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        <title><![CDATA[The Asianist - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Read independent essays, reportage, and historical analysis on Asian politics and society. Fostering Asian consciousness and solidarity beyond Western media. - Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Neoliberals’ Fix for the Education Crisis: Gutting the Humanities.]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist/neoliberals-fix-for-the-education-crisis-gutting-the-humanities-b3e00767572e?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1354/0*vHXJLp99QBCMavFf.jpg" width="1354"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">On the state&#x2019;s institutional assault on the humanities and social sciences.</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist/neoliberals-fix-for-the-education-crisis-gutting-the-humanities-b3e00767572e?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4">Continue reading on The Asianist »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-asianist/neoliberals-fix-for-the-education-crisis-gutting-the-humanities-b3e00767572e?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[teaching]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[education-reform]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philippines]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[higher-education]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Author, Lee Sankara, M.A.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 01:33:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-21T02:48:43.207Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[While the Nazis get jacked and train like warriors, the Leftists get fat, slow, and stupid.]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist/while-the-nazis-get-jacked-and-train-like-warriors-the-leftists-get-fat-slow-and-stupid-985634c21cf7?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1918/1*Pif3RcpZbi4KnHt02i2oIQ.png" width="1918"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">A polemic against &#x201C;Fitness is fascist&#x201D; rhetoric and how bad it is for the socialist revolution.</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist/while-the-nazis-get-jacked-and-train-like-warriors-the-leftists-get-fat-slow-and-stupid-985634c21cf7?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4">Continue reading on The Asianist »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-asianist/while-the-nazis-get-jacked-and-train-like-warriors-the-leftists-get-fat-slow-and-stupid-985634c21cf7?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-justice]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[socialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fascism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Author, Lee Sankara, M.A.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 01:46:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-09T14:52:58.338Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why we need to focus on the brewing condition in East Asia.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-asianist/why-we-need-to-focus-on-the-brewing-condition-in-east-asia-84c244270af1?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[asia]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[world]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Rajshree Bhardwaj]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 05 Sep 2026 04:24:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-06T19:10:27.212Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*NXuQe793OkcDMwmH" /><figcaption><em>Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force vessel in formation. Source: Stocktrek Images / Getty Images</em></figcaption></figure><h4><strong><em>Why East Asia Is quietly arming up as the US steps back</em></strong></h4><p>The current West Asian conflict has rewritten not just war tactics and economic emergency protocols but also geopolitical standings and deterrence set ups. While we think the crisis is regional it has already impacted our pockets and well our systems. And so, the East is moving ahead not industrially as we are used to seeing; but militarily. Japan is remilitarizing, Korean peninsula is in high tension, the Philippines and Indonesia are stockpiling weapons. Indo-Pacific is bracing for a perilous new era with echoes from past.</p><p>For decades the post-WW2 era offered the international community a comforting illusion: undeniable American Hegemony. You have US Bases/US military support? No one will dare to launch an attack against you. Mere threat of US sanctions could freeze conflicts in their tracks, but that situation stands shattered today.</p><p>From the authoritarian entrenchment of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela to the burning grounds of Ukraine; but nowhere is the downfall of American deterrence more visible than West Asia, and nowhere are the consequences more dangerous than in East Asia. Every time a global era collapses, people make the same mistake: believing that the system keeping peace is too big to fail, is too big to ever fall.</p><p>Same way, in the summer of 1914, world leaders assumed their economies are too interconnected for a major war to break out; in the 1930s, the League of nations watched aggressive military expansion in Europe and Asia, treating them as isolated, local, not too serious issues, definitely no threat to global security. And as its said history repeats, if i were to rephrase, history echoes.</p><h4>The historical weight of the Pacific</h4><p>To understand the gravity of the current moment, the historical weight needs to be understood. The common misconception of ignorance that East has been some utopia of ‘sunshine and rainbows’ built purely on industrial exports is what causes us to devaluate the issues and concerns to “regional conflict.” The region’s current geopolitical architecture is built directly on top of the unhealed scars of imperialism and scars of WW2.</p><p>China’s current military assertiveness is deeply rooted in avenging its “century of humiliation” at the hands of foreign imperial powers. Conversely, Japan’s post WW2 pacifist constitution: Article 9 which renounced the right to wage war was born from the ashes of its own brutal imperial expansion under the banner of the “Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, which culminated in atomic devastation. For 80 years, these historical animosities were kept in check by an overwhelming US military presence. But as that presence is questioned, the history is repeating.</p><p>And while our attention is consumed by the active wars in Eastern Europe and the West Asia, the actual foundation of global security: the American &quot;security umbrella&quot; in the Pacific is no longer as valued or feared. East Asia is no longer just moving forward economically; it has entered an era of rapid, competitive re-armament. Regional powers have started to realize that relying on the West to keep the peace is no longer a safe game.</p><h4>Anatomy of breakdown</h4><p>“Deterrence&quot; is the idea of keeping your enemies in check through the threat of overwhelming force, it’s entirely about belief and isn’t just about counting aircraft carriers deployed in the vicinity. When an adversary stops believing that crossing a line will result in severe consequences, the concept itself fails. The recent chaos in the West Asia gave rest of Asian powers a front-row seat to the limits of Western military dominance:</p><ul><li>The Threshold Crossings: Despite massive, high-tech strikes, from the deep-penetration raids of Operation Midnight Hammer on Iranian nuclear sites to Israel’s Operation Rising Lion and the joint Operation Epic Fury, a literal decapitation strike; Western firepower failed to achieve permanent escalation dominance.</li><li>The Asymmetric Counter: Relying on what is known as the &quot;Mosaic Doctrine&quot; a strategy of spreading out forces so they can’t be wiped out with decapitation, Iran proved that a heavily sanctioned nation can absorb blows and still strike heavily fortified US bases, like Al-Udeid in Qatar.</li><li>The Diplomatic Hollow Core: The failure of the 6 April breakthrough, fractured G7 summits, and the collapse of the Versailles deal proved a harsh reality: traditional diplomacy is running out of leverage.