<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
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        <title><![CDATA[SOOHO Blog - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[SOOHO protects you to grow while keeping the value of your blockchain services. - Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Draw-to-Earn Rising In Popularity, Smart Contract Loopholes Remain]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soohoio/draw-to-earn-rising-in-popularity-smart-contract-loopholes-remain-a319c996b140?source=rss----182a49657410---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a319c996b140</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[SOOHO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Aug 2022 06:14:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-08-05T06:14:38.229Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Vulnerabilities in smart-contract-based Gacha-style random draws are a growing concern as D2E games grow in popularity</em></p><p><strong><em>Written by Jasper Lee, Audit Tech Lead at Sooho.io.</em></strong></p><p>‘Gacha’ is derived from the Japanese word ‘がちゃ’, describing the sound of metals hitting against each other, like the sound you hear from toy vending machines. Similar to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loot_boxes">loot boxes</a>, gacha games induce players to spend <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_economy">in-game </a>currencies to receive a randomly generated <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gacha_game#Virtual_Item">in-game item</a>.</p><p>Given the random draw aspects of the game, this style is becoming popular in the <strong>GameFi segment </strong>of the DeFi ecosystem. As hacks remain a major concern in this ecosystem, our team at Sooho.io have been looking into the security of such games, in partnership with our clients.</p><p>In this article, we’re going to talk about the potential weaknesses that lie within the <strong>probability-based random draw </strong>functionality of these games when applied in a Web3 play-to-earn (P2E) setting. These vulnerabilities are inherent in all gacha-style NFT games that use a smart contract for the random draw process. As this approach is becoming more prevalent for the minting of NFTs in P2E games, we want to explain how these vulnerabilities can be avoided.</p><p><em>Different Popular Utility Models</em></p><p>Let’s take a look at the three utility models in these games that allow users to make a profit.</p><p><strong>First, there’s P2E like in Axie Infinity.</strong> This game uses the method of purchasing three Axie characters and obtaining a smooth love potion (SLP). Each player can earn through gameplay by selling characters and items according to the market price within the P2E economy, or through a breeding method, which involves obtaining better skill cards through mating characters and selling them at a higher price.</p><p><strong>Second, there’s a move-to-earn (M2E) model</strong> in which digital sneakers, such as those used in STEPN, are purchased as grade-specific NFTs. Then the energy accumulated every day results in mined GST tokens, as calculated by the distance traveled through exercise. Like Axie, STEPN has the function of minting new shoes through crosslinking with the mined GST.</p><p>For the third example, and the method we are discussing today is the <strong>NFT minting method based on probability-based random draws, or draw-to-earn (D2E)</strong>.<strong> </strong>Generally speaking, this random draw model is a good approach for P2E. Each player can generate revenue by drawing cards via attempts at a random NFT draw, to acquire both good skill cards and rare cards. However, certain vulnerabilities may arise in using this random draw function when smart contracts are the basis for the draw.</p><p><em>Flaws in Draw-to-Earn Design</em></p><p>In a smart contract execution environment, since the execution value is basically verified by all network participants as part of a decentralized network, this means the mechanics are exposed to everyone, and the value of the draw is therefore accessible via calculation. As such, all the supposedly random outcomes <strong>are</strong> <strong>actually computable</strong>.</p><p>Like anything else, NFT-based systems require proper implementation by the developer to be effective against compromise. Managing a database should <strong>firstly guarantee protection </strong>from intruders and secondly consider <strong>potential redundant copies </strong>of the data contained within it somewhere. If a public database were to be compromised, the loss of data stored could mean to a gamer a loss of assets purchased using in-game currency or real-life money. And without transaction data accessible on the user-end, these potential vulnerabilities are sure to have a compounding negative effect on the user’s sense of ownership over their own minted NFTs.</p><p>While NFTs are relatively secure, it’s no secret that hackers are constantly looking for new ways to steal something physical or digital. The rapid growth of money tokens, as something already in-game and in motion, has opened a unique revenue stream for hackers.</p><p>The element of surprise in the minting process has become very desirable for a lot of NFT projects, so in keeping the ‘luck of the draw’<em> it’s important that users aren’t able to determine anything about their NFT ahead of time</em>.</p><p>We are also seeing increasingly creative and varied minting strategies in which the raffle draw approach is used. For example, The Project URS raffle draw method allots shares to buyers based on their subscription size. If the subscription exceeds the total number of shares available, then the shares would be allotted using a random draw.