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        <title><![CDATA[The Stratagems - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[From the worm eye view to the bird eye view. - Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Republic Day  Edition :]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-stratagems/republic-day-edition-3a022c8c639e?source=rss----5697016db665---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[constitution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[republic-day]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Karan Aggarwal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jan 2023 18:21:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-26T06:52:24.334Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Republic Day Edition :</h3><h4>Constitution as Equilibria</h4><blockquote>“However good a Constitution may be, if those who are implementing it are not good, it will prove to be bad. However, bad a Constitution may be,<br>if those implementing it are good, it will prove to be good”.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/474/0*SAv0x2sID3ITAS3Q.jpg" /></figure><p>Let’s explore how a social contract comes to emergence between a ruling body and its service providing citizens, from a pre-constitution era and how it self-enforces itself in the post-constitution era,</p><p>~ through the lens of Game Theory</p><h3>1. INTRODUCTION</h3><p>We when modelling the constitution as an equilibria try to understand it through a game where the society is diversified into two groups. The first group represents the service providing civilians while the other is the ruling body which provides security , stability , law and order in exchange for a particular share on the commodities produced by the former group.</p><p>We propose a contract between the two players where the worker or the service providing civilians put an effort <em>(e) </em>while the violent group or the ruling body takes a percentage of the goods produced <em>(q).</em></p><p>We start observing the game from a pre-constitution era to the emergence of the social contract and its stability in the post-constitution era therefore visualising the self-enforcibility of the contract.</p><h3>2. MODEL</h3><p>The game can be considered in the following way :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TUY9gSM_xzV2i-N1JNxB2A.png" /><figcaption>Extensive View of Game</figcaption></figure><p><strong>W</strong> denotes the group producing goods and service , <strong>V </strong>symbolises the violent group.</p><p>The model begins with <strong>W</strong> having the first move, <em>e </em>showing his effort varying from high<em>(h)</em> to low<em>(l). </em><strong><em>Y </em></strong>represents the goods produced and E is the extra effort needed to produce high output.</p><p>The game shifts towards the autocrat’s group <strong>V</strong>. The autocrat group now decides its share in the goods produced varying from <em>q = q</em>₀ to <em>q = 1. </em>For the share where <em>q &gt; q</em>₀ the group V must produce some violence to extract extra share which bears them additional cost of <em>k .</em></p><p>In response to the share demanded by the V , W can choose whether to revolt or not. The outcome of the revolt modelled as nature (N) has the probability of <em>p </em>for the win and in both cases the service group will have to pay extra cost <em>c </em>termed as the revolution cost. If they decide to revolt and the revolt comes out to their success then they will get the complete share of the products (Y) whereas the violent group will be robbed of the share they had earlier. On the other hand if the revolt doesn’t comes out to their will then the service group has to give group V the demanded share (q*Y). The outcome of each possibility is shown in the above diagram.</p><h3>3. BACKWARD INDUCTION</h3><p>Refer to this link to know more about <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backward_induction"><strong><em>Backward Induction</em></strong></a><strong><em> </em></strong>.</p><p>The model can be simplified using the technique of backward induction where we progress from the end towards the begin while simulating the conditions for every step.</p><h4>3.1 The revolution decision</h4><p>First we will analyse the decision for W whether to attempt a revolution or not. While analysing we will ignore <em>E </em>for our understanding.<em> </em>Assuming the probability for the success of revolt to be <em>p</em>ₑ then the payoff of group <strong>W</strong> will be</p><p>Payoff 𝓌 = <em>p</em>ₑ<em>[Y</em>ₑ<em> − c] + (1 − p</em>ₑ<em>)[(1 − q</em>ₑ<em>)Y</em>ₑ<em> − c] (Refer to the Extensive View of Game )</em></p><p>W will only choose to revolt if <strong><em>p</em>ₑ<em>q</em>ₑ<em>Y</em>ₑ<em> &gt; c </em></strong>as then the revolution will be the dominant strategy<strong><em> </em></strong>and this is called the<em> revolution condition.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qPvjPe2JFy14FdKdPnVjdQ.png" /><figcaption>Revolution Condition</figcaption></figure><h4>3.2 The exploitation decision</h4><p>Here the group V chooses whether to exploit the workers or not by raising their ask <em>(q &gt; q</em>₀<em>)</em> . From the above observation we can deduce that that the workers will revolt only if <em>q &gt; c/ p</em>ₑYₑ . Hence group V has 3 possible decisions :</p><ul><li><em>q = q</em>₀<em> </em>, they cooperate and their payoff is <em>q</em>₀.Yₑ</li><li><em>q = qₗ’</em> = <em>c/ p</em>ₑYₑ , i.e moderate exploitation that avoids revolution and thus getting payoff <em>qₑ’Yₑ − k .