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        <title><![CDATA[Push The Pace - Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Factors That Influence NBA Home Court Advantage]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/push-the-pace/the-factors-that-influence-nba-home-court-advantage-2a5a602f8c1f?source=rss----36ac178f831e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2a5a602f8c1f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[brooklyn-nets]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[denver-nuggets]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-analytics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dashiell Nusbaum]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Dec 2019 22:56:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-12-19T22:56:33.787Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/0*QcsNE8RFlfGL4ZX2" /></figure><p>Many see sports as the ultimate “equal playing field” — where the same rules, regulations, and opportunities exist for all, where the best team will emerge victorious. This isn’t always the case.</p><p>We find the existence of a “home court advantage” across sports, where teams are more likely to win at home than away. This is especially true of the NBA, which has the largest home advantage of the four major American sports. The existence and magnitude of a home court advantage has been extensively studied; however, we lack an understanding of the factors that cause certain teams to have larger home court advantage than others.</p><p>I found the average regular-season home court advantage for all 30 NBA teams from 2008/2009 through 2018/2019. Home court advantage is a team’s winning percentage at home minus their winning percentage on the road. For example, from the 08/09 through 18/19 season, the Denver Nuggets won 75.62% of their home games and 46.52% of their away games.</p><p>Therefore, Denver’s home court advantage = 75.62% - 46.52% = 29.10%.</p><p>My data begins in the 2008/09 season, as this was the first season following the NBA’s last major relocation, when the Seattle Supersonics relocated halfway across the country to become the Oklahoma City Thunder. Since then, only one other team, the New Jersey Nets, have changed states. The Nets migrated a mere half-marathon away to Brooklyn, with no significant change in home court advantage after the move.</p><h3>Home Court Advantage By Team (08/09 - 18/19)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/393/1*f0QZGtWMiueGRG2o2XFTAQ.png" /></figure><h3>Home Court Advantage By Team (2013 Locations)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0-geXVMg2PxjLXGaFplBsw.png" /></figure><h3>Potential Factors</h3><p>I believed the following factors might have an impact on home advantage:</p><ul><li>Overall Winning Percentage</li><li>Home Attendance Percentage (percent of seats filled at home arena)</li><li>Fan Loyalty/Quality (explained below)</li><li>Distance From Other NBA teams (using 2013 arena locations)</li><li>Altitude of Arena</li><li>Population of Metropolitan Area</li><li>Home Referee Bias (16/17 and 17/18 NBA 2-minute report)</li></ul><p>The above stats are all fairly self-explanatory except for fan loyalty. I calculated the loyalty rating by plotting attendance percentage vs. winning percentage, and calculating how much higher or lower a team’s attendance was than would be expected given the team’s winning percentage.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HykbQA9JD0oPPNQyxipoKQ.png" /></figure><p>Teams that performed poorly but had large home attendance numbers received a better fan loyalty/fan quality rating than teams that had attendance numbers much lower than expected for their team success.</p><h3>Associated Factors</h3><p>Winning percentage, altitude, fan loyalty/quality, and metropolitan population were significantly correlated with a home advantage in my model.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rnn8gCI_exusNApCeBtWNg.png" /></figure><p>Interestingly, fan loyalty and metropolitan population were negatively associated with a home advantage. I initially believed that a higher population would harm away teams, who might stay up late partying in exciting cities far from their homes. In addition, I assumed “better” fans would motivate teams to play better at home.</p><p>These unexpected results may be related to the ongoing discussion in the NBA about rest. Perhaps more passionate fans and a more exciting environment create a chaotic climate for players, which in turn harms their performance.</p><h3>Model</h3><p>I then created a model which predicts home court advantage based on these four factors. The model explains 57.37% of teams’ home court advantage.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/596/0*PoAq7-cfK0_by4Gk" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/850/1*Qbwrb7bbMgmDDiI6O_vBcw.png" /></figure><h3>What Now?</h3><p>As previously noted, factors associated with rest and relaxation seem to be important. This lines up with the current popular discourse about the roles sleep and rest play in athletic performance. With this in mind, it is not exactly shocking that Denver, Indiana, Portland, Utah, San Antonio, Charlotte, and Memphis top the list of teams with the best home court advantage. Future research could explore the arenas themselves (noise, lights, etc.) or the alleviation of altitude advantage to help mitigate certain road disadvantages.</p><p>Home court advantage is not necessarily a bad thing — arenas are mainly populated with home fans, who want to see their team win. Home advantage means more people get to see the result they want. This only becomes a problem when different home teams have different advantages, or in the playoffs, when certain teams get to play more games at home.</p><p>Denver’s advantage is more than twice that of Brooklyn, due to factors unrelated to on-court performance. To achieve a truly equal playing field, especially come playoff time, the league may want to look into changing that.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2a5a602f8c1f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/the-factors-that-influence-nba-home-court-advantage-2a5a602f8c1f">The Factors That Influence NBA Home Court Advantage</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace">Push The Pace</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Using Data To Predict The 2019–2020 NBA Most Improved Player]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/push-the-pace/using-data-to-predict-the-2019-2020-nba-most-improved-player-3a38f26a6cbb?source=rss----36ac178f831e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3a38f26a6cbb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[detroit-pistons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[boston-celtics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dashiell Nusbaum]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Oct 2019 20:25:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-10-21T20:25:51.129Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/780/1*l6JuKHMdiJdXq2xRLtmBvA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Generally, I’ve found people don’t put too much thought into predicting the winner of the Most Improved Player award. It’s one of the least-discussed awards in preseason predictions, and gets left off of many lists entirely. When predictions are made, they’re often based more on gut feeling than anything else. And I don’t blame them. The award is not as obvious or easy to pick as MVP, not as flashy as All-NBA, not as important as DPOY.</p><p>In addition, MIP seems to be a narrative-based award, with an improvement in points being more important than anything else. You wouldn’t know that unless you looked at the numbers. So I did.</p><p>I wrote a similar article back in 2017, with only cursory look at the data and limited knowledge of statistics. This year, brings a closer look at the data and a slightly stronger knowledge of statistics.</p><p>My model takes into account both a player’s prior season stats and “jumps” in stat categories from 2 seasons prior to winning MIP to the season prior to winning the award. Most players to win Most Improved do so after making small improvements year-to-year before that breakout season. Typically, a huge jump in production doesn’t come out of nowhere. I calculated MIP score using the distribution of values for various stat categories for MIP winners since 2000. If players fell more squarely in the middle of the distribution, they scored well. In addition, I saw which of these stat categories most strongly predicted MIP success and weighted these stats accordingly.</p><p>TL;DR For this year’s candidates, I used what their stats looked like compared to the stats of past winners, then weighted by importance.</p><p>90% of athletes to win Most Improved Player in the past decade scored above 54 on my model, 70% above 57. For reference, out of all players I considered eligible for this year, only about 15% scored above 54 and 10% above 57.</p><h4>Eligibility:</h4><p>Players must have scored between 4.8 and 19.6 ppg in 2019, and be entering year 3–6 of their career. 95% of non-sophomore MIP in the last 20 years meet this criteria. Sophomores were not graded using my model for two reasons: 1) there were only two sophomore MIP winners in the past 20 years and 2) these players could not experience jumps from two years prior to the year prior (as they had not been in the NBA two years prior). Once I got my results, I cut them down to the 7 highest-scoring player that were likely to start on their team.</p><p>Below is how all players to win Most Improved since 2000 scored on my model. You can see how, since 2009, the model has predicted the award with greater certainty.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*s1u9IcdyVsRGRJEL3V6m1w.png" /></figure><p>MIP is very much a narrative based award. That’s why already-great players never win the award, even if they improve more than those who do (e.g. Steph Curry going from MVP to Unanimous MVP). Counting stats definitely matter the most for winning MIP, especially points per game. Here’s how much weight each stat warranted.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/312/1*PxMTupnlKcnAOS5zLhUikA.png" /></figure><h3>Honorable Mentions:</h3><p>These players all scored highly in the model, but there’s varying degrees of certainty as to whether each will earn a starting role this upcoming season.</p><h4>Kyle Kuzma</h4><p>Score: 54.11</p><p>Kuzma’s job description reads just one word: Scorer. This year, he’ll be surrounded by two of the league’s best</p><h4>Kris Dunn</h4><p>Score: 57.39</p><p>Dunn’s PPG decreased last year</p><h4>Bryn Forbes</h4><p>Score: 57.46</p><p>Forbes lacks the physical tools held by many recent award winners</p><h4>Terrance Ferguson</h4><p>Score: 57.99</p><p>Ferguson’s prior-year USG% (10.4) is significantly lower than any player to win it in the last 20 years.