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        <title><![CDATA[Inflection Points - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Searching for changes in direction. Insights on startups and technology. - Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[You can follow my latest writing at ScreenshotEssays.com]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/how-to-project-your-startups-growth-b05004d3e710?source=rss----a12b6c1dde9---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b05004d3e710</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[product-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marketing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Stromberg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jan 2018 18:43:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-04T20:15:20.881Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G1FvsFqmVlqh10poq_-2ng.jpeg" /><figcaption>Ben Affleck is very serious about growth spreadsheets</figcaption></figure><h3>How to Project Your Startup’s Growth</h3><p>Projecting customer growth can be tricky, but is key to understanding where your startup is headed. It will tell you what resources you need when, and help anticipate inflection points in the business that competitors may miss.</p><p>To project your startup’s growth, it is intuitive that you have to calculate:</p><blockquote><strong><em>1. The number of customers you will add each month.<br>2. The number of customers you will lose each month.</em></strong></blockquote><p>However, the most common mistake founders make is not accurately accounting for customer attrition (#2) when projecting growth.</p><p>To make this process easier, I put together a <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1bWldr6B72EI_Sz3aWgjE9kzoOf9WdtKUfOzMU-_U4no"><strong>simple spreadsheet</strong></a> that allows you to incorporate your customer retention curve to drive growth projections. I’ve used this model over the years to project a number of businesses, and wish I had something like it when I first started Oyster. It is particularly useful for subscription products, but relevant to any product with paying customers.</p><blockquote><a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1bWldr6B72EI_Sz3aWgjE9kzoOf9WdtKUfOzMU-_U4no/edit?usp=sharing">You can follow this link to view the spreadsheet.</a></blockquote><h3>Growth Drivers</h3><p>In order to project the number of customers you will gain and lose in each month, you have to look at two things:</p><h4><strong>1. Monthly Acquired Customers (# you gain)</strong></h4><p>The number of customers you will acquire each month, given marketing spend and acquisition cost. It important to keep this projection grounded in reality rather than simply assuming a set growth rate over time. Driving this number off marketing spend and acquisition costs helps do that. As you scale, you can break this out by channel to get a more granular projections.</p><h4><strong>2. The Cohort Retention Curve (# you lose)</strong></h4><p>The percent of customers who sign up in month 1 who will still be around in each successive month. The curve represents the probability that a new customer is active in month [X] of their lifetime. To demonstrate the idea, I’ve included below an example of what projections for an upside case, base case, and downside case curve might look like for a pre-launch startup:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*ANH2rlfoOQAuZx1Z4RuasA.png" /></figure><p>Retention curves generally reach an asymptote over time (meaning the curve will flatten out). This makes sense — older customers retain better than newer ones. Those who see less value in the service drop off earlier in their life, leaving the service with more committed members over time.</p><p>The spreadsheet applies your retention curve to each cohort of new customers acquired to show how many will remain at month [X]. It then sums these cohorts to give you an accurate projection of the total customers at the end of every month.</p><h3>Spreadsheet Definitions</h3><p>Below are definitions for each section of the model that help get to these two growth drivers:</p><h4>To get <strong>Monthly Acquired Customers (# you gain)</strong></h4><ul><li><strong>Acquisition Build (cell E3):</strong> A projection of how many customers will be acquired each month for the first 60 months of the business, based on marketing spend and customer acquisition cost. This section has two inputs: marketing spend and acquisition cost. For example, if you think you will spend $5K per month and acquire customers for $15, you can input those numbers. You can change these numbers over time to account for key launches and expansions. If you don’t plan any paid marketing, you can change the “Acquired Customers” column directly based on your own estimates.</li></ul><h4>To get The Cohort Retention Curve (# you lose)</h4><ul><li><strong>Month (column A): </strong>The month in the customer’s lifetime.</li><li><strong>Cohort Retention (column B): </strong>The percent of the original cohort that is still around in each successive month. In other words, the probability that a customer who signs up in month 1 will be around in month X. If you haven’t yet projected a Retention Curve for your business, you can use the <a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/a-spreadsheet-for-calculating-subscription-lifetime-value-402d1a3ae7fd#.eer35vbl2"><strong>LTV spreadsheet I put together</strong></a><strong> </strong>to create one. Once you have that, you can paste those projections into column B of this sheet.</li><li><strong>Retained From Previous Month (column C): </strong>The marginal retention rate from month to month. For example, the percent of people that are retained between month 2 and month 3.</li></ul><h4>Bringing it all together</h4><ul><li><strong>Retention Build (cell E9): </strong>This section applies your retention curve to each cohort of acquired customers. It projects how many customers in each acquired cohort will still be around after month 1, month 2, and all the way to month 60.</li><li><strong>Growth Summary (cell E72):</strong> This is a rollup of the Retention Build, showing total active customers at the end of each month. If you want, you can add an average revenue row to drive revenue projections.</li></ul><h3>How to Use the Spreadsheet</h3><ul><li><strong>Make a local copy of the file: </strong>You can do this by clicking on the tab and clicking “Copy to,” and copying to your own Google Drive:</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/264/1*wmb0xDlk4wP84F7zbkZwHw.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Numbers in blue are inputs, and numbers in black are outputs.</strong> You can change the blue numbers to customize the projections. Specifically, you can adjust the “Cohort Retention” column that represents your Retention Curve, as well as the “Acquisition Build” section.</li></ul><p>Working on lifetime value and growth models is not the most glamorous part of the founder journey. However, making the time is critical. Seeing the sensitivity of specific outputs to changing inputs gives you a deeper understanding of where the startup is, and where it must go. It is a great way to develop instincts that can help you make decisions about your business both faster and better.