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        <title><![CDATA[The Strategic Brief - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Opinion at the intersection of defense policy, global conflict, and security strategy. From military operations to economic sanctions, we explore how global power plays shape security and foreign policy, and what that means for decision-makers, analysts, and engaged citizens. - Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief?source=rss----2d2623a64713---4</link>
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            <title>The Strategic Brief - Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Critical Minerals, Insurgency, and the Power of Geography]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/critical-minerals-insurgency-and-the-power-of-geography-a78a12dfbe30?source=rss----2d2623a64713---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[balochistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[insurgency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[critical-minerals]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Costello]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Feb 2026 01:49:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-12T01:49:00.702Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qkGJFXRgy8FpX_wCV9az5g.jpeg" /></figure><p>I am starting to see a problem in the race for critical minerals. AI expansion increases demand for copper, lithium, and rare earths while raising pressure on energy infrastructure. Washington wants supply chains that bypass China. Investors want stability. Armed groups want relevance. Geography brings them together.</p><p>At the end of 2025, the United States moved to finance the Reko Diq project in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. The Export Import Bank approved 1.25 billion dollars for the project. The deal fits a broader push to dilute Beijing’s dominance across the materials that feed everything from data centers to military weapons.</p><p>Balochistan is already home to a long running insurgency. Pakistan’s poorest province has faced decades-long violence and separatist attacks by ethnic Baloch seeking greater autonomy and a larger share of the area’s natural resources. The latest attacks killed dozens of civilians and security personnel. The banned Balochistan Liberation Army claimed responsibility. Authorities responded with sweeping security restrictions. Control has returned on paper. Risk is still very much reality.</p><p>You should frame these attacks as a terrorist strategy. Armed groups understand that mining projects depend on more than ore. They require roads, power, insurance, foreign specialists, and predictable timelines. Break one link and financial models unravel. When that happens, leverage shifts.</p><p>These groups do not need to win on the battlefield. They need the capacity to interrupt.</p><p>We have seen this pattern before.</p><p>The Taliban targeted roads, contractors, and energy infrastructure across Afghanistan. NATO could defend population centers, yet convoy risk inflated costs and delayed work. Over time, uncertainty discouraged investment and reinforced dependence on foreign aid. Persistent harassment produced strategic effects.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q2rruQjKq1WIANdweZ8BNQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><strong>An Islamic State fighter inside the Baiji oil refinery complex.</strong></figcaption></figure><p>ISIS applied the same logic to energy. By capturing fields and facilities such as Baiji, the organization gained revenue and bargaining power. The destruction of cultural sites amplified psychological and economic damage. Even after territorial defeat, the threat of sabotage complicated reconstruction. Control of ground translated into influence.</p><p>Al Shabaab refined this approach in Somalia. The terrorist organization extracts an estimated 100 million dollars annually through taxation and coercion, a sum that rivals the Somali federal government’s revenue base. Outside its territory, high profile attacks signal that authorities cannot guarantee safe trade. The message is clear. You cannot move goods without us.</p><p>The Houthis in Yemen are perhaps the best example demonstrating how limited capability can yield global influence. By threatening traffic through the Red Sea, they forced shipping firms to reroute and drew multinational naval deployments. War risk premiums more than doubled within days. Egypt reported billions in revenue losses. A regional actor became a variable in international trade.</p><p>Balochistan fits the template.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/670/1*6GsapPLGYL1jpTx8wVdt3Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Bystanders walking past a burnt vehicle as others collect recyclables along a road after a BLA attack.</figcaption></figure><p>The BLA regularly targets Pakistani security forces and has attacked civilians, including Chinese nationals, who are among thousands working on various projects in the province.</p><p>Nushki sits at the gateway to Chagai, the center of Pakistan’s mineral future. Demonstrating reach there signals that access is negotiable.</p><p>This creates an uncomfortable tradeoff for the riches in the ground.</p><p>China controls roughly 90 percent of rare earth refining and a majority of processing capacity across several other critical inputs. Dependence creates vulnerability. Yet shifting extraction of these minerals toward fragile regions replaces one risk with another. Instead of relying on Beijing’s export policy, states rely on Islamabad’s ability to secure vast territory under increasing insurgent pressure.</p><p>You can change the supplier. You cannot escape the risk.</p><p>When armed groups disrupt projects tied to global competition, audiences multiply. They challenged Islamabad’s authority. They are warning Washington. They are testing Beijing.</p><p>Violence becomes a language everyone understands.</p><p>So what can be done?</p><p>Policy responses often default to hard security. Protection matters, but durability usually rests elsewhere. Transit routes require sustained control. Agreements must survive leadership change. Local communities must see benefits. Exclusion feeds terrorist recruitment far faster than any propaganda campaign.</p><p>Critical minerals sit at the center of industrial policy, defense planning, and energy transition. Governments therefore push for speed. Speed through contested territory invites resistance.</p><p>The BLA cannot defeat Pakistan in conventional war. They can however influence whether billions of dollars arrive on schedule. That influence alone grants them strategic weight far beyond their numbers.</p><p>As events unfold, we need to watch more than casualty figures. Track insurance rates, contractor withdrawals, and revised completion dates. Those indicators often reveal more about success or failure.</p><p>One thing is for sure, geography still rules.</p><p>Actors who can interrupt flows often matter as much as the minerals under their feet.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a78a12dfbe30" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/critical-minerals-insurgency-and-the-power-of-geography-a78a12dfbe30">Critical Minerals, Insurgency, and the Power of Geography</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief">The Strategic Brief</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[When the Last Plane Leaves Syria]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/when-the-last-plane-leaves-syria-106fd4f6cf97?source=rss----2d2623a64713---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kurds]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syrian-civil-war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Costello]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2026 00:55:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-29T01:00:44.958Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2P1mu-HDIbdoPDcpYEzF-A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Members of the Syrian security forces stand guard outside al-Aqtan prison, where some Islamic State detainees are held, in Raqqa, Syria January 23, 2026. (Reuters/Karam al-Masri)</figcaption></figure><p>Over the past few weeks, while international attention has been fixed on Venezuela, Iran, and Greenland, dramatic shifts have been unfolding in Syria. Once again, the prospect of a U.S. military withdrawal raises a familiar and unsettling question: what becomes of America’s partners once the last soldier boards the C-17?</p><p>For Syria’s Kurdish population, and for the country’s wider minority communities, this question is not theoretical. It is sudden, significant, and shaped by a long memory of alliances formed under pressure and dissolved once the pressure subsides.</p><p>Since the resignation of Bashar al-Assad in late 2024, Syria has entered a new and deeply fragile phase. An interim government has been declared, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). In March 2025, that government published a constitutional declaration outlining the framework of a post-Assad Syrian state. HTS, alongside the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), played a decisive role in the final offensive against regime forces that culminated in the capture of Damascus in December 2024. For the first time in over a decade, Syria is no longer defined by a single autocratic ruler, but whether it will escape the gravitational pull of authoritarian consolidation remains unclear.</p><p>For the United States, this transition presents a strategic crossroads. Since President Barack Obama authorized U.S. troop deployments to Syria in 2014, Washington’s most effective local partner was not a state, but a force: the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Formed during the rise of ISIS, the SDF, predominantly Kurdish, became the backbone of the campaign that dismantled the ruthless caliphate. The partnership was one forged out of necessity rather than shared vision. That distinction matters, because pragmatic alliances are often the easiest to abandon once the immediate threat subsides.</p><p>Syrian Kurdish communities have deep historical roots in Damascus, Afrin, and Aleppo. Much of the modern Kurdish population descends from refugees fleeing persecution in Turkey in the early twentieth century, many of whom settled in the Jazira region under French Mandate rule. Independence did not bring security. Instead, successive Syrian governments subjected Kurds to systemic discrimination, most notoriously through the 1962 census that rendered tens of thousands stateless. Political exclusion, economic marginalization, and cultural repression defined Kurdish life in Syria for decades.</p><p>The collapse of central authority after 2011 created space for a different experiment. Inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the Syrian civil war initially saw Kurdish actors pursue cautious neutrality before consolidating territorial control and establishing the autonomous governance project known as Rojava. Flawed, contested, and imperfect, it nonetheless represented a rare attempt at decentralized governance in a region long dominated by coercive authoritarianism. Crucially, that experiment survived in large part because it was shielded by the U.S.-led coalition.</p><p>That shield is now beginning to wear down.</p><p>The SDF has been blamed for dragging its feet in negotiations over what integration into a centralized Syrian state would look like under Sharaa’s interim government and the reconstituted Syrian military. At the same time, the SDF has steadily lost ground, legitimacy, and local alliances. Several Arab tribes in northeastern Syria have shifted allegiance toward Damascus, eroding the SDF’s authority and further isolating Kurdish leadership. What once appeared to be a durable governing partner now looks increasingly like a transitional force without a clear political future.</p><p>This erosion carries serious consequences beyond Kurdish autonomy. The SDF has been responsible for securing detention camps and prisons holding thousands of ISIS fighters and affiliates. The decimation of SDF capacity raises immediate concerns about the long-term containment of ISIS, a threat that has been largely neglected by the international community as attention shifts toward Syria’s political transition. Prison security is not a blasé issue; it is one of the few remaining barriers preventing ISIS from regrouping as a coherent insurgent force.</p><p>Into this vacuum steps Ahmed al-Sharaa. Since its split from al-Qaeda, HTS has repositioned itself as a nationalist movement, inward-facing and focused on governing territory rather than exporting jihad. It has not conducted foreign terrorist attacks, nor issued threats beyond Syria’s borders. Its singular objective was the removal of Bashar al-Assad. That objective has now been achieved.</p><p>This is precisely where concern deepens.</p><p>Movements forged in opposition often struggle once the unifying enemy disappears. Wartime restraint does not automatically translate into post-war pluralism. With Assad gone, Syria’s minorities may find that their strategic value has diminished. Kurds, Alawites, Druze, and Christians face different but overlapping vulnerabilities in a political landscape that no longer requires their cooperation.</p><p>Christians initially experienced modest improvements under HTS administration: improved security, the removal of foreign fighters from their neighborhoods, and the restoration of limited local judicial authority. Yet these gains were constrained. Politically, Christians remained excluded from meaningful representation in the General Shura Council and instead managed through a Directorate of Minority Affairs not led by minorities themselves. This was an arrangement that emphasized oversight rather than inclusion.