</p><h3>7: Shai Gilgeous-Alexander</h3><p>Score: N/A</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/945/1*KD6QPJUyTA3Akn4VBFOJLQ.png" /></figure><p>Sophomores are often seen as some of the players most likely to break out after getting a year of experience on an NBA roster. The same is true of players who change teams, the perception being that a fresh system and new group of teammates could better suit their talents. The reality is that while these perceptions can become reality, it often doesn’t lead to a Most Improved Player award. For sophomores, I would hypothesize it’s because as second-year players they are <em>expected</em> to make improvements, and so even somewhat large strides go under the radar. I think that to a lesser extent the same is true for players that change teams, or maybe there just aren’t as many team-changes happening for younger players. Either way, only 2 of the last 20 MIP award winners have been second-year players, only and only 3/20 were on new teams.</p><p>However, it still happens.</p><p>But I couldn’t use my model to evaluate these athletes (as the model takes into account prior-year jumps in stats, which can’t happen for sophomores). Instead, I looked at the 17 second-year players who have come in the top 3 in MIP voting in the past 20 years, and found those who most matched their profiles. Out came Shai Gilgeous-Alexander.</p><p>Honorable Mention: Wendell Carter Jr.</p><h3>6: Caris LeVert</h3><p>Score: 56.54</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*j5dAwbdx86vaVzan67tJdw.jpeg" /></figure><p>LeVert can ball. <a href="https://ats.io/nba/nba-most-improved-player-odds/13578/">ATS.com puts him tied for 10th in MIP odds</a>. Many people see him as a potential burgeoning star already. That’s all I have to say on the matter.</p><h3>5: Clint Capela</h3><p>Score: 60.18</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wba8P3XEfd6H-5iazfSK_A.jpeg" /></figure><p>This might seem far-fetched, but Gobert came close to winning the award multiple times, and there’s always the potential that Capela made strides on aspects of his game we haven’t heard about. Maybe he simply makes a leap in things he’s already great at. Maybe he starts shooting threes (probably not).</p><h3>4: Joe Harris</h3><p>Score: 62.97</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mhsMGY85hr816pIHJicP5Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>Harris is the 2nd Nets player in my top 6. In fact, there were three Nets players that made the MIP cutoff: LeVert (56.54), Allen (59.04), Harris (62.97). Allen (against many Nets fans wishes) probably won’t start this season after their acquisition of DeAndre Jordan.</p><p>Even in addition to the Nets’ two superstars, they appear to have quite the young core. It will be interesting to see which players continue to come into their own as Durant sits out the year.</p><p>Despite scoring highest in my model, Harris only ended up 4th in my personal rankings. He’s not exactly the type of player you’d expect to win the award, but perhaps neither was Pascal Siakam or Ryan Anderson. The numbers are enough to earn him a spot on the list.</p><h3>3: Myles Turner</h3><p>Score: 61.35</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PGaomjrP2fNcb2ZlBWXjpg.jpeg" /></figure><p>When <a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/how-to-predict-the-winner-of-the-nbas-most-improved-player-award-a-season-in-advance-and-f1b53936cf93">I did these rankings two years ago, Turner was my pick to win the award</a>. While he didn’t end up succeeding,(and neither did anyone else on my list — the award went to model outlier Victor Oladipo) he has since made strides as a player, improving his three-ball and leading the league in blocks last season.</p><h3>2: Jaylen Brown</h3><p>Score: 58.25</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jvENn-6Rtyl-WqNZzYlaOQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Of Boston’s young wings, it’s Tatum, not Brown, that is the popular choice to take home the Most Improved Player award this year. In fact, Tatum is the top choice out of the entire field — he was <a href="https://ats.io/nba/nba-most-improved-player-odds/13578/">given the best odds of winning the award in 2020 by ATS.com.</a> It’s possible, however, that Tatum may have actually scored too much (15.7 PPG) to win the award last year. With Kyrie and Horford gone and Kemba as the only true star on the team, Brown may be primed to take the leap.</p><p>Maybe he’ll deserve the $115 million he just got. Siakam just got $130 million after winning the award.</p><h3>1: Luke Kennard</h3><p>Score: 59.09</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*df7N_T3mhODPZeHmokCzpw.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/duncansmith/2019/08/28/where-does-luke-kennard-fit-in-the-detroit-pistons-rotation/#8f4c30a7d028">There’s no guarantee that Kennard starts this season,</a> but it felt wrong to put him in honorable mentions. He had the fourth-highest score of any player on the list, and is in my eyes best equipped to win the award from a skill and narrative standpoint. He certainly has the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uCezVC59UuU&amp;">talent necessary to win the award</a>, but goes under-the-radar. That’s a good thing. A large improvement this year would give him the narrative boost necessary to take home the hardware.</p><p>Though it’s not something I considered when creating these rankings, it’s probably worth noting that since 2012, every player to win the award has made the playoffs. Can Detroit crack the postseason? <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2020-nba-predictions/">538 gives them a 45% chance of doing so</a>. If you believe making the playoffs is important to winning the award, perhaps Brown would be a better bet.</p><h3>Gaps in the article:</h3><p>I did not calculate scores in comparison to players that did not<strong> </strong>win MIP from 2000–2019, I only used players that did win the award as my data set. In other words, I made a coverage error — I only did sampling on the dependent variable. In addition, I assumed the distribution for each stat was normal and came from a normal population, I did not know how to do any differently at the time. Next year, I’ll take these factors into account and probably change the statistics I base this on. This model is significantly more accurate than my last (which wasn’t even really a model), and next year’s model should be an improvement on this year’s as I incorporate these and other changes.</p><p>For now, however, here’s who I got.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*GAhoCf-gO5Un_D7vmc9K8w.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3a38f26a6cbb" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/using-data-to-predict-the-2019-2020-nba-most-improved-player-3a38f26a6cbb">Using Data To Predict The 2019–2020 NBA Most Improved Player</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace">Push The Pace</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Playtype Frequency and Success By Team: Visuals]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/push-the-pace/playtype-frequency-and-success-by-team-visuals-855e404ddada?source=rss----36ac178f831e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/855e404ddada</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[golden-state-warriors]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dashiell Nusbaum]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Jul 2019 01:16:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-15T17:56:51.465Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SXLw7Z-2rYFyoS5mZobSZQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>L→R, Top→Bottom: ISO, Transition, P&amp;R Ball Handler, Hand Off, Cutting, Spot Up, P&amp;R Roll Man, Post Up, Off Screen</figcaption></figure><p>It can be hard to accurately judge coaches (except Jason Kidd) when so much of a team’s on-court results come down to the talent of the guys that hustle up and down the hardwood for forty-eight minutes. One way we evaluate coaches is through the plays they run. But teams go through thousands of possessions over the course of an 82 game season, making it difficult to see in real time the way that minor differences in playtype frequency and efficacy add up to major differences in wins.</p><p>So I set out to visualize it, to simplify every NBA offense to nine bubbles. These bubbles would show how much and how well each team ran the nine different play types (I know there are more than nine, but they can essentially be boiled down to these nine, and that’s how Synergy keeps track). The bubbles are also color coded to show how teams performed versus league average. Finally, I included some comments and analysis below each.</p><p>Obviously, this won’t be an exact science for team and coach evaluation. For example, while cutting is far and away the most effective play in the league, teams can only cut so many times before defensive adjustments are made, and players may cut but not receive credit for that play type if they don’t receive the ball.</p><p>Still, these charts tell us a lot. So let’s go.</p><h4>How to read these charts</h4><p>Higher Up: Scored lots of points per possession from this play</p><p>Lower Down: Scored few points per possession from this play</p><p>Larger: Used this play frequently</p><p>Smaller: Used this play rarely</p><p>More Red: Scored more points per possession from this play than the league average points per possession scoring from this play</p><p>More Blue: Scored less points per possession from this play than the league average points per possession scoring from this play</p><p>Note: You can come back soon for an article that displays up-to-date versions of these charts for the 2019 season.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hEfxVSjhZABtTiypCYd6IA.png" /></figure><p>ATL: Atlanta used Trae Young a lot, giving him a long leash to figure things out (and he did!). Look for play type frequencies to remain similar in 2019–2020, but with improved numbers in isolation and P&amp;R BH.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yzI6tH7YPyCaufr2crarhw.png" /></figure><p>BOS: Boston was above league average at plays they used more frequently. Good for them! Notably, they performed poorly in isolation (a category Kemba’s Hornets did well in). Here’s to another odd year for Brad Steven’s Celtics.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZWpmYOqm7f6un-NaZgFWdg.png" /></figure><p>BKN: Other than post ups, the Nets were a very balanced team by play type. This upcoming Kyrie year followed by the Kyrie + Durant year will be an interesting duo to follow. Role players like Joe Harris can pop up here — those hand off and off screen numbers look real good, while cutting should improve with the addition of the two megastars.