</p><p><em>If you enjoyed this post, you can </em><a href="https://twitter.com/ericstromberg"><em>follow me on Twitter for updates</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b05004d3e710" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/how-to-project-your-startups-growth-b05004d3e710">You can follow my latest writing at ScreenshotEssays.com</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points">Inflection Points</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Scaling Marketing is Like Learning to Drive]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/scaling-marketing-is-like-learning-to-drive-d1cff9971687?source=rss----a12b6c1dde9---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d1cff9971687</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[growth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[planning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marketing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Stromberg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jan 2018 18:42:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-29T18:44:06.044Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wfQY0wBDX-fkm_elZIvb2g.jpeg" /></figure><p>Let’s say your startup has set a budget to spend on marketing over a period of time.</p><p>Let’s also say you have the superpower of being able to predict perfectly when your customer acquisition opportunity would be high, and when it will be low.</p><p>You might predict opportunity will be fairly consistent throughout the period, looking something like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/751/1*xx50sgE8WDRap-mYJ3_cyA.png" /></figure><p>This prediction might lead you to allocate marketing budget evenly across the period. You would feel pretty good about this decision because consistent spend feels more comfortable than wide variances in spend.</p><p>In fact, what you’d learn quickly is that opportunity varies widely, and the chart looks more like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/780/1*XZEYFkA5_lx-wyQzFADVYQ.png" /></figure><p>This variance in opportunity means the customer acquisition cost (CAC) would vary widely as well. Because of this, it is generally the wrong decision to allocate spend perfectly evenly across a set time period.</p><p>Like a new car you are learning to drive and testing the motor, every entrepreneur must learn the conditions that make marketing opportunity for their business high vs. low — when, where, and how quickly to step on the gas vs. hit the breaks.</p><p>Every product has unique customer acquisition dynamics. A key part of growing a startup is learning the idiosyncrasies of marketing opportunity for your unique product.</p><p>Here are a few examples of the learnings you can expect as you start to test and scale marketing:</p><h4><strong>1. Holidays offer </strong>opportunity<strong> for some and challenges for others.</strong></h4><p>Valentine’s Day, Mother’s Day, Father’s Day and Christmas all present valuable opportunities to bring down CAC due to higher customer spend on gifts. The challenge is that every company knows this and allocates more budget to these times so the cost of a click goes up.</p><p>However, if you happen to have a highly targeted product to the occasion this can still be a big opportunity. For example, offering digital gifts is a differentiator around holidays. At Oyster we offered a last-minute digital gift card for those who were inside the window where e-commerce shipping would no longer arrive in time. We quickly learned the appeal of last-minute gifting and started to concentrate almost all of our spend in the 48 hours leading up to Christmas when many other retailers who shipped physical products stopped spending.</p><p>CAC can also drop steeply at the start of January as companies pull back from spend levels around the holidays and competition is reduced.</p><h4><strong>2. Aligning marketing spend with customer budgets </strong>can improve efficiency.</h4><p>Customers will often deplete their personal budget (and willingness to spend) at the end of the month, and refill it at the top of the month. This can make CACs lower in the start of the month than toward end of the month for some products.</p><p>This is especially true if your product is billed through carriers who have monthly spend limits.</p><h4>3. Understanding seasonality of the product and doubling down is key.</h4><p>I once spoke with the CMO of a fitness company that spent 70% of their annual marketing budget in January to capitalize on New Year’s resolutions.</p><p>At Oyster we were a book reading application, so CAC went down during summer months when people went on vacation and read a lot of books.</p><h4><strong>4. Press (particularly national) can drive CAC anomalies.</strong></h4><p>CAC drops quickly during press weeks. This is particularly true for national press. Our CAC decreased by about 60% when we were featured on national TV. I have heard similar comps from other e-commerce businesses. As a founder, it is likely a good idea to concentrate spend around press events.</p><p>Customers often need to see your brand a few times before they are primed to take action on an ad. National press does this very effectively. It creates brand awareness quickly, so customers already know about your product and are more likely to click when they see an ad on Facebook.</p><p>You can also try to simulate this early on by running targeted brand advertising on podcasts and radio simultaneously with Facebook ads to a similar audience (i.e. in one city) to see the impact it has on CAC.</p><h4>5. Channels with the same CAC can have very different retention.</h4><p>You might find that CAC on Facebook is the same as Twitter, but that Facebook customers stay twice as long. It will take you a bit longer to figure this out, but it is usually effective to look at first month retention as a leading indicator.</p><p>The quality of customer that a channel sends is often product-specific as opposed to channel-specific (i.e. Pinterest ads might send great customers for a food subscription but bad ones for a mobile game), so it’s important to learn the unique <a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/a-spreadsheet-for-calculating-subscription-lifetime-value-402d1a3ae7fd#.oatk8bjmt">retention curves</a> of each channel for your offering.</p><p>Founders of new companies have the advantage over incumbents that they often know the nuances of the business more deeply — after all, they are the ones who built up every small detail of the company from nothing. The accumulation of this knowledge can ultimately be a differentiator for the business. Marketing follows this logic as well — if you can learn the market conditions that make marketing your product more efficient, you can outpace competition.</p><p>This is why I think its a good idea for founders to be deeply involved in marketing for an extended period of time when they start, rather than hiring immediately or handing it over to a third-party agency. By doing so, you will learn how to drive more quickly, and the instincts will stay with you as you scale.</p><blockquote>Follow along for the next idea — <a href="https://www.getrevue.co/profile/ericstromberg">sign up for my newsletter</a>.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d1cff9971687" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/scaling-marketing-is-like-learning-to-drive-d1cff9971687">Scaling Marketing is Like Learning to Drive</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points">Inflection Points</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Snapchat is Building its Content Business for Scale]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/snapchat-is-building-its-content-business-for-scale-872fd90bb6d5?source=rss----a12b6c1dde9---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/872fd90bb6d5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[snapchat]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[netflix]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[medium]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Stromberg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jan 2018 18:41:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-04T04:38:09.312Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Bx_FVYwBfj6IiUm4CO-CRQ.png" /></figure><p>In October <a href="http://www.recode.net/2016/10/18/13326196/snapchat-discover-ad-sales-plan-change">Recode</a> reported that Snapchat is changing it’s payment model with publishers who create content on the platform:</p><blockquote>Instead of sharing ad revenue that section produces, Snapchat wants to pay content partners a flat license fee up front and keep the ad money for itself. It’s the same model that TV networks use when they buy programming.