<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Philosophy Outside the Text - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[No references. No footnotes. No academic gatekeeper’s jargon. Philosophy about what’s hidden in plain sight, for those who care to look. - Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text?source=rss----26c3dbe85bec---4</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 00:44:19 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/feed/philosophy-outside-the-text" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The problem of evil does not exist]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/the-problem-of-evil-does-not-exist-f8913fdff924?source=rss----26c3dbe85bec---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f8913fdff924</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[theodicy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dogs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[evil]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[religion]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob W. Archambault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Jun 2019 12:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-30T12:01:01.220Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y15akrnXqJ_b_aOeP_sTCQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The existence of evil does not constitute evidence against the existence of God. On the contrary, it constitutes a condition without which God could not be God, and hence could not exist.</p><h3>Argument</h3><p>The conditions necessary for the possibility of an object existing do not contradict those necessary for the possibility of understanding the concept of that object:</p><p>Therefore, the conditions necessary for the possibility of a god existing do not contradict those necessary for the possibility of understanding the concept ‘God’.</p><p>But a standard condition assumed necessary for the possibility of god’s existence, namely, a world in which there neither was nor can be any evil, is one in which it is impossible to grasp the concept ‘god’.</p><p>Therefore, a world in which there neither was nor can be evil is not a condition necessary for the possibility of god’s existence.</p><h3>Exposition</h3><p>The condition of a world in which in which there neither was nor can be any evil is one in which it is impossible to grasp the concept ‘God’. That is, a world in which it is possible to grasp the concept ‘god’ is one in which there was or can be evil.</p><p>Proof: I am not concerned here with more philosophical definitions of God, but with a simple one present in every popular theistic religion: by a god, I mean a being to which one should pray. The two chief forms of prayer are petition and gratitude. Petition presupposes the possibility of deprivation. Gratitude presupposes the avoidance of possible deprivation. Deprivation is evil. Without evil, there is thus no concept of prayer; without prayer, no concept of God. Thus, the existence of evil cannot constitute evidence against the existence of God, as a matter of principle.</p><h3>Corollaries</h3><p>Eternity is not, strictly speaking, a world distinct from this. If the saints give thanks, it is because they have known evil. If they petition, it is because evil is possible.</p><p>The formulation of problem of evil requires some distance from evil itself. This is empirically confirmed by the growth of atheism in proportion with material comfort, i.e. the existence of atheism as essentially a bourgeois phenomenon.</p><p>God is called a father, as one who supports and protects; one in heaven, for the altogether simple reason that that is whence the sun and rain come, without which there is no life.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2017/06/21/the-problem-of-evil-does-not-exist/"><em>jacobarchambault.com</em></a><em> on June 21, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f8913fdff924" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/the-problem-of-evil-does-not-exist-f8913fdff924">The problem of evil does not exist</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text">Philosophy Outside the Text</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[What makes medieval philosophy medieval?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/what-makes-medieval-philosophy-medieval-3430f8867ba8?source=rss----26c3dbe85bec---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3430f8867ba8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[medieval-philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[medieval-theology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history-of-philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sociology-of-academia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob W. Archambault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Jun 2019 12:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-30T12:01:01.216Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*91bSpRl0uVriQHfX0NjQNg.jpeg" /></figure><p>We begin with some standard answers to the question “What is Medieval Philosophy?”</p><p>Taking <em>philosophy </em>as primary, ‘Medieval philosophy’ is a name for philosophy as it was done in that period following late antiquity and stretching until the dawn of the modern period.</p><p>Taking <em>Medieval </em>as primary, ‘Medieval philosophy’ names an aspect of Medieval civilization, and less generally, a component medieval intellectual life. In this case, philosophy is taken to be the highest knowledge the mind is capable of attaining apart from the grace of revelation.</p><p>The oddity of putting these two terms together should strike us more strangely than it does. ‘Philosophy’ is, presumably, a name for an intellectual discipline; ‘Medieval’, an adjective specifying a time period. The matchup between the subject of predication and what is predicated of it should come across as a category mistake. It sounds strange, for instance, to describe Thomas Aquinas or William of Ockham as ‘doing’ Medieval philosophy. Philosophy isn’t the kind of thing that can be Medieval.</p><p>As an intellectual discipline, as a discipline preoccupied with getting ‘the right answers’ to the questions it poses — answers to questions supposed to be perennial — philosophy aims to have nothing to do with time. Even if philosophy is <em>in fact</em> always done from a given temporal standpoint, ideally, insofar as it aims to be a <em>scientia, </em>it would prefer that this weren’t the case. This helps to explain the neglect of the history of philosophy by a great many mainstream philosophers. To study philosophy <em>qua </em>medieval is not to study philosophy at all, but rather, the history of philosophy, now construed as something distinct from philosophy itself. Philosophy, it is said, thinks about and attempts to answer philosophical questions; but the study of medieval ‘philosophy,’ like any branch of history of philosophy, surreptitiously substitutes the study of thinkers for the study of the questions they are concerned with.</p><p>Medieval philosophy, then, can also be taken to be a subdiscipline of the history of philosophy — i.e. that part of philosophy which studies the Medieval Period. Its object of study can be construed as a certain set of thinkers from this time period; or perhaps the content of their thought; or perhaps a common body of doctrines held over that period. Medieval philosophy names a subdiscipline of history, more particularly a subdiscipline of intellectual history.</p><p>This definition fails for a reason that attacks the very concept of history as a science. The object of a science must, by virtue of its nature, be present to the mind of one who knows it. While the content of history is <em>ex hypothesi</em> absent, no longer present. If one insists, on the other hand, that it is only the <em>content </em>of the thought of thinkers that is studied, then the grouping of philosophers under the heading ‘medieval’ should seem quite accidental.</p><p>From here, I’d like to suggest a concept of Medieval Philosophy that has been little explored, and arises by a peculiar instance of metonymy. If the epithet ‘Medieval’ refers to a time period, what it signifies is something quite different, a distinctive aspect of that time period. On the basis of such — not carvings that we make as part of some ‘conceptual scheme’, but differences that come to the fore in the matter itself — we come to regard, for instance, the distinction between ancient, medieval, and modern philosophy as more natural than that between, say, philosophy before and after the year 923.