</li></ul><p>For strategists in East Asia, the math is simple: if Washington struggles to control adversaries in the West Asia; an area packed with US bases; why should anyone believe, the US will risk World War III over a few small islands in the Pacific? If a nation deemed to be “weak enough to not last a week” can bring US to the brink of desperate deals, what can a deemed next superpower like China can do? And why would Washington risk engaging in the Pacific only to walk in with a losing hand?</p><h4>Structural breakdown</h4><p>As classical realism dictates, when a security guarantor&#39;s credibility shakes, the international system reverts to raw self-help. Regional actors cease relying on multilateral treaties and begin stockpiling unilateral instruments of survival.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/1*OzCd8gTS1wkkJSzEXpSJ6w.jpeg" /></figure><h4>The Indian Precedent</h4><p>New Delhi saw this shift early. The execution of Operation Sindoor in May 2025, a highly complex, deep-penetrating military strike targeting terror infrastructure inside Pakistan marked a massive departure from decades of restraint. India demonstrated the new rule of the modern era: you can no longer wait for Western permission or global consensus to secure your borders.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/820/0*Rr9F2b-xvKdPHrDm.jpg" /><figcaption>A copy of Japan’s latest defence white paper with an anime-style cover in this illustration picture taken in Tokyo, Japan, August 4, 2026. REUTERS/Tim Kelly/illustration</figcaption></figure><h4>Japan’s Awakening</h4><p>This same realization is driving Japan’s most radical transformation since 1945. According to the Defense of Japan 2026 white paper, Tokyo officially views China as its &quot;core strategic challenger.&quot; Japan is methodically tearing up its post-WWII pacifist rules. They are acquiring long-range counter-strike missiles, merging civilian tech with military defense, and lifting bans on exporting weapons to arm neighboring countries like the Philippines. Why? Because Taiwan sits right in the middle of the shipping lanes that supply over 80% of Japan’s energy. If China takes Taiwan, Japan’s entire economy is effectively at Beijing’s mercy.</p><p>For Japan, defending the Pacific isn’t about entering a super power race as of now; it’s about pure survival.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*x6gHUPsymtAgkNKS9XF7fQ.jpeg" /></figure><h4>The Korean Peninsula</h4><p>At the same time, the security net on the Korean Peninsula is unravelling. North Korea isn&#39;t acting crazy; it is acting strategically. By supplying weapons and troops to Russia for the war in Ukraine, Kim Jong Un secured Russian technical backing for his own missile programs while battle training his troops simultaneously. The volatility was fully exposed just this month (August 2026) when North Korean troops blatantly breached the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) , forcing South Korean guards to fire warning shots.</p><p>Yet, the US response shocked allies: unilateral reductions in long-planned joint military exercises, paired with rhetoric from Donald Trump calling Kim Jong Un &quot;unthreatening and respectful.&quot; When an allied superpower tries to appease a dictator rather than standing firm, it forces nations like South Korea to ask a terrifying question: Do we need our own nuclear weapons to stay safe?</p><h4>The Chain Reaction</h4><p>The real danger in East Asia isn&#39;t that a leader wakes up and decides to start a global war. The danger is that the system is now so tense, and so heavily armed, that a minor accident could trigger an unstoppable chain reaction.</p><blockquote>Small &quot;Accidental&quot; Clash at Sea or in the Air<br>↓<br>Leaders Refuse to Back Down to Save Face<br>↓<br>A Country Calls on US Mutual Defense Treaties for Help<br>↓<br>Superpowers Face Off in a Crowded Ocean<br>↓<br>Global Trade Routes and Tech Supply Chains are Cut<br>↓<br>Global Economic Crash and Active Combat</blockquote><h4>The Most Likely Flashpoints:</h4><p>The South China Sea Trap: As the Philippines and Indonesia fortify their waters, China’s Coast Guard is using aggressive tactics, like ramming ships and using military lasers. A single fatal crash could force Manila to call on its mutual defense treaty with the US. Washington would then face a nightmare choice: fight a naval war with China over a reef, or back down and prove to the world that American alliances are worthless.</p><p>The Taiwan Trap: Beijing doesn’t need to launch a massive, D-Day style invasion of Taiwan. They can simply use their navy to surround the island and block anything from going in or out. Without firing a shot, China could force the world to either start a war to break the blockade or let Taiwan fall.</p><p>The Supply Chain Trap: A conflict in these waters isn’t just a political crisis; it’s an economic apocalypse. It would instantly cut off the world’s supply of advanced microchips (made in Taiwan) and paralyze global shipping. The production of phones, cars, and medical equipment would collapse almost overnight.</p><h4>The Horizon</h4><p>The tragedy of the 21st century may well be that we spent years preparing for the wrong crisis in the wrong hemisphere.</p><p>China has observed the paralysis of the West and achieved dominant strategic positioning without expending major combat power. In response, from Tokyo to Manila, the Indo-Pacific is quietly turning into the world’s most heavily armed maritime theater. We are living in a pre-crisis environment. If we continue to treat East Asia as a secondary storyline, we will soon discover that the wars making headlines today were merely the opening act for the real realignment.</p><p><strong>_______<br>References:<br></strong>Ministry of Defense. (n.d.). <em>Defense of Japan annual white paper</em>. <a href="https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/">https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/</a></p><p>Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. (n.d.). <em>The Constitution of Japan</em>. <a href="https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html">https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html</a></p><p>Haghshenass, F. (2008, September). <em>Iran’s asymmetric naval warfare and the mosaic doctrine</em> (Policy Focus №87). The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-asymmetric-naval-warfare">https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-asymmetric-naval-warfare</a></p><p>Katzman, K. (2021). <em>Qatar: Governance, security, and U.S. policy</em> (CRS Report No. R44533). Congressional Research Service. <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44533">https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44533</a></p><p>ChinaPower Project. (2017, August 2). <em>How much trade transits the South China Sea?</em> Center for Strategic and International Studies. <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/">https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/</a></p><p>Avalon Project. (n.d.). <em>Mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Philippines; August 30, 1951</em>. Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library. <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp">https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp</a></p><p>Permanent Court of Arbitration. (2016). <em>The South China Sea arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China)</em> (PCA Case №2013–19). <a href="https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/">https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/</a></p><p>Maizland, L. (2023, April 18). <em>Why China-Taiwan relations are so tense</em>. Council on Foreign Relations. <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations">https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations</a></p><p>Neely, C. J. (2025). The economic effects of a potential armed conflict over Taiwan. <em>Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review</em>, 107(3). <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/2025/feb/economic-effects-of-potential-armed-conflict-over-taiwan">https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/2025/feb/economic-effects-of-potential-armed-conflict-over-taiwan</a></p><p>Albert, E. (2020, November 16). <em>North Korea’s military capabilities</em>. Council on Foreign Relations. <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-korea-military-capabilities">https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-korea-military-capabilities</a></p><p>Stimson Center. (n.d.). <em>38 North</em>. <a href="https://www.38north.org/">https://www.38north.org/</a></p><p>Pushparaj, J. (2023). <em>India’s military modernisation and strategy</em>. Observer Research Foundation. <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-military-modernisation/">https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-military-modernisation/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=84c244270af1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist/why-we-need-to-focus-on-the-brewing-condition-in-east-asia-84c244270af1">Why we need to focus on the brewing condition in East Asia.