</blockquote><blockquote>That’s a switch from <a href="http://www.recode.net/2015/1/26/11558116/snapchats-content-play-comes-into-focus-discover-debuts-tuesday">the terms Snapchat has offered since it launched Discover in 2015.</a> Up until now, <a href="http://www.recode.net/2015/3/12/11560116/snapchats-ad-rates-for-its-discover-feature-are-really-high">it has let publishers sell ads against their own content</a>, and Snapchat has also sold ads against the same content using its own sales team. Splits have varied depending on the deal and who sold the ads.</blockquote><p>In short, Snapchat is moving away from revenue split deals with publishers to paying flat-fee licenses for content rights. This move is an important one and better aligns their business model with their product strengths.</p><p>To understand why Snapchat made this move, let’s first look at the different ways content distributers pay content owners today.</p><h4>How Content Distributers Pay Content Owners</h4><p>There is a long history of content distributors paying content owners for rights. From Netflix to Pandora to Spotify, each has struck unique deals for content. A few structures emerge when looking at these deals:</p><ul><li><strong>Revenue Splits: </strong>An agreement to split revenue generated from all customers in a specific proportion (70/30, for example).</li><li><strong>Per-Subscriber Fees: </strong>A set dollar amount paid to the content provider for each subscriber who is active in a period.</li><li><strong>Per-Use Fees: </strong>A set dollar amount paid to the content provider each time their content is consumed.</li><li><strong>Flat-Fee License: </strong>A guaranteed dollar amount that will be paid to the content irrespective of subscribers, usage, or revenue generated by consumers. This is sometimes layered on top of a Per-Subscriber, Per-Use, or Revenue Split arrangement as a “Minimum Guarantee.”</li></ul><p>Distributors will sometimes blend different models together. For example, it’s been reported that Spotify pays music labels the higher of a flat-fee dollar amount or a 70/30 revenue split.</p><h4>Why Snapchat is Changing Payment Models</h4><p>Snapchat started out striking revenue split deals with publishers. Revenue splits make it easy to enter the market because your costs scale in proportion with your revenue base. You can never pay out more than you take in, and the splits are desirable when revenue is low and hard to predict.</p><p>However, once you reach scale the profit upside is capped, which makes it harder to reap the benefits of scale. Below is a theoretical example of revenue and costs in a revenue split model:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/949/1*6oDrWEChhy_PIl7T56gUtg.png" /><figcaption>Revenue split deals make it easier to enter a market but harder to capitalize on scale</figcaption></figure><p>On the other hand, flat-fee license deals usually make it much harder to enter the market. You must commit to paying content owners high amounts before you have scaled revenue, regardless of performance. This is generally prohibitive for new startups and not desirable when experimentation is high and ROI uncertain. However, flat-fee licenses have the benefit of providing a high degree of upside on profit when you reach scale and bet on the right content (think Netflix’s big bets on originals like House of Cards):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/953/1*KYXr44VQ6WpXaMZimawpDw.png" /><figcaption>Flat-fee deals make it harder to enter a market but easier to capitalize on scale</figcaption></figure><p>With this backdrop, it’s clear that Snapchat navigated their entrance into the content market and transition quite well. Revenue split deals allow for easier market entry in the early stages, while flat-fee models allow for higher profit upside as the company grows. Snapchat was able to enter at a low cost but will enjoy the benefits of scale:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/984/1*q0Xy9Fwed2Ib3TH2-v6jkg.png" /><figcaption>Snapchat’s strategy made it easier to get started while giving it the benefit of large scale</figcaption></figure><p>Of course, the key assumption in all of this is that Snapchat continues to grow revenue and the content performs well. The flip side of this business model shift is that Snapchat will now be taking on more risk if they pay for content that does not perform well (i.e. the revenue graph for the content goes down, not up over time).</p><p>In the matrix below, Snapchat is looking to move from the bottom left quadrant to the top right quadrant (with Netflix). The result will be a higher profit upside on their biggest hits. Profit can then drive a virtuous cycle that allows them to make even larger investments in content.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/847/1*cIPROFVijdHM2OJrp5iiVA.png" /></figure><h4>The Move Aligns their Business Model with Product Strengths</h4><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-mission/3-predictions-for-the-future-of-live-video-9fb145cc262b#.2c6e8e9lx">Content platforms that drive discovery</a> are the ones that win. This is what makes Netflix so powerful. They can take a show like <em>Breaking Bad</em> that had a modest audience at the time and make it into one of the most popular TV shows ever with their massive distribution.</p><p>A show like <em>Breaking Bad</em> also drives outsized profit for Netflix. They can pay a relatively low flat-fee compared to more popular shows, and then generate customer demand for the show by putting it in front of just the right people. The fixed-cost structure allows them to enjoy all of the upside of demand creation. Here, Netflix is a textbook example of a popular phrase in media:</p><blockquote>“Whoever generates the customer demand gets to capture the value.”</blockquote><p>Snapchat is one of the more powerful content discovery platforms we have seen in a long time. In other words, they are great at generating customer demand. Millions of people are spending more and more time on Snapchat and will watch whatever content Snapchat pushes to them.</p><p>Moving to a flat-fee licensing model allows Snapchat to acquire content rights for a fixed rate, and capture the value in the upside when they generate demand for content by putting it in front of their growing and engaged audience. They wouldn’t be able to do this as effectively in a revenue-split model where they were committed to sharing 70% of the revenue even when they created all of the demand for it.</p><p>Snapchat has consistently proven they are innovators in technology: in messaging, augmented reality, and even hardware. I’m excited to see them push the boundaries in premium content creation and consumption. Step one was getting the business model set up for scale.</p><p><em>To receive future posts via email, you can </em><a href="https://www.getrevue.co/profile/ericstromberg"><em>sign up for my weekly newsletter</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=872fd90bb6d5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/snapchat-is-building-its-content-business-for-scale-872fd90bb6d5">Snapchat is Building its Content Business for Scale</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points">Inflection Points</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Complexity Trap]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/the-complexity-trap-c6c5bbaa5674?source=rss----a12b6c1dde9---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c6c5bbaa5674</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[software-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[product-management]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Stromberg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Nov 2017 02:33:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-09T18:32:43.817Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y5fpbDysk7-lkSHAJwOc3g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Building a company is not a theoretical exercise</figcaption></figure><p>When you first start a company, everything is simple. The team is small and communication is easy. The core product designs fit on a handful of screens. Third-party API integrations and services are minimal. Your partnership contracts haven’t gone through any redlines.