</p><p>One distinctive aspect of medieval Philosophy is its humility. In the Medieval period, philosophy is the <em>ancilla theologiae</em>, and, for the most part, gladly subordinates its aims to those of theology. This same humility shows up in the characteristically Medieval posture towards authority. A philosophical position could scarcely be justified without being attributed to Aristotle, Augustine, Dionysius, or another major figure. Novelty was frowned upon, if only because philosophy itself was animated by the operative presumption that those who came before us knew better than we did.</p><p>What is called Medieval philosophy today, a presumed sub-discipline of the history of philosophy, also furnishes us with an interesting sociological phenomenon: Medieval scholarship is often itself characteristically medieval in the above described sense. In a way that isn’t duplicated either in contemporary or other historical areas of philosophy, those who work <em>on </em>certain figures in Medieval philosophy often hold a certain allegiance <em>to </em>those figures.</p><p>‘Medieval philosophy’ thus seems to signify a way of doing philosophy, present both in the genre’s primary figures and texts and in much secondary scholarship discussing its sources. It is on account of the presence of this distinctive mode that the name is taken to apply to that historical age which most exemplified this philosophical style; conversely, the waxing and waning of this style provide the period with its relative chronological boundaries. Because the point at which this style ceases to dominate is not exact, neither are the chronological boundaries of the period governed by it. And because the waning of this mode of philosophizing takes place at different times in different places, so, too shall the medieval period be more or less expansive in different locations: medieval philosophy continues to be vibrant, for instance, in Spain and Germany while it’s influence is waning in France and England.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2017/04/05/what-makes-medieval-philosophy-medieval/"><em>jacobarchambault.com</em></a><em> on April 5, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3430f8867ba8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/what-makes-medieval-philosophy-medieval-3430f8867ba8">What makes medieval philosophy medieval?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text">Philosophy Outside the Text</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[What do student evaluations in philosophy measure?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/what-do-student-evaluations-in-philosophy-measure-4f4c2ca88acd?source=rss----26c3dbe85bec---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4f4c2ca88acd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy-of-education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[consumerism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[student-evaluations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob W. Archambault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 23 Jun 2019 12:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-23T12:01:01.160Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Philosophy teaching evaluations measure <em>faultless wonder</em>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*autD9EJdz9uqutBcr4Bu6g.jpeg" /></figure><p>Wonder is the passion one undergoes not in learning knew knowledge, but in the prior learning <em>that </em>such knowledge exists to be discovered. It is what one undergoes when a whole world, as it were, opens up before the wonderer to be explored. Such wonder is faultless when the prior ignorance of what one discovers is not held to be culpable.</p><h3>How is this engendered?</h3><p>By teaching philosophy in the manner of a personal enrichment course. This is done best when teaching is broad, relativistic, and non-judgmental. Breadth is achieved by introducing students to a wide variety of problems or figures at a pace too fast to cover them sufficiently; relativism, by leaving what views to accept a matter of personal decision. Philosophy teaching is non-judgmental when assessment is minimal and grades are generous. Lay out the figures and problems of philosophy like a gourmet to feast on, served buffet-style, at a low cost.</p><h3>What does it perpetuate?</h3><p>Today, the concern to keep philosophical wonder faultless perpetuates the assimilation of philosophy to positive science. Why? Because the alternative — that philosophy is not a specialist’s domain, but rather concerns those matters closest to us from the first — brings with it an air of culpability: once philosophy is stripped of its jargon, its subject and claims become something I <em>should </em>have recognized. The removal of the threat of culpability, in turn, perpetuates an approach to philosophical problems as pastimes, games without any real import. A literature whose existence is self-justifying is generated, and teaching becomes a matter of socializing students into the vocabulary and opinions expressed therein. This, in turn, reinforces the racial and class homogeny of philosophy: poor people and minorities just don’t have time for that.</p><h3>Can it be stopped?</h3><p>In most places, probably not. Philosophy instructors who perform well on evaluations are tempted to see these as a sign of teaching quality; instructors who do not are eliminated. Philosophy departments benefit from a student body contented by their conflation of faultless wonder with actually <em>learning </em>philosophy — a student body happier in this way is one with more majors and minors, and this means a more secure department; and deans and colleges benefit financially from providing students courses that satisfy them as a break from the ‘real’ work of science and business.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2017/03/29/what-do-student-evaluations-in-philosophy-measure/"><em>jacobarchambault.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4f4c2ca88acd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/what-do-student-evaluations-in-philosophy-measure-4f4c2ca88acd">What do student evaluations in philosophy measure?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text">Philosophy Outside the Text</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[On the origin of the distinction between the philosopher and the poet]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/on-the-origin-of-the-distinction-between-the-philosopher-and-the-poet-f9a9f329afc1?source=rss----26c3dbe85bec---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f9a9f329afc1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[poetry]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[metaphysics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[metaphilosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wisdom]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob W. Archambault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 09 Jun 2019 12:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-09T12:01:01.107Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/576/1*7qefnjj5UfuFRsFVtWZIcg.jpeg" /></figure><p>We might view the order Plato imposes on the Socratic dialogues leading up to Socrates’ trial as a way of defining philosophy itself in the person of Socrates, in contradistinction to the pursuits of the interlocutors after whom the dialogues are named: in the <em>Euthyphro</em>, against poetry and religion; in the <em>Sophist</em>, against rhetoric; in the <em>Statesman</em>, against politics. Philosophy is rational rather than mythological, based on reason rather than authority or faith; convicted rather than contrived; theoretical rather than practical.</p><p>If we focus on the first of these dialogues, we should make a distinction between the style and substance of what is called poetry at this time. Stylistically, we can focus on the presence of such attributes as rhyme and meter, or even perhaps on the absence of the defining characteristics of prose writing. The substantial distinction between philosophy and poetry in Plato’s time, however, appears to be one between <em>logos</em> and <em>mythos</em>. This allows Aristotle to number Parmenides among the philosophers, and his teacher to number Homer among the poets. In contradistinction to philosophers as truth-tellers, poets are storytellers.</p><p>Against this backdrop, the value attributed to poetry divides into two types: first, there is its instrumental value for facilitating the grasping of propositional content; second its intrinsic value, commonly identified with its aesthetic value. The former attribution assimilates the value of poetry to that of a noble lie; while the identification of the intrinsic value of poetry with its aesthetic value serves to locate the value of poetry in the realm of feeling, as opposed to that of understanding.</p><p>In short, poetry is nice.