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        <title><![CDATA[Salem Center for Policy - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Texas McCombs Salem Center for Policy - Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/policy-analytics?source=rss----1aff32b4d442---4</link>
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            <title>Salem Center for Policy - Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/policy-analytics?source=rss----1aff32b4d442---4</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Visit us on our new website: SalemCenter.org]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/policy-analytics/visit-us-on-our-new-website-salemcenter-org-e157a6c30a87?source=rss----1aff32b4d442---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e157a6c30a87</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[TJ Canann]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2020 17:01:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-02T17:01:29.374Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e157a6c30a87" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics/visit-us-on-our-new-website-salemcenter-org-e157a6c30a87">Visit us on our new website: SalemCenter.org</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics">Salem Center for Policy</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Covid-19 and Texas MSA’s]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/policy-analytics/covid-19-and-texas-msas-56078b044554?source=rss----1aff32b4d442---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[texas]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unemployment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Megan Wright]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jul 2020 16:16:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-14T16:16:08.825Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>At the Salem Center for Policy, we have been gathering information about large areas of economic activity in Texas, starting with Austin and then expanding to cover 20 other major MSAs, in order to make policy recommendations about re-opening the economy with the effect of Covid-19 in mind. Our data focuses on GDP and employment by sector, baseline risks of contracting Covid-19 by sector, and employment changes throughout the Covid-19 crisis.</em></p><p>To explore our work further, please see the link below:</p><p><a href="https://sites.google.com/view/salemcentercovid/home">Salem Center for Policy</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IHd24tJcswBDSApskuaYWQ.png" /><figcaption>Employment change in Austin, Texas from February to March, in the beginning of Covid-19 shut down in Texas.</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=56078b044554" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics/covid-19-and-texas-msas-56078b044554">Covid-19 and Texas MSA’s</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics">Salem Center for Policy</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Covid-19 Interviews]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/policy-analytics/covid-19-interviews-46519364302d?source=rss----1aff32b4d442---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/46519364302d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Megan Wright]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2020 21:00:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-25T21:00:14.865Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Salem Center for Policy has been developing a series of COVID-19 related video interviews. These timely conversations include scholars and policy experts from a wide variety of disciplines. We invite you to visit our YouTube Channel and take a look at the interviews. And while exploring our videos, <strong>please subscribe to our channel</strong> to be updated with the more recent content.</p><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCQeLiGnhfndoTUXqsBmIGaw">Salem Center for Policy</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4UAlwmqINxXOeXhQM-PW3Q.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=46519364302d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics/covid-19-interviews-46519364302d">Covid-19 Interviews</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics">Salem Center for Policy</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Regulation Best Interest: Assessing the Market Impact of the New Rules]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/policy-analytics/regulation-best-interest-assessing-the-market-impact-of-the-new-rules-dfadd49f20dd?source=rss----1aff32b4d442---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[regulation-best-interest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reg-bi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Megan Wright]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2020 16:20:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-15T16:20:39.594Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In February 2020, Salem Center for Policy hosted a Conference on Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI). The event brought together current and former government officials, industry experts, and academic researchers to engage in a series of dialogues on how the new regulation will impact securities brokers and registered investment advisors.</p><p>Speakers from the SEC, FINRA, SIFMA, CFP Board, leading law firms and universities, and the financial services industry discussed the underlying market issues that led to the new rules, how the measures are intended to impact investor relationships with brokers and investment advisers, and the likely compliance challenges. Participants also gained insight on how the new rules might shape their business environment, including the impact on the use of technology, the potential effect on investor behaviors, and litigation risk.