Lara Lukaszewicz

In the early hours of July 31, 2015, masked men crept into the Palestinian village of Duma, in the West Bank. They hurled a firebomb through the window of a home where the Dawabsha family lay asleep, and scrawled the Hebrew word for “revenge” on the walls. Eighteen-month-old Ali was burned alive; his parents, Saad and Riham, died of their burns. Only Ahmed, then four, survived. Years later, the attacker, Amiram Ben Uliel, a Jewish extremist, was sentenced to three life terms for murder, though he was acquitted of belonging to a terrorist organization.

But the Duma attack was far from an isolated case. Fast-forward to October 16, 2026: a crowd of masked Israeli settlers severely attacked Washington Post photojournalist Heidi Levine while covering the olive harvest near Ramallah. According to her account, the attackers launched a coordinated assault that left her with four fractured vertebrae, two broken ribs, and four puncture wounds. Levine was only freed when young Palestinians began hurling stones at the assailants with slingshots. U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee called the attack a “despicable act of terror.”

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), between January 2023 and August 2026, settlers carried out 6,199 attacks in the West Bank, killing 72 Palestinians, injuring 5,728, and displacing more than 6,500 others. Washington, Israel’s largest source of military aid, has the means to deter this violence. By enforcing laws, sanctioning violent individuals and, if necessary, conditioning assistance, the United States can promote peace without abandoning its closest ally in the Middle East.

Context

The Jewish state often backs extremist violence in the West Bank. Armed settlers act alongside army units at times, and in March Israel approved about $16 million for security equipment for illegal outposts. That sum is part of $128.7 million in coalition funds allocated to the Settlements and National Missions Ministry, headed by Minister Orit Strock, a Religious Zionist Party lawmaker.

Settlements also violate international law. The U.N. General Assembly, the International Criminal Court, and the Red Cross hold that these establishments violate Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits an occupying power from transferring its civilian population into an occupied territory. Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, such transfer is defined as a war crime. Furthermore, on July 19, 2024, the International Court of Justice delivered an Advisory Opinion declaring that the settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem violate international law.

Failing to act carries at least four costs for the United States. The first is legal credibility. The Leahy Act prohibits funding foreign security units implicated in gross violations of human rights. Because armed settlers at times act alongside Israeli army units, Washington faces the question of whether those units should undergo Leahy vetting. That is not a hypothetical concern. The UN Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory concluded in its October report that Israeli authorities and forces have committed crimes against humanity in the West Bank, including extermination, torture and sexual violence.

The second is strategic credibility. The United States invokes the rules-based international order and the protection of civilians to criticize Russia and China. Tolerating in the West Bank what it condemns elsewhere weakens its moral authority, makes coalition-building harder, and damages its ability to mediate in the Middle East.

The third is regional security. Settler violence and settlement expansion make a negotiated resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict difficult. It also strains relations with Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, all of which support the Palestinian cause. In June, these three countries, together with Qatar, the UAE, Indonesia, Pakistan and Türkiye, issued a joint statement condemning the escalating settler violence and warning that Israeli unilateral measures fuel instability and extremism. Amman stands to be the most affected by any forced displacement of Palestinians, given its long border with the West Bank and its large Palestinian population.

The fourth is domestic politics: by undermining the two-state solution, settlement expansion runs counter to the longstanding bipartisan position and may harm Israel’s long-term interests.

What we can do

But Washington has a robust set of tools to deter Israeli policies that enable settler violence.

Step 1: Make the issue a formal condition of the bilateral relationship. Senior officials should raise settler and soldier violence in every high-level meeting and state that continued U.S. support depends on concrete Israeli action.

Step 2: Law enforcement. The Leahy Laws and the Arms Export Control Act already restrict assistance to security-force units credibly implicated in gross human rights violations. The State Department and the Pentagon should review units operating alongside violent settlers and suspend aid to any that fall under these restrictions.

Step 3: Protect U.S. citizens. The Justice Department has authority to investigate and prosecute killings and attacks against Americans abroad. It should open investigations into cases involving U.S. citizens living in the West Bank and report publicly on their progress.

Step 4: Designate extremist settler organizations as terrorist groups and sanction key individuals. The State Department should designate violent extremist settler organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In parallel, Treasury and State should sanction individual leaders, organizers and financiers of settler violence as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) under Executive Order 13224, and impose visa bans on them and their family members.

Step 5: Condition assistance if violence and annexation continue. If Israel fails to prevent and prosecute settler and soldier violence in the West Bank, the United States should condition additional aid or specific weapons transfers on measurable changes in policy.

While Israel remains one of the United States’ closest allies and a valuable asset in confronting Iran and its proxies, alliance cannot mean compliance. Washington should use its soft power decisively to defend the rule of law and the liberal order, starting with its closest friends.

…

Lara Lukaszewicz is an Argentine journalist based in Washington, D.C., with over five years of experience covering politics, crime and culture. Her reporting has focused on Argentina and Latin America, as well as migration across the Americas and its connections to the United States. She is completing a master’s degree in International Relations at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella while studying at George Washington University, where she is deepening her focus on U.S. foreign policy.

Restraint without rupture: How a Democratic House could press Israel to stop settler violence was originally published in The Diplomatic Pouch on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Benedicta Solf & Joel Malebranche

Haiti has been facing multiple overlapping crises, including rising violence, political instability, foreign intervention, and devastating natural disasters. For the last two decades, local gangs have terrorized communities by killing and kidnapping people, trafficking children, stealing at illegal checkpoints, and destroying public and private property. More than half of the population is now grappling with food insecurity, over 1.4 million people (10% of the population) are internally displaced, and, with more than 16,000 killings since January 2021, the country has one of the world’s highest homicide rates.

Haiti is now at a pivotal moment. In April 2026, the Multinational Gang Suppression Force (GSF) was deployed to restore stability and dismantle criminal gangs. The presidential and legislative elections planned for December 2026 offer one of the country’s most consequential opportunities in more than a decade to rebuild constitutional governance and public confidence. Credible elections, with safe and meaningful participation, however, require public safety. Only then can elections confer state legitimacy and provide leadership capable of sustaining progress in security, justice, and economic development. Otherwise, Haiti risks further institutional erosion, weakened state authority, and a deepened humanitarian crisis.

Security Crisis and Expansion of Gang Activity

Haiti has long experienced significant social and political instability. The situation escalated when widespread social unrest and mass protests culminated in the assassination of Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, leaving Haiti without a democratically elected national government. Gangs took advantage of the power vacuum, established almost total control over the capital, Port-au-Prince, and expanded into western Haiti. The security situation worsened in February 2024, when the two largest gang coalitions formed an alliance known as Viv Ansanm, now listed on the UN Sanction List, and launched a coordinated offensive targeting civilian infrastructure across Port-au-Prince.

The alliance fundamentally shifted the balance of power against the overstretched Haitian National Police (HNP). Gangs that had previously operated as fragmented, localized factions — making them, to some extent, manageable by the HNP — became unified, allowing them to capture ports, major roadways, and critical infrastructure. Now, only an estimated 10% of Port-au-Prince remains under government control.

Gangs have increasingly targeted areas with limited or no security presence, while engaging in territorial conflicts with law enforcement and using informants to infiltrate these communities. The Haitian Coast Guard does not have adequate authority over the country’s ports, which has enabled the trafficking of an estimated 270,000 to 500,000 firearms from abroad, many of them under gang control.

Estimates suggest that Viv Ansanm comprises between 12,000 and 20,000 members, including more than 3,000 heavily armed fighters. The HNP has been unable to contain the escalating violence: with only about 10,000 officers serving a population of more than 11 million, the force lacks the capacity to confront gangs effectively. The HNP suffers from poor working conditions, high attrition, desertion, and corruption (in 2022, about 40% of HNP officers had ties to gangs). Many Haitians have turned to vigilantism as a means of defending themselves against armed gangs when state protection was perceived to be absent or ineffective. In April 2023, residents lynched and burned 10 alleged gang members, an incident that grew into a broader movement known as Bwa Kale.

In addition, several natural disasters (a 2010 earthquake, Hurricane Matthew, and a 2021 earthquake) and disease outbreaks (COVID-19, cholera in 2022) have eroded the state’s ability to protect and provide for its citizens. As of early 2026, 6.4 million people need humanitarian aid, and gang blockades of highways, ports, and health facilities have cut off access to many of them.

International and Domestic Security Interventions in Haiti

In response to the escalating unrest in the country and to support the HNP, then–Prime Minister Ariel Henry requested the deployment of an “international specialized force” in October 2022. The U.N. Security Council eventually authorized a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, under a 12-month mandate, to work in close coordination with the HNP and the Haitian armed forces to conduct intelligence-led operations to neutralize gangs, provide security for critical infrastructure, and support humanitarian access. The mission prevented the immediate collapse of the state but did not significantly weaken gang networks or establish the conditions necessary to hold credible elections.

