<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
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        <title><![CDATA[Seed to Scale Advisors - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Advisory services for early stage tech companies. - Medium]]></description>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Biggest Mistake of Seed and Series A Fundraising (and how to do it differently)]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors/the-biggest-mistake-of-seed-and-series-a-fundraising-and-how-to-do-it-differently-e681e67a9f45?source=rss----69c8be96e6ed---4"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1200/1*G7wSpfIkPfe0AdNGkFAHiw.jpeg" width="1200"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">My oldest son, Wilson, is a college soccer player. Going through the recruiting process was a challenge for him and his parents. He sent&#x2026;</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors/the-biggest-mistake-of-seed-and-series-a-fundraising-and-how-to-do-it-differently-e681e67a9f45?source=rss----69c8be96e6ed---4">Continue reading on Seed to Scale Advisors »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors/the-biggest-mistake-of-seed-and-series-a-fundraising-and-how-to-do-it-differently-e681e67a9f45?source=rss----69c8be96e6ed---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fundraising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[saas]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[neisner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Dec 2020 22:41:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-12-28T22:41:52.525Z</atom:updated>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[#FourWomen]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors/fourwomen-c6fd873a1b97?source=rss----69c8be96e6ed---4"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/2600/0*YINxy9ifqjd7mMik" width="5100"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">When I launched Seed to Scale, my hope was to help entrepreneurs solve their most pressing problems during the early phases of the&#x2026;</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors/fourwomen-c6fd873a1b97?source=rss----69c8be96e6ed---4">Continue reading on Seed to Scale Advisors »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors/fourwomen-c6fd873a1b97?source=rss----69c8be96e6ed---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c6fd873a1b97</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[women-in-tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[diversity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[neisner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 08 Mar 2019 17:09:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-10T05:51:57.302Z</atom:updated>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[What’s Your Wedge?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors/whats-your-wedge-a0ada4e8ccca?source=rss----69c8be96e6ed---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a0ada4e8ccca</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[neisner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Feb 2019 23:01:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-07T00:56:30.766Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Later this month, the team at <a href="https://www.scoutrfp.com/">Scout</a> will be holding their <a href="https://www.spark.scoutrfp.com/">2nd Annual Spark Customer Conference</a>. It’s a great accomplishment to be at the stage where you have enough customers who want to learn from their peers, exchange best practices, see what’s coming next, and swap stories. I’ve had the unique opportunity to advise the Scout team at their very early stage, so I’ve watched as they have become the category leader in the Sourcing space. Scout started in 2014, but let’s be clear that the Sourcing space is much older than that. I was around dozens of companies building negotiation products back in the 1990’s. So how did Scout go from a newbie to a category leader in a crowded field in a relatively short time? In my mind, it comes down to finding and exploiting a “wedge”. When you carve out and own something that’s unique you have a chance in a crowded space. But this isn’t just a story of Scout. It’s a story of three companies who all found a wedge and became category leaders.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*eEyoQgYdo48-F8x4" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@heftiba?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Toa Heftiba</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>This tale starts back in 2006. My friend and I had started this little eProcurement company. There were plenty of big fish swimming in that space…companies like Ariba, SAP, CommerceOne, Ketera, Oracle, PurchasePro, Sciquest, Basware, and I’m forgetting probably 20 others. We knew that we couldn’t build a product with more features, one with just a prettier UI, we couldn’t simply hire better sales people, focus only a specific vertical, or even charge less. We needed a “wedge” that made our offering special. It had to be as clear as day. It would be the most critical part of our value proposition that would enable clear differentiation in the market over a lasting period.