</p><p><strong>Assessing the market impact of the new rules:<br></strong>Remarks by SEC Chief Economist SP Kothari followed by a discussion with former Chief Economist Chester Spatt on how the economics of giving advice has changed.</p><p><em>Moderator </em>— Scott Bauguess, McCombs School of Business<br>- SP Kothari, Chief Economist, SEC<br>- Chester Spatt, Professor, Carnegie Mellon University, and former SEC Chief Economist</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F4qJyRU2GB74%3Fstart%3D9%26feature%3Doembed%26start%3D9&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D4qJyRU2GB74&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F4qJyRU2GB74%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/d03074aafccbc1216d75bf41e2cd2f07/href">https://medium.com/media/d03074aafccbc1216d75bf41e2cd2f07/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dfadd49f20dd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics/regulation-best-interest-assessing-the-market-impact-of-the-new-rules-dfadd49f20dd">Regulation Best Interest: Assessing the Market Impact of the New Rules</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics">Salem Center for Policy</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How will Regulation Best Interest Shape Industry Practices?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/policy-analytics/how-will-regulation-best-interest-shape-industry-practices-38eb24fd0b9b?source=rss----1aff32b4d442---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[regulation-best-interest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reg-bi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Megan Wright]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2020 16:16:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-15T16:16:08.224Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In February 2020, Salem Center for Policy hosted a Conference on Regulation Best Interest (Reg BI). The event brought together current and former government officials, industry experts, and academic researchers to engage in a series of dialogues on how the new regulation will impact securities brokers and registered investment advisors.</p><p>Speakers from the SEC, FINRA, SIFMA, CFP Board, leading law firms and universities, and the financial services industry discussed the underlying market issues that led to the new rules, how the measures are intended to impact investor relationships with brokers and investment advisers, and the likely compliance challenges. Participants also gained insight on how the new rules might shape their business environment, including the impact on the use of technology, the potential effect on investor behaviors, and litigation risk.</p><p><strong>How will Reg BI shape industry practices?<br></strong>A discussion of how the financial services industry will need to adapt to sweeping new rules governing the giving of investment advice.</p><p>Introduction to the Conference: <br>Scott Bauguess, Director of Program on Financial Markets Regulation, UT McCombs</p><p>Introduction to the new Wealth Management program at McCombs:<br>Ramesh Rao, Director, McCombs Wealth Management Program</p><p><em>Moderator </em>— Jim Burns, Partner, Willkie Farr &amp; Gallagher<br>- Dan Kahl, Deputy Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, SEC<br>- Ira Hammerman, General Counsel, SIFMA<br>- Leo Rydzewski, General Counsel, CFP Board<br>Tom Selman, EVP Regulatory Policy (retired), FINRA</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FmyqVGuSrw4s%3Fstart%3D958%26feature%3Doembed%26start%3D958&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DmyqVGuSrw4s&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FmyqVGuSrw4s%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/3ba80b54744f38d8df4a5597e5f7a26d/href">https://medium.com/media/3ba80b54744f38d8df4a5597e5f7a26d/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=38eb24fd0b9b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics/how-will-regulation-best-interest-shape-industry-practices-38eb24fd0b9b">How will Regulation Best Interest Shape Industry Practices?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics">Salem Center for Policy</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Industry Level Baseline Risk of COVID-19 Infection (Working Paper)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/policy-analytics/industry-level-baseline-risk-of-covid-19-infection-working-paper-c3b85cd19899?source=rss----1aff32b4d442---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c3b85cd19899</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[texas]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reopening]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[university-of-texas]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[shutdown]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[TJ Canann]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2020 04:56:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-13T04:56:27.172Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Center has a new working paper detailing industry level risk classifications of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) spread and detailing the economic contributions and trade-offs of lockdown/re-opening policies for the Austin metropolitan area.