</p><p>The Alawite community faces a different set of insecurities. The dismantling of state institutions has stripped many Alawites of employment and communal protection. Widespread perceptions of collective guilt, coupled with demographic vulnerability and predatory security actors, have left the community exposed and deeply anxious about its future.</p><p>Druze concerns have now entered the regional spotlight. In March 2025, Israel’s defense ministry announced preparations to defend a Druze settlement near Damascus, citing threats from Syrian forces. This development illustrates how quickly minority protection can become a geopolitical warning light and how easily Syria’s internal fractures can trigger regional escalation.</p><p>For the Kurds, however, the fear is more specific and more familiar. There is deep distrust that once again they will be shafted by an international partner eager to normalize relations with a centralized Syrian state. The United States has historically preferred state-to-state engagement rather than reliance on non-state proxies. With a new interim government in Damascus, that preference is reasserting itself. The emergence of a recognizable Syrian authority may help explain why the SDF now appears to have been quietly deprioritized.</p><p>From a narrow diplomatic perspective, this logic is understandable. From a strategic and moral perspective, it is unthinkable.</p><p>If the United States withdraws in 2026, the question is not simply whether Sharaa will govern differently than Assad. It is whether Syria’s new rulers will resist the structural temptations that have defined the country for decades: centralized power, security-first governance, and the marginalization of inconvenient communities.</p><p>Beyond Syria, the regional context only amplifies these risks. Lebanon remains fragile. Iraq and Yemen continue to strain under militia politics and external pressure. The Israel–Gaza conflict reverberates across every regional fault line. When multiple pressure points collide, instability rarely remains contained.</p><p>Is another Arab Spring possible? Perhaps. But the more relevant question is whether the international community has learned anything from the last one.</p><p>For Syria’s minorities, the greatest danger is not immediate repression, it is being labeled as irrelevant. Being promised protection is one thing; having enforceable guarantees, political representation, and tangible security is another. History suggests that when attention fades, minorities are the first to pay the price.</p><p>Ahmed al-Sharaa may be all Syria has for now. If his government collapses or hardens into another exclusionary regime, the country faces an even more perilous future. That reality should not excuse abandonment. It should sharpen accountability.</p><p>The United States must decide whether it wants to be remembered as a partner that shared victory, or one that walked away when the costs of peace became inconvenient. The fate of Syria’s Kurds and minorities will be an early indicator of what kind of state emerges from the rubble.</p><p>And whether promises made during war will survive once the last American plane leaves the runway.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=106fd4f6cf97" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/when-the-last-plane-leaves-syria-106fd4f6cf97">When the Last Plane Leaves Syria</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief">The Strategic Brief</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Don’t Get Bored with the Basics of Foreign Policy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/dont-get-bored-with-the-basics-of-foreign-policy-61b8176ad5a4?source=rss----2d2623a64713---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/61b8176ad5a4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[national-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trump-administration]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Costello]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Aug 2025 00:53:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-05T00:52:55.456Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*xZ24_5rIKxAx64XhBuzBMQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>As Donald Trump reshapes U.S. diplomacy in his second term, understanding the foundational principles of foreign policy is more important than ever.</p><p>Here’s what they are, and what’s at risk.</p><h3>The Foundations of U.S. Foreign Policy</h3><p>Foreign policy is how the United States manages its relationships with other countries. The basics are not glamorous, but they are vital. These foundations have remained fairly consistent since the end of World War II:</p><ul><li><strong>Alliances</strong>: Maintaining NATO and regional alliances like those with Japan, South Korea, and Australia.</li><li><strong>Deterrence and Defense</strong>: Keeping adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran in check through military readiness, economic sanctions, and international coalitions.</li><li><strong>Trade Policy</strong>: Using trade agreements to project economic power and influence global standards.</li><li><strong>Human Rights</strong>: Supporting democratic institutions abroad, either through diplomacy or soft power tools like foreign aid and cultural exchange.</li><li><strong>Institutional Leadership</strong>: Leading and sustaining international institutions like the UN, WTO, and IMF to foster stability and cooperation.</li></ul><p>These elements work in tandem to keep the U.S. safe, economically strong, and diplomatically relevant. Foreign policy can’t rely on a single moment.</p><p>Like any long lasting relationship, it needs to have a disciplined system of constant engagement.</p><h3>The 2025 Approach: Disruption</h3><p>Since returning to office, Donald Trump has leaned hard into his familiar “America First” doctrine, but with fewer institutional guardrails than before.</p><ul><li><strong>NATO Uncertainty</strong>: Trump’s constant demands for increased European defense spending, while not entirely misplaced, have come with renewed threats to pull out of NATO altogether.</li><li><strong>Transactional Diplomacy</strong>: Trump has resumed bilateral dealings that undercut multilateral commitments. These include the recent revisiting of trade tariffs on EU goods to signaling a possible withdrawal from the World Trade Organization.</li><li><strong>China and Taiwan</strong>: Trump has adopted a sharper tone against China while signaling unpredictable positions on Taiwan. The ambiguity ultimately serves no one well.</li><li><strong>Middle East Volatility</strong>: His open support for Israel remains, but diplomatic engagement with Arab partners has thinned. The Iran question, once precariously balanced under the JCPOA, is again an area of strategic silence or knee jerk escalations.</li></ul><p>Trump’s approach is a rejection of continuity. He favors optics over orchestration.</p><h3>Why the Basics Matter More Than Ever</h3><p>Foreign policy isn’t just made for crisis headlines to roll across CNN each morning. I believe foreign policy is the foundation of U.S. leadership. It is built on routine diplomacy, stable partnerships, and mature deterrence. The result should be an area of bipartisan agreement, supporting collaboration between parties at home and allies abroad. These decisions don’t always make the front page, but they shape the world more deeply than any tweet or sound bite.</p><p>When you abandon these basics, adversaries’ ears perk up. They test boundaries. Allies hedge their bets in the background. The void left by a distracted U.S. can be quickly filled by actors like North Korea, who has reportedly sent supplies and troops to help bolster Russian forces on the Ukrainian frontline.</p><h3>Memento Foreign Policy</h3><p>This kind of foreign policy amnesia reminds me of <em>Memento</em>, where the protagonist wakes up each day with no memory of what came before, vulnerable to manipulation and misdirection. When the American public and political class stop paying attention to the basic rules of foreign policy, they become easy prey for flashy rhetoric and impulsive leadership.</p><p>It creates the perfect conditions for a president to rewrite America’s role in the world without resistance.</p><p>Just like in the film, when memory fades, chaos and bad decisions follow.</p><h3>Remember the Basics</h3><p>Foreign policy isn’t about being flashy. It’s about being firm, consistent, and credible. That doesn’t make for a great campaign slogan, but it makes a safer world.</p><p>Like most of Trump’s 2025 decisions, they highlight how quickly decades of groundwork can be undone.</p><p>Neglecting the world doesn’t make it go away. It just hands the keys to someone else.</p><p>While Washington sleeps, others redraw the map, broker the ceasefires, and shape the future of places like Gaza — with or without us</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=61b8176ad5a4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/dont-get-bored-with-the-basics-of-foreign-policy-61b8176ad5a4">Don’t Get Bored with the Basics of Foreign Policy</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief">The Strategic Brief</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Silence After the Shots: Shane Tamura and the Shifting Social Reaction to Public Violence]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/the-silence-after-the-shots-shane-tamura-and-the-shifting-social-reaction-to-public-violence-135408502af1?source=rss----2d2623a64713---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/135408502af1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mass-shootings]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mental-health]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[national-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[shane-tamura]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gun-violence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Costello]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jul 2025 20:31:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-29T20:31:45.610Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tyANUZUUe2R_1YyOCMzEKA.avif" /></figure><p>The Manhattan shooting by Shane Tamura shocked the Big Apple. Online public response has been muted.</p><p>On a quiet evening in Manhattan, Shane Tamura walked into a building lobby armed with an AR-15-style rifle. He killed an NYPD officer, a security guard, a Blackstone executive, and a real estate firm employee before taking his own life. His suicide note accused the National Football League of concealing the dangers of brain injuries in players. This attack was deadly, shocking, and deliberate. Yet, 24 hours later, the public conversation has not quite been what I was expecting.</p><p><strong>II. What Happened in Manhattan?</strong></p><p>The facts are as harrowing as they are clear. Tamura, 27, executed a planned assault in the heart of New York City. His weapon of choice, the AR-15-style rifle, remains central in America’s gun control debates. His targets crossed professional boundaries, from law enforcement to high finance. His motive, rooted in grievance against a billion-dollar sports league, opens the door to mental health and trauma discussions.</p><p>But despite the gravity of this act, Tamura’s name hasn’t taken root in public consciousness. News outlets have covered the incident. The NYPD made statements the next morning. Yet, there are no impassioned posts about justice.</p><p><strong>III. Narrative Economy and the Selective Spotlight</strong></p><p>This leads me to my thought that not all acts of violence receive equal attention. Social media, news, and political commentators curate the violence they amplify. This curation is not always based on body count or brutality, but narrative.</p><p>Luigi Mangione, who killed a CEO in broad daylight earlier this year, generated viral outrage. His act tapped into a narrative that was ripe for online digestion: class conflict, urban crime, vigilante anger.</p><p>Tamura’s act seemingly has not.</p><p>Narrative economy functions like a marketplace. Attention is finite. Stories compete. The ones that sell generate outrage, solidarity, or fear.</p><p>Tamura’s story lacked a usable moral. It lacked an archetype.</p><p><strong>IV. Social Reaction in the Digital Age</strong></p><p>Social media platforms serve as the frontline of public sentiment. They dictate not only what we talk about, but how we feel about it. In Mangione’s case, posts on X (formerly Twitter) and Instagram spun him into a meme and provocateur. His victim, a wealthy CEO, was — rightly or wrongly — cast as deserving of retribution in a rigged economic system. Public sentiment rallied around an identifiable narrative.</p><p>In contrast, Tamura’s story has remained largely untouched by online culture. The story lacked meme potential. It didn’t divide neatly into heroes and villains. The discomfort of his motive — concussions, institutional betrayal, veteran trauma — doesn’t ignite the same visceral response as class warfare or police misconduct.</p><p><strong>V. What This Tells Us</strong></p><p>This gap in reaction reveals more about society than about the shooter. It reflects which types of violence society we are prepared to process. It shows how some tragedies are too complex or inconvenient to trend.</p><p>Perhaps it also reveals that narrative saturation has numbed our collective response.</p><p><strong>VI. Implications for National Security and Social Trust</strong></p><p>From a national security perspective, the way society digests violence has long-term effects. When narratives are chosen over facts, when reaction replaces reflection, public trust erodes. If the public only reacts to violence that fits a preferred storyline, we risk misunderstanding the threats we face. Violence becomes entertainment. Grief becomes algorithmic.</p><p><strong>VII. Conclusion</strong></p><p>Shane Tamura’s name may not live on in hashtags, but the implications of his act remain. As society grapples with how it responds to violence, narrative economy will continue to shape who gets remembered and why.