie them to the execution of one or more smart contracts, including smart contracts that create and manage tokens. Through this approach, any token operating on Ethereum and any smart contract can be imbued with legal effect.</p><p>Using OpenLaw, DAOs can be set up as traditional legal entities and can use binding legal agreements to effectuate the transfer of assets or to perform other tasks. We have already demonstrated this possibility through the launch of our vertical <a href="https://dao.openlaw.io/">OpenLaw DAO</a>. We now are extending this concept with the launch of the LAO. Much like how Coinbase helped bring the trading of traditional assets to millions by attempting to comply with various legal requirements, OpenLaw will help to resurrect the initial vision of The DAO in a manner that comports with U.S. law.</p><p><strong><em>The Structure of The LAO for Members</em></strong></p><p>The LAO will provide a legal structure to enable members to not just give grants, but to invest in blockchain-based projects in exchange for tokenized stock or utility tokens. Projects or Ethereum-based projects will be able to receive funding for their projects in days once submitted to the LAO.</p><p>Using the tooling provided by OpenLaw, the LAO will be set up as a limited liability entity, organized in Delaware, using curated <a href="https://github.com/openlawteam/TheLAO">smart contracts</a> to handle mechanics related to voting, funding, and allocation of collected funds. This entity will presumably limit the liability of LAO members and help clarify their relationship to avoid knotty questions related as to whether partnership law applies. This structure will also provide members of the LAO with tax flow — through treatment by the Internal Revenue Service, such that tax is not paid by both the entity and a person holding a beneficial interest in the LAO.</p><p>Members will be able to purchase interests in the LAO and the proceeds from the purchase will be pooled and allocated by members to startups and other projects in need of financing, using a voting mechanism and tools similar to Moloch DAO.</p><p>In order to comply with United States law, membership interests of the LAO will be limited and only available to parties that meet the definition of an accredited investor — although there are arguments that LAO membership interests may not be securities. And, the LAO will be anchored by 10 founding members (which will be announced shortly). Other interested parties will be able to purchase interests in the LAO (potentially through a public sale).</p><p>Through OpenLaw’s tools, the creation and set up of The LAO will be streamlined. All of the relevant legal documents from the entity formation documents to member subscription agreements will be generated via the OpenLaw protocol — taking complex corporate financial processes and streamlining their operation — while also providing members with the backing of the U.S. legal system. We also will be exploring on-chain verification of accredited status for the LAO using third-party oracle services (such as <a href="https://chain.link/">ChainLink</a>) to streamline the onboarding process.</p><p>Much like the original Moloch design, members of the LAO will be able to <em>ragequit</em> and immediately retrieve back their fair share of unallocated funds based on their economic contribution (regardless of voting weight). With this safety mechanism in place, LAO members will always have the option to opt-out of the LAO should they disagree with aspects of the LAO membership, investment portfolio or need to rapidly receive back their assets. Extending emerging Moloch designs further, LAO members can also continuously claim their fair share of profits provided by tokens received from projects that receive investment from the LAO, further incentivizing collective LAO diligence, voting participation, and membership stability.</p><p><strong><em>The Application Process of Members</em></strong></p><p>The LAO will allocate to potential projects funding in Ether (or potentially DAI ◈). Funding will be provided once a member nominates a project for funding and a majority of the members (based on their voting weight) approve the allocation of funds.</p><p>The funding will be provided on a take it or leave it basis. The LAO will receive a certain portion of the projects tokenized stock or other ERC-20 token in exchange for a fixed amount of funding from the LAO.</p><p>To accept funding, projects will submit an application and be required to create a Delaware legal entity and OpenLaw will provide a set of standardized documents to streamline the process. If the project is later stage, OpenLaw will work with the project to ensure that the LAO can provide funding, given the project or entity’s then-current legal structure.</p><p>Through this approach, a project can conceivably submit a request for funding and receive funding from the LAO in days. Below is a quick preview of how fast funding can be received.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F357421374%3Fapp_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F357421374&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F810767837_640.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="720" height="1280" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/e9f99c03adda4b7c6a00ca0ebd5aaa5a/href">https://medium.com/media/e9f99c03adda4b7c6a00ca0ebd5aaa5a/href</a></iframe><p><strong><em>OpenLaw’s Role</em></strong></p><p>OpenLaw’s role in the creation and maintenance of the LAO will be that of an administrator. OpenLaw will help on an ongoing basis with any ongoing legal requirements and improve any tooling that may be necessary to maintain or enhance the LAO. However, OpenLaw will exercise no control over the LAO unless directed by the members.</p><p>For these services, OpenLaw will receive a fee for its role in creating and maintaining the software necessary to create LAOs. The fee will be used to pay for ongoing software development and other costs necessary to set up and maintain the OpenLaw protocol. The LAO will have no general partner and OpenLaw will not earn any carry or other forms of the LAO’s potential profits — this will go directly back to the members’ wallets.</p><h3><strong>The Future of LAOs</strong></h3><p>The DAO painted a vision for the future of organizations and financing. It relied on the wisdom of the crowd to fund novel projects and automated key aspects of the governance process using smart contracts.</p><p>There is a strong argument that if The DAO didn’t collapse for technical or legal reasons the boom of the ICO market would have been tempered if not entirely unnecessary.</p><p>With the LAO, experimentation with automated governance and the allocation of funds for profit can begin again, spurring innovation in areas like real time royalty and dividend payments, markets for delegates voting rights, and other synthetic assets involving tokenized stock or utility tokens.</p><p>The LAO and similar structures could lead to increased development of secondary trading for LAO interests either through private markets or potentially even on public exchanges, potentially leading to a future of publicly traded venture capital funds.</p><p>Over the long run, LAOs can be set up for other protocols and blockchain-based ecosystems helping to ensure that protocol developers and other early supporters of protocol can continue to fuel network development without needing to be a limited partner of a large venture capital fund.</p><h4><strong>Learn More</strong></h4><p>To learn more about The LAO, sign-up and continue the conversation on our <a href="https://web.telegram.org/#/im?p=@thelaofficial">Telegram</a> and follow us on our <a href="https://twitter.com/TheLAOOfficial">Twitter</a>. We are looking for input and feedback to make sure that we can take the next step in the evolution of DAOs.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9eae89c9669c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/openlawofficial/the-lao-a-for-profit-limited-liability-autonomous-organization-9eae89c9669c">The LAO: A For-Profit, Limited Liability Autonomous Organization</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/openlawofficial">OpenLaw</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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