</p><p>If you would like to read this research see here:</p><p><a href="https://drive.google.com/open?id=1rWx4Sy3Gz-WWJPwnnxUZerQnhzBzvWuy">BaselineRiskCOVID.pdf</a></p><p>We are also developing an online supplement to provide equivalent economic measures for other metropolitan areas in Texas. This can be found here:</p><p><a href="https://sites.google.com/view/salemcentercovid/texas">https://sites.google.com/view/salemcentercovid/texas</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c3b85cd19899" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics/industry-level-baseline-risk-of-covid-19-infection-working-paper-c3b85cd19899">Industry Level Baseline Risk of COVID-19 Infection (Working Paper)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics">Salem Center for Policy</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Unobserved Heterogeneity in Covid19 Models]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/policy-analytics/unobserved-heterogeneity-in-covid19-models-45e2270a8656?source=rss----1aff32b4d442---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/45e2270a8656</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Carlos Carvalho]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 11 Apr 2020 19:17:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-11T19:17:17.636Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Richard Lowery, CEPA Senior Scholar</p><p>As data on infections and hospitalizations for SARS-CoV-2 come in, it is beginning to look like case peaks will be earlier and lower than originally projected by leading epidemiological models. It is essential to objectively evaluate the performance of these models, both for the sake of determining their scientific validity and because the models may be needed again if spread resumes following reduction in mitigation efforts. It is in particular essential to avoid declaring victory based on lower case values relative to predicted values if instead the issue was the models were incorrect in the first place. Without such caution, we may end up validating counterproductive and dangerous policies. Models must be held to the standards they set ex ante and not be taken as true, thus attributing all the discrepancy between model and data to mitigation effects. We cannot repeat the debacle of the stimulus following the financial crisis, where economic performance came in well below predicted performance under the stimulus package and the architects of the stimulus package claimed that this just showed how much worse than expected things would have been if they had not pushed through such a policy. Subsequent research (Mullingan 2012, Glaeser 2017) shows that is far more likely that the stimulus package hampered the recovery, and if that is not the case the failure of the predictions simply means that they could not model the economy and invalidates their claims that they could anticipate the effect of their policies.</p><p>In the pandemic setting, we have one major concern about the modeling that we have not seen addressed. It appears that many of the models calibrate an R_0 from the doubling rate of the virus in the early phase of the spread. In an immunologically naive population, this is treated as the right approach to back out R_0. But, in the models we have seen there is no attempt to control for unobserved heterogeneity within the coarse divisions by, for example, age and hospitalization risk. This omission seems to generate a potentially very large upward bias in the number of expected cases under any policy. Economists have long known that it is essential to account for such unobserved heterogeneity when the probability of being included in a sample depends on such heterogeneity. The classic example is estimating the wage available to workers in a population where some people work and some people do not. Simply averaging the wage is not enough, because those workers who are not working are likely not working in part because the wage they could earn is lower than the wages of those who we do observe working, possibly for reasons that are unobservable to the analyst.</p><p>In the pandemic context, it seems like there is a potentially extremely strong selection effect if the R_0 is estimated from the doubling rate early in the pandemic. Those individuals most likely to become infected and infect a lot of other people are also likely to be infected early in the outbreak. Thus, the initial doubling rate before any policy intervention may not represent the growth rate later in the pandemic, leading to very erroneous predictions about total cases. Of course, epidemiological models exhibit a decline in the effective reproduction rate as more individuals develop immunity. However, at least in many cases, including the work that influenced decisions in Austin (Wang et al., 2020), the R_0, which is the reproduction rate that would occur in a fully susceptible population, is held constant (Bauche and Oraby, Lancet, 2013 and Breban, Riou and Fontanet, Lancent, 2013). But, even within whatever subgroups the model defines, the rate of spread even holding the number of suspectable individuals fixed, would be different, and potentially appreciably lower, later in the outbreak than earlier. To take an extreme example, consider a population consisting of half straphanging subway commuters and half hermit monks, with both groups having the same age profile. Even assuming no one changes behavior as the epidemic gets going, the modeling based on the initial doubling rate will overstate the peak number of cases by a factor of close to 2; those individuals who engage in the behaviors that are most likely to expose them to the virus will be infected first and will generate more follow on infections; since they were infected first they will have an outsized effect on the estimates of transmissibility. This overestimate will be even more severe if individuals respond by changing their behavior to act more like monks and less like commuters. But, both the selection effect and the behavior effect will combine to make any policy put in place look to have been effective, even if it was completely useless or too late to affect the spread.