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rKHeoohrmDDwFPsleFNLKA.png" /></figure><p>CHA: Arguably the league’s most boring team has the numbers to prove it. After losing Kemba, their only real strong points (ISO and P&amp;R BH) have vanished. Other play types should increase their frequency, but dip heavily in PPP. I hate to say it but… they could stand to post up a bit more. Alongside Houston, Charlotte had the most predictable offense in league (their playtypes were either very often or very sparingly used).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qgJ48kNiVggLfx1Ylfwcgg.png" /></figure><p>CHI: They’re more successful at P&amp;R with a roll man, they could stand to use a roll man more than they have been. Chicago was the only team that wasa negative in every single playtype. It’s possible they have similar frequencies to last year. If that’s the case, it will be interesting to see Coby White’s affect on points per possession as a P&amp;R ball handler.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DCbpuQv4Sl2WCPXCDyA4tw.png" /></figure><p>CLE: This team has a lot of problems, and it would be unfair to place too much of the blame on the coaching. However, I’ll not that isolations and post ups could probably be phased out of a Cleveland offense that lacks highly skilled one on one players.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6DLCQ_3C9WLNcGXyEXw1cw.png" /></figure><p>DEN: The Nuggets were a <em>team </em>last season— they hardly ever isolated, they cut, they passed, they did everything the “right way.” If Michael Porter Jr. plays next season (or ever), I wonder how he fits into this dynamic. I would expect hand offs to be a stronger category for Denver next year as they age and improve.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OB_WIU6YwQ5LQeGoykgbhQ.png" /></figure><p>DAL: How does a healthy Porzingis change things? They’re already a pretty good half court team — do they improve THAT much in transition with him? It seems like his impact will be larger in other areas like post ups. They were already a good rolling team. Rick Carlisle will figure things out.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Rl-FP9kUCAOBafrzNF-m5w.png" /></figure><p>DET: The Pistons’ bigs were great at initiating hand off plays, but the two big men hampered cutting potential as a result. Also, shouldn’t they have been better at posting up? I don’t know what the plan is here.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9u17VrCq608oIQ9jGuTs5A.png" /></figure><p>GSW: The Warriors were only below league average at P&amp;R RM (but to their credit hardly used the play). Props to Golden State for not only having talent, but utilizing it effectively — they used their best plays most frequently, and their worst least frequently. Despite getting league-average results, they cut more than any other team in the league (a smart move, as cutting is the most efficient play type, and a predictable move, seeing as they had talent on the perimeter to open up the middle of the court and high IQ players to make the right reads). Surprisingly, the Warriors were last in P&amp;R Ball Handler frequency. That should increase this season.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rL171PXk7Wxq8OftJ1Sv9Q.png" /></figure><p>HOU: The Rockets, surprisingly enough, were the most efficient post up team in the league (though almost never posted up). Alongside Charlotte, they were the most predictable offense in league (most play types were either very often or very sparingly used). Westbrook finished the most possessions in transition last year, but at one of the worst marks in the league. It’ll be interesting to see if he affects their transition game (oh, and how he affects every single other aspect of the Rockets. I’ll leave that discussion to others though, who analyze the move with a depth it deserves).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8JKVOM6GY5kniJvKXA2ddQ.png" /></figure><p>IND: Nate McMillan’s Pacers played extremely effeciently, running the highest-scoring plays most frequently. The Pacers used a roll man and shot off screens more than any other team in the league. For plays off screens, the frequency gap between Indiana and 2nd place Orlando was larger than the gap between Orlando and last place. They also didn’t run many isolations or use the ball handler in the pick and roll much. And yet, despite all that, Indiana had the most balanced playtype usage of any team in the league.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZnemnWIdwlzN5CZEEi4MHA.png" /></figure><p>LAC: Kawhi and Paul George fit in beautifully here, and cutting should increase as a result of their talent. So should LA’s transition, with George and Leonard producing more turnovers (and, thus, transition opportunities). The Clippers had more Pick n Roll Ball Handler possessions than any team in the league. It’ll be interesting to see how much they run it next year, and with which players.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AR9hoeLBBvuu0L2a4QoXsw.png" /></figure><p>LAL: Like their Staples Center sibling, a lot changed for the Lakers this offseason. They changed head coaches, got a new superstar, supporting cast, etc. I’ll leave it to the think pieces to parse out all the changes, instead of trying to sum it up in a sentence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PSBhY0S58iTmECUUAcLmIA.png" /></figure><p>Mem: Memphis’ defense, as always, will be it’s strong suit as JJJ and Brandon Clarke leading the charge. Ja Morant gives Memphis a smart ball handler in the pick and roll, but like Mike Conley before him he will struggle on a Grizzles team that begs for spacing. Post ups will be down without Marc Gasol (doesn’t it seem like so long since he’s been on the team?).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ijwZjHoLfLnIeZkJw4EKiw.png" /></figure><p>MIA: I expect the Heat’s playtype frequencies to look similar to last year, but with Butler leading the charge at the 2/3 (instead of Richardson and Wade), they should convert on their efforts more frequently. The Heat had the most hand off possessions in the NBA last season, which is something that is both weirdly obvious and so unremarkable that it wouldn’t ever cross your mind.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*58HjPCP7Ukb_jOTTL7izUg.png" /></figure><p>MIL: The Bucks were the only team to be above league average in every single offensive playtype. To fault them for optimization would be silly here. But, seeing as that’s what we are, they could probably use the roll man a bit more(especially when that roll man is the reigning MVP). They really only utilize four playtypes (of those that are listed) — Transition, ISO, Pick and Roll Ball Handler and Spot Up (creds to Splash Mountain).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G0frX5QLbAMdTe0-rFXFDQ.png" /></figure><p>MIN: They are so clearly good at three playtypes and so clearly horrible at everything else. Karl Anthony towns needs help in the form of axing Andrew Wiggins. Wiggins accounts for the majority of those blue iso possessions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mg0GQ3ZYkfZJz1IyeoFogQ.png" /></figure><p>NOP: Their guards were not meant to handle the ball, and won’t next season either. Zion should help with transition and in isolation. JJ Redick gives them the potential to incorporate more hand offs into their game, as one of the best in the league in that category last season.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PTB3VF6vWoKNE4f4ZiDNdA.png" /></figure><p>NYK: lolknicks. (Also, they got rid of Hezonja, the one player who extremely effective in that category.) (Also, they barely cut at all, despite it being the most efficient play at all.) (Of course, that’s because they didn’t have the talent to open up the floor.) (lolknicks.)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ll5Nehycs6qXQa6hdNrUhQ.png" /></figure><p>OKC: None of this will remain the same. At least they should share the ball a bit more.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_n-gDa4-9PAxES133tfNPA.png" /></figure><p>ORL: For all the praise Vucevic got, this was a team meant to run. They were worse than league average at post ups. They used their best play types less frequently. Finally, while DJ is a great backup point who started serviceably, but a breakout season from Fultz would propel this team (and their high volume of P&amp;R BH possessions) to the next level.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*L0Yrl7EmjrUYCMtdRAUuHQ.png" /></figure><p>PHI: What a weird offseason. They probably won’t improve in transition, and their shooting got worse (hurting hand offs and plays off screens). Maybe they can still get Korver. They have a lot of great roll men, but can’t do anything about it because they have a lot of great roll men (a sentence that is somehow correct).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gXlXib5V0J2rrgPlTSOuvA.png" /></figure><p>PHX: Phoenix used ineffective plays frequently and successful plays quite infrequently. The data points to a need to do something many Suns fan clamored for throughout the season — feed DeAndre Ayton. Please. (Also, they need a better point guard. Ricky Rubio probably isn’t the answer.)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SNT2C12RWJcmEaJgxVfebA.png" /></figure><p>POR: Dame and CJ’s influence is clear in these charts. This is a team built to thrive in the halfcourt, which bodes well for playoff basketball.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ObTNZY5wm3xlDBZSXTvegA.png" /></figure><p>SAC: For the first time in years, shoutout to the Kings. This team bodied opponents in transition. Will a new coach and Bagley at the five lead to even more thrashing in transition?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*li0PMKueTGBcil4JSPT1lg.png" /></figure><p>SAS: Pop runs this team well, and did his best with the players he had last season. San Antonio ran plays that suited their talents (for example, they led the league in post up possessions and were third best at converting them). Next season’s Spurs will probably remain pretty quiet in transition, but perhaps an improved defense (a reasonable assumption with the return of Murray and the coaching of Popovich) will add a few more transition possessions. Good for them.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WbvN5drP7Bp0ZJDFUBrqow.png" /></figure><p>TOR: Transition was a key part of Toronto’s game in the regular season, a play type that decreases in frequency come playoff time. It was a good thing, then, that they unlocked playoff Kawhi. Without Leonard, Siakam should take over the reins to the team this season, and I don’t see them losing more than a few steps because of it (despite my continued assertion that Siakam plays every game like the YouTube highlights of a bad player having a good game. Not a criticism, just an observation. I love to watch him play).