</p><p>In that silence, there is a signal — not of apathy, but of selective attention. And in that selectivity, new dangers take root.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=135408502af1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/the-silence-after-the-shots-shane-tamura-and-the-shifting-social-reaction-to-public-violence-135408502af1">The Silence After the Shots: Shane Tamura and the Shifting Social Reaction to Public Violence</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief">The Strategic Brief</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Calm After the Storm? America’s Moment of Strategic Pause]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/calm-after-the-storm-americas-moment-of-strategic-pause-b2e1059a357c?source=rss----2d2623a64713---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b2e1059a357c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[north-korea]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Costello]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2025 19:29:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-24T19:28:55.926Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/621/1*CkLs7Q993cyhhyure9Iu2Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>With no major ground wars on its plate, the United States is in a rare moment of global calm. But with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea diversifying, is this truly peace… or are we just in the eye of the storm?</p><p><strong>The United States stands at a rare strategic crossroads.</strong><br>After years of high-profile engagement, from Iraq to Afghanistan, from counterterrorism campaigns to proxy fights in Syria, the storm has seemingly passed. For the first time in years, the U.S. is not directly entangled in a major ground war. But that calm is deceptive.</p><p>America faces adversaries on three fronts: <strong>China, Russia, and Iran</strong>. Each remains a long-term strategic competitor, committed to challenging U.S. influence regionally and globally. The question now is not whether America will be drawn into another confrontation, but how it will position itself to prevent one?</p><h3>Strategic Patience, or Strategic Drift?</h3><p>The U.S. is also diversifying. Its behavior is no longer reactive, but it is now built on posture. <strong>Deterrence</strong> is the operative word in Washington. Forward deployments remain across the Indo-Pacific, NATO’s eastern flank is reinforced, and CENTCOM still casts a long shadow over the Middle East. But the level of risk is lower than in previous years.</p><p>This moment of calm offers time to reassess, rearm, and rebuild. However, Donald Trump’s presidency gutted key functions of the State Department, sidelined diplomacy, and allowed America’s institutional strategic muscle to atrophy.</p><p><strong>Rebuilding that capacity remains critical and an ongoing operation.</strong></p><h3>Europe Wakes Up</h3><p>Germany’s pledge to double its defense budget over the next five years signals a major shift in European deterrence strategy. NATO is no longer viewed as a dusty Cold War relic but as a viable, cohesive necessity. Like I mentioned above, Poland, the Baltic states, and Finland have also made changes in how their defense strategy is serving themselves and their allies.</p><p><strong>For the first time in decades, Europe is serious about its own deterrence.</strong></p><p>This shift directly benefits the U.S. Global deterrence works best when it’s not carried alone. The more NATO steps up, the more the U.S. can focus on the Indo-Pacific — <strong>where China’s growing influence is the center of attention.</strong></p><h3>The Axis That Wobbles</h3><p>Iran, Russia, and China have shown signs of coordinated intent. But that alliance is fragile.</p><p>Iran, after launching a failed joint strike with proxies and facing swift Israeli and U.S. retaliation, is depleted for now. Russia, after three years of grinding war in Ukraine, is bleeding manpower and resources. Its recent moves to deepen ties with North Korea signal desperation more than strength.</p><p><strong>China is watching closely on the sidelines.</strong> It sees its strategic allies limping. This undermines any grand vision of a multipolar order led from Beijing.</p><h3>North Korea’s Next Move</h3><p>North Korea’s pivot toward Russia is among the most under-reported geopolitical shifts of the year. By providing supplies to Moscow, <strong>Kim Jong-un has bought relevance along with Putin’s attention.</strong></p><p>In return, North Korean personnel are likely gaining combat experience in Ukraine. This a first for a regime that has long operated in the depths of isolation.</p><p>This tightens the knot of insecurity in East Asia. For decades, China was North Korea’s sole ally. That leash has now loosened.</p><p><strong>Pyongyang is forging its own path, and it is one paved in confrontation.</strong></p><h3>The Security Dilemma Reawakens</h3><p>I believe now we are entering a new era of global instability. It is reminiscent of the Cold War but layered with a new, modern complexity. I think it represents the <strong>security dilemma</strong> quite strikingly. This of course is the classic concept where one state’s defensive actions are perceived as threats by others.</p><p>Every missile test, every drone strike, every naval deployment now resonates across multiple actors. The world has become a chessboard with no sidelines. With artificial intelligence entering military and strategic planning, escalation cycles may become faster and less predictable.</p><h3>America’s Challenge</h3><p>The U.S. must decide how to lead in this <strong>multipolar, multi-domain environment</strong>. Its competitors are wounded but still dangerous. Its allies are under new development but not yet fully capable. Its own institutions are still recovering from years of strategic whiplash.</p><p>This moment of calm is not permanent. It is a pause before the next phase of inevitable. global confrontation.</p><p><strong>How America chooses to use it will shape the next decade of international security.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b2e1059a357c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/calm-after-the-storm-americas-moment-of-strategic-pause-b2e1059a357c">Calm After the Storm? America’s Moment of Strategic Pause</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief">The Strategic Brief</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Does Pop Culture Help to Construct Our Meanings, Understandings, and Perceptions of Terrorism?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/how-does-pop-culture-help-to-construct-our-meanings-understandings-and-perceptions-of-terrorism-61ebf049c892?source=rss----2d2623a64713---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/61ebf049c892</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[videogames]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[violence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tv-shows]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pop-culture]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Costello]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2025 10:21:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-13T19:44:09.740Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7H-WG1kzGgh3AZkkTuQnmQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Growing up in the late 1990’s and entering the new millennia, I was present during the pop culture boom which featured the portrayal of terrorism. From my brother enjoying movies such as True Lies and The Living Daylights, my parents watching Homeland and The Bodyguard, to me playing Call of Duty every night with my friends, our perceptions of what terrorism entailed was unconsciously being constructed by these different media.</p><p>Since 9/11, terrorism was not just confined to the newsroom, but it now features at the cinema, on our televisions and in our video games (Pears, 2016). I argue this is specifically relevant during the past year in which COVID 19 lockdowns have impacted the lives of everyone in the UK and the wider globe. Virgin Media reported viewing time was up threefold during lockdown and production has increased by £3.7bn (Sweney, 2020).</p><p>Therefore, in this essay, I will explore how popular culture has constructed terrorism through film, television, and video games along with causes of change and subsequent shifts in these constructions. Audiences do not consume these media in isolation, which suggests that neither the variety in interpretation nor the constraints on the range of that variety are located exclusively in the text itself (Hall, 2001). I will argue although some of their content might be outdated now in 2021, it helped construct our meanings, understandings, and perceptions of terrorism by implementing geopolitical narratives which were accurate for the time of production.</p><p>A text cannot completely control its final meaning because different people can interpret it differently, relying on their own diverse cultural, social and personal circumstances, identities and knowledge (Pears, 2016). Terrorism is therefore constructed through the interpretation of events, the use of statements made up of language and symbols, the work of pop culture producers to attract the public’s attention and manipulate popular opinion in favour of one interest over another (McQueeney, 2014).</p><p>I would like to state this essay will not be a comprehensive analysis of popular culture’s extensive repertoire of sources, as I will be mainly focusing on how Islamic terrorism is constructed in popular culture as it was the focus in the majority of content produced for the above media.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/612/1*3okps-Q3aqfZQG2oax_anA.jpeg" /></figure><p>One area of popular culture that has constructed our knowledge of Islamic terrorism and the wider Arab world is cinema (Atif and Shahiq, 2019). Terrorism, especially Muslim terrorism against America, brings in considerable cash for the box office (Ramji, 2015). Films have an important influence on public opinion and construct meanings, understandings and perceptions which have become an integral part of our culture (Atif and Shahiq, 2019). They influence us by offering insights into the perspectives of both terrorists and counter-terrorists (Bettwy, 2015). Filmmakers have their own inherent, national biases, and since economics forces them to appeal to domestic audiences, films tend to express the ‘national discourse’ of their nations (Bettwy, 2015).</p><p>In terms of how cinema constructs our perception of terrorism, American cinema has constructed a homogeneous concept of what a Muslim is, and what a Muslim terrorist is, who is an Arab person (Ramji, 2015). The films I would like to focus on in the section are The Living Daylights, which was released in 1987 and True Lies, which was released in 1994. I have chosen these films in particular as they were released pre 9/11 and offer insights into how these films constructed our meanings, understandings, and perceptions of terrorism due to the period they were filmed. It will be my argument that although Islamic terrorists featured in both of these films, they were constructed based on differing understandings of what terrorism is.</p><p>However, I argue this is not from an Islamophobic perspective, as most of the terrorist acts committed in and around these films being made were by Islamic terror groups. Between 1968 and 2005, Islamist groups were responsible for 93.6% of all terrorist attacks by religiously motivated groups (Piazza, 2009). I also argue narratives continue to change in film in accordance with political sentiment at the time of filming.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*ev60uykaQSMKgKCJPl3NCA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Hollywood films of the 1980’s that depicted overseas terrorists, such as the Afghani mujahedin in The Living Daylights tended to personalise terrorists, demonstrating the ability of filmmakers to tell balanced narratives about terrorism (Bettwy, 2015). It can also be argued this was a favourable portrayal as Afghanistan was at war against the Soviet Union, a primary threat perceived by America in the Cold War.</p><p>In contrast, the 1990’s constructed a discourse of American dominance over Arab terrorists, which is illustrated in True Lies where Arnold Schwarzenegger plays a US agent chasing down an Islamic terror group called Crimson Jihad (Ramji, 2015). The narrative constructs our understanding of terrorism as threatening Western global interests by people happily prepared to use weapons of mass destruction (Boggs and Pollard, 2006).</p><p>A popular criticism of this movie is based on its sensationalism, constructing the terrorist’s motivations as being meaningless, excessive, and unjustified (Reid, 2015). This is related to popular discourse that terrorist violence is ‘irrational’ and terror suspects are demonised as the worst type of human beings, making it permissible to kill them (Espinoza, 2018). However, I can put forward the argument not all terrorism is neatly planned out in a manifesto, with proportionate aims and justifiable consequences. Strategic groups have far more specific and discrete goals (Piazza, 2009). Actors who decide to employ a terrorism strategy must create significant strategic leverage in order to initiate the process that they intend to manipulate (Neumann and Smith, 2005). The strategy in the case of Crimson Jihad was to get US troops to pull out of the Persian Gulf by threats of detonating bombs in a major American city every week (Boggs and Pollard, 2006).