</p><p>Little work seems to address this effect; accounting for unobserved heterogeneity is challenging, but there are well established methods to correct in such a way as to reduce or eliminate the bias. If these are not directly applicable, it is still the case that the models must have some adjustment for this effect if they are not going to mechanically provide bad policy advice. Further, it is not even clear that this is entirely a problem of unobserved heterogeneity; the data used to determine frequency of contact should allow an estimate of the dispersion of contacts within age-risk bins, which can then be used directly to partially correct for selection early in the outbreak.</p><p>If the epidemiology models are in fact flawed in this way, it is very hard to use the outcomes of the outbreak to evaluate the effectiveness of the policies we put in place. Fortunately, there is a much better guide for policy going forward; South Korea achieved better outcomes at lower cost with a combination of test and track, selective isolation, and universal mask wearing, with limited shutdowns focusing on the most likely sources of large scale transmission. Perhaps even South Korea would have seen a drop in cases without their interventions (though this seems unlikely), but in any case their policy comes at a much lower cost. The crucial difference seems to be that they based their policy on sound virology and science instead of conjectural epidemiological models with biased assumptions. We should invest resources in emulating these successful policies; while we cannot know which pillar of their approach was most effective, it makes sense to copy the entire package. Since the infrastructure was not in place to implement these policies up front, certain emergency measures may have been necessary; in particular, a lockdown of New York seems likely to have been correct, but at this point we have no evidence that the economically damaging lockdown elsewhere was worth the costs. Going forward, a careful understanding what activities lead to transmission, based on detailed case studies of real virus spread, will likely guide policy better than complex but potentially deeply flawed big picture mathematical epidemiology models. There seems to be ample direct evidence of extensive spread associated with large social events, relatively small social events in confined spaces, and public transportation. Taking the approach of indiscriminately shutting down all contact because the models do not account for these differences seems to create a huge cost at potentially a very small benefit.</p><p>We must get the evaluation of these models and the policies implied correct for many reasons. (1) The virus may return when shutdowns are relaxed; establishing the most cost-effective approach to containing the outbreak is essential to getting buy-in from the community to take the most effective measures, particularly the community of relatively young people who are extremely unlikely to become severely ill but can potentially be spreaders. Telling everyone that the world will come to an end if they go golfing is simply asking to be ignored when you suggest the virologically more sensible policy of, say, banning spectators from Texas football games in the fall due to a risk of a resurgence of the virus. (2) The virus may not die off completely, and we may need to maintain some significant restrictions for some period of time, which will be both costly and potentially impossible if the measures are not targeted. Ultimately, we do live in a free society and buy in is necessary; destroying credibility by promoting biased models that quickly prove to overstate the short-term risk will justifiably lead people to trust the government less, and if sustained efforts can be effective in reducing the total number of infections than we need such trust. The authoritarian regime in China may have been able to suppress the virus below epidemic levels and perhaps even eradicate it from some areas, which suggests it can be done; we might be able to do it without such extreme measures if we are more judicious in the approaches we use to advise behavior. Authoritarian governments do have an advantage on some dimensions in combating respiratory viruses, but our society can operate with a greater level of trust, voluntary buy in, and innovation, particularly if the government makes efforts to restore credibility following the decision to make policy based on potentially flawed models. (3) Most importantly, this virus, as bad as it has been, does not really seem to be the big one. Just in the past 20 years there have been 3 deadly novel coronaviruses; SARS and MERS were relatively easily contained due to the high mortality rate limiting the spread. SARS-CoV-2 has spread aggressively, but the mortality rate is disturbingly but not extremely high. Perhaps there can never be a coronavirus to have a longer period of mild symptoms with very effective spread, with a much higher probability of eventual severe disease, but it seems unwise to rule out that possibility. Further, another pandemic flu that avoids our vaccines, or some new, horrifying pox could strike at any time. SARS-CoV-2, for all its problems, is not the big one we have been waiting for. Consequently, we must have credible, low costs policies ready to implement at the first sign of a potential spread; we can never again rely on a massive economic shutdown to stave off a virus. We will either end up destroying the economy with repeated false alarms or waiting too long to implement such policies.