</p><h3>2 Inverting and collapsing the poetry/philosophy distinction</h3><p>Philosophical reevaluations of poetry along alternative lines nevertheless tend to begin with this image of the philosophy/poetry dichotomy as a microcosm of the reason/emotion dichotomy, if only to undermine it. Such attempts typically tend in one of two directions: on the one hand, there are those who would collapse the distinction; on the other, those who would invert it. Reason becomes either, with Leibniz, a mode of appetition; or with Hume, the slave of the passions.</p><p>Attempts in the first direction are parasitic in nature, and so philosophically fruitless: they merely absorb one member of a dichotomy into its opposite with minimal change of meaning, the performance of which structurally presupposes the dichotomy targeted for suppression.</p><p>Attempts in the second direction operate on two levels: one of dependency, the other of worth. In accordance with the first, they highlight the manner in which the higher element depends on the lower, though confusing this mode of dependency with that in which the lower depends on the higher; in accordance with the second, they single out for valorization precisely what was denigrated in the received model. These attempts are philosophically unproductive for much the same reason as the first kind of attempt: the preconditions for their being posited undermine the plausibility of the positing itself; such positing only makes sense as a reactionary gesture that the obtaining of the posit would render senseless.</p><h3>3 The genesis of the distinction between philosophy and poetry</h3><p>To ground this distinction between philosophy and poetry, one should enter into a space where the difference between them does not yet have its sense. Doing this, one can see the divisions that must become real for the distinction between the two to become intelligible.</p><p>Consider the following passage from the Book of Wisdom (6: 12–20):</p><p>12 Wisdom is radiant and unfading, and she is easily discerned by those who love her, and is found by those who seek her. 13 She hastens to make herself known to those who desire her. 14 He who rises early to seek her will have no difficulty, for he will find her sitting at his gates. 15 To fix one’s thought on her is perfect understanding, and he who is vigilant on her account will soon be free from care, 16 because she goes about seeking those worthy of her, and she graciously appears to them in their paths, and meets them in every thought. 17 The beginning of her is the most sincere desire for instruction, and concern for instruction is love of her, 18 and love of her is the keeping of her laws, and giving heed to her laws is assurance of immortality, 19 and immortality brings one near to God; 20 so the desire for wisdom leads to a kingdom.</p><p>One could hardly find a subject matter more befitting philosophy than wisdom itself. But if one leaves aside the self-consciously revisionist approaches to the philosophical canon that have become fashionable of late, the above text remains a non-philosophical one. Certain aspects jump out as especially unbefitting philosophical discourse: the personification of wisdom as a woman; the use of figurative language; the wholly lacking concern to meet the reader where he is in the discourse’s point of departure; the generally lacking argumentation; the lacunas to be found where, as in verses 17–19, the semblance of an argument appears. If the works of John of Damascus, Al-Ghazali, Moses Maimonides or Thomas Aquinas occasionally appear unphilosophical on account of their commitments, they remain philosophical in their style. The above text, however, like others from the <em>Tao Te Ching</em> and elsewhere, seem altogether unphilosophical in their form. These teach as one having authority, and not as our philosophers.<a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/15/on-the-origin-of-the-distinction-between-the-philosopher-and-the-poet/#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><p>In many early religious/poetic texts, <em>parallelism</em> and<em> chiasm</em>, the use of synonymous or connected terms in a repeated or reversed pattern, figure prominently. Hence verse 16, for instance, highlights a close relationship between appearing and meeting, on the one hand, and the paths and thoughts of those seeking wisdom, on the other. Those thoughts are called paths, what the seeker traverses and meanders upon in his seeking. But the author does not highlight the connection between appearing and meeting by drawing out the one from a description of the other, or vice versa. Nor does he qualify as merely figurative the description of thoughts as paths. Rather, all of the poet’s skill goes toward gathering together these pieces into a unity.</p><p><em>The poet manifests as he gathers.</em></p><p>Because of this, coordinating terms like ‘and’ are permitted to play an important role in this gathering, one present in the poet’s use of parallelism. In these parallels, diverse descriptions are brought side by side with each other as belonging to a common space. Likewise with sustained allegory, where gender and figures are impressed on wisdom and her surroundings as a way of unifying them. Lastly, the poet’s use of the verb ‘to be’ differs from both common and philosophical usage, representing neither the inherence of a property in a subject nor the identity of the referents of subject and predicate terms, but rather, the belonging together of beings in a unified manifold. Thus, if the poet had been more inclined to our modes of speech, he might have said ‘where there is giving heed to wisdom’s laws, there is assurance of immortality’, rather than ‘and giving heed to her laws is assurance of immortality.’</p><p>The role of subordinating terms like ‘for,’ ‘because,’ and ‘so,’ however, is greatly diminished compared to their use in philosophical discourse. Each of these appears only once in the above text. And though these terms retain their subordinating role, the ‘consequences’ they help form would be regarded as philosophically defective for other reasons: they are not immediate; their conclusions are not drawn directly from what is given in their premises; and they lead not to scientific knowledge, but only back to ‘metaphorical’ modes of speech.</p><h3>4 What is philosophy?</h3><p>The philosopher, while concerned with making manifest, is concerned with a more restricted way of doing so than the poet. If the poet operates by gathering beings together in being, the philosopher begins with a focus on beings themselves, setting as his task the naming of their being. This difference of focus is itself represented in the philosopher’s more object-oriented analyses of the copula ‘is’: whether with Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, as the inherence of what the predicate signifies in a subject; with William of Ockham and John Buridan, as the identity of the referents of subject and predicate terms; with Bertrand Russell, as an existentially [universally] quantified conjunction [conditional] of properties in a common object; or with W. V. O. Quine, as the membership of an object in a set.</p><p>The object, then, is in one sense what the philosopher begins from. But more than this ‘objective’ focus, the philosopher takes his bearing from the object as <em>familiar</em>. In this decision, the figurative, seen as such because distant from the figures in common usage, because far from the way familiar things usually appear, is banished. Philosophy begins from what is immediate.<a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/15/on-the-origin-of-the-distinction-between-the-philosopher-and-the-poet/#_ftn2">[2]</a> That what is immediate is understood as belonging to the inquirer then gives rise to different notions of the philosophical given, in accordance with whether this inquirer is understood individually or collectively: philosophy as recollection; philosophy as the practice of giving and sharing of reasons.</p><p>Not only does philosophy begin with the immediate: it also proceeds from the immediate to what is near to it. The philosopher does not make ‘leaps’. Philosophical reasoning proceeds from the immediate given, and draws what is given implicitly from out of this, thereby bringing it, too, into the sphere of the familiar.<a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/15/on-the-origin-of-the-distinction-between-the-philosopher-and-the-poet/#_ftn3">[3]</a></p><p><em>Philosophy is the securing manifestation of what is at-hand from the familiar and immediate as its ground.