</p><p>Thus, in a typical software execution environment, the random number draw will require an alternative generation model, by generating random outcomes from unpredictable input values. Examples of such random input values could take the form of the user’s mouse movement or CPU temperature at the exact time of the draw. Alternatively, the system could take random values from a centralized environment that exists outside of the smart contract.</p><p><em>Sooho.io’s Suggestions</em></p><p>Increasingly adopted in the NFT sphere, developers can revert to smart contracts behind the system currently in play, using it as a basis for fixes to vulnerabilities. Where information isn’t always transparent, Sooho.io’s automatic smart auditing tools can increase confidence for businesses and in-game NFT holders.</p><p>To ensure fair and fun gameplay, P2E (play-to-earn), M2E (move-to-earn), and D2E (draw-to-earn) project all need to provide customers with a stable execution environment. They can achieve this with the support of service architecture consulting from a professional security audit company, or by using authenticated functions such as Chainlink VRF.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a319c996b140" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soohoio/draw-to-earn-rising-in-popularity-smart-contract-loopholes-remain-a319c996b140">Draw-to-Earn Rising In Popularity, Smart Contract Loopholes Remain</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soohoio">SOOHO Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Kleva Protocol Incident: Root Cause Analysis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soohoio/kleva-protocol-incident-root-cause-analysis-80c20b8a2186?source=rss----182a49657410---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[sooho]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kleva]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kleva-protocol-incident]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[root-cause-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kleva-protocol]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[SOOHO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Feb 2022 10:42:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-08T08:50:16.602Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/678/1*i1Cb5qth6gbdly4n9SEnhw.jpeg" /></figure><p>안녕하세요,<br>수호아이오 오딧 팀입니다.</p><p>수호아이오 오딧 팀은 건전한 커뮤니티 조성을 위하여 정확한 사고 원인 규명 및 해당 사건과 수호아이오 오딧팀의 관계성을 밝히는 것을 목적으로 본 문서를 작성하였음을 밝힙니다.</p><h3>사고 개요</h3><p>이번 2022년 1월 27일 19:28 KST에 Kleva Protocol의 코드 업데이트가 있었고, 그 과정에서 Vault(Lend, Stake, Farm 기능을 관리하는 핵심 컨트랙트)의 이자 계산 로직에 잘못된 multiplier가 곱해져 비정상적으로 큰 이자가 지급되는 사고가 일어났습니다. 그 결과, 총 52,389,039 KUSDT 의 피해가 발생하였습니다.</p><p>KLEVA 팀은 수호아이오 오딧 팀의 검토 내용에 따라 수정 패치를 진행중이며, 99.4% 이상의 자산이 회수 확정되었습니다. KLEVA 팀은 본 이슈로 손해를 본 모든 참여자들의 리스트는 확보 완료되었으며, 해당 참여자들의 손실은 전액 보전될 예정임을 밝혔습니다.</p><h4>- Kleva Protocol이란</h4><p>Kleva Protocol은 레버리지 이자 농사 서비스를 전문적으로 제공하는 Klaytn의 DeFi 프로토콜입니다. Kleva Protocol에 관한 자세한 내용은 <a href="https://docs.kleva.io/">KLEVA 공식 문서</a>를 참조하시기 바랍니다.</p><h3><strong>사고 원인 규명</strong></h3><p>2022년 1월 27일 19:28 KST에 KLEVA 팀이 ibUSDT Contract의 업데이트를 진행합니다. 업데이트 내용은 다음과 같습니다: <strong>초당 이자율 계산에 사용되는 단위 변수(DENOM)를 10의 18승에서 10의 6승으로 바꾸는 패치였습니다.</strong></p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/8f8aad65d31522e9442d2b37b18eeabb/href">https://medium.com/media/8f8aad65d31522e9442d2b37b18eeabb/href</a></iframe><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/42a1e3cb4d048c970923b8b6ab2f6da3/href">https://medium.com/media/42a1e3cb4d048c970923b8b6ab2f6da3/href</a></iframe><p>이 패치는 ibKUSDT Vault의 이자 지급 테스트 과정 중에서 이자 계산 함수인 calcPendingInterest가 계속 0을 반환하여 투자자들에게 이자가 지급되지 않는 오류를 수정하기 위해서 진행된 패치였습니다.</p><p>이자는 아래의 코드와 같이 초당 이자율인 ratePerSec과 총 토큰 대출 규모 값인 totalDebtAmount, 그리고 마지막 이자 계산으로부터 초과한 시간인 timePast의 곱을 단위 변수로 나눈 값이 됩니다.</p><p>즉, 마지막 이자 지급으로 부터 지난 시간만큼 초당 이자율을 총 대출 규모에 대해서 계산해서 정확한 이자 지급양을 계산하는 식인 것입니다. 테스트 과정에서 대출이 발생 했음에도 이자가 계속 0으로 나와 KLEVA 팀은 단위 변수인 DENOM이 총 토큰 대출 규모 값인 totalDebtAmount의 자릿수인 10의 6승 (KUSDT의 토큰 자릿수)에 연관되어 있다고 판단하고 위와 같은 패치를 진행하게 됩니다.</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/c6950e6568195e9ecb780f82c1101ca4/href">https://medium.com/media/c6950e6568195e9ecb780f82c1101ca4/href</a></iframe><p>하지만 사실 단위 변수는 초당 이자율인 ratePerSec에 연관되어 있고, ratePerSec은 10의 18승을 기준으로 계산하는 것이 맞기 때문에, DENOM을 수정할 필요는 없었습니다.</p><p>실제로 calcPendingInterest의 값이 계속 0이 나온 이유는 QA 과정에서 발생한 대출금의 규모가 전체 예치 자산에 비해 매우 작았고, ibKUSDT Vault의 입출금이 굉장히 잦았기 때문입니다. ibKUSDT Vault의 이자 계산은 매 입/출금마다 호출됩니다.</p><iframe src="" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/89a72d72f455080b187dfcf5ef5905cd/href">https://medium.com/media/89a72d72f455080b187dfcf5ef5905cd/href</a></iframe><p>초당 이자율인 ratePerSec은 다음과 같이 계산되는데, 간단히 설명하자면, 전체 예치금 중 대출액이 차지하는 비율이 높을 수록 (가동율이 높을 수록) 높은 이자를 계산합니다. 그리고 그 이자를 초당으로 분할하여 값을 계산해 줍니다.</p><p>테스트로 넣어뒀던 대출(371 KUSDT)은 전체 예치금의 1%도 되지 않기 때문에, 10의 -14승 만큼 작은 초당 이자율을 계산하게 됩니다. Solidity는 소숫점 계산을 하지 못하기 때문에 단위 변수를 곱하면 10의 4승 정도 되는 값으로 나오게 됩니다.</p><p>다시 calcPendingInterest로 돌아오면, 10의 4승정도 되는 ratePerSec과 10의 9승 정도 되는 totalDebtAmount, 그리고 timePast를 곱한 값이 DENOM인 10의 18승보다는 커야 0보다 큰 값이 나오고, 그러기 위해서는 timePast는 최소 10의 5승, 최소 반나절 간격으로 호출되어야 1보다 큰 값이 나오게 되는 것입니다. 하지만 실제로 ibKUSDT Vault는 1분에 한두번 꼴로 입출금이 이루어지고 있었기 때문에, 이자 계산은 계속 0이 나왔던 것입니다.</p><p>결과적으로 이 패치로 인하여 의도된 이자보다 10의 12승 배 더 많은 양이 이자로 계산되어 출금 양에 영향을 주게 되었습니다.</p><p>이에, 2022년 1월 27일 19:32 KST에 KLEVA 팀이 새로운 코드 업데이트를 통하여 모든 출금을 차단한 22분 사이에 지갑주소 <em>0x02c6…</em>와<em> 0x6ffa…</em> 로 약 52,389,313 KUSDT가 과지급되었습니다.</p><h3>현 커뮤니티 인식과 실 사고원인의 차이점</h3><blockquote>아래 내용에서 ‘커뮤니티의 인식’은 현재 발행된 Post-mortem analysis 를참고한 것이며, 실제 시각과 다를 수 있음을 밝힙니다.</blockquote><p>현 사고의 초기 원인이 커뮤니티 내에서<strong> decimal 설정의 문제로 인해 이자가 계산되지 않은 것으로 인식</strong>되고 있는 것과 달리, 실제로는 애초에 e18 decimal을 기준으로 이자 계산 주기와 최소 이자 크기를 설계한 것이기 때문에 초기에 이자가 지급되지 않는 버그가 발생하였던 것입니다.