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        <title><![CDATA[ShiftLeft Blog - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[ShiftLeft is NextGen code analysis, purpose-built to automate security workflows delivering the right developer with the right vulnerabilities at the right time. - Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog?source=rss----86a4f941c7da---4</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Optus Breach: How Bad Code Keeps Happening to Good Companies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/the-optus-breach-how-bad-code-keeps-happening-to-good-companies-189bb11bcf42?source=rss----86a4f941c7da---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[data]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Chetan Conikee]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Sep 2022 13:32:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-26T13:32:29.301Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/0*J8wOmkQG1hQ5mPW3" /></figure><blockquote>First, let me be clear that I have no insider knowledge. This is my best guess at what occurred, based on publicly available information <a href="https://www.optus.com.au/about/media-centre/media-releases/2022/09/optus-notifies-customers-of-cyberattack">here</a> and others indicated in <strong>references </strong>section below.</blockquote><p>On Thursday this week, Australia’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optus">second-largest telecom company</a>, Optus, <a href="https://www.optus.com.au/about/media-centre/media-releases/2022/09/optus-notifies-customers-of-cyberattack">announced</a> it had suffered a major data breach that had compromised sensitive customer information.</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/Jeremy_Kirk">Jeremy Kirk</a> of <a href="https://twitter.com/RansomwareFiles"><strong>The Ransomware Files</strong></a><strong> </strong>has been progressively uncovering details associated to this incident.</p><h3>Jeremy Kirk on Twitter: &quot;Someone is claiming to have the stolen Optus account data for 11.2 million users. They want $1 million in the Monero cryptocurrency from Optus to not sell the data to other people. Otherwise, they say they will sell it in parcels. #optus #auspol #infosec #OptusHack pic.twitter.com/1eCINue2oZ / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>Someone is claiming to have the stolen Optus account data for 11.2 million users. They want $1 million in the Monero cryptocurrency from Optus to not sell the data to other people. Otherwise, they say they will sell it in parcels. #optus #auspol #infosec #OptusHack pic.twitter.com/1eCINue2oZ</p><p>As details are still emerging, let’s examine the attacker’s <strong>tactics, techniques </strong>and<strong> procedures.</strong></p><p>This attack bears close resemblance to <strong>Citibank</strong>, <strong>Molina Health</strong> and <strong>Signet/Jared Jewelers</strong> documented in detail below</p><p><a href="https://chetan-conikee.medium.com/case-files-attack-like-its-1999-citibank-in-2012-signet-jared-jewelers-molina-health-d81f37be9b44">Case Files: Attack like its 1999 (Citibank) in 2012 (Signet/Jared jewelers, Molina Health)</a></p><h3>What happened?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PNZrMIvt9ZjP45m5n4Pwsg.png" /></figure><ol><li>Information suggests that the data was exfiltrated through an unauthenticated REST API endpoint <a href="https://twitter.com/Jeremy_Kirk/status/1573875819361214464">at</a> <a href="http://api.www.optus.com.au/"><strong>http://api.www.optus.com.au</strong></a><strong> </strong><em>(which has since been shut down)</em></li><li>Essentially anyone in public domain is allowed to send a request asking the server “fetch contact details for Optus customer with contactid=XXXXXXXXX”.</li><li>Even worse than that, the parameter in question sounds like it was a directly referenced <strong>contactid</strong> (<em>with predictable sequence</em>) and that it was included in the URL of the request rather than securely placed within the body in a POST request.</li><li>As a consequence, the attacker was able to enumerate and exfiltrate <strong>11.2 million Optus customers</strong> and their personal information which the server duly returned.</li></ol><h3>What data was exposed?</h3><ol><li><strong>11.2 million Optus customers</strong> have been impacted by this incident</li><li>As indicated <a href="https://www.optus.com.au/about/media-centre/media-releases/2022/09/optus-notifies-customers-of-cyberattack">here</a>, the information which has been exposed is their <strong>customer’s name, date of birth, email, and the number of the ID document you provided such as drivers license or passport number</strong>. No copies of photo IDs have been affected.</li></ol><h3>Why did this happen?</h3><ol><li>Lack of <strong>authorization</strong> checks for every user request. Web portals have several channels of communication like the browser, mobile apps, API services, embedded links in an email that trackback to the portal. Are all these paths following uniform authenticated and authorized controls?</li><li>Even if authorized, are <strong>referential integrity</strong> checks performed to ensure that the authorized user is checking his/her data within their tenancy control? Let alone the hacker, it seems like there wasn’t any AAA checks to ensure that customers across tenancy domains in a SaaS environment could access or have visibility across all tenants</li><li>Using <strong>direct object references (predictable sequences) : </strong>Contact Numbers are retrieved from databases and they obviously have a primary key id that uniquely identifies each of them. Rather than directly passing the contact number into the response object, one can create a transient and random contact-id and cache map to the real contact-id in the scope of an active request. This fundamentally breaks the predictable sequence which further on could have prevented repeated enumeration by attacker.</li><li>Sending <strong>sensitive information</strong> in the URL of a request: When in doubt, send parameters within the body of a POST request. This won’t protect you from this type of attack but it makes the flaw slightly less obvious.</li><li>Lack of <strong>API gateway controls</strong>, <strong>tenancy validation</strong>, <strong>rate-limiting</strong> and <strong>request throttling configuration </strong>for every API endpoint that directly/in-directly touches sensitive information. If this request was initiated <strong>11.2 million times, </strong>there weren’t any controls in place to raise alerts indicating anomalous behavior.</li></ol><blockquote>Ironically, this is one of those types of <strong>flaws</strong> that’s all but impossible for an automated web application vulnerability scanner to find but incredibly easy for even a savvy 10-year-old to discover.</blockquote><h3><strong>How can such flaws be identified and thereafter avoided?</strong></h3><p>Is there a <strong>human-assisted expert system</strong> available to check your specific application belonging to a specific business domain for design flaws that can be exploited?</p><p>Yes, such a system does exist. ShiftLeft’s <a href="https://www.shiftleft.io/shiftleft-core/">CORE</a> is a platform built over the foundational <a href="https://www.shiftleft.io/technology/">Code Property Graph</a> that is uniquely positioned to deliver a specification model to query for <strong>vulnerable conditions</strong>, <strong>business logic flaws </strong>and <strong>insider attacks</strong> that might exist in your application’s codebase.</p><p>To request a free trial and demo, please signup at <a href="https://www.shiftleft.io/request-demo/">https://www.shiftleft.io/request-demo/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=189bb11bcf42" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/the-optus-breach-how-bad-code-keeps-happening-to-good-companies-189bb11bcf42">The Optus Breach: How Bad Code Keeps Happening to Good Companies</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog">ShiftLeft Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Reachability and Risk: Tools for Security Leaders]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/reachability-and-risk-tools-for-security-leaders-39660e00a9da?source=rss----86a4f941c7da---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[application-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[open-source-software]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The ShiftLeft Team]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 May 2022 16:48:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-19T16:48:28.345Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Malcolm Harkins, Bryan Smith, Rob Lundy</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BF539ILvoAv6I2rGUO1odQ.png" /><figcaption>Attacker Reachability (or “Attackability”), is a concept in open source software vulnerability management. It’s a way to understand if, 1) a vulnerability is present, and 2) Can an attacker actually get to it.