</em></p><p>The distinctions between the ancient/early medieval, later medieval, modern, and postmodern philosophical periods arise on account of how this immediate given is understood: as the external, informed object received in understanding; as divinely-inspired external authority; as immanent thought of a thinking thing; as others <em>qua </em>immanent authorities in the intersubjective whole of which the individual is a mere part.</p><h3>5 What is poetry?</h3><p>Once philosophy is understood in the above way, we can achieve a better grasp of its relation to the poetic both before and after philosophy’s arrival on the scene. From here on, I call that poetry existing prior to philosophy, out of which both philosophy and poetry are generated as specifications, the <em>arch-poetic</em>. I reserve ‘poetry’ to refer to what poetry appears as in the light of philosophy.</p><p>Philosophy, as securing manifestation of what is at-hand from the familiar as ground, is a restriction of arch-poetry as gathering manifestation of beings in being. Philosophy is initiated in understanding’s turn toward the object as ground, reflected in both an object-oriented analysis of the verb ‘to be’ and the greater prominence accorded to subordinating terms like ‘therefore’. In modernity, the familiar is further restricted to the immanent ownness of one’s thinking; and today this sphere of ownness expands to include others as authoritative and constitutive parts of the intersubjective community of knowers, where each subject reflects all the others from its own point of view, albeit without the violence of external influence: where everyone belongs to everyone else.</p><p>From this, we can see the ancient religious-poetic writings of diverse wisdom traditions speak a wisdom the philosopher does not begin to fathom, one his own study only exists as an attenuation of. There is thus something correct in the tendency to describe these, and particularly ‘eastern’ writings, as ‘holistic’ rather than analytic. This holism, however, is not so much unique to eastern writings as characteristic of a broader array of ancient pre-philosophical texts, both eastern and western.</p><p>Philosophy is thus a restriction of the arch-poetic. But when this arch-poetry recedes from view, the poetry that arises in its place becomes philosophy’s inferior, and is defined in contrast with it. Today, poetry shares with philosophy its concern with manifestation as well as its immanence, represented in the usual understanding of it as a form of self-expression. Taken together, these ‘opposites’ witness the extent of the growth of a nihilism in which the external and unfamiliar have been deprived of their power and activity, these being accorded instead to the immanent (collective) subject. But by being allocated to the realm of affection rather than understanding, it is indicated that the poetic is the groundless and ephemeral, rather than securely grounded; what it calls forth is distant, rather than at hand; and it proceeds not from the familiar, but from the immanent <em>un</em>familiar, having its root in the unconscious and its fruit in imagination. Both reason and imagination may produce, but rational activity is collective construction. Both reason and imagination may be the activity of dreamers, but the former dream is well-ordered, sustained and shared: constant collective self-deception.</p><p>Perhaps it is time we awoke from our dogmatic slumber.</p><p>Awake harp and lyre. I will awake the dawn.</p><p><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/15/on-the-origin-of-the-distinction-between-the-philosopher-and-the-poet/#_ftnref1">[1]</a> This is also why the place of certain figures in the philosophical canon, such as Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, is ambiguous, and hence contested by philosophers with a more restricted view of philosophy. Whether they are right or wrong to do so, these reactions must be understood <em>as reactions</em> to an ambiguity in the relation these figures held to philosophy itself.</p><p><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/15/on-the-origin-of-the-distinction-between-the-philosopher-and-the-poet/#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Cf. Aristotle, <em>Posterior Analytics </em>Bk. 1, ch. 2, 72a8-b4; Thomas Aquinas, <em>Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, </em>Bk. 1, lec. 5–6.</p><p><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/15/on-the-origin-of-the-distinction-between-the-philosopher-and-the-poet/#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Cf. Aristotle, <em>Posterior Analytics</em> Bk. 1, 75a18–37; 75b37–76a25; Aquinas, <em>Commentary</em> Bk. 1, lec. 14, 17.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/15/on-the-origin-of-the-distinction-between-the-philosopher-and-the-poet/"><em>jacobarchambault.com</em></a><em> on June 15, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f9a9f329afc1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/on-the-origin-of-the-distinction-between-the-philosopher-and-the-poet-f9a9f329afc1">On the origin of the distinction between the philosopher and the poet</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text">Philosophy Outside the Text</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Being, judgment, and the shape of a philosophical question]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-40f40c9b68f2?source=rss----26c3dbe85bec---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/40f40c9b68f2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[judgment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[metaphilosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[metaphysics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[being]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob W. Archambault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 02 Jun 2019 12:01:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-02T12:01:00.894Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Contemporary metaphysics is often thought to be essentially a continuation of the project that engaged Plato and Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and other figures of philosophy’s perennial past. This post shows a respect in which this fails to be the case.</p><p>The central questions of contemporary metaphysics reduce to two: the first, ‘what is there?’; the second, ‘what is there fundamentally?’ The former question dominated the metaphysical program in Anglophone philosophy until quite recently; and now, the latter question looks as though it may fundamentally write the contrast program for metaphysics for the next generation. In spite of their differences, these questions share some similarities they fail to share with those of the long dead masters.</p><p>Both questions admit of plural equivalents. On the first understanding, to ask the question of what there <em>is</em> is equivalent to asking what things there <em>are</em>. Here, the second question is only a minor modification of the first: it wishes to know what things there are <em>at bottom</em>.</p><p>Second, both questions admit of paraphrase in terms of a series of ‘whether’ questions. Since the answers to the question, ‘what things are there?’ or ‘what things are there at bottom?’ can be given as universally quantified disjunctions, the disjuncts of which are non-empty and non-redundant,<a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/08/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-1/#_ftn1">[1]</a> one can ask whether a thing is in the disjunction.<a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/08/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-1/#_ftn2">[2]</a> This allows research in metaphysics to bear a superficial relationship to that of the natural sciences, where an overarching view is articulated,<a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/08/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-1/#_ftn3">[3]</a> and progress is made by testing more manageable aspects of our environment against this view.<a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/08/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-1/#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><p>Thus, a central aspect of modern metaphysics is this focus on producing questions to be answered in an act of <em>judgment</em>. Research in metaphysics today poses questions the answers to which may be formulated as ‘there-is’ statements, or, alternatively, as ascriptions of being or existence,<a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/08/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-1/#_ftn5">[5]</a> which may or may not be qualified adverbially,<a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/08/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-1/#_ftn6">[6]</a> to a subject. And like the natural sciences it is modeled upon, its aims are essentially prohibitive: to demarcate and delimit the domain of a universe of discourse, often in the service of making it simpler and more manageable. But unlike the natural sciences, where the domain of inquiry is specified and restricted antecedently,<a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/08/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-1/#_ftn7">[7]</a> today’s metaphysician imagines herself to cast the beings outside of her purview wholly to oblivion, or at least to bar them from inclusion in an elite group.