</p><p>더군다나 블록타임이 1초로 짧고 가스비가 거의 없어 transaction 생성이 잦은 체인 특성상 이자지급 주기가 예상보다도 훨씬 짧아지게 되어 충분한 이자가 쌓일 시간이 없었습니다.</p><h3>현 사고와 수호아이오 오딧팀과의 관계성</h3><p>우선, 수호아이오의 오딧 팀은 공정한 보안 감사를 위하여 Kleva 개발팀과는 철저히 분리된 외부 업체의 입장으로 오딧에 참여하였음을 밝힙니다.</p><p>이에 다른 외부 오딧 업체들과 마찬가지로 오류가 발생한 <strong>업데이트 코드</strong>에 대해서는 감사를 요청받은 바 없으며, 따라서 <strong>해당 오류 코드에 대한 보안 감사는 수호아이오 오딧 팀에서 진행하지 않았습니다.</strong></p><p>그러나 ‘수호아이오’가 이번 Kleva Protocol 사업과 특수 관계에 있다는 점을 감안한다면, 외부 오딧 업체들과는 질적으로 다른 깊이 있는 접근법을 고안하고 코드 업데이트에 대한 선제적 오딧을 제안할 필요가 있었을 것입니다.</p><p>그렇기에 수호아이오 오딧 팀은 금번 사고에 대한 책임을 통감하며, 재발 방지를 위해 Kleva 개발팀과 긴밀히 협업하여 향후에 있을 크고 작은 모든 업데이트 건들에 대해 <strong>선제적인 오딧을 진행할 것</strong>을 약속드립니다.</p><h3>결론</h3><p>수호아이오 오딧 팀은 이번 사고로 인해 불명확한 오딧 Scope의 명시와 특수관계에 있는 클라이언트와의 세밀하지 못한 소통이 결과적으로 서비스 신뢰도에 영향을 미침을 경험하였습니다. 보안의 영역에서 서비스를 제공하는 팀이니만큼 더 신중하게 접근해야 했음을 절감합니다.</p><p><strong>현재, 수호아이오 오딧 팀이 보안 감사를 마친 코드 Status에서 보안 사고가 발생한 적은 없습니다. </strong>그러나, 이번 일을 통하여 기술적 역량만큼이나 절차적인 부분에 있어서의 미흡함도 서비스의 결함으로 이어질 수 있음을 깨닫고, 해당 절차적 부분에서의 보완에 만전을 기할 것을 약속드립니다.</p><p>마지막으로, 관련하여 수호아이오 오딧팀은 Kleva 개발팀의 보안 파트너로서 아낌없는 지원과 조언을 통해 해당 사고의 조속한 해결 및 서비스 정상화를 함께 꾀할 것임을 밝힙니다.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=80c20b8a2186" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soohoio/kleva-protocol-incident-root-cause-analysis-80c20b8a2186">Kleva Protocol Incident: Root Cause Analysis</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soohoio">SOOHO Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[수호아이오, 온라인 이더리움 해커톤 개최]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soohoio/%EC%88%98%ED%98%B8%EC%95%84%EC%9D%B4%EC%98%A4-%EC%98%A8%EB%9D%BC%EC%9D%B8-%EC%9D%B4%EB%8D%94%EB%A6%AC%EC%9B%80-%ED%95%B4%EC%BB%A4%ED%86%A4-%EA%B0%9C%EC%B5%9C-b0cc9f8d20c5?source=rss----182a49657410---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b0cc9f8d20c5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sooho]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackaton]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bill]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Jul 2021 02:33:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-07-21T02:33:39.079Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>안녕하세요. <br>수호아이오입니다.</p><p>수호아이오가 블록체인 생태계 발전에 기여하고 개발자를 적극 지원하는 계기를 마련하고자 토카막 네트워크, 디사이퍼와 함께 8월 2일부터 20일까지 온라인 이더리움 해커톤(Online Ethereum Hackathon)을 개최합니다.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*Zrw99Nmseqxt4h3KavZK0g.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>주관</strong><br>수호아이오, 토카막 네트워크, 디사이퍼</p><p><strong>지원</strong><br>코인데스크코리아, 위메이드트리</p><p><strong>참가대상</strong><br>이더리움 기반 서비스 개발에 관심 있는 개발자 또는 팀</p><p><strong>지원분야</strong><br>탈중앙화 금융(De-Fi), 대체불가토큰(NFT), 탈중앙자율조직(DAO)</p><p><strong>일정</strong><br>해커톤 참가 신청 마감: 2021년 8월 1일<br>해커톤 진행: 2021년 8월 2일 ~ 20일<br>1차 선정: 2021년 8월 24일<br>온라인 심사: 2021년 8월 28일 ~ 29일<br>최종 발표: 2021년 8월 31일</p><p><strong>심사위원</strong><br>수호아이오 / 토카막 네트워크 / 디사이퍼 관계자, 김지윤 DSRV 대표, 김준수 스테이크피시 전략 및 운영담당자, 박광성 A41벤처스 매니징 파트너, 임완섭 이더리움 재단 개발자, 독립 컨설턴트 최윤성씨</p><p><strong>상금</strong><br>1위: 500만 원<br>2위: 300만 원<br>3위: 100만 원</p><p><strong>특전</strong><br>- IR 피칭 기회<br>- 온·오프라인을 통한 프로젝트 홍보 기회</p><p><strong>해커톤 참가 신청</strong>: <a href="http://bit.ly/OEHackathon">http://bit.ly/OEHackathon</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b0cc9f8d20c5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soohoio/%EC%88%98%ED%98%B8%EC%95%84%EC%9D%B4%EC%98%A4-%EC%98%A8%EB%9D%BC%EC%9D%B8-%EC%9D%B4%EB%8D%94%EB%A6%AC%EC%9B%80-%ED%95%B4%EC%BB%A4%ED%86%A4-%EA%B0%9C%EC%B5%9C-b0cc9f8d20c5">수호아이오, 온라인 이더리움 해커톤 개최</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soohoio">SOOHO Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Belt Finance V2 Incident: Exploit Analysis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soohoio/belt-finance-v2-incident-exploit-analysis-1c57726a3187?source=rss----182a49657410---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1c57726a3187</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[binance-smart-chain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[belt-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[smart-contract-auditing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[smart-contract-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[JisuPark (jitkuu)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 May 2021 10:57:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-07T12:59:57.919Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/678/1*THO0ik5HKuwPK9jki6hqXw.jpeg" /></figure><h3>TL;DR</h3><ul><li>Belt Finance V2 has suffered from the Flash Loan Attacks which led to the more than $6M BUSD loss at May-29–2021 07:09:34 PM +UTC</li><li>The incident happened in the new multi-strategy vaults introduced in V2</li><li>SOOHO audited the V1 three months ago and did not participate in V2</li><li>Keep the safety of your Defi project with continuous security</li></ul><h4>Disclaimer</h4><p>SOOHO follows <strong>responsible disclosure</strong> and the purpose of the article is to provide accurate information to the community. SOOHO has assessed a security audit for Belf Finance V1 but unfortunately, we did not participate in V2 where this incident occurred.</p><h3>About Belt Finance</h3><p>Belt Finance is a stableswap AMM protocol incorporating multi-strategy yield optimization. It is running on Binance Smart Chain (BSC) and recently they support the Huobi ECO chain (HECO).</p><h3>What changes in V2?</h3><p>With the explosive growth of Belt Finance V1 that only supports Venus protocol strategy, Belt updated into V2 supporting multiple pools with multiple yield strategy for yielding across the BSC Defi services.