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist">The Asianist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The glaring irony of Duterte’s “National Press Freedom Day.”]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist/the-glaring-irony-of-dutertes-national-press-freedom-day-130cd2efbf98?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*3SrIRbnrIqIRnf0v" width="1024"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">The dictator&#x2019;s PR move to cleanse his legacy of killing journalists.</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist/the-glaring-irony-of-dutertes-national-press-freedom-day-130cd2efbf98?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4">Continue reading on The Asianist »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-asianist/the-glaring-irony-of-dutertes-national-press-freedom-day-130cd2efbf98?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[journalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[activism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[duterte]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philippines]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Author, Lee Sankara, M.A.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Aug 2026 10:13:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-21T09:22:29.042Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why East Asia’s Patriarchies are Extreme Too.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-asianist/why-east-asias-patriarchy-is-extreme-when-measured-by-women-s-total-labor-time-3c630fa32922?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[feminism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sociology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[women]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gender-equality]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jules Vela]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 23 Aug 2026 06:55:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-09T12:36:43.648Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gaWHpjK2-BHw_Pc51eOIlg.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.pexels.com/zh-cn/photo/8553345/">photo</a> by <a href="https://www.pexels.com/zh-cn/@pavel-danilyuk/">Pavel Danilyuk</a> on pexels</figcaption></figure><h4>The unseen weight of paid and unpaid labor on East Asian women</h4><p>Many people default to the idea that only the Middle East represents extreme patriarchy, while East Asia has already modernized and retains at most some traditional residue. This judgment is convenient. It is not true.</p><p>I often feel puzzled when discussing East Asian feminism with Western friends. Their reactions frequently suggest they imagine East Asian women as something like Mantis from <em>Guardians of the Galaxy</em>, or as Korean girl-group idols — powerful, polished, and luminous. The broader stereotype of East Asians is that they are hardworking, diligent, quiet, and good at math. Almost no one sees what East Asian women pay in the private sphere after work, or as full-time housewives, under patriarchal culture.</p><p>The real measure of how much labor a society extracts from women is not whether the law still assigns guardianship to men or requires a headscarf. It is how many hours a woman actually spends in a day — paid plus unpaid — and how many kinds of unpaid obligations she is required to perform. Most of these obligations are installed early through culture and identity formation. That is why men in the region can easily say that every woman here is held to the same standard, and that if you fail to meet it, the problem is yours.</p><p>This is also why, in my extensive fieldwork, so many East Asian men in California insist on marrying a woman from their home country, even if she speaks no English. Their stated reason is almost always “cultural compatibility.” In reality it has far less to do with culture than with the fact that these women have been conditioned from childhood to serve men and to interpret various forms of male violence as normal or deserved.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8tNo2ltKd7D9i-lT7zQZzA.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.pexels.com/zh-cn/photo/8194168/">photo </a>by<a href="https://www.pexels.com/zh-cn/@iamirinaax-64831523/">Ирина @iamirinaax</a></figcaption></figure><h4>Today we will do a simple calculation.</h4><p>Japanese women spend roughly 3.5 to 4 hours per day on unpaid housework and care; Japanese men spend about 40 minutes. The ratio approaches 5.5 to 1 — one of the most extreme among countries with data. Korea is similar: the gap remains large and persistent. Chinese women work longer paid hours; their unpaid load is somewhat less extreme than Japan’s and Korea’s, yet their total labor time frequently exceeds men’s.</p><p>Because of long-term cultural conditioning, and because men have long performed the role of being “not good at anything outside work” while displaying a kind of wounded helplessness, many women come to see themselves as strong and independent precisely while still carrying a full traditional female workload on top of full-time jobs — plus the financial costs that fall on women.</p><p>East Asian women’s burden of beauty work is among the highest in the world. It is precise: neck circumference, weight preferably under ninety jin, skin texture, the color and tightness of private parts. Beauty maintenance is treated as something women must provide and cannot demand that husbands pay for. Yet a husband can still use “you are not doing it well enough” as legitimate grounds for punishment or infidelity.<br>(From a darkly humorous angle, Middle Eastern women, by comparison, are spared a great deal of time and money on this particular lifelong project.)</p><p>Traditional expectations of East Asian women include obedience, being sensible and understanding, caring for the husband, and the skill of “reading the air” — guessing, from childhood training, whether a silent or expressionless man wants more conversation, liveliness, quiet gentleness, or something else. Misreading him is your failure and your fault. Anyone — men, other women, or the man himself — can use it to shame or discipline you. This remains a widely accepted reason for a husband’s dissatisfaction and punishment of his wife.</p><p>When many Western friends conclude that East Asian men are not particularly violent or dangerous, it is largely because they are not East Asian women. Much of the punishment of women is carried out through culture and collective reinforcement rather than open physical force.</p><p>I am reminded of a scene in <em>Desert Flower</em>: a Somali nurse in Britain shames Waris Dirie in their shared language for allowing a white male doctor to examine her, and for accepting the removal of the stitches of her circumcision — calling it a complete betrayal of tradition, family, people, and religion. Waris flees the hospital in tears. The British doctor had only called the nurse to translate. The nurse used the mother tongue to punish her again.</p><p>I recognized this pattern because I experienced the same form of cultural punishment in the United States during a period of depression. A white teacher, and later a professor, brought in native speakers of my language out of a genuine desire to help me. What I received instead was moral and cultural discipline that deepened the depression and made the environment worse.