</p><p>As you scale the business, plan meets reality. Sales grow, the team grows, expectations grow — and complexity enters. When you are a larger company, the cost of complexity and value of simplicity becomes clear. Simplicity is a key advantage that allows the team to communicate better, iterate faster, and outpace competition.</p><p>But you aren’t there yet. It’s early and minimizing complexity is far down your list of priorities. Instead, you optimize for precision by introducing complexity to each part of the business. The tradeoff between complexity and precision makes sense: as you add additional rules to a function, it becomes more complex and more precise. This feels like a smart tradeoff because you want don’t want to shortchange your startup in any way.</p><p>That’s when you fall for the complexity trap.</p><p>Below are a few examples of this trap at work for an early-stage company:</p><h4><strong>1. Company Metrics</strong></h4><p>The calculation of core company metrics like customer churn, lifetime value, and customer acquisition cost can be as simple or complex as you want. If you want to be really bored, we can talk about a 10-step process for calculating churn that is marginally more accurate than looking at subscribers who left in a period and dividing it by starting subscribers. There is a time for this precision, but it’s not early in the life of the company if it means sacrificing simplicity.</p><p>The cost of complexity in tracking company metrics is real. The downside is that not everyone in the organization truly understands how a metric is calculated, so they recreate it wrong, leading to different outputs. And this is a much worse outcome than an output that is marginally imperfect.</p><p>When I was first implementing our metrics tracking at Oyster, I sat down with a veteran of a very successful e-commerce business to learn. I thought I was pretty smart when I asked if we should be discounting our lifetime value calculations to the present. He laughed at me. Even at the scale they were operating, the marginal value of greater precision was not worth the complexity it introduced.</p><p>It turns out, Warren Buffett agrees. Investment banking 101 teaches you that you must discount cash flows to the present to drive a valuation. However, when asked about discounting cash flows to present, Warren Buffett says he doesn’t do it because “If (the value of the company) doesn’t scream out to you, it’s too close.”</p><h4><strong>2. Partnership Deals</strong></h4><p>When working on a new partnership, the desire for precision at the sake of simplicity can creep in as each side maneuvers to define exactly what they want. Inventing smart new terms neither side has seen before, and over-optimizing contract definitions can feel like the right move.</p><p>However, especially if you are working on partnership deals with big companies, complexity is your enemy. While the principal negotiators might understand the new terms and definitions, big companies can require explicit sign-off from 10+ people, and implicit sign-off from many more. Your contact at the big company might perfectly understand the nuance of every item, but how about their boss? Or their boss’ boss? Or their cross-functional counterpart?</p><p>Complexity makes the game of telephone difficult to navigate, with each person who is another degree removed not really understanding why a term is the way it is. This makes it harder for people to internally champion the deal, stalling things out or stopping the conversations entirely.</p><h4><strong>3. Product Edge Cases</strong></h4><p>Worrying about small edge cases is generally not a good idea for a very early stage software company. An edge case is one that only impacts a small fraction of the customer base. While it makes the end output (the software) more precise in its function, it introduces complexity to the codebase and product scope. Engineers must maintain these edge cases, and product managers must understand all of them going forward.</p><p>Again, there is a time for ironing these out, but it is not early in the company life before product/market fit when iteration is the highest.</p><p>Falling for the complexity trap overcomplicates the business as you try to scale. Small complexities compound with growth, and lead to technical, organizational, and product debt that the company must pay down.</p><p>The natural process of scaling a company will introduce enough complexity, so anchoring on minimizing it early on will pay dividends down the line. You want to confine complexity to the core areas you are innovating, and remove it from most other areas.</p><p>The difficult role of the founder is to determine when precision can be sacrificed in the name of simplicity, and when it cannot. But when in doubt, take the route that minimizes complexity.</p><p><em>If you enjoyed this post, you can </em><a href="https://twitter.com/ericstromberg"><em>follow me on Twitter for updates</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c6c5bbaa5674" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/the-complexity-trap-c6c5bbaa5674">The Complexity Trap</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points">Inflection Points</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[3 Predictions for the Future of Live Video]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/3-predictions-for-the-future-of-live-video-9fb145cc262b?source=rss----a12b6c1dde9---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9fb145cc262b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[netflix]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[television]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Stromberg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Nov 2017 02:23:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-04T15:37:39.654Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OScJjQ4xhoakvZnrQ06F4w.png" /></figure><p>2016 was a big year for live video, and I expect 2017 will be as well. To understand what the future of live video may hold, let’s first take a look at the past.</p><p>In 2008 Netflix <a href="https://www.cnet.com/news/netflix-adds-2500-streaming-movies-from-starz/">struck a deal with Starz</a> to bring 2,500 movies to their newly-formed streaming service. The deal cost Netflix just $25 million. On-demand streaming was in it’s infancy, and as time would prove, content owners dramatically undervalued the audience Netflix could drive with its service. The Starz catalogue helped catapult Netflix from almost no streaming subscribers in 2008 to over 30 million subscribers by the end of 2012. In that year, just four years after the original deal, Starz declined a $300 million renegotiation offer from Netflix. The dramatic step up ($275 million in four years) highlighted just how much value Netflix took from the deal.</p><p>Fast forward to 2016, and the original Netflix deal with Starz is widely seen as the godfather of on-demand streaming. Since then, there has been an escalating arms race among these services. Collectively, Netflix, Amazon Prime Video, HBO, and Hulu have grown their combined content budgets to more than $10 billion per year. The race has driven each to pay billions for exclusive deals, original shows, and celebrity-driven programming as they jockey for position in the streaming gold rush. For viewers, the result has been a dramatic surge in great content to watch.