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/742/0*A9Ti8Nbm4aeG7qE7" /><figcaption>New pool called 4Belt LP (ref. Belt Finance Medium)</figcaption></figure><p>Belt V2 induces deposits and withdrawals through an incentive bonus system so that the proportion of assets in the 4Belt pool is 25% each. Also, the price of each asset is calculated by aggregating relevant strategies.</p><h3>What happened in the transaction?</h3><p>The attacker manipulates the BUSD-USDT price through the Ellipsis and uses the Venus Strategy of BUSD. A total of 8 transactions used in the incident. Only the first transaction includes step 2. Transactions have several steps as below.</p><h4>STEP #1. Flash Loans</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Lu9933SreC2Dz5-XzA9UUA.png" /></figure><p>The attacker used 8 flash loans about $387m from the PancakeSwap</p><h4>STEP #2. Deposit $10m BUSD in bEllipsisBUSD</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Gu_ERbyx3SbG5wtaqRCzsQ.png" /></figure><p>The attacker deposited $10m BUSD in Ellipsis Strategy. Only the first transaction includes the current step. It is used for manipulating the BUSD-USDT pair price in step 4.</p><h4>STEP #3. Deposit $187m BUSD in bVenusBUSD</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QwzycWQDy-PzfxNfh9XqOw.png" /></figure><p>The attacker deposited $187m BUST in Venus Strategy and accordingly, the attacker gets $184m beltBUSD token.</p><h4>STEP #4. Swap $190m BUSD to $170m USDT through Ellipsis</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eIzE3YklSXsAxf8N6ImMAA.png" /></figure><p>Through the swapping BUSD and USDT in Ellipsis, <strong>BUSD-USDT pair price is manipulated</strong>.</p><h4>STEP #5. Withdraw $187m and extra $11 BUSD from bVenusBUSD</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9SO1wf5OVPdIerm2y23LIA.png" /></figure><p>The attacker has $187m beltBUSD through step 3, but the price has already been manipulated through step 4. As a result, the attacker was able to withdraw $11m BUSD more than the deposited funds ($187m BUSD) from Venus Strategy.</p><p>The root cause was because Belt V2 calculates the MultiStrategyToken price with aggregating strategies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/908/1*46Jwvy1tdsweBbacSXLzHQ.png" /></figure><p>In other words, the manipulated price in the Ellipsis affects Belt Finance V2 through the below code.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/698/1*9_aFIm_2W7j4gf0XL2R54Q.png" /></figure><h4>STEP #6. Swap back the $170 USDT to $189m BUSD through Ellipsis</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6RVn2RWXDSn3A0atJSBnbg.png" /></figure><p>The attacker swap $170 USDT back to the Ellipsis and got $189m BUSD back. (Actual exploit is $0.6m)</p><h4>STEP #7. Deposit back the $197m BUSD to bVenusBUSD</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lj7DqyLKqqXoibubxwl8CA.png" /></figure><p>The attacker deposits $197m BUSD back to the Venus Strategy. We need to remark that the original withdrawal is $198m in step 5.</p><h4>STEP #8. Repeat from Step 3 to Step 7 multiple times</h4><p>The attacker repeated the steps from 3 to 7 over 7 times.</p><h4>STEP #9. Payback the flash loans</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xEHN0tD_H_8-FLl2eiORmg.png" /></figure><p>The attacker pays back the flash loans from step 1 for the last. And moreover, the attacker repeats the whole steps (i.e., transactions) multiple times.</p><h3>Updates</h3><ul><li>We are sharing blacklist addresses with VASPs to track and freeze funds.</li><li>Belt Team announced the detailed report <a href="https://medium.com/belt-finance/may-29-incident-report-865d20cc46ca">https://medium.com/belt-finance/may-29-incident-report-865d20cc46ca</a></li></ul><h3>About SOOHO</h3><p>SOOHO provides an automated way for blockchain-based companies to improve the level of security with our smart contract analyzing program ‘Odin’. Odin has detected vulnerabilities of various blockchain SW including tokens, DeFi, Dapp, Hyperledger Apps, and Mainnet project. It can actually detect security vulnerabilities in smart contracts and even suggest a way to fix them in real-time. More information can be found on our website (<a href="http://www.sooho.io/">www.sooho.io</a>).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1c57726a3187" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soohoio/belt-finance-v2-incident-exploit-analysis-1c57726a3187">Belt Finance V2 Incident: Exploit Analysis</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soohoio">SOOHO Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is ETA: Ethereum Trust Alliance?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soohoio/what-is-eta-ethereum-trust-alliance-cc0e063b9e04?source=rss----182a49657410---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cc0e063b9e04</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain-solution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[smart-contract-auditing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[smart-contract-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[SOOHO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2021 02:35:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-19T02:35:11.348Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/904/1*j1JeWivvdC-bDV54kpTBqg.jpeg" /></figure><h3>What is ETA?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/0*xxTNGVwMJreG6MfO" /></figure><h4>Definition</h4><p>ETA stands for ‘Ethereum Trust Alliance’. In other words, this alliance is a global alliance of professional security companies to strengthen the credibility of the Ethereum ecosystem.</p><h4>The goal of ETA</h4><p>The goal of this gathering is to make people to trust Ethereum ecosystem. As the platform grows and changes from time to time, it becomes crucial to develop and upgrade blockchain security. It is natural that general Ethereum users rarely notice risk level without any security test, and ETA is just for people like them.