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        <title><![CDATA[Workers Voice @ OECD - Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Commenting on the latest OECD reports, events and policies from a trade union perspective with inputs from the TUAC staff and other trade union representatives - Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[No rules in the Grey Zone : Platform workers at high risk during Covid-19 Pandemic]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/no-rules-in-the-grey-zone-platform-workers-at-high-risk-during-covid-19-pandemic-9d23e4a6e24?source=rss----19680cba31ac---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9d23e4a6e24</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gig-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[on-demand-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[future-of-work]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[platform-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Anna Byhovskaya]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2020 14:08:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-11-06T13:43:56.551Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>No rules in the Grey Zone : Platform workers at high risk during Covid-19 Pandemic</strong></h3><h4>Most non-standard workers are hit heavy by lock-down and social distancing measures during the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. Many platform workers belong to this group. They remain “on-demand” as they fulfill locally based, physical tasks via online platforms. Way before the Covid-19 outbreak most risks concerning their health, safety and income were borne by each of them individually. The pandemic just made matters worse.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/509/0*RoBR2ESBct9ExAF8" /></figure><p>The majority of workers, who deliver, drive, clean or repair, is not able to claim predictable and set pay levels and are treated as self-employed — despite evidence that they are not quite that. They are dependent on work supply via intermediary platforms, who set the parameters on prices and access to consumers (users). This results in a gap between the contractual link (self-employed) and the economic reality of the relationship between them. This has been debated at length and labelled as “grey zones” (among other <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/oecd-employment-outlook-2019_9ee00155-en">by the OECD</a>). Workers in these zones lack clarity on their rights and status. Some of them are suffering from a mis-classification of their employment relationship.</p><p>As such, California’s proposition 22 ballot going through is a major set-back to labour protections. Behind the ride-sharing platforms’ win are a whopping <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/akddx8/proposition-22s-victory-shows-how-uber-and-lyft-break-democracy">$203 million spent on their campaign</a>. With this, workers remain independent contractors without health insurance. They will receive stipends towards insurance. The voters’ decision will legally supersede the A.B. 5 law that would have given employee protections to gig workers.</p><p>Elsewhere, now more than ever revisiting the rules governing this grey zone is key. It can happen through the application of new or existing regulation (think proof of the employment relationship). It also can happen if major on-demand platforms themselves change their approach. Some platforms do offer good protection for workers, when they recognize them as employees (not as self-employed) or when they have a pay policy that observes established minimum wage levels, or in the very least, when they provide paid (sick) leave.</p><h4><strong>During the crisis …</strong></h4><p>The crisis impacted platform businesses very differently. Transaction volumes increased on online shopping, delivery and logistics platforms, decreased for ride-hailing platforms and dropped significantly for personal services. Some platforms are reportedly <a href="https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-economy/dossiers/developments-in-the-covid-19-crisis">down scaling their workforce </a>to cope with the drop in revenue. In that case what happens to workers who do not benefit from social and employment protection? When a ‘regular’ business closes or proceeds with layoffs, workers receive compensation. “Self-employed” workers on platforms don’t. The Fairwork Foundation estimates that <a href="https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-economy/dossiers/developments-in-the-covid-19-crisis">50 million platform workers globally have been affected by COVID-19</a> in spring, with half of them having lost their jobs and those still in work having lost two thirds of their income on average.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/509/0*Kc6b_hmsP_Orfrl7" /></figure><p><a href="https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bv8bxm/you-couldnt-swipe-fast-enough-how-the-covid-pandemic-devastated-instacart-workers-v27n3">Massive hirings</a> occurred in those segments where demand increased. These are due to low barriers to entry and the overall crisis situation — yet this increased demand will not be sustainable over time. We’ve seen this now with Instacart — a grocery delivery platform in the US. A record number of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/23/tech/instacart-hiring/index.html">300.000 new workers joined the platform in late Apri</a>l — presumably laid off from other sectors. Reports suggest that with falling demand, and the absence of minimum floors, workers are now starting to compete against one another for gigs on lower wages.</p><p>Globally speaking, platform workers have done what can be considered <strong>essential services</strong> during and beyond lock downs. And yet, most did not receive any hazard pay while doing so. Vulnerable workers<em> “</em><a href="https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-economy/dossiers/developments-in-the-covid-19-crisis"><em>with very low income continued their platform work in spite of the inherent health risk</em></a><em>”.</em> For that health risk to come by, the employer — in this case the ‘platform’ has to provide <a href="https://fair.work/fairwork-releases-report-on-platform-responses-to-covid-19/">regular, adequate, free provision of Personal protective equipment (PPE) </a>and ensure contact free supply chains and physical protection barriers.<strong> </strong>In spring, many platforms only took actions after health risks became glaringly apparent and workers started to voice their legitimate frustration. Media outlets picked up their concerns. The issue became a business risk. Hence, those that introduced measures do not need to be applauded for taking up their civic duty to protect the health of workers and consumers during a pandemic.<strong> </strong>Since, some workers have reported that they have not received promised PPE supplies or have not been reimbursed for purchases made on their own account.</p><p>In some cases, <strong>governments had to step in</strong> trying to fill in gaps in unemployment benefits and wage losses (see Denmark,UK or Italy). Local governments have covered paid sick leave elsewhere (Philadelphia, US). Occupational, Health and Safety authorities also took action (New South Wales, Australia). In Brazil, it took a court case to <a href="https://fair.work/the-uprising-of-brazilian-food-delivery-riders/">force a platform to provide PPE to workers</a>.</p><p>An <a href="http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/what-have-platforms-done-to-protect-workers-during-the-coronavirus-covid-19-crisis-9d1c7aa2/">OECD policy brief</a> released last month is displaying a range of measures taken by platforms during the pandemic (including the provision of protective equipment and of paid sick leave). The platform survey that the brief is based on was complemented by a workers’ survey showing quite mixed results:</p><p>‒ <em>Only 35% of respondents said that their platform(s) had taken measures to assist them during the pandemic and just under half of those 35% said that they were satisfied with the measures taken</em>.</p><p>‒ <em>Asked about the resources provided, more respondents said that it was easy/relatively easy (38%) to access these resources than those who said it was hard/relatively hard (30%)</em>.</p><p>Most platforms seem to have refrained from providing income loss compensation and none had allowed for worker representation. <a href="https://fair.work/fairwork-releases-report-on-platform-responses-to-covid-19/">According to the Fairwork Foundation</a>: “<em>Platforms have largely, with the exception of some which are providing some level of sick pay, left this to governments. Instead, platforms have focused mainly on preventive measures which are predominantly aimed at protecting and reassuring customers”. </em>This has been rightly labelled an <strong>incremental approach</strong>: “<em>Except, perhaps, for the introduction of sick pay, they have been incremental rather than radical in their responses. We see this incremental approach across the board, in the choices being made by some platforms: offering loans rather than grants to workers with financial difficulties; deferring rather than waiving loan repayments; simply telling workers to disinfect rather than monitoring that they do so; […] paying minimum sick pay rather than maintaining past earnings during illness.”</em></p><p>This fits the previous assumption that there is a business case to pursue some of the quintessential measures to keep demand up. And, that there is a business case not to change the business model as well. Meaning that providing PPE and possibly sick pay during a global pandemic does not equal re-assessing the employment relationship or reviewing working conditions. Many platforms would likely drive themselves out of the market if they were to pay labour costs. It’s just not in their interest.</p><h4><strong>… and beyond</strong></h4><p>It all points back to the elephant in the room: on-demand workers are mostly dependent workers and not at all self-employed. To be sure, some workers indeed seek self-employment and short-time gigs and want to retain all flexibility coming with that. But many others who work full- or part-time would surely qualify for the employee status. They should be entitled to get out of the “grey zone” but are not given that possibility.</p><p>Unrecognized employment relationships are a <strong>structural problem for platform workers</strong>. And, they are a structural benefit that allow platforms to save money. A survey of the Spanish trade union UGT has shown that platforms are saving ca. 5000 euros in social contributions per worker. Platform delivery riders in the UK earn at best around two-thirds of what a worker would earn even at the national minimum wage.</p><p>Trade unions have tried to address some of these issues. In doing so, they are faced with some barriers, including on the competition front. One of the first collective agreements in Denmark between a domestic workers’ platform and the 3F union allowed for flexibility and compromise. Workers could decide themselves if they wanted to obtain the employment status, while others could remain freelances — yet benefit from minimum fees. Unfortunately, the latter component is now being challenged by <a href="https://www.socialeurope.eu/collective-bargaining-rights-for-platform-workers">domestic antitrust legislation</a>. At the European level, there is hope that the new public consultation on allowing self-employed platform workers to bargain. If it does, agreements like this could become more prominent.</p><p>If nothing changes, most platforms would keep the same business model as before, one that puts risks on workers, but with minor adjustments at the margin, and ones that they can quickly reverse once the situation comes back to “normal” and pressure on them subsides.</p><p>What we need to see more of is:</p><p><strong>‒ Help with reducing costs by for example lowering intermediary fees or by increasing per-gig payments during the crisis;</strong></p><p><strong>‒ Pay that is in line with living or minimum wage standards, and income compensation in case of drops in demand or for health reasons including by introducing a general health insurance cover and sick pay;</strong></p><p><strong>‒ Unrestricted worker representation and engagement, and openness to consider employing full- and part-time workers based on their working hours.</strong></p><p>There are firms that have a genuine ambition to do the right thing. There are platforms who stopped claiming commissions during the crisis. There are those operating on an employee model (Foodora in Norway, Alto in the US). And, there are <a href="https://digitalplatformobservatory.org/initiative/austrian-collective-agreement-for-couriers/">few collective agreements</a> out there that set the right protections for workers including a minimum wage level.</p><p>The on-demand platform economy still has a long way to go. It is one that hopefully is more responsible using the crisis to reconsider some of the practices that made the industry grow initially.