</figcaption></figure><p>It is impossible to manage security posture without considering two key factors in any potential vulnerability or security flaw: reachability and risk. The two factors are related. Reachability defines the degree to which a given security vulnerability that is detected, such as a CVE, can actually be attacked and exploited to gain privileged access and directly or indirectly access critical systems or data. Risk is a business measurement that assesses the potential for a vulnerability to actually damage an enterprise or organization. In general, without reachability, there is less risk.</p><h3>How to Think About Reachability</h3><p>Reachability and risk have dramatically shifted in recent years as we have moved from a hard perimeter “fortress” approach to security to more distributed systems, APIs, cloud computing, SaaS, and far more potential points for attack ingress and exfiltration egress. To mitigate this new risk landscape, we have actually moved to fortify all the newly exposed internal elements and the critical systems of security. We have built a new perimeter around identity, with authentication and Zero Trust,. We have built perimeters around connected devices, around our cloud infrastructure, and our virtualized environments and our configuration of all these systems. At every point where there is a potential for risk, you need to think about fortifying the new mini-perimeters.</p><p>A key aspect of risk and reachability that we have spent less effort on is the human aspect. We do not consider, yet, people as a perimeter to be defended, even though people comprise the most reachable vulnerability. As people we create flawed software. We misconfigure our infrastructure, our security tools and our authentication systems. A key part of the new mindset of reachability must be better accounting for and mitigating the risks of people. This means simplifying their decision trees,, either through better systems or better design, and by helping them become a better gray-matter perimeter.</p><p>Due to the atomization of our IT and application environment, and the resulting miniaturization of our security fortresses, we have created a far more granular surface. In some cases, such as through segmentation, we have enhanced security and reduced risk, In other cases, we have added complexity. Without a doubt, we now have many more points of contact and a broader attack surface exposed to the world. A critical consideration in assessing reachability is how far each of those points can be exploited, and to what breadth and depth — looking at horizontal traversal and immediate compromise of critical systems or subverting supply chain and other pivotal sub-systems for subsequent attacks. The miniature fortress mentality is a useful framework for thinking through the potential attack surface and putting in place the right controls, at the right places, to address reachability.</p><h3>Risk Scoring and Reachability</h3><p>So what is the interplay between risk scoring and reachability? We cannot say no to new technologies that introduce more complexity, and potentially more risk if our end users are demanding them. We need to better manage how risk scores are created and applied to help people perform better in this environment of greater complexity.</p><p>Today, the responsibility for understanding the complete security picture and applying the proper context to decision and judgements has grown more widespread. Everyone who is deploying, using, building or designing applications and technology environments must be constantly thinking about what are the security implications of whatever project or code they are working on. The lens for those implications is not only at the application or system or infrastructure level, but for the general well-being of the business. This means broader understanding of risk scoring driven by reachability and criticality and taking into better account the implications of reachability and attackability.</p><p>In cyber, there is no shortage of risk measurements. Injecting reachability into the scoring process is a way of framing vulnerabilities to prioritize which of these issues are likely to be an actual risk. It is possible to have something that comprises a major business risk but have a very low reachability context, which may lead a security team to treat that vulnerability differently.</p><p>Broadly speaking, however, it is insufficient to make decisions solely based on programmatically generated risk scores. Any risk score is a reflection of the system generating the score, and how that system was tuned, either by the vendor or by your team. It is important to always remember that any risk score involves some subjective judgments. This is necessary but injects opportunities for drift and bias that may skew scores in ways that leave you less secure.</p><p>To be clear, risk scores serve a crucial purpose in application security. Risk scores help you reduce the noise and find signal amidst the flood of CVEs and vulnerabilities and alerts. In fact, there is today so much noise around security that any effective team relies on multiple layers of noise reduction in their decision chain and prioritization and policy efforts. Where risk scores fail is with inability to map accurately to business risk or by inaccurately reflecting the reachability of any CVE or other reported issue. This requires security teams must build their own internal and mental models of risk, modeling threats against the most critical systems and creating context that can be used to verify decisions by the risk scoring systems. Knowing how data flows through application and infrastructure is crucial if a human agent can quickly judge the reachability and attackability of any given vulnerability presented or recognize when the automated risk scoring engines may not accurately reflect business risks.</p><p>In effect, there are two different processes at work — calculating risk and contemplating risk. Calculating risk is programmatic and automated, human-guided initially but driven by models applied against the mass of vulnerabilities surfaced by security testing tools like software composition analysis, static application security testing, fuzzing and linting. Contemplating risk is a more holistic exercise that leverage the human capacity for intuition and innate knowledge of systems driven by experience and hard-won insights.</p><p>Contemplation is what will help security teams identify undetected biases, guide threat modeling to better consider drift, and highlight areas where human breakdowns might have augmented risk in ways that a risk scoring system could never capture. Above all, contemplation is about context. The more context a human actor has, the better they can understand the big picture. The more understanding of the big picture, the better decisions that people make. This must also flow through and inform the models and the risk scoring engines so that the value of contemplation is captured in the calculation.</p><h3>How to Use Risk Scoring Tools to Minimize Reachability and Attackability</h3><p>A security team must constantly measure the efficiency and efficacy of all security tooling. The general rule is that security controls lose efficacy over time as vendors lose focus or fail to account properly for emerging classes of threats. When you have a security tool that generates risk scores in tune with your reachability guidelines and proves accurate, you should elevate that system to a higher level of trust and give more weight to its findings. That said, even tools that generate risks you think are accurate and perform well must be constantly evaluated and cross-checked.</p><p>Unfortunately, it only takes a small amount of drift to open up an organization to potentially catastrophic attacks. A critical part of this calculation is ensuring that humans stay on top of how the risk scores are created and continue to influence the scores to fight drift. Drift is natural but it is not inevitable. Your code and environment is constantly changing, This may result in changes in reachability which can materially impact your overall risk posture and should alter the way you approach different systems and risks. An automated risk scoring system may not understand that a new type of supply chain attack might result in subsequent related attacks on similar components in other operating systems, to name one example. Human intelligence and contemplation, really, is the secret ingredient that makes risk scoring tools far more valuable and reliable.