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        <title><![CDATA[The Query - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Decrypting the DNS - Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/the-query?source=rss----59c9dca6ea74---4</link>
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            <title>The Query - Medium</title>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ICANN’s Single-Character .COM Malarkey]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-query/icanns-single-character-com-malarkey-506348cf2573?source=rss----59c9dca6ea74---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/506348cf2573</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trademark]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[big-tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[competition]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[icann]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Thomas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Dec 2019 04:05:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-12-09T04:05:14.369Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Auctions betray brands and trademark registrants.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/250/1*tYnjZvNhBSQGI6JffZvxOA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>This past Saturday a most remarkable thing happened when, for the first time in 26 years, the IANA registrar opted not to renew its registrations for the single-character .COM domain names (SCDN). These names were initially registered in 1993 by the man who was IANA, Jon Postel, and ever since then have been maintained as active registrations by ICANN — until now.</p><p>Presumably, there will be a Grace Period followed by a Pending Delete period before the names expire and, as is likely to be the case, they will cease to exist. The .COM registry agreement prohibits the registry operator from conjuring any of them back into existence — except one, O.COM, which the Second Amendment to the .com Registry Agreement specifies can be released, following an auction process that determines the highest bidder.</p><p>But the auction — like the recent .ORG mess and pretty much everything ICANN-related — is a disingenuous fraud and a mockery of the letter and spirit of multistakeholder governance.</p><p>Never mind that millions of dollars in auction proceeds from a public interest asset are to be distributed to a non-public list of organizations by a trustee whose selection — and length of tenure — is in the sole discretion of the registry operator. After all, it’s much easier to just keep $7.85 and secretly funnel the rest of the money through a hand-picked trustee to a hand-picked set of organizations than to seek a waiver of consumer pricing safeguards from pesky competition regulators at the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Justice Department.</p><p>Much more sordid, however, have been the bad-faith waivers that ICANN and the registry operator granted unto themselves to ignore standard trademark rights protection mechanisms (RPMs) for new and previously reserved domain names (e.g. Sunrise Period, Trademark Clearinghouse, Priority Access) and VeriSign’s commitment — made multiple times over multiple years — to enhanced protections for trademark owners.</p><p>The argument has been made that RPMs don’t apply to SCDNs and therefore, that owners of registered trademarks with a clear claim can be denied their property rights. This is self-serving nonsense that, if allowed to prevail, would be a demonstrable failure by ICANN, its Intellectual Property Constituency, and the International Trademark Association (INTA) to safeguard brands and trademark registrants. It is only in the instances where rightsholders cannot be clearly ascertained — or if they are ascertained but forego their claim — that any auction can be contemplated.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=506348cf2573" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-query/icanns-single-character-com-malarkey-506348cf2573">ICANN’s Single-Character .COM Malarkey</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-query">The Query</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Fadi’s .org Fracasso]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-query/fadis-org-fracasso-45426e04f2b3?source=rss----59c9dca6ea74---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/45426e04f2b3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nonprofit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[big-tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[domain-names]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Thomas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Dec 2019 17:33:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-12-03T17:33:31.227Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Internet stakeholders need to get with the program and assert themselves now — if they still can.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/295/1*I-O3--NisGvIZMoh_OfWOA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>The recent attempts by the Internet Society (ISOC) to wrap itself in the halo of Jon Postel’s “original intent” for the sake of .org is specious and laughable. Conveniently ignored is the fact that Postel also didn’t like how big the top-level domains were getting and suggested, in 1993, that TLDs should be capped at 10,000 names and that further zone growth should happen at the second- and third-levels (similar to how the UK has .uk and then .com.uk, for example).</p><p>Postel would have been appalled at a zone with 10 million names in it and even further appalled that a private equity firm was acquiring ANY registry — he didn’t want the money associated with domain names to become a corrupting factor at the Internet’s core.</p><p>At the risk of being pedantic, it might be worth pointing out that the Internet’s core is comprised of three components: naming, addressing, and protocols and which are each administered, respectively, by registry operators, regional Internet registries, and the Internet Engineering Task Force. The first two are self-funding — registry operators sell domain names and RIRs allocate blocks of IP addresses, which aren’t expensive but they aren’t free. The IETF receives its funding from contributions/corporate support and the rest of its financial resources are provided by ISOC.</p><p>From ISOC’s About page on their website:</p><blockquote>The Internet Society was founded in 1992 by a number of people involved with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). From those early days, one of our principal rationales is to provide an organizational home for and financial support for the Internet standards process.</blockquote><p>.org was given to ISOC, not really for any reason having to do with non-profits, but to create a permanent funding stream for the IETF. Vint Cerf and others advocated for this precisely because it was determined to be important that IETF was independent and not reliant on the registry operators or other commercial sources for it’s funding, which could potentially lead to the protocols becoming more commercially-driven and engineering expertise being subordinated to industry priorities.</p><p>The focus on non-profits was driven by the $5 million that Verisign gave. It wasn’t going to fund the startup of a competitor — and focusing .org on non-profits was an easy and non-threatening way to spin off .org so that it wouldn’t challenge .com and .net. Remember, at this time there were only 7 TLDs — .com, .net, .org, .gov, .edu, .mil, and .int. The last four were not publicly available for registration.</p><p>$1.15 billion is one heck of an endowment and so from the point of view of ISOC’s Andrew Sullivan, he acted responsibly. The problem with the sale of .org is the bad faith but entirely predictable manner in which it was done. ICANN, PIR, and ISOC were disingenuous and misleading in the justifications that they gave for removing the pricing restrictions and the smoking gun is the 98.1% of public comments they ignored. The reason people should be angry is not that .org got sold, but that the community’s will was ignored in order to do so. If the pricing restrictions were still in the .org registry agreement, then it wouldn’t have been such an attractive acquisition target for Fadi and Ethos Capital — who likely will flip it in some form or fashion — and it wouldn’t have commanded such a princely sum.</p><p>Once again, the community fails to assert itself and instead gets frazzled and neurotic about a symptom rather than the underlying disease.</p><p>During the Obama Administration’s surrendering of the U.S. Government’s historical role as guarantor of the Internet’s root and subsequent takeover by ICANN of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), there was an opportunity to transform ICANN into a member-based organization, which would have provided 6 statutory powers to members under California law. A weighted system was proposed for the supporting organizations and stakeholder groups to function similarly to a legislative body and for ICANN-corporate to function as an administrative organ, and then with an Independent Review Panel, or IRP (not what exists today which is a total watered-down PoS) as the independent judiciary whose decisions would be binding, rather than the recommendatory body that exists today and that ICANN regularly ignores.</p><p>ICANN hated the whole idea and fought hard to leave itself as a so-called “designator” organization, which has one statutory power under California law — to recall the Board. The whole framework was further made complex by creating the existing system of an Empowered Community, which can supposedly empower itself to name a Sole Designator which can then exercise the one power — to recall the ICANN Board.</p><p>Factions within the community itself fought against giving themselves additional powers — perhaps the first time in history that such an illogical, counterintuitive, and cognitively dissonant phenomenon has occurred. But such is the way of things in ICANN-land. It’s an interesting parlor game to wonder when the community will wake up and perceive that the reason why, in ICANN-land, up is down and left is right is because it is made to be that way. And it is made to be that way because of one thing and one thing only — and it’s the same thing that Willie Sutton was after when he robbed banks:</p><p>Cold. Hard. Cash.</p><p>An astonishingly small number of people pointed out during the IANA transition that this Sole Designator mechanism for accountability was essentially useless because, considering the fractious nature of the community and the severity of the single power that could be exercised, that the Empowered Community would rouse itself with only slightly more frequency than the appearance of Haley’s comet.</p><p>It seems like now may be an opportune time for a comet to streak into view.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=45426e04f2b3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-query/fadis-org-fracasso-45426e04f2b3">Fadi’s .org Fracasso</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-query">The Query</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[.COM Contract Amendment Coming Soon]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-query/com-contract-amendment-coming-soon-6b296d43679e?source=rss----59c9dca6ea74---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6b296d43679e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dns]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[icann]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intellectual-property]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[domain-names]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Thomas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Nov 2019 01:04:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-12-04T00:07:44.512Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>VeriSign CEO indicates “ICANN process” is moving forward; expect public comment period soon.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/1*B7jDvo9_UhSLX-mN3ZVa0A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Last Thursday, during VeriSign’s Q3 2019 quarterly earnings call, CEO Jim Bidzos offered statements that seemed to be carefully calibrated to satisfy Wall Street’s curiosity about protracted negotiations with ICANN on a Third Amendment to the .com Registry Agreement while also appearing to distance the company from the soon-to-be forthcoming product of that year-long effort.