In 2025, the United Nations authorized the creation of the Multinational Gang Suppression Force (GSF) to replace MSS, a 5,500-person mission tasked with a broader mandate of directly combating armed gangs and securing critical infrastructure in Port-au-Prince. The GSF entered Haiti in April 2026. Both the U.N. and the U.S. conditioned their support for Haiti’s security forces on the government holding elections. Separately, the Haitian government contracted Vectus Global, a U.S.-based private military company, to supplement domestic security efforts, largely through weaponized drone strikes. In late 2025, the government launched an ambitious police recruitment initiative aimed at training an additional 4,000 officers over an 18-month period to strengthen the existing police force.

Preparing for Haiti’s First Elections in a Decade

Despite these efforts, the Haitian state also finds itself in a broader struggle for the allegiance and legitimacy of the Haitian population. Gangs have increasingly adopted populist rhetoric, framing themselves as protectors against corrupt elites. Haiti has lacked an elected president for nearly a decade, and the most recent parliamentary elections were held in 2019.

Following the assassination of Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, Ariel Henry assumed the role of Prime Minister and served as Haiti’s de facto head of government while the presidency remained officially vacant. In March 2024, amid a coordinated surge in gang violence that left him unable to return to the country, Henry formally resigned. In April 2024, a nine-member Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) was established to steer Haiti’s political transition, restore constitutional governance, and pave the way for credible elections. On February 7, 2026, the TPC was dissolved and executive authority was transferred to Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, an economist educated at Boston University, who assumed sole executive leadership of the government.

Despite repeated commitments by Haiti’s transitional authorities to organize national elections, significant uncertainty persists regarding both the timeline and the feasibility of the electoral process. In early July 2026, the government and the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) reached an agreement on a reduced electoral budget of US$120 million, ending months of disagreement over election financing. At the same time, a record number of 316 political parties have been registered and approved. In addition, voter registration, which had been suspended for a short period, has resumed. After a long delay, the CEP published a revised electoral calendar on July 26 — the presidential and legislative elections are now scheduled for December 13 with a runoff vote on February 21, and final results due on March 7. Earlier this year, Fils-Aimé acknowledged that Haiti’s security conditions were insufficient to support elections in August (as they had been originally scheduled).

While authorities continue to express their commitment to holding elections before the end of 2026, ongoing gang violence, mass displacement, territorial control by armed groups, and logistical constraints continue to raise serious concerns about whether the conditions necessary for free, credible, and participatory elections can be achieved. Although it is welcome news that voter registration has resumed, persistent insecurity raises concerns about people’s ability to leave their homes and to safely access polling stations and cast their ballots without fear and intimidation.

Ensuring broad voter participation will be critical — in 2019, only 19% of Haiti’s nearly six million registered voters participated in the presidential election. The country’s large number of political parties and candidates reflects a highly fragmented political landscape, with critics arguing that some parties function more as vehicles for accessing campaign resources or advancing shared political interests than as distinct political movements.

Beyond Elections: Building the Foundations for Stability

Without a doubt, restoring security in Haiti is the necessary first step. Lasting stability, however, will also depend on re-establishing the rule of law. Without an independent, impartial, and corruption-free judiciary, public trust will continue to erode, and anti-establishment narratives will remain attractive. Haiti’s announcement of two new judicial units in June 2026, intended to address serious human rights abuses in Haiti, is a welcome step in that direction.

The international community also has a responsibility to curb the flow of trafficked weapons fueling gang violence while continuing to support Haiti’s recovery and long-term stability. The GSF, authorized to “seize and collect, record and dispose of illicit arms, ammunition, and other material,” can play a critical role in tracing the illicit weapons flow and providing training, procedures, and resources to the Haitian Coast Guard.

Addressing both Haiti’s immediate needs and the root causes of the crisis will require stronger alignment between humanitarian, development, and governance efforts, including support for civil society organizations working in the communities most affected by violence and instability. Beyond security and justice, Haiti’s population needs visible signs of hope: investments that create jobs, stimulate local economies, and expand opportunities for young people are essential to reducing instability and easing the social conditions that fuel violence, migration, and gang recruitment.

Lastly, the future of Haiti also matters for the hundreds of thousands of Haitians living in the United States. The Trump administration’s decision to end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haiti has placed approximately 350,000 Haitians at risk of deportation. As of September 2026, 450 Haitians have already been returned to the country, many of them without financial resources and at risk of ending up homeless. Yet the security and humanitarian conditions that led many Haitians to seek protection abroad remain largely unchanged. As recently as July 2026, thousands of people were displaced from Kenscoff, just southeast of Port-au-Prince, following renewed attacks by armed groups.

…

Benedicta Solf currently serves as Associate Director for Program Development at Church World Service. Prior to that, she held research positions at the Migration Policy Institute, the Atlantic Council, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, focusing on migration and refugee policy. She holds a Master of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University (Class of 2020).

Joel Malebranche serves as Director of International Programs at Church World Service, where he leads strategic oversight of international programs across five regions. With more than 15 years of experience, he has managed complex global portfolios and partnerships with organizations including Chemonics, Internews, the International Rescue Committee, Partners in Health, and the United Nations Development Programme. He holds a Master of Arts in International Affairs from The New School.

Amid Ongoing Gang Violence: Haiti’s First National Elections in a Decade was originally published in The Diplomatic Pouch on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

International security architecture is divided across functional and operational spectrums to address interstate conflict. Organizations fall into three categories: Universal Normative & Governance Bodies (the UN), Regional Technical & Verification Frameworks (the OSCE), and Collective Defense & Minilateral Coalitions (NATO, JEF). Operational urgency organizes these bodies into two primary tiers: Tier 1 bodies equipped for immediate hard-power deterrence and emergency intervention, and Tier 2 bodies specialized in technical monitoring, humanitarian relief, and long-term verification.

Reform of international organizations has been a perennial topic for government officials and lawmakers the world over. Debate has been invigorated of late by candidates vying to become the next UN Secretary-General. Reforming these existing structures, rather than attempting to replace them with new bodies, has never been more important. Scrapping established organizations would forfeit decades of institutional memory, international legal legitimacy, pre-positioned logistical infrastructure, and broad state buy-in that cannot be replicated during an active crisis. These reformed bodies offer indispensable advantages: Tier 1 structures can provide quick operational containment to freeze forward aggression, while Tier 2 frameworks can offer mechanisms for ceasefire verification, civil-military deconfliction, and humanitarian access. By overhauling procedural rules rather than abandoning institutional foundations, the international community can maintain a multi-layered defense against escalation.

The Gridlock paralyzing today’s primary international security bodies is not just a bureaucratic failure; it is an existential threat to global stability. When major powers engage as direct or indirect combatants, traditional multilateral forums frequently default to operational paralysis. To counter hybrid warfare, secure rapid ceasefires, and guarantee humanitarian access, the international community must understand the broader landscape of crisis organizations, prioritize emergency response bodies, and embrace multi-layered security architectures that link operational deterrence with structured and negotiated settlements.

The Landscape of Crisis Management Organizations

Over the past century, particularly following World War II and the end of the Cold War, a plethora of international, regional, and functional organizations were created and progressively modernized to deal with violence, to manage international crises, and to constrain the use of force. While these organizations share the broad goal of preserving peace, their institutional designs and operational patterns vary significantly. Crucially, while crisis responses often share structural similarities, such as deploying observers, establishing buffer zones, or enforcing sanctions, the specific pathways to conflict resolution are frequently sui generis. That is, solutions are tailored to the unique historical, geographic, and geopolitical realities of each specific dispute.

Despite these distinct features, the approaches can be categorized by core functions:

• Universal Normative & Governance Bodies: Institutions with global reach, such as the United Nations (UN), designed to establish international legal norms, maintain collective security, and authorize peace operations.
• Regional Technical & Verification Frameworks: Inclusivity-focused regional bodies, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which specialize in political dialogue, confidence-building measures (CBMs), and on-the-ground technical monitoring.
• Collective Defense & Minilateral Coalitions: High-readiness military alliances (e.g., NATO) and agile sub-regional groupings (e.g., the Joint Expeditionary Force) built for hard-power deterrence, joint operational readiness, and rapid containment of military force.

Prioritizing Security Organizations by Operational Urgency

Not all international bodies are equipped to respond to rapidly escalating violent crises. To improve the effectiveness of global security architecture, the international community would be well served by establishing a clear priority hierarchy and distinguishing between organizations designed for immediate crisis intervention and those suited for broader functional or post-conflict roles.

