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        <title><![CDATA[useanalyst1 - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Analyst1 bridges the gap between threat information and actionable intelligence. As a platform with a contextualized knowledge base reciprocally enriching data with various cyber security tools, teams within cyber operations centers are empowered to act together with Analyst1. - Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lies from the DarkSide: Ransomware Gang Lied About Pipeline Attack]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/useanalyst1/lies-from-the-darkside-ransomware-gang-lied-about-pipeline-attack-b3780f655cc6?source=rss----b2cc5b224e37---4</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dark-side]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[colonial-pipeline]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russian-hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jon DiMaggio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 May 2021 16:41:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-14T16:41:22.485Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*msxgcV8qMlO-SAHq.jpg" /></figure><p>In May 2021, DarkSide, a Russian criminal gang, hacked Colonial Pipeline, the organization responsible for the largest Gas pipeline spanning the east coast of the United States. However, the gang soon backtracked, claiming they did not intentionally hack the organization. Instead they claimed it was an accidental infection caused by the gang’s partner affiliate, who assisted in the attack for a share of the ransom profit.</p><p><em>“From today we introduce moderation and check each company that our partners want to encrypt to avoid social consequences in the future.” -DarkSide Ransomware Gang</em>.</p><p>However, their statement is not valid. DarkSide predetermines and selects every target before an attack and creates individual ransomware payloads for each. The payload infects and encrypts victim data and generates the ransom note. Each ransom note is tailored to the specific victim and includes a unique key and URL as seen in Figure 1:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*oyD1xUKNeNePt6EM" /></figure><p>Figure1: Ransom note with unique victim key and website URL</p><p>With the key, URL and payload compiled before the attack, DarkSide had to be aware of who they were attacking prior to attack execution. This is also a major attack locking down an entire network of operational systems and not some accidental infection of a few computers. Even without the evidence presented, it’s hard to fathom an attack of this magnitude could be conducted accidentally.</p><p>Without the unique key and URL, negotiations cannot begin. Using a key prevents researchers or the media from establishing communications or pretending to be the victim in an attempt to extract information from the attacker. Pre-populating a key into each ransom note and payload indicates the attacker has to select the victim intentionally. <strong>Therefore, the DarkSide group itself, not the affiliates, are responsible for the ransomware payload.</strong> DarkSide had to create the payload for the Pipeline victim specifically.</p><p>Figure 2 below shows the key authentication window presented after the victim clicks on the unique URL included in their ransom note.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/859/0*f2tA8nfEm-SOnheQ" /></figure><p>Figure2: DarkSide victim key authentication window</p><p><strong>Pre-Populated Data Posts</strong></p><p>Another unique tactic used by DarkSide is how they populate victim data and messages to their data leak site. According to the ransom note, “<em>The data is preloaded and will be automatically published if you do not pay.</em>” DarkSide pre-loads victim data after theft to populate their data leak site once a predetermined time passes. If the victim pays, DarkSide halts the process. If not, it automatically releases a post leaking victim data. This, however, did not happen with the Colonial Pipeline attack. The attacker likely decided not to post data due to the backlash from the US government after the attack took place. The attacker may want to leave themselves plausible deniability due to the amount of attention the attack generated.</p><p><strong>Activity Decline</strong></p><p>The volume of victim data leak posts significantly reduced in May 2021. It’s worth noting at the time of this writing: there have only been twelve days in May to compare against other months. However, the DarkSide attacker has only made one post to their data leak site in May. In comparison, within the first twelve days of April, DarkSide made eight posts, releasing small amounts of victim data. Similarly, DarkSide made a much higher volume of posts from January through March, as seen in Figure 3 below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/361/0*Z_5bYC-GKXIwH8Ta" /></figure><p>The DarkSide gang also “pinned” two older victim posts to the top of their victim list in May after the Pipeline attack took place. Yet, Darkside has still not posted any of the Pipeline data. The discrepancy may be an attempt to give the appearance operations are continuing as usual.