</p><p>Prior to actually building the product, we talked to lots of procurement people to understand their pain. We identified a common theme that lead us to our wedge. We would build a procurement solution for the everyday person in the organization that helps them do their job, NOT the procurement department. We would make it so super simple for anyone to buy whatever they needed as simply and quickly as possible. But wait you say? The procurement department is the economic buyer or the guy/gal who writes the check (along with their boss, the CFO). I remember talking to a number of Procurement VPs in the early days, and they didn’t know what to make of me saying “We’re not building software for you and your people, but we will make your life so much better.” With that premise and our wedge, we set off on our way. It was an uphill battle. Gartner and other analysts at the time would write that eProcurement systems had to save you money, force contract compliance, had to control and reject spend, communicate electronically to the supplier, and other cares of the procurement department. They didn’t understand that wasn’t the core pain. With lots of good execution through the years, that little startup, <a href="http://www.coupa.com/">Coupa</a>, now has a ~$5B market cap and has become the dominant player in the category. In <a href="https://get.coupa.com/Gartner_MQ_2018.html">Gartner’s latest report on the space</a> (have to put in an email address to access it), they finally have caught onto the wedge that we identified back in 2006. The #1 most important issue for customers is what they call “Guided Buying,” or helping requisitioners buy stuff. Coupa is the first company in this tale.</p><p>In late 2006, Coupa signed its first set of customers. During those implementations, our Customer Success group (2 people) realized that we needed a way for our customers to log and track issues. It had to be self-service of course. Lots of big and small companies existed in that customer service software space. Our first stab by the CS team was some semi-popular, semi-affordable web-based customer service solution. I can’t remember the name, but I do remember that we all hated it. The customers were confused, the CS team hated it, and my product and engineering team despised it. Unfortunately, it seemed like all the customer service software companies were pretty similar. This was going to be a problem for Coupa as our 2007 customer list was growing quickly. Seggy, one of our engineers, threatened to build an issue tracking solution over the weekend (a common developer refrain when they are super pissed), but instead he went off scoured the Internet. On Monday, he came in and said, “I found this cool tiny company in Europe. They have this SaaS solution, and it looks pretty simple. Let’s try it out.” By that evening we had implemented their free trial. The next day, we ran a series of test flows simulating a set of customer issues through it. By Wednesday, we told a few customers to start using it. And by Friday, we paid for our first set of users. 12 years later, Coupa is still a <a href="http://www.zendesk.com/">Zendesk</a> customer. Yes, that little company was Zendesk, now a $7B leader in customer service software and the second company in this tale. Coupa was actually mentioned in their <a href="https://www.prweb.com/releases/helpdesk/saas/prweb1038614.htm">seed funding announcement</a> in 2008 :)</p><p>Zendesk also launched into a crowded category. They weren’t going to win the feature-function fight. Their competitors had deeper pockets. Their competitors had complex solutions that could do just about anything given some dollars to customize. According to <a href="https://searchcrm.techtarget.com/news/1250722/Gartner-ranks-customer-service-software">Gartner at the time</a>, “It’s too complex an issue the way a business achieves customer service excellence. We’re not seeing any one vendor or any one vendor type able to create a full suite”. I don’t even know what that means, but it isn’t right. Zendesk founders looked at the space and found their wedge. They understood what companies needed. Companies wanted their CS agents to deliver an awesome experience for their customers that could be simply set up and configured for the flows of internal agents. I’m sure the Zendesk team would describe their wedge more elegantly, but no one could dispute that Zendesk had a clear differentiation in the space.</p><p>Over the years, I got to know Mikkel Svane, CEO of Zendesk, as they moved the company from Copenhagen to San Francisco. I’m particularly enamored by the culture they have created. In 2014, Mikkel sent me an email wanting to connect me to 2 young entrepreneurs, Stan and Alex, who had approached him for advice. Mikkel knew that I had more domain expertise in the specific area, so that’s how I became involved.</p><p>Stan, Alex, and I grabbed coffee the next week in Palo Alto. They were pumped to create Scout so that companies could issue RFPs (Request for Proposals) to their suppliers and other prospective vendors. I had heard this story before. Just like Coupa and Zendesk, the RFP/Sourcing market was crowded. In many ways, it was worse than that. It hadn’t even emerged as its own category if your metric is customer adoption. Frankly, only a handful of large companies had implemented and were successfully using the existing solutions in the market. The Sourcing world is littered with gravestones of startups or ones who were swallowed up by IBM or other consulting companies for pennies on the dollar. How would these guys be any different?</p><p>In my first conversations with Stan and Alex, I could tell their ideas were different. They were not focusing on the complex negotiations that other software providers were. They were not focusing on features that delivered value to only 5% of the market. Their clear goal was an easy-to-use, easy-to-implement, RFP solution that sourcing folks at most companies could use to negotiate most contracts. Let’s be honest, most companies are not running Dutch auctions. Most companies aren’t airlines hedging fuel contracts. Most companies don’t have the sourcing requirements that Tesla may have with its direct parts suppliers. So, Scout ignored those problems which others touted as reasons to buy their software. Scout stayed simple. If a capability wasn’t needed in the majority of negotiations, they didn’t build it. They carved their wedge by staying so simple that customers could run negotiations within the first week. Like Coupa and Zendesk, some would say they were too simple at the start. Well, of course they were. Remember that even Amazon started with books. But all three companies focused on delivering value to where the pain was the greatest and where the users needed it most.