</em></li><li><em>q = 1, </em>signifying the maximum exploitation resulting to payoff equal to <em>(1 − pₑ)Yₑ − k</em></li></ul><p>Thus we can propose that → Given a social contract <em>(q</em>₀<em>, h)</em>, an effort choice e ∈ {h; l}, probabilities of success <em>p </em>and the<em> </em>revolution cost <em>c</em> then the optimal action of V will be :</p><ul><li><em>q = q</em>₀ if, and only if, <em>k &gt; (qₗ’ − q</em>₀<em>)Y</em>ₑ and <em>k &gt; (1 − p</em>ₑ<em> − q</em>₀<em>)Y</em>ₑ</li><li><em>q = qₗ’</em> if, and only if, <em>k &lt; (qₗ’− q</em>₀<em>)Y</em>ₑ and <em>qₗ’</em> &gt; <em>(1 − p</em>ₑ)</li><li><em>q</em> = 1 if, and only if, <em>k &lt; (1 − p</em>ₑ<em> − q</em>₀<em>)Y</em>ₑ and <em>qₗ’</em> &gt; <em>(1 − p</em>ₑ)</li></ul><h4>3.3 The effort decision</h4><p>Now we finally arrive to our first stage where group W has to make their effort decision. There can be multiple possibilities based on the effort choice made by the workers i.e {h; l} . Lets view one of the possibility :</p><ul><li><em>(e = h, qₕ = q</em>₀<em>)</em>, thus in compliance with the social contract</li><li>(e = l, <em>qₗ = qₗ</em> ‘ ), stating stable exploitation in response to low effort</li></ul><p>For this possibility to be the dominant strategy the following 4 conditions must be satisfied based on our above observations for the group V to make the choices mentioned above (<em>qₕ = q</em>₀ ; <em>qₗ</em> = <em>qₗ’</em> ) :</p><ol><li><em>k &gt; (1 − p</em>ₑ<em> − q</em>₀<em>)Y</em>ₑ</li><li><em>k &gt; (qₗ’ − q</em>₀<em>)Y</em>ₑ</li><li><em>qₗ’</em> &gt; <em>(1 − p</em>ₑ)</li><li><em>k &lt; (qₗ’ − q</em>₀<em>)Y</em>ₑ</li></ol><p>For the worker to make high effort decision the following condition must be met :</p><p>5<em>. E &lt; (1 − q</em>₀<em> )Yₕ − (1 − qₗ’ )Yₗ</em></p><h3>4. Conclusion</h3><p>For the social contract to be stable and self-enforcing we must ensure that the parameters (<em>k , c , Y, q , p ,E ) </em>must be aligned in favour of the social contract <em>(e = h, qₕ = q</em>₀<em>) </em>to be the dominant strategy .</p><p>Let us begin with the conditions for <em>qₕ = q</em>₀. The conditions (1) and (2) are more likely to be fulfilled when :</p><ul><li>Higher<em> k , pₕ ,</em> <em>Yₕ </em>and <em>q</em>₀</li><li>Lower <em>c</em></li></ul><p>Finally, we analyse condition (5), which is equivalent to <em>E &lt; (1 − q</em>₀<em> )Yₕ − (1 − qₗ’ )Yₗ </em>. This condition is more likely to be fulfilled when :</p><ul><li>Higher <em>Yₕ </em>and <em>c</em></li><li>Lower<em> E , Yₗ , pₗ </em>and<em> q</em>₀</li></ul><p>On employment of the model in real world scenarios , we observe that the parameters align in such a way that the democratic constitution emerges out as a dominating and self-enforcing force for a nation to attain stability , law and order among its citizens .</p><p><em>Bibliography</em></p><ul><li><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46459037_Constitutions_as_Equilibria_A_Game-theoretic_Approach_to_Positive_Constitutional_Economics">Approach to Positive Constitutional Economics</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3a022c8c639e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems/republic-day-edition-3a022c8c639e">Republic Day  Edition :</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems">The Stratagems</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[MichaelNew Year Party !!!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-stratagems/michaelnew-year-party-d34ef2680ec0?source=rss----5697016db665---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d34ef2680ec0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[intellectual-property]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[drinking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2023]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Karan Aggarwal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 31 Dec 2022 05:41:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-31T05:41:00.074Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Michael’s New Year Party !!!</h3><p>It is the time of the year when you will want to groove to the music with a jug of beer in your hand and dancing with your mates around. Yes it’s the new year’s eve party.</p><p>This year Michael is raising a new year’s eve party. But alas his lounge can serve to a crowd of 120 people apart from him and Michael being silly in his approach invites all of his office network summing to 200 people. Since it is a huge festive occasion so everyone wants to have fun but under some certain conditions :</p><ul><li>If <strong>more than 60%</strong> of the total invitees turn up for the party, you will have rather have more fun staying at home.</li><li>If <strong>less than 60%</strong> of the total invitees turn up for the party, you will have less fun staying at home.</li></ul><figure><img alt="People having hell lot of fun at the party !!!!" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/650/1*Y-u5wruEG9JJvUvrEM1M9A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Overcrowding has never been a problem to Michael . Wondering why ? So here in this article we will see how Game Theory helps us to understand it through an example.</p><h4>THE EL FORAL BAR :</h4><p>This problem was created by Brian Arthur in 1994 based on The El Foral Bar in New Mexico, where there is where there is regular Thursday special party and crowd wants to have fun over there unless it’s too crowded. So if more than 60% of the population go to the bar they will have more fun staying home unless they will have more fun in bar.