</p><p>Additionally, due to the post DarkSide made to their website about the attack, many media outlets and researchers question whether DarkSide and the Russian government are affiliated with one another. The DarkSide gang insinuates they have no Russian government affiliation in a post they made to their website’s press section on May 10th. The message is displayed in Figure 4 below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*9y0JHWx47-vJnxpq" /></figure><p>Figure 4: DarkSide post regarding the pipeline attack</p><p>On 13 May, fuel once again began to flow through the pipeline delivering gas across the east coast. As Colonial reinstated pipeline operations, President Biden released an executive order addressing new cybersecurity requirements and standards intended to improve the security posture of federal government computer networks and systems. While all of this took place, DarkSide’s infrastructure mysteriously went down. Sometimes adversaries move their infrastructure; however, this does not appear to be the case. Instead, DarkSide’s data leak site no longer resolves. It’s unclear what happened, but a US government takedown operation is certainly plausible.</p><p><strong>Closing</strong></p><p>Despite the attempt to distance themselves from the Russian government, it’s worth noting the aftereffect of the Pipeline disruption fits nicely with Russian tactics used in the past (e.g., attacks against Ukraine, Georgia, Estonia, etc.). This type of attack causes major gas outages resulting in panic and doubt regarding the victim government’s ability to protect critical infrastructure. All of this fits the Russian government’s playbook of cyber operations. For now, we must treat this as a criminal attack as more evidence is needed to make any government-affiliated attribution. However, even if criminals are the only perpetrator, the claim the attack is accidental, is laughable and simply not true.</p><p><em>*You can find the related indicators of compromise </em><a href="https://analyst1.com/blog/lies-from-the-darkside-ransomware-gang-lied-about-pipeline-attack"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b3780f655cc6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/useanalyst1/lies-from-the-darkside-ransomware-gang-lied-about-pipeline-attack-b3780f655cc6">Lies from the DarkSide: Ransomware Gang Lied About Pipeline Attack</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/useanalyst1">useanalyst1</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Ransomware Gangs Move Toward Efficient Self-Automated Attacks]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/useanalyst1/ransomware-gangs-move-toward-efficient-self-automated-attacks-46fdf434afa5?source=rss----b2cc5b224e37---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/46fdf434afa5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[raas]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jon DiMaggio]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 May 2021 19:26:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-04T19:26:11.802Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fAMJ5b0yz7tLO2aIktduVw.jpeg" /></figure><p>In early April 2021, Analyst1 published a whitepaper analyzing a self-proclaimed ransom cartel. While conducting research for the whitepaper, we reviewed several ransomware gangs and their activities. Now, we want to expand on one of our findings, which poses an extreme threat to enterprise organizations. Since February 2020, three of the five ransomware variants we researched — Lockbit, Ryuk, and Conti variants — began adding new functionality to automate components of their attack. Gangs are introducing this functionality into their ransomware payloads to improve their efficiency, thereby shortening the time it takes to compromise victims. This benefits attackers in a couple of ways:</p><ol><li>Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) providers pay affiliates to conduct on-network activities that require human interaction to stage and compromise the environment. Gangs have realized they can eliminate these middlemen by automating affiliate-operated phases of their attacks. Currently, RaaS providers and affiliates share profits. If gangs can remove the affiliate dependency, then they can significantly increase their profits.</li><li>Today, most ransomware attackers spend anywhere from days to weeks in a victim’s environment. They spend their time staging and preparing the environment before executing the ransom payload. By optimizing their attacks and reducing the attack time from weeks to hours, attackers can significantly increase the volume of their operations. Naturally, this leads to an increase in revenue.</li></ol><p>In the Ransom Mafia whitepaper,1 we discuss how the Lockbit gang took advantage of unpatched VPN software present on public-facing victim infrastructure. In doing so, they ran the most efficient enterprise ransomware attack we have seen to date.2 The vulnerable software and brute force tactics allowed for the perfect storm; it provided the gang with administrative privileges in addition to remote access into the victim’s environment. From there, the ransomware payload issues an ARP request to identify and connect to additional hosts. The ransomware achieves this by leveraging the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol to access each connected system. Next, each new victim’s system issues a request to attacker C&amp;C infrastructure to download and execute the ransom payload, thereby reducing attacks from weeks to hours. Of course, the attack chain is more complex than we describe here, and we further detail it in our whitepaper. However, the primary takeaway is that with proper access, new automated features significantly reduce how long it takes the attacker to fully compromise a target.