</p><h4>ETA founding members</h4><p>Experts from popular blockchain companies such as MythX, Quantstamp, Runtime Verification, Sooho, SmartDec, and ConsenSys Diligence were gathered to establish ETA. All of the companies are globally trusted blockchain security companies, and this made it possible for ETA to work well.</p><h3>Achievements of ETA</h3><h4>ETA ratings</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/374/0*UFO4w_aISRGXwXUY" /><figcaption>Smart contract security trust level badges (<a href="https://ethtrust.org/">https://ethtrust.org/</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>ETA rating system contains security rating levels of a smart contract. There are smart contract security trust level badges, which represents the level of risk. If the level of ETA ratings is high, the risk goes down.</p><p>This system is essential for Ethereum wallet users to recognize the risk level of smart contract before they send tokens. Moreover, ETA rating level can be the qualification of exchanges and even be the part of risk analysis or assessment of organizations.</p><p>To use Ethereum as a platform of financial transactions, being trusted is important. ETA ratings can be the way to determine which contract to trust. The rating would inform users to notice which smart contracts passed specific level of rating test.</p><h4>EthTrust Registry system</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/602/0*tjKpUEqjTrJ9ey4s" /><figcaption>Overview of EthTrust Registry system (<a href="https://ethtrust.org/">https://ethtrust.org/</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Last year, ETA announced that it has been working hard on EthTrust Registry system. This system records which smart contracts was passed the test for security defects. Along with ETA ratings system, it would let Ethereum users to figure out safer smart contracts.</p><h3>SOOHO in ETA</h3><h4>Behind story of SOOHO joining ETA</h4><p>In 2018, the Ethereum conference Devcon5 was held in Osaka, Japan. SOOHO also participated in it as a leading blockchain security company. While the conference is in progress, CEOs of blockchain companies could talk to each other, and they found out the necessity to improve the security level of blockchain. So, they decided to establish ETA for the better blockchain world.</p><h4>Role of SOOHO in ETA</h4><p>All of ETA members do what they can do for blockchain security. SOOHO also would contribute to tasks related to smart contract security. For example, our smart contract analyzer ‘Odin’ would be used in ETA ratings. If you want more details of SOOHO, please visit our website (<a href="http://www.sooho.io/">www.sooho.io</a>) and get more information!</p><p>Reference: ETA website (<a href="https://ethtrust.org/">https://ethtrust.org/</a>)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cc0e063b9e04" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soohoio/what-is-eta-ethereum-trust-alliance-cc0e063b9e04">What is ETA: Ethereum Trust Alliance?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soohoio">SOOHO Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Braincolla signed MOU with SOOHO]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soohoio/braincolla-signed-mou-with-sooho-c0e860759efb?source=rss----182a49657410---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c0e860759efb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[smart-contract-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain-solution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain-startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[smart-contract-blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[SOOHO]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2021 08:33:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-02T08:33:23.946Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LowS3tfQRIHbRmwujo-EYA.jpeg" /></figure><p>SOOHO and Braincolla signed MOU on January 26th, to develop AI and blockchain-based global content IP acceleration platform! Through the partnership, we are going to cooperate by providing technology and information security to each other in the blockchain technology and security fields. Please keep an eye on us challenging for better achievements.</p><h3><strong>About Braincolla</strong></h3><p>Braincolla’s mission is to find fun stories anyone can enjoy by building human-machine collaborative intelligence infrastructure for content business. It provides an end-to-end solution that helps restructure legacy content businesses in content creation, distribution, consumption, and investment using AI and blockchain technology. For more information, please visit the website (<a href="http://www.braincolla.com/">www.braincolla.com</a>)!</p><h3><strong>About SOOHO</strong></h3><p>SOOHO provides an automated way for blockchain-based companies to improve the level of security with our smart contract analyzing program ‘Odin’. Odin has detected vulnerabilities of various blockchain SW such as tokens, DeFi, Dapp, Hyperledger, and Mainnet. It can actually detect security vulnerabilities in smart contracts and even suggest the way to fix them in real time. Visit our website (<a href="http://www.sooho.io/">www.sooho.io</a>) and get further information!