</p><figure><img alt="The El Foral Bar,New Mexico" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*b_iMMwruozMZSyEU1jxy6g.jpeg" /><figcaption>El Foral Bar, New Mexico</figcaption></figure><p>Since the situation is symmetric for all, so a pure deterministic strategy will fail as either no one will attend the program or everyone will come making it disappointing for all.</p><p>Let the attendance of past <em>m </em>Thursdays be available to the everyone in their memory and each person is assumed to have <em>N </em>different strategies which uses the past Thursday’s footfall to decide about the upcoming Thursday. Let <em>A(t)</em> denote the footfall of the upcoming Thursday and <em>t-1,t-2,…..,t-m</em> be the timestamps of previous Thursdays in past M weeks. So a strategy S may look like :</p><p>S(t) = 100[ w₁A(t-1) + w₂A(t-2) + ……………….. + wₘA(t-m) + c]</p><p>where wᵢ is the weight given by any individual to a particular experience on that Thursday. If S(t) &lt; 60 then only that person will go to the bar otherwise he will stay at home.</p><h4>THE DOMINANT STRATEGY :</h4><p>Each person has N such different strategies and now has the task to deduce which strategy he should choose. So according to this model an error based approach is used to select the best strategy for a particular person. Thus we determine Error(S) which is the difference between the predicted model’s attendance and the actual attendance of past week Thursdays.</p><p>Error(S) = | S(t-1)-A(t-1)| + |S(t-2)-A(t-2)| + …………… + |S(t-m)-A(t-m)|</p><p>The best strategy (<em>S*</em>) will be the one with the lowest error.</p><p>Let us model these m Thursdays assuming everyone follows their dominant strategy. On taking an enough value of<em> m</em> and <em>N </em>we observe that the footfall at the El Foral Bar remains around 60%.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Rpj5iTC36ezfVhQycTyPQw.jpeg" /></figure><h4>CONCLUSION :</h4><p>Thus the El Foral model demonstrates that self-organized cooperation and “efficiency” are possible without perfect rationality, complete knowledge and deductive reasoning. Hence we understand why overcrowding was not hindering Michael from inviting more people.</p><p><em>Bibliography</em></p><ul><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Farol_Bar_problem">El Foral Bar Problem — Wikipedia</a></li><li><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QB6GmQ2AK1o&amp;ab_channel=ComplexityExplorer">The El Foral Problem — Complexity Explorer on Youtube</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d34ef2680ec0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems/michaelnew-year-party-d34ef2680ec0">MichaelNew Year Party !!!</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems">The Stratagems</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Joker: sadist or strategist?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-stratagems/joker-sadist-or-strategist-71a84f87c1e9?source=rss----5697016db665---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/71a84f87c1e9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[batman]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[the-dark-knight]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[joker]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[The Indian Game Theory Society, NSUT]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 18 Dec 2022 09:31:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-18T09:31:58.347Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Joker: Sadist or Strategist?</h3><p><em>By </em><a href="https://medium.com/@mahijee1603"><em>Manan Hingorani</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://medium.com/@devanshisharma_84157"><em>Devanshi Sharma</em></a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*KK5_iwAZqaQ16V5L.jpeg" /><figcaption>Heath Ledger as Joker in ‘The Dark Knight’ by Cristopher Nolan</figcaption></figure><p>Director Christopher Nolan crafted one of the best superhero series of all time with <em>The Dark Knight</em> trilogy, which introduced us to one of the most complex villains yet- the Joker.</p><p>Ledger’s Joker is unlike any other version- alternately psychotic and cunning, chaotic, but mentally always in control.</p><p>He is a great mastermind, aptly described by Bruce Wayne’s loyal friend Alfred as a character who “just wants to watch the world burn”. But is the Joker actually a crazy criminal, but a great mastermind?</p><p>In this article, we will look at some scenes from ‘The Dark Knight’ and see what game theory can tell us about the villain and his motivations.</p><h3>1. The Bank Robbery</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*ibL9VaY0_wGbaTI8.jpeg" /><figcaption>The Bank Robbery</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vetKTtM7YyU">It’s<strong><em> The Dark Knight</em></strong><em>‘</em>s opening scene</a>: five robbers in clown masks embark on an elaborate bank heist, put on the job by some weird guy in a clown mask. Something unexpected happens: one by one, they turn on each other believing that the lesser number of them left, the more money they’ll get.</p><p>Now, through this scene, we understand an important concept of game theory: <strong>Nash equilibrium</strong>. Nash equilibrium in game theory is a situation in which a player will continue with their chosen strategy, having no incentive to deviate from it, after taking into consideration the opponent’s strategy.