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*aI-Tm3mpti1XbJ-Y" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@rawpixel?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">rawpixel</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>So what’s your wedge? Is it clear to your prospects, users, customers, and investors? As always, I welcome startups to sign up for a <a href="https://seedtoscale.us/schedule-a-meeting/">free exploratory conversation</a> where we can chat about your wedge in San Francisco or Menlo Park.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a0ada4e8ccca" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors/whats-your-wedge-a0ada4e8ccca">What’s Your Wedge?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors">Seed to Scale Advisors</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[5 Biggest Mistakes of Early-Stage Startups]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors/5-biggest-mistakes-of-early-stage-startups-5502f08abeb7?source=rss----69c8be96e6ed---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5502f08abeb7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[top-5]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[neisner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jan 2019 20:29:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-15T20:29:05.128Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>People often ask me about the story of Coupa and how it became a multi-billion dollar company. Some people assume that it must have been a rocket ship from day one. It wasn’t. Others assume we must have made every right decision in the book. We didn’t. What I like to say is that we saw a big market opportunity, made a number of good decisions, and executed well. Just as important, we didn’t make any truly bad/costly decisions.</p><p>In my advising business, I’ve met over 100 startups in the last couple years. From those discussions and my own experience, I’ve compiled my list of the Top 5 Mistakes of Early-Stage Startups.</p><h3>1 | Fail To Talk to The Customer</h3><p>This one seems obvious, but I can’t overemphasize how many early-stage startups get a failing grade here. Founders get an idea, talk to a couple buddies who work in the space, and start building. Most likely, they soon find themselves wondering why they can’t get more than a handful of early customers.</p><p>A smart founder will have a wealth of conversations with decision-makers or influencers at companies that may be in her target market. She will ask plenty of open-ended questions about a “pain” in the focus area. She will listen, take copious notes, and look for patterns.</p><p>I’ll have future blog posts on this topic because it is so important, but here I’ll give you some snippets from my Coupa experience. My co-founder Dave and I had run a similar product area during our years at Oracle. He probably had 10 years of experience in the space and I had 6-plus years. We had deep knowledge, but that is not enough. I spent a couple months finding, pleading for time, and then having conversations with key procurement leaders across a broad number of industries. Over 40 in-depth conversations plus follow-ups were completed before we coded a single line. We understood their pains, we recognized where their priorities were, we tested concepts, we zeroed in on and ruled out certain markets, and more.</p><p>You cannot short-circuit this step. Your message won’t resonate with prospects, your product won’t fit, and you’ll flail in answering questions from potential investors.</p><h3>2 | Underprice Their Solution</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*MKAJ5VDCjJlieF4N" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@julesmarchioni67?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Jules Marchioni</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Pricing is an under-appreciated aspect of startups, but it can be one that delays your progress, or quickly kills it. In my experience, B2B startups often underprice their offering. There are many reasons they do, but let me focus on the outcomes of underpricing. On the positive side, if you underprice, you’ll get more logos <em>in the short-term</em>, but the other side of the ledger is larger and problematic.</p><p>The four undesirable effects of underpricing are:</p><p>1. You will struggle for meaningful revenue. This likely needs no further explanation.</p><p>2. You will gain less attention from your actual customers. You want to be an important solution for your early customers. You want them to sing your praises and recommend you to others. If a customer is paying you $100K annually for your SaaS solution, it’s important to them. They are making a real investment and will put the right players on the project. You’ve got their attention. If a customer is throwing $10K annually for it, they may have snuck it under some procurement rules. It’s a nice-to-have and may not get the focus it needs.</p><p>3. You will decrease your stickiness. They say that B2B apps tend to be sticky. That’s true, except in two circumstances. First, if the app was never put into production or rolled out to a wide number of users. And second, if you ask for a significant price increase. Nothing is sticky when the customer values the solution at $10K, and then can’t explain why the new price is $75K.