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c0e860759efb" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soohoio/braincolla-signed-mou-with-sooho-c0e860759efb">Braincolla signed MOU with SOOHO</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soohoio">SOOHO Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Malicious Crypto Transaction Report 3 : Coinbene hacker’s money laundering flow analysis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soohoio/malicious-crypto-transaction-report-3-coinbene-hackers-money-laundering-flow-analysis-7dc1d9c9ee3e?source=rss----182a49657410---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7dc1d9c9ee3e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[compliance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Heejin Hwang]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Dec 2019 05:48:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-12-11T06:08:11.283Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Malicious Crypto Transaction Report 3 : Coinbene hacker’s money laundering flow analysis</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/678/1*S4FBd5LrgL0grMkcMDCfwg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Hi, this is mara who is a data analyst of SOOHO.</p><p>In March 19, there was a hacking incident on Coinbene, Singapore’s cryptocurrency exchange, which led to the hijacking of large amounts of cryptocurrency. Most of the cryptocurrencies were Ethereum-based ERC tokens, which were withdrawn shortly afterwards to Huobi and the decentralized exchange, Etherdelta.</p><p>Since then, Ether has been sent from Etherdelta to accounts including Coinbene hacker’s. The amount of funds withdrawn from Etherdelta in the form of Ether is found to be over 10,817 ETH and is now flowing through the money laundering process to the Russian exchange Yobit. The last time it flowed into Yobit is November 16, and now there are still about 3,000 ETH remaining.</p><p>The figure below summarizes and diagrams the flow of Coinbene hacker’s funds.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VQqlKw3Sq6PQQ9tAwi5_Ig.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1. Fund flow diagram</figcaption></figure><ul><li>Red line: token flow</li><li>Black line: ether flow</li></ul><h3>Key figures</h3><ul><li>Amount taken from Coinbene : 107 Types of cryptocurrenies, KRW 5.8 billion</li><li>ether sent to wallet related to Coinbene hacker from Etherdelta : 10,817 ETH</li><li>Amount flowed into the Yobit: 8,740 ETH</li><li>Amount deposited in red wallet address : 3,030.5925156861 ETH</li></ul><h3>Flow of the cryptocurrencies</h3><p>The below are the details of the movement of the cryptocurrencies.</p><ul><li>The funds seized from Coinbene on March 25 were 107 types of cryptocurrencies, total KRW 5.8 billion.</li><li>A day after, the hacked funds were withdrawn from hackers’ wallets to Huobi and Etherdelta wallets starting March 26.</li><li>Among them, the Ethers were withdrawn from the wallet where the token was deposited with EtherDelta and gathered into 0x6bbd2c904161f0d09f27a5abe42ce47997e0e2fe. The total amount was 10,817 ETH.</li><li>Since then, Ether has been sent to 0x6bbd2c904161f0d09f27a5abe42ce47997e0e2fe and sent to 0x1cab134c69a361d880a33eb98237b5557ad4cd2 on September 20, and after that, a total of 26 transactions have flowed into Yobit through approximately 6,800 ETH. The remaining 4,000 ETH was sent back to the wallet 0x43b69c2927e53f8cccdcb2bbb73bf637215405c7.</li><li>Later, in November, hacker transferred some of the laundry funds to Yobit, remitted the remaining funds to another account, and then slowly flowed the funds into Yobit on over several times.</li><li>Finally, the funds that have not yet flowed into the exchange are around 3,030 ETH, which was sent to the wallet on November 17th at 0x698a98afbca7423b413b5f0f7efabbb08a773767 and is still kept in there.</li><li>In addition, on November 16, about 55 ETH flowed from the hacker’s account to the Binance. After 28 minutes, there was a record of withdrawal of approximately 53 ETH from Binance’s wallet to one of the money laundering accounts, 0x8d419c8b98885a899844dc74f0213431a620be2c, possibly withdrawing the funds back.</li></ul><p>Therefore, each exchange should take action as soon as possible, including registration the wallet addresses below as blacklist.</p><h3>Address list</h3><ol><li>Wallet address of Coinbene Hacker</li></ol><ul><li>0xb3df999c5dc026dea265aeb02b8519844c9b6d5e</li></ul><p>2. Wallet address related to Yobit</p><ul><li>0xfe51c743cc2bd9546b4fdfba6478c229229c5ad0</li><li>0xdbe9dfaf4a94da4cdc9da677048c2d5ae6cd401a</li><li>0xdbe9dfaf4a94da4cdc9da677048c2d5ae6cd401a</li><li>0x6709b9bba3eafdb5dd7d3d0cc3a1d5178a77bacf</li><li>0x2521b8f714bf17baf3d7462ed86544c8592638b5</li><li>0xe83031ff3ff1f8b6e12fb80566a489ffc93392af</li><li>0x8c67d5ad5b9f28bc6cb31c81afc4fcf5cbb9609c</li><li>0x8c3d690ed8289358b837366250ea4aea80f9e129</li><li>0x82e047410fc84f904261a993333209f01dc952ba</li><li>0xa95527fb3a5473adf67c5ffbd514191d504cf76c</li><li>0x8d797502dd801b7ebddbe9180d29ba7fc9607012</li><li>0x45f951ae837823ab4fcac62391418bce4bcdc16b</li><li>0x42aaba73a577a1a3a2bde883b77ad4b972e6852d</li></ul><p>3. Wallet address related to Etherdelta</p><ul><li>0x6ec8572dac56c5a400cf2a94eb629b3eae029550</li><li>0xc7124291ddbef24f800e90b8476e03284ad18757</li><li>0x8173e3d5bb53a9e869307e0e19b6a4b4927bfb1b</li><li>0xba351e7f0c630b3baa30a0ff38f6f4a333ef2133</li><li>0x3d2b314516a614c821e586fb0ea4e645c66ede4e</li></ul><p>4. Wallet address related to Huobi</p><ul><li>0x712ae2390e296311d69fcd143a2ad2117a7ca997</li></ul><p>5. Wallet address related to Binance</p><ul><li>0xd9ee699014aefd7084033255af0cab02367c5b70</li></ul><p>6. Wallet address needed constant monitoring</p><ul><li>0x698a98afbca7423b413b5f0f7efabbb08a773767</li></ul><p>7. The wallet address took part in this money laundering