</p><p>As I’ve written previously, this Third Amendment is necessary because of the First Amendment to the .com Registry Agreement which extends the current agreement’s term, including the wholesale registration price cap, until 2024 — a circumstance made inconvenient late last year when the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) amended its Cooperative Agreement with VeriSign to remove the 2012 price restriction and granting pre-approval, beginning in 2020, for increases that don’t exceed 7% annually in four out of every six years of a .com Registry Agreement term.</p><p>Some industry bloggers, such as DomainNameWire’s Andrew Alleman and DomainIncite’s Kevin Murphy, seemed to hint recently that this Third Amendment may not be the clean pass-through of price increases that VeriSign likely prefers — a possibility that I raised earlier when I suggested that ICANN will replicate the very lucrative innovation that is already incorporated into the .NET registry agreement. In that case, they invented a “special development fund” to which VeriSign annually remits $0.75 for every .NET registration — in addition to the $0.25 per domain name registration that it and every other registry operator already contributes to ICANN’s budget. These funds are deposited into ICANN’s general treasury, where they are neither sequestered nor audited or otherwise accounted for.</p><p>This breakthrough innovation has, so far, generated nearly $200 million in additional and unaccountable slush funds for ICANN’s general treasury with no muss, no fuss, and, indeed, nary a peep from the much-vaunted stakeholder community that’s been saddled with accountability backstop duty since the U.S. Government’s Obama-era abandonment of its historical role as guarantor of the Internet’s root.</p><p>There is, of course, nothing to stop ICANN from merely reusing what has previously proven to be a successful method of levying tolls that generate increased revenue. After all, the precedent exists, and ICANN has demonstrated time and again that it is remarkably impervious to stakeholder outcry and community attempts at accountability seem to roll off of ICANN just like water from a duck’s back.</p><p>But, like as not, it’s quite possible that ICANN has been hard at work pursuing its own kind of permissionless innovation that pushes the envelope in the name of progress.</p><p>What might that look like?</p><p>Well, the simplest way to innovate here is to make the tolls “automagically” progressive — meaning that every time VeriSign gives itself a raise, then ICANN also shares in the good fortune. What seems most probable, if this path was taken, would be to determine the toll amount — let’s say $0.15 per .com registration per year (this leaves VeriSign $0.40 of its next price increase which, between monopolists, probably seems grudgingly “fair”) — and to peg an additional $0.15 to every price increase that VeriSign takes. This way, ICANN’s share of recurring toll revenues grows in concert with the profit margin of its largest ratepayer and fellow monopolist collaborator.</p><p>This would equate to around $20 million of increased revenue in conjunction with Price Increase #1, another $20 million for Price Increase #2, and so on, so that by 2024, assuming that VeriSign takes all of its allowable price increases (which past behavior suggests that they will), then ICANN will be making an additional $80 million more in revenue — per year — than they are today.</p><p>The other virtue of this approach is that, because VeriSign always takes its price increases, ICANN would essentially be able to forecast out its revenue increasing $20 million per year in four out of every six years in perpetuity. This is a staggering sum of inefficiently allocated resources — excuse me, revenue — and it doesn’t even account for the massive borrowing power that comes with this type of consistent and predictable revenue growth.</p><p>During last week’s earnings call, VeriSign’s CEO went out of his way to stress that the contract negotiation is an ICANN process and otherwise distanced the company to the point that one could be forgiven for concluding that VeriSign was merely a passive observer to the negotiation for the contract from which more than 90% of its revenue is derived.</p><p>But this isn’t exactly true when two parties are negotiating a contract, is it? Rather, that’s a point that is stressed by a party that has been outmaneuvered by the other and wants to signal to investors and posterity that they did not accede to the terms in the agreement gladly, but that the deal isn’t so bad as to necessitate rejecting it.</p><p>As the saying goes, success has a million parents, but failure is an orphan. Regardless, it seems laughable that ICANN wouldn’t have taken this opportunity to secure its financial future by ensuring that VeriSign’s rising tide raises, if not all, then at least ICANN’s ship. The question is whether ICANN focused on pecuniary self-interest or whether it also secured public interest concessions — like intellectual property rights protection mechanisms and anti-abuse provisions — similarly as it recently did with .ORG in exchange for agreeing to greater pricing flexibility for the registry operator.</p><p>There are likely to be more developments during or shortly after next week’s ICANN meeting in Montreal. Stay tuned.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6b296d43679e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-query/com-contract-amendment-coming-soon-6b296d43679e">.COM Contract Amendment Coming Soon</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-query">The Query</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The DNS Decrypt]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-query/the-dns-decrypt-bf62e7c75d55?source=rss----59c9dca6ea74---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bf62e7c75d55</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[icann]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[domain-names]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Thomas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 Sep 2019 23:50:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-15T23:52:00.796Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FcwoxyVQAB0Y%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DcwoxyVQAB0Y&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FcwoxyVQAB0Y%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="640" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/262d3a984143358c13712fd2741f0e10/href">https://medium.com/media/262d3a984143358c13712fd2741f0e10/href</a></iframe><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*th1Mulh4_Q2Gn3JOvi3FGA.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bf62e7c75d55" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-query/the-dns-decrypt-bf62e7c75d55">The DNS Decrypt</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-query">The Query</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Keeping a Free and Open Internet Starts at the Root]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-query/keeping-a-free-and-open-internet-starts-at-the-root-ca89e2071a54?source=rss----59c9dca6ea74---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ca89e2071a54</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[competition]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dns]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[antitrust]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Thomas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Sep 2019 20:59:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-09T20:59:01.657Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Dynamics at the Internet’s core erode stakeholder legitimacy and aid Sino-Russian efforts for multilateral control.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iiTRAk3jU21fKtVH8OdbiA.png" /></figure><p>At the beginning of what became a prolonged process for privatization, the U.S. Government established a framework of fundamental guiding principles for governance of the Internet’s root. These principles were designed to work to preserve a free and open nature for a global network that was to be elastic, extensible, and — at more than two decades — enduring. Chief among these working principles were:</p><ul><li>private sector leadership;</li><li>private property respect, namely IP;</li><li>bottom-up policymaking;</li><li>consensus-based decision-making;</li><li>diverse stakeholder representation;</li><li>competition and consumer choice.</li></ul><p>Adherence to these principles may strengthen legitimacy but don’t confer infallibility upon the multistakeholder model of Internet governance and there are many areas needing significant improvements. Borrowing from Winston Churchill, private sector-led multistakeholder Internet governance may well be a poor form of governance — except there is no better alternative. But some would disagree and multistakeholderism has its detractors, particularly among a certain subset of Communist, Left-leaning, and authoritarian nation-states that, having been shown to have some skill at playing the multilateral system for geopolitical gain, are frustrated to discover that governance is trending towards multistakeholderism just as they are arriving to take a seat at the multilateral table.</p><p>This means that the longevity of a free and open Internet is heavily dependent on the legitimacy of Free World governance remaining intact. Consider that, every two years the United Nations’ International Telecommunications Union(ITU)convenes a plenipotentiary of its members, all of whom are government representatives of sovereign nation-states. The effective control of the Internet’s root and/or other Internet governance items are always on the agenda and the conclave serves as a sort of biennial focal point for an ongoing campaign — led by authoritarian Russia and Communist China and which includes a growing ecosystem of their allies and client states — that seeks to supplant private sector leadership of Internet governance with multilateral government control and thereby reserving to dubious sovereign states the policy-making prerogatives at the Internet’s root.</p><p>Anyone who thinks this seems alarmist might consider brushing up on recent history. The IANA transition — an effort lasting from 2014 to 2017 whereby the US Government removed itself as the historical guarantor of legitimacy for governance at the Internet’s core — was justified by the Obama Administration as necessary, following Edward Snowden’s surveillance disclosures, for U.S. diplomats to maintain support for the status quo from middle states(undecideds who are open to being persuaded) at the ITU plenipotentiary in 2016.</p><p>So, on one hand there is an ongoing campaign to subvert control of the Internet’s root by two antagonists, authoritarian Russia and Communist China, who argue that it is illegitimate for the private sector to lead over sovereign nation-state governments. On the other hand, the Free World’s superpower that was the historical guarantor of legitimacy for multistakeholder Internet governance has removed its protective umbrella. Thus, the governance model and its stakeholder participants are left to shoulder the burden of sustaining legitimacy of governance and to blunt insurgent attempts at wresting policy-making into the multilateral arena — where“free and open” has a different and diminished meaning than now.</p><p>This is a critical lens for any sincere examination of the current dynamics in play at the Internet’s root, where systematic corruption and intimidation are being used by what appears to be a corporate monopolist cartel to capture and hold in thrall the Internet’s Domain Name System(DNS). This undermines the legitimacy of policy-making at the Internet’s root and — by calling into question the fundamental premise of private sector-led multistakeholder governance — is a clear and present danger to the free and open Internet.