</p><p>We return to the question: why the oppression of East Asian women is not lighter than that of women in the Middle East.</p><p>Married Japanese women have a high rate of part-time work, which pulls down the overall average of paid hours. But once the lens focuses on employed women — especially wives in dual-earner households — the picture is clear: they typically complete near-standard paid working hours and then perform the overwhelming majority of housework and childcare. Men contribute almost nothing. The result is a double burden, not a modern division of labor.</p><p>The Middle East and North Africa present a different pattern. Female labor-force participation is much lower; more women perform housework and care full-time, so absolute unpaid hours are often higher. Gender segregation is more public, and legal and religious restrictions on women’s movement are more direct. Because participation rates are low, average paid hours across all women are heavily depressed. Both structures are heavy; their forms differ.</p><p>For employed women in East Asia (especially Japan and Korea, and full-time employed women in China), total labor time — paid plus unpaid — frequently ranks among the heaviest in the world. The double burden is typical. Averaged across all women, the Middle East shows higher unpaid hours and lower paid hours. The composition is different.</p><p>East Asia has already brought more than half of women into the labor market (roughly 54% in Japan, 55% in Korea, and around 60% in China for women aged 15 and over), yet it has almost never redistributed unpaid labor in parallel. The result is not liberation. It is many women carrying both paid work and the great majority of domestic and care work. Low participation in the Middle East is one mode of extraction; high participation plus near-zero male sharing in East Asia is another.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y6OB2ZFJG2su_sTrXgGVbw.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.pexels.com/zh-cn/@yi-ren-57040649/">photo</a> by <a href="http://YI REN">Pavel Danilyuk</a> on pexels</figcaption></figure><h4>Why is East Asia so easily underestimated?</h4><p>Middle Eastern patriarchy has visible symbols: dress codes, guardianship systems, open gender segregation. These are easy to see and easy to label extreme.</p><p>East Asian extraction is more concealed. It does not rely on forbidding women from leaving the house. It relies on three overlapping mechanisms:</p><ol><li>Encouraging or compelling women into the labor market (economic necessity, low fertility pressure, the dual-earner norm);</li><li>Locking the final responsibility for housework, childcare, and elder care almost exclusively onto women;</li><li>Using institutions and culture (Japan’s spousal tax deduction and Category 3 insured person system, Korea’s ancestral rites and proxy filial piety, the pervasive standard of the “good wife/good mother”) to make this allocation appear natural and even moral.</li></ol><p>The result is a highly efficient form of extraction: women contribute both paid and unpaid labor, while men’s unpaid contribution can remain close to zero for decades. The fact that Japanese and Korean men rank at the bottom internationally in housework time is not accidental; it is structural.</p><p>When people say “East Asia already lets women work, so it cannot be that extreme,” they omit the second half of the sentence: after women went out to work, the labor inside the home was never reallocated. It was simply added on top.</p><p>Extreme patriarchy does not have only one face.<br>One face excludes women as far as possible from the public sphere and assigns them almost all reproductive labor in the private sphere.<br>Another face permits or even requires women to enter the public sphere, refuses to redistribute private-sphere labor, and achieves a more efficient extraction through the double burden.</p><p>The first is easy to see. The second is easily covered by narratives of progress. The Japanese and Korean pattern belongs especially to the second. China, with longer paid hours, is closer to “heavy on both ends.”</p><p>Measured by total labor time rather than by cultural symbols, the situation of East Asian women — especially employed women — fully belongs in any serious discussion of the extreme. This is not a competition in suffering with the Middle East. It is a refusal to use “already modernized” as an excuse to treat ongoing, calculable, almost entirely unshared labor extraction as something that belongs to the past.</p><p>I have written a great deal on these subjects. Some Western readers still treat the cases as extreme outliers. Articles written in my mother tongue are often dismissed by local readers as unnecessary, as if I am merely manufacturing anxiety: “Just live well and stop thinking about it. Lucky and unlucky women exist everywhere; the whole world is the same.”</p><p>For these readers, refusing to name the demon feels like a way to prolong survival and to display strength and wisdom. They also believe that sufficient intelligence and endurance will allow them to have the last laugh.</p><p><a href="https://julesvela.substack.com/p/the-hours-no-one-counts"><strong>The Hours No One Counts</strong></a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*c_5GRNFXgi4XXmy9.jpeg" /><figcaption>Made with Grok imagine</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Copyright Notice</strong></p><p>© Jules Vela. All rights reserved.</p><p>The concepts of Narrative Correctness, Narrative Correctness Gaslighting, Femiharm-Based Pleasure, and Cultural Dark Tetrad are original theoretical frameworks coined and developed by Jules Vela, forming part of the Dark Disease series. No part of this work, including its terminology, frameworks, or analytical structures, may be reproduced, adapted, or cited without attribution to the author. Unauthorized use constitutes intellectual property infringement.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3c630fa32922" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist/why-east-asias-patriarchy-is-extreme-when-measured-by-women-s-total-labor-time-3c630fa32922">Why East Asia’s Patriarchies are Extreme Too.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist">The Asianist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lost and Found in Vietnam]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-asianist/lost-and-found-in-vietnam-0ebb46ca86da?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0ebb46ca86da</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[vietnam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[travel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[travel-writing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Radhika Mimani]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 23 Aug 2026 06:47:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-23T06:47:35.169Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*3W4z_LJcM0ssyWsl" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@thao_ho?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Thao Ho</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>It’s been over a month since the suitcases have been cleaned and stacked up in the loft; the holiday gear, jackets, and snorkels have been washed, dried, and put away. The gifts have been distributed, and the souvenirs and shopping have been tucked away. There is no physical trace of my vacation to Vietnam except the silk lanterns hanging in the garden or the bamboo root masks occupying the wall. But what remains after everything has returned to its grind is the euphoria of this escapade.</p><p>To me, it doesn’t matter whether we missed the checklist or skipped an attraction or omitted a popular eatery. In my memory, Vietnam stays alive through the sights, smells, and sounds that washed over my senses with an oriental calm. What I reminisce about are cringe conversations with my teenage kids; their ecstatic shopping sprees; the crazy antics of my daughter; the cool, detached vibe of my son; the ease of being with my partner; and the exciting late nights of couplehood.</p><p>However, because my camera fails me, it is in words that I preserve these precious memories. Memories that hug me with gentle contentment. As I recount these memories, I promise you that you’ll feel them vicariously in your body because I am writing from my senses and not from my intellect. Dear reader, if you have indulged me by reading thus far, I am obliged not to bore you with the drabness of my itinerary or the list of things to do.