</p><p>In this scene, the main strategy of all the robbers was to kill each other to get the maximum share. Here, all of them are assumed to be optimal robbers, that is, all of them are driven by greed and are ready to kill each other if offered more money. Hence, here a Nash equilibrium was obtained where all of them had to kill each other, thus leaving them worse off than if they had cooperated</p><p>At this point in time, we can safely design a payoff matrix:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/582/1*YgTjGCVi_9TPHaQ3jQ7Crw.png" /></figure><p>Considering a two-robber (R1, R2) situation- there are two options available to each of them- to kill the other one or to not kill. The worst case (-1,-1) is what occurred in this particular scene (both die), with (1,1) being the best-case scenario where both robbers come out alive.</p><p>Game theory works so well with Joker’s schemes because self-interest is a basic assumption of game theory, and most of his schemes are based on basic human nature- most people are self-interested, and they think about themselves before thinking of others.</p><p>This bank robbery scene is similar to a very famous game theory riddle known as <strong>The Pirate Game</strong>. Check it out in References for a better understanding of the Nash equilibrium!</p><h3>2. Joker’s Negotiation</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*TuE1nw1OGCfoZ0_X.png" /><figcaption>Joker negotiating with the mob</figcaption></figure><p>Now, this is a very interesting scene through which we will understand another important concept of game theory: <strong>negotiation</strong>.</p><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3oOldViIgY">The scene is as follows</a>: There is a meeting where mob leaders are deciding how to preserve their money. As the gang leaders debate their next step, the Joker sneaks in and offers his services- killing Batman in exchange for half their money. While the robbers aren’t very receptive to taking him seriously, they‘re desperate enough to agree to hear his offer.</p><p>The word <em>desperate</em> is very important and plays a crucial role in the bargaining process. The game theory concept used here is based on the fact that for a despairing person, ‘something is better than nothing’, and the negotiator urges them on saying “make this deal before it’s too late”.</p><p>The mob (and Joker) knows that if they don’t agree to his offer, then Batman would eventually find their money and they would be left with nothing, so killing him is necessary, even if they have to forgo half of their total bankroll in exchange for it.</p><p>This scene is similar to the <strong>Shrinking Pie Riddle </strong>in game theory (see references).</p><h3>INTERMISSION: On Motivation</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/474/0*ziO98QeT7hKerK_j" /><figcaption>The Joker burning the money</figcaption></figure><p>It’s always “the Joker did this, the Joker did that”, but never <em>why </em>he’s doing it- after all, for a lunatic wearing awful clown makeup, he sure loves to think.</p><p>His actions are contradictory: why would someone go to such lengths to rob a bank, work out a strategy to best negotiate for even more money, and then burn said bank? It begs the question: why exactly is he doing anything that he does? <br>the short answer is: he likes the games.</p><p>He gets off the thrill of engaging Batman in a psychological game he didn’t ask for, and thrives off making little puzzles for his own amusement that he knows are sure to bring chaos; that’s why his actions are almost impossible to guess ahead of time.</p><p>In a way, Batman was the reason Joker was born. <em>Batman created Joker.</em> Isn’t that thought scary, but incredible?</p><p>Thus, I offer an analysis: he isn’t some crazy nihilist, but crafty in a way others cannot understand. Halfway through the movie when Batman finally manages to arrest him, he never once thinks that the Joker might have let himself get arrested <em>on purpose.</em></p><p>And here lies the crux of game theory- making strategies to out best someone is great and all, but it’s equally important to think of what they might do- especially when dealing with someone as sly as the Joker, who plays games of chance and probability making sure that the odds are always rigged in his favor.</p><h3>3. The Two Boats</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*lRIzNVQKEgE8Umbh.jpg" /><figcaption>The Two Boats</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K4GAQtGtd_0">The Joker’s final game</a> is undoubtedly one of the most memorable scenes in the movie- there are two ships, one with criminals and the other with civilians, and both are given a button that can blow up the other ship up.</p><p>From a third-person point of view, it’s easy to figure out: either side is given a chance to kill the others and save themselves before Joker kills them both. It strongly favors the Joker’s personal philosophy about how altruism doesn’t exist and that everyone acts for their own interest, he’s had his life to prove it.</p><p>The dominant strategy is to push the button and save yourselves —</p><blockquote>“Their morals, their code — it’s a bad joke. You’ll see. I’ll show you — when the chips are down, these civilized people, they’ll eat each other. See, I’m not a monster. I’m just ahead of the curve.”