</p><p>A typical rank-and-file stakeholder participating in DNS-related governance or commerce may be only peripherally aware of the heavy-handed habits of the monopolists that rule the root. But fearfully whispered testimonies — alleging such improprieties as outside counsel retained as henchmen for questionable and highly irregular purposes, of casting defamatory aspersions that interfere with customer and partner relationships, of deceptively and knowingly making false claims of non-existent intellectual property rights, of bad-faith re-purposing of the civil tort for frivolous voyages of discovery, and of threatening potentially existential jeopardy through the weaponization of seemingly benign and supposedly non-discriminatory economic incentives, amongst others — reveal that immense market power is being wielded in a manner that runs counter to the aims of multi-stakeholder governance, competitive markets, and the free flow of information and ideas; in other words, a manner that runs counter to the core principles of the Internet itself.</p><p>This sort of behavior is nothing new — indeed, it has become normalized which is why protest is muted, if there is ever any at all. In the current environment — where fear is a feature, not a bug — publicly-available examples abound, including:</p><ul><li>Becky Burr, a current ICANN board member and former Clinton Administration official who was instrumental in privatizing the DNS, <a href="https://paper.dropbox.com/ep/redirect/external-link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.home.neustar%2Fresources%2Fvideos%2Fbecky-burr-icann-history&amp;hmac=6UPIMYp5gFN%2FzIdkwhOiiKvQosjdOr0z%2Bhv6W%2FpbBbE%3D">described the atmosphere surrounding the early Internet as “hostile.</a>”(beginning at the 10:00 mark and ending at 13:30).</li><li>In 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice <a href="https://www.justice.gov/atr/strategic-abuse-antitrust-laws-0">alleged“strategic abuse of the antitrust laws</a>”;</li><li>A 2009 settlement of a <a href="http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2009/06/05/07-16151.pdf">lawsuit</a> involving the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers(ICANN)</li><li><a href="https://paper.dropbox.com/ep/redirect/external-link?url=http%3A%2F%2Fdomainincite.com%2F13221-verisign-says-people-might-die-if-new-gtlds-are-delegated&amp;hmac=RW2YW32hN3WxJbTHdpc011Ni0HG7XVCApOSkhdxs0O8%3D">Delays to roll-out of new generic top-level domains</a>;</li><li><a href="https://paper.dropbox.com/ep/redirect/external-link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdomainnamewire.com%2F2015%2F08%2F11%2Fverisigns-lawsuit-against-xyz-continues-pesters-donuts-icann-as-well%2F&amp;hmac=tc4DWf9GhHKMlmdQB%2BmFR7yi6SsctT1s3r%2B54oSGPig%3D">Lawsuits against competitors</a>; and</li><li><a href="https://paper.dropbox.com/ep/redirect/external-link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.c-span.org%2Fvideo%2F%3Fc4620257%2Fhostle-letter-verisign&amp;hmac=mPR%2F73xD7Jlr8Pd1NVAzHnC1vxQQYA38SertS2B0oLg%3D">Sending a letter characterized, again, as“hostile”</a> to think tank scholars immediately prior to their Congressional testimony.</li></ul><p>The heavy casualties of the current rot at the root include an independent press, free speech, private property rights, open and competitive markets, innovation, along with any modicum of ethics, fairness, and common sense. Such things as these are what formed the cornerstones of liberty and have served as bulwarks safeguarding against tyranny. Many people took for granted that a dial tone would always be there — except when it wasn’t. Similarly, there has only ever been a free and open Internet and, despite its vulnerability, many will assume that it will always be so — right up until the moment that it isn’t. It is unrealistic to hope that authoritarian Russia and Communist China will adhere to original principles in their attempts to force multilateral control of Internet governance or that they will overlook the erosion of legitimacy that is resulting from the mockery being made of private sector leadership. Nor is it reasonable to assume that Leftist middle states such as India and Brazil will be idle observers on the sidelines of this 21st century Great Game tug-of-war.</p><p>There is a story in American folklore of a woman who stopped Benjamin Franklin on his way out of the Constitutional Convention and asked what form of government had been selected for the new nation. His answer was:“Arepublic, if you can keep it.” Today, Dr. Franklin might say:</p><p>“A free and open Internet, if you can keep it.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ca89e2071a54" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-query/keeping-a-free-and-open-internet-starts-at-the-root-ca89e2071a54">Keeping a Free and Open Internet Starts at the Root</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-query">The Query</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Internet’s Security & Stability Is Independent of VeriSign’s Margins]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-query/the-internets-security-stability-is-independent-of-verisign-s-margins-9a247c3a9226?source=rss----59c9dca6ea74---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9a247c3a9226</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[intellectual-property]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[domains]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[icann]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-governance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Thomas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Aug 2019 21:18:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-08-02T21:18:51.129Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A company with 69% operating margin shouldn’t be tying security and stability of the Internet to price increases.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*kTvL7dQEZ5fpMqvwemwNfg.png" /></figure><p>On July 25th, VeriSign reported its second quarter 2019 earnings and conducted an earnings call with investors. As CEO Jim Bidzos noted, it was another “solid quarter” for the company , with earnings mostly on target and non-GAAP operating margin expected to hit 69% for the fiscal year.</p><p>As expected, there was some discussion during both the prepared remarks made by Jim, as well as during the Q&amp;A with financial analysts, pertaining to the necessity of adding conforming language to the .COM registry agreement that will permit the price increases that have already been approved by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in Amendment 35 to the Cooperative Agreement.</p><p>From Jim’s prepared remarks in the <a href="https://seekingalpha.com/article/4277847-verisign-inc-vrsn-ceo-jim-bidzos-q2-2019-results-earnings-call-transcript?part=single">transcript</a>:</p><blockquote><em>As noted during our recent earnings calls, we are engaged in a process with ICANN to incorporate terms of Amendment 35 for the Cooperative Agreement, including the pricing terms into the dot-com registry agreement. For those not familiar with this, let me remind you that under the 2016 amendment to the dot-com registry agreement with ICANN, which extended the term of the dot-com registry.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>We agreement </em>(sic)<em> — we and ICANN also agreed to negotiate in good faith to flow through any changes that would be made to the Cooperative Agreement, including the pricing terms, and in addition to preserve and enhance the security and stability of the dot-com registry of the Internet. These discussions with ICANN are ongoing. And at this time, there are no further details to share. Of course when appropriate, we will update you.</em></blockquote><p>And from the Q&amp;A with financial analysts:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Matt Lemenager</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>Okay, got it. And then, just my last one, the process on the dot-com pricing with ICANN. Is that something that’s maybe taking longer than you thought to get that amendment or is this about the timeframe that you thought nothing outside of the time frame that you expect it to get that kind of stamp of approval from the ICANN RA amendment?</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Jim Bidzos</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>So we’re actively engaged in this process, as I said, and we won’t be able to comment and don’t comment on any details of discussions. And like I said in my prepared remarks, we’re going through a process to incorporate the terms approved in Amendment 35, including the pricing terms into the com agreement with ICANN.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>But also, as part of the 2016 amendment, Verisign and ICANN, a 2016 amendment that we made back then to extend the com agreement, Verisign and ICANN agreed to negotiate in good faith the flow through those changes, including pricing, but in addition to preserve and enhance the security and stability of the com registry of the Internet. So no updates beyond that.</em></blockquote><p>Responsible and vigilant stakeholders should be questioning what exactly is going on with this process — after all, proposed, now-approved, pricing-related amendments to the .ORG registry agreement sparked more than 3,300 dissenting comments from stakeholders and with only six voices in support. The .COM registry has more than ten times the number of domain name registrations and there is likely to be a large spike in the number of objections raised during public comment on any proposed changes.</p><p>It will also be interesting to see whether ICANN succeeds in re-using its contractually innovative method of taxation that it created for the .NET registry and inserts a “special development fund” contribution into the .COM RA amendment. After all, new generic top-level domains (nTLDs) aren’t performing in the market as well as expected, the non-profit can’t count on another .WEB-like $135 million winning bid contribution, another round of nTLDs — with their six-figure application fees — isn’t imminent, and there is still that pesky $23 million reported budget shortfall that is getting in the way.</p><p>Even more interesting will be seeing whether ICANN negotiates intellectual property rights protection mechanisms (RPMs) and anti-abuse provisions into the .COM RA, similar to what was inserted into the .ORG registry agreement in exchange for pricing flexibility sought by the registry operator and, in any event, are included in all nTLD registry agreements — which, as Jim noted during the earnings call, apply to more than 1,000 domain name registries and, as such, should be considered to be standard operating procedure for the DNS at this point.</p><p>Of course, ICANN didn’t have 20-year old .ORG domain name registrations that it was seeking to convert into cash money for a shadowy, secret list of non-profit organizations — but it has a slew of those very same things for .COM and properly applied RPMs would put a severe crimp in that plan. Which seems to suggest that RPMs will be included only if a “special slush fund” is also created and that would provide a substantial and annually recurring source of alternative, direct revenue for ICANN.</p><p>Clearly, ICANN and VeriSign are engaged in protracted negotiations over Amendment 3 to the .COM RA. If not, then why — when Amendment 35 to the Cooperative Agreement was agreed to last October — has it taken almost a year to “flow through” those changes?</p><p>Jim was also careful to note, twice, that the “flow through” of changes from Amendment 35 to the .COM RA did, in fact, include pricing issues, but “…in addition to preserve and enhance the security and stability of the com registry of the Internet.”</p><p>If stakeholders were doing their job, then maybe one or two courageous crackpots might have the temerity to ask why that point is being emphasized by a company with a public interest concession that is enjoying a 69% non-GAAP operating margin and that uses more than 90% of its free cash flow for stock buybacks?</p><p>Given those financial and publicly-reported realities, what threats to the stability and security of the Internet would arise if VeriSign is unable to raise prices?</p><p>Is VeriSign signaling that, in the absence of being permitted to increase its profit margin further, that it will choose to allow security and stability risks to go unmitigated in favor of continuing its stock buybacks and maintaining stunning margins?