</p><h3>Takeaways: Atomized Systems, Reachability and Risk and Humans</h3><p>The environment and application landscape will continue to atomize further as we move into new infrastructure paradigms like edge computing and all systems on the network gain capacity. For this landscape, security teams and the developers they work with on shifting left should:</p><ul><li>Recognize that we have shifted from a global perimeter to an atomized constellation of mini-perimeters and shift their mindset to consider security and building fortresses at the micro level as a key way to reduce reachability and risk</li><li>Developers and security teams need to assess the systems they build and protect on the basis of reachability and risk to properly prioritze. Risk scoring tools are useful element in reducing noise but cannot supplant human intelligence to “gut-check” risk decisions</li><li>All along the way, humans have to continue to guide and inform these risk scoring systems and ensure that risk scores do not become blind proxies for criticality and importance. Allowing automated risk scoring to dominate the decision process can make security drift more dangerous and allow human error to go unrecognized, leaving applications and infrastructure both reachable and at risk.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=39660e00a9da" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/reachability-and-risk-tools-for-security-leaders-39660e00a9da">Reachability and Risk: Tools for Security Leaders</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog">ShiftLeft Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Security and privacy in a world of digital identity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/security-and-privacy-in-a-world-of-digital-identity-87b880bf1756?source=rss----86a4f941c7da---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[podcast]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web3]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Vickie Li]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 Apr 2022 15:15:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-04-20T15:15:38.598Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Interview with Shinesa Cambric, Principal Product Manager at Microsoft</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*ovACvbeGWc-ocvWKsOt3XA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Our guest today, Shinesa Cambric, is an IT security professional who is passionate about designing roadmaps for identity and access management programs, and architecting security strategies for emerging technologies.</p><p>In this episode of Sources and Sinks, Vickie Li, developer evangelist at ShiftLeft, interviews Shinesa about her research in identity and access management at Microsoft. Listen on to learn about the identity management challenges we face today, how we can balance security and privacy, and where Shinesa thinks the future of identity management is going.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.buzzsprout.com%2F261001%2F10467696-security-and-privacy-in-a-world-of-digital-identity-with-shinesa-cambric%3Fclient_source%3Dtwitter_card%26player_type%3Dfull_screen&amp;display_name=Buzzsprout&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.buzzsprout.com%2F261001%2F10467696&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.buzzsprout.com%2Frails%2Factive_storage%2Frepresentations%2Fredirect%2FeyJfcmFpbHMiOnsibWVzc2FnZSI6IkJBaHBCRnQ0RHdNPSIsImV4cCI6bnVsbCwicHVyIjoiYmxvYl9pZCJ9fQ%3D%3D--1e1249e12ac8c8f1ccbdcd598ad7f13eff236383%2FeyJfcmFpbHMiOnsibWVzc2FnZSI6IkJBaDdDem9MWm05eWJXRjBTU0lJYW5CbkJqb0dSVlE2QzNKbGMybDZaVWtpRFRJMU1IZ3lOVEJlQmpzR1ZEb01aM0poZG1sMGVVa2lDMk5sYm5SbGNnWTdCbFE2QzJWNGRHVnVkRWtpRERJMU1IZ3lOVEFHT3daVU9neHhkV0ZzYVhSNWFWVTZEMk52Ykc5eWMzQmhZMlZKSWdselVrZENCanNHVkE9PSIsImV4cCI6bnVsbCwicHVyIjoidmFyaWF0aW9uIn19--7c01cea9791a272b28ad9ad979e61898eb50a271%2Fpodcast%2520%282%29.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=buzzsprout" width="500" height="210" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/0666be03092277c92e059215aed68fd7/href">https://medium.com/media/0666be03092277c92e059215aed68fd7/href</a></iframe><p>Source and Sinks is a technology-focused podcast. We talk about the business, people, products, and culture of technology — with a security twist. Listen to more Sources and Sinks here:</p><p><a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/sources-and-sinks/id1503847743">‎Sources and Sinks on Apple Podcasts</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=87b880bf1756" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/security-and-privacy-in-a-world-of-digital-identity-87b880bf1756">Security and privacy in a world of digital identity</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog">ShiftLeft Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Breaking the entry-level barrier with Jasmine Jackson]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/breaking-the-entry-level-barrier-with-jasmine-jackson-c3a8bc441e89?source=rss----86a4f941c7da---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c3a8bc441e89</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[podcast]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[careers]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Vickie Li]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 Apr 2022 15:39:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-04-14T15:39:00.177Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Launching your career in cybersecurity with self-study</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*HxOA-6pqJiC-y0bT-UMYmQ.png" /></figure><p>Our guest today, Jasmine Jackson, is an experienced cybersecurity professional who got her start through self-teaching. Looking at Jasmine’s resume right now, it’s difficult to imagine that she was not able to find a job at all when she first started in the field!</p><p>Jasmine has a technical background, but why was it so hard for her to find her first job? And how did she break through that barrier? Listen on for her advice on breaking the entry-level barrier in infosec and how she learned using CTFs and writeups.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.buzzsprout.com%2F261001%2F10404330-breaking-the-entry-level-barrier-with-jasmine-jackson%3Fclient_source%3Dtwitter_card%26player_type%3Dfull_screen&amp;display_name=Buzzsprout&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fsourcesandsinks.buzzsprout.com%2F261001%2F10404330&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fsourcesandsinks.buzzsprout.com%2Frails%2Factive_storage%2Frepresentations%2Fredirect%2FeyJfcmFpbHMiOnsibWVzc2FnZSI6IkJBaHBCRmw4Q1FNPSIsImV4cCI6bnVsbCwicHVyIjoiYmxvYl9pZCJ9fQ%3D%3D--3b15555105896e271d249e17e9468ac7d5956548%2FeyJfcmFpbHMiOnsibWVzc2FnZSI6IkJBaDdDem9MWm05eWJXRjBTU0lJYW5CbkJqb0dSVlE2QzNKbGMybDZaVWtpRFRJMU1IZ3lOVEJlQmpzR1ZEb01aM0poZG1sMGVVa2lDMk5sYm5SbGNnWTdCbFE2QzJWNGRHVnVkRWtpRERJMU1IZ3lOVEFHT3daVU9neHhkV0ZzYVhSNWFWVTZEMk52Ykc5eWMzQmhZMlZKSWdselVrZENCanNHVkE9PSIsImV4cCI6bnVsbCwicHVyIjoidmFyaWF0aW9uIn19--7c01cea9791a272b28ad9ad979e61898eb50a271%2Fpodcast.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=buzzsprout" width="500" height="210" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/d83cf313b744f9d55ba024425b9d5618/href">https://medium.com/media/d83cf313b744f9d55ba024425b9d5618/href</a></iframe><p>Source and Sinks is a technology-focused podcast. We talk about the business, people, products, and culture of technology — with a security twist. Listen to more Sources and Sinks here:</p><p><a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/sources-and-sinks/id1503847743">‎Sources and Sinks on Apple Podcasts</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c3a8bc441e89" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/breaking-the-entry-level-barrier-with-jasmine-jackson-c3a8bc441e89">Breaking the entry-level barrier with Jasmine Jackson</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog">ShiftLeft Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Spring4Shell: Spring Remote Code Execution Vulnerability]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/spring4shell-spring-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-acdf0fc1e03f?source=rss----86a4f941c7da---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/acdf0fc1e03f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[java]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[software-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[software-engineering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Vickie Li]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 02 Apr 2022 05:45:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-04-02T05:45:04.222Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Spring unauthenticated RCE via classLoader manipulation</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2a7sFli-DaV1Re1c" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@emilep?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Emile Perron</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>A critical zero-day vulnerability in the Spring framework was recently reported to Spring’s maintainer, VMWare. The vulnerability is an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability that affects Spring MVC and Spring WebFlux applications. You can find the CVE here: <a href="https://tanzu.vmware.com/security/cve-2022-22965">https://tanzu.vmware.com/security/cve-2022-22965</a>.</p><h4>What is affected?