</blockquote><p>— HOWEVER. Joker, for all his smart strategies and games, <em>fails </em>to consider human conscience. He doesn’t count on both boats to have enough ethical strength to choose the passive strategy (doing nothing, and letting themselves be killed), and is thus caught by Batman before he can let the explosives off.</p><p>This is reminiscent of the famous <strong>Trolley Problem: </strong>there’s a runaway trolley barreling down railway tracks, onto which 5 people are tied. Their deaths can be prevented if one is to pull a lever that will deviate the course of the trolley onto another track only having one person tied to it. The question is: will you pull the lever?<br>In this case too the dominant strategy is to pull the lever and save 5 people (the human brain is receptive to numbers) and let one die, but everyone chooses the passive strategy in order to preserve themselves of guilt because of murder.</p><p>The most interesting thing to note in these instances is that the standard game theory model fails<em>. </em>Joker, for the first time since the movie (and his life), is let down by game theory. The principles he’d learned of humans being selfish- which is essentially the most basic assumption of game theory- are discredited, and credits roll.</p><p>We hope that the next time you sit down to watch <em>The Dark Knight</em>, you’ll remember Joker not just as a nihilist psychopath, but also as a stellar game theory connoisseur.</p><p>— —</p><p>References:</p><ol><li>The Pirate Game is best understood through <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mc6VA7Q1vXQ">this</a> TED-Ed video.</li><li>For The Shrinking Pie Riddle, refer <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01756293">article</a>: Livne, Z. Bargaining over the division of a shrinking pie: An axiomatic approach. <em>Int J Game Theory</em> <strong>16</strong>, 223–242 (1987).</li><li>For the Trolley Problem, refer to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yg16u_bzjPE">this video</a> by TED-Ed. For more variations of the same problem, see <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/would-you-kill-one-person-to-save-five-4045377">this</a> article.</li><li>For a more in-depth analysis of the first scene, refer to <a href="https://mindyourdecisions.com/blog/2008/08/19/game-theory-in-the-dark-knight-a-critical-review-of-the-opening-scene-spoilers/">this article</a> by Presh Talwalkar.</li><li>For more information about Payoff Matrix, refer to <a href="http://mccollegeonline.co.in/attendence/classnotes/files/1585848452.pdf">this article</a>.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=71a84f87c1e9" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems/joker-sadist-or-strategist-71a84f87c1e9">Joker: sadist or strategist?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems">The Stratagems</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tinder Is A Game That You All Have Been Playing Wrong!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-stratagems/tinder-is-a-game-that-you-all-have-been-playing-wrong-692aec53e8f5?source=rss----5697016db665---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/692aec53e8f5</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Paarth Chhabra]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Feb 2022 15:49:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-14T16:00:15.299Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An old saying goes <em>“Right love often comes unexpectedly and in a natural way, to stay”</em>, but cut short to 2022 where technology has made Gen Z’s life so fast owing to the phrase <em>“Love is just a swipe away”</em>. And with Valentine’s day around the corner, the fact is even more true and visible.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/491/1*ArTkFa_G744RibSH4iNxqA.png" /></figure><p>Whether seeking the right person or chasing and exploring different personalities to find love is a separate discussion for some other day, let’s take a look at the game theory aspect of the latter for now. Especially with the onset of dating applications like Tinder, Bumble, and many others, it’s easier to analyze what your outlook on finding love is like based on the successful matches you get- yes, based on how many people like you back.</p><p>For simplicity, let’s analyze the most popular dating app. Any guesses? Right, Tinder it is! According to Statista, 76% of all US Tinder users in 2020 were male while the rest were either female or non-binary. Although popular and enormously hyped, people using the platform for the longest time have been complaining about the low match rates and being unsatisfactory. A 2016 study by the Queen Mary University of London related to the same found that it’s an actual issue.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/650/0*P4YbU3uM8LpfOJzz" /></figure><p>Let’s take a closer look at the analytics that the study found. The success rate for men to get a match is 0.6% compared to 10.5% for women. Now the numbers might vary with the demographics but the general trend suggests that people who spam their swipes get a low number of matches, and those who are selective get a decent amount of matches, but it includes those too who spammed which is not what they intend for.