</p><p>In this way, contemporary metaphysics remains a practice centrally concerned with the conferral and withholding of status. Where the restriction of the domain of the scientist serves the constructive purpose of specifying an object of concern, and thereby removes other beings from consideration, helping to ensure a kind of scientific detachment from positive or negative evaluation of those beings, this same restriction in metaphysics fails to specify a domain, and instead serves to make the things to be affirmed and denied objects of concern precisely as things to be evaluated positively or negatively — contributing to attitudes of both attachment and opprobrium in the respective cases. In metaphysics, the same precautionary measures taken in the sciences reproduce not the inquiry of the servant, but the decree of the master. This transformation of the mechanisms producing virtuous science into mechanisms producing vicious metaphysics suggests their inappropriateness to the matter at issue in the latter discipline.</p><p>Where modern metaphysical programs take their shape by lifting a pattern of inquiry found in the sciences, one focused on ‘whether’ questions and a non-copulative use of the verb ‘is’, the pattern one finds in the great figures of the past grows more naturally out of ‘what’ questions, to be answered in terms of a copulative use of the same verb. A toddler can ask ‘what’s that?’ Those around them respond ‘that’s a banana,’ ‘a chair,’ ‘a birch tree’, ‘a reservoir,’ ‘the moon’. Still very young children may articulate a more advanced kind of question, where the demonstrative ‘this’ or ‘that’ is replaced with a noun: what’s a reservoir, a university, blindness, virtue, friendship, God? One even finds a pattern in Plato’s dialogues where Socrates’ interlocutor is led from more pragmatic ‘whether’ questions to these more essential ‘what’ questions. Tell me Socrates, is virtue teachable? Well, Meno, to determine this, we should first know what virtue is.</p><p>After practice with these sorts of questions, one can move to question what appears unassumingly in all of one’s questions and answers:</p><p>What is it to be?</p><p>To this, the philosopher provides various answers. To be is to be present. To be one. To be intelligible. To be good. To be situated. To change. To differ. To act. To suffer.</p><p>In this way, the essential question of metaphysics has its root in the earliest questioning of the toddler, even if those who raise it explicitly, let alone answer it, remain few. Furthermore, never in this natural progression is the reality of what is given questioned. Rather, the toddler and the true lover of wisdom alike submit to it and wonder.</p><p>From the above, we can see the inquisitive child remains three steps closer to the genuine metaphysical question than many professional philosophers concerned with questions ill-fitting the non-copulative use of the verb ‘to be’, separated as they are by 1) the respectable non-copulative questioning common to both scientific and non-scientific inquiry alike, where the existence of monsters, God, quarks or gravitational waves is inquired about, and 2), the legitimate, albeit self-interested questioning of a Meno, for instance, asking whether virtue is teachable, from 3) the copulative essential questioning of the child asking what dinosaurs are. From this last we have much to learn.</p><p>And an argument arose among them as to which of them was the greatest. But when Jesus perceived the thought of their hearts, he took a child and put him by his side, and said to them, ‘[…] he who is least among you all is the one who is great.’</p><p><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/08/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-1/#_ftnref1">[1]</a> E.g. ‘Everything is an atom or a cat or a baseball bat or …’</p><p><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/08/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-1/#_ftnref2">[2]</a> E.g. ‘Are there cats?’ ‘Are atoms fundamental?’</p><p><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/08/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-1/#_ftnref3">[3]</a> E.g. ‘Only non-composite objects exist!’</p><p><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/08/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-1/#_ftnref4">[4]</a> E.g. ‘This article examines the question of whether there are baseballs, on the assumptions that only simple objects exist and baseballs aren’t simple.’</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nPETRsXSFB_kNOMsS9VfFw.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/08/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-1/#_ftnref5">[5]</a> E.g. ‘There are baseballs,’ ‘Baseballs exist.’</p><p><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/08/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-1/#_ftnref6">[6]</a> E.g. ‘Fundamentally, there are no baseballs.’</p><p><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/08/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-1/#_ftnref7">[7]</a> E.g. the biologist concerns herself with living beings as such, and only those.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2016/06/08/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-1/"><em>jacobarchambault.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=40f40c9b68f2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/being-judgment-and-the-shape-of-a-philosophical-question-40f40c9b68f2">Being, judgment, and the shape of a philosophical question</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text">Philosophy Outside the Text</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[What traffic jams teach us about suffering, culture, and the foundations of justice]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/what-traffic-jams-teach-us-about-suffering-culture-and-the-foundations-of-justice-46b39cd047ac?source=rss----26c3dbe85bec---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/46b39cd047ac</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[suffering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob W. Archambault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2019 15:45:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-18T01:19:06.363Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>What traffic jams can teach us about suffering, culture, and the foundations of justice</h3><h4>How a common non-cooperative game can help us better understand how to live with others</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-AEd5a-c1d-XyAN3.jpg" /></figure><p>The other day, I found myself stuck on the highway in traffic, which was caused by a lane that was blocked so workers could wash graffiti off of an approaching tunnel wall and trim trees reaching over the highway’s guard rail. The natural reaction of many, if not most drivers in this situation was to place themselves in the shorter and/or faster lane, switching back and forth as necessary up to the point where the traffic jam dissipated.</p><p>A traffic jam is a very simple, real-world example of what game-theorists call a non-cooperative game: it is an activity, essentially a very slow race, in which multiple participants have a goal, getting to the end of the jam in the fastest way possible. It is non-cooperative in that under certain conditions, a participant can better secure that goal for themselves by inhibiting others from achieving it. For instance, if the traffic jam is caused, as they often are, by the imposition of a large blinking light followed by traffic cones blocking off a lane, one can drive as far as one can up to the blocked lane, then merge at the last possible moment, cutting others off and slowing down traffic in the process. In doing so, a driver makes his own position better, but makes the jam worse for everyone else.</p><p>People behave in non-cooperative ways for a variety of reasons. Some may have a compelling reason for doing so — emergency ambulance drivers, to continue with our example, can initiate a traffic jam in this way. Others are inattentive, e.g. a distracted driver who slows down and rapidly switches lanes to avoid missing an exit. Others may simply be aggressive or selfish. Others engage in non-cooperative behavior as a preventative and punitive measure against the bad behavior of others, e.g. a driver who refuses to let another merge and thereby contributes to the backup in the merging driver’s lane. Still others, recognizing that their own good behavior won’t be enough to change the underlying situation in light of the uncooperative behavior of others, abandon their natural disposition on the grounds of futility.