</h4><p>The Spring4Shell RCE vulnerability allows attackers to execute code on applications using the Spring framework before 5.3.18or 5.2.20, with JDK 9+. In addition, applications need to be mapping request parameters into Plain Old Java Objects (POJO) to be vulnerable. Finally, currently available POCs only work on WAR deployments on the Apache Tomcat server.</p><p>Because of these mitigating factors, the Spring4Shell vulnerability is not expected to have the wide-ranging impact of the Log4Shell vulnerability we encountered back in December. However, things can change, and more ways to exploit the vulnerability might be found in the future. And although this vulnerability might not affect the majority of Spring applications, its impact is devastating for vulnerable applications.</p><h4>How does the attack work?</h4><p>Web applications often need a way to take in user data from requests, and map them into formats that the application can operate on. Spring’s RequestMapping functionality gives developers an easy way to map request parameters. There are different ways of mapping request parameters into Java data types, and one of them is to map request parameters into Java objects.</p><pre>@Controller <br>public class ExampleController {</pre><pre>    @RequestMapping(&quot;/signin&quot;)<br>    public String accountHandler(Account account) {<br>        return &quot;You have signed in!&quot;;<br>    }</pre><pre>}</pre><p>This code specifies that we have a controller named ExampleController. It will handle requests to the endpoint /signin and the endpoint should take in a parameter called account as the request parameter. The account request parameter will be mapped to an Account object. Now if we send a request to the web service:</p><pre>http://example.com/signin?name=test</pre><p>The service will map the request parameter into an Account object with the name field set to test. This is a convenient functionality, but it also introduces security issues. Because if an attacker sends a request parameter containing another Java object, Spring would attempt to map to the appropriate object type. When a request parameter is bound to a Java object like this, the attacker can use the request handler to access the <a href="https://docs.oracle.com/javase/9/docs/api/java/lang/Class.html">class object</a>. And from there, the attacker can access other valuable object types via the properties of class.</p><p>An attacker can achieve RCE by accessing objects of the right classes that can lead to the execution of arbitrary commands. From there, the exploit potential is endless. For example, the attacker can write a web shell onto the server and achieve RCE on the machine. I originally thought that the vulnerability was insecure deserialization, but it is instead a class injection issue similar to this Apache Struts vulnerability: <a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2014-0094">https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2014-0094</a>.</p><h4>How do I remediate this issue?</h4><p>Spring now has new versions that are not susceptible to the issue. You can find the releases here: <a href="https://spring.io/blog/category/releases">https://spring.io/blog/category/releases</a>. If you can upgrade, your application will be safe from the vulnerability. Users of the Spring framework 5.3.x should upgrade to 5.3.18+, and users of 5.2.x should upgrade to 5.2.20+. If you use Spring Boot, versions 2.5.12 and 2.6.6 depend on the safe Spring versions.</p><p>If you are not able to upgrade Spring, you can make use of one of these workarounds, both of which will close the attack vector:</p><ul><li>Tomcat has released new versions that shut down the attack vector, so you can also upgrade to Tomcat versions 10.0.20, 9.0.62, or 8.5.78.</li><li>Since the exploit requires JDK 9+, downgrading to Java 8 is also an option.</li></ul><p>However, since additional ways of exploiting this vulnerability may be found, upgrading Spring is the best course of action. Keep an eye on your application logs and review them for any unusual activity.</p><p>Please see Spring’s official announcement (<a href="https://spring.io/blog/2022/03/31/spring-framework-rce-early-announcement">https://spring.io/blog/2022/03/31/spring-framework-rce-early-announcement</a>) for a more detailed discussion of the mitigation options and their tradeoffs.</p><p>Zero-days found in common dependencies like this one highlights the need to keep your dependencies updated and your software supply chain safe. You can use ShiftLeft CORE (<a href="https://www.shiftleft.io/shiftleft-core/">https://www.shiftleft.io/</a>) to help you identify the parts of your code where you’re using vulnerable versions of dependencies, and see whether the affected library is reachable from an untrusted source using <a href="https://www.shiftleft.io/secure-open-source/">Intelligent SCA</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=acdf0fc1e03f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/spring4shell-spring-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-acdf0fc1e03f">Spring4Shell: Spring Remote Code Execution Vulnerability</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog">ShiftLeft Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Okta’s Breach Highlights Risk of Putting Crown Jewels in the Cloud]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/oktas-breach-highlights-risk-of-putting-crown-jewels-in-the-cloud-52549d6c169a?source=rss----86a4f941c7da---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/52549d6c169a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[application-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[software-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[devsecops]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The ShiftLeft Team]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Mar 2022 19:10:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-24T19:10:24.845Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Arun Balakrishnan, Sr. Director Product Management</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ujOV4shbMYZmW6dS" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@markusspiske?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Markus Spiske</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Identity credentials and source code are critical assets that can create major risks for your organization when exposed by breaches of third-party cloud service companies that provide identity management and software composition analysis. Know the risks of pushing your crown jewels into other services running in the cloud.</p><p>When allegations appeared on Twitter on March 22 that cloud identity services provider Okta had been breached, the tech world held its breath. CEO Todd McKinnon tweeted, “In late January 2022, Okta detected an attempt to compromise the account of a third-party customer support engineer working for one of our subprocessors. The matter was investigated and contained by the subprocessor.” Speculation continued to run wild on Twitter that the breach may have affected other companies, leading them to instruct employees to reset their passwords and identity information.</p><p>The caution is understandable. Okta is used by thousands of companies, including some of the world’s largest enterprises, for identity and access management of employee credentials used to log into and stay logged into all types of systems. Okta stores user identities, passwords, and other data for numerous critical systems including SaaS (CRM, finance, HR), PaaS (developer platforms, serverless computing, etc.) and IaaS (cloud servers, cloud networking systems, cloud databases).</p><p>As one of the world’s largest identity and access management (IAM) providers, Okta has always had a giant target on their back; any successful breach could yield a treasure trove of data that could be used to pivot to attacks on many other enterprises and their systems. Making matters worse, a known Ransomware group claimed credit for the breach. An IAM provider is a potential vector for Ransomware that would be particularly hard to address because IAM occupies such a position of trust in the technology stack and software supply chain.</p><p>Breaches happen, even to companies like Okta that put a priority on security. This breach could have happened to almost any company, and more of these types of breaches on key cloud-services companies are likely coming. Nation-state actors will target cloud-based providers of critical services like Okta in the future, and are likely already doing so now. The larger question that remains, however, is that of risk assumed by enterprises when pushing so much valuable information into a third-party cloud services providers environment.</p><p>Storing critically important identity data with a third-party vendor means that you are trusting that vendor with your crown jewels. But you may have limited visibility into risks facing your crown jewels. We don’t have a lot of details about the Okta breach. However, several security vulnerabilities recently disclosed would have allowed attackers to <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2021/8/27/22644161/microsoft-azure-database-vulnerabilty-chaosdb">break out of supposedly secure containers</a> and penetrate hosts in public compute clouds <a href="https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cr8escape-new-vulnerability-discovered-in-cri-o-container-engine-cve-2022-0811/">or major container orchestration platforms (Kubernetes)</a>. So even if the third-party vendor you trust with your crown jewels does everything right, your jewels still might not be safe — due to vulnerabilities in the cloud itself.