process</p><ul><li>0x652fcc141c14fb95e3160b49e94dd868b6d2cd9e</li><li>0x84b60e8265d1a7c51592cd017e830357f644c7df</li><li>0x1be8ff95af0a819a7cb2494739b9903145c46d31</li><li>0x9664c954933bebbe320a24221b75d1efce058020</li><li>0x1f67836a991cd319db778b80806071eb05b42b4b</li><li>0x257dab66a7afe1a694676838695c7af644728b56</li><li>0x1c0f883fc1fb85bb10655f1a63d947fca49a46d1</li><li>0x9f2da349b5cfba583f70d2e03c60397bc92f49b9</li><li>0x8d419c8b98885a899844dc74f0213431a620be2c</li><li>0xe0071cbf23231b60c43051407a6029a37ba946f5</li><li>0xd59688b87e56621696f5bc994e91f027883c60f8</li><li>0x4fa909ccde53d08bdeaef158a1726d4d16d42110</li><li>0x17989484435e3ec07a0364189f6095d13f05b3f4</li><li>0x43b69c2927e53f8cccdcb2bbb73bf637215405c7</li><li>0x1cab134c69a361d880a33eb98237b5557ad4cd26</li><li>0x6bbd2c904161f0d09f27a5abe42ce47997e0e2fe</li><li>0x5af89ddde021869679530dc77ceb5cdb72f7d5e0</li><li>0xff74e337fd08960843d94e08771cc1d2cda2ecb1</li><li>0xee278bea06d3be84f69ae2dd15a77fbdcb27bd86</li><li>0x8db0620362b5a83ff77734831ded9f2d25f949f3</li><li>0xd1917932a7db6af687b523d5db5d7f5c2734763f</li><li>0xeefe879ca85b53ae6f48ba5f0bf4a74a841d83d1</li><li>0xcc1966c28d2bd35a99aa6b674937c33af2608fdc</li></ul><p>Thanks.</p><p>Please feel free to contact us if you need to analyze cryptocurrency transactions. (<a href="/service/mailto:contact@sooho.io">contact@sooho.io</a>)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7dc1d9c9ee3e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soohoio/malicious-crypto-transaction-report-3-coinbene-hackers-money-laundering-flow-analysis-7dc1d9c9ee3e">Malicious Crypto Transaction Report 3 : Coinbene hacker’s money laundering flow analysis</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soohoio">SOOHO Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[암호화폐 이상거래 보고서 3 : 코인베네 해커의 자금세탁 흐름 분석]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soohoio/%EC%95%94%ED%98%B8%ED%99%94%ED%8F%90-%EC%9D%B4%EC%83%81%EA%B1%B0%EB%9E%98-%EB%B3%B4%EA%B3%A0%EC%84%9C-3-%EC%BD%94%EC%9D%B8%EB%B2%A0%EB%84%A4-%ED%95%B4%EC%BB%A4%EC%9D%98-%EC%9E%90%EA%B8%88%EC%84%B8%ED%83%81-%ED%9D%90%EB%A6%84-%EB%B6%84%EC%84%9D-4790ba2af079?source=rss----182a49657410---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4790ba2af079</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[compliance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Heejin Hwang]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Dec 2019 07:30:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-12-11T05:41:32.179Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>암호화폐 이상거래 보고서 3 : 코인베네 해커의 자금세탁 흐름 분석</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/678/1*6fjMCXhH0Gv4p7UayN205A.jpeg" /></figure><p>안녕하세요, 수호 데이터 분석가 마라입니다.</p><p>지난 19년 3월 싱가포르의 암호화폐 거래소인 코인베네(Coinbene)에서 해킹 사건이 발생하여 대량의 암호화폐가 탈취되는 사건이 있었습니다. 해당 암호화폐는 대부분 이더리움 베이스의 ERC 20 토큰이었습니다. 해당 토큰은 그 직후 출금되어 중국계 거래소 후오비(Huobi)와 탈중앙화 거래소인 이더델타(EtherDelta)로 흘러들어갔습니다.</p><p>그런데 그 이후 이더델타에서 다시 코인베네 해커의 계좌 등으로 이더가 보내진 정황이 발견 되었습니다. 이더 델타에서 이더 형태로 출금한 자금은 약 10,817 ETH 이상인 것으로 확인되며, 자금 세탁 과정을 거쳐 러시아의 거래소 요빗으로 계속해서 유입되고 있는 것으로 확인됩니다. 현재 가장 마지막으로 요빗으로 흘러든 시점은 지난 11월 16일이며, 아직 3000 ETH 가량 남아있는 상태입니다.</p><p>아래의 그림은 코인베네 해커의 자금이 어떻게 이동 하였는지 그 흐름을 요약 및 도식화 한 것입니다.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VQqlKw3Sq6PQQ9tAwi5_Ig.png" /><figcaption>그림1. 자금 흐름 도식화</figcaption></figure><ul><li>빨간 선: 토큰 흐름</li><li>검은 선: 이더 흐름</li></ul><h3>주요 금액</h3><ul><li>코인베네에서 탈취된 금액 : 암호화폐 107종, 총 한화 58억원 규모</li><li>이더 델타에서 코인베네 해커 관련 지갑으로 보내진 이더 : 10,817 ETH</li><li>요빗으로 흘러들어간 금액 : 8,740 ETH</li><li>빨간색 지갑 주소에 예치된 금액 : 3,030.5925156861 ETH</li></ul><h3>자금 이동 과정</h3><p>구체적인 자금 이동 과정은 다음과 같습니다.</p><ul><li>지난 3월 25일 코인베네에서 탈취된 자금은 암호화폐 107종, 총 한화 58억원 규모였습니다.</li><li>해킹된 자금은 해커의 지갑에서 하루 뒤인 3월 26일부터 후오비와 이더델타 지갑으로 출금되었습니다.</li><li>이중 이더델타로 토큰을 입금하였던 지갑으로부터 이더들이 출금되어 0x6bbd2c904161f0d09f27a5abe42ce47997e0e2fe 지갑으로 모였습니다. 금액은 총 10,817 ETH 규모였습니다.</li><li>이후 0x6bbd2c904161f0d09f27a5abe42ce47997e0e2fe 로 보내진 이더는 지난 9월 20일 0x1cab134c69a361d880a33eb98237b5557ad4cd26 로 보내진 후 곧바로 요빗으로 총 26번은 트랜잭션을 통해 약 6,800 ETH 가량이 흘러들어갔습니다. 남은 4,000 ETH 가량은 다시 0x43b69c2927e53f8cccdcb2bbb73bf637215405c7 지갑으로 보내졌습니다.</li><li>이후 11월에도 요빗으로 세탁 자금의 일부를 입금하고 나머지 자금은 다시 다른 계좌로 송금하며, 천천히 요빗으로 으로 자금을 흘러 보내는 행위를 두차례 이상 반복하였습니다.</li><li>최종적으로 아직 거래소로 흘러 들지 않고 고여있는 자금은 3030 ETH 가량이며 지난 11월 17일에 0x698a98afbca7423b413b5f0f7efabbb08a773767 지갑으로 보내져 현재까지 보관되고 있습니다.</li><li>이 외에 11월 16일에 해커의 계정에서 약 55 ETH 가량이 바이낸스 거래소로 흘러들어갔습니다. 이후 28분 후에 바이낸스의 지갑에서 자금 세탁 계정 중 하나인 0x8d419c8b98885a899844dc74f0213431a620be2c 로 약 53 ETH가 출금된 기록이 있어, 해당 자금이 그대로 다시 출금 되었을 가능성이 존재합니다.</li></ul><p>따라서 각 거래소는 조속히 아래의 지갑 주소들을 블랙리스트로 등록하는 등 조치가 이루어져 할 것으로 보입니다.</p><h3>지갑 목록</h3><ol><li>코인베네 해커의 주소</li></ol><ul><li>0xb3df999c5dc026dea265aeb02b8519844c9b6d5e</li></ul><p>2. 요빗 관련 지갑 주소</p><ul><li>0xfe51c743cc2bd9546b4fdfba6478c229229c5ad0</li><li>0xdbe9dfaf4a94da4cdc9da677048c2d5ae6cd401a</li><li>0xdbe9dfaf4a94da4cdc9da677048c2d5ae6cd401a</li><li>0x6709b9bba3eafdb5dd7d3d0cc3a1d5178a77bacf</li><li>0x2521b8f714bf17baf3d7462ed86544c8592638b5</li><li>0xe83031ff3ff1f8b6e12fb80566a489ffc93392af</li><li>0x8c67d5ad5b9f28bc6cb31c81afc4fcf5cbb9609c</li><li>0x8c3d690ed8289358b837366250ea4aea80f9e129</li><li>0x82e047410fc84f904261a993333209f01dc952ba</li><li>0xa95527fb3a5473adf67c5ffbd514191d504cf76c</li><li>0x8d797502dd801b7ebddbe9180d29ba7fc9607012</li><li>0x45f951ae837823ab4fcac62391418bce4bcdc16b</li><li>0x42aaba73a577a1a3a2bde883b77ad4b972e6852d</li></ul><p>3. 이더델타 관련 지갑 주소</p><ul><li>0x6ec8572dac56c5a400cf2a94eb629b3eae029550</li><li>0xc7124291ddbef24f800e90b8476e03284ad18757</li><li>0x8173e3d5bb53a9e869307e0e19b6a4b4927bfb1b</li><li>0xba351e7f0c630b3baa30a0ff38f6f4a333ef2133</li><li>0x3d2b314516a614c821e586fb0ea4e645c66ede4e</li></ul><p>4. 후오비 관련 지갑 주소</p><ul><li>0x712ae2390e296311d69fcd143a2ad2117a7ca997</li></ul><p>5. 바이낸스 관련 지갑 주소</p><ul><li>0xd9ee699014aefd7084033255af0cab02367c5b70</li></ul><p>6. 지속적인 모니터링이 필요한 지갑 주소</p><ul><li>0x698a98afbca7423b413b5f0f7efabbb08a773767</li></ul><p>7. 