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=45e2270a8656" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics/unobserved-heterogeneity-in-covid19-models-45e2270a8656">Unobserved Heterogeneity in Covid19 Models</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics">Salem Center for Policy</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Disclosure of Breaches: The Legal and Business Ramifications of Explaining What You Did Wrong]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/policy-analytics/disclosure-of-breaches-the-legal-and-business-ramifications-of-explaining-what-you-did-wrong-dff6cab8ebc9?source=rss----1aff32b4d442---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dff6cab8ebc9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-breach]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-breach-notification]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blackberry]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[TJ Canann]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Mar 2020 17:03:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-11T17:03:39.547Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/1*UmcxykWLDIv34nz56Pgoyg.jpeg" /></figure><p>We were delighted to have Mark Anderson, the Senior Director of Business Operations at Blackberry, speak in the Cybersecurity Speaker Series. Mark talked about the legal and business ramifications of disclosing data breaches.</p><p>Mark Anderson has been working in the Tech Sector in Austin, Texas since 1987. He has worked at Thomas-Conrad/Compaq, Dell, General Motors, and BlackBerry. He triple majored in Mass Communications Engineering, Economics, and Government at Western Kentucky University before receiving his JD from the University of Kentucky. Following law school, Anderson worked as an attorney in Kentucky before moving to Austin to work in the emerging tech sector. He has written books on networking and network design, and holds two patents that he helped develop while working at Dell. He has extensive knowledge in management, security, software licensing and manufacturablility, and network administration.</p><p>According to IBM and Ponemon Institute’s “Cost of a Data Breach Report for 2019,” the average cost was 3.9 million dollars and the average breach affected 25,575 records. The average time to identify and contain a breach was 279 days, but the costs and consequences of the breach can last for years.</p><p>Breaches can be associated with a variety of incident types beyond just software vulnerabilities, including fraud, intentional leaking, malware, phishing campaigns, and failure of third-party suppliers. Recent years have seen a steady growth in malicious and criminal activities, however, these only account for 51% of data breaches — system glitches and human errors almost equally split the remainder. Some of these breaches require HR and training fixes as much as cybersecurity ones.</p><p>Regardless of the type of breach, businesses face a myriad of international, state, and local notification laws and regulations they must navigate. Anderson made a clear distinction between breaches affecting Personally Identifiable Information (PII), where disclosure is mandated by law, and non-PII breaches where businesses need to weigh disclosure against a variety of costs. He briefly highlighted the differences between the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), and the US’s sectoral approach which is governed by multiple agencies and state laws.</p><p>In determining how to respond to a data beach, the business must negotiate four key elements of that breach and the costs associated with them: detection (31.1% of cost), notification (5.4% of cost), post breach response (27.3% of cost), and lost business (36.2% of cost). Lost business is the major issue in deciding whether to disclose the breach to the public. Some companies make poor business decisions in responding to these breaches, as seen in recent ransomware attacks. In 2019, companies faced a 29.6% chance of experiencing any type of breach and Anderson recommended that companies remain cognizant of the risk and plan for breaches going forward.</p><p>Watch the full video from the event here:</p><p>COMING SOON!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dff6cab8ebc9" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics/disclosure-of-breaches-the-legal-and-business-ramifications-of-explaining-what-you-did-wrong-dff6cab8ebc9">Disclosure of Breaches: The Legal and Business Ramifications of Explaining What You Did Wrong</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics">Salem Center for Policy</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Career Opportunities in Cyber Intelligence]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/policy-analytics/career-opportunities-in-cyber-intelligence-2da2ce36898e?source=rss----1aff32b4d442---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2da2ce36898e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[election-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberdéfense]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[TJ Canann]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Feb 2020 13:33:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-11T17:08:00.759Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Cyber Intelligence and Election Security</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sVt3D1MejV9MCo59SUgETQ.png" /></figure><p>In this episode of Cybersecurity Speaker Series, we enjoyed having Monty St John, the Director of Cyber Intelligence at <a href="https://cyberdefenses.com/">CyberDefenses Inc.</a> Monty talked about the different career opportunities in cyber intelligence and ways that CyberDefenses secures local and national elections.