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7CwqNWxFyYdO7qWZbytd7A.png" /></figure><p>UTA: Not a shocker that this team ran isolations less than any other team in the league. It became more than the sum of its parts last year, so expect this well-built offense to become a humming machine next year after the additions of Mike Conley Jr. and Bojan Bogdanovic.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GIN3drZzL7ecrFrH-4RoQg.png" /></figure><p>WAS: The chart makes it look as it might had John Wall played, with slightly fewer possessions from the P&amp;R BH. Transition remained strong without Wall.</p><h3>Playtype Efficiency Rankings</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/191/1*R6C9qYOwsTzUuiHS_UnQZQ.png" /></figure><p>Where these numbers come from: Teams that used more efficient plays more frequently and less efficient plays less frequently get better scores. Even if a team performed poorly overall on offense, it can perform well in these rankings (e.g. Atlanta), as these rankings measure the slope of frequency and points per possession. Golden State, for example, got the “1.27” from here.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/755/1*J83qaVbBqjErwVOcwbbfMw.png" /></figure><h3>Talent Maximization Rankings</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/254/1*CjI2X2YBnGGu_TbTEnE-Kw.png" /></figure><p>These numbers are harder to see on the graphs. If a team is better than league average at a given play type and use it more frequently than league average, they receive a better score (They maximize their talent through the plays they run). Here’s where Brooklyn’s 2.39 comes from</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/754/1*rp-n8IB2odufpZ53h1LwUw.png" /></figure><h3>Offensive Coaching Score Rankings</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/337/1*YYb-LOG_aMxkiBZS5m5djw.png" /></figure><p>This takes the average of a team’s percentiles in the first two tables and converts it into one number. Obviously, this is not a perfect catch-all metric— the Knicks offense was not better coached than the Bucks — but is perhaps one way to measure how well a team’s offense is coached for the talent it has.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c-mipJSAhh1iVesjphCelA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Indiana, interestingly enough, was 2nd best in playtype maximization and 4th worst in talent optimization (in other words, they maximized for overall efficiency, regardless of the fact their players weren’t best suited to do so).</p><h3>2018–2019 NBA Regular Season → Post Season: Tracking Playtype Frequency and PPP (of teams that made the playoffs)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qodfbYOZyh-GgpUekHI4yg.gif" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*nMQwpZlayf-tSZmwLICy2g.png" /></figure><p>In the playoffs, post ups and shots off screens decreased the most in usage, while spot up and isolation plays saw more actions. As expected, the effectiveness for all play types went down in the playoffs (where defensive effort ramps up). Post up plays took the biggest hit, whereas isolations and pick and roll ball handlers remained mostly unchanged. Teams can look to these charts to see what sorts of plays they need to focus on as to not falter come playoff time.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=855e404ddada" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/playtype-frequency-and-success-by-team-visuals-855e404ddada">Playtype Frequency and Success By Team: Visuals</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace">Push The Pace</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Just Some Notes on Defense and Movement]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/push-the-pace/just-some-notes-on-defense-and-movement-1b02e47eae17?source=rss----36ac178f831e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1b02e47eae17</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defense]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[statistics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dashiell Nusbaum]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 May 2019 15:08:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-28T15:28:26.489Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6-vG-rSpWWfq9HD8S0I9_w.png" /></figure><p>Teams with lots of movement and little defense tend to have faster, skinnier bigs (Mitchell Robinson, Anthony Davis, Dewayne Dedmon, WCS). For all the emphasis we place on these types of bigs, it seems intelligence on defense is signficantly more important (see Lopez, Gasol, Horford).</p><p>Also… holy hell Cleveland is lazy.</p><p>Miami, Denver, Orlando, and Memphis were clustered together. They all had good defenses with slower bigs, and didn’t have to move as much on defense. While Denver and Orlando ended up faltering in the playoffs, I found (using data from the last 4 years) no correlation between regular season movement and playoff defense. In other words, movement on defense in the regular season is not a predictor of successful defense in playoff basketball.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/605/1*d8NB5bZI9Pzrm4hcj_fHng.png" /><figcaption>No Correlation</figcaption></figure><h3>Midrange shots vs DRTG</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/603/1*J6SJBtRd_IaYtwnkT30Z3w.png" /></figure><p>The Kings’ defense would stand to benefit from causing more midrange shots. It’s unlikely Luke Walton will help — The Lakers’ defense was better (108.9 DRTG), but caused very few midrange shots.</p><p>Atlanta’s defense would stand to improve from forcing more midrange shots, and it also might help them have to move less (though there’s only a very slight correlation between these two stats, I believe it has more to do with the other confounding variables that affect movement on defense). The thing is, do they have the talent to do it? I would think that between Collins, Dedmon, Prince, etc that the physical attributes are there. Coaching and individual defensive work will be key.</p><h3>Top &amp; Bottom 5 Defenses: Frequency of 2pt attempts at different times on shot clock</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ChVP_iYTIbcurhPayuLmrA.png" /></figure><h3>Top &amp; Bottom 5 Defenses: Frequency of 3pt attempts at different times on shot clock</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Du_C84hIrmI8kxQwCorptA.png" /></figure><p>Bucks have a very similar shots allowed profile to bottom five defenses.</p><p>Top 5 defenses in general allow less shots early in the shot clock than bottom 5 defenses.</p><p>The first 7 seconds are the most important time to stop all shot attempts (it’s the largest difference between good and bad defenses). That’s when intensity has to be highest.</p><p>From 15–7 seconds left, good teams allow more 2s than 3s, bad teams allow more 3s than 2s. Bad defenses pack the paint too much in the middle of the shot clock.</p><p>The Bucks’ size helps them stop penetration, and they seem to pack the paint. This helps prevents drive and kick three pointers.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1b02e47eae17" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/just-some-notes-on-defense-and-movement-1b02e47eae17">Just Some Notes on Defense and Movement</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace">Push The Pace</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Pushing The Pace Of Change in Modern NBA Fandom — Challenging Masculine Hierarchies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/push-the-pace/pushing-the-pace-of-change-in-modern-nba-fandom-challenging-masculine-hierarchies-f32ef7808c6b?source=rss----36ac178f831e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f32ef7808c6b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fandom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gender-equality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sociology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dashiell Nusbaum]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2019 16:55:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-15T16:55:43.368Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Pushing The Pace of Change in Modern NBA Fandom — Challenging Masculine Hierarchies</h3><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?url=https%3A%2F%2Fstreamable.com%2F7oksn&amp;src=https%3A%2F%2Fstreamable.com%2Fo%2F7oksn&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;schema=streamable" width="1440" height="1080" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a592236d7764f634eacf415bcd81c40e/href">https://medium.com/media/a592236d7764f634eacf415bcd81c40e/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f32ef7808c6b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/pushing-the-pace-of-change-in-modern-nba-fandom-challenging-masculine-hierarchies-f32ef7808c6b">Pushing The Pace Of Change in Modern NBA Fandom — Challenging Masculine Hierarchies</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace">Push The Pace</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Our Biggest Loser: How NBA Fans Establish Identities by Rooting for Losing]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/push-the-pace/our-biggest-loser-how-nba-fans-establish-identities-by-rooting-for-losing-a4453e3e9a54?source=rss----36ac178f831e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a4453e3e9a54</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philadelphia-76ers]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sociology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dashiell Nusbaum]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 11 May 2019 23:58:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-11T23:58:50.716Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*lDlxTpaVyhk9AD7z.jpg" /></figure><p>Mike Breen’s voice rang out over televisions across America. “It’s over! It’s over! Cleveland is a city of champions once again! The Cavaliers are NBA champions!” (NBA). His excitement was not without merit: The NBA’s Cleveland Cavaliers had just come back from a 3–1 deficit to win the NBA finals (something that had never been before). Moreover, their win was over the Golden State Warriors, a team which that season had achieved the greatest record in NBA history, winning 73 games and losing only 9. It was the quintessential American sports story: a team of underdogs, defying all odds to become champions. While those finals are certainly what most will remember most from the 2015–2016 NBA season, something equally important was happening on the opposite end of the standings. The Philadelphia 76ers, the worst team in basketball, had just lost the second most games in NBA history, with 10 wins and 72 losses. Sixers fans couldn’t have been happier.