</p><p>If not a veiled threat, then how else should the company’s gratuitous linking of potential pricing increases together with security and stability be understood?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9a247c3a9226" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-query/the-internets-security-stability-is-independent-of-verisign-s-margins-9a247c3a9226">The Internet’s Security &amp; Stability Is Independent of VeriSign’s Margins</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-query">The Query</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Mexican Standoff in Wonderland]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-query/a-mexican-standoff-in-wonderland-8c8562f2b7c7?source=rss----59c9dca6ea74---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8c8562f2b7c7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[icann]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[domains]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dns]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trademark]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Thomas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jul 2019 17:48:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-22T17:48:34.535Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Internet governance stakeholders need to do their job — and end strategic impasse in the DNS.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TLhe0stL90_Xa_f8.jpg" /></figure><p>Wikipedia defines a Mexican standoff as “a confrontation in which no strategy exists that allows any party to achieve victory. As a result, all participants need to maintain the strategic tension, which remains unresolved until some outside event makes it possible to resolve it.” This would be an apt way to describe what may be possibly occurring presently between the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and its largest ratepayer, VeriSign.</p><p>Understanding any potential strategic stalemate requires stakeholders to ask two questions:</p><p>First, when will the auction for O.COM be announced? VeriSign’s proposed Registry Service Extension Proposal, or RSEP, was approved in March and the necessary conforming language has been incorporated into the .COM registry agreement (RA) as Amendment 2. In fact, enough time has passed that Amendment 2 has, itself, been amended in order to redact the list of nonprofit organizations that have been anointed to receive the auction proceeds.</p><p>If stakeholders were doing their job then one or two courageous stalwarts might be found to be inquiring why the identity of these non-profit organizations are being kept secret — and how does this opacity serve the public interest? Heck, at this point, a few conspiracy-theorizing crackpots sporting tinfoil chapeaus would be preferable to deafening silence of the sort that makes one wonder whether it is caused by complicity or cowardice. That the list of organizations selected to receive the auction vig is redacted — and the fact that this has been met with a chorus of crickets — speaks volumes and is truly “Exhibit A” of the whole single-character domain name dumpster fire. (See the full and un-redacted version <a href="https://s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/secure.notion-static.com/1a6b8473-7c41-4bb9-b13c-5caef467b36d/RA_Amendment_27_Mar.pdf?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&amp;X-Amz-Credential=ASIAT73L2G45LXI46GVX%2F20190722%2Fus-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&amp;X-Amz-Date=20190722T161448Z&amp;X-Amz-Expires=86400&amp;X-Amz-Security-Token=AgoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEFUaCXVzLXdlc3QtMiJHMEUCIATxeD%2BclKZNJFaxShX26vlkp8PUvJUhxAqnzModPkTRAiEAhCBpbnj5taiIIidcc2SjyUBzoWs1ySwd%2FMYudQpd4aYq4wMIvv%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAAGgwyNzQ1NjcxNDkzNzAiDBsOUdkMk9IaS%2BScmCq3A50jS28UpHfReyVov%2B3WbQi48KMyfK1KMc6oZPSO4hNCsMAeW6JT0brTg5aMmMFoykWyHs%2BCCoRtpUvn1Y1hbQHP9RLhN0qGABphQcsuhlyt%2Bf18ZcOosTmVEXZ1TvlfUPZfh4I6i%2Bvv7D9zjQhL1Ke4IJDU1koZII72gEjn9DGJPxfl2M6zNErJsTmM6%2Bl9cBuypuPrPEfQUfW9DcMRWFiIN0GoBf7EQ%2Byqcc6k7pOR0za7Lpr3T%2FTMLpVlZKcNt6yS%2Fo1HWnXn799yPftnZxn5SrEimhiJyMbZjaHEJ2d7x7eUi8Ylp4K3HG0tMzTrvO9CK1sUaXpB4q2ioXTuJU9hsrqpGZBIQZ9vDe1s1gDmTfY8ZTgMc%2B0ku%2F%2FjhpuwBcqIzguZQ2Y2sfYTYK7DGsHKgIa8jrtpumb9I08zBsFWf4p79VD3%2Fuha1VtpDu9RFERermifzAzi4X3zm4JSMVESRAfbxDTDAPRd5PsOk7sGQY%2Bgxkxsw2KOAfo8KrjuwjP9TggcpPtrASjUbwUqaVIhVqh4J63hsumpzLJukXiZd7JJVVEYAy4bpTa3Kh%2BtMVn3XtyLFOkwj93W6QU6tAH%2BqJpmez028cUEg7jq2sFo9sosZ8TQqtfe6yTf7I%2FoQNkPHEqTmQ6mmr7WXG%2Fqw48ppVGL03KGe1%2BOPU8WiHnhVh8eOXDsdbuCXIBlJc3yg2KPi4uq0XrWpV%2FJoLbpsB0IcU1agjlnVnO2oTtu4pzR2H%2FIyftDEpZw4VXV6SLOeXBYAR9%2B59ZbHYWABrTWeiFKzyVvImyRsitQYV6dbOSN7q2B2hhpbZGkVcxecikmxshADNA%3D&amp;X-Amz-Signature=e99259d6fe30cde9531e7e543f533d61e7af54bff5e4d9e28e0c94cae421955e&amp;X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&amp;response-content-disposition=filename%20%3D&quot;Second%2520Amendment%2520to.COM%2520Registry%2520Agreement%2520UNREDACTED%2520(3%252F27%252F2019).pdf&quot;">here</a>.)</p><p>Secondly, stakeholders should be asking when VeriSign and ICANN will conclude their negotiations on Amendment 3 to the .COM registry agreement and put the draft text out for public comment. Amendment 3, of course, will be the conforming language that is still required to align the .COM registry agreement with Amendment 35 to the Cooperative Agreement that was agreed to by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and VeriSign in late October of last year.</p><p>An Amendment 3 to the RA is necessary because of Amendment 1, which was made effective in 2016 as part of the package of agreements and accountability reforms that effectuated the IANA transition and whereby the U.S. Government absented itself from its historical role as the guarantor of the Internet’s DNS. In this case, Amendment 1 was done in conjunction with the then-new Root Zone Maintenance Agreement (RZMA) between ICANN and VeriSign — which, by the way, also remunerates VeriSign for providing root zone maintenance services that were previously provided as a public service — and extends the term of the .COM registry agreement until 2024, when both agreements expire and will need to be renewed.</p><p>Ostensibly, this was done for the security and stability of the Internet, but the .COM registry agreement, like all registry agreements, has a presumptive right of renewal. So, if there is no real likelihood that VeriSign will lose its cash cow concession any time soon, and therefore it is improbable that operation of the .COM registry and performance of root zone maintenance functions will be bifurcated between different entities, then why was the registry agreement extended in 2016?</p><p>The answer to that $73 million question is tucked neatly into Section 1(b) of the <a href="https://www.icann.org/sites/default/files/tlds/com/com-amend-1-pdf-20oct16-en.pdf">First Amendment to .COM Registry Agreement</a>, which states (emphasis added):</p><ul><li>“(b) Section 7.3(d)(i) of the Agreement is hereby deleted and replaced in its entirety by the following new Section 7.3(d)(i):</li><li>‘(i) from the Effective Date <strong>through November 30, 2024, US $7.85;’”</strong></li></ul><p>Oops.</p><p>Now, one begins to see that events are transpiring on the other side of Alice’s looking-glass as the curtain comes up on Kabuki in Wonderland.</p><p>The recent negotiations pertaining to amending the .ORG RA left a lot to be desired in terms of good governance — but ICANN demonstrated clearly that it knows how to make a deal. During the negotiation process, PIR sought the removal of pricing restrictions that have existed as a consumer protection mechanism since the very first registry agreement in 1999, which also included .COM and .NET. In exchange, ICANN countered by proposing the addition of intellectual property rights protection mechanisms and anti-abuse provisions that are similar or identical to requirements imposed upon new gTLDs even though they lack the scale and recurring revenue enjoyed by a legacy gTLD such as .ORG — or, for that matter, .COM and .NET.</p><p>As an aside, to help illustrate what this means, consider what would have happened if the European Union had enacted the General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR) and exempted Facebook, Google and other established market leader from complying with its requirements while subjecting start-ups to its provisions for twenty-plus years and then decided that — maybe, just maybe — it’s a good idea to require the platforms with the largest populations of users and, therefore, personal information to implement the same burden of compliance which every other competitor is subjected to. if you think this scenario sounds preposterous, then welcome to Wonderland.</p><p>This author, <a href="https://reviewsignal.com/blog/2019/06/24/the-case-for-regulatory-capture-at-icann/?ref=hvper.com&amp;utm_source=hvper.com&amp;utm_medium=website">along with others</a>, has noted the appalling disregard exhibited by ICANN during this amendment process to the views of stakeholders — more than 3,000 of whom voiced opposition to the removal of price caps during the requisite public comment period, compared to only six in support. However, by securing the inclusion of community-designed public interest safeguards in exchange for a benefit sought by the registry operator, ICANN exhibited a passable grasp of Negotiation 101.</p><p>Add to this Amendment 1 which — considering the absence of any pressing need for extending an RA that includes a so-called presumptive right of renewal — is looking increasingly like a clever-to-the-point-of-insidious trap laid by ICANN for its largest ratepayer. Given all that can be known without being a fly on the wall during tete-a-tete’s between ICANN and VeriSign, the responsible thing to do is to assume that ICANN knows how to make a deal and the safest bet as to what is driving all of this is the same answer that Willie Sutton gave when asked why he robbed banks: because that’s where the money is.</p><p>Practically speaking, what does this mean? On July 25th, VeriSign will release earnings for the quarter that ended on June 30th and will have to face financial analysts in an earnings call — and, as they say, inquiring minds want to know. That’s because beginning in a little more than five months — on January 1st, 2020 — VeriSign has approval from NTIA to raise, for the first time since 2012, the annual wholesale registration price for a .COM domain name by up to 7%, or about $0.55, which translates to around $73 million in annual revenue. Partly in anticipation of this windfall — most or all of which will be profit — the company’s stock price has increased 50% since the beginning of the year. There is just one itsy-bitsy, teeny-weeny, polka-dotted ICANN meanie standing between the company and Wall Street nirvana.</p><p>Under these circumstances, who has all the leverage — along with a recently reported $23 million loss last year? To paraphrase Scooby-Doo: ruh-roh!</p><p>This author has repeatedly tried to warn stakeholders — beginning with <a href="https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/responsible_consumers_alliance_commentsubmissionjuly172018.pdf">comments submitted to NTIA in July 2018</a> — by pointing out that a “special development fund” has been included in the <a href="https://www.icann.org/sites/default/files/tlds/net/net-agmt-pdf-01jul17-en.pdf">.NET RA </a>since 2006 that requires VeriSign to remit to ICANN an extra $0.75 — on top of the standard $0.25 paid by all registries — for every registered .NET domain name. Doing the math, this works out to be around $67 million over the six-year life of a registry agreement, or more than $145 million in unaccountable cash remitted to ICANN since 2006.</p><p>The .COM registry contains around nine times the number of registered domain names as .NET and that sort of scale means that ICANN can close its budget gap and have plenty left over for a whole host of new and improved shenanigans with a much smaller remittance per domain name — perhaps a mere $0.25, which would be a little less than half of the maximum price increase approved by NTIA for 2020 but still would result in around $33 million in additional — and annually recurring — slushy funds for ICANN. Based upon even a cursory understanding of past history, one might reasonably surmise that this is a non-starter for the company — as it should be for every single stakeholder of the DNS.