</p><p>Therefore, I argue criticism of the construction of the Arab terrorists as ‘meaningless’ are unjustified, as there was a wider strategy at play. These two examples I have analysed are by no means a census of all appearances of Muslim terrorist characters in cinema, but I have argued it is interesting to see the construction of what terrorism is in cinema changing so dramatically in the short space of time between the two movies. I argue this shows narratives in cinema are so heavily reliant on what the geopolitical situation is outside of the directors’ camera which leads to multiple interpretations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mlVk-VuuxcBmXa7_1QiCwg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Similarly, television producers also capitalise on geopolitical events to help construct audiences’ meaning, perceptions and understandings of terrorism in both the US and UK. For most of us, television is an important part of our daily lives, and it is where discourses, norms and common sense are created (Pears, 2016). Television also plays an important role in constructing narratives in the macro process initiated by global hegemonic powers (Izgarjan and Djurić, 2016).</p><p>Television programs rely heavily upon the understanding that terrorism can and will happen anywhere (Muzzatti, 2017). I argue this is best illustrated in the television shows Homeland and The Bodyguard, both of which I argue helped shape our understandings, meaning and perceptions of what terrorism is. Homeland follows a CIA officer that attempts to disrupt terrorism threats to the US. In season one, the viewer learns that an Al-Qaeda commanders’ son was killed in a US-led drone strike in Afghanistan, which resulted in the death of 83 children and was subsequently covered up by the US government. This resulted in retaliation being planned on US soil involving two US marines who were recruited by Al-Qaeda.</p><p>I argue this is an accurate construction of terrorist recruitment as state repression is an effective recruiting tool. It can produce emotional reactions making people more risk-seeking and therefore more likely to join a terrorist organisation (Kalyvas, 2004). I argue this construction is also important as it introduces the viewer to state terrorism, which constructs the understanding that terrorism is much more than what non-state actors undertake in the Middle East. The audience is allowed to sympathise with the innocent children who were targeted indiscriminately and rendered disposable, leading the drone programme to operate as state terrorism (Espinoza, 2018). This act provided an additional grievance for the commander in the death of his son, something that might not have led to further violence if the drone strike was aborted.</p><p>The presence of concrete grievances within an identifiable subgroup is a direct cause of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981). As I have mentioned above, the hatred of those impacted by drone strikes is reasonable given that their loved ones’ deaths are not acknowledged as their communities are rendered subhuman (Espinoza, 2018). I argue this inclusion of an example of state terror is important as Western involvement in terrorism has largely been ignored (Jackson, 2008). As witnessed in Homeland, state violence can be identified as human rights violations or war crimes, but never as terrorism (Jackson, 2008). A thorough examination of the history of state terrorism, including that practised by Western democracies, is essential for understanding the purposes it is meant to serve and the consequences it has, as well as demonstrating how infrequently it serves any useful purpose in the fight against terrorism, instead, creating grievances within communities affected by its violence. (Blakeley, 2010).</p><p>In sum, I argue Homeland provides an honest discussion and constructs our understanding that the drone programme is a tactic for counter-terrorism that itself constitutes a form of terrorism, which leads individuals to be recruited for retaliation attacks in order to redress a grievance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*kW602Y0jQwRGsFsmSYWITA.jpeg" /></figure><p>An additional illustration is The Bodyguard, a BBC production produced in 2018. The premise of the show can be summarised in the following quote, “You all saw me as a poor, oppressed Muslim woman. I am an engineer. I am a jihadi” (Dearden, 2018). In this case, this show challenged our understanding and perceptions that women are victims of terrorism rather than perpetrators of it.</p><p>I argue this construction is important as women have been actively involved in terrorism throughout history and all around the world, from Chechnya to Palestine (Spencer, 2016). Recent statistics regarding the group Islamic State (IS) back up the storyline as 13% of IS foreign recruits in Iraq and Syria were female, one of which being Shamima Begum who garnered substantial media coverage (Zeuthen and Sahgal, 2019).</p><p>In contrast, Spooks was a similar British television show that dealt with missions of MI-5, the UK’s domestic intelligence organisation. Its creators said that they kept track of the geopolitical situation in order to predict future events in the series (Izgarjan and Djurić, 2016). Like in Homeland, terrorist attacks on the Western alliance are viewed as a response to Western troops invading their country and way of life (Izgarjan and Djurić, 2016). Similar to Homeland, I argue one important element of Spooks that constructed the viewer’s meaning, understandings and perceptions of terrorism was that they avoided portraying Muslims solely as terrorists, featuring agents who belonged to Muslim communities (Izgarjan and Djurić, 2016).</p><p>Although I have argued these television shows accurately construct the process of terrorism well, one issue they have in common is the fierce criticism they helped construct a culture of Islamophobia in Britain through the emphasis on terrorism regarding the representation of Muslims (Khan, 2020). I argue this is a legitimate critique because, in the broader racialised environment of radicalisation in the UK, which has placed British Muslims as ‘suspect communities’ through the workings of PREVENT and CHANNEL, it becomes clear that, no matter how complex the construction of Islamic terrorism is within popular culture, it is a reductionist representation of Islam for non-Muslims.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/602/1*EyvmQNKA7_EpLOKVEbdxow.jpeg" /></figure><p>Complimentary to this, video games that depict combat scenarios, such as Call of Duty and Battlefield, have become a global phenomenon that transcends social, cultural and geographical boundaries with hundreds of millions of active players worldwide (Clarke, Rouffaer and Sénéchaud, 2012). Though such games represent a small portion of total combined gaming formats, first-person shooter (FPS) games are quite popular (Andersen and Kurti, 2009). The video games industry is the world’s largest popular culture sector by monetary value and is the fastest-growing of all popular culture industries (Robinson and Whittaker, 2021).</p><p>Thus, I can make the argument video game creators have established themselves as a form of popular culture that shapes our meaning, understandings, and perceptions of the world, including terrorism (Šisler, 2008). Like the other forms of popular culture, I have mentioned, there has been a significant rise in games with the aim of combatting terrorism (Šisler, 2008). Generally speaking, in these video games, the player controls American forces, while enemy units are controlled by the system and often referred to as terrorists dressed in loose Arab clothing (Šisler, 2008).</p><p>The most famous illustration of this is Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare (CoD 4) which has a narrative of fighting the War on Terror, which is personified by a radical Arab leader of a Middle Eastern monarchy (Andersen and Kurti, 2009). This game also features terrorists as Arabs dressed in loose clothing wielding AK-47’s, but this vagueness allows them to be a stand-in for any terrorist enemy the player imagines (Andersen and Kurti, 2009).</p><p>Battlefield 3 has a similar narrative to True Lies mentioned earlier where nuclear arms carried by Iranian revolutionaries pose a threat to American civilians (Robinson, 2015). Therefore, it is my argument we can see a shift back to the construction of terrorism being irrational and being a threat uniquely personified by the Arab population which only America can solve.</p><p>Video games have also helped construct an understanding that the end justifies the means and methods of war are unlimited in the fight against terrorism. It has been argued this is a result of video games falling under the umbrella of ‘neglected media’, which tends to reproduce stereotypical representations because this form of media is considered to be less relevant and free from critique (Šisler, 2008). This lack of critique has spawned concerns that gamer communities are ripe for the growth of extremism, with recent terror attacks in Christchurch and El Paso having attackers referencing mainstream FPS games (Robinson and Whittaker, 2021).</p><p>These representations generally illustrate Arabs and Muslims as enemies and in turn construct our meanings, perceptions, and understandings of terrorism as inherently Islamic. The American military is portrayed as a global police force that operates covertly with small rapid deployment teams in the context of low-intensity conflict warfare (Robinson, 2015). These representations have dominated popular culture for decades as they proved to be commercially viable and capable of reproduction several times over (Šisler, 2008).</p><p>However, I can argue, in contrast to the other forms of media I have mentioned, video games lack the facility to accurately convey to the player the background of the conflict they are virtually participating in. For example, in CoD 4, justification in the game is unexplained for sending US marines into this hypothetical Middle Eastern country (Andersen and Kurti, 2009). In hindsight, I argue if the information were provided back when these games exploded with popularity, it could have led to fewer negative understandings of the Muslim population being constructed.</p><p>A similar positive move was used by the game Counter-Strike where the player can embody a terrorist, but there is no ideological explanation of their activities (Lakomy, 2019). This allows the player to construct a meaning, understanding and perception of terrorism that is not associated with Islam and instead it is left to the imagination.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bzgGK79ecnB6T1_E1w61kg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Furthermore, with my discussion on state terrorism by targeted drone strikes earlier in this essay, I would like to mention the additional nexus between new generations of unmanned drone pilots, who bring may bring years of video game experience to their new role of conducting counterterrorism operations, representing an indirect form of interaction between the military and the video game community<strong> </strong>(Clarke, Rouffaer and Sénéchaud, 2012).</p><p>In conclusion, through exploring portions of popular culture above, I have argued how popular culture has constructed terrorism through film, television, and video games along with causes of change and subsequent shifts in these constructions. These shifts included constructing terrorism as something beneficial to the West to labelling Islamic terrorism as irrational and unjustified. In the case of the two video games I discussed, this was due to the lack of historical or geopolitical context being provided to the viewer. I have also argued Homeland was an exception to this case, with the terrorist’s grievance being explained and state terrorism also being introduced. The Bodyguard was a welcome piece of popular culture that constructed an understanding of female participation in terrorism which is often overlooked.</p><p>Each piece of popular culture I have addressed sheds light on how popular culture and geopolitics are intertwined in the construction of terrorism by asking the consumer to consider how threats and danger are imagined. When it comes to thinking about how terrorism is constructed through popular culture narratives, there is certainly a larger landscape to consider, such as how interpretations can lead to the creation of ‘suspect communities’.</p><p>Future research on the nexus between popular culture and terrorism could concentrate on the far right. The majority of white communities are also affected by the predicaments that lead to extremism, radicalisation and violence, but popular culture discourses and narratives focus less on such groups, significantly skewing the debate (Abbas, 2017). I would like to end by reaffirming my argument that the consumer should critically interpret the narratives that construct what terrorism is, whether they come from the White House, 10 Downing Street, or a fictional intelligence briefing room on your television screen. I argue this is important in order to make it possible to have an honest discussion to what we think is meant by terrorism and how we perceive and understand it in the future.</p><h3>Reference List</h3><ul><li>Abbas, T. (2017) “Ethnicity and politics in contextualising far right and Islamist extremism,” <em>Perspectives on Terrorism</em>, 11(3). Available at: <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/86974/1/Abbas_Ethnicity%20and%20politics%20in%20contextualising%20far%20right1.pdf.">http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/86974/1/Abbas_Ethnicity%20and%20politics%20in%20contextualising%20far%20right1.pdf.</a></li><li>Andersen, R. and Kurti, M. (2009) “From America’s Army to Call of Duty: Doing Battle with the Military Entertainment Complex,” <em>Democratic Communiqué </em>, 23(1), pp. 45–65.</li><li>Atif, K. and Shahiq, Z. (2019) “Discourse on Terrorism: Image of Pakistan in Bollywood film Phantom1,” <em>Pakistan Journal of History and Culture</em>, 40(1), pp. 163–180.</li><li>Bettwy, S. W. (2015) “Evolving Transnational Cinematic Perspectives of Terrorism,” <em>Perspectives on Terrorism</em>, 9(2), pp. 42–60.