</p><p>In what seems like an affront to the very meaning of sport, a trend has emerged in recent years in which basketball fans will cheer, loudly and proudly, for their teams to lose as many games as possible. They don’t do this without reason. In the NBA, there is an annual “draft” of players. These athletes are NBA hopefuls, consisting of some of the best young basketball talent the world has to offer. There is a “lottery” to decide which teams get to select players earlier in the draft. Here’s where the importance of losing comes in. The team with the worst record that season gets the best chance of receiving a good spot in the lottery. The team with the second worst record has the <em>second</em> best chance at a good draft position, and so on and so forth. It’s the league’s way of ensuring parity, giving poorly performing teams a chance to land a top player. Since the Philadelphia 76ers hiring of general manager Sam Hinkie in 2013, several teams have made efforts to “game” this system, deliberately losing as many games as possible in order to acquire future talent.</p><p>This process has led to an aversion towards mediocrity and a championing of reaching one of two true outcomes: championship contenders or losing rebuilders. This strategy, where teams intentionally lose games, is known as “tanking,” and it’s received harsh, persistent criticism throughout the years from both fans and those within the industry. But there are many who embrace tanking. Fans find humor and community in its masochism. They find purpose in its embrace of intellectual approaches to sport. Tanking gives fans a way to display their unwavering commitment to a team and shifts the landscape of sport by reversing one of its fundamental goals — to win.</p><p>In the past, Academia has produced extensive research studying the effects of winning on sports fans. However, new approaches are needed to account for modern changes to team management and sports fandom. I focus specifically on fans of tanking NBA teams, and how they craft their personal identities around following teams that defy conventional goals of the sport. These transformation in fans’ identities have implications across sports fandom, including to sports fandom’s toxic and hierarchical masculinity. Fans cheer for tanking teams because it reaffirms them as “good fans” — fans who are committed, intellectual, and modern. These characteristics have the potential affect of undermining the masculine hierarchy of sports fandom. However, these same traits can cause fans to reproduce toxic masculinity, and it’s important to guide these traits away from the processes sports fans have been participating in for generations and instead towards progressive gender goals.</p><p>Fans cheer for poorly performing teams because, surprisingly, it can make them look good. One might assume that being a fan of a good team would improve one’s self-esteem and self-worth — your team does well, that reflects well on you. For a while, scholars found this to be the case. In an article for the European Journal of Social Psychology, Mark Dechesne et. al dug into the idea of BIRGing, or Basking In Reflected Glory. Fan scholars found BIRGing present in sports fans. According to scholars, fans’ “affiliation with successful sports teams allows favorable comparisons with others that result in a positive self-image” (Dechesne et. al 814). In other words, fans support good teams because it makes them look good. Fans of tanking teams, however, cannot participate in BIRGing the same way fans always have, because their team loses purposefully. One option for fans of losing teams would be to simply switch teams. Dechesne et. al suggest that many fans do as such, finding that fans of poorly performing teams even go so far as to shift the team they most identify with in order to preserve their self-image (814). They conclude that fans shift their allegiance to more successful teams to improve their self-worth. This finding, however, occurred more than a decade before tanking was popularized. In reality, fans of tanking teams haven’t been shifting to follow new teams. Instead, they come up with new ways to find glory with the teams they already follow. I argue that in the modern day, fans still shift sports allegiances, but that now the shift is more towards painting losing as a positive outcome, as opposed to following new teams.</p><p>Fans now choose to support poorly performing teams because it gives them the opportunity to display their loyalty, enhancing their self-image. Dechesne et. al mention that despite finding that most fans shift allegiances, highly committed fans are more likely to stick with their team through losses (832). Norris et. al find that these fans are maximizers. Maximizers are people who measure themselves against a standard of excellence, instead of against average expectations. In their study, they find that these fans identify more strongly with their favorite team when that team is historically less successful (Norris et. al 157). They discover that “maximizers did not ‘maximize’ by simply following more sports teams,” they instead followed their own team more fiercely (Norris et. al 161). Unlike the fans in Dechesne’s study, maximizers find it even more important to strongly identify with their team when it performs poorly. They didn’t change teams. Norris and his co-authors hypothesized that maximizing fans strengthen their allegiance because it’s more important to them that they be “the best fans” rather than “fans of the best team” (Norris et. al 164). To be a “good fan,” then, they must stick by their team through bad times. Tanking appeals to many fans because it gives them a chance to prove the strength of their allegiance. As tanking grows, more fans find themselves trying to perform as maximizers, demanding excellence from themselves in their fandom. Modern fans, then, begin to praise themselves more than their teams. This promotes loyalty, a generally positive character trait.</p><p>Loyalty, however, can have dividing affects between fans and those considered disloyal. Take this post by Orlando Magic fan @NBAtweets4you, which states “If you don’t remember this man, don’t watch a single playoff game” (@NBAtweets4you). The man pictured is Andrew Nicholson, an unknown and inconsequential Orlando Magic player over the course of their tank. The post has 610 likes, 93 retweets, and 101 replies (as of 4–17–19), gaudy numbers for an account with ~400 followers. Posts like this gain steam frequently in the community because it gives fans a chance to publicly display how they are not average, “fair weather” fans. They prove their worth by fiercely rejecting fans who only support teams when they do well. Fans of tanking teams feel the need to frame certain fans as less faithful to strengthen their own image. This shows how identity traits of tanking fans can in certain circumstances keep other fans out. Tanking fandom can then lend itself to exclusionary practices, as I explain later. These processes are about turning the praise of fandom to oneself (as opposed to their team) and comparing oneself to other fans, which has implications for fans’ other identity traits.</p><p>These high-commitment fans cheer for their team to lose because it gives them the opportunity to paint themselves as modern, intellectually superior fans. Tanking was a strategy born from contemporary, data-driven approaches to sports. Because fans of poorly performing teams are concerned with being the “best fans” and boosting themselves, they welcome the opportunity to associate themselves with scholarly approaches — supporting losing gives them the chance to prove their intellectual might. Maurice Peebles, a deputy editor at Complex and Philadelphia 76ers fan, writes about how the intellectual purpose of tanking drives his affection for the then-tanking Sixers. Peebles claims that fans who oppose the grand scheme of losing to win are either “people who don’t fully understand the plan,” old, stogy fans afraid of change, or those who won’t be satisfied no matter what the 76ers do (Peebles). While that sentiment might be up for debate, the perception by pro-tank fans is what’s most important. These fans create differences between themselves and others, positioning themselves as smart and accepting of change. However, as with their “loyal” identity, they do so in contrast to other types of fans, encouraging divide. Their intelligence and willingness to change, then, might not manifest in certain situations.</p><p>Bob Quan-Minh Ngo, a Ph.D. student of Sociology at University of California Santa Barbara, argues that sports fandom was previously dominated by more masculine fans (7). These new fans subscribe to a different type of masculinity, one “based on scientific rationalism rather than athletic excellence” (Ngo 11). I use Bob Quan-Minh Ngo’s study of sabermetrician fans to explain how this new wave of “intellectual” sports fans develop these masculine identities. Sabermetricians are fans of baseball who study the sport using advanced analytics. These fans are similar to fans of tanking NBA teams — both apply more economic, data-driven approaches to explain sports, both are stereotyped as unmasculine, and both pose challenges conventional fandom.</p><p>In championing themselves as intellectuals, fans in Ngo’s study and fans of tanking teams embrace new forms of masculinity. These scholarly fans hold themselves in high esteem. When entering the masculine arena of sports fandom, this egotism turns into a tool for reinforcing gender hierarchy. Many of these fans, when asked why there were so few female sabermetricians, expressed they felt that “advanced understanding of baseball is not something that women would or should be interested in” (Ngo 157). They explain the lack of gender diversity in a way that frames them as welcoming, but that the group they are welcoming to — women — simply aren’t interested. These sorts of comments bare a strong resemblance to those made in conventional sports fandom, which, according to postdoctoral researcher Abby Waysdorf, often pushes out female fans (Waysdorf). This disinterest discourse is a more subtle way of maintaining the gendered hierarchy of this fandom. As long as fans feel progressive, that’s enough for them. One explanation for these reactions is tanking fans’ desire to engage in practices that build up their individual character. The problem, as I’ve shown, is that these practices are not necessarily progressive, and often involve tearing down other groups, such as conventional fans or women. Fans of tanking, however, might not recognize their complicity.</p><p>It’s harder for “intellectual” fans to recognize themselves as oppressors because they also play a role in the subversion of masculinity. Patricia Hill Collins, former president of the American Sociological Association, argues<strong> </strong>“while many of us have little difficulty assessing our own victimization within some major system of oppression… we typically fail to see how our thoughts and actions uphold someone else’s subordination”<strong> (</strong>Collins 25<strong>)</strong>.