</p><p>This also offers a possible partial explanation as to why the O.COM auction has not been announced. VeriSign is set to earn $7.85 from a process that is certain to generate much more cash. But why would the company move forward with an auction that benefits ICANN, even if indirectly, while the non-profit organization is channelling the outlaw Jessie James by trying to commit highway robbery? Hence, the Mexican standoff in Wonderland and strategic standstill.</p><p>What VeriSign ought to do is tell ICANN to go to hell — the organization has mismanaged the resources it already has been given and this doesn’t warrant the provision of additional funds, nor is it VeriSign’s job to bail ICANN out. Expediency doesn’t work here because if this is permitted to occur then where does it end? The road to hell is paved with good intentions and, if the DNS is ending up there anyway, then it is preferable to see VeriSign hold the line and return the value to their shareholders than remit it to the fiscally irresponsible, corrupt, and corrupting organization that currently has a death grip on the root of the Internet. (Disclosure: I do not own any VeriSign stock — a situation that, considering the current stock price, I deeply regret).</p><p>The seemingly simplest way to remedy this situation is for VeriSign to follow through on the commitment it made in a February 2013 earnings call with financial analysts and investors. During that call there was the following exchange between J.P. Morgan’s Sterling P. Auty and VeriSign’s Pat Kane, pulled from the <a href="https://s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/secure.notion-static.com/fba39033-3d35-4440-acc4-302490d3c913/Verisign_Earnings_Call_2013.pdf?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&amp;X-Amz-Credential=ASIAT73L2G45M7YSBMUO%2F20190722%2Fus-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&amp;X-Amz-Date=20190722T171604Z&amp;X-Amz-Expires=86400&amp;X-Amz-Security-Token=AgoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEFUaCXVzLXdlc3QtMiJHMEUCIEH4Wla55n6ZIdAxFsJ76E5EPAFw%2Bd%2BWdD%2FeNlFtjZZAAiEA8NYFjOk3383MXFXx%2Bs797BgTwZXMkvXimkWYP1t5nmwq4wMIvv%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAAGgwyNzQ1NjcxNDkzNzAiDD%2FNfuEqePXmIu4Q4Cq3A3eEOR6UBfyvFOUN9XlKA0%2FP5k8prEQh9DTw8XF0PXI2Y%2BRNFerG9Jw1cptqcEI3ba8FczFNnDdmVl83%2B1IjEfwTiDE06rbebI83Hh3sXorQ2nxEhJBeeXbzbvwJKQpZ8zmwDQ2ten%2BSiIyxtsN8FcAz3rrXeRVHQwz7MzqNlFKjkB0sHF15bGJvFASr4E6o1feWjRQwYrJ7GgWrz8bgXWJziXbzXye0EB%2Fm24JZEZmUWLYC2Tt8C9ZMEYSa8I4i8vhQ1HcKu0ux5Nt5tfS1xoWrUas4l9Db1yR69PoeQcmnV6Q2pHKQdPeQypQw1WbMlOfv95kd8YGhXw7OY7%2FS2SdjDcD%2BP%2Fq29iTzdlXTfilnNvG49vVEqc1ywI4TC4H4PJ%2FgnoIVKAZg6p2OUBUk5cQGv0uMfesq2Wa9gOFikFknTCPzYVtiA02eVpY4kprKZOChlgjGla8JBwCK7ox%2FXu60S08Tep4E%2BTaPiEwNJSBynX3093BFs%2F4q%2BxNrkGFD%2FjTRMVl%2FjiOClqtHex4iiigWbkRKYYlgpyMe94cualBoDJF7orCsd8UBUss2H%2FGOV7XbhgymBAkwitfW6QU6tAGC2zoQCxBX8A73fNtJU1rq32o79BQjdpIAfn4tgOjdXQ%2FhgJuTcgw8nAhMmzRvlYEHwb1P7eOzZATkHylYMy%2BBb2jrf%2F%2BRlAyi09C5vl%2BEbj6vNBBBUfZ7%2F7sApVWvb1HqT%2BU%2B9JQ1t5pt%2FTCXOhDKGU9pU1XkVK6FGAMp7oxC8mOmhSKLdl1EI%2FAUwCTOoR5%2Bms7t3mttWY1IDnk%2FbKKVK7iHEAmJ7my9uKqkIynA7O1hcBQ%3D&amp;X-Amz-Signature=2d65eea167c0214fb9f216bc979bfcb8ea38214e01c407c983dc8a093b9dd62f&amp;X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&amp;response-content-disposition=filename%20%3D&quot;Quarterly%2520Earnings%2520Call%2520-%2520%2522The%2520Commitment%2522%2520(2%252F2013).pdf&quot;">transcript</a>:</p><ul><li><strong>Sterling P. Auty — JP Morgan Chase &amp; Co, Research Division: </strong>Just a quick follow-up on that line of conversation. Pat, you mentioned, to protect trademarks and the IDNs, that may take longer. I guess it was our understanding that there was that period of time that the trademark clearinghouse was supposed to do that. Are you saying that you’re doing something above and beyond what the trademark clearinghouse is doing?</li><li><strong>Patrick S. Kane:</strong> “Yes. Essentially I haven’t said that we’re doing something different, and because what we’re doing — we may have talked about this in previous calls, but the idea of applying for the transliterations of .com and .net, one of the benefits of that was to protect the applicant — or protect the registrant that has invested in .com today. So if there’s a transliteration of .com in Chinese, what we have proposed to do is to make certain that only the registrant that is — or if the registrant has already registered in .com, that they’re the only one that has the opportunity to register that domain name in the transliterated version for Chinese or for Hangul or for whatever TLD that we’ve operated. So that’s something that’s unique to what we’re doing within our applications. And so that’s an additional protection for intellectual property and trademarks.</li></ul><p>Or, that was re-iterated in a <a href="https://blog.verisign.com/domain-names/update-on-verisigns-idn-implementation-plans/">July 12, 2013 blog post</a> detailing plans for Internationalized Domain Name(IDN) implementation:</p><ul><li>“Use Case №2: John Doe does not have a registration for an IDN.com second-level domain name. John Doe registers a second-level domain name in our Thai transliteration of .com but in no other TLD. That second-level domain name will be unavailable in all other transliterations of .com IDN TLDs and in the .com registry unless and until John Doe (and only John Doe) registers it in another .com IDN TLD or in the .com registry.”</li></ul><p>This blog was posted a day after the company sent <a href="https://s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/secure.notion-static.com/e9177b16-3a68-405e-964f-e5bebbcd4b85/kane-to-willett-11jul13-en.pdf?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&amp;X-Amz-Credential=ASIAT73L2G45CU44VZ6V%2F20190722%2Fus-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&amp;X-Amz-Date=20190722T161244Z&amp;X-Amz-Expires=86400&amp;X-Amz-Security-Token=AgoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEFUaCXVzLXdlc3QtMiJIMEYCIQCbiGmKr9S4gY7W3uQ10KaknsMp5MKwCNFwhQzOy30qIAIhAP9cTHXZngNu3AsVUnshCJNceq3HoOEnI6%2Fex4dD0bXUKuMDCL3%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEQABoMMjc0NTY3MTQ5MzcwIgxyIe%2B3ra2ElQgwkK0qtwMhfQ%2FVlqNBTUJqTfmGmPe3vTvEJOotqOeZMr%2F0bY0OP0iikswcr9Of5XJdTCo5EB%2FKfECwa2xodxQBkw1aBlvTiOBPx8kWWtYYsvjKPz8PDzCHiLx36hArKUXbmekBiIie%2FYkcc%2F4pA2GvBBmvPeNnL%2BdeVFgpuFUrNNaWJrIlF%2B6%2BEABJ%2FGwq%2FZKQ4cYa%2FKaiQ4bd3O7IIPJIe%2FvW07CbrDTePhz5FLcDkCY8kXeQg9AJxMqDv4nRXck2Ls1h7mFEjxHzzXlELpeskTx%2FR%2FyAnYLh2JoOfQhw6OoOR%2BU03k%2FM0L%2BMKgnT47iMViMVxj8Subx%2FO%2FFVqNX100OTRTRUPgrmVZjET%2BWFreJIn%2BUcJWHRskmUn2keX2hAVqIFon5nyouke7Aub8ld%2BmWuKvPuDaNSoP6ypcauOLvoflxJEJuP0SxD6VrZuV5l7HQr2sOSng7ECIBgl3J2xG4hiacGLK3Sl69qFvxAcAjHaLjicjeEtNkZkXEdAgGV8u29bOtUHotKTQ9CeVuYon380LfplLrH9Q8fpEfbPBfRw%2BBUW6%2B3I47SafTf4xIhCHoszHpAZtNtr4lMMJ7T1ukFOrMBSbpj836sqwCgbOvcukKN5s%2BYsSIogOnedKXQi0%2FjwLIdeWnH4LU19bxV2iT75Q6ut3NW2m%2B0U2xSUoh6vg8WpKrBezevu3pAdPL6HfPDuizbB2TvsNb8R596BYuZkn3kxM%2Bv8sWdcZNjU7PGiXYWNsaYu07JMwrX6CNzUN09XPDvaTfnGF1Pd6gu2ZPJa2KGKCfhZMT5wNUpSo6WpxDpeF7vdLMAZGkoEEf6pBwDXV4nFwI%3D&amp;X-Amz-Signature=86c739e9c5b1557e172e13026542a194243a6644801458418cb5107ed4ed7a31&amp;X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&amp;response-content-disposition=filename%20%3D&quot;kane-to-willett-11jul13-en.pdf&quot;">a letter to ICANN</a> making the same commitment and using the exact same language. Which brings us to the third question that stakeholders would be asking if they were doing their job: what other motive would VeriSign — an otherwise rational actor — possibly have for engaging in such Kabuki when the most money they stand to make at the end of this auction process — regardless of who is the eventual registrant and who is the beneficiary of auction largesse — is $7.85?</p><p>But, there’s something blocking VeriSign’s ability to live up to its commitment: a one-eyed, one-horned, flying purple profit-eater named ICANN.</p><p>Untangling this part of the plot requires a brief look at history. <a href="https://s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/secure.notion-static.com/1a679f8a-81e3-4665-b83c-82d8b86d6c60/Re-_one-letter_domains_copy.pdf?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&amp;X-Amz-Credential=ASIAT73L2G45ML4C7CEJ%2F20190722%2Fus-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&amp;X-Amz-Date=20190722T162914Z&amp;X-Amz-Expires=86400&amp;X-Amz-Security-Token=AgoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEFUaCXVzLXdlc3QtMiJGMEQCIFe88CpU%2FchmLrziLh80lDQMp6J3uU%2FfYGVSvGPGiHHMAiB%2BxNtSAkTrbtEheTWdYJXJngcjb0M6X2TdrNQS8ZT%2FHirjAwi%2B%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDI3NDU2NzE0OTM3MCIMc00m62maXnmylQjuKrcDGpGzkgDldcCHCEKXBDW9%2ByBY4KHL%2B9i6l5EhoQaX3LwX4zquwsx0ohrHs%2Fsuio8qQxLpzwzIYyoh70osHgl8SbMYgoXThmRGbVUqhlV3xTIURGiYdMyohryfwmdlsvdheTvZ9Z6GVk4J0%2BZMOcaTZvshe2tWXDTj2Z9ds1UGUMPssN2Mi0GYLTNh8TjtI2w2iu%2FrD0QxrjN9zndNQ4cNiobQ8XijTJC9Xgws6uLWf1gDX%2FZ5T%2BX5WpVjrpKTYFFzHk2JadWAfxj0%2Bf0o1Q4fglHQtnu119XL4MOeHlxyKjqvvVtPzw5TlwMa6GaTQPXhonK9chEbISyD91znPSXgZpr%2F47USJy2YzE3Si%2Bhy8tV11PjCzzE8WxYJCz2EzdgQM31mRE0Buzf%2Bp0x1oWIun%2Bcsbd1HvjKlwnf8V70tcyy7CwBXiwdZ3pp%2BIXkOGy96Y1Ain17xq7lkB2kWBowwkJgpVMzFqtHwiNpI%2FnwkWoicblpN11Ll%2BZ5Ay5SdFNTy5WdrJf0I6s%2FPFpdqExRR%2BKwy2vaIKlOYA1sX6%2B6Gx1KwQfjnZwOBkqFGfWbEM1dF0rCtS58hWjCv4dbpBTq1AaJifqrC4Uf8KFlemiv3PbpKp1PLdhls%2Fxdnij5TWDfvPGzVUV1zr5z8wvCEuRNZyIp%2F0RmofpUQKuwSOXWQ6HcYECNQFsqYGliSeE%2FI4Za1om%2BLqlFgWTgqpsGDJ9%2FROgtO2b6uKDbiXvaN0oNT6imIhsUoLyFAQ6lXG2yiMGDrcJ3ANSIufyKA%2FTz3x65lX5ypHES7Y5vbOoY3A5DUHakxPIGz0haqybjsDp1IkdflgUSlHM4%3D&amp;X-Amz-Signature=40d16d1b6c2e3a19767885e48f93b90567da6594bd33756c796530553cb58e01&amp;X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&amp;response-content-disposition=filename%20%3D&quot;Jon%2520Postel%2520E-mail%2520Explaining%2520Registration%2520of%2520Single-Character%2520.COMs%2520(5%252F20%252F1994).pdf&quot;">In 1993, the reservation of single-character domain names was undertaken by Jon Postel </a>using the only feasible means available and, in any event, what would have occurred naturally to the man who <strong>was</strong> IANA — he registered them. It wasn’t until 1999 when the <a href="http://archive.icann.org/en/nsi/nsi-registry-agreement-04nov99.htm">first registry agreement </a>would make available another method of reserving domain names — by contract.</p><p>Section 3(C)(iii) of the 1999 registry agreement stated:</p><ul><li><em>(iii) reservation of SLD names that may not be registered initially or that may not be renewed due to reasons reasonably related to (a) avoidance of confusion among or misleading of users, (b) intellectual property, or © the technical management of the DNS or the Internet (e.g., “example.com” and </em><strong><em>single-letter/digit names</em></strong><em>);</em></li></ul><p>At this point, registration was no longer necessary for reservation. That’s because in order to comply with the contractual obligation, the registry operator would be required to deny any aspiring registrant while still being permitted to renew — and, importantly, to transfer — existing registrations of “single-letter/digit” domain names in the .COM registry. This is how, for example, Elon Musk was able to acquire X.COM — not once, but twice. Yet ICANN did not delete its registration of SCDNs — at which point the domain names would have ceased to exist and the registry operator would have been contractually prohibited from registering them to a new registrant. Instead, it has held onto them for 20 years — until now. Why?</p><p>Again, the wisdom of Willie Sutton likely answers that question: because that’s where the money is. Cash in sufficient quantity to entice ICANN to disregard the recommendations of its own Intellectual Property and Business Constituencies to require VeriSign to subject the release of O.COM to community-developed RPMs — the same RPMs that it recently has negotiated into the .ORG registry agreement. Implementation of VeriSign’s commitment along with Trademark Clearinghouse protections including Sunrise and Priority Access periods might result in some of the single-character domain names being acquired at or near the wholesale price for a .COM domain name registration. But why would VeriSign care if this occurs when the most they stand to receive — under any circumstances — is $7.85?