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        <title><![CDATA[The Lavender Project - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Blue + Red = Purple? Your Blue Team should be Purple all along! Defending your network with an adversary mindset - Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Blue Team 201: Detection — Where Do You Start?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-lavender-project/blue-team-201-detection-where-do-you-start-76540dbceeb0?source=rss----4effc1815152---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dylan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2020 18:33:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-22T18:32:36.305Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Blue Team 201: Detection — Where Do You Start?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/920/1*RTPBAuc4gGkxUUmZiJDwYA.png" /></figure><p>Many of you may have heard the old adage “prevention is ideal, but detection is a must.” For the detection piece in this blue team series I decided to focus on <a href="https://redcanary.com/blog/endpoint-security-vs-network-security/">endpoints</a> specifically. I know this does not cover everything, especially those of you who are responsible for protecting things you can’t just slap an AV or agent on (sorry ICS folks). I also find endpoint detection to be more straight-forward than network detection if you are starting from scratch. If you remember the <a href="https://github.com/swannman/ircapabilities">pyramid model</a> from my <a href="https://medium.com/the-lavender-project/blue-team-101-ec2cbac6e9b2">last post</a>, two of the bottom tiers asked the questions: “Do you have visibility across your assets?” and “Can you detect unauthorized activity?” Detection can be analogous to playing a game of “find the needle in the haystack”-although sometimes it feels as if its a game of “find the needle in the needle-stack”. With that said, lets start with the basics and get down to it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/464/1*njEYPS6ru1E3UmYMo2GlBQ.png" /><figcaption>Trying to distinguish actual malicious recon from vulnerability scans.</figcaption></figure><p>What do we want to accomplish here? I don’t know about you but ultimately I would like my blue team to be the Eye of Sauron. We want to see everything happening in our environment so we are able to detect any activity, malicious or not. We know the logs do not lie, so what are the first things we can start auditing to acquire visibility in our environment? For the purposes of this post I am going to assume we’re in a primarily Windows Enterprise environment to keep things simple.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Dtsd-UWIbD7OhZ9WRVfPZg.gif" /><figcaption>The Eye of Sauron</figcaption></figure><p>One of my favorite resources of all time is the logging cheat sheet by <a href="https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets/">Malware Archaeology</a>. This guide is an utterly fantastic starting point to determine what kinds of events you want to capture in your Windows domain and why. To determine what you want to enable, ask yourself questions like: Can I see every time a user logs on or off a machine? When they change their password? Or even when they start a new process? Not all of this information is available by default so we’ll have to turn some stuff on. A great way to accomplish this and manage it is through group policy. I found myself repeatedly looking up which group policy settings correspond to which Windows event codes, so here is all that information in one <a href="https://girl-germs.com/?p=363">place</a> to complement your windows logging cheat sheet. If you’re not yet familiar with windows event logs and the context they bring to infosec, here are a few places to start: <a href="https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/peeping-through-windows-logs.html">Peeping Through Windows Logs</a>, <a href="https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/tips-and-tricks/spotting-the-adversary-with-splunk.html">Spotting the Adversary with Splunk</a>, <a href="https://conf.splunk.com/session/2015/conf2015_MGough_MalwareArchaelogy_SecurityCompliance_FindingAdvnacedAttacksAnd.pdf">Sexy Six Event Codes</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*djScb0IjCG60HnO81FmWng.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.splunksecurityessentials.com/">https://www.splunksecurityessentials.com/</a></figcaption></figure><p>Once you are confident in your visibility, the next step is to get all those logs into one place so your team can easily access them for investigation. There are many ways to accomplish this and therefore I will try my best to be vendor-agnostic in this series. With that said, several of the resources I mention here use Splunk, but almost all of the insights presented can be used in other platforms. There are countless alternatives out there like AlienVault USM, IBM Qradar, GrayLog, ELK, LogRhythm, etc. You also don’t have to use the Windows native event log as <a href="https://www.gartner.com/reviews/market/endpoint-detection-and-response-solutions">EDR</a> agents have become so popular nowadays and gather much of the same telemetry if not more.</p><p>Like I mentioned earlier, I will be talking about detection around the endpoint, but obviously that is only one piece among the diverse IT infrastructure you may have in place. We will not forget about those firewalls, proxy servers, VPN, DNS, and other network device logs. In another post I will explore the field of network security monitoring and all the detection powers used by IDS/IPS solutions such as Zeek (Bro), Snort, Suricata, etc. But if you’re too eager to wait I highly recommend picking up a copy of <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Practice-Network-Security-Monitoring-Understanding/dp/1593275099/ref=pd_lpo_14_t_0/136-8657496-9404749?