</p><p>We can think of the situation as a game, with the players being a man and a woman (say), and their strategies are either to be selective or spam the suggestions. Let’s try to construct a payoff table with the facts we have for an ideal case, where women and men participate equally in the game-</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*pliGy2z2BzqiHfhF" /></figure><p>The number in red is the best response for each participant. The best-case scenario is that both genders are selective, as this ensures that they are matched with someone interested in them. The payoffs for such a case are 8 for both the players. If both the genders spam matches, everyone will wind up with many undesirable matches, defeating the purpose of Tinder and resulting in a low payoff (4 here for both). If one gender is selective and the other spams, the selective person is happy because they obtain a good number of matches and feel validated (another reason why so many people use Tinder!), whereas the spammers are dissatisfied since they don’t get many matches. Both the genders will prefer to be selective in this game because it pays off more than spamming, regardless of what the other person does. As a result, the overall return in this game is maximized and we observe a nash equilibrium.</p><p>NOTE : This askew matrix is due to the population difference between genders. And thus the findings.</p><p>Now it’s obviously important to analyze the payoffs for a more realistic case. According to the same research and data, men are more likely to spam those right swipes owing to the lower match rates. When both people are selective, the payoff for the man is now 2, because even if a single man is selective, it won’t affect the reality that tens of thousands of other men are still spamming, and thus being selective won’t earn you many matches. On the other hand, the best payoffs for a woman are observed when she is selective. So now the best payoff for a man, in this case, is 5. As a result, the woman is picky, while the men spam.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_ropaGmRdmYfKWHu" /><figcaption>Payoff are not to scale. (For a rough idea only.)</figcaption></figure><p>One can also infer from the payoff table above that a woman swiping selectively is also an example of a dominant strategy, since the best payoffs are expected when she is picky with her choices. A dominant strategy is an optimal move for a player, regardless of how the others act. Consequently, the dominated strategy can be related to the male counterpart spamming the suggestions, as it is clearly observed that the payoffs are lower when the woman is selective, but the man spams.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/293/1*WSrN-Y2RSN25TFfwyiLGLQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>If only everyone on Tinder became more selective and returned to the initial game, which is actually our desired case, the total payoff would be higher for both the players. But the ratio of selective to spamming men and women is quite low currently and those who take the first way to find love are overshadowed by those going the other way. Maybe a small change here and there in the Tinder algorithm and we can see the right partners matching with each other!</p><p><strong>Acknowledgments and Sources</strong></p><ul><li>Statista</li><li>Queen Mary University of London</li><li>Blogs.cornell.edu</li><li>Adelaide Economics Club</li><li>Bustle</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=692aec53e8f5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems/tinder-is-a-game-that-you-all-have-been-playing-wrong-692aec53e8f5">Tinder Is A Game That You All Have Been Playing Wrong!</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems">The Stratagems</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How James Bond saved Spider-Man !]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-stratagems/how-james-bond-saved-spider-man-a013021b39ef?source=rss----5697016db665---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a013021b39ef</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sony-pictures]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[james-bond]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tobey-maguire]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[spider-man]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Shubham Kumar]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 08 Jan 2022 15:10:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-08T15:11:32.564Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>How James Bond Saved Spider-Man !</h3><p>Everyone loves the friendly neighbourhood Spiderman, especially movie studios. Spiderman has always mattered to the big studio houses like SONY, MARVEL, DISNEY… but why did the rights to the character gain so much hype coming down the years?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*ndBt-V6PazvyjNnPrpTLAQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Selling movie rights to indie production houses was the understood gimmick in the seventies and eighties, Marvel also laid in the game of selling the rights of Spiderman to Cannon films. From then the war between directors, producers rift occurred due to multiple storyline narratives. Even when the script was finalized, budget became the main issue. Cannon Films CEO at that time, Golan, left the company (forming 21st Century) Spiderman rights with him before he sold TV rights to Viacom and Columbia Pictures(SONY). 21st Century backed by MARVEL made a new agreement with Carolco Pictures. Carolco bought some rights to Spiderman and hired James Cameron to direct the movie. Later on, a dispute occurred yet again between James and Golan regarding the rights which downsized 21st Century and Marvel in a legal suit leading to bankruptcy.