</p><p>However, there is one area that on-demand streaming services have largely ignored in content acquisition: live video. You don’t generally see Netflix acquiring the rights to live sports, news, events, or other very timely content. There are two reasons live video has been overlooked by on-demand services historically:</p><ul><li><strong>Product incompatibility:</strong> The timely nature of Live is at odds with the “watch anytime” promise of on-demand streaming. The latest <em>Transparent</em> episode from Prime Video can be watched and enjoyed months later by subscribers, whereas a Thursday night NFL game is significantly less compelling months after airing.</li><li><strong>Content strategy incompatibility:</strong> Netflix, Amazon, and Hulu have built a content acquisition model where they commit to large up-front payments to content owners. They then earn back these payments through subscription fees paid over an extended period of time. Netflix may have agreed to pay Disney close to <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323901604578159432752905010">$1 billion</a> for it’s content, but Netflix subscribers can enjoy the movies for years. With live video, viewership is focused on a single day. This type of viewership lends itself best to an advertising model, not subscription. As a result, on-demand services have a harder time earning back the high costs of live content.</li></ul><p>Enter the social networks: in 2016 Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, and Instagram all turned their attention to this live video, filling the void left by on-demand streaming services. Always focused on timeliness, and with expertise in advertising, social networks are a more natural fit for live video than Netflix. Each of these companies has made “Live” a strategic priority.</p><p>We are in the early phases of seeing a new ecosystem emerge around live video, delivered through new distribution channels on the internet. 2016 in live video felt a bit like 2008 in on-demand streaming, where each player was aggressively searching for their own watershed Starz deal. We saw a lot of experimentation from all major players to see what sticks: deals for <a href="http://variety.com/2016/digital/news/twitter-mlb-nhl-free-live-games-1201821793/">full</a> professional <a href="http://www.wired.com/2016/07/usa-basketball-exhibition-games-will-stream-live-facebook/">games</a>, full <a href="http://bleacherreport.com/articles/2652050-pac-12-twitter-agree-to-live-stream-sporting-events-for-2016-17-season">college games</a>, live TV <a href="http://marketingland.com/twitters-live-tv-lineup-grows-three-bloomberg-weekday-shows-184035">news</a>, <a href="https://www.cnet.com/news/twitter-to-livestream-golden-globes-red-carpet-pre-show/">award shows</a>, as well as <a href="http://www.recode.net/2015/9/17/11618660/snapchat-inks-nfl-deal-to-bring-football-into-its-live-stories">content</a> and <a href="http://variety.com/2016/digital/news/facebook-nfl-celebrity-live-streaming-deals-1201724283/">clips</a> around <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/turner-sports-and-snapchat-sign-live-stories-deal-starting-with-march-madness-1457607601">live video</a>. Facebook started <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-signs-deals-with-media-companies-celebrities-for-facebook-live-1466533472">acquiring content</a> to <a href="http://fortune.com/2016/06/21/facebook-paying-live-video/">support their live video efforts</a>, and recently brought <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2016/11/21/instagram-live/">live video to Instagram</a>. Today, the content being acquired may feel “fringe,” but so did streaming movies over the internet in 2008.</p><p>Snapchat and Instagram, with their Stories products, are also pioneering “almost live” video. While not technically live, the format is only available for 24 hours and delivers the same relevancy and timeliness of live video. When Instagram launched Stories earlier this year, I would not be surprised if the company paid celebrities to create “almost live” video on the platform, hoping to find their own <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/22/arts/music/for-dj-khaled-snapchat-is-a-major-key-to-success.html?_r=0">DJ Khaled</a>.</p><p>With the backdrop of the last 8 years in on-demand streaming, we can make a few predictions about how the next few years of live video will unfold:</p><h4><strong>1. New entrants will emerge as the market matures.</strong></h4><p>Today, Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, and Instagram are making their first moves in live video. Apple has had its sights on the TV market as well, though to date they have focused less on acquiring specific live video and events, and more on partnering with networks to disrupt the cable bundle.</p><p>However, just as we’ve seen a wide range of technology companies follow Netflix over the past 8 years, I expect to see other properties with large web and mobile audiences to start picking off live video rights. Early candidates include Verizon, Apple and Amazon.</p><p>As the market matures and companies figure out which content and creative approaches perform best in live video (length, camera positioning, format, etc.), the formats will become more consistent as well. As this happens, experimentation will fade, ROI will improve, and a new set of bidders who are further on the adoption curve will emerge. This will all contribute to rising prices for live video content.</p><h4><strong>2. Content will move to exclusive rights at higher prices.</strong></h4><p>When large companies with access to capital are jockeying for position in a content market, the natural outcome is a move to exclusives. Content that is available in multiple places is a commodity, and the fastest path to differentiation is exclusivity.</p><p>The move from non-exclusives to exclusives as the market matures makes sense. In the early days of the arms race every deal is in-effect exclusive: if you can get there before your competition, you can have an exclusive. Additionally, neither side knows what the ROI will be so both sides hedge: the distributor gets a lower price by not demanding exclusivity, and the content owner gets to also distribute through other proven channels.</p><p>However, as the market matures the opportunity to grab new land fades. The path to differentiation is not through pure execution of new deals, but by strategically locking up exclusive content. Additionally, as ROI becomes more clear, both sides know in greater detail what they are getting, allowing both sides to commit to larger deals.</p><p>At minimum, category exclusivity will be negotiated. This would look something like “exclusivity in mobile live video,” where the content cannot appear on another mobile TV property. This is similar to how Netflix sometimes negotiates exclusivity in on-demand subscription, but the content can be shown in linear TV. We might even see companies like Snapchat and Instagram pay celebrities to gain exclusive rights to their Live broadcasts.</p><h4><strong>3. The platforms that drive content discovery will win.</strong></h4><p>When experimenting with a new distribution channel, content owners are looking at how effectively the channel can attract an incremental audience. Content owners already have outlets for their content where they can attract a very large audience — they look to new channels to grow the audience. This is what made Netflix so powerful. They could take a show like <em>Breaking Bad</em> that had a modest audience at the time and make it into one of the most popular TV shows ever.</p><p>To be successful in live video, platforms like Twitter, Facebook, Snapchat and Instagram must give content owners access to a new audience. They have to bring in a new viewer who otherwise wouldn’t have watched the broadcast. For example, for a Thursday night Patriots game, Twitter must go beyond attracting the diehard Patriots fan (this fan would have watched it where ever it was broadcast); they must convince a casual Football fan who otherwise would have not watched to tune in (the value they create).