</p><p>Given the assumption that others will behave badly in a given situation, one cannot secure one’s own best outcome by behaving in a cooperative way, e.g. by staying in one lane, driving at a slow, constant pace, and letting others merge when they wish, rather than shifting lanes and closing traffic gaps as quickly as possible. Conversely, the only way to secure the best available outcome for everyone is if <em>everyone</em> (or at least the vast majority) behaves cooperatively, and thus refuses to consider their own advantage under changing conditions.</p><p>Let us call the best possible outcome, with respect to a given end, for a community as a whole, <em>just. </em>Understood in this way, not reaction to bad behavior, but indifference to it, serves as a precondition of justice.</p><p>Furthermore, for a just outcome in the above sense to even be possible requires that some suffer voluntarily so long as ideal conditions <em>don’t</em> obtain. In doing so, those who suffer under such conditions witness to the possibility of harmony among members of the community, a possibility that they themselves may never see realized.</p><p>Lastly, call the harmony of a community, with respect to its natural and chosen ends, consequent on the self-abnegation of its members, its <em>culture</em>.</p><p>Voluntary suffering under unjust conditions, then, would serve as a both a witness to and a condition for the very possibility of a common culture.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2019/05/17/what-non-cooperative-games-can-tell-us-about-suffering-for-a-cause/"><em>http://jacobarchambault.com</em></a><em> on May 17, 2019.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=46b39cd047ac" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/what-traffic-jams-teach-us-about-suffering-culture-and-the-foundations-of-justice-46b39cd047ac">What traffic jams teach us about suffering, culture, and the foundations of justice</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text">Philosophy Outside the Text</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[On the consequences of capital concentration, addendum]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/on-the-consequences-of-capital-concentration-addendum-a52f34e2789e?source=rss----26c3dbe85bec---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a52f34e2789e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[family]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[identity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob W. Archambault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2019 16:41:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-16T16:41:04.822Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/861/0*H8lLJbEr6bCukk0r.jpg" /></figure><p>In a previous post, I showed how a wide variety of problems, from rural poverty to data mining, are consequent on or otherwise conditioned as responses to the problem of the concentration of capital resources both geographically and by class. Here, I’ll add a few further points that I neglected to mention in the previous post.</p><p>As capital concentration increases and capital itself improves, the number of laborers necessary to secure sufficient societal goods decreases. Hence competition among laborers becomes greater. One way this manifests itself is in a tendency for individuals whose production under earlier conditions had been within the context of household business or even outside of sphere of monetary economic activity, to enter (or re-enter) that sphere, particularly women, children, and the elderly. As a result, households, previously themselves diversified units of production, get drawn into the same kind of iterative non-cooperative game that we earlier saw befall businessmen in their competition for the accumulation of capital, and localities, states, and nations in their competition to secure sources both of revenue for their operations and of labor for their citizens. In short, women and, where legal, children, enter the labor force. Initially, this secures a competitive advantage for two-income households. But in the aggregate, this not only increases the supply of labor, leading to a corresponding decrease in its value; it also undermines the rationale of the household as itself a stable unit for production. Inasmuch as <em>marriage</em> was previously understood as a precondition for the well-being and stable operation of households, the need for marriage in this form is undermined, the absolute rate of marriages decreases, and the rationale for marriage itself, if it is to continue playing any important societal role, must shift, as it has in our society to romantic love. Initially, this leads to the possibility of expanding marriage to those who were excluded by the previous definition, e.g. homosexuals, the divorced, groups of individuals, or blood relatives (the exact groups to whom the institution is expanded will differ from society to society, but the underlying rationale is the same). Ultimately, as it becomes clear that marriage is not a prerequisite for romantic love, the institution itself loses its distinction and meaning.</p><p>In societies where public discomfort prevents children from working, they do not remain unaffected by effects of capital concentration. Instead, where the education of children was previously informal and conducted by households and local communities (generally as one activity among others), it later becomes the dominant focus of childhood, aimed at a) inculcating attitudes conducive to working conditions that prevent households from serving as economic units and drains societies of the power and opportunity to bring people together and b) providing the basic skills necessary to secure future advantage as skilled laborers in a capitalist economy. Today, these two aims take the form of a) cultivating an understanding of social relations themselves on the model of market relations, i.e. as transactions between consenting individuals free from natural ties, and b) an emphasis on skills in science, technology, engineering, and mechanics (STEM).</p><p>Lastly, as individuals are increasingly bereft of not only capital, but of property more broadly, this comes to affect not only the material conditions of life but also the attitudes and psychology of those thus affected. Bereft of the opportunities to meaningfully participate in productive activity that they can call their own, the economic activity of those lacking capital becomes increasingly concentrated on consumption. This brings with it a general slackening of attitudes of self-denial, such as those previously cultivated by religious belief towards the partaking of sex, food, and sleep. Second, it allows opportunities for consumption themselves to become a source of community substituting for kinds of social relations that economic conditions no longer support. This can take the form of associating only with those who have similar consumption habits (e.g. dining at luxury restaurants), or even of the creation of cultural icons and events (e.g. superhero movies, the Super Bowl) as substitutes for religious and other forms of community. As people increasingly identify themselves with what it is they consume, consumer attitudes are increasingly extended to things not previously thought of as consumer goods (e.g. gender, race). Likewise, if forms left over from a fading culture associate consumption with different types of individuals to different degrees (e.g. teenagers more than adults, women more than men, the wealthy more than the poor), those attitudes will be correspondingly more manifest in a society among those classes more associated with consumption, at least until the underlying logic of capital itself extinguishes the material conditions requisite for those attitudes to be sustained.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2019/05/16/on-the-consequences-of-capital-concentration-addendum/"><em>http://jacobarchambault.com</em></a><em> on May 16, 2019.