</p><p>4. Underpricing your offering attracts the wrong type of sales people. It’s uncommon to have a B2B offering that is marketing-driven, i.e., prospects come to your site, learn, and buy with little to no sales involvement. Most B2B offerings require some form of sales outreach. On the people front, good sales people are financially driven. They’ll look for opportunities to sell at a high price point. That’s how they make their numbers.</p><p>All four of these aspects can hurt your ability to fundraise, which means your flywheel won’t start spinning.</p><p>A confession: We didn’t do this well at Coupa early on. We went for logos and significantly underpriced. It’s hard to quantify precisely, but I would say this cost us 12–24 months and a decent amount of equity.</p><h3>3 | Too Slow to Follow-Up</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*d9XgJFNW4Xg-E-Nc" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@damebash?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Sebastian Molinares</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Most startups are formed by techies who like things they can control. Coding, for the most part, is controllable with a single path. If they control the input (time/effort), then the output (solution) will be realized. Most of the rest of an early-stage startup doesn’t work that way. As a founder, you need to have target market / prospect conversations, you need to work with customers to implement, you need to hire, and you need to fundraise. These are are asynchronous communications requiring multiple threads, inevitable obstacles, and ability to influence others.</p><p>My experience shows that techie founders are pretty good at the initial outreach. But eventually something doesn’t go to plan and the engine grinds to a halt. Let me give you an actual example. I was advising a young startup where the CEO was off-the-chart smart. He and the team had built a pretty compelling product, and in one of our early meetings, he excitedly told me about a great sales meeting he just came from. He was ready to forecast a big opportunity. I asked what the next steps were and he promised to follow-up right away with his key contact to articulate them. But, fast forward a few weeks later to our next meeting in which this CEO informed me that he’d sent a single email to his contact but never heard back. He didn’t call, he didn’t send numerous follow-up emails, he didn’t push. Now, the momentum was gone, and the deal was lost. I’ve yet to find a startup that failed because the founders were too pushy, but I’ve seen many flounder because the leadership was too passive.</p><h3>4 | Underperform in Fundraising</h3><p>I’m not going to shock anyone by saying that fundraising is difficult and takes more time than expected. Fundraising requires the right inputs, the right plan, the right effort and follow-up, and the right attitude. And a $750K seed round requires the same effort and thoughtfulness as a multi-million dollar venture round. Of course, you need a good deck with the right story/message (no business plan, please!). You’ll want some level of a financial model and a strong set of backup slides to show your understanding of the pain you are solving, the market opportunity, your go-to-market approach, and your use of funds, etc. On the planning side, you must pick the right set of investors likely to be attracted to your deal. A firm with a $1B current fund isn’t going to invest in a $500K round. Likewise, you can’t easily raise $4M from friends and family. Also, a biotech VC won’t often (or ever) do an enterprise apps deal. Once you have a good set of potential investors, treat it like a sales funnel. Reach out, have early meetings over coffee, follow-up quickly on questions, and when you are ready, ask for concrete steps to a term sheet. Lastly, attitude does play a part. Be confident without being arrogant. Investors know that confidence will help you in customer conversations and hiring early employees. If you aren’t confident here, you won’t be successful out there.</p><h3>5 | Accelerate Without Intent</h3><p>This one might be a little controversial. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/alejandrocremades/2018/08/07/top-10-startup-accelerators-based-on-successful-exits/#2a6f20034b3b">Accelerators are popular</a>. Whether it is YCombinator, 500 Startups, Techstars, Angelpad, Alchemist or one of the many others, you can find an accelerator that will accept you. It’s a nice ego stroke when you get the acceptance. They all have several great success stories, but is it the right path for you? Think about who you are, where you are in the startup process, what you need, and what you are willing to give up. If everything aligns nicely with the accelerator, go for it. But let’s look at a case where it might not. Imagine you are a team of 4 people in Omaha. You’ve raised enough money to last you a year at current run rate, and you expect to have your beta ready in two months. Your target market is oil and gas companies. What are the things you need at this point and do those needs really fit with what the accelerator offers? The accelerator folks may bring big enterprise sales experience, but do they understand oil and gas and have good contacts? They have a great demo day in 3 months, but you’ll just be deploying your first customers at that time, so your focus should be there. They are located in Silicon Valley, which brings you into a great tech network, but away from your customers and your team (and increases your burn). Given what you need, ask yourself if that accelerator will truly increase your chances of success.</p><p>These are my Top 5 mistakes of early-stage startups. Yours might be different. Please feel free to comment. What did I miss? Where am I mistaken?