Priority Tier 1: Urgent Crisis Management Bodies

Some organizations are explicitly tasked with managing immediate emergencies that threaten to trigger broad use of force. Given their broad remit and membership, they could be given priority in international strategy during acute escalations:

• UN Security Council (UNSC): The primary global body endowed with legal authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to mandate enforcement actions, peace operations, and binding sanctions.
• NATO (North Atlantic Council): The principal multilateral collective defense body capable of deploying decisive hard-power deterrence and rapid-reaction forces to halt armed aggression.
• High-Readiness Minilaterals: Sovereign, sub-alliance coalitions (such as the Joint Expeditionary Force) capable of immediate operational deployment without broad institutional delays.

Priority Tier 2: Specialized, Regional, and Functional Organizations

While less suited to containing armed violence between states, these bodies operate with high effectiveness within their specific operational domains:

• OSCE: Essential for comprehensive regional dialogue, post-conflict technical verification, border monitoring, and human rights oversight across Eurasia.
• Humanitarian Agencies (WFP, UNOCHA): Specialized bodies designed to mitigate human suffering and maintain life-saving infrastructure during active hostilities.
• Targeted Task Groups: Issue-specific coalitions (such as the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group) that address localized threats without requiring global consensus.

Overcoming Paralysis in Universal & Regional Bodies

Critical shortcomings in global crisis response occur primarily at the intersection of acute military conflict and international governance. Key institutional absences include:

• Absence of Rapid Neutral Enforcement: The lack of a standing, non-aligned military mechanism capable of establishing emergency buffer zones without protracted political debate.
• Absence of Unilateral Humanitarian Access Guarantees: The absence of binding, non-blockable mechanisms to enforce civilian supply corridors during active combat between major powers.
• Absence of Operational Continuity in Regional Verification: Structural gaps created when regional monitoring bodies are forced to shut down due to administrative vetoes by aggressor states.

Institutions have failed to respond to emerging conflicts due to several complex factors. Security bodies were designed under the premise that major powers would cooperate to enforce peace or respect formal veto boundaries, not to paralyze the institution. Pushing procedural overrides against a hostile major power risks causing that power to withdraw from the treaty framework, leaving verification bodies procedurally agile but operationally blind on the ground. And the shift toward smaller, flexible coalitions (“minilaterals”) runs the danger of fragmenting regional defense efforts, diluting procurement resources, and creating a multi-tiered security landscape without overarching diplomatic coordination. Reclaiming the utility of foundational organizations requires targeted procedural overhauls.

The United Nations: Circumventing the Veto for Humanitarian Ends

To overcome the UNSC’s structural paralysis, serious consideration should be given to activating alternative pathways embedded within the UN Charter:

• Operationalizing “Uniting for Peace”: The UN General Assembly could expand its use of Resolution 377A (“Uniting for Peace”). When a permanent member’s veto triggers a security deadlock during active aggression, the General Assembly should automatically convene to authorize neutral humanitarian corridors, establish fact-finding commissions, and approve non-militarized observer missions.
• Insulating the Humanitarian Core: The delivery of civilian assistance could be decoupled from political consensus. Global distribution mechanisms managed by entities such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and OCHA could operate under automatic statutory triggers that would activate upon designated thresholds of civilian displacement, bypassing the Security Council and direct great-power disputes.

The OSCE: Operationalizing “Consensus-Minus-One”

The OSCE is unique as an inclusive regional forum linking human rights, economic stability, and hard security. However, its requirement for absolute consensus allows a single state to block annual budgets, veto field missions, and silence monitoring. Bypassing consensus has precedent. The 1992 Prague Document introduced the “Consensus-Minus-One” (CMO) principle, which permitted action without the consent of the target state in cases of “clear, gross and uncorrected violations” of commitments (used in 1992 to suspend Yugoslavia). If the OSCE is to be relevant to current conflicts, CMO could be expanded into workflows:

• Unblocking Operational Budgets and Field Missions: Recalcitrant states currently use budget approvals to paralyze monitoring capabilities. Implementing CMO for administrative and mandate-extension decisions would prevent single-nation blockades from dissolving critical missions.
• Targeted Deployment of Verification Teams: Under an upgraded CMO framework (and its extension, Consensus-Minus-Two, to prevent collusion between allied aggressors), the OSCE Permanent Council could authorize fact-finding missions, border posts, and cyber-audit teams over the target state’s objection.
• Preserving Post-Conflict Foresight: The OSCE possesses unmatched institutional memory in technical monitoring, demining verification, and confidence-building measures (CBMs). Bypassing veto paralysis ensures the OSCE can rapidly deploy to monitor ceasefires when diplomatic windows open.

There has been concern that applying CMO against an aggressor state (e.g., Russia) risks causing that state to completely repudiate the organization. Because OSCE confidence-building measures and verification missions rely on voluntary access, stripping a major power’s veto might make the organization procedurally agile, but operationally impotent on the ground if access is denied. Nonetheless, were a country to pull back from or impede the work of the organization in response to these steps, it would also have to weigh the loss of regional and international support.

NATO and Minilateral Defense: Flexible Coalitions in Action

While the UN and OSCE are intended to promote inclusive diplomatic pathways, hard-power deterrence requires flexible, adaptive internal structures. Relying solely on 32-nation consensus for crisis response or specialized regional defense leads to sluggish decision-making. Some scholars warn against over-relying on framework nation groupings, arguing that an uncoordinated web of minilaterals risks “fragmentation of defense efforts in Europe,” wasting scarce procurement capital and creating two-tier security structures that weaken collective defense guarantees of NATO and the EU. However, minilateralism within NATO does not replace Article 5 collective defense. Rather, it creates high-readiness sub-regional coalitions that streamline procurement, enhance readiness, and establish immediate denial capabilities before alliance-wide bureaucracy mobilizes. Minilaterals bridge the gap between alliance members and regional partners.

The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)

Led by the United Kingdom and comprising Northern European and Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden), the JEF represents a flexible minilateral model:

• Mechanism: The JEF can deploy forces independently of NATO’s formal consensus process utilizing NATO standards and equipment but operating under a sovereign decision-making model agreed by participating nations.
• Impact: In response to threats against critical undersea communications infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, the JEF executed rapid maritime security patrols, demonstrating how a subset of allies can act decisively in gray-zone crises.

The Lublin Triangle & Black Sea Task Groups

• Mechanism: The Lublin Triangle (Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine) facilitates intelligence sharing and joint training (via the LITPOLUKRBRIG). Formed by Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria, the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Task Group addresses sea mines threatening civilian shipping lanes.
• Impact: By keeping these initiatives localized, the coalitions bypassed broader geopolitical friction while securing maritime safety and building resilience to hybrid tactics.

A Preferred Common Pattern for Dispute Resolution and Force Constraint

While full organizational integration remains a long-term goal, establishing a unified Command and Control (C2) structure across Priority Tier 1 and Tier 2 bodies requires a streamlined coordination framework, separating strategic authorization, operational enforcement, and tactical verification while establishing clear handoff protocols.

Core Mechanisms of the Proposed C2 Architecture

1. Strategic-to-Operational Handoff: Tier 1 bodies (such as NATO or sub-regional minilaterals like the JEF) operate under a primary mandate to establish immediate deterrence and secure physical buffer zones. Once a forward ceasefire is achieved, operational control of the zone transitions to a Tier 2 integrated command.
2. Integrated Civil-Military Deconfliction Nodes: Humanitarian agencies (UNOCHA/WFP) and technical monitoring bodies (OSCE) share a joint tactical command platform. This guarantees real-time military deconfliction for civilian transport without requiring separate approval chains through political bodies.
3. Modular Minilateral Command Plugs: Minilateral coalitions serve as “plug-and-play” military modules that adopt standardized NATO/UN operational protocols, allowing sub-regional groupings to plug directly into broader joint task force command structures during high-urgency crises.

A comprehensive framework that integrates these three sequential steps could include:

1. Operational Separation and Rapid Force Constraint: Priority Tier 1 bodies and flexible minilaterals establish immediate military deterrence, freeze offensive forward movement, and secure humanitarian access corridors.
2. Technical Verification and Monitoring: Tier 2 bodies (such as the OSCE operating under Consensus-Minus-One or UN observer missions) deploy immediately to monitor ceasefires and verify heavy weapon withdrawals.

In conclusion, beyond the European examples to utilize these structures cited above, there is growing interest in applying these lessons to other regions, including the Indo-Pacific. By linking rapid operational deterrence with diplomatic mechanisms, international multilateralism moves away from brittle consensus models and toward an agile, principled architecture capable of maintaining order in a multi-polar era. While specific conflict solutions will always retain sui generis elements tailored to unique local contexts, the international community must express a clear preference for a standardized, repeatable process to constrain force and resolve disputes. Ad hoc arrangements lead to frozen conflicts; structured frameworks may lead to durable peace.