</p><p>The answer is overwhelmingly simple: they don’t. But ICANN certainly does and every single stakeholder of the DNS should be vigorously and loudly questioning this state of affairs. In short, play time is over and stakeholders need to do their job by stepping in and ending the stand-off — the future of the Internet hangs in the balance.</p><p>And with that, let’s get on with the show.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8c8562f2b7c7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-query/a-mexican-standoff-in-wonderland-8c8562f2b7c7">A Mexican Standoff in Wonderland</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-query">The Query</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Ageless Warning of Icarus]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-query/icarus-fd566f993bfe?source=rss----59c9dca6ea74---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fd566f993bfe</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dns]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[icann]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[domains]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Thomas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 13 Jul 2019 17:44:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-07-13T17:44:13.902Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Domain Name System (DNS) stakeholders should heed the cautionary moral from an ancient myth about straying in the strata.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*sIOmRjfJoxrSsQKi.JPG" /></figure><p>It wasn’t that long ago that, during a visit home, my brother asked me, “Why are you so stuck on this Internet thing?” His direct question caused me to realize that I had never actually stopped and considered why I was investing so much time — and in such a highly visible manner — into Internet governance when I wasn’t being compensated to do so and, in fact, was — not putting too fine of a point on it — flat broke.</p><p>Considering the source, the question demanded further reflection — and a response. After some introspection, I realized that my motivation is actually quite simple: the current DNS governance regime is offensive and not since the day in 7th grade when another boy smacked me across the face in the schoolyard — and four boys had to pull me off of him — have I been able to tolerate bullies. Regardless of original intent, ICANN and the system of governance it presides over have mutated into something that is unhealthy, unseemly, and unacceptable.</p><p>The practice of collecting tolls on the information superhighway has been obsolete for some time now; yet the toll booths remain. By persisting, these economic chokepoints harm the public interest by perpetuating and legitimizing the fiction that value is provided by the toll collectors. They also present an irresistible temptation to four for-profit companies and a non-profit corporation that have proven — time and again — to have a tendency for coveting and appropriating unearned and undeserved economic returns that don’t correspond to the value contributed in real terms.</p><p>An illustrative analogy might be that of companies engaged in mineral extraction. In many cases these are monopolies that are entitled — by virtue of owning land or mineral rights — to explore and extract resources from a specific, discrete area in order to create value. However, this comparison only works up to a point.</p><p>That’s because mineral extraction enterprises may have a monopoly — and, in fact, can generate vast sums of cash — but risk to the public interest is limited because even the most resource-rich field has a shelf life. There’s a finite commodity that, at some point, will be depleted. This scarcity functions as an existential incentive for continual investment in exploration and innovation while also functioning as a defensive barrier that helps to protect the public interest from monopolistic rapacity. This is a rational — and free — system.</p><p>Legacy sponsored gTLDs, such as .COM, .NET, and .ORG, that have achieved scale, on the other hand, are an infinite digital commodity with relatively modest fixed costs and no inherent incentive for continued innovation. This results in a systemic version of addictive and co-dependent behavior as well as forming the ideal environment for corruption and profiteering that materially harms the public interest. This is a dysfunctional and, therefore, irrational system.</p><p>As others have pointed out, the legacy sponsored gTLDs were “found” bonanzas — literally a concession granted by the United States Government and guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the United States taxpayer — that require minimal maintenance and print an endless supply of cash. Yet, a domain name registry is essentially an encrypted .TXT file that is published to a virtualized system of root and recursive servers. There is no longer any single point of failure for the Internet, such as a single authoritative root server. The “A” root is just one virtualized server cluster with 12 virtualized server cluster siblings and the so-called “hidden master” references functional operations of publishing the root zone file via Anycast — not an actual set of discrete server and network resources.</p><p>VeriSign, when it bothers to communicate at all, points to the sky and says, “because of registration fees the sky is blue, and to keep it blue we must raise rates.” What is left unsaid, and which very few seem to realize, is that the sky is blue today, just as it was blue yesterday and will be tomorrow — and anybody seeking to be paid to keep the sky blue is engaging in nothing more than a thinly veiled protection racket and foisting it upon an unbelievably gullible set of marks. A trained monkey — to say nothing of an AI-enabled resource — could perform the functions that VeriSign performs at an infinitesimal fraction of VeriSign’s current burn rate — which is, itself, a rounding error in an ocean of cash that is nothing more than an enormous transfer of wealth and inefficient resource allocation swaddled in a shroud of hocus-pocus.</p><p>The only consequence of putting the .COM registry out to bid would be that IBM, AT&amp;T, or some other highly competent organization subject to the jurisdiction of the United States would operate it moving forward while charging an annual wholesale registration price of about $3 — and still turn a healthy profit. A stratified set of investors may experience modest corrective effects and this would be essential to the imperative of restoring rational and free economics.</p><p>Many errors were made during the Internet’s infancy. Primarily among those, is that the resources that enable the DNS exist for the benefit of the public interest and, as such , should be owned by an organization that faithfully represents that trust. The tempest that punctuates debate about VeriSign’s potential ability to function as a registrar as well as a registry is revealed to be raging in a teapot when compared to the egregious injury inflicted upon the public interest by VeriSign’s vertical integration.</p><p>During the IANA transition, the .COM registry agreement was extended to correspond with the term of the new Root Zone Maintenance agreement between VeriSign and ICANN — which replaced what had previously existed in the Cooperative Agreement between the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and VeriSign. The primary explanation for why this extension was necessary was explicit and asserted that the .COM registry is “inextricably intertwined” with the root zone of the DNS and that they cannot be separated without destabilizing the DNS.</p><p>This is both true and untrue at the same time. That’s because the .COM registry is the root zone of the DNS — VeriSign has never maintained separate infrastructures and it has never been required to. It is this same infrastructure which has been partitioned in order to create the individual namespaces that can be leased to new gTLD operators who don’t wish to run their own infrastructure — who, instead, aspire to be brand developers, service providers and marketing organizations. If this is untrue, then how can it be asserted that customers of VeriSign’s Back End Registry Services (BERS), along with the root zone itself, enjoy the same low latency and continual uptime as .COM when more than 90% of VeriSign’s free cash flow is used for stock buybacks?</p><p>Insult and injury in equal measure will continue to be inflicted upon the public interest until this dysfunction is resolved. One possible solution might be to separate ownership of infrastructure from the function of maintaining and operating it — a form of vertical disintegration.</p><p>The effectiveness of accountability reforms accompanying the IANA transition were predicated upon a community of stakeholders remaining vigilant and engaged to counter-balance what history and experience tells us inevitably happens when systems of governance are left insufficiently checked. This empowered community turned out not to be such an effective safeguard and near-limitless economic resources have enabled the capture of the ICANN organization and its constituencies by its largest ratepayer — which appears intent on gaining an unrestrained range of operation in the DNS. For editing, encrypting, and publishing a .TXT file — this sad and sorry state of affairs can’t continue.</p><p>As they say, past is prologue, and my next post will take cues from history — some more recent than others — to informed proposed solutions that may help set a corrected course for the future.</p><p><strong><em>Greg Thomas </em></strong><em>is the executive director of the </em><strong><em>Responsible Consumers Alliance</em></strong><em>, a non-profit organization that educates and informs consumers of the Internet’s Domain Name Service (DNS). Learn more at </em><a href="http://protectdnsconsumers.org/"><em>protectdnsconsumers.org</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fd566f993bfe" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-query/icarus-fd566f993bfe">The Ageless Warning of Icarus</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-query">The Query</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Responding to “The Case for Regulatory Capture of ICANN”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-query/responding-to-the-case-for-regulatory-capture-of-icann-26e361f12162?source=rss----59c9dca6ea74---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/26e361f12162</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[top-level-domain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dns]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[icann]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-governance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Thomas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Jun 2019 21:42:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-30T21:42:08.087Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YOfR80a9bJR7XfYRCPHc7A.png" /></figure><h3><em>A recent investigative report reveals alarming structural hazards in Domain Name System (DNS) governance</em></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/320/0*oxgoRckKkRBF_3nr" /></figure><p>This past Monday, as ICANN65 was beginning in Marrakesh, the technical review blog <em>Review Signal</em> published a detailed expose, “<a href="https://reviewsignal.com/blog/2019/06/24/the-case-for-regulatory-capture-at-icann/">The Case for Regulatory Capture of ICANN</a>” authored by site founder and “geek-in-charge” Kevin Ohashi. The post was clearly the product of extensive investigative reporting — and what it reveals is deeply disturbing.</p><p>Ohashi marshals a dizzying and diverse array of facts and figures into a damning indictment of the ICANN organization. This, by itself, isn’t exactly news. But his post goes a step further and, by connecting the dots of various data points, he begins to reveal how key constituencies of the Internet governance ecosystem are being influenced by the largest industry players in the Domain Name System (DNS). He accomplishes this in the same way that these things always are: he follows the money.