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a52f34e2789e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/on-the-consequences-of-capital-concentration-addendum-a52f34e2789e">On the consequences of capital concentration, addendum</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text">Philosophy Outside the Text</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[On the consequences of capital concentration]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/on-the-consequences-of-capital-concentration-567aabdb6131?source=rss----26c3dbe85bec---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/567aabdb6131</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[environment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob W. Archambault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2019 15:08:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-15T04:35:41.754Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Most political problems arise out of this one, really big problem</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*YIgN988fpFhPt1CF.jpg" /></figure><h3>1 What is capital?</h3><p>The term ‘capital’ is used in several senses.</p><p>In its most basic sense, ‘capital’ refers to physical goods that may be used in the production of other goods or services. In this sense, something as simple as a box of pencils counts as capital.</p><p>In another sense, the term may also include non-material goods, such as patents, proprietary code, or the value of a well-known brand.</p><p>In a third sense, the term may refer to those types of capital that, in a given era, would provide an advantage over one’s competitors in the provision of certain goods and services — as tractors did for some farmers, at the expense of others, at the turn of the 20th century, and as network effects did for some social media networks, at the expense of others, at the beginning of the 21st. This sense disregards capital which common to all or most participants in a monetary economy (or sector thereof) in order to focus on those granting distinction to their owners.</p><p>In a fourth sense, the term is used to refer to goods that, while not themselves capital in any of the above senses, are goods derived in some way from these more basic ones. Common stock, which signify ownership of the right to provide input concerning the direction of capital in these senses, is capital in this sense. A bank loan, which is a tangible signifier of the goodwill that a borrower has in the estimation of a lender, is also capital in this sense.</p><p>Capital may be concentrated by <em>location</em>, as, for instance, New York City has a greater quantity and variety of capital than the entire state of Wyoming. It may also be concentrated by <em>class</em>, e.g. if capital ownership is largely restricted to individuals within a given social or economic group.</p><h3>2 The initial consequences of capital concentration</h3><p>In all but the most basic sense, the concept of capital is correlative to that of labor power. While nothing prevents labor from itself being regarded as a form of capital, inasmuch as the capacity to work is exercised in the production of goods and services, it is typically regarded as a separate category. The original reason for this was that since labor is a cause of every produced good, and thus a source of capital in the sense of goods used in production, it itself could not be regarded as capital in the same sense that these goods themselves were. The distinction has remained, though the reason that originally grounded it has been abandoned by most mainstream economists.</p><p>A society in which capital is sufficiently concentrated in one class of individuals is one in which labor, rather than contributing for the most part to household production of goods for consumption, instead contributes to the sale of goods in a market economy. This occurs in a society where the use of money is directly or indirectly necessitated by law, e.g. via its collection as taxes for the provision of common goods like national defense. The necessity of the provision of taxes in monetary form itself conditionally necessitates formal participation in buying and selling.</p><p>However, when capital in the third of the above listed senses becomes available to some members of society, but not others, such individuals have the capacity to produce goods at greater speed than others. Inasmuch as money is itself a means for securing those external goods necessary for maintaining a life, the capacity to produce goods more quickly, and hence to increase sales where there is demand for those goods, may be used as a way of ‘purchasing’ additional leisure time, as a way of providing goods at a lower price than one’s competitors (thus increasing one’s gross profit by cutting into the number of items a competitor sells, while decreasing one’s profit per item sold), or a combination of both. However, since competition for sale of goods and services is not a one-time event, but one iterated indefinitely many times, any choice to not increase production is simultaneously a bet — and a bet against the odds — that competitors sharing the similar capital advantages will act likewise. Because of this, the prudential decision, at least outside of monopoly conditions, will be to use one’s advantage to increase production and thereby lower prices. These conditions provide an instance of a type of scenario call an iterated non-cooperative game, which is one of several kinds of games studied in a discipline called game theory.</p><p>As this process is reiterated, previous businessmen will find themselves unable to compete directly with those who have accumulated greater levels of capital, and may find themselves in a situation where rather than selling goods produced, their own competitive advantage lies in selling their labor, i.e. in working for a capitalist. By doing so, they avoid direct competition with their employer, and partake of the advantages that that capitalist has against other competitors, while those employing them are provided with greater labor power against those same competitors. However, since the remaining capitalists will themselves not be in a situation of equilibrium as long as they have competitors, this process will continue to iterate in such a way as to dispossess previous capitalists of their labor for so long as there is not a monopoly and/or the kind of economy in which economic activity operates remains one where access to goods for production plays a decisive factor in determining the place of individuals within that society.</p><h3>3 Later consequences of capital concentration</h3><p>For as long as tangible material goods play an important role in a capitalist economy, those goods will have to be located in some place. As those goods become more concentrated in a given class of individuals, they will also become concentrated spatially. As a result of this, those not in a position of capital ownership will compete with each other by offering their labor to the far fewer number in a position to productively employ them. Since opportunities for sale are limited, some will not be hired, and will become poor. In this way, capital concentration generates the problem of <em>urban poverty</em>.</p><p>At the same time, as barriers to sales across large distances decrease, certain entire areas will find themselves required and unable, in the absence of deliberate protective measures, to compete with those in possession of greater capital. Since this will be practically impossible, those in possession of sufficiently in-demand skills will leave their areas. The areas they leave will then lack not only the resources, but also the talent to compete with those businesses in the city. In this way, capital concentration generates the problem of <em>rural poverty</em>.</p><p>This situation then conditions several further shifts in the economy of the city. In order t secure the advantages of greater production in a situation where buyers of the goods are increasingly scarce, programs are developed to ensure that the poor have at least some purchasing power. In other words, the problem of urban poverty has, as one of its possible, albeit temporary solutions, the creation of the <em>welfare state</em>. This grows government itself as a sector of employment, on the one hand, and — as these programs come to count the employed among their users — artificially lowers worker wages on the other, since it lowers the price of labor by providing for basic necessities that had earlier been secured by a wage. In this way, welfare provisions then act as an indirect subsidy to employers, further accelerating the process of capital concentration.</p><p>Those workers who find work in the city will find themselves among others who lack work. Some of these will have recourse to participation in the sale of illegal items as a way to provide for their wants and needs. Others will have recourse to theft, sometimes violent. In this way, capital concentration should lead to a <em>relative increase in criminal activity</em> wherever it is located amidst sufficient poverty — which, given the draw of excess labor towards capital will be everywhere capital is located.