…

David J. Kostelancik was a career member of the Senior Foreign Service of the United States of America, with the rank of Minister Counselor. Mr. Kostelancik most recently served as acting Deputy Coordinator for Terrorism Prevention and Detention in the Bureau of Counterterrorism. From August 2021 until September 2023, he served as foreign policy advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Kostelancik previously served as Deputy Chief of Mission, and for two years, as Charge d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Budapest, Hungary. Other assignments at the Department of State include as Director of the Office of South Central European Affairs and as Director of the Office of Russian Affairs, both in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, as well as Director of the Office of Europe and Asia in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

Reform, Not Replacement: Rebuilding Multilateral Crisis Response for a Multipolar World was originally published in The Diplomatic Pouch on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

David J. Kostelancik

For years, the U.S. and the EU invested significant political capital, funding, and diplomatic pressure into helping Albania build one of the most ambitious anti-corruption institutions in the Balkans: the Special Anti-Corruption Structure, known as SPAK. SPAK was created to do what previous institutions often could not — investigate powerful political interests, confront organized crime, follow suspicious financial transactions, and restore public confidence in the rule of law. It was designed to operate independently, insulated from political pressure and capable of pursuing complex investigations involving senior officials, major business interests, and transnational criminal networks. For the long-term health of democracy and public confidence in government, SPAK undertook the hard work of demonstrating to Albanians that their trust in institutions of governance was justified, and to foreign investors that their financial commitments would be guaranteed by law.

Today, Albania faces a test of whether that vision will be realized.

The controversy surrounding a proposed $1.4 billion luxury resort project linked to Affinity Partners, Jared Kushner, and Ivanka Trump has become one of the most politically sensitive development projects in the country’s recent history. The project, which involves development plans around Sazan Island and the Vjosa-Narta coastal region, has generated intense public debate, environmental concerns, allegations of irregular land transactions, and questions about legislative changes that benefited the development.

The issue is no longer simply about tourism or foreign investment. It has become a question of institutional credibility. If SPAK was built to investigate allegations involving political influence, suspicious financial activity, and potential corruption, then this is exactly the kind of case that demands rigorous scrutiny.

Importantly, there is currently no public evidence that Affinity Partners or Jared Kushner or Ivanka Trump knowingly participated in criminal conduct. Multiple reports and SPAK’s own statements have emphasized that investigators have not established a direct evidentiary link between Affinity leadership and alleged criminal activity involving local actors. But that does not end the inquiry.

SPAK’s mandate is not limited to determining whether foreign investors committed crimes. Its responsibility is to determine whether Albanian laws were manipulated, whether public resources were improperly transferred, whether state institutions acted lawfully, and whether criminal networks exploited the project for illicit purposes.

Indeed, SPAK has already begun exercising its authority.

Prosecutors have opened inquiries into the 2024 legislative changes that altered protections surrounding the Vjosa-Narta wetlands and Sazan Island. These changes were critical to enabling the development and have become a focal point of public opposition, including large demonstrations known as the “Flamingo Revolution”.

The agency possesses extensive domestic powers to investigate these matters. SPAK can subpoena government records, question public officials, examine communications related to legislative decision-making, and investigate whether lobbying efforts crossed legal boundaries. It can determine whether the project’s designation as a “Strategic Investor” followed proper procedures or whether political influence improperly affected the process.

SPAK also has powerful financial investigative tools at its disposal. Prosecutors can freeze assets, seize property records, trace beneficial ownership structures, and coordinate with Albania’s financial intelligence authorities to identify suspicious transactions. These powers are particularly relevant because allegations have emerged regarding land deals associated with the project.

A central allegation is not that the resort developers themselves engaged in criminal conduct. Rather, prosecutors suspect that certain local intermediaries and landholders may have used real estate transactions to launder proceeds derived from international narcotics trafficking.

SPAK has reportedly sought action against dozens of individuals connected to a broader cocaine trafficking network, while investigators examine whether Albania’s booming construction sector was used as a vehicle to integrate illicit funds into the legal economy.

Additional concerns have arisen from dramatic increases in the reported value of certain parcels of land. Prosecutors are examining why some properties experienced extraordinary jumps in valuation over a short period of time. Such rapid appreciation can sometimes be consistent with techniques used in money-laundering schemes, though investigators have not publicly reached final conclusions.

These are precisely the types of questions SPAK was established to answer.

Critics argue that political considerations could limit the scope of the investigation. Prime Minister Edi Rama has strongly supported the development, portraying it as a transformative investment opportunity that could boost tourism and economic growth. Given the project’s political significance, any investigation will inevitably encounter resistance from those who view scrutiny as a threat to a flagship national initiative.

That is exactly why SPAK’s independence and expertise matters.

The institution was created because Albania’s international partners recognized that ordinary law enforcement mechanisms often struggle when investigations approach powerful political or economic interests. The United States repeatedly championed judicial reform in Albania on the premise that no individual, political party, or investment project should be beyond scrutiny.

At the same time, SPAK’s authority has limits. It cannot independently subpoena American citizens under investigation, compel production of records from U.S.-based investment firms, or investigate potential conflicts involving U.S. government officials. Such actions would require cooperation from American authorities, including the Department of Justice or congressional oversight bodies. But such limitations should not excuse inaction.

SPAK has broad jurisdiction over conduct occurring within Albania. It can investigate Albanian officials, local developers, intermediaries, land transactions, environmental approvals, asset transfers, and allegations of organized criminal infiltration. It can determine whether laws were altered improperly, whether corruption occurred, and whether criminal proceeds entered the project through local channels.

The credibility of Albania’s justice reforms depends on whether those powers are exercised fully and fearlessly.

The United States helped create and fund SPAK because Albania needed an institution capable of confronting exactly these kinds of difficult cases. If allegations involving politically connected legislation, disputed land ownership, suspicious financial flows, and organized crime do not warrant aggressive investigation, it becomes difficult to imagine what would.

No conclusion should be predetermined. The facts may ultimately clear many of those involved. Investors are entitled to due process, and allegations alone do not establish wrongdoing. But the public is entitled to answers.

SPAK was created to follow evidence wherever it leads. Albania’s democratic institutions, its international credibility, and the integrity of its justice system now depend on allowing investigators to do precisely that. As Albania’s key ally, the U.S. owes it to the Albanian people to support their quest for truth and transparency.

David J. Kostelancik was a career member of the Senior Foreign Service of the United States of America, with the rank of Minister Counselor. Mr. Kostelancik most recently served as acting Deputy Coordinator for Terrorism Prevention and Detention in the Bureau of Counterterrorism. From August 2021 until September 2023 he served as foreign policy advisor to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Kostelancik previously served as Deputy Chief of Mission, and for two years, as Charge d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Budapest Hungary. Other assignments at the Department of State include as Director of the Office of South Central European Affairs and as Director of the Office of Russian Affairs, both in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, as well as Director of the Office of Europe and Asia in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

The United States Helped Build SPAK. Now SPAK Must Do Its Job was originally published in The Diplomatic Pouch on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Emma Frazier

In Spain, debates over migration often unfold alongside deeper anxieties about identity. When anti-Muslim chants echoed during a recent national team match, they were widely condemned — but they also revealed something more uncomfortable. Europe’s migration debate is not only about borders, but about how migration itself is perceived. Those perceptions help explain why European policy remains focused on control rather than addressing the underlying conditions driving migration in countries like Tunisia.

As Europe scrambles to curb irregular migration across the Mediterranean, policymakers have leaned on short-term agreements with transit countries like Tunisia. While these deals may reduce arrivals in the near term, they miss the core issue: economic stagnation, political frustration, and a lack of opportunity drive migration. By prioritizing short-term containment over long-term stability, Europe risks reinforcing the very conditions driving people to leave. Spain should instead push for long-term economic engagement with Tunisia; without it, Europe will remain trapped in a cycle of crisis management rather than sustainable policy.

Tunisia sits at the center of this challenge. What was once seen as the most promising outcome of the Arab Spring now faces mounting economic pressure. Growth remains sluggish, unemployment is high — especially among young people — and public confidence in institutions continues to erode. For many Tunisians, migration is less a choice than a response to limited economic and political stability.

Europe has responded by focusing on stopping movement. The European Union’s recent agreements with Tunisia emphasize border enforcement, funding security forces, and limiting departures across the Mediterranean. These measures may temporarily reduce crossings, but they do little to change the underlying dynamics. By prioritizing control over reform, Europe risks stabilizing the surface while deeper structural problems worsen.

Public perception critically shapes this approach. When migration is framed in terms of fear or cultural anxiety, policy follows the same logic. In Spain, migration debates often become intertwined with identity and security, even as the country depends on migrant labor. Spain has bucked broader European trends by experiencing strong economic growth alongside rising migration, with migrants helping sustain the labor force. Yet public discourse continues to emphasize strain and instability, obscuring these economic realities and reinforcing short-term, restrictive responses over long-term strategies.

This strategy involves real risks. Economic stagnation in Tunisia will continue to drive migration pressure despite enforcement measures. Simultaneously, external funding that lacks a connection to meaningful reform can worsen existing governance issues. Over time, this approach may increase instability rather than reduce it. Migration will persist; it will adapt to new constraints.