_encoding=UTF8&amp;pd_rd_i=1593275099&amp;pd_rd_r=72846504-e1a4-44a6-a534-484635560736&amp;pd_rd_w=xcTXj&amp;pd_rd_wg=xLKKD&amp;pf_rd_p=7b36d496-f366-4631-94d3-61b87b52511b&amp;pf_rd_r=P296YD1KBDM35NRMWCAG&amp;psc=1&amp;refRID=P296YD1KBDM35NRMWCAG">Practice of Network Security Monitoring</a>. With that in mind, I firmly believe that when you are starting out, the most manageable and pragmatic place to start is the endpoint, as it <a href="https://redcanary.com/blog/endpoint-security-vs-network-security/">is the most conclusive place to look</a>. Once you have enabled logging for windows events and start to become familiar with what is normal in your environment, now the real fun begins.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/490/1*sf4xV0vcLUvjmH6HxelsdA.png" /><figcaption><a href="http://ryanstillions.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-dml-model_21.html">http://ryanstillions.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-dml-model_21.html</a></figcaption></figure><p>Windows event logs are super valuable when it comes to detecting malicious activity but it won’t catch everything. So can we take it a step further? <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon">Sysmon</a> is a free and <a href="https://medium.com/@haggis_m/splunking-the-endpoint-threat-hunting-with-sysmon-9dd956e3e1bd">much more granular</a> event logger that is a part of Mark Russinovich’s Sysinternals tool suite for Windows. What makes sysmon so valuable is that its a kernel-mode driver, which for our purposes means it can provide even greater visibility into the operating system. SwiftonSecurity’s sysmon <a href="https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config">configuration file</a> is a great place to start as this type of logging has the potential to be very noisy (Malware Archaeology has a <a href="https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets/">cheat sheet</a> for sysmon as well). Not all organizations have the budget for enterprise security products and this is why I am such a huge advocate for FOSS security solutions. I consider sysmon to be so <a href="https://medium.com/@olafhartong/endpoint-detection-superpowers-on-the-cheap-part-1-e9c28201ac47">valuable</a> when it comes to detection because it is free and just as good, if not better than many commercial EDR products.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/835/1*R0baTlz1OR8_xmMwb-go8w.png" /><figcaption>A benevolent coworker explains to a newly minted SOC member.</figcaption></figure><p>Now that you have visibility into all your endpoints, you can focus on improving your detection. There is a multitude of malicious “things” out there you can detect and it can be very overwhelming to determine which ones you should care about and why. So if you’re not sure how to measure the maturity of your detection capabilities, refer back to the <a href="https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets/">cheat sheets</a> I mentioned earlier. At this point you may have some out-of-the-box alerts from any security tools you have or maybe wrote/curated some alerts yourself. False positives are forever the chronic affliction of the blue team and now we can work towards improving the <a href="https://medium.com/palantir/alerting-and-detection-strategy-framework-52dc33722df2">fidelity and durability of our detection</a>. A great illustration of this is the model SpecterOps has coined the <a href="https://posts.specterops.io/introducing-the-funnel-of-fidelity-b1bb59b04036">Funnel of Fidelity</a>. This is the process we want to use to help finding that needle in the haystack less difficult. Just keep in mind for every alert, notification or email that reaches your inbox, would you rather it be right 9/10 times or 1/10 times?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/862/1*nfOKv3xtkV_W1Onv8ZctQA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*vS0fajQ5yVHXG-E_.png" /><figcaption>The Funnel of Fidelity (left) inspired by the Pyramid of Pain (right).</figcaption></figure><p>Having said that, I hope I’ve provided you with some great resources to start building your detection stack and turn your blue team into the omnipresent Eye of Sauron. If you want to take this a step further I encourage you to look at <a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/03/silketw-because-free-telemetry-is-free.html">Event Tracing for Windows</a> (ETW) and see how in-depth you really can get with the operating system logs. I also recommend checking out the <a href="https://wazuh.com/">Wazuh</a> project as well as <a href="https://securityonion.net/">Security Onion </a>for those of you who are interested in free and open-source detection technologies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AGeEiIRT2SL3TYHWFd1y_g.png" /><figcaption>Blue teamer suited up for detecting lateral movement.