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9d23e4a6e24" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/no-rules-in-the-grey-zone-platform-workers-at-high-risk-during-covid-19-pandemic-9d23e4a6e24">No rules in the Grey Zone : Platform workers at high risk during Covid-19 Pandemic</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd">Workers Voice @ OECD</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Digital Transformation, the Future of Work, the Future of the Firm — Where does the OECD stand?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/digital-transformation-the-future-of-work-the-future-of-the-firm-where-does-the-oecd-stand-76a56e170103?source=rss----19680cba31ac---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/76a56e170103</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[future-of-work]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade-unions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-transformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[oecd]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Pierre Habbard]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2020 12:52:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-27T20:13:59.846Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Opening remarks at the ETUC/ETUI conference: <a href="https://www.etui.org/Events/ETUC-ETUI-conference-The-World-s-of-Work-in-Transition">The World(s) of Work in Transition</a>, 27–29 June 2018 Brussels</p><p>An industrial revolution is just starting and it is neither the first nor the last one confronting the labour movement and our economies. As we shift towards low-carbon, digitalised economies, 14% of existing jobs would be completely automated in the next 15–20 years. Another 40% would see their task content partially changed (<a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/fr/employment/automation-skills-use-and-training_2e2f4eea-en">OECD</a>).</p><p>As we know however, the distinctive feature of this technological revolution is that employment relations are seriously being challenged. Data-driven business models give employers even greater possibilities to monitor operations at arm’s length and for outsourcing.</p><p>Five years ago, the launch of the Dreamliner airplane by Boeing was an industrial failure, and it had an explanation at that time: Boeing had “outsourced too much” we were told. We can bet that with today’s data-driven businesses, such failure would not have happened. Outsourcing and fragmentation of business can reach new levels unseen before. New business models allow for a mismatch between the economic relationship and the contractual relationship that bind the worker to the employer. This obviously is of concern because the contractual relationship is what protects the worker from unbalanced power relations with the employers and what allows workers to access social benefits and protection.</p><p>And globalisation is serving as an accelerator to this mismatch by creating ever more complex and globalised production systems. To give an example: 90% of crowd work assignments come from advanced economies but 80% of the work is done in emerging economies (source OECD).</p><p>Any discussion on the Future of Work also calls for a broader conversation on the Future of the Firm. Digital-driven disruption affects the way we regulate, employment indeed, but also competition, tax and data privacy. It affects all the key stakeholders, those who hold a claim against the firm: workers, users, consumers, the tax collector among others. Under the combined effect of globalisation and digitalisation, the “boundaries” of the firm become less clearly defined — to whom is it accountable within its operations and in global supply chains? where are the profits located? how is corporate wealth distributed? These questions are increasingly becoming open-ended ones.</p><p>These transformations come at a time when we are still struggling against the broken social contract and decades-long structural reforms that have either deprived workers of minimum basic protection, or promoted a ‘flexicurity’ model that has delivered far more flexibility than security. They come at a time when levels of inequality are comparable to the 1930s in many countries, and when wage growth is persistently flat, no longer keeping pace with productivity growth.</p><p>They come when — ten years after the crisis — the recovery is at best fragile, entirely dependent on fiscal policy easing. Wage dynamics should be accelerating. <a href="https://tuac.org/news/release-of-the-oecd-economic-outlook-2018/">But they are not</a>. Employment creation is in low productivity jobs, dragging down further the wage productivity gap. Three out four jobs created in Europe are in jobs below national average labour productivity; four out of five in the US (source <a href="http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/low-productivity-jobs-driving-employment-growth-in-many-oecd-countries.htm">OECD</a>).</p><p>And the private sector is not playing its role as an engine of growth. With current interest rates, business investment should be booming. But it is not. There are for sure several reasons, including the uncertain economic outlook. But there is evidence of corporate short-termism. Instead of making productive investments, corporations are hoarding record returns, paying them out in shareholder dividends and share-buybacks, or channelling them into mergers and acquisitions. In 2017, in US S&amp;P 500 companies spent some USD1.2tr in shareholder dividends and share buybacks — more than the total amount spent in investments and R&amp;D.</p><p>And these transformations come at time when the foundations of multilateralism are being badly shaken — just as we need greater multilateral cooperation to overcome these common challenges.</p><p>This is the context in which we are conducting this conversation. So what do we need to do? Yes, we need to understand and anticipate on the quantitative impact of digital transformation and the disruptive nature of new business models. But we also need to deal with the legacy of past structural reforms that shifted risks from employers to workers, from the collective to the individual. And we must ensure that any conversation about the Future of Work extends to the Future of the Firm, and indeed the Purpose of the Firm.</p><p>Where does the OECD stand on all this? The OECD, and the G20 and G7 forums, sit high in the food chain of policy- making. What is discussed behind closed doors at the OECD often ends up on the menu here, in Brussels, or in the corridors of national parliaments.</p><p>The primary response of the OECD to the Future of Work question can be summed up that way: “skills! skills! skills! with an added layer of social safety nets”. Both are much needed we agree, but offer an incomplete response to the erosion of workers’ bargaining power. On labour market reform, the OECD has evolved from the old recipes of the past. Just weeks ago it adopted two blueprints for structural reform — <a href="http://www.oecd.org/mcm/documents/C-MIN-2018-7-EN.pdf">a revised Jobs Strategy</a>, and an <a href="http://www.oecd.org/mcm/documents/C-MIN-2018-5-EN.pdf">Inclusive Growth Framework</a> — as well as an interim report on its <a href="http://www.oecd.org/mcm/documents/C-MIN-2018-6-EN.pdf">Going Digital</a> initiative.</p><p>The OECD recommends considering “minimum wages as a tool to raise wages at the bottom” and promoting collective bargaining which in turn “can help to promote a broad sharing of productivity gains”.</p><p>The OECD is also discovering the virtues of social dialogue for a just transition to digitalisation and it is supporting the <a href="http://www.theglobaldeal.com/">Global Deal</a> initiative in partnership with the ILO. And it is taking steps toward a renewed discussion on the Future of the Firm, with its new <a href="https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0443">Due Diligence Guidance</a> that offers an authoritative framework for business responsibility within and beyond its legal perimeter. As the chair of the OECD WP on Responsible Business Conduct would say, “you can outsource your operations, but you can’t outsource your responsibilities”. And it has the right approach when it comes to corporate tax accountability, although perhaps the current BEPS plan has yet to deliver. It is not there yet with respect to curbing corporate short termism and promoting worker participation, although the discussion on the Future of the Firm continues to take shape at the OECD.</p><p>Now, let’s not be too enthusiastic or naive. There are many voices and perspectives at the OECD and in forums such as the G20 and the G7. And for sure, for every recommendation on job quality and security, there is a comparable one on individual flexibility and one on cutting regulatory burden for businesses.</p><p>Colleagues, we must maintain pressure and ensure the doors of the OECD rooms and of other global forums remain open. Our voice needs to be heard.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=76a56e170103" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/digital-transformation-the-future-of-work-the-future-of-the-firm-where-does-the-oecd-stand-76a56e170103">Digital Transformation, the Future of Work, the Future of the Firm — Where does the OECD stand?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd">Workers Voice @ OECD</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Regulating Big Tech, the Too-Big-To-Fail Way]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/regulating-big-tech-the-too-big-to-fail-way-45db7b9fce5b?source=rss----19680cba31ac---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/45db7b9fce5b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gafa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[taxes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade-unions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[oecd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Pierre Habbard]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2020 12:51:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-07T12:01:52.996Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong>There has been much talk about breaking up Big Tech, but not sufficiently at the international level — including at the OECD. The post-2008 financial reform agenda can be a source of inspiration as we move ahead.</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*slbtZmBrb_0DMVfyKbASkg.jpeg" /><figcaption>“Data centre panorama” by Bob West <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/38176485@N08/4171615158">https://www.flickr.com/photos/38176485@N08/4171615158</a></figcaption></figure><p>Top-heavy market concentration in the digital economy is well documented. It is evidenced by the OECD’s 2019 <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264312012-en.pdf?expires=1594135295&amp;id=id&amp;accname=ocid84004878&amp;checksum=B298B88B4AA322672599C960B51387D7">Going Digital</a> report. The risks that go with it are also well known. The <a href="https://www.ituc-csi.org/">ITUC</a>, the sister organisation of the <a href="http://www.tuac.org/">TUAC </a>at the international level, for example <a href="https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/digital_chapters_and_the_impact_on_labour_en.pdf">published a report in July</a> with the New Economics Foundation exposing the dangers of the current e-commerce discussions at the WTO. In the current state, the Big Tech have the upper hand.</p><p>Data is the new gold, the value of which is difficult to measure and the “GAFAs” are taking full advantage of that. Excessively powerful, economically and politically, they are capturing an enormous amount of wealth, but also enormous market power, with consequences for consumers and workers when this translates into data control and labour market monopsony — the latter being raised in the OECD <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/oecd-employment-outlook-2019_9ee00155-en">Employment Outlook 2019</a> .</p><p>And in fact, their CEOs agree. In July, Bezos, Zuckerberg, Cook and Pichai told the US Congress that they have <a href="https://on.ft.com/308ws9B">“too much power”</a>.</p><h3>TBTF 2008 versus GAFA 2020</h3><p>The spotlight is on the digital economy. Ten years ago, the banking sector was in a similar situation. Banks were considered “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) and also too-big-to-be-regulated, to be supervised, etc.