</p><p>My eyes had so much to absorb that first morning we landed in Hanoi and stepped out on the streets looking for breakfast. Every hundred steps, sat groups of men and women huddled on low stools, with animated expressions and hasty chopsticks doing the talking. It looked like a communal practice with ladles of soup poured over blanched greens, fresh vegetables, and noodles. Generous helpings of silken tofu and fragrant herbs adorning the street pho.</p><p>Most fascinating was to see people sitting in big and small cafes ubiquitously, with the chairs facing the road instead of each other. As if ‘watching the world go by’ were a national pastime, and me being me, I wanted to do the same. So, we tried fascinating coffees across several cafes, wafting bold aromas and robust flavours, whether salted, coconut, pistachio, or almond. Assimilating the touristy with the local, it felt as if being in Hanoi bought you more hours on hand.</p><p>In complete contrast to this slow coffee culture was the electric vibe of Beer Street in the old town. Just being there made you feel more alive, more chaotic, and crazier. Blasting music, dancing people, flowing drinks, and pulsating streets could bring the dead to life. I did what I do best — watch people, strike up conversations, and cook up fantastical stories about them all in my mind. However, the experience of Hanoi would be incomplete without mentioning one of the finest pizzas of my life that I savoured at 4P’s Pizza. I am salivating as I recall the tenderest bite of the juiciest grilled aubergine sitting flamboyantly over the warm and soft pizza base. Do not miss out on this ambrosial food when in Hanoi, and avoid going in as a walk-in because you have no idea of how incredibly overbooked they are.</p><p>The following day, we embarked on a cruise of Ha Long Bay to experience this magnificent natural wonder, which is recognised as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. However, I am not giving any build-up to this breathtaking view because it just didn’t take my breath away. My view may be an exception, but the landscape with its petite islands scattered along the sea was underwhelming for me. Nevertheless, the Sung Sot caves, carved out of sunken limestones and acidic water, certainly awed me with its massive proportions. A stunning marvel of stalagmites and stalactites conjured a mystical play of light and shade through its openings and crevices.</p><p>However, it is the tantalising Michelin star-level dinner service on the Ambassador Cruise that remains etched in my memory. It was extraordinary how the cruise team went to the effort of curating a fully vegetarian sit-down meal for us, all without compromising on flavours, presentation, or service. The charcoal-grilled eggplant ratatouille, served with saffron sauce, titillated and sated my taste buds entirely, while every other course was equally meticulous and delicious. Not to mention, the chef and his team even succeeded in incorporating <em>pani puri</em> into the Indian vegetarian buffet. The sight of it delighted the foreign passengers like small kids, while I found myself grinning in amusement.</p><p>However, as we flew out and reached Hoi An, it seemed like an antique land of quaint romance. What a charming city, lit by a thousand lanterns and existing dreamily against the Hoai river. Unlike most Indian tourists, who choose to stay in Danang and visit Hoi An as a day trip, we opted to spend three languorous days in this fairy tale town. If someone were to ask me what to do there, my only response would be ‘slow down’. I slowed down to bicycle, to unwind with a massage, to sit by the river and read, to stroll around and drink, and to window shop and admire the gardening skills of the affable Vietnamese people.</p><p>I was enraptured by the copious spring in every nook and corner of that city. Multitudes of flowers in the most gorgeous colours overhung from ceilings, roofs, awnings, and entrances — just about everywhere. Their bonsai horticulture was another remarkable feat for me. But as the evening came along, the multihued lanterns in the stores, streets and river dramatised the scene most enchantingly. It transports you to an ancient site steeped in history, culture, and tradition. Hordes of shoppers, day-trippers, and travellers behold this picturesque view, ironically not so much in their eyes as in their clicks.</p><p>With the evening kerfuffle settling down, a whole new atmosphere set in on the other side of the river. As people bantered, cheered aloud, sang along, and pubs doled out into the streets, you let loose, forgetting your goals, the grind, and the groceries. Amidst that high-octane shindig, what’s vivid in my memory is some heartwarming, crazy, and exciting jesting with my husband. That’s what a holiday is about, because what stays is not how beautiful the Taj Mahal is but what that beautiful Taj Mahal evoked in me. Hoi An, with its delectable vegan white rose dumplings, best vegetarian Banh Mi, grilled rice paper, prolific flora, abounding lanterns, revelling crowds, and insignificant fights (part of every family trip), reset and reminded me that life is more beautiful in your partner’s arms while your kids hold your hand.</p><p>Carrying that soothing sense of calm, we landed at the final destination of the trip — the balmy island of Phu Quoc. It was such a fitting culmination to the holiday, unloading ourselves into the rustic opulence of the Ocean Bay Resort against the cyan and turquoise waters of Ong Lang Beach. There is an extravaganza of things to do, shows to see and sights to cover on this island. But we stuck to the basics: we ate and drank, we read and relaxed, we swam and snorkelled. There is nothing I desire more on a beach holiday than to sip a drink by the sea, lounge with a favourite book, soak in the warm waters, meddle with the kids, and cuddle with my husband.</p><p>The sea was so inviting with its gentle tide, soft sand and pristine water that my son couldn’t get enough of it, undeterred even by the noon sun. While my daughter only cared for passion fruit juice and French fries with a book tucked under her arms.</p><p>The stillness of ‘no rush’ against the ocean breeze, the knowledge of ‘no hustle’ on the breakfast table, and the idea of a ‘lazy morning’ in a four-poster bed summarise my perfect reverie. Add to this charm the adventure of finding an unexpected reef just off the hotel beach. The sheer variety and abundance of marine life that I saw in that small and shallow reef was absolutely mesmerising. From endemic starfish to giant crabs to sea cucumbers, tiny electric blue fish, translucent jellyfish, and schools of iridescent fish in all sizes and shimmering colours surrounded us. The beauty and bounty of nature were unparalleled, which kept drawing us to discover and admire it in every swim.</p><p>Apart from spending this serene time, the only other activity we did was visit the VinWorld amusement park. In my opinion it is skippable, especially if you have visited other amusement parks in Singapore, Malaysia or Hong Kong. We also booked a deep-sea snorkelling tour which takes you to two or three protected coral reefs. Sadly so, I dropped out of it due to my lethargy, but my man did go and called it an unmatched experience of jaw-dropping coral gardens and forests, unimaginable below the sea.</p><p>By then it was time to pack — pack what we had carried from home along with what we brought and created there. It was time to pack and treasure the peals of laughter, the noise of squabbles, the slow mornings, and the dreamy days. It was time to capture and preserve the fact that my teen and pre-teen still enjoyed holidays with us, sat down for awkward and cheeky conversations, hollered at us to resolve sibling bickering, and still gave space to their parents to be individuals. This is how my album of Vietnam sits together cosily and stays alive in my memory.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0ebb46ca86da" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist/lost-and-found-in-vietnam-0ebb46ca86da">Lost and Found in Vietnam</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist">The Asianist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why the Philippines Can't Bring Its Mangroves Back]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-asianist/why-the-philippines-cant-bring-its-mangroves-back-67cd80da3cc6?