</p><p>It bears mentioning that the effectiveness of the post is considerably dampened by expending a considerable amount of proverbial column inches to call out the past employment history with VeriSign of Shane Tews, which ended nearly a decade ago and is ancient history — she is currently founding principal of Logan Circle Strategies and a visiting scholar with the American Enterprise Institute. The post also details various financial disclosures made in accordance with legal requirements by NetChoice’s Steve Delbianco and Jonathan Zuck, formerly of ACT. Presenting these past and present affiliations as “gotcha” revelations overlooks the reality that information about them is publicly available for anybody with an Internet connection to view for themselves on LinkedIn or their respective organization’s websites. What isn’t publicly available but ought to be disclosed here is that these three professionals are first-rate subject matter experts and thought leaders who contribute time, energy, and expertise to DNS policy and Internet governance which would be difficult, if not impossible, to replace and without which would be to the great disadvantage and detriment of the public interest.</p><p>It is possible to disagree with someone without questioning their integrity and undue focus on mischaracterizing certain individuals’ motives distracts attention away from what should be the primary areas of concern: the hazardous structural defects that are becoming increasingly and insistently apparent in the DNS governance edifice.</p><p>The post centers on current negotiations concerning the .ORG registry agreement between its operator, Public Interest Registry, and ICANN. .ORG is one of the original legacy DNS registries that was delegated, along with .COM and .NET, in the original Registry Agreement and is heavily populated with domain name registrations belonging to non-profit organizations. This registry agreement renewal has become somewhat controversial because of an amendment that would remove pricing regulation that has functioned to protect registrants for wanton price increases for nearly two decades.</p><p>For many, if not most, matters, ICANN requests public comment on proposed actions and, at any given time, there may be multiple open comment periods for various and sundry ICANN work streams. This would seem to suggest that incorporating stakeholder input is part and parcel of ICANN’s normal course of business. But when it comes to matters related to registry agreements, contractual relationships with other contracted parties, or, more broadly, any issue with financial implications, then public comment becomes just that — chatter from the hoi polloi that often serves as a pressure-release valve during times of controversy and, in all cases, provides the facade of participatory governance and bottom up consensus-based policymaking to what would otherwise be seen quite clearly as closed-door dealmaking between ICANN and its contracted parties — or, more bluntly, between the regulator and the regulated.</p><p>In order to illustrate this point, the post’s author analyzed all of the more than 3300 comments that were submitted during the request for comment period related to the proposed amendments to the .ORG registry agreement. What he discovered was that 3252, or 98.1%, of comments <strong>opposed</strong> allowing PIR an unrestrained ability to raise prices and only six, or 0.02%, of comments were in favor of the proposed change. In what alternate version of reality would an organization with a mission to serve the public interest feel justified to continue to push forward with a proposed action that enjoys virtually no public support while facing such voluminous opposition? By ignoring the “optics” of moving forward despite overwhelmingly expressed opposition, ICANN is signaling hubris — and, as these things usually go, it’s likely all downhill from here.</p><p>Playing devil’s advocate for a moment, the post doesn’t really highlight the fact that the reason for such an elevated number of negative comments is because the Internet Commerce Association, a trade group consisting of professional domain investors, made an organized push along the lines of a “Write Your Congressman” grassroots political effort that helped drive increased “turnout.” However, the profit-minded motives behind this effort become irrelevant in the face of a supporting coalition of only six individuals that submitted comments in support of pricing flexibility for PIR.</p><p>The real issue of burning importance here is the hubristic disdain that ICANN displays towards stakeholders by disregarding their input — especially when it solicited that input in the first place. This isn’t an academic concern, nor is it a clerical error happening at the margins of a vast bureaucracy. It is corruption occurring at the heart of a major governance institution and, judging by the absence of organized protest or clarion calls for reform, it has become normalized.</p><p>Acquiescence to ICANN’s corruption might also explain why stakeholder concerns and recommendations were utterly disregarded during VeriSign’s recently approved Registry Services Extension Proposal (RSEP) to release O.COM for auction. The circumstances are strikingly similar — proposed amendments to a registry agreement that weaken or remove longstanding consumer protections and that receive opposition from affected parties during a public comment period that is later summarily disregarded. During that public comment period, ICANN’s Intellectual Property and Business constituencies, along with others, recommended that VeriSign’s proposed release of O.COM be subject to standard community-developed intellectual property rights protection mechanisms, including Trademark Clearinghouse, Sunrise Period and Priority Access. However, ICANN’s Board approved the RSEP in March, at the last ICANN meeting in Kyoto, in a consent agenda vote with no discussion or further consideration pertaining to stakeholder concerns.</p><p>One of the most chilling aspects of the O.COM release has been the complete lack of uproar — the deafening silence — that has emanated from the community in response to ICANN’s setting aside of critical protections that enjoyed community consensus. An observer could be forgiven for wondering if stakeholders are becoming trapped in a fog of myopic cynicism that causes them to ignore the implications of ICANN’s failure to enforce its own policies in the first place and then proceeding to sidestep stakeholder recommendations explicitly calling for their implementation. Perhaps the community should take heed of the cautionary note that, paraphrasing an old poem, warns “I said nothing when they came for everybody else and so there was nobody left to say anything when they came for me.”</p><p>When the U.S. Government removed itself from direct oversight of ICANN, the thinking at the time was that the stakeholder community would step up to serve as the counter-balance and accountability backstop to the ICANN organization. There was an involved process of developing new accountability mechanisms that the community could leverage to keep ICANN in check. In reality, there’s only one power that the community can avail itself of in the face of a runaway and intransigent ICANN — the power to recall the ICANN Board — which requires a process so convoluted that it’s likely to be invoked with only slightly more frequency than the appearance of Haley’s comet.</p><p>By all appearances, it hasn’t taken long, in the absence of U.S. Government oversight, for rot to set in at the root. If the community is going to acquiesce to its own dismissal — if corruption is to become normalized at ICANN and in DNS governance — then, perhaps it’s time to start looking towards the heavens.</p><p><em>Greg Thomas is executive director of the Responsible Consumers Alliance, a non-profit organization promoting awareness and engagement on issues of importance to the public interest. He is also founder of The Viking Group LLC, an advisory services firm.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=26e361f12162" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-query/responding-to-the-case-for-regulatory-capture-of-icann-26e361f12162">Responding to “The Case for Regulatory Capture of ICANN”</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-query">The Query</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Defining America’s Internet Legacy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-query/made-in-america-bd412d3de63b?source=rss----59c9dca6ea74---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bd412d3de63b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[internet-governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[icann]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dns]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[commerce-department]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Thomas]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2019 13:59:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-15T22:27:37.608Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><em>An expiring contractual arrangement offers a final opportunity for the National Telecommunications and Information Administration to set the right course for the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS). It must act — here’s how.</em></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VX-9qhvamNe_fpNZoXaW9g.jpeg" /></figure><blockquote>NOTE: This is reprinted from a response submitted to a request for public comment by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) regarding “International Internet Policy Priorities.”</blockquote><h4>Introduction — The IANA Transition Wasn’t the Final Vestige of Unique U.S. Stewardship of the DNS</h4><p>It may be a question for the ages whether the tempest that punctuated the final days of the 2016 transition to the private sector of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions — the so-called IANA Transition — was confined to a teapot or a portent of something more. However, the controversy that has arisen surrounding alleged influence of the 2016 U.S. presidential election is a stark reminder of the consequential nature of the network of networks known as the Internet.</p><p>The IANA transition resulted from a nearly superhuman, multi-year effort by a global community of DNS stakeholders which culminated with the expiration of a procurement contract between the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). However, it was not the last remaining vestige of unique influence stemming from the U.S. Government’s legacy as the originator of the Internet. Another contractual arrangement — this time between NTIA and Verisign, Inc., and known simply as the “Cooperative Agreement” — is still in effect and confers to NTIA extraordinary and unique influence over a private corporation managing core components of the DNS. The agency is faced with deciding whether to extend this Agreement or allow it to expire in November of this year.</p><p>The Cooperative Agreement is a lengthy document, requiring a 2-inch binder, that has been amended many times since it was first signed by the U.S. Government and Network Solutions (whom Verisign acquired in the early 2000’s). However, the Agreement was comprised of three core components:</p><ol><li>assignment of the authoritative “A” root server;</li><li>delegation of the Root Zone Maintenance function; and,</li><li>conferral to NTIA of the unilateral right to review and amend the .com registry agreement.</li></ol><p>The first two are no longer relevant — for various technical reasons, the “A” root server is no longer authoritative and the Root Zone Maintenance function, though still performed by Verisign, is now governed by an agreement between ICANN and Verisign that was executed as part of the IANA transition completed in 2016. However, what remains is the powerful yet tightly scoped authority for NTIA to amend a single contract in order to regulate competition within a single market: the DNS. NTIA has exercised its’ prerogative only once, in 2012, when the agency unilaterally amended the .com registry agreement to restrict the wholesale price of an annual .com domain name registration to $7.85 whereas, previously, Verisign had been permitted to raise the price by 7% in four of the six years of the concession.