</p><p>In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the G20 mandated the Financial Stability Board (FSB) “<a href="https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Policy-Measures-to-Address-Systemically-Important-Financial-Institutions.pdf">to address the systemic risks and the associated moral hazard problem for institutions that are seen by markets as TBTF</a>”. Since then, <a href="https://www.fsb.org/2019/11/2019-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-g-sibs/">an official list</a> of banks deemed TBTF is updated annually by the FSB. In June 2020, the FSB released a consultation report on <a href="https://www.fsb.org/2020/06/evaluation-of-the-effects-of-too-big-to-fail-reforms-consultation-report/">assessing the impact of TBTF reforms</a>. The report finds that the TBTF problem is not entirely resolved and that significant gaps remain. But the regulatory approach that was then adopted, and the international cooperation framework that went with it, were the right ones: devising specific rules, specific regulation and specific mechanisms to TBTF institutions, including:</p><ul><li>additional requirements coming on top of the general prudential rules Basel III (aka “total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements”)</li><li>additional supervision (including international colleges of national supervisory authorities);</li><li>additional authority for supervisors should things go wrong (aka “effective resolution regimes”).</li></ul><h3>The tax negotiations</h3><p>The policy discussions on the digital economy at large, and on Big Tech in particular, cover a wide spectrum from data privacy, to competition, tax, and cybersecurity. They are under way at national level and at European level. At the international level however, and pending the launch of negotiations at the WTO on e-commerce and aside from data privacy and protection, discussions on tax aspects are the most visible and most advanced. And for a reason: GAFAs are under-taxed.</p><p>At the end of 2015, the <a href="http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/151116-communique.html">G20 tasked the OECD to set up an “Inclusive Framework</a>” to implement the <a href="http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/">Base Erosion and Profit Shifting</a> corporate tax reform package agreed then, but also pursue further reform on tax and digitalisation. Over 130 countries have joined the Framework since then.</p><p>Today, the negotiations are organised around <a href="https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-by-the-oecd-g20-inclusive-framework-on-beps-january-2020.pdf">two complementary pillars</a> to “address the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy”. These are comparable to the post-2008 FSB process on banking regulation and TBTF. Akin to the revision of the Basel prudential regulation for banks, “pillar 1” aims to revise the international standards for corporate income taxation of MNEs. The current proposal would introduce a light dose of unitary taxation (by opposition to the failed “arm’s length principle” on intra-MNE transfer pricing). A modest, but right move towards taxing MNEs for what they are: single entities, not an aggregate of entities created by tax lawyers. And again, similar to the TBTF “resolution frameworks” (i.e. when things go wrong), “Pillar 2” aims at securing a right for governments to redress under-taxation of entities benefiting from opaque overseas schemes.</p><p>Negotiations are supposed to end this year; they have been slow and difficult. On the surface, much is to blame on the current US administration, which abruptly pulled out of the negotiations before the summer break. Yet, the root causes seem to lie deep in national interests and trade considerations. It is difficult to judge given the confidential nature of the discussions, but the short-term desire to protect the interests of each countries’ “own” MNEs (fully digitalised, or not) seems to dominate over the broader matter that is at stake: the global under-taxation of digital activities.</p><h3>Wrapped up in technicalities</h3><p>If the tax negotiations are not advancing enough, it is also because of the complexity of the topics on the table. Just like banking resolution and prudential rules in 2008, it is those who precisely contributed to the complexity of rules for the purpose of regulatory arbitrage (the bankers, the tax lawyers), who have a comparative advantage in the negotiations. They know better because they set the rules.</p><p>The overly strict adherence to business confidentiality rules is not helping to clarify the discussion. We end up with a catch-22: business groups and many governments fiercely opposed to corporate transparency and public reporting on tax revenues in 2015, come to find out in 2020 that they are struggling to have a clear picture of the tax impact of the digital economy — clarity missing precisely because of the failure to agree on public data and public reporting in 2015.</p><p>Just like banking and financial regulation, tax simplicity and transparency matter in their own right, but also for the purposes of reform and negotiations. When the system combines with self-reporting and self-risk assessment, both financial regulators and tax collectors will always be played by their counterparts — the bankers, the tax lawyers, and the “creative” accountants. Now, they are played by the Big Tech.</p><p>Back in 2013, Adrian Blundell-Wignall, who was then deputy director of the OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs (DAF) and colleagues of the OECD Secretariat delivered a <a href="http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-markets/Bank-Business-Models-Basel-2013.pdf">cold assessment</a> of the banking regulation reforms precisely on the grounds of complexity and self-serving reporting:</p><p><em>“First [Basel III] is too complex, allowing large banks plenty of room to manipulate it both with their models and derivatives thereby avoiding effective control on leverage. […] Second, […] Basel III has not dealt with bank business model issues that are at the heart of TBTF [problems]”. [p6] “This complexity has made it even more difficult to bring capital rules into alignment for all financial institutions — it has not achieved the regulatory principle that the financial promises should be treated in the same way no matter where they are shifted”. [p17]</em></p><p>From there, the OECD Secretariat recommended “a simple adequate leverage ratio”, one that would be “controlled directly” by regulators. We could use that same text, replace “Basel III” with “current tax rules”, “bank” and “financial institution” with “digital economy” and “TBTF” with “Big tech” and we would then have a very similar picture. But that has not been recognised as far as the OECD tax work on the digital economy is concerned.</p><h3>The business model revolution</h3><p>Both the Big Tech and TBTF debates originate from “revolutionary” business models that are disrupting the way regulators see the world. Post-crisis, financial regulators were struggling to understand how the business models of banks had shifted so rapidly in the years prior. Policymakers thought about “boring banking” — i.e. institutions that were making a small profit margin between loans and deposits, with a low-risk exposure. The reality for TBTF groups was very different. Profits were not “boring” at all, originating in the speculative trading and the selling of opaque products to the markets, products where, they themselves had no skin in the game. It is the realisation of the changing nature of the business models of large banks, making them TBTF, that prompted the need for specific regulation and specific supervision at the international level.</p><p>The breaking nature of the business model is even more pronounced in the case of the digital sector, but the OECD so far is drawing different conclusions to their financial and banking peers. Both the OECD flagship report <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264312012-en.pdf?expires=1594135295&amp;id=id&amp;accname=ocid84004878&amp;checksum=B298B88B4AA322672599C960B51387D7">Going Digital</a> in 2019, and the more specific tax-related report on the digital economy in <a href="http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-challenges-arising-from-digitalisation-interim-report-9789264293083-en.htm">March 2018</a> recognise “key features” of the digital business model:</p><ul><li>the capacity to “scale without mass” (Going Digital report) by generating profits and market power via the accumulation of data (“no mass”), cloud and online platforms resulting network and lock-in effects and the challenges to identify the “nexus” (Tax report) when physical presence is no longer needed to carry out business;</li><li>The value of intangible assets — not the traditional ones, like licensing and IP rights, but the newer ones: the processing and exploitation of data, “free” user contributions and branding effect — is particularly challenging to measure (for the purpose of fixing tax liability, of value collaterals to fund raising, etc.);</li></ul><p>The Going Digital report elaborates on a number of other “<a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/vectors-of-digital-transformation_5ade2bba-en">vectors of digital change</a>” while the tax experts add another key feature related to the difficult “characterisation” of digital transactions. But all in all, the OECD recognises the revolutionary nature of digitalised business models, in much the same way the OECD and financial regulators did post-2008 when dealing with banks deemed TBTF. However, here comes a twist. Both the Going Digital report and the tax report stay away from drawing conclusions on specific rules and specific supervision. The OECD report on the <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264241046-en.pdf?expires=1594136328&amp;id=id&amp;accname=ocid84004878&amp;checksum=B80501144395172E790D6CFB8F0AD772">BEPS and digital economy</a> of 2015 is clear about that where it states that, while business models are specific, they cannot be “ring-fenced”:</p><p><em>“Because the digital economy is increasingly becoming the economy itself, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to ring-fence the digital economy from the rest of the economy for tax purposes”.</em></p><p>No ring fencing, no identified group of high-digitalised businesses, no specific regulation or supervision applying to systemically important big tech groups. If regulation has to be tightening on taxation, it cannot aim specifically at the GAFAs, because we are all destined to become digital companies and that is, in essence, what the OECD is saying. The no-ring-fencing principle has been guiding the entire OECD work on tax and digitalisation since then. Early 2018, the UK presented a tax reform proposal to the OECD that precisely would target fully digitalised businesses — it was rejected on the ground of the non-ring fencing principle. The principle is being contested by many governments, as seen in the recent rise of national determined “digital service taxes” — which in turn are disrupting the OECD negotiations.</p><h3>The failure to address corporate concentration</h3><p>Tackling the excessive market power of the GAFAs through competition rules is a lively topic in many parliaments and national executives. The market power of the Big Tech is such that it might be illusory to rely on existing competition frameworks to deal with the issue. And unlike tax and financial regulation, there is no international forum on competition that has the power and the authority to set international norms. For its part, to date the OECD position relies on the very same established competition principles that prevailed over the past 2–3 decades. In its report on the <a href="http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Regulatory-effectiveness-in-the-era-of-digitalisation.pdf">Regulatory effectiveness in the era of digitalisation</a> of June 2019, the OECD recommends to facilitate entry of new players who would gradually contest the dominant role of the GAFAs. More competitors should solve the problem, we are told. The policy framework underpinning that view is the OECD’s <a href="https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/45544507.pdf">Competition Assessment Toolkit</a> revised in 2019. This toolkit is drawing on an old report of the OECD “<a href="http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/2391768.pdf">Regulatory Reform</a>” dating back to 1997 and one that considers regulation as second priority to trade, competition and market liberalisation.</p><p>There are however a growing number of alternative views outside the OECD that call for reviving the discussion on anti-trust policies and other specific regulatory measures aiming at the Big Tech. Sebastien Soriano, chairman of the French telecom supervisory authority, ARCEP, for example, calls for antitrust rules for Big Tech in what he calls the need for <a href="https://medium.com/@sorianotech/big-tech-regulation-d12430d7fc1b">Empowering the Many by Regulating a Few</a> . In a <a href="https://www.thedigitalnewdeal.org/en/big-tech-regulation-empowering-the-many-by-regulating-a-few/">report</a> released in September 2019, he and other digital experts offer innovative views on dealing with Big Tech — by OECD standards at least. In January 2020, Soriano further proposed “<a href="https://en.arcep.fr/news/arcep-speaks/view/n/tse-digital-economics-conference-january-2020-toulouse.html">four golden rules</a>” regarding regulation of the “digital ecosystem”:</p><ul><li>“<em>focus on structuring platforms through asymmetrical regulation. Forget classical horizontal rules.