</p><p>Okta claims that this breach resulted from problems with a third-party customer support engineering provider that appears to have had privileged access to some Okta systems. This is another potential risk faced by handing over crown jewels to a third-party; you don’t know who else has access to critical systems or to your sensitive information.</p><p>The source code of your applications hosted in your cloud is another crown jewel, and constitutes an added potential vector for supply chain attacks or serious breaches. Pushing your source code into multiple third-party services beyond your code repository provider increases the risks of compromise and expands the potential attack surface on both your source code and on your organization. Most CISOs and security practitioners do not realize that their software composition analysis tool or other cloud-based security scanners suck in all source code and process scans in the cloud before shipping results back.</p><p>There is an alternative approach that safeguards your source code. At ShiftLeft we elected to use an agent-based architecture that does not require us to upload all your source code into our systems. Instead of the code itself, we upload a graph representation of your code (we call it a <a href="https://docs.shiftleft.io/core-concepts/code-property-graph">code graph</a>) with all sensitive information removed. (You can read more about how this works in this blog post — <a href="https://www.shiftleft.io/blog/why-your-code-is-a-graph-06-24-2021/">Why your code is a graph.</a>)</p><p>By abstracting away your code and only pulling a graph that we can analyze, we ensure that attackers cannot steal your code via our tool or use our system to implant malicious unauthorized code into your applications and repositories. This is both more efficient and more secure. It minimizes the attack surface and exposure to supply chain attacks, breaches and other malicious activity.</p><p>Cloud computing has revolutionized the ways we build and run applications. It has enabled microservices and radically reduced costs of creating companies and technology stacks. Reverting to the old world where everything critical runs on your premises on servers and on hardware controlled directly by your team would be an absolute non-starter. That said, we need to acknowledge the potential risks of storing our most sensitive information in services we do not control. Then, we must make intelligent choices about how much risk we wish to undertake based on the potential impact of a breach. Every additional exposure of your crown jewels in a third-party service in the cloud is an expansion of your attack surface and should only occur after a conscious decision based on risks and benefits.</p><p>To get a demo of static analysis of custom code, open-source dependencies, and secrets, visit <a href="http://www.shiftleft.io/request-demo/">shiftleft.io/request-demo/</a><a href="https://blog.shiftleft.io/www.shiftleft.io/request-demo/">.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=52549d6c169a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/oktas-breach-highlights-risk-of-putting-crown-jewels-in-the-cloud-52549d6c169a">Okta’s Breach Highlights Risk of Putting Crown Jewels in the Cloud</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog">ShiftLeft Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Importance of Securing Software with a Zero Trust Mindset]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/importance-of-securing-software-with-a-zero-trust-mindset-e2b68ec6d4e0?source=rss----86a4f941c7da---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e2b68ec6d4e0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[open-source]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[software-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The ShiftLeft Team]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Mar 2022 18:54:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-22T18:54:04.359Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Shinesa Cambric, Microsoft</h4><p><em>This article is part of a series showcasing learnings from the Secure Software Summit.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ihhdSGvHJj9FJZi8" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@morganeper?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Morgane Perraud</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>With the increase of supply chain attacks on everything from logging software like Log4J to takeovers of important JavaScript packages to compromises of network utility tools like SolarWinds, more and more organizations are recognizing the need to adopt a Zero Trust mindset. Zero Trust can improve security, reduce risks, and give organizations greater confidence in the integrity of their IT infrastructure and applications. To correctly set up a Zero Trust architecture, you need to understand what it actually takes to make systems Zero Trust.</p><h3>Zero Trust Definition and Guiding Principles</h3><p>Due to the rise of interest in Zero Trust, many misconceptions have built up that bear correcting.</p><ul><li><strong>Zero Trust is not a product or tool. </strong>In fact, there is no single tool you can apply to an environment to configure a full-stack Zero Trust implementation. Rather, Zero Trust is more about creating and refining an architecture and applying a consistent mindset.</li><li><strong>Zero Trust is a never-ending journey.</strong> It is not a destination. You are never done and finished setting up Zero Trust, because software applications and IT environments continuously evolve. As your environment evolves, part of applying Zero Trust is going back and reassessing everything you are doing on a regular basis to ensure it complies with the principles of Zero Trust and covers all your software and technology assets.</li><li><strong>Zero Trust does not mean your environment cannot be hacked or breached.</strong> On the contrary, under Zero Trust you constantly assume your environment has been breached. Zero Trust emphasizes building defensive layers that reduce the potential impact of any hack or breach and protect your assets and data.</li></ul><blockquote>So then what is Zero Trust?</blockquote><p>Zero Trust is a framework and approach to security that assumes an organization’s IT assets — software, networks, data — are constantly at risk and must be secured through continuous verification of the identity, and the application of “least privilege” principles against any identity — human or machine — operating inside the IT environment. The core of Zero Trust is the lack of inherent trust for any identity as a managing approach to building more resilient applications and segmented risk.</p><p>Zero Trust has several key guiding principles:</p><ol><li><strong>Verify all identities all the time using a strong form of authentication </strong>— not just username and password. Specifically, use strong forms of authentication, such as multi-factor authentication. This principle applies not only to human users but also to all devices, bots, services, APIs, and partner systems accessing your environments. They must be verified every time they seek access and continuously while they are active inside your environment.</li><li><strong>Always assume your environment has been breached.</strong> From this starting point, design your systems to reduce the blast radius and protect your assets as if an attacker is continuously present and moving within your environment to perform malicious acts — data exfiltration, system takeover, or other forms of abuse.</li><li><strong>Always enforce least privilege for everyone and everything operating in your environment. </strong>Least privilege means limiting access only to systems, applications, data and services required for each task or interaction. To properly apply least privilege requires an understanding of expected behavior for applications and services, what they should and should not be doing, and also creating a sense of context. Applying least privilege with context is also dependent on assessing the security posture of any device, service, application, API or identity seeking access. Your Zero Trust policy enforcement engines should always interrogate inbound and ongoing connections to understand where an identity is coming from, what it is trying to connect to, and what is the current security posture of that identity. The answers to these questions should inform and shape least privilege permissions and provide additional insight into the risk of providing access.