</p><p>Similarly, another gang known as Wizard Spider added new automation functionality to their Ryuk ransomware. In this instance, the ransomware can now automate host discovery and spread the ransom payload on its own. To accomplish this, Wizard Spider used a legitimate wake-on- LAN technology to discover all other hosts on the network. From there, they spread the ransomware payload, which removes most of the attacker&#39;s manual interaction.3 In addition to identifying hosts, the wake-on-LAN technology allows Wizard Spider to power on offline systems before executing the ransomware payload across all systems in the victim environment. This ensures that the attacker can infect all systems within the target environment. Again, this capability reduces overall attack time and greatly reduces the attacker’s own interaction.</p><p>Wizard Spider also conducts operations involving Conti ransomware. The gang added capabilities to Conti — the gang’s newest ransomware variant — to reduce attack time significantly. Similar to Lockbit, Conti also takes advantage of the SMB protocol to self- propagate in addition to scripts, which further automates the compromise. However, its developers found other novel methods to reduce attack timeframes. Conti’s developers understood that the quicker they could move from initial access to ransomware execution, the fewer opportunities defenders would have to mitigate the attack.</p><p>To maximize efficiency, Conti ransomware uses 32 simultaneous threads to encrypt files. This reduced the time required to encrypt large amounts of data from hours to minutes. Furthermore, another update to the Conti payload added a file selection process prior to encryption. Specifically, this capability allows the attacker to encrypt local, network, or all data found in a target’s environment. Organizations will often store important data on network drives to make it accessible to their teams who may need it. Additionally, this ransomware feature provides attackers with the ability to encrypt high-value networked data if they choose to — as opposed to encrypting everything. By doing so, the attacker spends less time and resources encrypting the locally stored data, which is often less critical to the operation. This and its multi-thread encryption process significantly shorten the attack timeline.</p><p><strong>What’s to come?</strong></p><p>Ransomware attackers’ immediate focus will center on identifying new and creative ways to quickly acquire administrative privileges. Secondly, gangs will continue adding more efficient automated capabilities into their ransomware payloads. The elevated privileges are necessary to automate the attack. As of today, these upgrades have not replaced all “human on keyboard” phases of the attack. However, attackers are quickly moving toward this goal. Based on the additions and upgrades geared toward attack efficiency which we observed over the last year, we will likely see fully automated ransomware attacks becoming the norm within the next two years. The best way to reduce the risk of these attacks is to ensure that all public facing infrastructure is secure and up-to-date. Analyst1 continues to monitor Ransomware attackers, and we will provide updates upon discovering new information.</p><p>Endnotes:</p><p><em>1. DiMaggio, Jon. “Ransom Mafia — Analysis of the World’s First Ransomware Cartel.” Analyst1, 07 Apr. 2021, </em><a href="https://analyst1.com/whitepaper/ransom-mafia-analysis-of-the-worlds-first-ransomware-cartel."><em>https://analyst1.com/whitepaper/ransom-mafia-analysis-of-the-worlds-first-ransomware-cartel.</em></a></p><p><em>2. Lopez, Marc Rivero and the ATR Operational Intelligence Team. “Tales From the Trenches; a Lockbit Ransomware Story.” McAfee, 30 Apr. 2020, </em><a href="https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/tales-from-the-"><em>https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/tales-from-the-</em></a><em> trenches-a-lockbit-ransomware-story/.</em></p><p><em>3. Abrams, Lawrence. “Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices.” Bleeping Computer, 14 Jan. 2020, </em><a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-"><em>https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-</em></a><em> offline-devices/.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=46fdf434afa5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/useanalyst1/ransomware-gangs-move-toward-efficient-self-automated-attacks-46fdf434afa5">Ransomware Gangs Move Toward Efficient Self-Automated Attacks</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/useanalyst1">useanalyst1</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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