</li><li>Blakeley, R. (2010) “Liberal democracies and the globalisation of state terrorism in the 21st century,” <em>Critical studies on terrorism</em>, 3(2), pp. 169–172.</li><li>Boggs, C. and Pollard, T. (2006) “Hollywood and the spectacle of terrorism,” <em>New political science</em>, 28(3), pp. 335–351.</li><li>Clarke, B., Rouffaer, C. and Sénéchaud, F. (2012) “Beyond the Call of Duty: why shouldn’t video game players face the same dilemmas as real soldiers?,” <em>International review of the Red Cross</em>, 94(886), pp. 711–737.</li><li>Crenshaw, M. (1981) “The causes of terrorism,” <em>Comparative politics</em>, 13(4), pp. 379–399.</li><li>Dearden, L. (2018) “Bodyguard’s Nadia shows the danger of underestimating female jihadis,” <em>Independent</em>, 25 September. Available at: <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/bodyguard-bbc-tv-ending-nadia-bomb-terrorist-female-oppressed-isis-jihadis-a8553181.html">https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/bodyguard-bbc-tv-ending-nadia-bomb-terrorist-female-oppressed-isis-jihadis-a8553181.html</a> (Accessed: April 20, 2021).</li><li>Espinoza, M. (2018) “State terrorism: orientalism and the drone programme,” <em>Critical studies on terrorism</em>, 11(2), pp. 376–393.</li><li>Hall, A. (2001) “Film reviews and the public’s perceptions of stereotypes: Movie critics’ discourse aboutthe siege,” <em>Communication quarterly</em>, 49(4), pp. 399–423.</li><li>Izgarjan, A. and Djurić, D. (2016) “Metaphors of the future and the power of images in the British TV drama Spooks,” <em>Futures</em>, 84, pp. 154–162.</li><li>Jackson, R. (2008) “The ghosts of state terror: knowledge, politics and terrorism studies,” <em>Critical studies on terrorism</em>, 1(3), pp. 377–392.</li><li>Kalyvas, S. N. (2004) “The paradox of terrorism in civil war,” <em>The journal of ethics</em>, 8(1), pp. 97–138.</li><li>Khan, M. (2020) “From mute to menacing: why TV’s portrayal of Muslims still falls short,” <em>The guardian</em>, 15 October. Available at: <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2020/oct/15/why-tvs-portrayal-of-muslims-still-falls-short-ramy-bodyguard">http://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2020/oct/15/why-tvs-portrayal-of-muslims-still-falls-short-ramy-bodyguard</a> (Accessed: April 25, 2021).</li><li>Lakomy, M. (2019) “Let’s play a video game: Jihadi propaganda in the world of electronic entertainment,” <em>Studies in conflict and terrorism</em>, 42(4), pp. 383–406.</li><li>McQueeney, K. (2014) “Disrupting Islamophobia: Teaching the Social Construction of Terrorism in the Mass Media,” <em>International Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education</em>, 26(2), pp. 297–309.</li><li>Muzzatti, S. (2017) “Terrorism and counter-terrorism in popular culture in the post-9/11 context,” <em>Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice</em>. Oxford University Press.</li><li>Neumann, P. R. and Smith, M. L. R. (2005) “Strategic terrorism: The framework and its fallacies,” <em>Journal of strategic studies</em>, 28(4), pp. 571–595.</li><li>Pears, L. (2016) “Ask the audience: television, security andHomeland,” <em>Critical studies on terrorism</em>, 9(1), pp. 76–96.</li><li>Piazza, J. A. (2009) “Is Islamist terrorism more dangerous?: An empirical study of group ideology, organization, and goal structure,” <em>Terrorism and political violence</em>, 21(1), pp. 62–88.</li><li>Ramji, R. (2015) “Examining the critical role American popular film continues to play in maintaining the Muslim terrorist image, post 9/11,” <em>Journal of Religion &amp; Film</em>, 20(1). Available at: <a href="https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1356&amp;context=jrf.">https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1356&amp;context=jrf.</a></li><li>Reid, J. (2015) “The Age of Sympathy: Re-examining discourses of Muslim terrorism in Hollywood beyond the ‘pre-’ and ‘post-9/11’ dichotomy,” <em>Journal of Media and Communication</em>, 6(2), pp. 95–107.</li><li>Robinson, N. (2015) “Have you won the war on terror? Military videogames and the state of American exceptionalism,” <em>Millennium Journal of International Studies</em>, 43(2), pp. 450–470.</li><li>Robinson, N. and Whittaker, J. (2021) “Playing for hate? Extremism, terrorism, and videogames,” <em>Studies in conflict and terrorism</em>, pp. 1–36.</li><li>Šisler, V. (2008) “Digital Arabs: Representation in video games,” <em>European journal of cultural studies</em>, 11(2), pp. 203–220.</li><li>Spencer, A. (2016) “The hidden face of terrorism: An analysis of the women in Islamic state,” <em>Journal of strategic security</em>, 9(3), pp. 74–98.</li><li>Sweney, M. (2020) “Covid pandemic fuelling growth of film and TV studios in UK,” <em>The guardian</em>, 7 November. Available at: <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/nov/07/covid-pandemic-fuelling-growth-of-film-and-tv-studios-in-uk">http://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/nov/07/covid-pandemic-fuelling-growth-of-film-and-tv-studios-in-uk</a> (Accessed: April 28, 2021).</li><li>Zeuthen, M. and Sahgal, G. (2019) “Shamima Begum: Why women support terror,” <em>BBC</em>, 16 April. Available at: <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-47653190">https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-47653190</a> (Accessed: April 25, 2021).</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=61ebf049c892" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/how-does-pop-culture-help-to-construct-our-meanings-understandings-and-perceptions-of-terrorism-61ebf049c892">How Does Pop Culture Help to Construct Our Meanings, Understandings, and Perceptions of Terrorism?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief">The Strategic Brief</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Panic in Paris: The 2015 Bataclan Massacre]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/panic-in-paris-the-2015-bataclan-massacre-824ae21cce88?source=rss----2d2623a64713---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/824ae21cce88</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[parisattacks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bataclan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[macron]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Costello]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2025 10:20:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-14T14:26:41.327Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/927/1*DKFeH1YYxNSNh7EtyTJkng.jpeg" /></figure><p>2015 was the year that saw an increase in terrorist attacks in Europe, that were reportedly carried out by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Bartholomew, 2016).</p><p>One such attack that shocked the world occurred on November 13th, 2015 where 130 people were killed after gunmen entered the Bataclan concert hall in Paris. Unlike the Charlie Hebdo incident the previous January, in which the victims were specifically targeted, the Bataclan victims were the victim of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The terrorists organized nature and seemingly indiscriminate targeting of civilians triggered a new security situation in France (Geraghty, 2015). French President Francois Hollande described the attack as “a horror” and vowed “France must be strong, it must be great and the state authorities must be firm” (Sharma, 2015). I argue that this firmness resulted in the securitisation of the Muslim population of France.</p><p>Before the attacks of 2015, the French government’s approach towards immigration was restrictive in nature. One example would be in 2003, a new law entered into force making it easier to deport individuals who committed offences justifying a criminal trial (Galli, 2008). November 2015 would change security in Paris both in the short and long term. Searches increased when people entered buildings, the metros became enclosed tubes of suspicion towards anyone with a bag and armed police presence was more visible than before. To this day, armed soldiers still patrol metro stations and tourist traps like the Eiffel Tower (Walt, 2020).</p><p>The long-term effects saw the French government declaring a<strong> </strong>state of emergency, allowing authorities the freedom to carry out a range of powers that previously would require authorisation from a judge. Although this measure was intended to be temporary, it was later extended to the 2017 presidential election. In addition, legislative measures such as a new counter-terrorism law were passed, further strengthening the powers of French security agencies in areas of searches, surveillance, and arrests. Within six months, 3500 searches had been carried out and over 350 uncharged individuals were required to report to police daily (O’Brien, 2016).</p><p>Security officials maintain that extra resources and invasive measures are justified because Islamist terrorism is still perceived to be the biggest to most EU member states (O’Brien, 2016). The Paris attacks and the resulting measures have also helped develop a climate of Islamophobia, further excelling anxieties and bolstering stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists (Bartholomew, 2016).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/992/1*M-1T_QVhRvIE90kzk6aNlA.jpeg" /></figure><p>These policy changes I have discussed above can be linked to Securitisation, a concept developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (Bright, 2012). They claimed security situations could be identified through their creation of a special kind of politics linked to crisis and emergency, which enables certain actions, which would otherwise be deemed unacceptable (Bright, 2012). This construction of threats which enables the allocation of this rule-breaking power is the essence of security and at the heart of securitisation (Bright, 2012). In short, the issue of securitisation is one of language, where the subjectively perceived reality being addressed, in this case, terrorism is rendered an objective threat (Galli, 2008). In the context of this case study, ‘securitising’ was France’s way of asserting that terrorism is an existential threat to its national democracy.</p><p>It is my argument the French government is playing a dangerous game in relying on the concept of Secularism as a means of countering terrorism through the process of securitisation. It is my view that this will only divide the relationship between Islam and the French state even more. For me, counterterrorism initiatives should focus on deterring acts of indiscriminate violence, not focussing on one set of religious beliefs. This can be illustrated in the report released by the New Zealand government describing how they failed to stop the Christchurch shootings in March 2019. The report detailed multiple warning signs, such as online radicalisation, but New Zealand’s intelligence service was focused “almost exclusively” on the threat of Islamic terrorism (Salvatore, 2020).</p><p>In other words, there was no possible way the shooter could have been identified due to their narrow focus on Islamic extremism. In my view, alienation seems to be the catch of the day in France rather than proactive steps in pursuing ways to stop acts of terror. Alternatively, I see building resilience within communities as one of the basic pillars of counter-radicalisation. The process of resilience is when governments bring communities together by teaching them how to respond to a range of contemporary problems and hazards (Hardy, 2015). I argue to fight terrorism more effectively, a focus on social work and education is a process that needs to be implemented in France to provide a connection with a new generation of Muslim citizens. Resilience is both a principal and an underlying theme of Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The Canadians believe a resilient country involves fostering a society in which communities and individuals can withstand extremists’ ideologies and challenge those who expose them (Government of Canada, 2013).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*Af-eZ36SVcA9Jo0ESoYewQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>However, 2020 has seen a further shift in the secular campaign against what President Macron calls ‘separatism’ (Scott, 2020). Since the beginning of this year, 71 mosques have been shut down due to their potential for bases of radicalisation and terrorism (Morrow, 2020). Calls have also been made to remove Muslim food from French supermarkets and to close the Colléctif Contre l’Islamophobie en France, a group aimed at ending discrimination against Muslims (Scott, 2020). Extraordinarily, the French education minister alluded to comparing anti-racist academics as the “intellectual accomplices of terrorism” (Morrow, 2020).</p><p>To conclude, it is my argument that the securitisation of Islam in France in the aftermath of the 2015 attacks was both the result of the French President speaking security and by the existence of an already consolidated discursive realm after the Charlie Hebdo attack.</p><p>As Paris marked the fifth anniversary this year, the country is still in an avid debate over France’s fractured relationship with Islam, with lone-wolf attacks continuing to keep the French population on edge, the most notable of which in Nice which killed 80 people. I argue this is sufficient evidence to prove the French policy decisions over the past five years have yielded little results.</p><h3>Reference List:</h3><ul><li>Bartholomew, R. E. (2016) “The Paris terror attacks, mental health and the spectre of fear,” <em>Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine</em>, 109(1), pp. 4–5.</li><li>Bright, J. (2012) “Securitisation, terror, and control: towards a theory of the breaking point,” <em>Review of international studies</em>, 38(4), pp. 861–879.