</p><p>And early-stage startups are welcome to <a href="http://seedtoscale.us/schedule-a-meeting/">signup for a free exploratory discussion</a> about their business. We’re in San Francisco on most Tuesdays and Menlo Park on Wednesdays. This week is all full, but there are spots open for next week.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5502f08abeb7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors/5-biggest-mistakes-of-early-stage-startups-5502f08abeb7">5 Biggest Mistakes of Early-Stage Startups</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors">Seed to Scale Advisors</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Launching Seed to Scale]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors/launching-seed-to-scale-a90654df3ba0?source=rss----69c8be96e6ed---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a90654df3ba0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[neisner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jan 2019 16:01:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-10T17:37:16.198Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I’m happy to announce the launch of Seed to Scale Advisors. My passion for advising sort of snuck up on me. Yes, I love technology, love the startup environment, and game playing out different scenarios. But advising sounded a lot like a job I <em>hated</em> with a passion….strategy consulting.</p><p>I joined a strategy consulting firm focused in the Retail and Consumer Packaged Goods industries right out of grad school. While my friends will tell you how much I love supermarkets, I hated my two years in that industry. The work involved lots of travel and chatting up potential and future clients. Not my forte. Some people dislike consulting because you don’t own the solution and follow through on execution with the client. But nothing bothered me more than the process we went through on the engagement. The senior partner sold the deal, got some insight on a likely conclusion that the client wanted, we wrote the main parts of the deck, and then we gathered the data to prove out the hypothesis. Of course, it didn’t always work out exactly that way. But in too many projects, it really did. Working to ensure that the data supported an opinion seemed an entirely backwards and counterproductive process to me. I loved questioning assumptions, going down all sorts of paths to find data, questioning the data’s relevancy, and then looking for insight in the data, if relevant. But I was a lowly analyst in the strategy consulting world. When I did object or question the data, I got reprimanded. It wasn’t long before I left to join a big tech company.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0PTL-FY1mQLoq2Oapp6ToA.jpeg" /></figure><p>When I began advising, I worried I’d fall into the role of the consulting partners I’d observed. It would be easy to meet up with tech CEO’s, listen to what they had to say about what they hoped to find, give them some nuggets of insight, and then encourage them on their way. The truth is, I’ve seen advisors act that way. There will be more on that in future posts.</p><p>My Silicon Valley tech career began in earnest in 1998 when I joined Oracle. During 7 years at Oracle and the subsequent 7 in which I co-founded and then helped scale Coupa Software to a billion dollar company, I’ve talked with hundreds of tech companies and both formally and sometimes informally advised <a href="https://seedtoscale.us/#testimonials">many of them</a>. In the years since my strategy consulting days I’ve discovered what I do well, and where I can make the biggest and most authentic impact for the client. That’s why we have a very distinct focus and process with Seed to Scale Advisors. Seed to Scale helps B2B-focused tech startups go from early stage (think seed or early Series A) to scale — typically after their Series B round. We don’t do accelerator-type engagements lasting 3 to 4 months. Instead, we structure our work over two years where we have time to work collaboratively on key issues facing the startup during different stretches. As you can see on our <a href="https://seedtoscale.us/">website</a>, the challenges range from truly understanding the customer, getting to product-market fit, pricing, fund raising and much more.</p><p>That’s enough for an initial post. If you are interested in learning more, I’d suggest we meet for coffee (another passion of mine). On our website, you can <a href="http://seedtoscale.us/schedule-a-meeting/">sign up for an intro meeting</a>. No pressure, no cost. Just coffee in either Menlo Park or San Francisco.</p><p>Photo credit: <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/z1d-LP8sjuI?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Hello I’m Nik</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a90654df3ba0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors/launching-seed-to-scale-a90654df3ba0">Launching Seed to Scale</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors">Seed to Scale Advisors</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Coming Soon]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors/coming-soon-9296008a81fd?source=rss----69c8be96e6ed---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9296008a81fd</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[neisner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Dec 2018 07:17:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-11T07:17:49.540Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>More and more content about advising early stage B2B companies!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9296008a81fd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors/coming-soon-9296008a81fd">Coming Soon</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/seed-to-scale-advisors">Seed to Scale Advisors</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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