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/67cd80da3cc6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philippines]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-carbon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mangrove]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Denise Janer, MSc]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 12:35:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-19T12:35:32.143Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Why the Philippines Can’t Bring Its Mangroves Back</h3><h4><em>The ecology is the easy part. Tenure and a divided bureaucracy are everything else.</em></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UCTfqo-O0rinDUR8HBzvgw.jpeg" /><figcaption>A long abandoned fishpond that was planted with mangroves in 2001.</figcaption></figure><p>For the past six months, I’ve been the lead of our technical consulting team in scoping for land in the Philippines that can be reverted to mangroves. We have narrowed the search to two clusters with the highest potential in terms of land eligibility, size, and accessibility among others. Zooming in on the maps, it’s easy to see the pattern — the largest suitable parcels lie inside fishpond zones, and that held true for every town we visited thus far.</p><p>On the surface, it looks like a contest between livelihoods and nature. But after sitting with fisherfolk, people’s organizations, and local government units, I’ve come to see how much more tangled it is — a knot of land tenure, culture and identity, economics, and climate change.</p><p>In this article, I attempt to consolidate my field notes from the sites we visited and, if these towns are any indication of the country as a whole, to contribute in sketching the scale of a predicament that needs urgent attention across all four fronts: ecological, economic, social, and institutional.</p><h3>History of conversion and how the map tells it</h3><p>It helps to remember that nobody snuck these ponds in. They were built on purpose, with the full blessing of the development consensus of their day. Brackishwater fishponds in the Philippines have existed since precolonial times. The earliest were stocked with <em>bangus</em> (milkfish), grown from wild fry that drifted in on the <a href="https://www.fao.org/4/x6943e/x6943e06.htm">tides</a>, and the practice likely arrived through trade long before Magellan reached Cebu in 1521.</p><p>For most of that history, the ponds were modest. What changed their scale was the 20th century: state-backed expansion of milkfish farming gathered pace through the <a href="https://repository.seafdec.org.ph/handle/10862/353">1950s</a>, and then, in May 1975, two presidential decrees set the legal terms that would reshape the coastline.</p><p>The <a href="https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/phi19101.pdf">Revised Forestry Code or PD 705</a> — its Section 43 in particular — set out how mangrove swamps could be released from the forest estate for fishpond development, while the <a href="https://www.bfar.da.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Presidential-Decree-No.-704.pdf">Fisheries Decree or PD 704</a> governed the leases themselves.</p><p>That same Section 43 carried a clause that matters enormously for mangrove restoration: <strong>any mangrove area released for fishponds and then left idle for five years was supposed to revert to forest land. </strong>The legal instrument for undoing an abandoned fishpond, in other words, has existed since 1975.</p><p>What followed instead was acceleration. The 1980s brought the <a href="https://repository.seafdec.org.ph/handle/10862/353">“shrimp fever”</a> — tiger prawn, <em>sugpo</em>, grown for export — and the ponds spread faster than ever. In 1920, the Philippines once held roughly <a href="https://climate.gov.ph/news/902">450,000 hectares</a> of mangrove forest. By the 1990s, that had fallen to around 292,000 hectares by satellite mapping (<a href="https://www.globalmangrovewatch.org/country/PHL?bounds=[[108.09251898227802,3.1054494963265853],[135.52904137379096,22.253562953324163]]">Global Mangrove Watch</a>) or 120,000 by conservative ground survey [(DENR-EMB, 1996) cited by <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0921800900001701?via%3Dihub">Primavera (2000)</a>]. Whichever figure you trust, the bulk of the loss happened between 1950 and 1990 — by most accounts almost 70% of the original cover <a href="https://www.intechopen.com/chapters/25457">(Samson &amp; Rollon, 2008)</a> — and roughly half of it traces to a single cause: the conversion of mangroves into fishponds <a href="https://repository.seafdec.org.ph/handle/10862/353">(Primavera, 1992)</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CPa5VY4ON2fXjpumUOSk-w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Mature stands of mangroves along a river</figcaption></figure><p>Mangroves grow in a narrow band of the upper intertidal zone: a gently sloping area reached by high tides. This same band — flat, soft, reliably watered, and easy to wall off — is exactly what makes a good brackishwater pond. The ponds sit where the forest used to be because they were carved directly out of it.</p><p>But the map is generous and the ground is not. On desktop analysis, a single cluster might show upward of 10,000 hectares as viable for restoration, but site validation shrinks that to a fraction. In one cluster, only about 30% of the area fell into the abandoned, unutilized, or underdeveloped category we were looking for. Another 40% was already vegetated — ponds neglected so long that natural growth had crept back on its own. The remaining 30% was still active, even if the yields were poor. The category that matters most to the project, then, is a minority of what remote sensing analysis identified — and even there, ‘abandoned’ describes only the state of the land, not the willingness of anyone to give it up. No owner or caretaker has signed anything.</p><p>That gap is its own quiet lesson, and a version of it runs through decades of Philippine reforestation. Where planting has happened, it has often happened seaward — out on open mudflats, sometimes on seagrass beds — because that is the land that looks empty and available. But those zones were never mangrove habitats, and the wrong species planted in the wrong place tends to die, with survival rates as low as 10% (<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11273-008-9101-y">Primavera &amp; Esteban, 2008)</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dPsX5rjCbIbC_NFhwMqiRA.png" /><figcaption>A Google Earth screenshot of the fishponds being scoped for mangrove restoration</figcaption></figure><h3>What the ponds look like now</h3><p>The ponds we walked across the two clusters vary widely in size. Some run to 25 hectares, others are barely 1 to 3 hectares. But size aside, they wear their neglect in the same few ways.</p><p>The Philippines sits in the path of some of the planet’s strongest storms, and a single bad season can breach dikes that took years to build. What water remains is muddy rather than clear, turbid enough that little light reaches the bottom.</p><p>Siltation has done its slow work: sediment clogs the gills of milkfish and starves the water of oxygen, and over time it reshapes the pond floor and forms strips of higher ground that keep the tides from flushing in at all. These protrusions dried out enough that people have begun planting coconut and other land crops on them — a sign that the water there is no longer saline, or even brackish, but freshening.</p><h3>The economics of holding on</h3><p>One of the primary questions we asked the fisherfolk was: If the ponds are failing, why hold on to them at all? Part of the answer is that keeping the fishponds is cheap, and leaving is not obviously better.</p><p>Securing or renewing the lease is, contrary to what we first assumed in the field, not expensive on paper. The <a href="https://www.bfar.da.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/FAO-No.-197-1-s.