</p><h4>A Rapidly Approaching Inflection Point</h4><p>NTIA must soon decide what course of action it will take regarding disposition of the Cooperative Agreement. The agency has two obvious options: renew or allow to expire. There are several chief reasons for why it makes sense to allow the Agreement to expire:</p><ul><li>NTIA is not a competition authority. In the United States, the responsibility for overseeing competition is shared between the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission — it should remain with those two entities.</li><li>It is more than likely that the international community would perceive an extension of the Agreement as a continuation of privileged status by the United States. This is due to the reality that Verisign performs fundamental functions at the root of the Internet, including editing and publishing the DNS root zone file. Additionally, it operates registries comprising approximately 45% of the Internet’s registered domain names and, by providing back-end registry services to other registry operators, provides the infrastructure for an even larger percentage of the approximately 333 million registered domain names in the DNS. By maintaining a chokehold on the company’s ability to generate revenue provides enormous leverage to NTIA.</li><li>Uncertainty surrounding the upcoming biennial plenipotentiary meeting of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) seems to tip the scales in favor of not renewing the Agreement in another attempt to convince non-aligned countries to remain ambivalent about the U.S.</li><li>If the IANA transition was completed in 2016 to finalize the privatization of the Internet and, in response to international pressure following the disclosures by Edward Snowden, to remove unique U.S. influence over the Internet, then it is logically impermissible, and more than a little hypocritical, to extend the Cooperative Agreement for another term.</li></ul><p>And yet, allowing the Agreement to expire comes with its own set of real-world risks — most importantly, how NTIA will justify a decision to abruptly remove regulatory oversight for a company that currently is subject to price controls due to competition concerns. If the justification for the price cap was that Verisign was too powerful in 2012, then what has changed to indicate the situation has improved sufficiently to remove the price restriction? It most definitely is not any of the primary financial indicators for the company, which has seemed not just to survive, but actually to thrive in an environment of remedial austerity. Verisign’s stock performance may be illustrative of how ineffective the price restriction has been: In November 2012 (prior to the price restriction being announced) Verisign’s stock price was trading close to $50. On Friday, July 13, 2018, after six years of operating under a wholesale price cap, Verisign’s stock price was $147.58.</p><p>Also, NTIA exercised its regulatory authority in full cooperation with the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, which assisted in developing the price restriction. The Antitrust Division’s interest was centered on consumer protection, specifically on a concept called “elasticity” which holds that certain registrants are so invested in a .com domain name, such as Amazon.com or Overstock.com, that they cannot easily transition to a new domain name without suffering substantial harm and, in effect, are locked into a .com domain name. In a real-world example, Overstock.com tried to rebrand itself to o.co within the last few years. After investing an estimated more than $100 million in re-branding, the company discovered that customers weren’t buying it and abandoned the effort. Even for companies that aren’t dot-com’s, the cost associated with tasks such as migrating e-mail, web and other IT services and even reprinting stationary and business cards can make the seemingly simple change of a domain name into a daunting proposition.</p><p>Other stakeholders include those who register and maintain large portfolios of domain names in .com, either for domain speculation, commercial use (i.e. companies with large brand portfolios such as Unilever or Disney), defensive purposes (anti-cybersquatting), or a combination of the above. Many large brands and intellectual property owners have .com domain name registrations that number in the thousands, or even tens of thousands, making them extremely vulnerable to even modest spikes in the annual registration price.</p><p>Nor has it appeared to stimulate competition in the domain name market — although the price restriction may have had a significant, though unintended, effect on the introduction of more than 1200 new generic Top-Level Domains (nTLDs). The stated purpose for this introduction of a vast amount of supply into an indeterminate-demand market was to increase consumer choice and market competition in the DNS. These are honorable motives, to be sure. But the “invisible hand” of the market for the private sector-led Internet may take little notice of honorable motives while caring very much about concepts such as supply-and-demand or profit-and-loss.</p><p>There are typically three ways in which a gTLD registry achieves economic viability:</p><ol><li><strong>The registry achieves scale.</strong> This is what was pioneered with .com and .net and Verisign benefits from today. The cost of operating the domain are tightly managed and scale is achieved in volume of registrations. This business model places the greatest value on the number of registrations because the expense model is, generally speaking, fixed. Which means that once a registry reaches the break-even point with its number of registrations then everything else is profit.</li><li><strong>The registry offers additional value.</strong> This is the value proposition that registries like .film and .bank are trying to offer. They focus on servicing a particular segment of the market that is willing to pay higher registration cost for some sort of benefit, either business-critical like security for .bank, piracy-free for .film, extortionate like .sucks, etc. This can also be targeted at the “vanity” buyer where an operator has an extension for which people are willing to pay a premium — i.e. .ninja or .guru.</li><li><strong>The registry is overhead. </strong>This applies when companies maintain a brand name (or similar) TLD that is operated as a cost center and/or a line item expense in their budget.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/569/1*zAY9wbY59yTo4dgraAqfUg.png" /><figcaption>To put the 24 million nTLD registrations in context, consider that 145 million domain names — or about 43% of the 333 million registered domain names in the entire DNS — are on .com. Also, 52% of nTLD domain names are unused or scheduled to be deleted.</figcaption></figure><h4>A Possible Solution: A Deal That Is Both Art and Science</h4><p>A third path may be possible, whereby NTIA allows the Cooperative Agreement to expire, but only after Verisign and the Department of Justice present a bilateral agreement that has been certified by the federal judiciary and transformed into a consent decree.</p><p>As a practical matter, a consent decree can consist of anything, provided that both parties request judicial certification. It is similar to a contract but carries the force of law. After reaching agreement on terms, both parties file a lawsuit at the same time and request an entry of judgment, which turns the agreement into a judicial decree. It does not require findings of fact, admissions of guilt or liability, and is more binding than a judgment against an unwilling party, which can be modified or reversed by the same or higher courts. A consent decree can only be modified by consent of both parties.</p><p>A consent decree would return oversight of competition to the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, which has the expertise and experience to ensure wholesale pricing of .com registrations helps promote meaningful competition in the DNS — and not just consumer choice. Further, they can ensure that any modifications to the current regime are implemented on a gradual glide path in order to avoid causing shocks to the market that would be associated with sudden changes in price.</p><p>A consent decree also provides an avenue for resolving some of the outstanding issues that are legacies of the Internet’s organic, dynamic, and sometimes messy development. It allows for commitments to be obtained from an American company, subject to U.S. jurisdiction, that don’t require ICANN’s Policy Development Process or upsetting the apple cart of consensus within the global community of DNS stakeholders. In this scenario, the Justice Department acts as the negotiating counter-party, rather than ordinary stakeholders. The consent decree can create requirements that function the same as public interest commitments and rights protection mechanisms, etc. This may even be an avenue for helping to address the challenge of upgrading the WHOIS database in a newly-GDPR world.</p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>The Cooperative Agreement anticipates the possibility that the registry operator (or its successors) might, at some point, grow dissatisfied with an arrangement where one party has a “presumptive right of renewal” and allows for the registry operator to terminate its’ obligations, with notice and in its’ sole discretion. But there’s a catch: if that option is exercised then the .com Registry Agreement is concurrently terminated and the concession for operating the .com registry of the Internet must be put out to bid. This recourse is also a historical artifact, and envisions a public tender overseen by the U.S. government. It is almost certain that extensive litigation would be required before a definitive outcome were to emerge — a wrinkle that most — but not all — parties would prefer to avoid.</p><p>Lastly, use of the word “agree” in this submission is a term of art — because of the possibility for re-bid of the .com registry agreement as well as NTIA’s unilateral right to extend the Cooperative Agreement, it isn’t necessary for the incumbent registry operator to agree with all, or any, of the terms presented. However, all parties gain material benefits with a consent decree such as the one proposed here. If NTIA allows the Cooperative Agreement to expire, then Verisign will eventually gain pricing flexibility, and under terms much more favorable to their shareholders than to the global public interest. But right now, NTIA holds all the cards, including (pardon the expression) a trump card or two. Chief among these is the ability to simply extend the Cooperative Agreement for another six years, leaving the price restriction unchanged, while placing culpability for the international fallout squarely on the company’s shoulders. It isn’t hard to imagine that the Justice Department, feeling slighted, might also take a greater interest in the activities of the company that jilted it at the altar. A wrinkle that most — but not all — parties would prefer to avoid.</p><h4><strong>About the Author</strong></h4><p>Greg Thomas is the Executive Director of the Responsible Consumers Alliance, a Nevada-based non-profit organization whose mission is to promote a culture of personal accountability on issues involving unique challenges caused by complexity or controversy. He is also the founding principal of The Viking Group LLC, a boutique advisory services firm helping clients navigate the disruptive dynamics of transformation occurring at the intersection of technology, global business and government.</p><p>Twice, he was a key strategist for Verisign, from 2009–2010 and 2013–2016, advising the company’s senior leadership on strategy as well as leading external affairs and U.S. Government Relations. This, combined with other roles in his career, has afforded him a unique, front-row seat at the three-ring circus (audience participation encouraged!) of Internet governance. This experience informs the opinions and perspectives contained in this submission. The views and opinions expressed here, including all errors and omissions, are solely the author’s own. Nothing contained in this submission was developed for or provided by any other party, for compensation or otherwise.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bd412d3de63b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-query/made-in-america-bd412d3de63b">Defining America’s Internet Legacy</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-query">The Query</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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