</em></li><li><em>give the power back to the people (not the State): consumers, entrepreneurs, NGOs, academics. […] with ex ante rules to give more choice to the users and by regulating with data.</em></li><li><em>rely on a specialised authority, ensuring a permanent monitoring of the regulated parties. An authority with a “stick”.</em></li><li><em>Ensure a good articulation between the national level and the European level. Both levels are relevant.</em>”</li></ul><p>Soriano’s “asymmetrical regulation” would require the formal listing of dominant players in the digital markets — a practice existing already not only in the telecom sector but also in the banking sector, with the annually updated list of TBTF groups maintained by the FSB.</p><h3>“SIDIs”, systemically important digital institutions</h3><p>In the post-crisis world of 2008, international cooperation was fit for purpose to deal with the banks that were TBTF. On substance, much remains to be done and is far from perfect ten year after. However, <em>something</em> happened at the international level with multilateral cooperation delivering tailored policies and instruments to deal with the TBTF banks. It had an authoritative forum for that, the FSB.</p><p>There is no equivalent to the FSB when it comes to policy debates around the GAFAs internationally. Hopefully the on-going tax negotiations will deliver good outcomes, but they will very likely not aim specifically at fully-digitalised businesses.</p><p>The former CEOs of big banks who were given a hard time in the many parliamentary hearings in the aftermath of 2008 might observe the current debate with irony. Their heirs, the CEOs of the GAFAs are also being grilled in parliamentary hearings. For now however, they do not face the same international regulatory consequences.</p><p>Could the OECD fill in that role? And would that be desirable anyway? What plays in favour of the OECD is for sure its multi-disciplinary nature; this formidable capacity to address a given topic from different angles. But the bottom line is for the OECD to level-up its policy stance on the excessive market concentration in the digital economy, including by engaging in a blunt discussion on anti-trust measures, and on transparency over data.</p><p>A first step could be the creation of an official list. National regulators do that all the time. Internationally, the FSB maintains an <a href="https://www.fsb.org/2019/11/2019-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-g-sibs/">official list of TBTF banks</a>, also known as the “SIFIs”, for systemically important financial institutions. The G20 and the OECD could work toward a formal list of “SIDIs”, systemically important digital institutions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=45db7b9fce5b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/regulating-big-tech-the-too-big-to-fail-way-45db7b9fce5b">Regulating Big Tech, the Too-Big-To-Fail Way</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd">Workers Voice @ OECD</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What does it take to join the OECD? And are Labour and Human Rights part of the package?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/what-does-it-take-to-join-the-oecd-and-are-labour-and-human-rights-part-of-the-package-25e86e5f1a66?source=rss----19680cba31ac---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/25e86e5f1a66</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trade-unions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[oecd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[labour-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[human-rights]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Pierre Habbard]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2020 12:28:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-28T08:16:40.582Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>In principle, membership rests upon two pillars: democratic societies &amp; market economies. In practice, it is much about a single one.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DA7fI_L0vHmPFu3CuKLqSg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Liaison Committee Meeting with the TUAC, OECD December 2018</figcaption></figure><p>Becoming a member of the OECD does not boil down to signing its founding <a href="http://www.oecd.org/general/conventionontheorganisationforeconomicco-operationanddevelopment.htm">Convention</a>. While it remains the foundation for membership, it is a text that dates back to 1961 — the cold war era, when “globalisation” and “sustainable development” were unknown concepts. Importantly, the OECD has developed a number of <a href="https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/">legal instruments</a> since then. Today, no less than 248 OECD legal texts are in force (Decisions, Conventions, Declarations, Recommendations, etc.).</p><h3>The broader definition</h3><p>Beyond the technicalities of the OECD legal instruments, the fundamental conditions for membership have been addressed several times in the past. Overall, it is about a “readiness” and a “commitment” to adhere to essentially two fundamental requirements: (i) democratic societies committed to the rule of law and protection of human rights; and (ii) open, transparent and free-market economies. This two-pillar approach can be found in several Ministerial declarations:</p><ul><li>Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the OECD asserted in 1990 “the basic values which are common to the OECD countries: pluralistic democracy, respect for human rights, and a competitive market economy”.</li><li>In 2004, a “Strategy for Enlargement and Outreach” (a.k.a the <a href="http://www.oecd.org/globalrelations/globalrelationsstrategy/37434513.pdf">Noburu report</a>) sets out four criteria: like-mindedness (shared values), significant player (contributes to the advancement of the Organisation), mutual benefit (membership is mutually advantageous) and global considerations (regional balance of membership);</li><li>In 2007, the Organisation’s mission was defined as “promoting peace, stability, prosperity and democratic values through sound economic policies and good governance” and the Ministerial “invited the Organisation to remain true to its founding vision and high standards”.</li><li>In 2011, for its <a href="https://www.oecd.org/mcm/48064973.pdf">50th anniversary</a>, “<em>OECD Members form a community of nations committed to the values of democracy based on the rule of law and human rights, and adherence to open and transparent market economy principles</em>”. The “vision statement”, as it is called, further specifies that “(t)<em>he Organisation’s essential mission is to promote stronger, cleaner, fairer economic growth and to raise employment and living standards. We rely on it to do so by identifying key economic, social and environmental policy challenges and designing policies to improve the well-being of people around the world</em>”.</li></ul><h3>In practice</h3><p>In practice however, the two-pillar approach very much rests upon a single one, the market and economy pillar, and the process itself has evolved over the years, becoming more complex and more stringent, including after accession.</p><p>In the 1990s, the enlargement focussed on the former eastern European communist countries — Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic — as well as Mexico and South Korea. The conditions for accession were relatively few, and were definitely focussed on market aspects. Examination processes would last for a year or so, with a handful of OECD committees conducting a shorter review with just one or two rounds of discussion. Countries joining the OECD, but failing to implement OECD legal instruments, were taken at their word to redress the situation ex-post. No need for detailed action plans. Accordingly no real post-accession monitoring process took place, with the notable exception of South Korea and following TUAC’s action on labour rights as discussed below.</p><p>In 2007, the OECD changed dimension with new ambitions for enlargement. The Ministerial Council adopted a new framework for accession, invited five countries — Chile, Estonia, Israel, Russia and Slovenia to open negotiations — to become full OECD members and decided to strengthen cooperation with Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa through enhanced engagement programmes with a view to possible membership. The new “roadmaps” for accession involved across the board in-depth review of a candidate country’s legislation, policy and practices and for more stringent the post-accession process. That model still prevails today, although it was revised and improved in 2015 with better monitoring (including public disclosure of an annual summary of post-accession progress).</p><p>In 2017, the OECD added another layer, this time for “prospective members”, ie. countries to be selected in the “waiting list” for formal accession. This <a href="https://www.oecd.org/mcm-2018/documents/C-MIN-2017-13-EN.pdf">Framework for Consideration of Prospective Members</a>” requires adherence to a dozen OECD instruments (on tax, competition, statistics, foreign investor protection, etc.) combined with general notions on rule of law and “values”. The documents lists a selection of OECD legal instruments, all of which are corporate or market-focussed — Declaration on International Investment, Global Forum on Exchange of Information and Transparency for Tax Purposes &amp; Inclusive Framework on BEPS; Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements; Recommendation on Good Statistical Practice; and Recommendation on Principles for Internet Policy Making. The only rule of law-related instrument mentioned is the Convention on Combating Bribery.</p><h3>What about human rights and labour rights?</h3><p>What is striking in the above list is the absence of instruments and norms related to the rule of law, public integrity and human rights (with the exception of the Bribery Convention). At face value, the OECD seems more concerned about the professionalism of statisticians and the protection of foreign investors than that of human rights activists. Human rights and labour rights are indeed seen as “values” and are not tied to specific texts and standards. A straight-forward explanation is that the OECD does not have such legal instruments in-house. The search function of the <a href="https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/">OECD database</a> in fact does not include these topics. On labour rights and labour market institutions, there are in fact only three recommendations in force: Integrated Mental Health, Skills and Work Policy (2015), Ageing and Employment Policies (2015) and Gender Equality in Education, Employment and Entrepreneurship (2013). The most well-known OECD recommendations on collective bargaining and social dialogue are found in the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/employment/jobs-strategy/">Jobs Strategy</a>, which is not a legal instrument as such, and is released under the sole responsibility of the OECD Secretary General. By comparison, the OECD has no less than 95 environment-related instruments (several of which, including chemicals and waste management are posing problems for many accession countries).</p><p>The issue of human rights, labour rights, democracy and independence of the judiciary in large part seems to be a blind spot for the OECD. When a country joins, it has to observe the OECD legal instruments, most of which are market-related. The assumption is that other international fora, the UN and the ILO, and regional bodies (such as the Council of Europe) can take care of these aspects. That sort of division of labour makes sense if, and only if, the OECD takes formally on board the UN and ILO instruments — not treating them as “values”.</p><p>That is precisely what the TUAC has advocated and for many years. In May 2008, the TUAC released a <a href="https://members.tuac.org/en/public/e-docs/00/00/02/76/document_news.phtml">Position Paper on the Enlargement process</a> fleshing out how the countries’ commitment to the “core values” — including the rule of law and human rights, respecting workers’ rights — should translate into concrete observance of ILO Core Labour Standards, ILO conventions and relevant UN texts. Since 2010, the issue of OECD membership has been addressed in every TUAC statement to the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting.</p><p>Three countries stand out in the TUAC’s effort to promote the rule of law labour and human rights in accession processes: South Korea, Israel and Colombia.