</figcaption></figure><p>And remember, think back to the IR pyramid mentioned in my <a href="https://medium.com/the-lavender-project/blue-team-101-ec2cbac6e9b2">previous blog</a>- asset inventory &amp; management comes <em>before</em> telemetry &amp; visibility in the hierarchy. Here is a scenario to paint the picture: A user reports opening a phishy attachment to the servicedesk, you go to check the logs and uh-oh, there’s nothing there because the EDR agent wasn’t installed or windows events were not forwarded to your SIEM. It can happen. Be patient in this process as telemetry is the <a href="https://posts.specterops.io/introducing-the-funnel-of-fidelity-b1bb59b04036">building block</a> of detection. Once you have all the data there, you can really get your hands dirty and sharpen your blue team skills. This stuff gets me pretty jacked up, so if you had some fun with this- grab a red bull and stick around for the next post where I will explore more advanced blue team tactics like <a href="https://posts.specterops.io/capability-abstraction-fbeaeeb26384">detection engineering</a>, catching windows tradecraft and threat hunting. Remember: the bad guys only have to get it right <em>once</em>, but we have to get it right <a href="https://www.scmagazine.com/home/opinions/hackers-only-need-to-get-it-right-once-we-need-to-get-it-right-every-time/"><em>every time</em></a>. I hope this post provided a good introduction to the art of detection, so when someone makes a sound- you hear it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/245/0*WpY2unvI_TDgI6Oq" /><figcaption>Blue team when a disabled account logs in.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Some more resources on detection below:</strong></p><p><a href="https://github.com/0x4D31/awesome-threat-detection">Curated Threat Detection List</a></p><p><a href="http://detect-respond.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html">The Pyramid of Pain</a></p><p><a href="https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-archive-1554993664.pdf">Threat Hunting via Sysmon</a></p><p><a href="https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/4266002/CG_WhitePaper_Splunkmon_1216-1.pdf?__hssc=231642944.1.1565053993871&amp;__hstc=231642944.5685b19a2de5c218ad172dc44f4ac8b2.1565053993871.1565053993871.1565053993871.1&amp;__hsfp=628735910&amp;hsCtaTracking=809679b2-007a-4d31-8f42-b98b68692899%7C61d2f653-55f7-4cec-a36d-1e300a30ca18">Splunkmon-Taking Sysmon to the Next Level</a></p><p><a href="https://github.com/MHaggis/sysmon-dfir">Sysmon DFIR Resources</a></p><p><a href="https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/reports/spotting-the-adversary-with-windows-event-log-monitoring.cfm">NSA Windows Event Logging</a></p><p><a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts">Tracking Lateral Movement Part One</a></p><p><a href="https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf">Hunting for Credential Dumping in Windows Environment</a></p><p><a href="https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/paper/34262">SANS:Detecting Security Incidents Using Windows Workstation Event Logs</a></p><p><a href="https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/paper/34132">SANS: Windows Logon Forensics</a></p><p><a href="https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/critical/paper/36352">SANS: Uncovering Indicators of Compromise (IoC) Using PowerShell, Event Logs and a Traditional Monitoring Tool</a></p><p><a href="https://www.giac.org/paper/gcia/11501/detecting-penetration-testers-windows-network-splunk/152302">Detecting Penetration Testers on a Windows Network with Splunk</a></p><p><a href="https://osquery.io/">Osquery</a></p><p><a href="https://www.limacharlie.io/">LimaCharlie</a> (not exactly free but pretty cool pricing model)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=76540dbceeb0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-lavender-project/blue-team-201-detection-where-do-you-start-76540dbceeb0">Blue Team 201: Detection — Where Do You Start?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-lavender-project">The Lavender Project</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Blue Team 101]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-lavender-project/blue-team-101-ec2cbac6e9b2?source=rss----4effc1815152---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ec2cbac6e9b2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dylan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 19 Jul 2019 18:37:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-19T19:14:46.623Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/984/1*rHHOcJN3shxsVz8pvNF_AA.jpeg" /></figure><p>So you’ve setup your SIEM, you got that “next-gen” AV finally deployed and you even convinced management to procure a DLP solution- props to you. You feel confident about your defense-in-depth and you’ve hit most of the CIS 20 security controls right on the head. So now what? Sit back, relax and watch those Splunk alerts kick off every time your sysadmin uses psexec on their workstation. No hacker is gonna get past you now right? At least that’s what you thought until you found yourself explaining to the CEO why the state-of-the-art, block-chain, AI-based, machine learning security solution didn’t stop the ransomware outbreak that bricked half the company’s computers.</p><p>I started this series because the cybersecurity industry has erupted with countless different tools, vendors, solutions and services. It’s hard to keep up with. Nowadays everybody is chasing after that set-and-forget, silver-bullet solution. Over-marketing has captured our attention with things like MDR, SOAR, security instrumentation, AI this, block-chain that and it can be a little overwhelming to decide not only whats the best fit for you, but whether the stuff actually brings value. Because of this I believe people tend to miss the fundamental steps of how to protect your business. Remember that infosec is a process, not a product- and that the human element is still every-bit important as well.