-2012.pdf">rules</a> require an applicant to show a bank certificate proving capital in cash of ₱5,000 per hectare, plus a non-refundable application fee of ₱2,000. For a small pond, that is a modest sum. The fee, in any case, was never the real obstacle. A holder can usually manage it the first time. What is hard is paying it again and again on a pond that keeps losing money — its dikes broken, with no assurance the yields will ever return to where they once turned a profit.</p><p>To state plainly: Of ten thousand shrimp fingerlings stocked in a pond, perhaps four in ten survive to harvest; of those, not all reach a size worth selling, so the price the catch fetches per kilo rarely justifies the cycle. Milkfish growers face their own arithmetic, often buying feed and fertilizer on credit because they cannot front the cost. Informal loans in these towns can carry interest as steep as twenty percent a month. Between the survival rates and the cost of that credit, a working pond can finish the season with negative profits.</p><p>Many operators continue anyway. As one fisherfolk put it, at least his harvest can still feed his family. It is the livelihood they know, and the immediate alternative is not a better pond but no pond at all. So the ponds persist in a kind of suspended animation — not productive enough to thrive, not unproductive enough to walk away from outright.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WjexqDBBZ938oespM1rx7Q.png" /><figcaption>With the owners gone, the tax records spoke for them — the last year of payment usually showing when the pond was abandoned.</figcaption></figure><h3>The paper and the mud</h3><p>Beneath the land conditions and economics lies a third tangle, and in my opinion, it is the one that pulls tightest. Even where a community is willing to participate, the tenure behind it is rarely simple to work out.</p><p>Many of the leases on these ponds expired long ago, but the vacancy is not enforced, so the holders simply keep using the land. The gap runs the other way, too: parcels of land that should never have qualified for fishpond development have had applications filed on them anyway, and rather than being refused outright, they wait — so ponds also exist where, strictly, they should not.</p><p>After enough years of this, the official records (which remain in analog and not digital) and actual land use stop matching at all. It is little surprise, therefore, that when we sit down with a fishpond holder, what we hear is rarely the language of leases. We hear that the land is <em>theirs</em> — that it has been in the family for generations, and that whatever some document says, no one has ever told them otherwise.</p><p>Reverting any of it is harder still because, very often, there is no one to revert it with. The named holder may have died, or moved away decades ago, leaving only a caretaker on the dike — and sometimes not even that. To hand a pond back, someone with standing has to relinquish it, and when no such person can be found, a project inherits a real risk: that years later, a claimant surfaces and accuses it of taking land that was never free to take.</p><p>Behind these individual tangles sits a structural one. A fishpond and a mangrove forest answer to two different arms of government, and moving a single parcel from one column to the other is neither quick nor automatic; each step can stall for years.</p><p>The irony is that the law has pointed toward reversion since 1975, and reaffirmed it since — yet official figures put the total area formally returned to forest nationwide at <a href="https://www.philstar.com/headlines/climate-and-environment/2024/02/14/2333348/govt-urged-revert-unproductive-fishponds-mangroves-climate-fight">under a thousand hectares</a> as of 2023, a rounding error against the <a href="https://www.wetlands.org/case-study/scaling-science-based-mangrove-restoration-in-the-philippines/">30,000 hectares of AUU fishponds</a> lying idle.</p><h3>What comes next</h3><p>The sea is rising, the storm surges that ride on it are reaching further inland, and the Philippines absorbs roughly a third of the world’s tropical cyclones. For the communities on these coasts, a healthy belt of mangroves is often the best protection standing between them and the water.</p><p>But I won’t pretend it’s as easy as simply planting mangroves. What I can already say is that the binding question was never really ecological. Whether any of these ponds becomes a forest again will depend less on the science, and far less on the maps, than on whether the agencies who share this coastline can act together — and, finally, on whether we can make doing the right thing also the rational thing for the most vulnerable people on the coast. Until we can, the maps will keep pointing us to the ponds, and the ponds will keep pointing back at us.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=67cd80da3cc6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist/why-the-philippines-cant-bring-its-mangroves-back-67cd80da3cc6">Why the Philippines Can&#39;t Bring Its Mangroves Back</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist">The Asianist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[“Safe na safe, Remulla!” [OPINION]]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist/safe-na-safe-remulla-76df565cb503?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1200/0*3vH5sox0mRAHMnsL.jpg" width="1200"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">How a Rising Perception of Crime and School Violence Manufactures Consent for Sara Duterte&#x2019;s Presidency.</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist/safe-na-safe-remulla-76df565cb503?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4">Continue reading on The Asianist »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-asianist/safe-na-safe-remulla-76df565cb503?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/76df565cb503</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mass-shootings]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philippines]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Author, Lee Sankara, M.A.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 03:19:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-21T03:05:22.374Z</atom:updated>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Jakarta’s Invisible Genocide in Western New Guinea.]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist/jakartas-invisible-genocide-in-western-new-guinea-3e7c3cf58cfd?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/2000/0*wJnODrX0YlffL-vo" width="2000"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">From the New York Agreement to Highland Guerrilla Warfare: The Evolution of West Papua&#x2019;s Resistance</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist/jakartas-invisible-genocide-in-western-new-guinea-3e7c3cf58cfd?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4">Continue reading on The Asianist »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-asianist/jakartas-invisible-genocide-in-western-new-guinea-3e7c3cf58cfd?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3e7c3cf58cfd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bahasa-indonesia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[west-new-guinea]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[southeast-asia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Author, Lee Sankara, M.A.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 05:51:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-13T09:22:07.256Z</atom:updated>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Russia’s Defense Offer Comes With Costs Cambodia Cannot Ignore]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-asianist/russias-defense-offer-comes-with-costs-cambodia-cannot-ignore-96e8885cf753?source=rss----0c6c4183b176---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/96e8885cf753</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cambodia-thailand-border]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia-ukraine-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia-defen]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cambodia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sao Phal Niseiy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 23:16:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-08T23:16:12.021Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tETVcyMwynLU6Ru4PEdPeQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>M Hun Manet shakes hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kazan on the sidelines of the ASEAN forum. Photo by Presidential Office</figcaption></figure><h3>Russia’s defense offer comes with costs Cambodia cannot ignore.