<strong> </strong>Sabermetricians and tanking fans alike have spent much of their short history stereotyped as unmasculine (Ngo 148). This, as Collins would argue, makes it more difficult for them to recognize their role in reproducing masculinity. Even if fans don’t explicitly support these practices, their dismissal of and negligence towards these issues confers to them some complicity in the oppressive masculinity in sports fandom. The process of dominance and suppression over others, then, continues.</p><p>Because these fans receive large amounts of their esteem through their fandom, it’s unlikely they’ll respond well to direct criticism. Instead, to change the more toxically masculine aspects of their fandom, appeals should be made to their desire to be forward-thinking and modern. Take the San Antonio Spurs fandom, for example. While the Spurs aren’t a tanking team, their fanbase still in some ways resembles a pro-tank one — they’re acknowledged as highly loyal and progressive, subscribing to progressive unconventional approaches team-building. Their fans are self-praising, seeing their team’s forward-thinking attitude as an extension of their own. It’s because of these reasons that when the Spurs became the first team to hire a female assistant coach, their fans rejected prevailing discourses around her ability as a woman to coach (Gasol). Instead, they threw their support behind the move. “It’s almost unfair how awesome our organization is,” and “I’m pretty enthused with how NBA athletes are taking the opportunity to be socially progressive,” were the predominant responses from Spurs fans (/u/BranchDavidian; /u/marshalldungan). Instead of treating a woman’s entrance into their progressive domain as an assault, they welcomed it. Forward-thinking attitudes in gender issues were, to these fans, a natural progression of their identity. They basked in the reflected glory of feeling like a good person. By encouraging these discourses, we reward their esteem, a key driver of their fandom.</p><p>A strong factor in fans’ advocacy for Hammon was her support from players. Fans’ comments in the prior paragraph are from the comment section of an article by Pau Gasol, a Spurs player. Gasol uses the article to “knock down a few of the silly arguments and talking points against Coach Hammon’s candidacy” (Gasol). Fans were drawn to his arguments. This, in large part, has to do with their identities as tank-like fans. Fans of tanking or tank-like teams highly identify with their team’s processes. When the athletes and teams’ processes include promoting gender equality (among other issues), it increases the likelihood for highly identifying fans to agree. Encouraging these fan objects to denounce toxic masculinity then presents itself as a way of combatting inequality within fandom. Some might argue that fans don’t have to agree with the political practices of the teams they follow. I agree with this take, have shown that it has strong potential to at least shift the views of many fans. That’s better than keeping things the way they are.</p><p>While fans of tanking pride themselves on their intellect and commitment, they also increase their esteem by broadening the definition of what’s considered praise-worthy. In 2017, the 76ers made the turn to become one of the best teams in the league. When asked if all the years of losing were “worth it,” 76ers fan /u/trust-theprocess expressed a sentiment held by many:</p><p>Only outsiders and bandwagoners call it suffering, hardcore Sixers fans who actually followed the team during those years will tell you that it was way more interesting than the previous decade. The post-finals/pre-process [pre-tanking] era was real suffering. (/u/trust-theprocess)</p><p>By changing the definition of what constitutes success to include winning and losing, fans who support tanking have more opportunities to engage in self-esteem boosting. It’s easier, then, to be a fan who supports tanking that one who doesn’t. As long as their team has direction, they don’t feel suffering.</p><p>Because fans of tanking teams have many opportunities for affirmation, it would be illogical and impractical to attempt to destroy this type of fandom as a way of challenging sports fans’ masculinity. Instead, this brand of sports fandom needs to be given more chances for affirmation in the ways it can help dismantle toxic masculinity.</p><p>Fans of tanking teams gain affirmation through support of the new types of fan texts they create. These texts undermine the masculinity entrenched in sports fandom. Without as much on-court success to point to, fans of tanking teams find new ways to support their team. This can mean turning to less masculine fan performances. Just take the subreddit for fans of the Atlanta Hawks, one of the worst teams in the NBA. It is here you’ll find fan texts such as “Ranking Every Hawks Player in Terms of Shoulder Mass” (/u/Tharpedge). This type of post wouldn’t belong in traditional masculine sports fandom, which keeps its focus mainly on the on-court action and avoids mention of players’ bodies. But this fan text pokes fun at masculine norms. Posts like this give fans space to define what fandom means. The growth of tanking and the types of fan texts produced as a result push against the masculine boundaries of fandom. While I previously established that tanking fans are complicit in reproducing toxic masculinity, it’s clear that these fans hold less entrenched views and are highly capable of challenging masculinity in other ways. Encouraging these ways is one approach fans can take to endorse gender inclusivity.</p><p>“You begin to love the team even harder because of those who don’t understand or don’t approve of the team’s unapologetic strategies” (Peebles). Despite the positives that come with tanking fandom, fans of tanking NBA teams have also participated in fierce exclusion of outsiders, and have been unapologetic in doing so. This exclusion is borne out of many of the desirable character traits they hold, such as the aspirations towards intellectualism and fierce loyalty through challenging times. Sports fandom has had a sad history of being unwilling to allow outsiders. As definitions of fandom change, tanking fans have the opportunity to be better. Masculinity in general can take a lesson from the opportunities within the fandom. By appealing to masculine desires such as the desire for high status, we can affect change. That’s not to say criticism is unwarranted, or that telling people “you’re progressive” is good enough. But if we shift perspectives, and show them the things they need to do to warrant praise, we’ll be taking a step in the right direction.</p><h3>Works Cited</h3><p>/u/BranchDavidian. Comment on “An Open Letter About Female Coaches by Pau Gasol,” by /u/ u/midnyte007. <em>Reddit</em>, 11 May 2018, <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/NBASpurs/comments/8ios79/an_open_letter_about_female_coaches_by_pau_gasol/">https://www.reddit.com/r/NBASpurs/comments/8ios79/an_open_letter_about_female_coaches_by_pau_gasol/</a>.</p><p>Collins, Patricia Hill. “Toward a New Vision: Race, Class, and Gender as Categories of Analysis and Connection.” <em>Race, Sex, &amp; Class</em>, Vol. 1, №1, Fall 1993, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41680038">https://www.jstor.org/stable/41680038</a>.</p><p>Dechesne, Mark et. al. “Terror Management and the Vicissitudes of Sports Fan Affiliation: The Effects of Mortality Salience on Optimism and Fan Identification.” <em>European Journal of Social Psychology</em>, Vol. 30, Iss. 6, Nov. 2000, <a href="https://search-proquest-com.proxyau.wrlc.org/socabs/docview/60379539/7EA285C7AAFC47BCPQ/3?accountid=8285">https://search-proquest-com.proxyau.wrlc.org/socabs/docview/60379539/7EA285C7AAFC47BCPQ/3?accountid=8285</a>.</p><p>Gasol, Pau. “An Open Letter About Female Coaches.” <em>The Players’ Tribune</em>, 11 May 2018, <a href="https://www.theplayerstribune.com/en-us/articles/pau-gasol-becky-hammon">https://www.theplayerstribune.com/en-us/articles/pau-gasol-becky-hammon</a>.</p><p>/u/marshalldungan. Comment on “An Open Letter About Female Coaches by Pau Gasol,” by /u/ u/midnyte007. <em>Reddit</em>, 11 May 2018, <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/NBASpurs/comments/8ios79/an_open_letter_about_female_coaches_by_pau_gasol/">https://www.reddit.com/r/NBASpurs/comments/8ios79/an_open_letter_about_female_coaches_by_pau_gasol/</a>.</p><p>NBA. “Final 3:39 of Game 7 of the 2016 NBA Finals | Cavaliers vs Warriors.” <em>YouTube</em>, 24 Dec. 2016, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wgVOgGLtPtc">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wgVOgGLtPtc</a>.</p><p>@NBAtweets4you. “If you don’t remember this man, don’t watch a single playoff game <a href="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/D3ufa_CW0AYuAiK.jpg">https://pbs.twimg.com/media/D3ufa_CW0AYuAiK.jpg</a>.” <em>Twitter</em>, 9 Apr. 2019, 12:59 PM, <a href="https://twitter.com/NBAtweets4you/status/1115660621910028288">https://twitter.com/NBAtweets4you/status/1115660621910028288</a>.</p><p>Ngo, Bob Quan-Minh. “Stats Geeks: Sabermetrics, Baseball Fans, and the Struggle over Masculinity.” <em>University of California, Santa Barbara, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing</em>, 2012, <a href="https://search.proquest.com/socabs/docview/1013836892/fulltextPDF/D2E626474CAF462FPQ/1?accountid=8285">https://search.proquest.com/socabs/docview/1013836892/fulltextPDF/D2E626474CAF462FPQ/1?accountid=8285</a>.</p><p>Norris, J. Ian; Wann, Daniel L; Zapalac, Ryan K. “Sport fan maximizing: following the best team or being the best fan?” <em>The Journal of Consumer Marketing</em>, Vol. 32, Iss. 3, 2015, <a href="https://search.proquest.com/socabs/docview/1678449535/A774F0CCEB2489DPQ/5?accountid=8285">https://search.proquest.com/socabs/docview/1678449535/A774F0CCEB2489DPQ/5?accountid=8285</a>.</p><p>Peebles, Maurice. “You Suck But I Love You: Philadelphia 76ers.” <em>Complex</em>, 12 Dec. 2014, <a href="https://www.complex.com/sports/2014/12/you-suck-but-i-love-you-philadelphia-76ers">https://www.complex.com/sports/2014/12/you-suck-but-i-love-you-philadelphia-76ers</a>.</p><p>Ross, Terrance F. “Welcome to Smarter Basketball.” <em>The Atlantic</em>, 25 Jun. 2015, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/06/nba-data-analytics/396776/">https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/06/nba-data-analytics/396776/</a>.</p><p>/u/Tharpedge. “Ranking Every Hawks Player in Terms of Shoulder Mass.” <em>Reddit</em>, 15 Jul. 2017, <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/AtlantaHawks/comments/6ngisu/ranking_every_hawks_player_in_terms_of_shoulder/">https://www.reddit.com/r/AtlantaHawks/comments/6ngisu/ranking_every_hawks_player_in_terms_of_shoulder/</a>.