As a primary entry point into Europe, Spain experiences the immediate effects of migration flows. However, it also has an opportunity to shape the broader European response. In 2026, Madrid approved a large-scale regularization program that could grant legal status to more than 500,000 undocumented migrants, integrating them into the formal economy and expanding access to work and public services. This approach recognizes that migration is not only a question of control, but also of integration — and that economic inclusion can serve as a tool of stability rather than a concession.

Yet Spain also offers a revealing test case for Europe’s broader migration debate. The policy reflects a practical reality: Spain’s economy depends on migrant labor in sectors such as agriculture, tourism, construction, and care work. But it is also politically risky. At a time when much of Europe is moving toward more restrictive migration policies, Spain’s decision runs counter to the continental trend and exposes the tension at the heart of its migration politics: migration may be economically necessary, but it remains culturally contested. Domestic frustrations over strained public services, housing pressures, and access to healthcare have also shaped how some voters interpret migration, even when these challenges cannot be reduced to immigration alone. Vox, Spain’s right-wing populist party, has repeatedly framed immigration through the language of illegality, insecurity, and national threat. That risk does not make regularization misguided. Rather, it reinforces the need for Spain to pair integration at home with a more credible long-term strategy abroad.

To move beyond crisis management, Spain and its European partners should shift resources toward long-term investment in Tunisia’s economy, prioritizing job creation, vocational training, and support for small and medium-sized enterprises in sectors that can absorb young workers. Economic engagement must become central to migration policy, not secondary.

This is where the current EU-Tunisia approach remains insufficient. The EU’s agreement with Tunisia includes language on economic development, investment, and macroeconomic support, but migration control remains the organizing logic of the partnership. Development is treated as a supplement to containment rather than as the foundation of a sustainable migration strategy. Without deeper investment tied to youth employment, private-sector growth, regional development, and governance reform, European assistance risks stabilizing Tunisia only on the surface while leaving the pressures that drive migration largely unchanged.

This approach also requires coordination at the European level: bilateral deals risk producing fragmented policies, so Spain should push for a unified framework that aligns financial assistance, development programs, and migration policy, with clear expectations for transparency and economic reform.

Critics argue that effective border management remains essential, especially given domestic political pressures. That concern holds some truth. Governments must respond to short-term migration challenges. However, a strategy that focuses solely on containment is inherently limited: it addresses symptoms instead of causes and risks perpetuating the same cycle of crisis and response. A more balanced approach does not abandon enforcement; it complements it — border management can reduce short-term pressures, but only economic stability can reduce migration permanently. Spain and its European partners should recognize this distinction and adjust their policies accordingly.

Migration will not be solved at Europe’s borders. Conditions beyond them will shape it. Tunisia’s future is closely tied to Europe’s own stability, whether policymakers acknowledge it or not. If Spain wants a more sustainable migration strategy, it should shift from short-term containment to long-term economic engagement with Tunisia. Otherwise, Europe will continue reacting to crises it has the capacity to prevent.

Emma Frazier recently earned her Master of Arts in International Affairs from George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Her research interests include migration, international security, Middle East affairs, and great power competition. Find her on LinkedIn.

Spain, Tunisia, and the Limits of Europe’s Migration Strategy: Control Without Stability was originally published in The Diplomatic Pouch on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Mehran Atashjameh

More than four decades ago, during the Iran-Iraq War, both sides targeted merchant vessels in the Persian Gulf, including oil tankers, to exert economic leverage. This period became known as the “Tanker War.” These attacks caused a rise in oil prices by restricting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s vital energy arteries. A coalition of countries, led by the United States, decided to escort tankers. However, even escorted vessels were at risk: in one incident, a tanker was struck by a sea mine previously planted by Iranian naval forces.

More than 40 years later, tensions have resurfaced and escalated in the Persian Gulf, this time between Iran and the United States. The United States has targeted Iranian naval assets both in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, and claimed that Iran’s naval forces are numerically inferior and unable to project power. On the other side, IRGC naval forces have blocked the Strait of Hormuz in response to U.S. aggression, stating that they will not interfere with merchant ships from “non-hostile” countries. Recently, Iran targeted several ships, including two tankers on April 23, whose seizure was broadcast widely by state media. Despite U.S. claims that they have completely destroyed Iran’s naval power projection capabilities, it clearly continues to restrict shipping. If we are not already, are we likely to witness another tanker war?

Tehran’s Leverage

Former Iranian commanders have long acknowledged that a conventional confrontation with the United States in the Persian Gulf is likely to result in defeat due to the technological superiority of U.S. forces. Iranian decision makers therefore adopted asymmetric tactics rather than conventional naval doctrine, highlighting IRGC strategic foresight. The fact that the Persian Gulf is relatively shallow enables this strategy significantly, since the strait’s deepest point is only 90 meters. This limits the freedom of maneuver for large vessels and constrains operational flexibility, a problem exacerbated by massive sea mine deployment. While the United States may achieve relative air superiority over Iran’s coasts using long-endurance platforms such as drones, this advantage is not absolute and faces operational challenges. Iran’s development of cruise missile platforms also strengthens its maritime strike capabilities. Since the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has recognized the effectiveness of cruise missiles, initially acquiring Chinese SY-family missiles (Silkworm). Over the years, Iran has invested in indigenous missile development, producing cruise missiles with ranges exceeding 2000 km that can be launched from civilian trucks, small boats, and other mobile platforms. This allows Iran to strike vessels outside its territorial waters from deep inland and minimize the risk to launch platforms by avoiding detection by hostile Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Additionally, the unveiling of anti-ship ballistic missiles and swarm drone attack capabilities further complicates any potential defender’s response, allowing Iran to conduct multi-platform attacks. All this means that Tehran retains both the will and the capability to conduct maritime strikes despite significant losses to its naval assets.

Washington’s Perspective

On the other side, in several public statements, U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that U.S. forces had the capability to destroy multiple Iranian vessels and asserted that Iran’s naval capabilities had been severely degraded or effectively neutralized. He also warned that Iran must keep the Strait open, or else it would be opened by force. Washington thus presents itself as a power with the operational and military capacity to ensure the security and uninterrupted flow of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. This effort, in parallel with the deployment of U.S. forces and statements threatening military action against Kharg Island, the main hub of Iran’s oil exports, signals Washington’s use of military pressure as a strategic bargaining tool. Although proposals to target or seize the island have been discussed in policy and military circles as part of contingency planning, they primarily function as leverage aimed at influencing Iranian behavior, particularly in relation to maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz, rather than indicating an imminent ground invasion. Regardless of the willingness and potential costs of such actions, this reflects Washington’s attempt to leverage its main advantage: massive conventional military superiority.

Diplomacy Under the Shadow of Mistrust

As a result of these clashes, Pakistan has taken the initiative and acts as a diplomatic mediator between Iran and the United States. Both sides’ representatives held a first round of negotiations, which ended without tangible results. This situation is largely the result of deep-seated mistrust. From Iran’s perspective, Washington, particularly under the Trump administration, is viewed as a state that first withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It is perceived as maintaining an aggressive and hostile posture, including military actions that coincided with periods of diplomatic engagement, such as the 12-day conflict in July 2025. Tehran also remains embittered over the targeted assassinations of Iranian officials and senior figures within the Islamic Republic’s political and security establishment. From Tehran’s point of view, these developments constitute a major barrier to diplomatic engagement and significantly undermine the prospects for trust-building between the two sides as an essential principle in diplomacy and a fundamental prerequisite for sustaining meaningful negotiations.

Conclusion

The failure of diplomacy between the United States and Iran stems from Washington’s perception of itself as a power capable of achieving its objectives through coercive leverage, including the strategic control or closure of the Strait of Hormuz. From this perspective, the United States seeks to use diplomatic engagement as a means of securing its objectives at the lowest possible cost, framing any successful outcome as a demonstration of power and strategic advantage. At the same time, Iranian decision makers consider trust-building to be largely unattainable due to the historical and structural background of mistrust between the two sides. Diplomatic engagement therefore remains constrained by conflicting strategic assumptions, where coercive leverage and historical mistrust continuously undermine the prospects for sustainable agreement. The situation in the Persian Gulf and efforts to resolve the Strait crisis are shaped by two deeply institutionalized perspectives, which make resolution increasingly challenging. Both sides, albeit with different degrees of effectiveness in their respective leverage, strongly adhere to their own strategic perceptions and assumptions, and both believe that their own advantages will hand them strategic victory. When both sides see victory, neither will back down.