</li><li>Galli, F. (2008) <em>The legal and political implications of the securitisation of counter-terrorism measures across the Mediterranean</em>, <em>Psu.edu</em>. Available at: <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.477.4190&amp;rep=rep1&amp;type=pdf">http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.477.4190&amp;rep=rep1&amp;type=pdf</a> (Accessed: December 9, 2020).</li><li>Geraghty, C. (2015) <em>The perils of “French Islam”: France’s misguided response to the Paris attacks</em>, <em>Brookings</em>. Available at: <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/12/16/the-perils-of-french-islam-frances-misguided-response-to-the-paris-attacks/">https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/12/16/the-perils-of-french-islam-frances-misguided-response-to-the-paris-attacks/</a> (Accessed: November 27, 2020).</li><li>Government of Canada (2013) <em>Building Resilience Against Terrorism CANADA’S COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY</em>. Available at: <a href="https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rslnc-gnst-trrrsm/rslnc-gnst-trrrsm-eng.pdf.">https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rslnc-gnst-trrrsm/rslnc-gnst-trrrsm-eng.pdf.</a></li><li>Hardy, K. (2015) “Resilience in UK counter-terrorism,” <em>Theoretical criminology</em>, 19(1), pp. 77–94.</li><li>Morrow, W. (2020) <em>Three killed in terrorist attack on church in Nice, France</em>, <em>World Socialist Web Site</em>. Available at: <a href="https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/10/30/nice-o30.html">https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/10/30/nice-o30.html</a> (Accessed: November 27, 2020).</li><li>O’Brien, P. (2016) “Counter-terrorism in Europe: the elusive search for order,” <em>European security</em>, 25(3), pp. 366–384.</li><li>Salvatore, A. (2020) <em>New Zealand report calls for “systemic change” after Christchurch massacres</em>, <em>Lawfare</em>. Available at: <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-zealand-report-calls-systemic-change-after-christchurch-massacres">https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-zealand-report-calls-systemic-change-after-christchurch-massacres</a> (Accessed: December 9, 2020).</li><li>Scott, J. W. (2020) <em>The contradictions of French secularism</em>, <em>NewStatesman</em>. Available at: <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2020/11/contradictions-french-secularism">https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2020/11/contradictions-french-secularism</a> (Accessed: November 27, 2020).</li><li>Sharma, S. (2015) <em>‘It is horror’: French President Hollande’s remarks after Paris attacks</em>, <em>Washingtonpost.com</em>. Available at: <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/11/13/it-is-horror-french-president-hollandes-remarks-after-paris-attacks/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/11/13/it-is-horror-french-president-hollandes-remarks-after-paris-attacks/</a> (Accessed: December 9, 2020).</li></ul><p>Walt, V. (2020) “The Paris attacks 5 years ago left young people scarred. But ‘generation bataclan’ may get its chance for justice,” <em>Time</em>, 12 November. Available at: <a href="https://time.com/5910960/paris-attack-anniversary-bataclan/">https://time.com/5910960/paris-attack-anniversary-bataclan/</a> (Accessed: November 19, 2020).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=824ae21cce88" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/panic-in-paris-the-2015-bataclan-massacre-824ae21cce88">Panic in Paris: The 2015 Bataclan Massacre</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief">The Strategic Brief</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Lone Wolf Walks into a Salad Bar]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/a-lone-wolf-walks-into-a-salad-bar-ffa3e6e57ab6?source=rss----2d2623a64713---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ffa3e6e57ab6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[salad-bar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brenton-tarrant]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lone-wolf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[timothy-mcveigh]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Costello]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2025 10:20:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-02-23T14:54:16.198Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Examining the Evolution of Terrorism in 2024.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/660/1*FjaUb75b1tXhqsf5rJ_Y-g.jpeg" /></figure><p>The title suggests the start of a classic Dad joke, but surprisingly I am going to explore how it sums up a niche of terrorism as we enter yet another year under the weight of violent extremism.</p><p>Acts of terrorism around the world are constantly evolving, which makes it a fascinating field to study. We still have large-scale attacks coordinated by organized groups, like we saw In Israel by Hamas on October 7th 2023. We’re also witnessing a rise in lone wolf terrorism — individuals who act alone, without direct support from any group or network.</p><p>The 2019 Global Terrorism Index noted a rise in ‘Lone Wolf Terrorism,’ a term frequently used to describe far-right mass shootings carried out by individuals who have radicalized themselves or been radicalized online. Historical data shows that the number of attacks by unaffiliated individuals is increasing. In the mid-1970s, unaffiliated attacks made up 5% of all terrorist attacks, compared to 70% between 2014 and 2018.</p><p>It begs the question of why is this style of attack increasing and is it just the far right carrying them out? I am going to explore some different cases, Oklahoma in 1995, Fort Hood in 2009 and Christchurch in 2019.</p><p>The term ‘Lone Wolf” can be defined as “a person who acts on his or her own without orders from — or even connections to — an organization” (Bruton and Stewart, 2008).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/727/1*AYW_96jvRQFd5YheEPUNvA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The devastation caused to the Murrah Building 1995</figcaption></figure><p>Whenever you have a mass casualty event such as the Murrah Building bombing in Oklahoma City, the assumption is always there’s got to be multiple people involved. The idea that Timothy McVeigh was a lone killer is incorrect because it absolves the movement from which it all sprang. McVeigh was not on his own. He was the creation of the white supremisict movement. McVeigh is often portrayed as the stereotypical “lone wolf”, the individual who acts alone without the support or direction of any person, group or ideology.</p><p>However, a closer examination of his background and the events leading up to the Oklahoma City bombing suggests a more nuanced picture. His anti-government stance started with his experiences during the Gulf War, where he served in the Army. McVeigh witnessed firsthand the devastation caused by the conflict, including the loss of civilian lives and the destruction of infrastructure. This experience left a profound impact on McVeigh, leading him to question the morality of war and the actions of his own government. He became disillusioned with the military and the government, viewing them as corrupt and oppressive.</p><p>This disillusionment was further exacerbated by the events at Ruby Ridge, where an FBI siege resulted in the deaths of a woman and her son, and Waco, where a standoff between the Branch Davidians and federal agents led to a deadly fire and the deaths of 76 people, including many children. McVeigh saw these events as examples of more government overreach and abuse of power, which fueled his anti-government sentiments. McVeigh believed that the government was becoming increasingly authoritarian and that it was his duty to resist it.</p><p>It turned out he was not alone in his beliefs or his plan of action. He had help from both Terry Nichols and Michael Fortier, who helped McVeigh acquire materials and construct the bomb that would be used in the attack. On April 19, 1995, McVeigh along with Nichols, parked a rented Ryder truck filled with explosives outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City. At 9:02 a.m, the truck exploded, killing 168 people, including 19 children, and injured hundreds more. To this day, the bombing remains the worst act of domestic terrorism in U.S. history.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/880/1*ZkKrs52pGcYGn6SjC1GQFg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Timothy McVeigh outside Mt Carmel, Waco 1993</figcaption></figure><p>In the aftermath of the bombing, McVeigh was quickly identified as a suspect and was arrested within days. He was charged, tried, and convicted of 11 federal offenses, including conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction and the use of a weapon of mass destruction. He was sentenced to death and executed by lethal injection on June 11, 2001 at United States Penitentiary, Terre Haute, in Indiana.</p><p>McVeigh was part of a broader network of individuals who shared his anti-government views and who were similarly radicalized by these events. Therefore, while McVeigh may have been the one who ultimately carried out the attack, he was not acting in isolation, and his actions were not solely the result of his own personal grievances. Instead, they were part of a larger movement that was motivated by a shared ideology and that was fueled by a sense of outrage over what was perceived as government overreach and abuse of power.</p><p>Let’s switch gears and talk about mass shootings. Are the individuals behind these attacks considered ‘lone wolves’?”</p><p>On November 5th, 2009, Nidal Malik Hassan entered Fort Hood, killed 13 people and injured over 30. It would become known as the worst mass killing at a US army base in history.</p><p>Like McVeigh, Hasan is often portrayed as a lone wolf. However, his case is more complex. Hasan had a history of expressing extremist views, including statements in support of violent jihad, and he had corresponded with Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical imam known for his ties to al-Qaeda. This radicalization is far from a solitary process and it was further influenced by his disillusionment with the U.S. military, even though he was a trained Army psychiatrist. He believed the U.S. Army was engaged in unjust wars against Muslims.</p><p>Despite these warning signs, the attack at Fort Hood was not prevented. Hasan entered a medical processing center at Fort Hood armed with a semi-automatic pistol. He fired more than 100 rounds and witnesses described the scene as chaotic, with Hasan methodically targeting victims as they tried to flee or hide. The attack lasted approximately 10 minutes before Hasan was shot and wounded by police officers, ending the rampage.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5lBpTBKyMdLETq5degf0jw.jpeg" /><figcaption>The aftermath of the Fort Hood attack 2009</figcaption></figure><p>Similar to McVeigh, Hasan’s actions at Fort Hood were ultimately carried out by him alone, but they were influenced by a combination of factors, including his interactions with his imam and his disillusionment with the U.S. military.</p><p>There were several missed opportunities to intervene, including Hasan’s interactions with his imam and his internet communications with Awlaki, which were known to the FBI. Additionally, Hasan’s behavior and statements while he was stationed at Fort Hood raised concerns among his colleagues, but these concerns were not adequately addressed.</p><p>The failure to prevent the attack highlights the importance of effective communication and coordination among U.S. security services and the need for a comprehensive approach to countering violent extremism.</p><p>For me, after exploring the cases in this piece, I don’t agree with the term lone wolf because it makes the character out to be someone who acts totally and utterly alone when that is simply not the case. The Internet, speeches, books, music can all influence us to do different things. The same can be said for terrorism and this is why lone wolf is a contested term in the field of terrorism studies.</p><p>It is for this reason I believe a lone wolf must visit the salad bar in order for the term to make sense.</p><p>We all know what a salad bar is: a variety of fresh foods, allowing diners to select and customize their meal according to their preferences. In the context of terrorism, this can mean that individuals draw from various ideologies or justifications to create their own rationale for engaging in violent acts. I find it interesting that Timothy McVeigh and Nidal Hasan shared a similar grievance with The Army as they saw it was unjust in its military actions in the Middle East.</p><p>This played a significant role in their radicalization and ultimately led to their violent acts on U.S. soil. In both cases, they were not formally affiliated with any terrorist organization, but they were influenced by a combination of personal grievances, political beliefs, and religious or ideological motivations. This “salad bar” approach allowed them to construct their own justifications for their violent actions, drawing from a variety of sources to create a worldview that justified violence.</p><p>​​This was the case with the Christchurch shooter in 2019 which provides a stark example of the ‘salad bar’ approach to terrorism. Like Timothy McVeigh and Nidal Hasan, the shooter was not affiliated with any terrorist organization but was influenced by a combination of factors.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zWChDCPEASxUxmyJOrLdkw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Brenton Tarrant shown on his livestream March 15, 2019 before entering a mosque</figcaption></figure><p>Brenton Tarrant was radicalized online, consuming and sharing far-right extremist content that fueled his anti-immigrant, Islamophobic, and white supremacist beliefs. Despite posting racist and violent content across various social media platforms, security services failed to recognize the increasing radicalization and threat he posed.