이외 이번 자금 세탁 과정에 참여한 지갑 주소</p><ul><li>0x652fcc141c14fb95e3160b49e94dd868b6d2cd9e</li><li>0x84b60e8265d1a7c51592cd017e830357f644c7df</li><li>0x1be8ff95af0a819a7cb2494739b9903145c46d31</li><li>0x9664c954933bebbe320a24221b75d1efce058020</li><li>0x1f67836a991cd319db778b80806071eb05b42b4b</li><li>0x257dab66a7afe1a694676838695c7af644728b56</li><li>0x1c0f883fc1fb85bb10655f1a63d947fca49a46d1</li><li>0x9f2da349b5cfba583f70d2e03c60397bc92f49b9</li><li>0x8d419c8b98885a899844dc74f0213431a620be2c</li><li>0xe0071cbf23231b60c43051407a6029a37ba946f5</li><li>0xd59688b87e56621696f5bc994e91f027883c60f8</li><li>0x4fa909ccde53d08bdeaef158a1726d4d16d42110</li><li>0x17989484435e3ec07a0364189f6095d13f05b3f4</li><li>0x43b69c2927e53f8cccdcb2bbb73bf637215405c7</li><li>0x1cab134c69a361d880a33eb98237b5557ad4cd26</li><li>0x6bbd2c904161f0d09f27a5abe42ce47997e0e2fe</li><li>0x5af89ddde021869679530dc77ceb5cdb72f7d5e0</li><li>0xff74e337fd08960843d94e08771cc1d2cda2ecb1</li><li>0xee278bea06d3be84f69ae2dd15a77fbdcb27bd86</li><li>0x8db0620362b5a83ff77734831ded9f2d25f949f3</li><li>0xd1917932a7db6af687b523d5db5d7f5c2734763f</li><li>0xeefe879ca85b53ae6f48ba5f0bf4a74a841d83d1</li><li>0xcc1966c28d2bd35a99aa6b674937c33af2608fdc</li></ul><p>감사합니다.</p><p>이외에도 암호화폐 거래 분석이 필요하시면 언제든 편하게 연락 주세요. (<a href="/service/mailto:contact@sooho.io">contact@sooho.io</a>)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4790ba2af079" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soohoio/%EC%95%94%ED%98%B8%ED%99%94%ED%8F%90-%EC%9D%B4%EC%83%81%EA%B1%B0%EB%9E%98-%EB%B3%B4%EA%B3%A0%EC%84%9C-3-%EC%BD%94%EC%9D%B8%EB%B2%A0%EB%84%A4-%ED%95%B4%EC%BB%A4%EC%9D%98-%EC%9E%90%EA%B8%88%EC%84%B8%ED%83%81-%ED%9D%90%EB%A6%84-%EB%B6%84%EC%84%9D-4790ba2af079">암호화폐 이상거래 보고서 3 : 코인베네 해커의 자금세탁 흐름 분석</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soohoio">SOOHO Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Digital Forensic Challenge 2019 수상]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soohoio/digital-forensic-challenge-2019-%EC%88%98%EC%83%81-d48519fcf43a?source=rss----182a49657410---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d48519fcf43a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain-startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[JeonghwaHeo(puri)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 15 Nov 2019 09:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-11-15T09:01:01.384Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/678/1*Gs7OxoFoGXMbyGgTfqW33g.jpeg" /></figure><p>수호 소속 보안 연구원 로이(이한얼)가 속한 ArmyGo 팀이 한국정보보호학회에 의해 열린 Digital Forensics Challenge 2019(‘이하 DFC 2019’)에서 수상하는 쾌거를 거두었습니다.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Lfwp8DTzlR788vgq" /><figcaption>맨 오른쪽, 수호 보안 연구원 로이(이한얼)</figcaption></figure><p>작년에 시작된 DFC는 국내외 유수의 디지털 포렌식 전문가들도 참여하는 큰 규모의 대회로, 참여자들은 디지털 포렌식 내 다양한 분야의 문제를 다루게 되며, 실제 업계 내 난제로 손꼽히는 문제들도 접할 수 있습니다.</p><p>이번 DFC 2019는 약 100일(2019년 6월 22일 ~ 9월 30일)에 걸쳐 진행되었습니다. 대회는 크게 챌린지 문제 풀이와 기술 컨테스트 두 부문으로 나뉘어 경쟁이 이루어지는데요, 로이의 경우에는 챌린지 문제 풀이에 참여하였습니다.</p><p>챌린지 문제는 안티 포렌식, 침해 대응, 임베디드, 아티팩트, MISC 다섯 부문으로 나뉘며, 총 25문제가 주어지게 됩니다. 각 문제 별로 100점부터 500점까지 100점 단위로 점수가 정해지며, 문제를 풀게 되면 해당 문제의 부여된 점수를 획득하게 되는 형식으로 이루어 집니다. 로이가 속한 팀은 총 3838점을 얻어 총 70개 참여 팀 중에서 국내 팀 중에는 5위, 전체 6위를 차지하였습니다.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*GM4-D9Cx8PLNZPwV" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d48519fcf43a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soohoio/digital-forensic-challenge-2019-%EC%88%98%EC%83%81-d48519fcf43a">Digital Forensic Challenge 2019 수상</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soohoio">SOOHO Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[TTC 재단과 파트너십 체결]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/soohoio/ttc-%EC%9E%AC%EB%8B%A8%EA%B3%BC-%ED%8C%8C%ED%8A%B8%EB%84%88%EC%8B%AD-%EC%B2%B4%EA%B2%B0-439edf2d70fa?source=rss----182a49657410---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/439edf2d70fa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain-startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ttc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[partnerships]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[JeonghwaHeo(puri)]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Oct 2019 22:31:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-10-30T22:31:02.588Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>수호 X TTC 재단과 TTC 에코시스템 보안과 효율성 증진을 위한 파트너십 체결</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/678/1*bu5No8cc1sWAgXuhM9dNCA.jpeg" /></figure><p>수호가 TTC재단과 안전한 TTC 에코시스템을 위한 파트너십을 체결했습니다.</p><h3>TTC 재단 소개</h3><p>TTC 재단은 “블록체인 대중화”의 비전 아래 2018년 론칭한 블록체인 개발 단체입니다. 자체 블록체인 메인넷 ‘TTC’, 3,200만 명의 유저를 확보한 소셜 네트워크 보상 프로토콜 ‘에이콘 프로토콜(Acorn Protocol)’ 그리고 탈중앙화 금융 서비스 ‘티그리스 프로토콜(Tigris Protocol)’을 개발, 운영하고 있습니다.</p><p>모바일 월렛 ‘TTC 커넥트 (TTC Connect)’ 앱 하나로 자산 관리, 투표, 디앱 사용 등 복잡할 수 있는 블록체인 관련 기능들을 누구나 쉽게 사용할 수 있도록 제공하였고, 그 결과 첫 디앱 ‘tata’의 오픈 베타 론칭 후, 3달 만에 400만 개 이상의 신규 계정을 확보하였습니다. TTC 재단은 기술력을 인정받아 해시드, 두나무앤파트너스, 블록크래프터스캐피탈 등 국내외 유명 크립토펀드로부터 투자를 유치하였습니다.</p><h3>파트너십 내용</h3><p>수호는 TTC재단과 장기적 파트너십을 통해 전 세계적으로 사용 되고 있는 TTC 블록체인, 에이콘 프로토콜, 티그리스 프로토콜, 그리고 여러 디앱의 보안성과 효율성을 대폭 개선에 기여하고자 합니다.</p><p>수호는 이미 탈중앙 금융서비스 ‘티그리스 프로토콜’의 스마트 컨트랙트 기술 보안 감사를 진행하였으며, TTC 재단은 수호가 제공한 감사 리포트에 기재된 잠재적 취약 포인트들을 모두 수정 및 보완하였습니다.</p><p>수호와 TTC 재단은 향후 탈중앙화 거래소 ‘TDEX’와 소셜 네트워크 보상 프로토콜인 ‘에이콘 프로토콜’의 기술 보안 감사를 시작으로 TTC 에코시스템의 전체적인 보안 향상을 위해 지속적으로 협력할 계획입니다.</p><p>감사합니다.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=439edf2d70fa" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/soohoio/ttc-%EC%9E%AC%EB%8B%A8%EA%B3%BC-%ED%8C%8C%ED%8A%B8%EB%84%88%EC%8B%AD-%EC%B2%B4%EA%B2%B0-439edf2d70fa">TTC 재단과 파트너십 체결</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/soohoio">SOOHO Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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