</p><p>As capital becomes sufficiently concentrated in a small number of citizens in a small number of cities, those same citizens come to wield sufficient power that local economies come to depend on them. In this situation, those economies will be less able to extract taxes from them at a rate less advantageous to them than those of neighboring locales. That is, localities, then states will find themselves in the same sort of iterated non-cooperative game with respect to taxation that capitalists themselves were initially in with respect to conditions of leisure. In this way, capitalism, which arises within the context of strong states in great part out through forced participation in the monetary economy in the form of monetary taxation, ultimately <em>inhibits the collection of taxes, and</em> <em>removes the capacity for meaningful self-governance from local political communities</em> .</p><p>Correspondingly, those governmental bodies that <em>are </em>capable of exercising taxing power will be those relatively far removed from local communities. As a necessity of counteracting large capital accumulations at sufficient scale, <em>government decisions will begin to be increasingly concentrated at the highest levels</em>, leaving it both <em>unresponsive</em> to the greater mass of its citizens and <em>susceptible to corruption</em> by those parts of society it initially sought to regulate.</p><p>Given the absence of sufficient numbers of buyers for the kinds of goods typical of an early market economy, the constant fierce competition for those buyers among existing firms, and the relatively large accumulations of capital by those firms, economies develop to serve not consumers in the traditional sense, but those companies, whose consumption is itself ordered toward the augmentation of their own competitive advantage. These conditions of the lack traditional demand, large capital accumulations, and competition for scarce buyers provide the precondition for the outsized role played in today’s economy by <em>ad revenue</em>and <em>data mining</em>.</p><p>The need to ensure a market of buyers for goods that are consumed multiple times requires that buyers not create products that undermine their own demand. Within fields like medicine, the form this will naturally take is a preference for repetitive care on a subscription-like basis over one-time solutions, as instanced in a focus on the development of drugs for repeated use over the cures, and on the very notion of health-care — which emphasizes a concept of care as constant superintendence over the emphasis on recovery from sickness emphasized in the notion of medicine. In other sectors it will take the form of a lower product quality to ensure that users return to buy a given product in a sufficiently short amount of time to make good the money spent in securing one’s competitive advantage. In this way, capital concentration leads to the generation of <em>excessive pollution and landfill</em>.</p><p>This list of negative consequences of capital concentration is incomplete. In the following days, I intend to discuss ways not to address these problems, then better methods for doing so.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2019/05/15/on-the-consequences-of-capital-concentration/"><em>http://jacobarchambault.com</em></a><em> on May 15, 2019.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=567aabdb6131" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/on-the-consequences-of-capital-concentration-567aabdb6131">On the consequences of capital concentration</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text">Philosophy Outside the Text</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A justification of the existence of evil in 120 words]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/a-justification-of-the-existence-of-evil-in-120-words-769c2884bf65?source=rss----26c3dbe85bec---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/769c2884bf65</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy-of-religion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[why-does-evil-exist]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[evil]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[theodicy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[god-and-evil]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob W. Archambault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 05 May 2019 12:01:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-05T12:01:00.813Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7XsU0hiOUCWqSqOw2kxzhg.jpeg" /></figure><ol><li>Good and evil are contraries.</li><li>Contraries are beings presupposing each other in sense, i.e. beings whose meaningfulness is conditional upon that of their opposites.</li><li>Meaningfulness is to understanding as possibility to existence: i.e. <em>meaningfulness to an understanding is nothing other than real possibility, </em>described with respect to an understanding rather than reality as such. Those who think otherwise ground meaning and possibility alike in their own ignorance.</li><li>Hence, contraries are beings whose possibility is conditional upon that of their opposites; as Aristotle says, potencies are directed at contraries.</li><li>So for goodness to be possible is for evil to be as well.</li><li>A world where goodness is possible is better than one where it isn’t.</li></ol><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2015/10/27/a-justification-of-the-existence-of-evil-in-120-words/"><em>jacobarchambault.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=769c2884bf65" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/a-justification-of-the-existence-of-evil-in-120-words-769c2884bf65">A justification of the existence of evil in 120 words</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text">Philosophy Outside the Text</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A dilemma for a constitutionally protected, publicly funded right to abortion]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/a-dilemma-for-a-constitutionally-protected-publicly-funded-right-to-abortion-a17b81a6ad2a?source=rss----26c3dbe85bec---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a17b81a6ad2a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[constitution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[abortion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob W. Archambault]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 May 2019 13:39:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-03T13:39:31.116Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/0*-YB6QOptkanNuSiG.jpg" /></figure><p>Whatever permits being publicly funded by the state is deemed a public good by the polity that funds it.</p><p>Nothing deemed to be a private good can also be deemed to be a public good by the same polity.</p><p>Therefore, nothing which permits being publicly funded by the state is a private good.</p><p>Whatever is deemed constitutionally protected under the justification of privacy is a private good. Since private and public are mutually exclusive categories, no such goods are public goods.</p><p>Public funding for abortion is required by law in <a href="https://www.aclu.org/issues/reproductive-freedom/abortion/public-funding-abortion?redirect=node/24455%E2%80%9D">multiple</a> U. S. jurisdictions, and hence would be deemed a public good by those same jurisdictions.</p><p>By the same criterion, it cannot constitute a private good in contradistinction to a public one, and thus cannot be legally protected under grounds of privacy.</p><p>But the grounds on which abortion is legally protected are exactly those of privacy.</p><p>Thus, if abortion is constitutionally protected on the grounds of its being a private good, then it is not permissible to publicly fund it. Likewise, if abortion is publicly funded, and hence treated as a public good, it is not constitutionally protected.</p><p>Therefore, abortion may be publicly funded in U. S. jurisdictions if and only if it is not constitutionally protected.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*mUXQ0QymS74yIkiW.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://jacobarchambault.com/2019/05/03/a-dilemma-for-a-constitutionally-protected-publicly-funded-right-to-abortion/"><em>http://jacobarchambault.com</em></a><em> on May 3, 2019.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a17b81a6ad2a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text/a-dilemma-for-a-constitutionally-protected-publicly-funded-right-to-abortion-a17b81a6ad2a">A dilemma for a constitutionally protected, publicly funded right to abortion</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/philosophy-outside-the-text">Philosophy Outside the Text</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>