The Second Tanker War? Diplomacy Under the Shadow of Missiles, Drones, and Sea Mines was originally published in The Diplomatic Pouch on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

David J. Kostelancik

Hungary’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for April 12, 2026, are unfolding in an environment shaped not only by domestic political competition but also by broader geopolitical tensions and debates about external influence. Charges of election interference have involved disinformation from state-controlled media, allegations of illicit activities by Russia, and attempts to paint Ukraine and the EU as adversaries. Sorting facts and providing Hungarian voters with an “objective” assessment of reality is a complex task. External actors — ranging from international institutions and partners to geopolitical rivals — interact with domestic political actors in ways that complicate any simple assessment of the details of influence from abroad and how it affects electoral fairness.

At the center of this debate lie two fundamental questions: (1) Will election observers, whether Hungarian or international, be able to determine whether the election is truly free and fair when outside influence may operate through diffuse and indirect channels? (2) If they make such a determination, will they say so and be prepared to defend their views?

External Influence Beyond Disinformation

In contemporary democracies, foreign election interference is associated with covert online operations, cyber intrusions, or clandestine funding networks. Hungary presents a broader picture. As a member of NATO and the European Union, Hungary operates within a dense network of international relationships that generate both expectations and scrutiny. European institutions regularly evaluate democratic standards within member states, while Western diplomatic engagement frequently emphasizes rule-of-law norms and electoral integrity. The Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), a vital part of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, has distinguished itself as the gold standard for election observation and assessment.

At the same time, Hungary has pursued concerning economic and political ties with Russia. These relationships have generated worry among Western policymakers that Moscow will seek to shape domestic political discourse through economic leverage, media influence, or less transparent means. It is in Vladimir Putin’s interest to perpetuate the influence on EU policymaking that he wields via his friends in Budapest.

The Legacy of Opposition and International Attention to Domestic Affairs

Debates about outside influence in Hungary also intersect with internal efforts to reorganize the country’s fragmented opposition. A notable example occurred before the 2018 parliamentary election, when Péter Márki-Zay — then the newly elected mayor of Hódmezővásárhely — attempted to coordinate opposition candidates across individual electoral districts. Although the coordination effort was fundamentally domestic, it attracted international attention because it was framed around democratic competition and electoral fairness — issues that resonated strongly within the European Union. The episode illustrated how Hungarian political developments often become part of broader international debates about democratic standards.

Legal developments also shape perceptions of electoral integrity. Hungary’s Sovereignty Law, for example, sparked debate about how states should regulate foreign influence. Supporters argue that such legislation protects national political systems from external interference, while critics contend that broadly defined sovereignty protections can invite unfair scrutiny onto political actors who maintain international affiliations, including dual citizenship or partnerships with foreign organizations. Interpretation of these laws, especially during election periods, can influence political participation. Monitoring how these laws are applied — particularly if investigations or enforcement actions target specific political groups — poses a challenge for election observers.

The Shining Light — and Limits — of Election Observation

International election observation missions — often organized by institutions such as ODIHR or independent monitoring organizations like Agora — play an important role in evaluating democratic processes. They typically examine voter registration systems, campaign conditions, media access, ballot secrecy, and vote tabulation procedures.

However, the Hungarian elections highlight the limitations of this approach. Many of the most contentious issues surrounding potential outside influence occur outside the traditional scope of observation missions. Non-transparent economic partnerships, geopolitical alliances, legislation, and the abuse of public media to spread disinformation shape the political environment long before ballots are cast. Limited numbers of long-term observers (e.g., the OSCE will send only 18) can dig deeper into these conditions and offer an assessment of the broader ecosystem of political power, but short-term observers will be constrained by time and election day obligations to monitor the actual voting process.

A Geopolitical Election

The 2026 election, therefore, represents more than a routine democratic contest. Polling has suggested growing support for opposition forces, in particular the Tisza Party and its leader Peter Magyar. Magyar, a former Fidesz official, has been relentless in his attacks on scandals and corruption that have flourished during Orban’s tenure. He has espoused center-right positions on domestic issues and advocated for measures to rebuild strained ties with European partners and undo the subjugation of Hungary’s judiciary and media by pro-Fidesz cronies. He has taken some nuanced stances, notably on Ukraine and LGBT rights, to deny Orban issue dominance.

Yet the structural features of Hungary’s electoral system and the enduring influence of Fidesz across state institutions indicate that it is not wise to make any early predictions.

For U.S. and other international partners and investors, the election’s outcome will influence perceptions of future regulatory stability and economic policy direction. Political rhetoric in recent years has increasingly emphasized protectionist narratives surrounding strategic industries and foreign investment, underscoring how domestic politics intersect with international business. Serious economic challenges, including ever-growing foreign debt, energy sourcing tied overwhelmingly to Russia, and attractiveness to foreign investment from other European countries, require attention. The ability of the next Hungarian government to address these challenges will depend on public perception of, and domestic and international investor confidence in, the freeness and fairness of elections, making observers’ vote of confidence critical.

Judging Freeness and Fairness

Ultimately, determining whether Hungary’s 2026 election is free will be straightforward. Procedurally, the voting process must meet international democratic standards, which observers can document on voting day. Whether it will be considered fair, regardless of the outcome, the factors outlined above — Russia influence and interference, institutional entrenchment, and the state’s media control — raise deeper questions about fairness.

Election observers can assess the mechanics of voting. Evaluating the subtler forms of influence that shape the political landscape, however, will require a broader analytical framework. In Hungary, the integrity of elections cannot be understood solely at the ballot box, but within the wider context of domestic institutions and international relationships that shape the political arena in which voters make their choices. The international observers’ assessment will likely spark heated debate. They need to be ready to defend it.

David J. Kostelancik was a career member of the Senior Foreign Service of the United States of America, with the rank of Minister Counselor. Mr. Kostelancik most recently served as acting Deputy Coordinator for Terrorism Prevention and Detention in the Bureau of Counterterrorism. From August 2021 until September 2023 he served as foreign policy advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Kostelancik previously served as Deputy Chief of Mission, and for two years, as Charge d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Budapest Hungary. Other assignments at the Department of State include as Director of the Office of South Central European Affairs and as Director of the Office of Russian Affairs, both in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, as well as Director of the Office of Europe and Asia in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

Foreign Interference and Election Observation in Hungary’s 2026 Parliamentary Vote was originally published in The Diplomatic Pouch on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Cecilia Ignacio

For decades, migrants have sustained the economies and families they left behind through remittances, financial or in-kind transfers made directly to family or community members. In 2024 alone, overseas workers sent an estimated $700 billion to low-and middle-income countries. The World Bank projects these flows will continue to be resilient in the years ahead.

These transfers are steady, personal, and often more reliable than aid. In many emerging economies, they account for a double-digit share of GDP, shaping everything from consumer spending to local construction.

Yet remittances are private by nature. Governments can tax and track them, but cannot dictate their use. Can private savings ever be turned into public capital? For years, governments have tried to channel migrant loyalty into liquidity. But without transparency, patriotism alone cannot fund development.

One answer that keeps resurfacing is the diaspora bond — a sovereign debt instrument built on nostalgia and national pride. Governments issue these typically long-term, low-coupon bonds to their citizens abroad, inviting them to invest in development projects back home at a patriotic discount. Notably, migrants are willing to lend below market rates as a form of charity with interest.

The effectiveness of diaspora bonds is often emphasized through their countercyclical stability and potential to diversify government funding sources. Because sentiment, as much as profit, drives diaspora investors, they may tolerate higher risk and currency volatility. For sovereigns, issuing such bonds may tap into a committed investor base even during downturns.

But if governments hope to harness migrant altruism, wouldn’t direct donations communicate generosity more clearly than debt? Diaspora bonds blur that line, turning a personal act of giving into a financial transaction. For officials, the instrument offers a way to raise funds when traditional markets turn away; for migrants, it transforms patriotism into social capital by publicly legitimizing their financial contributions.

The idea itself is hardly new. In 1919, Ireland’s revolutionary government marketed “Dáil Éireann” bonds to Irish-Americans through a nationwide campaign led by Éamon de Valera. The New York roadshow raised $2 million, and the campaign as a whole ended with $5 million — about $55 million today.

However, only Israel and India have successfully used diaspora bonds on a large scale.

Israel was the first modern model and registered its bonds in 1951 with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, giving investors legal protection. Although diaspora bonds have performed historically well for Israel when crises have sprung, such as the Yom Kippur War or COVID-19, the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict of October 2023 caused the country’s borrowing needs to surge and its credit rating to drop.

Interestingly, the country’s diaspora bonds behaved starkly differently from regular government bonds. In just one year, over $3.5 billion has been raised since the October 2023 war, even as conventional interest rates climbed. Instead of acting like rational market investors focused purely on profit, the diaspora acted more like patriots, lending to their country of origin at a discount. Yields flattened from two-year to ten-year bonds across maturities as decisions were driven more by pride and less by economics. Israel has raised $52 billion from diaspora bonds in its 70 years and counting.