</p><ul><li>South Korea joined the OECD in 1996 with a commitment to reform its labour law to bring it into line with the ILO standards. However, within two months the then government backtracked on its commitment and reduced rather than extended labour rights. In the light of this, a 10-year special monitoring process was implemented at the OECD Employment, Labour and Social Affairs Committee. It ended in 2006, without delivering fully on the initial commitments. TUAC has spared no efforts in the process. Letters were sent to the OECD Secretary General and the Korean authorities (including in <a href="https://old.tuac.org/News/0716IloOecd%20JE%20GR%20bp.pdf">2003</a>, and in <a href="https://members.tuac.org/print/en/public/e-docs/00/00/03/9E/document_news.phtml">2008</a>), field missions were held in <a href="https://members.tuac.org/fr/public/e-docs/00/00/0E/11/document_news.phtml">2014</a> and in <a href="https://members.tuac.org/en/public/e-docs/00/00/12/A7/document_news.phtml">2016</a> , a TUAC report was released that year, <a href="https://members.tuac.org/en/public/e-docs/00/00/11/D8/document_doc.phtml">Upholding Labour Rights in Korea in an OECD context</a>, as well as a formal <a href="https://members.tuac.org/en/public/e-docs/00/00/12/38/document_news.phtml">TUAC Resolution</a>. Today, the current Government might have a more constructive approach, including regarding ratification, at last, of the ILO core conventions. Yet a gap remains between the highly successful economy of Korea, one of the most integrated in globalisation, and the fragility of the labour market, of social dialogue and of labour rights.</li><li>Israel joined the OECD in 2010. The TUAC led a fact-finding mission in October 2009 on the working conditions and employment in both Israel and the occupied territories and delivered a submission to the OECD ELSAC <a href="https://members.tuac.org/en/public/e-docs/00/00/06/54/document_news.phtml">Employment and Workers Rights in Israel and the West Bank</a> on to help the OECD set the terms of the membership and the post-accession. Issues at the time included the geographical perimeter of Israel’s membership, whether coverage was limited to the 1967 borders as ruled by international law, or also included the settlements in the occupied territories.</li><li>Colombia joined the OECD in 2020, after a long and painful accession process that started in 2013, and ended in 2018. It took another two years for the country to ratify membership. Like South Korea, the TUAC and the trade union movement at large spared no effort throughout the process to ensure an ambitious pre-accession programme on impunity, independence and efficiency of the judiciary, collective bargaining and enforcement of law. The statements, the submissions, the reports are many on tuac.org. In December 2019 TUAC adopted a <a href="https://tuac.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/144PS_E_07_Colombia-2.pdf">resolution</a> calling among others for a strong and robust “post-accession monitoring framework”.</li></ul><h3>The future of the OECD</h3><p>Ahead of the 60th anniversary of the OECD, in December this year and next year, the TUAC issued key messages on “<a href="https://tuac.org/news/delivering-a-recovery-built-on-trust-tuac-statement-on-the-covid-19-crisis-and-the-future-of-the-oecd-pour-une-reprise-fondee-sur-la-confiance-declaration-du-tuac-sur-la-crise-du-covid-19-et-l/">the future of the OECD</a>” on 10 June last, including a call for the OECD to “<em>Be uncompromising on democracy, rule of law, including human rights and labour rights as defined by the ILO, including mechanisms for member states to be held to account for OECD norms and values</em>”. A week after, the ITUC released its annual country ranking “Global Rights Index” detailing the grim situation faced by workers across the world, with an upwards trend of restricting the rights to collective bargaining, the right to strike. Importantly, in an OECD context, <a href="https://tuac.org/news/2020-ituc-global-rights-index-several-oecd-countries-amongst-the-worst-for-workers/">several current members are singled out</a> in the ITUC report: Colombia and Turkey are listed among the “10 worst countries for workers”, while Chile, Greece, South Korea, Mexico and the United States are also flagged as countries of serious concern.</p><p>As the OECD celebrates its 60th anniversary and reflects on the future of the Organisation and the need to reinforce multilateralism, now more than ever, the rule of law, human &amp; labour rights need to be treated with substance. They are more than “values”, and have internationally recognised norms and instruments that need to be observed by current members and by accession countries.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=25e86e5f1a66" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/what-does-it-take-to-join-the-oecd-and-are-labour-and-human-rights-part-of-the-package-25e86e5f1a66">What does it take to join the OECD? And are Labour and Human Rights part of the package?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd">Workers Voice @ OECD</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The OECD “war on Covid-19” and the “underlying vulnerabilities” of our economies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/the-oecd-war-on-covid-19-and-the-underlying-vulnerabilities-of-our-economies-51f750f6d55b?source=rss----19680cba31ac---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/51f750f6d55b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[workers-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[oecd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[health]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[TUAC OECD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2020 10:39:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-30T10:38:45.594Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by <a href="https://medium.com/@habbard?source=post_page-----13821bdc449f----------------------">Pierre Habbard</a></p><p>How about starting with social dialogue and bargaining rights, investing in public services, fair trade and corporate accountability?</p><p>The OECD was quick to react to the Covid-19 crisis.</p><p>When launching <a href="http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/en/">a new platform on the crisis</a> on 20 March, the Secretary General Angel Gurria called for a “<em>sizeable, credible, internationally co-ordinated</em>” response to deal with “<em>the immediate public health emergency, to buffer the economic shock and develop a path towards recovery</em>”. The OECD is well placed to support such actions, being a truly multi-disciplinary Organisation with no real equivalent internationally. The key question that arises is whether the OECD can demonstrate enough flexibility in drawing lessons from this crisis and from the previous 2008 crisis to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.</p><p>There is no doubt that the on-going pandemic, as the OECD Secretary General puts it, constitutes the “<em>economic, financial and social shock of the 21st Century</em>” of the size and magnitude of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The current COVID-19 crisis brings a “<em>double whammy</em>” — combining a supply side and a demand side shock with containment measures putting our economies into “<em>deep freeze</em>”.</p><p>The immediate priority is to address the public health crisis and its immediate effects. The OECD puts forth three spending priorities that governments should advance jointly in order to provide an immediate buffer to our economies and speed up the recovery: health care, people and firms.</p><p>The OECD has released a mapping on employment and social measures taken in response to the crisis. A good mapping, but one that for TUAC, regrettably <a href="https://tuac.org/news/covid-19-the-short-term-oecd-mapping-of-employment-and-social-policy-issues/">omits the crucial role of trade unions</a> and their employer counterpart.</p><p>Beyond short-term measures, the OECD calls for “<em>immediate, large-scale and co-ordinated actions</em>” to support the economy, thereby relaying previous calls for “whatever-it-takes” measures to avoid a complete collapse of the economy.</p><p>Despite initial steps central banks’, G20 and G7 co-ordination remain too slow and timid. This is especially true for the G20, which ironically was designed to precisely deal with global crises like the current. Assuming that support measures come indeed in time and are sufficient, the other key question is for how long they should last?</p><p>The fiscal stimulus packages introduced in 2009 were withdrawn abruptly in 2011, in the midst of the Greek financial crisis and the Toronto commitment of the G20 to cut public deficits by a third in just three years. This sharp turn towards austerity ended all hopes for a sustained recovery.</p><h4>Let us not repeat the mistakes of the past. We need emergency support now to avoid a complete collapse of the economy followed by coordinated and sustained fiscal stimulus. The crisis is here to stay and will need continued support by governments well beyond the next 12 months.</h4><p>Moving to the more systemic challenges of the crisis, the OECD Secretary General lists a number of “<em>underlying vulnerabilities</em>” existed well before the COVID-19 outbreak but which now “<em>risk worsening the downturn</em>”.</p><p>An important vulnerability mentioned is <strong>“<em>the gaps in income, wealth and job stability in many countries, which threaten a large part of our populations</em>”</strong>. This is absolutely true. However, if income inequality has gotten out of control, it is first and foremost because of the continuing loss of bargaining power of people and of workers in society and the economy. Surely other factors play a role (e.g. technological change, unfair and unbalanced trade), but the primary factor is the continuing erosion of both collective bargaining and trade union density across OECD economies — spurred by the flexibilisation of labour markets. This is also nourished by the structural reforms of the last crisis. This should be acknowledged and feed into today’s crisis response. We cannot continue to accept more and more individualisation of risks in labour markets.</p><p>The second vulnerability listed by the Secretary General are the<strong> “<em>stark weaknesses</em>” of our health systems</strong>, both in infrastructure and service but also in the delivery and access to vaccines and treatments.</p><p>There are some hard lessons to draw for international organisations such as the OECD, which in the past has overplayed on the rhetoric of smaller and more “agile” government administrations and public services for fear of “crowding out” private business dynamism and entrepreneurship. This is a rhetoric that in practice has led to cuts in public services and essential infrastructure, including the very same hospitals that today are at the frontline of the crisis.</p><p>The primary answer and solution to the crisis will therefore be in the real economy, in public service workers and those people who are at the frontline of the crisis. It will be in social security schemes that ensure health care for all. Quality public services with universal coverage must be a priority for OECD recommendations.</p><p>The third set of vulnerabilities listed are the <strong>“<em>trade tensions between major economies</em>”</strong> which “<em>may not only affect badly-needed medical supplies (…) but also generate supply-chain disruptions in food or other essential goods and services, (and) increase the risk of a more severe outbreak, as well as of a deeper and longer-lasting recession</em>”. Hence, the crisis offers another opportunity for the OECD to call for removing trade restrictions, and then again to accelerate and deepen trade liberalisation.</p><p>There is of course a lot of potential for trade liberalisation to support sustainable growth. But it was not meant to end in a situation where 50% and up to 80% of production in certain sectors would be controlled by a single country. And, of course, it definitely was not meant to lead to a race to the bottom on labour rights and sustainability.</p><p>Trade restrictions may hamper the immediate response and need to be addressed to ensure delivery of emergency health measures. However, the underlying and fundamental vulnerability of our economies lies in the unbalanced and unfair trade system that still prevails. As the <a href="https://tuac.org/news/tuac-briefing-on-the-coronavirus-crisis-origins-development-and-policy-response/">TUAC writes in its policy paper on the crisis</a></p><blockquote>“<em>The disruption to global supply chains triggered by the coronavirus has brought to surface the risks of over-reliance and geographic concentration, particularly in China and other Asian countries</em>”.</blockquote><p>The last vulnerability mentioned, almost in passing, is the high level of corporate debt. The numbers are indeed alarming reaching USD 13.5 trillion worldwide according to the <a href="http://www.oecd.org/corporate/Corporate-Bond-Market-Trends-Emerging-Risks-and-Monetary-Policy.htm">OECD’s own account</a>. Thanks to low interest rates and ultra-accommodative monetary policy, corporations have indeed been able to raise massive amounts of money. But where did that money go? It definitely did not land in the real economy and in real productive investments. It was burned and wasted in speculative share-buyback programmes, whereby businesses manipulate stock markets for short profits to shareholders (already fed with generous dividends). As noted in a recent OECD paper “<em>until 2018, capital expenditures have been lacklustre for much of the post-crisis period. A key factor in this corporate behaviour is that, in aggregate, corporates have preferred to pursue share buybacks to boost returns on equity through financial leverage rather than invest in new business initiatives</em>”.