</p><p>In other words, they must be great at driving discovery of new content. This is, of course, the advantage of internet distribution as opposed to linear TV — it can be infinitely customizable. These emerging content platforms can, in theory, take an Olympic game of volleyball that would have otherwise gone largely on watched, and find 1 million people that it knows will love watching the game. Facebook seems well position here.</p><p>Snapchat could drive discovery in a different, and perhaps more innovative way. The company is rapidly creating a new market for “almost live” short video clips that, viewed in quick succession, give you the feel of Live TV in just 10% of the time. This new way of consuming Live TV could be key to unlocking new audiences.</p><p><strong>Final note:</strong> Every so often, a new content distribution pipe emerges. As it scales, there is tremendous demand to fill that pipe with content. As demand for the content scales faster than supply, content prices rise. During the past 5 years that pipe was on-demand streaming and the content was scripted dramas. Over the next 5 as video touch points continue to proliferate on mobile, that demand may be for live video. The last 5 years have been a great time to own the rights to premium movies and television, and the next 5 will be a great time to own live video rights.</p><p>Just as the Netflix streaming era sparked a golden age in TV dramas, we may be on the verge of entering a golden age in live video.</p><p><em>To receive future posts via email, you can </em><a href="https://www.getrevue.co/profile/ericstromberg"><em>sign up for my weekly newsletter</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9fb145cc262b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/3-predictions-for-the-future-of-live-video-9fb145cc262b">3 Predictions for the Future of Live Video</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points">Inflection Points</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Talent Monopolies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/talent-monopolies-38fa422ae8a6?source=rss----a12b6c1dde9---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/38fa422ae8a6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hiring]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Stromberg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Nov 2017 04:19:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-04T15:38:09.067Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Market monopolies are fairly well understood. They exist when a company has exclusive control of a market. In startup terms, when you are 10 times bigger than the next largest competitor, you are entering monopoly territory.</p><p>However, I’ve recently been thinking about a different type of monopoly, and the impact it can have on a startup’s trajectory: not of market but of talent.</p><p>A talent monopoly exists when a company is able to exclusively attract all of the best people who are passionate about a growing market. The company is able to do this by establishing a reputation of being by far the most appealing place to work in that market.</p><p>For example, if you wanted to work on payments in the early 2000s, you went to Paypal. If you wanted to to work on social in the mid-2000s, you went to Facebook. If you want to work in travel today, you work at Airbnb.</p><p>The idea is that the most talented people are mission-driven and therefore define their job search vertically as opposed to horizontally. They start with the industry they are most excited about and work their way through best companies, as opposed to conducting a broader canvass of interesting companies across technology. They want to work to invent the future of a specific market such as robotics, biology, or VR, and their market of choice is non-negotiable.</p><p><strong>Like a market monopoly, with a talent monopoly it is not just marginally better to be the best company in a market than the second-best company, it is an order of magnitude better.</strong></p><p>While a market monopoly is not within reach of startups (and ultimately illegal if you get there), even the smallest startups can start to build some kind of talent monopoly. Below are dynamics that can help:</p><ol><li><strong>Build products that have never been built before — </strong>To build a reputation for being the most interesting and ambitious place to work in a market, you have to be working to invent the future of that market. Great people gravitate to the leading edge of an industry, where both innovation and uncertainty of outcome are highest. This is where they can have the largest impact on the future.</li><li><strong>Align the company with a theme people are already excited about </strong>— Big markets with strong public benefit to innovation like education and healthcare have a large base of people who already want to work in them. Many people will naturally be attracted to the most interesting company in the space. This is also true for hobbies that people are passionate about, like cooking, music, or sports, as well as emerging technologies like robotics, drones, or AR. This makes it easier to build talent monopoly dynamics. However, it is a harder to build in markets like consumer packaged goods or B2B software. These markets might not be organic magnets of talent, so a bit more heavy lifting is required to evangelize why the market is interesting. This could be a great “why now” narrative that is tied to macro trends, the use of an emerging technology, or leveraging a distribution channel in a new way.</li><li><strong>Place the mission at the center of the company — </strong>Being a mission-driven company provides an advantage in attracting capital, customers, and talent. Simplicity of product and organization is often a startup advantage, and the same is true with mission. Incumbents often dilute their sole mission over the course of decades, meaning if as a startup you can place the mission of your business more front and center than others, you can attract mission-driven people who care deeply about a market.</li><li><strong>Make sure early hires really care about the market (and screen out those that don’t) </strong>— At my last company, our goal was to build the best place to work if you were passionate about books. Each of our first 10 hires was mission-driven about inventing the future of reading. The result was that if you ever interviewed at our company, a good portion of the interview was spent talking about the future of books. If you wanted to work in books, this was attractive. We definitely lost talented people because they weren’t passionate about books, but this approach enabled us to hire people we otherwise would not have been able to attract, and build a very specific culture early on.</li><li><strong>Highlight the process, not just the output </strong>— Great people who are passionate about a market want to learn as much about it as they can. While every company highlights new product launches externally, most do not give deeper insight into the process going on behind the scenes. This can include items such as engineering deep-dives, insight into how the company operates organizationally, or providing a view into the product roadmap. This gives differentiated information to potential employees who are passionate about the market, which then differentiates the company.</li></ol><p>Product innovation is the output startups produce. The best companies over the past few decades have been able to produce product innovation both faster and more frequently than competition. I think this is in large part because, at least for a defined period of time, they soaked up all of the best talent who were passionate about a given market. In other words, they were able to build a talent monopoly.