India relied on a global network of Indian and foreign commercial banks specializing in non-resident accounts to make its diaspora bonds easier for overseas Indians to purchase. Issued exclusively to Non-Resident Indians, the bonds carried a sense of ownership that boosted confidence, raising more than $35 billion over several years. Denominated in local currency, they appealed to investors with assets and obligations back home, minimizing fears of exchange risk.

Unfortunately, most other countries cannot bank on as much zeal. Ethiopia’s 2008 and 2011 diaspora bonds were intended to fund its Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam but failed amid poor accountability. Greece, at the height of its 2011 crisis, failed to raise its $3 billion target from its U.S. diaspora. Nigeria and Kenya completed one round each before weak institutions and low investor confidence proved recurring barriers.

Migrants can forgive low returns but not mismanagement. This trust deficit remains the Achilles’ heel of most diaspora-finance schemes. Individuals who fled corruption seldom lend to the regimes that drove them away.

African and European countries are not the only ones to have struggled. In Asia, which tops the global remittance charts, political unrest has deepened skepticism — aside from India’s relatively successful experience — prompting many migrants to keep wiring money directly to family, no matter how nationalistic the pitch.

Despite having its own ministry dedicated to the diaspora (Department of Migrant Workers) and backing from the Asian Development Bank, the Philippines has struggled to convert diaspora savings into public investment. Chronic scandals have damaged credibility as well.

Beyond governance failures, the way countries communicate with their diaspora also shapes investor confidence. Many do not publish detailed data on yields, maturities, or investor participation in diaspora-targeted bonds. In the Philippines, government securities are listed on regulated exchanges such as the Philippine Dealing System, but disclosures shy from distinguishing diaspora investors from domestic ones — leading to an odd situation where the government courts its overseas population yet fails to be accountable to them.

If governments are interested in tapping into diaspora bonds, then greater transparency would be a start. Even if such reforms amount to little more than window-dressing, they would still align diaspora bonds closer to commercial norms and make them more credible to potential investors.

So can diaspora bonds ever evolve into a credible development tool, or are they destined to remain symbols of fiscal desperation and overreliance on the overseas population? Their success depends less on sentiment than on governance. Patriotism can inspire investment, but it cannot substitute for security.

Most migrants remain more comfortable wiring funds directly to relatives than lending to their governments. Until governments prove they can manage money as carefully as one’s family does, diaspora bonds will remain a missed opportunity.

Cecilia Ignacio is a master’s student in Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of Notre Dame. She has professional experience with the United Nations International Organization for Migration, the Niskanen Center, and Georgetown’s Institute for the Study of International Migration. Follow her on LinkedIn.

Patriotism on Credit: Why Diaspora Bonds Can’t Buy Trust was originally published in The Diplomatic Pouch on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

David J. Kostelancik

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was once central to managing tensions between Russia and Ukraine. Today, it is a diminished institution — structurally weakened, politically constrained, and operationally curtailed by Russia’s abuse of its consensus rules. Yet despite its weakness, the OSCE retains technical capacities, field experience, and institutional legitimacy that could allow it to play a limited supporting role in any future Russia–Ukraine ceasefire agreement.

OSCE — Eyes and Ears for the Transatlantic Community 2014–2022

For nearly eight years after 2014, the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) served as the primary international presence on the ground in eastern Ukraine. The unarmed civilian mission monitored ceasefire violations, verified heavy weapon withdrawals, and facilitated local dialogue. Its daily reports provided the most authoritative public record of hostilities. The OSCE also operated a smaller border observation mission at the Russian checkpoints of Gukovo and Donetsk. These mechanisms reflected the OSCE’s traditional strengths: impartial monitoring, technical verification, and quiet diplomacy.

That architecture collapsed in 2022. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion, it blocked renewal of the SMM’s mandate through the OSCE’s consensus rule, forcing the mission’s closure in April 2022. Moscow also ended border monitoring. These closures were not procedural accidents; they demonstrated how vulnerable the OSCE is to obstruction by a participating state determined to paralyze it. Since 2021, Russia has also blocked agreement on the organization’s unified annual budget, compelling the OSCE to operate through temporary monthly allotments and voluntary contributions

Fast forward to the present and negotiations on ending Russia’s war. Any meaningful ceasefire monitoring mandate would require agreement among all 57 participating states — including Russia. The experience of 2022 illustrates that Russia is willing to dismantle OSCE operations rather than permit scrutiny.

Adapting to New Circumstances

OSCE’s operational credibility has also been damaged. Three OSCE staff members — Vadym Golda, Maxim Petrov, and Dmytro Shabanov — were detained in Russian-controlled territory in April 2022 while performing official duties and later sentenced by occupation courts on fabricated charges. Their continued imprisonment underscores the risks to field personnel and highlights Russia’s disregard for OSCE protections — and the OSCE’s limitations.

But the OSCE is still here. It has pivoted toward non-consensus mechanisms and extra-budgetary projects funded voluntarily by participating states. The most important of these is the Support Programme for Ukraine (SPU), launched in late 2022, which now runs more than twenty projects focused on humanitarian demining, psychosocial support for victims of gender-based violence, strengthening Ukraine’s financial monitoring systems to combat money laundering, supporting constitutional and judicial reform, enhancing chemical emergency response capacity, and promoting media literacy and journalist safety. It also assists with registering missing children and supporting their rehabilitation.

These initiatives do not alter the military balance, nor can they enforce a ceasefire. But they preserve OSCE expertise in Ukraine and sustain institutional relationships with national authorities. In a post-conflict setting, that accumulated technical engagement could be valuable for reconstruction, institutional reform, and stabilization.

The OSCE has also intensified its human rights documentation through the “Moscow Mechanism,” which allows a group of participating states to launch independent expert missions without the consent of the state under investigation. Since 2022, it has been invoked to investigate alleged violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. Reports issued in 2024 and 2025 documented patterns of arbitrary detention of Ukrainian civilians, torture and executions of prisoners of war, and other abuses that may constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity. While the OSCE cannot prosecute offenders, these fact-finding missions create authoritative records that may support future accountability processes.

In diplomatic terms, the OSCE remains one of the few inclusive security forums where Russia, Ukraine, the United States, the United Kingdom, and European states continue to sit at the same table. The Permanent Council in Vienna provides a standing venue for messaging and — potentially — quiet engagement. Senior OSCE officials, including the Secretary-General and the rotating Chairperson-in-Office, recently visited both Kyiv and Moscow, signaling readiness to support a negotiated settlement should political conditions permit.

If a ceasefire were reached, what role could the OSCE realistically play?

First, it could provide technical ceasefire monitoring. The organization has experience deploying civilian observers, operating patrol hubs, and using technological tools such as cameras and drones to document violations. Reconstituting a mission akin to the SMM would require consensus, but if both Russia and Ukraine accepted OSCE monitoring as part of a negotiated package, its prior presence in Ukraine gives it institutional memory that few other bodies possess.

Second, the OSCE could assist with verification of arms limitations or buffer zones. While it lacks the enforcement power of a military alliance, it has decades of experience with confidence- and security-building measures under instruments such as the Vienna Document. Even a modest verification role — inspections, reporting, data exchange facilitation — could increase transparency and reduce miscalculation.

Third, the organization could support post-war democratic stabilization. Its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and High Commissioner on National Minorities have decades of experience, and could facilitate dialogue on sensitive issues such as minority rights and language policy.

Yet all of these contributions would be supportive, not determinative. The OSCE cannot compel compliance, impose sanctions, or guarantee security. Any durable ceasefire would depend primarily on the political will of Moscow and Kyiv, backed by credible security guarantees from more powerful actors. The OSCE’s added value would lie in the tedious diplomatic work of confidence-building — not in coercion.

The OSCE’s present weakness does not equal irrelevance. The OSCE retains institutional memory, technical expertise, and an inclusive diplomatic platform that no other European security body fully replicates. If a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire emerges, the OSCE will not lead it. But it could play a practical, supporting role if its members show the same post-conflict foresight they did after previous conflicts, including in the Balkans.

David J. Kostelancik was a career member of the Senior Foreign Service of the United States of America, with the rank of Minister Counselor. Mr. Kostelancik most recently served as acting Deputy Coordinator for Terrorism Prevention and Detention in the Bureau of Counterterrorism. From August 2021 until September 2023 he served as foreign policy advisor to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Kostelancik previously served as Deputy Chief of Mission, and for two years, as Charge d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Budapest Hungary. Other assignments at the Department of State include as Director of the Office of South Central European Affairs and as Director of the Office of Russian Affairs, both in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, as well as Director of the Office of Europe and Asia in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

Don’t Neglect OSCE in Future International Efforts to Help Ukraine was originally published in The Diplomatic Pouch on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Mehran Atashjameh

Editors’ note: this piece was completed prior to the start of the Israeli and U.S. operations in Iran on February 28, 2026. Its analysis nevertheless holds, and we are grateful that the author chose to proceed with publication.