</p><p>Assuming that we are ahead of another round of massive bailing out and public equity stakes in private businesses, corporate accountability will emerge as a key political economy matter, as it did in 2009–2010. Back in September 2008, the <a href="https://tuac.org/news/lessons-from-the-crisis-joint-tuac-tuc-anniversary-conference/">TUAC warned against badly managed bailing out operations</a>. Let’s not repeat the mistakes of the past.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=51f750f6d55b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/the-oecd-war-on-covid-19-and-the-underlying-vulnerabilities-of-our-economies-51f750f6d55b">The OECD “war on Covid-19” and the “underlying vulnerabilities” of our economies</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd">Workers Voice @ OECD</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The $5 trillion commitment by the G20: Now, Make it Happen, Make it Work]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/the-5-trillion-commitment-by-the-g20-now-make-it-happen-make-it-work-7329f1f3eacf?source=rss----19680cba31ac---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7329f1f3eacf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[g20]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[labour]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jobs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[TUAC OECD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2020 09:51:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-30T09:51:16.712Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>by <a href="https://twitter.com/SharanBurrow">Sharan Burrow</a> (General Secretary, <a href="https://www.ituc-csi.org/covid-19-responses#pagination_news_662">ITUC</a>) &amp; <a href="https://twitter.com/habbard?lang=en">Pierre Habbard</a> (General Secretary, <a href="https://tuac.org/news/covid19-crisis-mapping-out-trade-union-and-social-partners-responses/">TUAC</a>)</p><p>With multilateralism in crisis the G20 Leaders’ Summit demonstrated welcome unity in the face of a global pandemic. At face value, their commitments are strong:</p><p>- Protect lives,</p><p>- Safeguard people’s jobs and incomes,</p><p>- Restore confidence, preserve financial stability, revive growth and recovery stronger,</p><p>- Minimize disruptions to trade and global supply chains,</p><p>- Provide help to all countries in need of assistance and</p><p>- Co-ordinate on public health and financial matters.</p><p>Importantly, these commitments come with a bold figure. Over $5 trillion dollars has been declared to date by G20 governments for “<em>targeted fiscal policy, economic measures, and guarantee schemes.</em>” The immediate challenge is to ensure the money is committed effectively and is targeted enough to reach those directly in need. The money needs to come with the right conditionality for businesses.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*zBD6l2kr0hEqNZru.jpg" /></figure><p>The history of international forums, and of the G20 in particular, is one of bold commitments and impressive figures that do not materialise in the end. Assuming that support measures come in time, the other key question is for how long will they last? “Whatever it takes” sounds great if implemented to support business sand workers in the short term and lays the foundation for longer term recover.</p><p>Let’s not repeat the mistakes of the past. The fiscal stimulus packages introduced in 2009 were withdrawn abruptly in 2011 in many parts of the world with the Toronto agreement of the G20 to cut public deficits. This sharp turn towards austerity ended all hopes for a sustained recovery that would reach working people.</p><h4>Today, the urgency of the situation demands bold commitments that are sustained and real.</h4><p>The vital support for frontline services, and for health workers in particular, is critical to save lives. The crisis is a dire reminder of the need for quality public services with universal coverage, which must be brought up front on the G20 agenda. A global commitment to universal social protection is more important than ever and G20 funding must be used to support this. The world is only as safe as its most vulnerable citizens.</p><p>Equally, <strong>supply chains for medical equipment, including PPE and medicine must remain open</strong>. Then, there are other essential products and services on which we depend and that still need to cross borders. This requires employers and unions working with governments and relevant international structures to keep production, transport and distribution routes open as well as protecting all of these frontline workers.</p><p>Then, there is the impact of economic closures and the emerging social and economic devastation where this is not addressed with the right protections and liquidity measures. <strong>Lay-offs and bankruptcies as a result of the present crisis need to be avoided.</strong></p><p>For workers, twelve countries of sixty-nine analysed to date by the ITUC have addressed the majority of the immediate needs supported by trade unions. This means real time wage and income assistance vital for individuals and vital for economies. While there is more to do even in many of these countries and others are coming on board, the vast majority of countries are yet to step up. However, too many nations do not have the resources to do so. They need to be supported — especially with vulnerable workers, informal economy workers and those in low wage, insecure and unsafe work in global supply chains in mind.</p><p>The international commitment to debt relief and liquidity swaps that support vulnerable countries is real leadership but again these instruments must be deployed in <strong>defense of the real economy</strong> and in line with the SDGs.</p><p>In this context, the G20 commitment to protect workers and business must be inclusive of countries where <strong>non-essential supply chains are collapsing</strong>. The social devastation and the economic risk to these economies multiplied across the global economy needs collective action. With international support, employers and unions are ready to help governments and international institutions to design and deploy vital funding. Jobs, incomes and production need to be secured for the capacity to either retool quickly to current demands or have the capacity to reopen as soon as possible.</p><p>With<strong> 60% of the world workforce in the informal economy</strong>, a failure to regulate labour markets cannot mean that they bear the risks and are excluded from protections. The underlying and fundamental weakness of our economies indeed lies in the unbalanced and unfair trade system that still prevails. In the long run, the G20 must take a serious look at how our supply chains are organised to ensure a more balanced stable global economy.</p><p>The $5 trillion commitment might entail another round of massive bail outs and public equity stakes in private businesses, to keep our economies afloat. Fairness and accountability will be crucial. At all cost we must avoid the disasters of the 2008/2009 bailouts for the financial sector that left people and small business without support, and that led to privatising the gains, while socialising the costs.</p><h4>The G20 was created to address the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. The upcoming weeks as the we respond to the health social and economic costs of the global pandemic will be a test of its leadership.</h4><p>G20 Leaders have set out their commitments. Now it’s time to make it happen, make it work, and make it work <em>with</em> social dialogue in the real economy involving unions and business to design and implement measures nationally and globally. G20 Labour and Finance ministers must work together with social partners to that end. Trade unions across the world are ready to play their part in making this work.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7329f1f3eacf" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/the-5-trillion-commitment-by-the-g20-now-make-it-happen-make-it-work-7329f1f3eacf">The $5 trillion commitment by the G20: Now, Make it Happen, Make it Work</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd">Workers Voice @ OECD</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tax avoidance by multinationals impacts workers too!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/tax-avoidance-by-multinationals-impacts-workers-too-83e39a08cf0f?source=rss----19680cba31ac---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/83e39a08cf0f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[oecd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[oecd-tax]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wef]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fair-taxation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[TUAC OECD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jan 2020 11:27:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-01-21T11:27:00.232Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Séverine Picard @Sevrine_Picard</p><p>“Taxes, taxes, taxes. All the rest is bullshit”. Last year, a discussion panel at the Davos World Economic Forum went viral after one of the panelists bemoaned the failure of the rich to pay their fair share of tax. Will the mood be any different this year?</p><p>The OECD has throughout 2019 worked intensively on a possible reform of international taxation rules for multinational corporations. The announced objective is to achieve a fairer corporate tax system, in an increasingly digitalised economy.</p><p>But what does fair taxation mean? So far, countries have been focusing on one dimension only: to retain as much as possible tax revenues on their respective territories but also ensuring that national champions do not face a too high tax burden when doing business abroad.</p><p>The conundrum is hard to solve, especially in a context of trade tensions. Recently, the French and US Finance Ministers have taken the matter in their own hands. Bruno Lemaire and Steve Mnuchin announced their plan to, bilaterally, find a global solution in the margins of the Davos world economic forum, set to take place on 21–24 January 2020. For Bruno Lemaire, “it is time to put away the pistols”.</p><p>It is also time to take out the hearing aids. Policy-makers must listen more to the voice of civil society, which is denouncing the weaknesses of the current tax architecture and its overall impact on society. Changing the rule at the margins will not help; a systemic reform is needed.</p><p>In 2015, the OECD agreed on a so-called “BEPS Action plan”. For the first time, an agreement could be achieved at multilateral level on a set of measures to combat harmful tax practices. This agreement had the merit to exist, which at the time many didn’t believe possible.</p><p>But fairness is not a key feature of the BEPS Action plan, for at least two reasons.</p><p>First, when it comes to the sharing of tax revenues globally excessive preference was given to OECD countries to the detriment of developing economies.</p><p>Secondly, the entire system is based on transfer pricing rules and the arm’s length principle. According to these rules, a multinational corporation has no existence of its own. Each of its subsidiaries and establishments is taxed as if it were an independent and autonomous company. This is a fiction of course. A multinational enterprise is a coherent unit, with a consistent tax and business strategy implemented throughout the company group, under the global oversight of the parent company.</p><p>The current transfer pricing rules therefore constitute an encouragement for multinationals to set up complex group structures with hundreds of conduit entities registered in low tax jurisdictions.</p><p>The impact of tax avoidance on public budgets is now well reported. Businesses often argue that corporate tax revenues have remained stable over the years. This is omitting the fact that corporate profits have also been steadily increasing over the past decades. Multinationals are proportionally contributing less and less to public budgets. In a context of austerity and budgetary constraints, this has an adverse impact on the sustainability of public services, social protection regimes, and regressive taxation as the tax burden is being shifted to consumers and workers.</p><p>Aggressive tax avoidance is also affecting workers in other ways. Profits are sucked out of healthy subsidiaries and sent, through complex mechanisms, to tax havens. Workers are then hung out to dry. In those companies, financial accounts are deplorable and there is little to bargain on. Wages are kept artificially low and working conditions precarious. It is pointless to reach out to management as it is hidden behind a multitude of shell companies and other letter-box practices.