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Jinru9lz4ngVR1ol8jEBaA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.lanner-america.com/blog/long-reaching-effects-inadequate-cyber-security/">https://www.lanner-america.com/blog/long-reaching-effects-inadequate-cyber-security/</a></figcaption></figure><p>Throughout this series I want to take a simple approach and present some of the core technologies and processes you can put in place to protect your organization. More importantly, I want to emphasize how a blue team should really be a purple team at the end of the day- hence the name of this blog series. Purple teaming has become a popular buzzword in the industry lately and I want to show that this is kind of unnecessary if your blue team is constantly testing their prevention, detection and response anyway. There is an abundance of free and public knowledge in this industry and I have come across such great resources over the years. Throughout the series I hope to show you some of the best I’ve found. So with that said, let’s get down to the basics and start from scratch.</p><p>Where do we begin? First things first- what is your job? For us defenders out there I like to think of it as fundamentally two things: 1) protect the organization and 2) find evil. This obviously varies depending on your industry, environment, budget, etc. but we’re going to keep it simple. I know a lot of us (me included) like to think that when there is an actual security incident, we look like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*h93EoaYGGYSy5AnL4M4XBQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>But as we know, unless you are the boots-on-the-ground IR team, your day-to-day is filled with less-exciting yet equally important tasks. With that said, if you envision yourself descending to Earth in an orbital drop shock pod next time there’s a cryptolocker outbreak- all the power to you.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/370/1*KcAdqNEIfLfyjCxUCgGVzg.gif" /></figure><p>The textbook dogma for infosec, which I’m sure many have heard of, consists of preserving the CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability). This is a great model to assist in setting goals, however I believe the much more pragmatic approach is to build your blue team off of three things: Prevention, Detection, and Response (<a href="https://www.giac.org/paper/gsec/501/information-security-process-prevention-detection-response/101197">https://www.giac.org/paper/gsec/501/information-security-process-prevention-detection-response/101197</a>)</p><p>I’m a really big fan of visuals and I found the best way to illustrate this is with Matt Swann’s incident response hierarchy of needs. I came across it from the HolisticInfoSec blog post here <a href="https://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2016/12/the-dfir-hierarchy-of-needs-critical.html">https://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2016/12/the-dfir-hierarchy-of-needs-critical.html</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iyRm6OgmjXSvMr6efU8qIg.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://github.com/swannman/ircapabilities">https://github.com/swannman/ircapabilities</a></figcaption></figure><p>When I first got into infosec, I was easily thrilled at the idea of things like threat-hunting and incident response (the tops of the pyramid). There’s nothing wrong with that, and lets be honest- adversary simulation and threat-hunting sound a whole lot cooler than asset inventory and management (bottom of the pyramid). With that said, the most important part of this model is that you start from the bottom-up and remind yourself to not jump the gun. You will absolutely not find the same value if the bottom of your pyramid is not complete first. What use is spending all your time hunting for APTs when you are missing telemetry from even just one of your endpoints? Or how many times one or two computers surface from your IT supply closet back onto the network without AV? It’s easy to get excited about getting that new user-behavior analytics tool or threat-intelligence feed, but remember that the fundamental part of setting up your blue team is establishing those first processes and asking yourself questions like: what assets am I defending? what data am I protecting? where is that data? And this brings back the idea that infosec is a process, not a product. The people and processes on your blue team are as equally important as the technologies you put in place.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mosbkcwRyXIOlZ3o8Afy2A.jpeg" /></figure><p>In the following posts I will try to get more specific and focus on each of the Prevention, Detection and Response categories you can use to shape the security posture of your business. I hope that this first post can help anybody out there who is starting from scratch or just looking to revisit how they approach defense. In addition, I can’t give enough credit to the individuals I referenced in this post (many more to come) and encourage you to please check out their stuff as well. Nearly all of what I have learned in this industry outside training and in the field, is from the fantastic public resources available online that these people have taken the time to create. Thanks for reading and feel free to shoot me an email if you have any ideas for this series.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ec2cbac6e9b2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-lavender-project/blue-team-101-ec2cbac6e9b2">Blue Team 101</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-lavender-project">The Lavender Project</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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