Deterrence has long been a central pillar of U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic, yet repeated efforts to coerce, constrain, or compel Tehran have produced inconsistent and often counterproductive results. Sanctions, military signaling, and diplomatic pressure have failed to generate predictable behavioral change. Classical deterrence theory would suggest that sustained economic damage, military asymmetry, and credible threats should incentivize restraint. Instead, the Islamic Republic has frequently absorbed costs, sustained pressure, and in some cases escalated rather than de-escalated. But deterrence failures stem less from insufficient pressure than from non-shared rationalities between the United States and the Islamic Republic. Western deterrence frameworks assume a materialist cost-benefit logic in which actors prioritize loss minimization and respond predictably to superior power. Tehran, by contrast, evaluates cost, risk, and reward through a strategic culture shaped by revolutionary ideology, religious authority, historical memory, and regime survival. These factors do not eliminate pragmatism, but they fundamentally alter how deterrent signals are interpreted. As a result, U.S. deterrence measures frequently misfire not because the Islamic Republic is irrational, but because it is rational according to different logic.

Non-Shared Rationalities and Strategic Culture

Deterrence is most effective when adversaries share similar assumptions about what constitutes unacceptable risk and intolerable cost. When these assumptions diverge, deterrent signals can be misread or discounted. Strategic culture theory highlights how states interpret threats and opportunities through historically embedded narratives and normative frameworks. In the Islamic Republic’s case, strategic culture emphasizes resistance, independence, and ideological legitimacy. External pressure is often interpreted not merely as a material challenge, but as a test of resolve and regime credibility. Actions that Western policymakers view as prohibitively costly may be perceived in Tehran as tolerable, necessary, or even strategically advantageous if they reinforce narratives of endurance and sovereignty. This divergence leads to persistent mirror-imaging. Western analysts frequently assume that the Islamic Republic calculates costs and benefits in the same manner as the United States. When Tehran does not respond as expected, its behavior is labeled irrational or reckless, rather than consistent within a different framework.

Leadership Identity and Decision-Making Authority

Strategic culture is reinforced by the centralized role of leadership in the Islamic Republic, particularly the Supreme Leader. Decision-making authority is concentrated in an office that combines revolutionary legitimacy, religious authority, and historical symbolism. The Supreme Leader explicitly rejects the identity of a conventional politician, framing his role instead as that of a revolutionary guardian and religious guide. In the words of Ayatollah Khamenei, “I am not a politician; I am a revolutionary.” This self-conception signals that compromise and tactical flexibility are acceptable only when aligned with revolutionary principles and ideological legitimacy. This hybrid identity shapes how risk and compromise are evaluated. Tactical flexibility is permissible, but only within boundaries defined by ideological legitimacy and regime preservation. Concessions that appear pragmatic from a Western perspective may be unacceptable if they are perceived as undermining revolutionary principles or signaling weakness. Conversely, absorbing material costs can be justified if it reinforces domestic legitimacy or ideological coherence. As a result, deterrent pressure aimed at altering short-term behavior often fails to account for how leadership identity filters external signals. Risk is assessed not only in operational terms, but also in symbolic and ideological terms.

Conditional Pragmatism and “Heroic Flexibility”

The Islamic Republic’s approach to negotiation illustrates how pragmatism operates within these constraints. During the 2013–2015 nuclear negotiations, the Islamic Republic’s leaders articulated the concept of narmesh-e qahramananeh, or “heroic flexibility.” This framework legitimized engagement and compromise while preserving revolutionary credibility. Leadership framed this flexibility not as capitulation, but as a strategic choice made from a position of confidence. Negotiation was acceptable precisely because it was bounded by ideological red lines and presented as serving long-term resistance rather than abandoning it. This episode demonstrates that Tehran is capable of pragmatic adjustment, but only when such adjustment is compatible with leadership identity and strategic narratives.

For deterrence, this distinction matters. Pressure alone does not produce compliance; outcomes depend on whether responses can be reconciled with internal legitimacy and strategic self-conception.

Divergent Cost–Benefit Logic and Doctrine

The Islamic Republic’s conception of cost-benefit differs fundamentally from Western rationalist models. While U.S. deterrence logic assumes that overwhelming military or economic superiority forces restraint in weaker actors, the Islamic Republic interprets risk and loss differently, often inspired by religious doctrine. A notable example is the numerical asymmetry principle derived from the Qur’an, particularly Surah al-Anfal (8:65–66). The verse states that a small number of steadfast believers can overcome forces ten times larger:

“If there are twenty steadfast among you, they will overcome two hundred; if there are one hundred, they will overcome one thousand.”

This passage implies that moral resolve, faith, and discipline can outweigh material or numerical disadvantage. It legitimizes endurance and resistance even when Islamic Republic forces are outnumbered, a principle that underpins the Islamic Republic’s defensive doctrine and asymmetric military strategy. The underlying logic is that an adversary’s numerical advantage does not automatically translate into strategic success; perseverance, discipline, and faith serve as force multipliers.

This logic is reinforced by another Qur’anic directive, Surah al-Anfal (8:60), which commands believers to prepare for conflict using whatever means are available:

“And prepare against them whatever you can of (military) power and of war-horses, to frighten thereby the enemy…”

This verse emphasizes that believers should gather whatever resources and capabilities are possible, including weapons, equipment, and strategic positioning, regardless of material limitations. In the Islamic Republic’s strategic culture, this doctrine translates into a deliberate effort to develop power despite constraints, such as U.S. sanctions or technological inferiority. The Islamic Republic has therefore consistently developed asymmetric deterrence and area denial capabilities like ballistic missiles, reflecting this principle of preparing fully with whatever is available. The Islamic Republic prioritizes deterrence through cost imposition toward any rival, even those with greater military capability. Its strategy seeks to make any attack prohibitively costly for adversaries, rather than simply avoiding conflict due to numerical or technological inferiority. Missiles, regional proxies, and the threat of escalation serve as force multipliers that amplify the Islamic Republic’s defensive capacity beyond conventional calculations. This approach diverges sharply from Western expectations, which equate material inferiority with an obligation to avoid confrontation. The Islamic Republic’s cost-benefit logic also accounts for cultural concepts such as martyrdom, pride, and honor. The Shi’a tradition of valorizing sacrifice for principle, exemplified by Husayn and his followers, shapes perceptions of acceptable risk. A small force confronting a larger opponent is not automatically seen as foolish or irrational; it can be morally justified and strategically viable if framed as resistance to injustice or defense of principles. Together, the Qur’anic directives and cultural-religious values form a coherent rationale for Islamic Republic’s asymmetric, resilience-based deterrence strategy. Hence, Tehran can sustain and even enhance its capabilities under severe pressure.

Misperception and Deterrence Failure

Western policymakers may interpret the Islamic Republic’s flexibility and occasional signs of passivity as weakness. In U.S. cost-benefit logic, concessions, negotiation, or restraint signal that pressure is effective and can be intensified. Yet from the Islamic Republic’s perspective, these actions represent strategic confidence, controlled adaptability, and moral strength. Historical experiences such as decades of sanctions, regime change, and perceived U.S. threats reinforce the Islamic Republic’s mistrust. US and Israeli strikes during ongoing diplomatic meetings in June 2025 were interpreted in Tehran as evidence of bad faith, not as inducements to comply. Misreading the Islamic Republic’s intentions perpetuates cycles of mistrust, escalation, and deterrence failure. Deterrence thus fails not because the Islamic Republic is irrational, but because its strategic culture defines risk, honor, and cost differently. In June 2025, the sense of betrayal and dishonor inflicted by Israeli strikes far outweighed any push towards capitulation, despite Israel’s tactical successes. Flexibility is tactical, endurance is valorized, and compromise is conditional — all constrained by ideology and leadership identity.

Conclusion

U.S.-Islamic Republic deterrence failures reflect a deeper problem of non-shared rationalities rather than simple miscalculation or irrationality. Tehran’s strategic behavior is shaped by a hybrid logic that integrates ideology, leadership identity, historical memory, and pragmatic calculation. Concepts such as conditional flexibility, resilience under pressure, and asymmetric deterrence redefine how costs and risks are assessed. Analyses that rely exclusively on conventional deterrence theory and materialist assumptions are therefore likely to misinterpret Islamic Republic behavior. A more accurate understanding requires recognizing how strategic culture and leadership identity mediate responses to coercion. Without accounting for these factors, deterrence efforts will continue to produce surprise, escalation, and policy frustration rather than predictable restraint

Mehran Atashjameh is an independent analyst specializing in missile defense, air power, the Middle East, warfare, and Iran. He holds a master’s in International Security from Jagielloński University. Follow him on LinkedIn.

Deterrence, Diplomacy, Rationality, and Strategic Culture: Iran’s Strategic Decision-Making Logic was originally published in The Diplomatic Pouch on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.