</p><p>/u/trust-theprocess. Comment on “Was it worth it?,” by /u/nbagenius2000. <em>Reddit</em>, 28 Jul. 2017, <a href="https://old.reddit.com/r/sixers/comments/6q4jg8/was_it_worth_it/">https://old.reddit.com/r/sixers/comments/6q4jg8/was_it_worth_it/</a>.</p><p>Waysdorf, Abby. “My Football Fandoms, Performance, and Place.” <em>Transformative Works and Cultures</em>, №18, 2015, <a href="https://doi.org/10.3983/twc.2015.0636">https://doi.org/10.3983/twc.2015.0636</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a4453e3e9a54" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/our-biggest-loser-how-nba-fans-establish-identities-by-rooting-for-losing-a4453e3e9a54">Our Biggest Loser: How NBA Fans Establish Identities by Rooting for Losing</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace">Push The Pace</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Modeling the Value of Future Draft Picks Based on Current Winning Percentages]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/push-the-pace/modeling-the-value-of-future-draft-picks-based-on-current-winning-percentages-caf236ffffa8?source=rss----36ac178f831e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/caf236ffffa8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philadelphia-76ers]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dashiell Nusbaum]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 Mar 2019 20:26:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-20T20:29:20.804Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Modeling the Value of Future Draft Picks Based on Current Winning Percentages (a.k.a. Draft Pick Value Generator)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*C9-goKfO8ZekQH4c.jpg" /></figure><p><a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1sddqWtco3-Ec5y7ceM4YlmL7NTnUU3La4IFVEdDcaBw/edit?usp=sharing">Draft Pick Value Generator</a></p><p>On February 6th, 2019, the Clippers sent Tobias Harris, Boban Marjanovic, and Mike Scott to the Philadelphia 76ers. In return, the Clippers received Wilson Chandler, Mike Muscala, and Landry Shamet, as well as the 76ers 2020 1st round pick, the Heat’s 2021 1st round pick, and two future 2nd round picks from Detroit.</p><p>In the deal, the Sixers got an All-Star caliber wing and much-needed bench help. Chandler, and Muscala hadn’t been much help on that front. Shamet was shooting well, but just a rookie, it was unclear he’d have any meaningful impact in the playoffs. But what about the picks they shipped off? What was the value of those?</p><p>With these questions in mind, I created a model predicting the value of draft picks based on team performance and pick’s year. The model assumes picks are unprotected, and values picks equally across years (for example, the 1st overall pick has the same value in 2019 as it does in 2023. Some teams are win-now, others are win-later, they factor this in. I didn’t). And, in case anyone was wondering, the Clippers got the equivalent of the 7th overall pick in the deal. Not bad.</p><p>To use the model, click on the link, do File → Make a Copy, then enter given winning percentage and year.</p><p>For anyone interested in a basic explanation of how the generator works:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/1*wrqSGgth0kQ-XDazOSfKqw.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=caf236ffffa8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/modeling-the-value-of-future-draft-picks-based-on-current-winning-percentages-caf236ffffa8">Modeling the Value of Future Draft Picks Based on Current Winning Percentages</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace">Push The Pace</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Does “The Hot Hand” exist for assists? (Or: Does LeBron have a hot hand for assists?)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/push-the-pace/does-the-hot-hand-exist-for-assists-or-does-lebron-have-a-hot-hand-for-assists-5710c65820b2?source=rss----36ac178f831e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5710c65820b2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[los-angeles-lakers]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lebron-james]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dashiell Nusbaum]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2019 18:26:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-02T22:50:26.731Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CpA8iVk3RCT10obzdCsB7w.jpeg" /><figcaption>This is what happens when you switch to BBB-manufactured balls</figcaption></figure><p>The “hot hand” is a popular theory in basketball that has been believed, dismissed, refuted, and unrefuted a number of times . It holds that once a player makes a few shots in a row, they’re more likely to hit their next shot. Once they’ve had a few go in, they become “in the zone”, or, as it goes, “on fire.” It says, for instance, that if you make two shots in a row, you’ll be more likely to make your next attempt than you would if you’d missed your most recent attempt.</p><p>And it’s true, to an extent. <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/the-hot-hand-effect-is-real-in-basketball-2014-3">According to Harvard researchers</a>:</p><blockquote>Players who have made an unusually high number of their last four shots will have a 1.2 to 2.4% greater likelihood of making their next shot than normal when accounting for shot difficulty.</blockquote><p>But I wondered: what if this is true for more than just shooting? What if the idea of the hot hand extends to passing as well?</p><p>What if, after getting a few assists in a row, you’re more likely to convert on your next pass than you would be had you just turned the ball over?</p><p>But first, some questions:</p><h4>Why only one player, and why only 110 games?</h4><p>This data took up 5 different spreadsheets and over half a million cells. Compiling the data took 20 hours. Excuse me if I stop then. Besides, 110 games is a decent sample size.</p><h4>If you’re going to write an article about it, shouldn’t you know how to do more?</h4><p>That’s… actually a very good point. Whatever.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mbW5SJhDd-BVz1rLrPKRmg.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Why LeBron?</h4><p>Well, firstly, name recognition. Also, LeBron is towards the top of the league in assists every year. Using him means we can see long stretches of assists in a row, and gives us a better data set then, say, <a href="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Db86HadV4AA62zo.jpg">Shelvin Mack</a>.</p><h4>Why do you always say “we” in your articles? I’m not doing anything.</h4><p>You’re right! Good point. Anyway, enough questions. Let’s get to the data.</p><p>The data is comprised of all games LeBron James has played in since the beginning of the 2017–18 NBA season up to December 13, 2018 (110 games). I imported the play-by-play data of all 110 games and used formulas to count the number of assists in a row LeBron would tally before recording a Bad Pass-Turnover. The number reset to zero at the beginning of each game, as a theoretical hot hand wouldn’t carry over from game togame. One can’t remain “locked in,” at least in the way we think of it, for the length of an entire day and night.</p><p>From that data I produced a data table that counted the number of times LeBron had n number of assists in a row. That way, I could see his chance of recording his next assist based on the number of assists he had in a row.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/277/1*sPoNFaZjPR6fAKbqKg4YVw.png" /></figure><p>I also calculated his Assist to Bad Pass-Turnover ratio.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/370/1*vjlofrWoh3VxmpWQmyPlig.png" /></figure><p>From this ratio, I calculated that James’ chance of getting an assist (as opposed to a bad pass turnover) at any time.</p><p>1 - (1/ 3.316742081) = 0.6984993179</p><p>If the hot hand doesn’t exist, then we’d expect this number to remain constant, like a coin flip. So I graphed the percentages vs this number for all times than n was large (n≥30) (I cheated and included the chance after 7 assists, because there were 29 instances that 8 assists were recorded) (it felt close enough).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*vLhdbhH2z5soXqUYsyDXsw.png" /></figure><p>I also did a rolling average up through 10 assists.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*VDgNSyKnDHj1pGp9aWIQUA.png" /></figure><p>So what does this prove? There may exist a hot hand for assists, as the above data supports. But we’ll need more than one player, and more than 110 games to concretely say so.</p><p><a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1YxiUCKiszbblYppHUeX_OAoueKXyVm8eWskcH1wYqyc/edit?usp=sharing">Here’s a spreadsheet outlining how I collected the data</a> (if you’re crazy, you can make a copy of it and fill it out for whatever player you want).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MDtU_GVoyXUvrc6Vv6ejdA.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5710c65820b2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/does-the-hot-hand-exist-for-assists-or-does-lebron-have-a-hot-hand-for-assists-5710c65820b2">Does “The Hot Hand” exist for assists? (Or: Does LeBron have a hot hand for assists?)