</p><p>In sum, corporate tax practices say a lot about the business model of a multinational. Aggressive tax avoidance is the signal of a short-term vision, maximising to the extreme shareholders’ value to the detriment of stakeholders in general, and workers in particular.</p><p>A fairer tax system is not just about the immediate impact of reform on national tax revenues. It is about what incentives can be put in place to promote longer term, stakeholders’ oriented business values. The trade union movement has long been taking position in favour of a unitary taxation principle, whereby the profits of a multinational enterprise would be determined at global level, and apportioned among countries according to a set of balanced factors. Only then would we treat multinationals as the global companies that they are, and have a real go at curbing profit shifting.</p><p>The OECD current discussions are a welcome recognition that transfer pricing rules are not fit in today’s economy. But the excessive caution and narrow interests displayed by our policy-makers will end up in a disappointing result. The discussed compromises are very limited in ambition. Unitary taxation could be introduced, but only for a very small part of a multinational profits — if at all!</p><p>The mountain that was promised to us may just give birth to a mouse.</p><p>The principle of a minimum tax rate is also being discussed in the OECD. This is in our view would be much welcome because such reform could lead to an increase of tax revenues globally, not just for a chosen few. It could also limit profit shifting to tax havens to some extent. But the devil will be in the design. Already, the rumour is that the minimum rate would not exceed 12% — which is very low compared to the global average effective tax rate (20–25%). The rumour also says that in the implementation of the rules, preference will be given to residence countries, i.e. where parent companies are. Again, this raises questions of fairness as OECD countries would benefit more. And the applicable tax rules are unlikely to be linked to the country where the workers are.</p><p>Lastly, fairness is also more tax transparency. There is no trade secret in the information that multinationals are currently required to share with tax administrations. But workers do need to have access to country by country information on the financial and economic situation of the multinational that employs them, as well as the scale of investments into low-tax jurisdictions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=83e39a08cf0f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/tax-avoidance-by-multinationals-impacts-workers-too-83e39a08cf0f">Tax avoidance by multinationals impacts workers too!</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd">Workers Voice @ OECD</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is Artificial Intelligence let loose on the world of work?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/is-artificial-intelligence-let-loose-on-the-world-of-work-966c86b975e8?source=rss----19680cba31ac---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/966c86b975e8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[algorithms]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[future-of-work]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-transformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[organizational-change]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[TUAC OECD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jan 2020 14:32:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-01-15T14:32:00.148Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Organisational change through Choice, Co-creation and Consultation</strong></p><p>by Anna Byhovskaya ( <a href="https://twitter.com/AnnaByhovskaya">@AnnaByhovskaya</a> )</p><p>What would happen to the way we live and work if Artificial Intelligence (AI) powered systems were run on minimum standards with inadequate supervision and consultation mechanisms? Such “AI let loose” scenario would most likely entail serious downside risks to the safety, the income and the well-being of many. Occupations and working conditions in particular would change dramatically. They already do. AI is spreading fast across different sectors. As we know, algorithms are heavily used on online platforms (urban transport, hospitality, etc.), in human resources and for professional appraisals.</p><p>A lot of benefits could come from AI: productivity gains through greater precision and more security and insights based on analytics. For workers, AI could bring ad-hoc training through Augmented or Virtual Reality, higher occupational safety with digital twin systems running in the background and, if all goes well, adequate wages and/or reduced working time. This scenario is within reach but only of the right choices are made when designing and applying AI systems. To reap the benefits, it important to understand digitally networked systems and the impact on workers.</p><p>Relying on so-called ‘human-centred’ design and ethical considerations will not be enough. Robust policy frameworks and targeted investments are needed to protect quality jobs and human autonomy. A cautious steering — if not a precautionary approach? — must prevail in the design and operation of AI. Citizens need to have assurance that somebody — and somebody that is driven by public interest –shapes its deployment and use responsibly.</p><p>For this to happen, actionable frameworks based on <strong>C</strong>hoice, <strong>C</strong>o-creation and <strong>C</strong>onsultation need to be carried out — especially when it comes to organisational change.</p><h4><strong>Getting hold of a busy AI Space</strong></h4><p>Breakthroughs and the diffusion of AI are not expected to slow down anytime soon. Unlike commodities and inputs of traditional “brick and mortar” businesses, data — the core element on which machine learning and algorithms are based — knows no degradation and can be recombined, tailored and versioned infinitely. The pacing challenge is real. AI and those driving it move fast. Money goes where AI is : “<em>AI start-ups have so far attracted around 12% of all worldwide private equity investments in the first half of 2018, a steep increase from just 3% in 2011</em>” according to the<a href="http://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/private-equity-investment-in-artificial-intelligence.pdf"> OECD</a>. Not only is the AI market booming, it is both geographically and economically highly concentrated. The US is leading on both public and private investment, closely followed by China. In 2019, the top 250 companies account for 70% of R&amp;D spending, 65% of patents filed, and 40% of trade marks (see the <a href="http://www.oecd.org/sti/intellectual-property-statistics-and-analysis.htm">World Corporate Top R&amp;D Investors</a>). Top sectors aside from ICT, are transport, electronics and machinery. Finance and insurance also see great increases, not at least in view of trademarks filed for FinTech.</p><p>Irrespective of whether AI development slows down or not, it is already crunch time to tackle some key policy issues including:</p><p>● The market concentration of leading firms and investors;</p><p>● The misuse of AI against democratic principles;</p><p>● The opaqueness of AI-design and the challenges of privacy, bias and discrimination; and</p><p>● The lack of inter-operability and cross-border governance solutions.</p><h4>The AI policy space is crowded. There are around 50 private sector led initiatives out there already that issue guidelines and principles.</h4><p>The <a href="https://www.partnershiponai.org/partners/">Partnership on AI </a>probably being one of the most prominent, now expanded to over 90 members (including one global sector union). The technical community is developing its own standards (e.g. the <a href="https://ethicsinaction.ieee.org/">IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems</a>), so do CSOs (e.g. <a href="https://thepublicvoice.org/ai-universal-guidelines/memo/">Universal Guidelines for Artificial Intelligence</a>) and academic institutions (see the <a href="https://www.montrealdeclaration-responsibleai.com/">Montreal Declaration</a>). The <a href="https://irgc.epfl.ch/issues/projects-cybersecurity/the-governance-of-decision-making-algorithms/">EPFL International Risk Governance Center</a> for example in discussing the governance of decision-making algorithms issued recommendations such as that the “<em>governance of DMLAs must consider existing regulations and key benchmarks, against which DMLAs’ performance must be calibrated</em>”. Some private sector actors are self-setting codes of conduct — see IBM, Microsoft with its guidance for bot designers or PwC’s Switzerland’s <a href="https://www.pwc.ch/en/insights/digital/five-practical-step-to-make-ai-interpretable.html">model for AI interoperability</a>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*p_wVJwgftc2Tr8unCgJ9bQ.png" /></figure><p>In this crowded space, policy makers need to assert themselves and civil society stakeholders need to get hold of standard setting processes. At the international level, the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/high-level-expert-group-artificial-intelligence">EU</a> and the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/">OECD </a>brought together multi-stakeholder expert groups to set guidelines and principles on the design and use of AI — with social partners on board (myself on behalf of the <a href="https://tuac.org/news/oecd-recommendation-on-artificial-intelligence-calls-for-a-fair-transition-through-social-dialogue/">TUAC</a> together with <a href="https://www.uniglobalunion.org/">UNI Global Union</a> in the OECD process). The 2019 OECD Ministerial went on to adopt the first intergovernmental <a href="https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0449">Recommendation on Artificial Intelligence</a> (since endorsed at the G20 level). This is quite important considering its geographical reach. A follow-up roadmap to make the principles a reality could compensate for the hitherto lack of governance.</p><p>What is special with the OECD Principles besides a thorough coverage of technical aspects, is that they feature an inclusive growth and labour market dimension including a principle on the rights of workers to a fair transition:</p><blockquote><em>“Governments should take steps, including through social dialogue, to ensure a fair transition for workers as AI is deployed, such as through training programmes along the working life, support for those affected by displacement, and access to new opportunities in the labour market” and should work closely with stakeholders to “aim to ensure that the benefits from AI are broadly and fairly shared.”</em></blockquote><p>… and responsible management at the workplace:</p><blockquote><em>“Governments should also work closely with stakeholders to promote the responsible use of AI at work, to enhance the safety of workers and the quality of jobs, to foster entrepreneurship and productivity, and aim to ensure that the benefits from AI are broadly and fairly shared.”</em></blockquote><p>On paper, such provisions (hopefully) create larger awareness on the link, and indeed conditionality, between investment decisions into R&amp;D, training, infrastructure and effective use of AI on one hand, and employment regulation and active labour market policies on the other. More broadly the Principles confirm that AI diffusion has to be dealt with in a cross-policy and a multi-stakeholder, bottom-up manner. Top-down corporate AI strategies with no, or too little third-party check, will be insufficient to ensure that labour market and broader public good objectives are met.</p><h3><strong>AI in the world of work: Organisational change done right</strong></h3><h4>Choice is key</h4><p>“<em>Somebody who makes 5 dollars a day will now be replaced and considered as too expensive</em>” — this is according to Volker Hirsch at his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRw4d2Si8LA">TEDxManchester talk</a>. Hirsch refers to the 60.000 lay-offs in Apple contracted Foxconn factories but also to the builder robot that combines all the inventions of the last years, never gets sick and works endlessly. This present day examples are not wide-spread — yet — and depend on choice — amongst other regarding new roles for workers alongside AI powered systems. Others adopt a “<a href="https://www.wired.com/wiredinsider/2018/04/ai-future-work/">Human plus machine equals superpowers</a>” point of view and count on job creation. This goes into the trainer/ explainer scenario that does not necessarily acknowledge the consequences for those who are not in the IT sector or highly skilled, likely ‘younger’ and residing in industrialised countries able to assume new roles easily.