</p><p>His ideology, rationale and self-justification for the impending atrocity was laid out in his 74 page manifesto, which he emailed to New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and approximately 70 media outlets. One of Tarrant’s strategic objectives, as detailed in his manifesto, was to “provoke violence, retaliation, and deepen the divide between the European population and those he viewed as occupying European territory.”</p><p>On March 15, 2019, armed with a shotgun and a semi-automatic rifle, he entered two mosques. Tarrant live-streamed the horrific assault on Facebook through a Go-Pro on his helmet, as he targeted innocent worshippers during Friday prayers. The attack, which lasted approximately 17 minutes, resulted in the deaths of 51 people and left dozens more injured. He was subsequently arrested and charged with multiple counts of murder, attempted murder, and terrorism.</p><p>Considering the anti-Muslim nature of Tarrant’s terrorism, his manifesto contains fewer references to Islam than one might anticipate. Instead, Tarrant emphasized the racist, xenophobic, and anti-immigration aspects of his ideology. While he undoubtedly conflated Muslims with immigrants and immigration, his primary concern appeared to be biology rather than faith.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5mu5nh8_5OF61oMosIpT5w.jpeg" /><figcaption>The aftermath of the Christchurch Massacre 2019</figcaption></figure><p>The failure of security services to detect and prevent the Christchurch attack despite the shooter’s online activity underscores the challenges of countering lone wolf terrorism. It is a reminder that radicalization can happen online and that individuals who self-radicalize can pose a significant threat.</p><p>Today, you can find any number of sources to connect with your worldview from the comfort of your own bedroom. We also witnessed this with Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, who carried out the 2016 Nice truck attack in France. Lahouaiej-Bouhlel drove a truck into a crowd celebrating Bastille Day, killing 86 people and injuring over 400 others. While Lahouaiej-Bouhlel was not formally affiliated with any terrorist organization, he was inspired by ISIS propaganda and had expressed support for the group’s ideology. His attack was considered an act of terrorism, and he was shot and killed by police at the scene.</p><p>To wrap up the “salad bar” approach to terrorism studies, I have shown it highlights the complexity of individual radicalization and the importance of considering multiple factors when examining violent acts. The cases of Timothy McVeigh, Nidal Hasan and Brenton Tarrant illustrate how individuals can draw from a variety of influences and ideologies to construct their own justifications for violence.</p><p>While they were not formally affiliated with any terrorist organization, they were influenced by a combination of personal grievances, political beliefs, and religious or ideological motivations. I believe it can be said attacks may be increasing due to the increase in accessibility to radicalizing material and attacks are not just exclusive to the far right.</p><p>This is why the future of social media and censorship is a highly contested subject worldwide. The acquisition of Twitter by Elon Musk has reignited the debate, as it has opened the floodgates for unregulated content to be posted on the platform. This is reminiscent of 4chan and 8chan, which the Christchurch shooter was known to frequent. The lack of regulation and moderation on these platforms has allowed extremist content to snowball the spread of hate speech.</p><p>To prevent future tragedies like the Oklahoma City bombing, the Fort Hood shooting, or the Christchurch attack, several measures must be considered. First, social media platforms must prioritize the removal of extremist content and hate speech. This would involve implementing more robust content moderation algorithms and hiring more human moderators to review flagged content and to keep up with the ever increasing amount of content being posted.</p><p>Second, there has to be greater collaboration between social media companies, law enforcement agencies, and intelligence services to identify and track individuals who are at risk of radicalization.</p><p>Third, governments must introduce legislation that holds social media companies accountable for the content posted on their platforms, similar to the proposed Online Safety Bill in the UK. Finally, there needs to be greater emphasis on education and awareness, both in schools and online, to teach children how to critically evaluate and resist extremist propaganda.</p><p>In conclusion, the future of social media and censorship is a complex and multifaceted issue. While there are no easy solutions, it is clear that action must be taken to prevent the spread of extremist content and hate speech online.</p><p>We have been talking about this for decades, after multiple attacks worldwide, but, by implementing stricter content moderation, enhancing collaboration between stakeholders, and promoting education and awareness, we can work towards creating a safer and more responsible online environment.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ffa3e6e57ab6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/a-lone-wolf-walks-into-a-salad-bar-ffa3e6e57ab6">A Lone Wolf Walks into a Salad Bar</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief">The Strategic Brief</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Curious Case of Côte d’Ivoire: Security Serenity Beneath the Sahel]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/the-curious-case-of-c%C3%B4te-divoire-security-serenity-beneath-the-sahel-aaef81bb6776?source=rss----2d2623a64713---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aaef81bb6776</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cote-divoire]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[al-qaeda]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[islamic-extremism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sahel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ivory-coast]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Costello]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2025 10:20:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-14T15:58:58.214Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*1l_PK-3JFlyTogCL" /></figure><p>When we think about Côte d’Ivoire, terrorism and extremism do not come to mind. Their love of soccer, rich cocoa production history and the impressive Church of her lady of Peace (the biggest church in the world) are more commonly attributed. What is lesser known is the country’s grapple with civil war over the last quarter century.</p><p>The West African country however has been a peaceful utopia compared to the stormy sea of islamic extremism that threatens them to the north and further across the Sahel. The fact that the door to the ever growing threat surrounding the former French colony has largely been kept shut is impressive on many fronts. I am going to explore why, how and if the wider region can take notes from this geopolitical diamond in the rough.</p><p>The Sahel region of Africa has been plagued by security concerns, particularly in recent years. One of the key factors contributing to instability in the region is the presence of Islamic extremism. Groups like Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province have carried out numerous attacks in the region, targeting civilians, government officials, and security forces. These groups have exploited local grievances, such as poverty, marginalization, and corruption, to recruit fighters and gain support.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*PC8J7KH7bmbQnu4FLRXBtw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Additionally, the Sahel is a strategic transit route for arms and illicit goods, making it a lucrative area for criminal and terrorist organizations. The presence of extremist groups in the Sahel has had devastating consequences for the region, leading to displacement, economic hardship, and loss of life. Addressing the root causes of extremism and promoting development and stability in the Sahel is crucial to addressing security concerns in the region.</p><p>Which is exactly what the Ivory Coast has achieved.</p><p>Ivory Coast, also known as Côte d’Ivoire, is located on Africa’s western coast. It shares borders with Guinea, Libera, Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana and the Gulf of Guinea. Its capital, Yamoussoukro, is located in the center of the country along with the economic capital, Abidjan located on the coast. The north is largely islamic and the south is largely christian.</p><p>After the country’s independence from France in 1960, their economy grew for the next two decades due to rich exports of coffee and cocoa. This changed in the 1980’s when prices fell, causing a domino effect in the country, culminating in social and political turmoil which lasted until 2011. In 2020, Ivory Coast was still the world’s largest exporter of cocoa beans.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/998/1*Y4-sIMzdM6zXudwcyhru7w.jpeg" /></figure><p>Civil war first took hold in the country in late 2002. It turned into a 5 year conflict and saw more than 3000 combatants and civilians killed. The two sides of the conflict were the central government of the Ivory Coast, led by President Laurent Gbagbo and supported by France and the United States. Gbagbo also recruited the Young Patriots of Abidjan militia. The rebels, led by Guillaume Soro and called the Forces Nouvelles de Côte d’Ivoire (the New Forces) were supported by Russia, Bulgaria, and Burkina Faso.</p><p>This effectively split the country into the Muslim rebel-held north and government-controlled Christian south. The rebellion, which ignited the war, was driven by forces which sought a re-run of the 2000 election and reform of exclusionary citizenship policies, named Ivorite. This incendiary piece of legislation included making it compulsory to have both parents of Ivorian descent in order to run or vote in an Ivorian election.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*AK-d9Q1TKOiuiVUoomwVJg.jpeg" /></figure><p>The conflict saw intervention from both France and the UN, which largely helped reduce violence by 2004 but could not find a suitable source of peace. The Ivory Coast national football team has also been credited with helping to secure this agreement when, after qualifying for the 2006 World Cup, they called on all sides to negotiate a peace deal. An extensive political settlement was finally reached in 2007, when Gbagbo and the New Forces signed the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.</p><p>I believe the first conflict is fascinating for the simple reason it was based on exclusionary ethnicity based policy, rather than the stereotypical religious schism that one would think. The policy of Ivorite led to the disqualification of the northern presidential candidate Alassane Ouattara, who claimed to represent the predominantly Muslim north.</p><p>I don’t think it’s naive to comment on the fact this policy was no more an act to secure political votes, rather than a deliberate act to pit Islam and Christianity against each other. The Ivory Coast was a tinderbox waiting for a spark which came in the form of nationalism and, in an increased form, elections based on ethnic distinctions. This was especially dangerous because such ideologies tend to flourish in situations of political uncertainty and economic collapse, two qualities the Ivory Coast unfortunately possessed at that time.</p><p>Peace returned to everyday life in the Ivory Coast until 2011 when elections reignited political tensions for a second time. It turned into a 5 month conflict and even though this is a fraction of the time of the first civil war, the casualty count was astronomical with over 3000 people killed and 500,000 people displaced.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/1*aZxzwCOZlYGaa3o81jgGWw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The conflict was initiated by the disputed 2010 Ivorian presidential election. Presidential candidate Alassane Ouattara was declared the winner of the contest but President Gbagbo immediately disputed the results claiming that there was extensive voter fraud. The international community, which included the United States, the European Union, the African Union, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), all supported Ouattara and urged Gbagbo to step down.</p><p>He refused and his followers soon resorted to violence. The conflict officially ended with the capture of Gbagbo by the Côte d’Ivoire military on 11 April 2011. This paved the way for a recovery process, including the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission.</p><p>Côte d’Ivoire has a history of successful peacebuilding efforts. Since the end of the civil war, the government has worked to promote reconciliation and peacebuilding, including through the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which seeks to identify root causes of the conflict, patterns and types of violations, and strategies to fulfill victims’ rights.</p><p>The TRC was set up in 2011 to investigate human rights abuses and other violations that occurred during the civil war, and to promote reconciliation and healing among the country’s various ethnic and religious groups. The TRC conducted extensive hearings and collected testimonies from victims and perpetrators of violence, and produced a final report with recommendations for reconciliation and justice.</p><p>Côte d’Ivoire is well on its back to pre civil war life. The country benefits from a relatively strong economy, which has helped to maintain stability. The government has worked to promote economic growth and create jobs, which has helped to reduce poverty and improve living standards. A number of programs aimed at reducing poverty and improving living standards, including initiatives to support small-scale farmers and entrepreneurs, and to provide access to education and healthcare have been a part of this effort.