</li><li><strong>Segment your environment to limit horizontal traversals or pass-through attacks. </strong>This is closely related to least privilege. The bottom line is, do not award any identities carte blanche access to your network, applications data, or infrastructure. Only allow identities access to the portions they truly need to perform their task, and only while they are performing that task.</li></ol><h3>How to Use Zero Trust to Secure Your Software and Software Supply Chain</h3><p>The conceptual language of Zero Trust makes it sounds like an identity architecture and network security approach, floating above developers. For building and deploying secure applications, developers and DevOps teams must also adopt a Zero Trust mindset. In fact, there are clear synergies between Zero Trust and application security — and particularly with regard to Open Source Software (OSS). OSS developers may not spend sufficient time and energy on securing their code, because it is not what they like about writing software. For this reason, if you are including OSS code (and nested OSS libraries) in your applications and environments, then you have even more reason to apply Zero Trust frameworks.</p><p>A useful framing is to think about Zero Trust as applicable from the inside out, from the outside in, and to everything in between linking internal and external, applications and APIs, code and integration/deployment pipelines, and partner environments. Properly executed, Zero Trust allows your developers to go faster but also be safer. Additionally, it is useful to view Zero Trust through the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) lens. You should design your Zero Trust architecture to deliver these elements in priority that map to your business needs and there are a few ways to implement Zero Trust principles to the software supply chain.</p><h4>Assume Your Code Has Been Breached And Is Insecure</h4><p>Conduct a software asset inventory, looking at and categorizing all code running in your environment. This makes it easier for you to identify unauthorized changes and build more resilient applications. Set up mechanisms to detect unauthorized changes or anomalous software behaviors. You may want to apply these guidelines to close partners and their software and supply chain, as well. Remember that attacks may be from you, through you, or at you.</p><h4>Manage Identities Carefully</h4><p>Analyze and categorize user entitlements to set a baseline for “least privilege”. Conduct an inventory of all identities active in your environment to identify known identities (and quickly recognize unknown identities). Set up mechanisms to analyze behavior of identities to spot anomalies and create a baseline for context and behavioral privilege and access policy decisions. Include partner identities in this inventory: your greatest risk may come from unsecure partners that attackers use to gain access to your environment. The inventory should also include service and admin accounts. The inclination is to set their privileges and forget about them, often awarding broad access so as not to slow them down, and also potentially providing an unmonitored backdoor to attackers.</p><h4>Inventory + Lock Down Integrations</h4><p>Inventory your external and internal supply chain. This includes all dependencies in the code, services called, APIs exposed or accessed, and tooling for developing, hosting, integrating and building applications. For example, you may want to analyze your CI/CD pipeline and deployment environments through the lens of segmentation and least privilege to limit access depending on the pipeline stage. Put in place measures to segment the software environment and prevent lateral movement, like application sandboxing (but make sure to also tightly secure your sandboxes).</p><h4>Code Assessment</h4><p>Developers need to apply threat models to their code and adopt the mindset of considering what an attacker might access and what they might do should they compromise an application or the surrounding supply chain. Obviously, for all code — and especially OSS code — developers will need to continuously look for vulnerabilities and scan code using tools like Static Code Analysis and Dynamic Application Security Testing. Zero Trust means continuous verification of your own code, not just the entities using the code.</p><h3>Zero Trust Takeaways</h3><p>As we continue towards a future of more complex and integrated application environments and more usage of OSS code for core application functionality, the Zero Trust future becomes Zero Trust forever. It will simply become a way of life in application development. That said, we should keep in mind four key guiding principles.</p><p><strong>Know Your Current State</strong> — Be aware of where your environment stands and your security posture, and direct and indirect impacts of security vulnerabilities.</p><p><strong>Assume Breach</strong> — Be able to identify anomalous behavior and continuously consider what could be done by an attacker if your app was used maliciously?</p><p><strong>Assess</strong> — Continuously assess the status and changes in the environment. Ask questions like: Who has what, when and where? Where do your integrated partners and vendors stand in terms of security?</p><p><strong>Continuous Improvement</strong> — Periodically assess and compare your Zero Trust efforts against desired security posture and make improvements that align with objectives around confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Constantly guard against risk.</p><p>These four principles map over to five key takeaways that any developer, application security team, DevSecOps team or platform team can apply today and forever.</p><ul><li>Review your environment with a Zero Trust lens</li><li>Recertify all identities continuously</li><li>Establish baseline app and identity behavior</li><li>Focus on detection and prevention of attacks</li><li>Design applications for resilience</li></ul><p>Following these guiding principles and basic framings will ensure your Zero Trust journey creates strong defenses that help protect your development supply chain from the outside in, inside out, and with integrated partners.</p><p>To view this and other recorded sessions from the Secure Software Summit, visit: <a href="https://go.shiftleft.io/secure-software-summit-2022-replay">https://www.techstrongevents.com/Secure-Software-Summit</a>.</p><p>To get a demo of static analysis of custom code, open-source dependencies, and secrets, visit <a href="http://www.shiftleft.io/request-demo/">shiftleft.io/request-demo/</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e2b68ec6d4e0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/importance-of-securing-software-with-a-zero-trust-mindset-e2b68ec6d4e0">Importance of Securing Software with a Zero Trust Mindset</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog">ShiftLeft Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Secure Software Summit: The State of OSS Supply Chain Security]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/secure-software-summit-the-state-of-oss-supply-chain-security-17781bcd08c5?source=rss----86a4f941c7da---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/17781bcd08c5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[software-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[application-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[supply-chain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The ShiftLeft Team]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 17 Mar 2022 13:02:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-24T19:07:44.650Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Dan Lorenc, Chainguard</p><p><em>This article is part of a series showcasing learnings from the Secure Software Summit</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*0JpaIJxznXkL7ZIF" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@rhsupplies?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Reproductive Health Supplies Coalition</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>The Open Source Software (OSS) Supply Chain is under attack. As evidenced by the recent Log4Shell vulnerability, the OSS supply chain is increasingly a focus for attackers seeking to exploit weak links in security. A number of research reports have recorded a significant increase in so-called “next-gen software supply chain attacks” over the past decade. These attacks look to compromise key links in the software supply chain including source code, build systems, CI/CD tools, and code testing tools, among others. Next-gen attacks are happening across all languages, all types of software and are increasing with frequency. Common forms include typosquatting, malicious code injection and tool tampering (like the CodeCov incident). In 2021, 64% of organizations reported they were affected by software supply chain attacks, according to container security company Anchore.