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace">Push The Pace</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Push The Pace’s 2018]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/push-the-pace/push-the-paces-2018-48bfded9b74e?source=rss----36ac178f831e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/48bfded9b74e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-journalists]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2018]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dashiell Nusbaum]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 27 Dec 2018 22:34:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-12-04T20:22:26.978Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*Lmky8PL4g1HQLG6NN3K-wA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Here are some things we learned this year:</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/push-the-pace-media-mario-hezonja-first-half-highlights-cb718ac18c2c">Mario Hezonja plays better with consistent minutes (and when he’s not hiding an injury</a>) (Side note: Not sure why he’s failed in New York so far, unless he’s injured. It’s worth noting he’s shooting only 63% from the free throw line, despite being an 81% career shooter from the stripe. That’s a fairly controlled area, leading me to believe something might be off)</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/star-wars-and-the-warriors-5ff5d1b85a10">The Warriors are mimicking Star Wars</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/do-revenge-games-exist-c2b13682d2bf">Players perform slightly better in “revenge games,” especially when they were longer-tenured members of the team they’re playing against</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/the-23-things-that-are-wrong-with-that-statefarm-commercial-fefc83c6dde6">Nothing is right in this State Farm commercial</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/im-off-for-a-bit-here-s-why-also-some-stats-e4cd372cc689">Around the 27th game of the season is when we can say that the standings look similar to what they’ll be at the end of the year</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/lebrons-options-e1ed89ffcddd">The Lakers had the 2nd best chance to sign LeBron</a> (ladies and gentlemen, they got him)</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/three-may-keep-a-secret-a-personal-review-of-bill-simmons-the-book-of-basketball-c3b14a98dbfc?source=collection_home---6------9---------------------">Bill Simmons’ book isn’t very good, but Kristi Toliver is</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/push-the-pace-draft-guide-2018-b561743ffcd6">Luka Doncic was the best prospect in the draft, Bagley the most overrated, and MORE</a> (this was the draft guide of the year)</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/what-if-marcus-smart-could-shoot-165bc61908d3">It’d be cool if Marcus Smart could shoot, but it’d mean he’d probably have been traded by now</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/the-est-teams-of-the-2017-18-nba-season-85f27568a27d">The Cleveland Cavaliers were the thiccest team of 2018; the “small-ball” Warriors were the tallest</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/part-1-the-anatomy-of-an-nba-conspiracy-theory-dd098fefdda">NBA conspiracy theories are fun, and may contain trace amounts of feces</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/the-ultimate-basketball-world-and-also-state-cup-d5b7311446fb">California creates some amazing basketball players (though Ohio is a close second)</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/guards-wings-and-bigs-oh-my-b8811fb4508f">Wings are probably the next big thing in basketball (though Bigs are a close second, followed in last by Guards, who currently lead the pack)</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/how-development-is-different-across-positions-and-a-picture-of-the-league-today-175fe76bd7b0">Centers are the quickest position to develop, guards the slowest</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/breaking-down-teams-offenses-using-nylon-calculus-23-offensive-player-roles-3df95a04feab">Offenses don’t work well when two players have the same role, and more about the 23 offensive roles (colorful!)</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/does-the-hot-hand-exist-for-assists-or-does-lebron-have-a-hot-hand-for-assists-5710c65820b2">The “hot hand” could exist for passing as well</a> (maybe) (for LeBron)</p><p>You viewed our stories over 30,000 times, or about once every 20 minutes. Thanks. The work wouldn’t mean anything if there wasn’t anyone to read it.</p><p>Love, The PTP team</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=48bfded9b74e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/push-the-paces-2018-48bfded9b74e">Push The Pace’s 2018</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace">Push The Pace</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Breaking Down Teams’ Offenses using Nylon Calculus’ 23 Offensive Player Roles]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/push-the-pace/breaking-down-teams-offenses-using-nylon-calculus-23-offensive-player-roles-3df95a04feab?source=rss----36ac178f831e---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3df95a04feab</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sports-analytics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[statistics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nba]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[golden-state-warriors]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dashiell Nusbaum]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 25 Oct 2018 19:42:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-10-25T19:42:20.118Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*X3zHtrSB5PbjORWPyncpiQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>A hypothetical:</p><p>Let’s take some of the elite talent from the last decade of basketball and put them all on one team. Hmm. We can put Carmelo Anthony in there… Amare Stoudemire was amazing for a few years…Oh! And Dwight Howard! Can’t forget about him. Joakim Noah was a top 5 MVP candidate, so it’s not outrageous to say he deserves to be here. Let’s round it out with DeMar Derozan, a killer, and now, a Spur.</p><p>So that puts our lineup at:</p><p>DeMar DeRozan</p><p>Carmelo Anthony</p><p>Amare Stoudemire</p><p>Joakim Noah</p><p>Dwight Howard</p><p>Wait, no. Nononononononono.</p><p>You can take a team of All-NBA players from the last decade and create a team that, even if each player was at their peak, wouldn’t win very many games. That’s because more than raw talent matters. How the talents play off each other and what roles players have also matter.</p><p>Todd Whitehead (<a href="https://twitter.com/CrumpledJumper">a.k.a “The Crumpled Jumper” on Twitter</a>) used nba play-type data from Synergy to group players based on the ways they tried to score. He was able to find 23 distinct offensive roles for NBA players.</p><p><a href="https://fansided.com/2018/10/15/nylon-calculus-defining-23-offensive-roles-nba-play-type-data/">Nylon Calculus: Defining 23 offensive roles using the NBA&#39;s play-type data</a></p><p>A list of the roles and examples of players in that role are below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/478/1*-3sxcEQPzp55GQYOebcBxA.png" /><figcaption>All data from the 2017–18 NBA season</figcaption></figure><p>Players’ roles do depend somewhat on the team and system in which they exist. While it places players in the right roles within their systems, there are a few instances where they wouldn’t be playing that role on a different team. One laughable example (and outlier) was, as twitter user @SportsTribution pointed out, Zaza Pachulia.</p><h3>Hannes Becker on Twitter</h3><p>@CrumpledJumper The warriors create so much space that Zaza looks like a mobile big :D https://t.co/OLNGz8ktez</p><p>One interesting note: The role of “Mobile Bigs Who Cut” was a role unique to the Golden State Warriors last season. There were 5 players who fit this role: Omri Casspi, Zaza Pachulia, Kevon Looney, and Jordan Bell, all Warriors. The Warriors’ unique offense and the space it created led to a new-ish type of offensive role, or at least the increased use of an existing type.</p><p>I took each team’s most used lineup (according to stats.nba.com), and ranked them by offensive rating. From there, I wrote down each of the offensive roles (and assigned each a number, 1–23) of players in this lineup. This is not to say these were the best offensive lineups in the NBA, but asks taking each team’s most used lineup, which were the best offensively? Here it is, visualized:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*p1Z7HIeuQlmHRM6GKNtTlg.png" /></figure><p>Well, that’s impossible to read.</p><p>Here were the best to worst offensive roles, in a vacuum (sorted by a mixture of ORTG and number of players in that role):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/469/1*qZr041K-lAdHt2_by41YRQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/724/1*0QC7vjKYhjh2dCbw7cSN2Q.png" /></figure><p>But this can’t be used in a vacuum. Offenses depend on five players.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/711/1*t-zX2ZbOpjLyMuyU3dLnFg.png" /></figure><p>The most common pairing was P<em>rimary Ball Handlers </em>with <em>Tall Wings With Handle, </em>sported by the with-Porzingis Knicks, The Suns (their offense wasn’t the problem, it was their defense), and The Raptors.</p><p><em>Bigs With Skills Everywhere</em> were more common on better offenses. Given the modern shift away from playing multiple bigs at once, it was surprising that they often shared the floor with bigs in other roles, whether those were ones that cut or ones that post up at the rim.</p><p>There were also more <em>Stationary Spot-Up Wings</em>, who fit in in all different types of lineups.</p><p><em>Primary Ball Handlers</em> were often paired with <em>Ball Handlers Who Share the Load</em>, <em>Tall Wings With Handle</em>, and/or <em>Stationary Spot-Up Wings. </em>Usually just one or two ball handlers are needed on successful teams, with shooting or rolling roles falling to other players.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/778/1*mjkLvtgVBbMuuiRHjSqsiA.png" /></figure><p>In the league’s worst offensive lineups, there are multiple instances of having two players in the same role on the court at once. This didn’t occur at all for the top 11 offenses in the league.</p><p>There were significantly fewer <em>Bigs With Skills Everywhere.</em> The only instance of players in this role was the Kings, who had two players (Zach Randolph and Willie Cauley-Stein) in this role. Having more than one player fill the same has some obvious downsides. Unless you have a genius coach who knows how to make it work (like Mike D’Antoni with Chris Paul and James Harden), there’s less to gain from two players doing the same thing, when one other offensive role might not be utilized.</p><p>There were fewer <em>Stationary Spot-Up Wings </em>and more instances of having multiple (up to 3, even) players at the 3rd, 4th, and 5th roles <em>(Ball Handlers Who Share the Load, Ball Handlers With Off-Ball Duties, Tall Wings With Handle)</em>.</p><p>There are many more wings with ball handling duties. This can perhaps be attributed to the inability of these teams’ guards to run the offense. Many of these lineups have multiple players all with ball handling or distributing duties.</p><p>The graphs above are available for any other conclusions you want to draw (How will the Warriors, with the addition of Cousins, a <em>Ball-Stopping Mobile Big</em> fare? Will he end up filling more of the <em>Mobile Bigs Who Cut </em>role?).</p><p>In addition, if you want to look at the giant mishmash of datatables and graphs used, including some not present in the article, <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1O7IeZu59EAx_wE-I629Fh1IuXIJi1HBp3BJ7eJTGEeg/edit?usp=sharing">click this link</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3df95a04feab" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace/breaking-down-teams-offenses-using-nylon-calculus-23-offensive-player-roles-3df95a04feab">Breaking Down Teams’ Offenses using Nylon Calculus’ 23 Offensive Player Roles</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/push-the-pace">Push The Pace</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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