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AGcD9oW0-7x4fop0VNdctQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>This is reflected in a World Bank report which indicates the Ivory Coast’s gross domestic product has increased from under $43 billion in 2013 to almost $70 billion today. With an annual growth rate of 6–7%, the country is poised to become the second-largest economy in the region, after Nigeria.</p><p>Overall, the Ivory Coast has managed to avoid the level of violence that has plagued many other countries in the Sahel region, thanks to a stable government, a relatively strong economy, and a history of successful peacebuilding efforts. However, challenges remain, including ongoing security threats from armed groups and the potential for political instability.</p><p>This was witnessed in the city of Grand Bassam on the southeast coast, which is now infamous for one of the most recent and deadly Al-Qaeda attacks on Africa’s west coast. A group of 3 men stormed the tourist beach in 2016 and fatally gunned down 19 people and injured dozens more. Al-Qaeda’s North African affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, claimed responsibility the same day for the attack. It was stated that the attack was in retaliation to military operations in the Sahel by France and its allies, and that it targeted Côte d’Ivoire for handing over its fighters to Mali.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/870/1*HAesOF14bAgj2B_l0QgG4A.jpeg" /></figure><p>The attack however has not dampened security efforts. In January 2024, ​​US Secretary of State Antony Blinken commended the Ivory Coast for adopting a less militarized approach to security during his four-nation tour aimed at uniting African democracies amid regional crises. He also announced the US would provide an additional $45m to West African nations as part of a plan to battle instability, bringing total funding under the year-old programme to nearly $300m.</p><p>In conclusion, The Ivory Coast has been proactive in bolstering its security measures to combat the threat of Islamic terrorism. It has implemented a multifaceted approach, including strengthening its military capabilities, enhancing intelligence gathering and sharing, and engaging in regional and international collaborations. Additionally, the government has focused on addressing the underlying grievances that can lead to radicalization, such as poverty and marginalization.</p><p>These efforts have helped to minimize the threat of Islamic terrorism in the Ivory Coast, although challenges remain, including the need for continued vigilance and ongoing cooperation with neighboring countries and international partners.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aaef81bb6776" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/the-curious-case-of-c%C3%B4te-divoire-security-serenity-beneath-the-sahel-aaef81bb6776">The Curious Case of Côte d’Ivoire: Security Serenity Beneath the Sahel</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief">The Strategic Brief</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Fighting for Freedom Abroad, Denying Refuge at Home]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/fighting-for-freedom-abroad-denying-refuge-at-home-a-western-paradox-1ca569623cd7?source=rss----2d2623a64713---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1ca569623cd7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[misinformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[migrant-crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Costello]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2025 10:20:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-22T15:42:33.732Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*klJC97Oy4vHDIQd86EPj3g.jpeg" /></figure><p>In the past decade, we have witnessed a significant increase in global conflicts, from the devastating civil war in Syria to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. These conflicts have not only shaped the geopolitical landscape we live in today, but have also sparked a resurgence of a unique phenomenon: the emergence of Western volunteers who travel thousands of miles to fight for causes they believe in.</p><p>Throughout history, from the French Foreign Legion, established in 1831 and still active today, to the International Brigades of the Spanish Civil War, there have been numerous instances where nations at war have eagerly accepted the assistance of foreign volunteers. These volunteers were either organized into special units or integrated into existing ones, highlighting a long-standing tradition of international solidarity in times of conflict.</p><p>At the same time, these conflicts have forced millions of people to flee their homes, seeking refuge in the very countries from which these volunteers come from. However, due to the rise of anti refugee sentiment online and in the political sphere which has manifested to violence on the streets of the U.K and Europe, I believe this juxtaposition of Westerners voluntarily entering war zones while simultaneously protesting the arrival of refugees highlights a complex and often contradictory set of attitudes towards war, freedom, and humanitarianism.</p><p>For some Westerners, the call to fight in foreign conflicts is irrefutable. Driven by a sense of justice, ideological alignment, or a desire for adventure, these individuals willingly leave behind the safety and comfort of their homes to join the fight in remote parts of the world. To avoid any confusion with the term mercenary, many foreign volunteers prefer to remain unpaid and self-funded during their deployment. Thus, I use the term “volunteer” throughout this piece.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*5yY3j4uxuDUcXqJJiQTHaA.jpeg" /></figure><p>In Syria, Western volunteers joined Kurdish forces in the fight against ISIS, motivated by the desire to combat extremism and protect vulnerable communities. They were integrated into various groups, including the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), the People’s Defense Forces (HPG), the International Freedom Battalion (IFB), and the Civil Protection Units (YPS).</p><p>Similarly, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has attracted Western volunteers who view the struggle as pivotal for the defense of democracy and freedom. Many of these volunteers serve in the International Legion’s battalions, while more experienced individuals join smaller, specialized units outside of the Legion.</p><p>While it was not illegal for U.S. citizens to join the YPG, the group’s international standing complicates matters. The YPG, an ally of the U.S. in the ground war in Syria, has played a crucial role in driving ISIS out of northern Syria by providing the majority of ground forces. However, Turkey, a NATO ally, views the YPG as an extension of a designated terrorist organization that threatens its sovereignty.</p><p>This current wave of Western volunteers fighting against ISIS began in the summer of 2014 and reached a pivotal moment in October 2017 with the conclusion of the Battle for Raqqa, ISIS’s de facto capital in Syria.</p><p>While these volunteers are willing to risk their lives on foreign battlegrounds, their fellow citizens often react very differently when the consequences of these conflicts arrive on their doorstep. The wars in Syria and Ukraine have produced an unprecedented refugee crisis, with millions fleeing violence and persecution in search of safety. Yet, the response in many Western countries has been far from welcoming.</p><p>In Europe and North America, the arrival of refugees has sparked heated debates and, in some cases, outright hostility. The very nations that champion human rights and democracy abroad often struggle to extend those same principles to those seeking refuge within their borders.</p><p>This dichotomy, of supporting military intervention or voluntary engagement in foreign wars while resisting the humanitarian fallout, raises difficult questions about the consistency of Western values. How can we reconcile the willingness to fight for freedom abroad with the reluctance to provide sanctuary to those displaced by war?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZemxnGUlWHgQ3TQcByvp5A.jpeg" /></figure><p>The irony of this situation is stark. Western volunteers who fight for causes they believe in are celebrated, while refugees fleeing the violence of those same conflicts are met with suspicion and resistance. This contradiction reveals a deep cognitive dissonance in the way the West approaches war and humanitarianism.</p><p>The motivations behind these opposing actions are complex. For some, fighting in foreign conflicts is seen as a direct way to contribute to a cause, an active form of engagement that satisfies a need for purpose or adventure.</p><p>On the other hand, accepting refugees may be perceived as a passive, burdensome responsibility that threatens social and economic stability. The former is often romanticized, while the latter is viewed through a lens of fear and scarcity.</p><p>In the last decade, the fear and suspicion surrounding refugees have been exacerbated by rogue data and misinformation. Media and political leaders play a crucial role in shaping these narratives. Refugees are frequently depicted as faceless hordes, their stories reduced to statistics, and their dignity overshadowed by discussions of borders and security.</p><p>Online influencers have weaponized the issue of immigration with disinformation and racist conspiracy theories, including the “great replacement” theory that predicts the replacement of white populations by nefarious global forces. This rhetoric has led to protests against refugee resettlement and made xenophobia a prominent topic of discussion.</p><p>Disinformation and conspiracy theories targeting immigrants and religious or ethnic minorities have long been tools for radicalizing individuals, often leading to violent incidents, such as the mosque attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2019, and the supermarket shooting in Buffalo, New York, in 2022.</p><p>When these falsehoods resonate, they capture greater attention, making it increasingly difficult to disprove the misleading or false claims they propagate.</p><p>Political rhetoric often deepens these narratives. Leaders who advocate for strict national borders and reduced immigration appeal to fears of cultural shifts and economic uncertainty. In contrast, those who support military interventions or volunteer efforts abroad are often commended for their dedication to global justice. In the U.S., Donald J. Trump has made the influx of refugees and migrants a focal point in this year’s presidential campaign.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bfDI-2MCKs_9hedTCm0Lbg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Similarly, in 2022, the UK passed a policy in Parliament aimed at deterring migrants by deporting those arriving by boat to Rwanda, where their asylum claims could be processed. These individuals would then be permanently barred from re-entering the UK.</p><p>This policy reinforces the perception that taking action abroad is honorable, while addressing humanitarian responsibilities at home is burdensome. It’s worth noting that, to date, not a single migrant has been forcibly removed from the UK and sent to Rwanda under this policy.</p><p>As we reflect on the comparison of Western volunteers and the refugee crisis, it becomes clear that a more consistent and compassionate approach is needed. If we are to truly uphold the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights, we must be willing to extend those principles to all aspects of our engagement with global conflicts, both on the frontline and at our borders.</p><p>Rather than viewing these actions as separate, we should recognize the interconnectedness of war and humanitarianism. The decision to fight for a cause abroad should come with an acknowledgment of the responsibility to support those displaced by that same conflict. In doing so, we can begin to bridge the gap between our ideals and our actions, fostering a more just and humane response to the challenges of our time.</p><p>I’d like to close with a tribute to the man who inspired this piece: Pete Reed, a former U.S. Marine who became a frontline humanitarian medic. In February 2023, Pete was killed by a Russian missile strike while treating wounded Ukrainian civilians in Bakhmut. He had previously led medical teams with the Kurdish Peshmerga during the Battle for Mosul.</p><p>Pete embodied what it means to be a volunteer on the frontline. He willingly placed himself in harm’s way, not for glory or recognition, but out of an unwavering belief in the value of every human life.</p><p>His dedication to providing care under fire, often with limited resources, exemplified a profound courage — one that placed the well-being of others above his own safety.</p><p>Pete Reed’s legacy serves as a poignant reminder of the extraordinary sacrifices made by those who choose to stand on the front lines of conflict, armed not with weapons, but with the tools of healing and hope.</p><p>His story calls us to reflect on the true meaning of bravery and the deep sense of responsibility that should guide our actions, both abroad and at home.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1ca569623cd7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief/fighting-for-freedom-abroad-denying-refuge-at-home-a-western-paradox-1ca569623cd7">Fighting for Freedom Abroad, Denying Refuge at Home</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-strategic-brief">The Strategic Brief</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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