</p><p>Following the bankruptcy, <strong>MGM</strong> purchased the film catalogue and property of 21st Century Fox, such as the copyright to James Cameron’s Spider-Man. In an unexpected turn of events, <strong>MGM</strong> CEO John Calley moved over to Columbia Pictures. With a vested stake in Columbia’s success, he needed to find a method to persuade <strong>MGM</strong> to capitulate on the legitimacy of the Spider-Man rights. Calley declared, in a flash of inspiration, that Columbia will make an alternative 007 series depending on the material Calley had purchased for Columbia. Both firms suddenly faced competing initiatives that might jeopardise their long-term viability. The story’s results might be straightforward, but however, their reasoning isn’t as you may believe.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/879/1*B1rZRYQ7M1FwcVb1fl9B3g.png" /><figcaption>The values are in million USD$</figcaption></figure><p>Consider the given payoff matrix, it is based on assumptions, valuations of the production houses, data of their previous projects, and the market value of these projects at those time. It is not completely accurate but rounded off to the nearest realistic value.</p><p>Nash equilibrium, described as “a notion within game theory where the ideal conclusion of a game is where there is no reason to stray from the starting strategy,” might be used to forecast the result of such a circumstance. In this situation, the Nash equilibrium would be at (200,200), because if one of the party tries to deviate from their position, it would lead to their loss only and they don’t have any incentive to do so. But the actual outcome of this situation isn’t same as predicted by the Nash equilibrium and that’s because this production houses aren’t newbie in their field, they have played this game before several times and are accustomed to such situations.</p><p>The actual outcome can be explained through Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, “where two players which have played the game before and they remember previous actions of their opponent and change their strategy accordingly”. Like in this situation, both the companies knew, that if they produced their own project, facing no direct competition, they both have a very high chance of earning high profits, rather than both of them producing their rival project movie in addition to their own, which might also have resulted in empty theatres in the worst case scenario. This is a perfect example of Peace-War game which is a variation of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. According to the Peace-War game model, peace makers become richer over time because it was clear that making war had greater costs than initially anticipated. Therefore, keeping this in mind, a deal was finalised where, MGM could continue to release James Bond pictures without the threat of a new Thunderball-based competitor, while Columbia acquired exclusive Spider-Man rights.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*Wr1e2h_GXFFx35rtIOcpew.png" /></figure><p>While we don’t have all of the details of these negotiations, we do know the reasoning behind them now, how they took place. Following that, Columbia Pictures purchased all of the rights to all previously written scripts, Sam Raimi was hired as director, and Spiderman was put into production. And that’s how James Bond rescued the day, bringing us Spider-Man fans, our own Spider-Verse!</p><blockquote>Bibliography</blockquote><ul><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_war_game">Peace war game - Wikipedia</a></li><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spider-Man_(2002_film)">Spider-Man (2002 film) - Wikipedia</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a013021b39ef" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems/how-james-bond-saved-spider-man-a013021b39ef">How James Bond saved Spider-Man !</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems">The Stratagems</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[One Match Two Losers]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-stratagems/one-match-two-losers-2a69367a6bb2?source=rss----5697016db665---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2a69367a6bb2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[strategic-planning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[planning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intresting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mukul Gupta]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Jan 2022 18:23:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-04T18:23:05.369Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Science of Rule-Making</h3><p><strong>Mechanism Design</strong> Theory helps us understand how to design systems with strategic participants that have good performance guarantees. Let us understand it’s importance with a cautionary tale.</p><h4>Once Upon A Time — Women’s Badminton in 2012 Olympics</h4><p>In 2012, the Olympics were held in London. One of the biggest scandals of the event concerned, of all sports, women’s badminton. The scandal did not involve any failed drug tests, but rather a failed tournament design that did not carefully consider <em>incentives</em>.