</h3><p>A week after the Kazan Summit marked the 35th anniversary of Russia-ASEAN relations, Moscow has signaled its intent to deepen ties with Cambodia in a more strategic arena. Speaking at a recent press conference, Russian Ambassador Anatoly Borovik said Russia is ready to help strengthen Cambodia’s defense sector.</p><p>The offer has drawn attention, not least because Russia remains one of the world’s largest arms exporters. It also comes at a sensitive moment, with Thailand’s occupation of Cambodian territory fueling public calls for stronger national defense. Against that backdrop, many Cambodians may be less concerned about who provides military assistance than whether it enhances the country’s ability to safeguard its sovereignty.</p><p>Russia’s proposal, however, is far from unprecedented. For decades, Moscow has expanded its influence across the developing world through arms sales and defense cooperation, including in Southeast Asia.</p><p>Before the war in Ukraine, Russia supplied everything from fighter jets and submarines to advanced air-defense systems, often at prices well below those of Western competitors. It also distinguished itself by offering flexible payment arrangements — including barter deals involving commodities such as palm oil and coffee — while attaching few political conditions to its military partnerships.</p><p>The war in Ukraine, however, has fundamentally altered that equation. Russia’s defense industry now faces significant pressures, and its ability to export weapons has declined considerably. The impact is particularly visible in Southeast Asia. Russia’s share of new ASEAN defense contracts reportedly fell from <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2026/06/how-the-russia-ukraine-war-rewired-southeast-asias-arms-trade/"><strong>nearly 20 percent during 2017–2021 to less than 3 percent between 2022 and 2024</strong></a>. The decline in purchases has also been attributed to the war in Ukraine where Russian military <a href="https://united24media.com/world/why-global-buyers-are-abandoning-russias-arms-industry-8494"><strong>hardware’s vulnerability has been exposed</strong></a>.</p><p>That is why Russia’s renewed outreach should be viewed through a strategic lens. Securing new defense agreements would help Moscow generate revenue amid sanctions while demonstrating that it remains far from isolated on the international stage.</p><p>So far, there is no indication that Cambodia will immediately embrace the offer made by the Russian ambassador. However, given the need to strengthen national defense capabilities, policymakers may view such cooperation as an attractive option. That is precisely why the proposal deserves careful scrutiny.</p><p>Cambodia has maintained a remarkably consistent position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, repeatedly supporting United Nations resolutions that affirm Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. By doing so, it has earned respect among countries that value international law and a rules-based order. Its stance reflects a principled belief that all nations, regardless of size, should be governed by the same rules.</p><p>This position is particularly notable given Cambodia’s long-standing friendship with Russia. While Phnom Penh has never forgotten the assistance provided by the former Soviet Union after the fall of the Khmer Rouge, gratitude for past support should not prevent it from making principled decisions based on present realities.</p><p>For small states such as Cambodia, respect for sovereignty and international law is not merely an ideal. It is a necessity. Without those protections, power becomes the dominant force in international relations, leaving smaller countries vulnerable to the interests of larger ones.</p><p>Strengthening national defense is a legitimate objective. Yet the source of that support carries political and strategic implications that cannot be ignored, especially at a time when Cambodia continues to reject the presence of Thai military forces on territory it considers its own.</p><p>Closer military ties with Russia would weaken Cambodia’s claim to be a consistent defender of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russian weapons may appear attractive at a time of growing tensions with Thailand. But expanding defense cooperation with Moscow would make it harder for Cambodia to argue that its foreign policy is grounded in respect for international law.</p><p>Money also complicates the picture. Russia is unlikely to provide military aid. Any defense cooperation would almost certainly come through commercial arms deals, reflecting the strain on Moscow’s wartime economy. Buying Russian weapons would also funnel money into an arms industry that continues to supply Russia’s war in Ukraine.</p><p>Cambodia still relies on Soviet-era and Russian-made equipment, and it will continue using those systems for years. But maintaining existing equipment is not the same as becoming more dependent on Russia. Cambodia can modernize its armed forces without deepening ties with a country whose invasion of Ukraine has left it increasingly isolated on the international stage.</p><p>In fact, Cambodia has already begun diversifying its military procurement, increasingly turning to <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-08-01/thailand-cambodia-conflict-arms-proliferation/105586072"><strong>alternatives from countries such as China</strong></a>. While Soviet-designed systems such as the BM-21 Grad will continue to play a role in its defense structure, any transition away from Russian equipment can be managed gradually. As Cambodia works to improve relations with the United States and other democratic partners, it has little to gain from creating new diplomatic headaches. A new military partnership with Russia could make it harder to build closer ties with countries that have backed Cambodia’s calls for respect for international law.</p><p>The choice, of course, belongs to the Cambodian government. But whatever the rationale, closer military ties with Russia would undermine the credibility Cambodia has earned by consistently defending sovereignty and territorial integrity. As a small country, Cambodia cannot match larger powers in military strength. Its greatest asset is the credibility of its position under international law. Protecting that credibility will do more for Cambodia’s security than any arms deal that weakens it.</p><p>In the end, Cambodia’s strongest defense is not another weapons supplier. It is the moral authority that comes from standing consistently for sovereignty and international law.</p><p><strong>— — — -<br>References:<br></strong><em>ABC News. (2025, August 1). </em>Thailand Cambodia conflict arms proliferation<em>. </em><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-08-01/thailand-cambodia-conflict-arms-proliferation/105586072"><em>https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-08-01/thailand-cambodia-conflict-arms-proliferation/105586072</em></a></p><p><em>Daly, J. (2025, May 20). </em>Why global buyers are abandoning Russia’s arms industry<em>. UNITED24 Media. </em><a href="https://united24media.com/world/why-global-buyers-are-abandoning-russias-arms-industry-8494"><em>https://united24media.com/world/why-global-buyers-are-abandoning-russias-arms-industry-8494</em></a></p><p><em>The Diplomat. (2026, June). </em>How the Russia-Ukraine war rewired Southeast Asia’s arms trade<em>. </em><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2026/06/how-the-russia-ukraine-war-rewired-southeast-asias-arms-trade/"><em>https://thediplomat.com/2026/06/how-the-russia-ukraine-war-rewired-southeast-asias-arms-trade/</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=96e8885cf753" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist/russias-defense-offer-comes-with-costs-cambodia-cannot-ignore-96e8885cf753">Russia’s Defense Offer Comes With Costs Cambodia Cannot Ignore</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-asianist">The Asianist</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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