</p><p>The increasing wave of next-gen attacks has driven new regulations mandating specific steps to inventory and make more transparent the content of software applications and the software supply chain. Specifically, Executive Order 14082, issued by United States President Joseph Biden, mandates a long list of security practices, including the inclusion of a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) with every application run by the U.S. Federal Government. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is creating reference architectures and templates for application security as a result of the Executive Order. In other words, regulation on software security will likely impact every company that produces code or sells products running on code (including SaaS products).</p><p>To be clear, some of the problems experienced by the OSS software supply chain are not exclusive to open source. The recent supply chain attacks on Microsoft Exchange Server and the SunBurst attack on the SolarWinds network management tool targeted proprietary code bases. That said, OSS is produced and maintained very differently than proprietary software. This does result in some unique risks. In this chapter, we will cover those risks as well as some promising initiatives underway to address those risks.</p><h3>Why Is the OSS Supply Chain A Juicy Target?</h3><p>There are two primary reasons. One is omnipresence and the other is weakness. It is not an exaggeration to say that OSS is omnipresent. According to Sonatype, 98% of all code bases contain OSS. This is likely an underrepresentation. You simply cannot build code from scratch today without using OSS components. It is too labor intensive and expensive.The ubiquity of OSS makes the supply chain that creates, distributed and manages OSS an obvious target. At the same time, the widespread use of OSS translates into an increasing burden on companies to maintain, update and patch all OSS dependencies in their applications.</p><p>This is an impossible task; it is far easier to insert OSS code to solve an immediate problem than to, over time, make sure that code is updated and not vulnerable. For this reason, Sonatype estimated that 92% of all applications contain outdated or vulnerable code. We have seen the impact of this inability of organizations to maintain their OSS code through attacks like the one perpetrated against Apache Struts software run by credit reporting company Equifax, a breach that exposed the sensitive personal and financial information of hundreds of millions of Americans.</p><p>In recognizing that OSS is a fruitful channel for attacks, attackers have focused more specifically on the supply chain because it is often the weakest link. Elements of the supply chain reside in the gap between responsible organizations and may be less strictly policed or less actively secured. Continuous Integration / Continuous Deployment tools, OSS libraries that can easily access other systems, package managers and open source developer tooling are all components of the supply chain that are widely used but often the responsibility of many or of part-time maintainers who write and maintain code as an unpaid avocation.</p><h3>OSS-Specific Challenges</h3><p>The three key benefits of OSS each create unique security and supply chain challenges. Specifically, OSS is open, free and transparent.</p><p><strong>The Two Sides of Open</strong></p><p>Linus Torvalds said that many eyeballs make all bugs shallow. To a degree this is true. But what if those same eyes are looking for bugs to exploit rather than fix? Not everyone on the Internet is nice and many seek to exploit the fact that anyone with a GitHub account can contribute code to critical libraries. This attracts a lot of great contributors but also a lot of bad actors and bad behavior.</p><p>The behavior is often hidden or delayed. For example, we often see bad actors ask to contribute to projects or libraries run by single maintainers that are relatively popular and used by big applications. Often maintainers struggle to keep up with the demands of these projects. A bad actor will offer to help, submit a handful of good PRs and gain commit privileges to the repository. At this point, the bad actor will then stealthily insert malware, such as a cryptojacking script.</p><p><strong>Free Puppy. Not Free Beer.</strong></p><p>Free is a good price. There are no purchase orders. This makes it super easy to use. Free also serves as a great distribution strategy. However, sometimes free is not worth it. If an organization depends on an application and it becomes critical, they might require fast patching, better compliance and official support relationships. Free OSS comes with no guarantee and this can be a major liability. An application’s maintainers might be writing the code and applying fixes in their spare time on weekends because they have a full-time job. In fact, research has shown that a significant percentage of the critical software powering the Internet is maintained by volunteers; this was the source of the Heartbleed vulnerability in the OpenSSH encryption libraries.</p><p>Free code also may not be updated for years. If a vulnerability is disclosed, you may not be able to get permission to merge fixes you write. If the code is abandoned and the author no longer checks comments or requests, then you are stuck and may have no choice but to fork the project. A hard fork on short notice can cause chaos and its own problems. This is what happened with a popular Golang library called JWT Go, which made its way into dependency trees across the Golang ecosystem. JWT Go was even included in Kubernetes, one of the most popular and important open source projects. When a vulnerability to JWT Go emerged, everyone realized the maintainer had abandoned it. Multiple forked versions emerged with different patches for the same bug. Chaos ensued.</p><p>It is a common refrain to ask companies to fund volunteer maintainers. There are numerous programs for this, including GitHub Sponsors, Open Collective and Tidelift. These programs are helpful but not sufficient. You can’t just hand people a small amount of money and get more secure code and professional grade maintenance. Even if you offered full-time salaries, it might not translate into well supported, secure code.</p><p><strong>The Illusory Benefit of Transparency</strong></p><p>Transparency of OSS is real but the idea that this code is getting audited and reviewed constantly is an illusion. Yes, the source code is distributed and open. But the sheer quantity makes it impossible to review all the code you use. If you are using millions and tens of millions of lines of code, you don’t have time or sufficient eyeballs. Even if you are spending considerable resources on code review, it is still easy to miss problems and vulnerabilities and relatively simple for malicious contributors to projects to hide malware or other bad inclusions. Reviewing the source code also does eliminate all risks. When most OSS code is consumed, it is running as a package compiled by another entity or developer.</p><p>Further, there is no guarantee that the contents of the package comes from the same source code you audited. We have actually seen this attack often with package repositories like npm and Maven, where malicious actors insert tampered builds or take over packages and insert code that is not listed as part of the package.</p><p>The CodeCov incident is one of the more recent and egregious examples. This free service for checking the code coverage of unit tests used BASH script running inside of a CI server for installation. The script. Was compromised and attackers inserted malware that could steal code secrets and export them. Those secrets might be tokens used to publish packages in npm or Maven and exposing those secrets allowed attackers to then compromise those packages. In another example, a PHP server managing source code distribution for the PHP project was compromised and multiple commits injected malicious code into the source code repository. The incident was caught quickly but it demonstrated how attacker could tamper with source code directly, bypassing code review and security processes.</p><h3>All Is Not Lost</h3><p>Innovative efforts to better secure open source and its supply chain are gaining momentum. The SBOM is gaining acceptance and it is getting easier to automatically generate SBOMs from CI/CD pipelines or build systems. A new initiative to make it easy to cryptographically sign code, called Sigsource, aims to remove barriers to code signing; ubiquitous code signing would make it much harder to compromise the supply chain by attacking the source code provenance problem at its root. Lastly, the Open Source Security Foundation has garnered tens of millions of dollars in funding from major technology companies and it is in the process of spinning up mechanisms to issue grants and otherwise provide a more robust financial support mechanism for OSS. These developments point to a brighter future where the OSS Supply Chain is far more robust and companies can more easily audit, track and trust all the OSS dependencies in their applications and the full supply chain that moves OSS code from developer boxes up into production environments.