</p><p>Looking for where these talent monopolies are being built is a good way to find companies that are set to break out. Further, observing large markets that are not saturated by startups, but nonetheless have high latent interest among talented people may reveal the best areas to start new companies.</p><p>Conversely, when product innovation at a company starts to falter, it may be a sign that a company has lost a talent monopoly, and in turn another company may have gained it.</p><p><em>To receive future posts via email, you can </em><a href="https://www.getrevue.co/profile/ericstromberg"><em>sign up for my weekly newsletter</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=38fa422ae8a6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/talent-monopolies-38fa422ae8a6">Talent Monopolies</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points">Inflection Points</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Spreadsheet for Calculating Subscription Lifetime Value]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/a-spreadsheet-for-calculating-subscription-lifetime-value-402d1a3ae7fd?source=rss----a12b6c1dde9---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/402d1a3ae7fd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[product-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Stromberg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Nov 2016 22:54:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-04T20:15:51.872Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7o9qCpTRk1lA9VuSDevSPA.png" /><figcaption>The glamorous side of entrepreneurship — Lifetime Value spreadsheets</figcaption></figure><h4>You can follow my latest writing at <a href="https://www.screenshotessays.com/">ScreenshotEssays.com</a></h4><p>Subscription is a powerful business model because it creates an environment where the default customer behavior is retention, as opposed to one where the default behavior is churn.</p><p>However, the underlying concepts that drive subscription businesses can be complex in the early days of a startup. The pillar of any subscription business is Lifetime Value (LTV), or the total profit you can expect to receive from a new customer over the course of their lifetime. LTV, in turn, drives willingness to pay to acquire customers.</p><p>When we were scaling our subscription business, I found that there were surprisingly few publicly available resources that explained in a detailed way how to calculate LTV. So, I built a simple spreadsheet that you can use to calculate and project Lifetime Value.</p><h4><a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1WZONQm1GbCtFavX_xTP-qNgQKMO6yYgSPIzzDygDwIM">You can follow this link to view the spreadsheet.</a></h4><h3><strong>Inputs for LTV</strong></h3><p>To use the model effectively, it’s helpful to understand the inputs of LTV:</p><ol><li><strong>Monthly Revenue: </strong>The total amount of money you expect to bring in from a customer each month.</li><li><strong>Margin</strong>: The percent of revenue that is profit.</li><li><strong>The Cohort Retention Curve:</strong> The percent of customers who sign up in month 1 who will still be around in each successive month. The curve represents the probability that a new customer is active in month [X] of their lifetime. To demonstrate the idea, I’ve included below an example of what projections for an upside case, base case, and downside case Retention Curve might look like for a pre-launch startup:</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/915/0*2ZUePG8zxUxD8sIO." /><figcaption>Example Retention Curve projections</figcaption></figure><p>Retention curves generally reach an asymptote over time (meaning the curve will flatten out). Put differently, the older a cohort is, the higher its marginal retention will be. This makes sense —older subscribers retain better than newer ones. Subscribers who see less value in the service drop off earlier in their life, leaving the service with more committed members over time.</p><p>With these three inputs in place, you can calculate LTV. Revenue and Margin give you expected profit for a customer that is retained, while the Cohort Retention Curve gives you the probability that the customer will be retained in each month. Taken together, you can project LTV, or the expected total profit from a new customer over their lifetime.</p><h3><strong>Spreadsheet Definitions</strong></h3><p>Below are definitions of each <strong>column header</strong> in the spreadsheet:</p><ol><li><strong>Month (column A): </strong>The month in the customer’s lifetime. The sheet models out the first 60 months, which is sufficient to project LTV.</li><li><strong>Cohort Retention (column B): </strong>The percent of the original cohort that is still around in each successive month. In other words, the probability that a customer who signs up in month 1 will be around in month X.</li><li><strong>Expected Revenue (column C):</strong> Projected revenue in each month, taking into account the probability from Column B. This is an average across the entire cohort of Month 1 signups (including those who cancelled), so the number generally goes down over time.</li><li><strong>Retained from previous month (column D): </strong>The marginal retention rate from month to month. For example, the percent of people that are retained between month 2 and month 3.</li><li><strong>Rate of change (column E): </strong>An input that drives how quickly the % retained from previous month (column D) changes, and ultimately the slope of your Retention Curve.</li></ol><p>Additionally, here are definitions for each of the <strong>assumptions</strong>:</p><ol><li><strong>Monthly Revenue:</strong> The monthly cost of your subscription to consumers.</li><li><strong>Margin:</strong> The percent of revenue that you keep as profit.</li><li><strong>Month 1 % Retained:</strong> The percent of customers who are retained after their first month.</li><li><strong>Retention Curve Rate of Change Baseline and Retention Curve Rate of Change Additions: </strong>These two assumptions drive the slope of your Retention Curve. The best way to use this is to change them, in connection with the Month 1% Retained assumption, to drive a curve that looks realistic to you. You can eyeball what the curve looks like as you make these changes in the included Year 1 Retention Curve chart.</li><li><strong>Long-term retention:</strong> The marginal rate at which your Retention Curve flattens (i.e. you will probably never have 100% marginal retention).</li></ol><h3><strong>Using the Spreadsheet</strong></h3><ul><li>First, make a local copy of the file. You can do this by clicking on the tab and clicking “Copy to,” and then copying to your own Google Drive:</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/304/1*hS2qLPsU-lR7VtAkYHetbQ.png" /></figure><ul><li>Numbers in blue are inputs, and numbers in black are outputs. You can change the blue numbers to customize the projections for your business.</li><li>If you already have some historical retention numbers, that’s even better. You can input your historical retention curve in the months you have, and use that to drive the slope of your retention curve (Column D). Once you understand that slope, you can use it to project the future slope and get more accurate LTV projections.</li></ul><p>Hopefully this is helpful in calculating the LTV of your subscription business. If you run into any issues, want to get a sense for what comparable retention curves look like for your product, or just want to talk subscription you can send me a note at ericgstromberg@gmail.com.