</p><p>Cybercrime is more lucrative than all other types of crime combined, a fact driving more cybercriminal activity, and also driving a significant need for cybersecurity professionals. Cyber threat intelligence, an important element of cybersecurity, is a growing area of career opportunity. Monty St John, Director of Cyber Intelligence for CyberDefenses, is a pioneer in this developing field. Drawing from decades of Darknet intelligence experience spanning the corporate world, the military and law enforcement, Monty explains what cyber intelligence is, its role in cybersecurity and the skills needed to excel in this career path. He shares how this investigative discipline is a key part of critical cybersecurity initiatives, including securing elections, forensics evidence gathering, protecting corporate intellectual property and helping businesses defend employees and customers against financial and identity theft.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/199/1*MDK6KoTd3fdZLSubVgBPzA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Monty is a cybersecurity expert with more than two decades of experience in threat intelligence, digital forensics, malware analytics, quality services, software engineering, development, IT/informatics, project management and training. He is an ISO 17025 laboratory auditor and assessor, reviewing and auditing 40+ laboratories. Monty is also a game designer and publisher who has authored more than 24 products and 35 editorial works. He has served in both the U.S. Army and the Navy. He is the Director of Threat Intelligence for CyberDefenses, an award-winning Managed Security Services Provider working with the Federal government, state and local government and businesses since 2001.</p><p>CyberDefenses is an award-winning Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP) headquartered in Round Rock, Texas. The company offers a full suite of consulting, cyber intelligence and threat monitoring subscription services from its state-of-the-art Security Operations Center. Founded in 2001 by military cybersecurity experts to secure Federal defense entities in the wake of the 911 terrorist attacks, the company continues to serve the military as well as businesses, state and local governments and elections.</p><p>Watch the full video from the event here:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FWJWNwzLUl0g%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DWJWNwzLUl0g&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FWJWNwzLUl0g%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/2509b4279319345f285ddd028bdd240e/href">https://medium.com/media/2509b4279319345f285ddd028bdd240e/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2da2ce36898e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics/career-opportunities-in-cyber-intelligence-2da2ce36898e">Career Opportunities in Cyber Intelligence</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics">Salem Center for Policy</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Socialism Sucks]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/policy-analytics/socialism-sucks-d5387cbb6bc4?source=rss----1aff32b4d442---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d5387cbb6bc4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[capitalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[socialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[drinking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[TJ Canann]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Feb 2020 17:48:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-24T01:45:57.071Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/328/1*lqaJWr2H-KOyGMRnUvHI6Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>To start this new semester of Policy@McCombs, SMU economist Robert Lawson will discuss his most recent book “Socialism Sucks.”</p><p>Socialism has a disastrous track record. Yet a growing number of Americans, especially younger ones, find it appealing. “How can so many Americans view socialism so favorably, when in practice it has led to misery and mass murder?” (p. 9)</p><p>From the Amazon book’s page:</p><p>“Irreverent but honest economists Robert Lawson and Benjamin Powell have all the data — and even more important, the firsthand global experience — to affirm that socialism fails to deliver on any of the utopian promises it makes and instead is very bad for your economic (and other) health. This is a book that every American who values freedom and sound economics (and good beer) needs to read.”</p><p>Watch the full video from the event here:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F6ZNdd6bnkWs%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D6ZNdd6bnkWs&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F6ZNdd6bnkWs%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/5e63f51405ff2119f805c352abe343da/href">https://medium.com/media/5e63f51405ff2119f805c352abe343da/href</a></iframe><p>You can also listen to the Policy@McCombs podcast interview with Robert Lawson here:</p><p><a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/robert-lawson-on-socialism-sucks-two-economists-drink/id1457058463?i=1000464964505">‎Policy@McCombs: Robert Lawson on &quot;Socialism Sucks: Two Economists Drink Their Way Through the Unfree World&quot; on Apple Podcasts</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d5387cbb6bc4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics/socialism-sucks-d5387cbb6bc4">Socialism Sucks</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/policy-analytics">Salem Center for Policy</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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