</p><p>To view this and other recorded sessions from the Secure Software Summit, visit: <a href="https://go.shiftleft.io/secure-software-summit-2022-replay">https://www.techstrongevents.com/Secure-Software-Summit</a>.</p><p>To get a demo of static analysis of custom code, open-source dependencies, and secrets, visit <a href="http://www.shiftleft.io/request-demo/">shiftleft.io/request-demo/</a><a href="https://medium.com/www.shiftleft.io/request-demo/">.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=17781bcd08c5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/secure-software-summit-the-state-of-oss-supply-chain-security-17781bcd08c5">Secure Software Summit: The State of OSS Supply Chain Security</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog">ShiftLeft Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Secure Software Summit Series: Focus on Preventative Readiness]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/secure-software-summit-series-focus-on-preventative-readiness-3c3d29612811?source=rss----86a4f941c7da---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3c3d29612811</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[application-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[devsecops]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[software-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The ShiftLeft Team]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Mar 2022 15:46:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-08T15:46:39.345Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Chetan Conikee</p><p><em>This article is part of a series showcasing learnings from the Secure Software Summit</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*rt5Yi7cOu3Py0Xba" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@towfiqu999999?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Towfiqu barbhuiya</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>The connected world economy and the COVID-19 pandemic forced companies to accelerate digital transformation. Sophisticated cybercriminals have seized this forced acceleration to lay the groundwork for cyberwarfare. In reaction to recent attacks ranging from the SolarWinds breach to the recent <a href="https://devops.com/?s=Log4Shell">Log4Shell</a> exploits, many companies have quickly isolated and patched their systems. However, these reactive fixes do not work all the time; nor does the watch-and-wait approach. We must focus on re-engineering our organizational operations and culture to build and maintain preventative readiness. Companies and infrastructures need to be more resilient and secure from the start by building secure coding practices into the development process.</p><h3>Secure Software Summit</h3><p>At the beginning of 2022, ShiftLeft hosted the <a href="https://go.shiftleft.io/secure-software-summit-2022-replay">Secure Software Summit</a> to provide industry experts and practitioners in the software development world a platform to discuss the latest methods and breakthroughs in secure coding and development practices — securing code earlier and better has become a discipline unto itself!</p><p>Some of the main takeaways from the event were:</p><h4>SBOMs are in Your Future</h4><p>In the very near future, organizations will need to better account for all the software and components of their applications, most likely via a software bill of materials (SBOM). The U.S. government has mandated barebones SBOMs, and we will soon see private industry start to mandate them, too, as part of procurement processes and auditing. This will enforce greater transparency and automate discovery of all dependencies and components in a way that, until now, was not common. Software composition analysis (SCA) will make this process easier and will become a standard part of the build process and the application development life cycle.</p><h4>Securing Open Source is Critical</h4><p>With Log4Shell and other open source software (OSS) supply chain attacks, application security teams must learn how to more intelligently update and secure the most critical OSS components and infrastructure. The average AppSec team needs to sift through massive piles of vulnerabilities and suggested security fixes — far more than they can possibly fix. We have seen record numbers of new vulnerability disclosures in each of the past four years. Proper prioritization based on whether a vulnerability can significantly impact an organization’s own applications and infrastructure is now essential amidst the blizzard of OSS dependencies that make up the modern application.</p><h4>Digital Threats Impact the Real World</h4><p>For many organizations in non-tech verticals such as health care that consume a lot of software, application security is at a crisis point — software vulnerabilities can literally put lives and our economy at risk. Researchers have correlated increases in mortality with hospitals running at higher levels of stress and capacity. When ransomware or other attacks impact health care institutions, the effect is the same as a massive pandemic flooding the ER: Doctors can’t use systems or equipment, care is rationed, patients are turned away and everything becomes more time-consuming. The net result is more deaths. Securing these systems against attacks becomes a matter of life or death — literally.</p><h4>Culture Change Must Come First</h4><p>Organizations will deploy new security architectures such as zero-trust, but these attempts will only be successful if AppSec and development teams change the culture around security. Organizations must recognize that the new normal is a state of constant renewal of trust. This will be challenging; constant renewal of trust requires entirely new infrastructure and a new mindset that can be hard on humans. It means implementing multifactor authentication in many more places and removing conveniences like administrative accounts that have blanket access to systems; it requires implementing least privilege practices. Software development will need to bake this constant renewal of trust into workflows and tooling to make it the new normal.</p><h4>Shift From Reactive to Proactive</h4><p>AppSec and development teams must shift from reactive approaches that tend to mobilize most resources during a breach or an incident and emphasize more proactive approaches such as better software security analysis and security chaos engineering. Knowing the unknown unknowns before they become a problem is key here. Netflix, which pioneered <a href="https://devops.com/?s=chaos+engineering">chaos engineering</a>, recognized that stressing systems frequently and constantly to see how they behave under adverse conditions often yielded surprising insights that could improve security (and resilience, more broadly). As mentioned above, creating better ways to prioritize vulnerabilities and focus on the ones that are actually attackable shifts the task from a hopeless burndown to a targeted and proactive tactical exercise that is manageable.</p><p>To view this and other recorded sessions from the Secure Software Summit, visit: <a href="https://go.shiftleft.io/secure-software-summit-2022-replay">https://www.techstrongevents.com/Secure-Software-Summit</a>.</p><p>To sign up for a free account for static analysis of custom code, open-source dependencies, and secreets, visit <a href="https://shiftleft.io/register">shiftleft.io/register</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3c3d29612811" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/secure-software-summit-series-focus-on-preventative-readiness-3c3d29612811">Secure Software Summit Series: Focus on Preventative Readiness</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog">ShiftLeft Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Interview — The Job]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/the-interview-the-job-46a6f4557ffb?source=rss----86a4f941c7da---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/46a6f4557ffb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[software-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[interview]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[comics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[software-engineering]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The ShiftLeft Team]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 04 Mar 2022 20:26:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-04T20:26:19.575Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Interview — The Job</h3><h4>Main Branch #25</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CHfC6KQh1F5Tit2Z79Bi3w.png" /></figure><p>Main Branch is a comic strip for developers produced by James Gilbreath, Jason Green, and Vickie Li.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=46a6f4557ffb" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog/the-interview-the-job-46a6f4557ffb">The Interview — The Job</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/shiftleft-blog">ShiftLeft Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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