</p><p><em>If you enjoyed this post, you can </em><a href="https://twitter.com/ericstromberg"><em>follow me on Twitter for updates</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=402d1a3ae7fd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/a-spreadsheet-for-calculating-subscription-lifetime-value-402d1a3ae7fd">A Spreadsheet for Calculating Subscription Lifetime Value</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points">Inflection Points</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How to Pitch an Entrepreneur]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/how-to-pitch-an-entrepreneur-5ee4572e2500?source=rss----a12b6c1dde9---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5ee4572e2500</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Stromberg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Nov 2016 22:02:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-11T22:35:56.902Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There are a seemingly endless number of articles written on <a href="https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&amp;ion=1&amp;espv=2&amp;ie=UTF-8#q=how%20to%20pitch%20a%20vc">how entrepreneurs can improve their pitch to investors</a>. However, in practice the pitch meeting is very much a two-way street. Entrepreneurs pitch VCs, but VCs also pitch entrepreneurs.</p><p>Founders of promising companies often have no shortage of options for capital. From the first interaction, the entrepreneur is trying to figure out if the VC is the right partner for the business. In turn, the best VCs are focused on how they can pitch entrepreneurs on the value they bring to the table.</p><p>Based on hundreds of pitch meetings I have been a part of both as an entrepreneur and investor, I’ve outlined how I’ve seen the best VCs approach the pitch meeting, leaving a great impression and increasing the likelihood of securing a deal:</p><p><strong>1. Do your homework</strong> — It is the VCs job to build a prepared mind ahead of the meeting, allowing entrepreneurs to go deeper on the business faster.</p><p>I remember pitching one VC during a partner meeting a few of years ago: two minutes and one slide into the meeting the VC said “We understand the market, product, and opportunity. Let’s flip to the roadmap and unit economics.” This was not only impressive but I appreciated the directness in not wanting to waste time. We covered a lot of ground that meeting. Another VC told me they had already spoken with 2 of our publishing partners and had very specific questions around our plans to expand our partner pipeline. I was impressed by the hustle. Yet another VC sent a company I work with a reverse pitch deck — a pitch deck on the market opportunity that they saw — ahead of the first meeting.</p><p>On the flip side, one well-known VC asked me how I was going to compete with a large incumbent in a completely different market. I later learned he confused us with another startup with a similar name. Not so impressive.</p><p><strong>2. Make the pitch meeting a two-way conversation </strong>—<strong> </strong>As an investor, the pitch meeting is an opportunity to show the entrepreneur what working with you will be like. But many investors stumble out of the gates by not making the meeting a two-way conversation.</p><p>Instead, they watch the entrepreneur flip through the slide deck for an hour with little interruption, saving most questions for the end. When the questions do come it feels more like a press conference than a conversation, with little follow-up or feedback after the questions are answered. The entrepreneur will read this lack of engagement as lack of interest, and they also won’t learn very much about the style, approach, or personality of the investor.</p><p>On the other hand, the best pitch meetings let the back-and-forth between investor and entrepreneur be the center of gravity, with the slides just used for support. The VC is both asking questions and providing insight, and the founder is doing the same. This feels more like a collaboration in which both sides are working together, as opposed to one where the entrepreneur is constantly convincing the VC.</p><p>When done right, this approach is a valuable and positive experience for the entrepreneur. The most enjoyable pitch meeting I had at my last company was in a very large board room with more than 10 people from the fund, myself, and my co-founders. Several times my co-founder Andrew and one of the VCs were essentially shouting at one another in a very heated, but well-spirited debate. The level of engagement left us with an incredibly positive impression. And we learned quite a bit during that meeting as well.</p><p><strong>3. Focus on the product — </strong>Founders spend most of their day thinking about their product and customers. VCs spend more of their time thinking about broader markets and deals. This can lead each side to steer focus to diverging aspects of the business during the pitch meeting. VCs that actively have used the product, focus on customer response, and have smart questions about the product roadmap show founders they are differentiated. They also demonstrate that they are not overlooking the most important part of building a business — making a product that a large number of people want.</p><p><strong>4. Get tactical — </strong>Entrepreneurs by nature enjoy being tactical about operating a business— otherwise they wouldn’t have started, much less survived, the early years of company building. How do I hire faster? How do I close our dream sales prospect? Should I hire a VP Finance or a CFO? Do I need a brand marketer or a direct response marketer? In contrast, many investors spend more time on macro questions: Where is the VR market going? What technologies will create the next big breakthroughs? Where are we in the market cycle?</p><p>There is obviously nuance here and crossover, but in general entrepreneurs tend to spend more time on, and value, tactical thinking. More than likely the entrepreneur is dealing with many tactical problems on the day of the pitch meeting. As an investor, if you can elevate those and provide actionable feedback that is helpful, you can quickly create memorable differentiation.</p><p><strong>5. Go on the journey with the entrepreneur — </strong>Creating a business from nothing requires figuring out ways to make seemingly impossible things happen, and doing so repeatedly. Great investors may do the same, but the nature of the VC job is that most investment decisions are a “no.” As a result, investors sometimes gravitate to all the reasons why a business won’t work, as opposed to why it will.</p><p>Despite this, I’ve found the best investors are willing to be optimists and go on the journey with the founder during the pitch meeting. This is not to say they don’t have concerns or questions — rather that they are open-minded and start from a place of belief. These VCs want to hear the optimist’s take and truly take it in. If after the meeting the pessimists take sets in, so be it. But going on the journey as opposed to being closed-minded during the pitch meeting will leave the entrepreneurs with a positive impression.</p><p><strong>Final note — </strong>As a VC, the pitch meeting is an opportunity to give the entrepreneur a glimpse into what working with you will be like. Just as the entrepreneur must refine their pitch, the investor must refine theirs. Further, it is likely that this approach will help with the actual investment evaluation as well. At minimum it will ensure founders leave the pitch meeting feeling that their time was well spent, and excited to work with you in the future, on their current company or the next.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Ff00de1%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Ff00de1%2F&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fmedia%2Fform.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a424fa08ce63f059732aeaaa6bc406f9/href">https://medium.com/media/a424fa08ce63f059732aeaaa6bc406f9/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5ee4572e2500" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points/how-to-pitch-an-entrepreneur-5ee4572e2500">How to Pitch an Entrepreneur</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-inflection-points">Inflection Points</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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