</p><p>The tournament design that was used is familiar from World Cup soccer. There are four groups (A, B, C, D) of four teams each. The tournament has two phases. In the first <strong>round-robin</strong> phase, each team plays the other three teams in its group, and does not play teams in other groups. The top two teams from each group advance to the second phase, the bottom two teams from each group are eliminated. In the second phase, the remaining eight teams play a standard <strong>knockout</strong> tournament (as in tennis, for example): there are four quarterfinals (with the losers eliminated), then two semi-finals (with the losers playing an extra match to decide the bronze model), and then the final (the winner gets the gold, the loser the silver).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*p3gxY-IPVWF6HbzR8Ze-Hw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Qualified Teams</figcaption></figure><p>The incentives of participants and of the Olympics committee (and fans) are not necessarily aligned in such a tournament. What does a team want? To get as good a medal as possible, of course. What does the Olympics committee want? They didn’t seem to think carefully about this question, but in hindsight it’s clear that they want every team to try their best to win every match. Why, you ask, would a team ever want to lose a match? Indeed, in the second <strong>knockout</strong> phase of the tournament, where losing leads to instant elimination, it’s obvious that winning is better than losing.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/741/1*AdBUd_scDH-9qbDGg7d7eg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Knock-Out Phase</figcaption></figure><p>To understand the incentive issues, we need to explain how the eight winners from the round-robin phase are paired up in the quarterfinals. The team with the best record from group A plays the second-best team from group C in the first quarterfinal; similarly with the best team from group C and the second-best time from group A in the third quarterfinal; and similarly with the top two teams from groups B and D in the second and fourth quarterfinals. The dominoes started to fall when, on the last day of round-robin competition, there was a shocking upset: the Danish team of <strong>Pedersen and Juhl (PJ)</strong> beat the Chinese team of <strong>Qing and Yunlei (QY)</strong>, and as a result <strong>PJ</strong> won group D with <strong>QY</strong> coming in second (so both teams advanced to the knockout round).</p><p>The controversial match involved another team from China, <strong>Xiaoli and Yang (XY)</strong>, and the South Korean team of <strong>Kyung-eun and Ha-na (KH)</strong>. Both teams had a 2–0 record in group A play. Thus, both were headed for the knockout stage, with the winner and loser of this match the top and second-best team from the group, respectively. Here was the issue: the group-A winner would meet the fearsome <strong>QY</strong> team (which came in only second in group D) in the semi-finals of the knockout tournament (where a loss means a bronze medal at best), while the second-best team in group-A would not have to face <strong>QY</strong> until the final (where a silver medal is guaranteed). Both the <strong>XY</strong> and <strong>KH</strong> teams found the difference between these two scenarios significant enough to try to <em>deliberately lose the match</em>. This unappealing spectacle led to scandal, derision, and, ultimately, the <strong>disqualification</strong> of the <strong>XY</strong> and <strong>KH</strong> teams.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/336/1*65nMNYDh6E30tcVsCuPtQg.jpeg" /><figcaption>One Match Two Losers</figcaption></figure><p>The point is that, in systems with strategic participants, <em>the rules matter</em>. Poorly designed systems suffer from unexpected and undesirable results. The burden lies on the system designer to anticipate strategic behavior, not on the participants to behave against their own interests. Can we blame the badminton players for acting to maximize their medal placement? To quote Hartline and Kleinberg:</p><blockquote>“The next time we bemoan people exploiting loopholes to subvert the intent of the rule makers, instead of asking ‘What’s wrong with these people?’ let’s instead ask, ‘What’s wrong with the rules?’ and then adopt a scientifically principled approach to fixing them.”</blockquote><p>There is a well-developed science of rule-making, the field of <em>mechanism design</em>. The study of mechanism design looks at situations where a planner (mechanism designer) needs to design a mechanism where strategic agents can interact. The interactions of agents result in some outcome. While there are several possible ways to design the rules of the mechanism, the planner has a particular objective in mind. For example, the objective can be utilitarian (maximization of the total utility of agents) or maximization of his own utility or some fairness objective. Depending on the objective, the mechanism needs to be designed in a manner such that when strategic agents interact, the resulting outcome gives the desired objective.</p><blockquote><strong>Bibliography</strong></blockquote><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Badminton_at_the_2012_Summer_Olympics_%E2%80%93_Women%27s_doubles">Badminton at the 2012 Summer Olympics - Women&#39;s doubles - Wikipedia</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2a69367a6bb2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems/one-match-two-losers-2a69367a6bb2">One Match Two Losers</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems">The Stratagems</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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