</p><p>To understand on-the-job impacts, one needs to look into the AI design-to-implementation cycle and the interplay between advanced robotics, sensor devices and decision-making systems (see <a href="https://blogs.cdc.gov/niosh-science-blog/2019/08/26/ai/">here</a> for example). One also needs to consider what AI systems are already capable of, such as speech, language and face recognition, and predictive capacities (see for example this <a href="http://www.bbc.com/storyworks/specials/how-artificial-intelligence-is-changing-the-workplace/">BBC’s infographic</a>) and anticipate its future potential.</p><p>The way in which AI is deployed (or any type of new technology for that matter) is ultimately a matter of choice: choice to do it in the first place, but beyond, choice of how to do it. Take the <a href="https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/spring2019/pages/hr-needs-to-stay-ahead-of-automation.aspx">KPMG International</a>’s predictions on how AI could fundamentally alter occupational functions in Human Resources (HR) — as shown below. This depiction is not too far-fetched. And yet, the question remains if indeed all of these tasks should be automated in the first place.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pncD6ALZFT_8eGy0DhpfPA.png" /></figure><p>Surely, “time and attendance” or “data management” can be effectively managed through an automated system. The answer is far less straightforward for other tasks such as “workforce planning” or “talent identification” for which human oversight and judgement surely would remain desirable. There is a distinction to be made between AI as a facilitator for decision making and implementation and AI as the decision maker. And workers are just saying that: <a href="https://www.techrepublic.com/article/workers-believe-ai-will-kill-40-of-all-jobs-within-10-years/">a recent survey administered by Gartner </a>shows that a “<em>majority of employees (52%) say they would prefer AI to be deployed as an on-demand helper — essentially, acting as their own employee — rather than as their manager (9%), coworker (11%), or proactive assistant (32%)”.</em></p><p>Choices also matter when it comes to creating new job opportunities by empowering people to enter new sectors or professions that in the distant future are not prone to be fully automated. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/17/artificial-intelligence-will-be-net-uk-jobs-creator-finds-report">Recent PwC research </a>pointed to the fact that with the right investments: “In the UK, by 2037, AI will create more jobs (7.2m) than it displaces (7m) by boosting economic growth.” Industrial policy and investment decisions could aim at creating jobs in new services, the care economy and in renewable energy — not least considering pressure coming from the joint pull of climate and demographic change. Of course, investments into workers’ access to skills and to lifelong learning will be necessary. There is a fairly good amount of consensus around that. The question is whether we walk the walk. Research by Accenture reveals that <em>“business leaders don’t think that their workers are ready for AI” and yet “only 3% of those leaders were reinvesting in training</em>” (via <a href="https://www.wired.com/wiredinsider/2018/04/ai-future-work/">Wired</a>).</p><h4>Co-creation is key</h4><p>A human-centred approach to AI need to be rooted in co-creation. Developers, public and private employers and workers should discuss why and how AI systems are deployed in a sector or at a workplace. The most important aspect here is, yet again, the willingness of the parties to do so from the beginning — when systems are about to be introduced. This means straying away from top-down, command and control approaches. Instead, organisational change should be guided by the goal <em>to safeguard autonomy and self-determination </em>of people working with new systems. This concerns workers’ occupational health and safety, their right to transparency, information and redress. Explainability and/ or the right to explanation would resolve some of the issues. Complementary decisions might need to be made around working time and training. This is about securing job quality with AI — not the other way around.</p><p>Employers start using programmes furnished by analytics companies to measure performance and make HR decisions — not only is bias probable, but concerns arise over transparency over decisions derived from such systems and over the privacy and protection of workers’ data. In its <a href="https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2018_Report.pdf">2018 report</a>, the AI Now Institute calls on “<em>technology companies to go beyond the “pipeline model” and commit to addressing the practices of exclusion and discrimination in their workplaces</em>.” Software such as LaborWise offers productivity analytics that “<em>help identify areas where labor costs are too high, impediments that slow people down, and departments that need additional staff</em>” (<a href="https://www.askspoke.com/blog/support/how-ai-is-transforming-workplace/">source</a>). If such programmes are used without workers in the know, it is bad enough. But as a next step, if no provisions are set out to protect workers against consequences, to provide them with possibilities of redress and information and consultation — the power of the employer sooner rather than later will be perceived as “Big Brother” like. Instead, workers should be in the know and have a say about the purpose and use of new hiring and assessment tools.</p><p>Alternatively, unfair treatment and constant stress over being monitored will only rise. Creativity will likely go down, and employee burn-out rates go up. This goes against predictions that we need more creative, pro-active employees. And, ultimately, it goes against new societal thinking around work-life balance and collaborative workplaces. Too much monitoring and recruitment based on key words is thus not future proof.</p><h4>Consultation is key</h4><p>Any technological transformation of the economy — including the deployment of AI — deserves a space for democratic dialogue and consultation between policy makers and all relevant stakeholders. Since AI systems will impact economic performance, public investment decisions and the labour market, involving social partners is essential. Up until this point, we observe substantial differences in the way consultations took place. Trade unions are far less involved than business and employer organisations — if at all. Consultation also needs to take place in sectors and at firm level — workers are increasingly aware when left out of decisions to implement AI systems without prior notice (see <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/business/economy/hotel-workers-ai-technology-alexa.html">Marriot strikes</a> as an example). A<a href="https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/publication/file/2018-09/Voss%20Report%20EN2.pdf"> survey commissioned by the European Trade Union Confederation</a> indicates: “<em>Only 23% of workers reported that the introduction of new technologies that have the potential to monitor performance and behaviour or data protection issues had been addressed by information and consultation at company level so far”.</em></p><p>The <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/oecd-employment-outlook-2019_9ee00155-en">2019 OECD Employment Outlook</a> provides several examples of company level bargaining and the role of works councils in shaping the digital transformation: e.g. on the right to disconnect and the treatment of workers’ data (France, Spain) or working time (Germany). The 2019 OECD report on ‘<a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/artificial-intelligence-in-society_eedfee77-en">Artificial Intelligence in Society</a>’ stresses that:</p><p><em>“[It is] recommended for “stakeholders to work together on complementary AI systems and their co-creation in the workplace” (EESC, 2017). Workplaces also need flexibility, while safeguarding workers’ autonomy and job quality, including the sharing of profits. The recent collective agreement between the German sector union </em>IG Metall<em> and employers gives an economic case for variable working times. It shows that, depending on organisational and personal (care) needs in the new world of work, employers and unions can reach agreements without revising legal employment protections.”</em></p><p>Finally, there are AI applications that might affect freedom of association. There are programmes able to predict future industrial actions and strikes. An <a href="https://www.prewave.ai/scm-logistics">Austrian company</a> advertises its labour relation software by — amongst other — referring to its “<em>Large scale data collection and geo-specific targeting […] to deliver accurate early warning of labour unrest well in advance”. </em>Workplace democracy and social dialogue might be stifled if such methods become mainstream.</p><h3><strong>A check-list for AI @ Work</strong></h3><p>In the end, the discussion on “AI @Work” is about ensuring job quality for workers through transparent and responsible steering. These organisational aspects of AI matter in at least four domains:</p><ol><li>The extent to which the monitoring of workers and the ownership, collection and repurposing of their data is carried out and regulated;</li><li>The misuse and bias risks associated with algorithms (e.g. price setting that affects wages on online platforms, hiring and firing decisions)</li><li>The uncertainty over liability and security standards for automated and human-to-machine systems affecting workers’ health and safety (industrial robotics, semi-autonomous transport)</li><li>The impact of automation, algorithmic decision making and digitally enhanced processes on organisational changes.</li></ol><p>Some of it could be addressed in oversight bodies, some of it through multi-stakeholder dialogue that has substance. When it comes to workplace issues in particular, information and consultation mechanisms have to be strengthened and likely new agreements between businesses and worker organisations made.<strong> </strong>To achieve fair outcomes for workers, their representatives have to be clear about:</p><p>‒ What on they are seeking information and consultation rights</p><p>‒ What to include into new rounds of social dialogue and potentially collective bargaining.</p><p>A checklist for AI@ Work could then take shape along the following chart.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*nfmdcSXVTxgjw6HdZhJrGA.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=966c86b975e8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/is-artificial-intelligence-let-loose-on-the-world-of-work-966c86b975e8">Is Artificial Intelligence let loose on the world of work?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd">Workers Voice @ OECD</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Digital Divides]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/digital-divides-60953ac46d8e?source=rss----19680cba31ac---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/60953ac46d8e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digitalization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[broadband]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-divide]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[TUAC OECD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 07 Dec 2017 13:15:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-07T13:15:33.222Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://twitter.com/AnnaByhovskaya">Anna Byhovskaya</a> &amp; <a href="https://twitter.com/KavyaTibrewal">Kavya Tibrewal</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kiMmch-6ycgujinSKjhm_Q.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>Digital divides — ie the unequal access to ICT- has several dimensions, including regional, gender, income distribution. Resolving digital divides also matters in the context of the SDGs. The following briefing offers an overview the issues at stake and, from there, three key policy areas where government would need to take action: (i) public investment to close infrastructural gaps, (ii) targeting affordability through lowering of prices and (iii) developing skills sets and digital literacy.</em></p><h4>What are digital divides?</h4><p>Digital divides refer to the unequal access (or lack of access) to information and communication technology (ICT) across countries, regions or certain sections of the society like low-income earners, rural populations, women, youth or migrants. The global digital divide refers to the technological gap between developed and developing countries. It is a result of a number of socio-economic factors, of which low income, lack of educational attainment, high prices of data and insufficient infrastructure (in particular broadband coverage) are prime causes.</p><p>The World Bank’s report on Data for Development in relation to data capacity building efforts in developing countries shows that financial assistance has been rather concentrated in 26 countries which have received financial support of more than $2 million dedicated entirely to developing data systems and technologies (World Bank, 2017). When it comes to uptake in industrialised countries, privacy concerns are another contributing factor as highlighted in OECD’s Digital Economy Outlook 2017: “<em>In 2015, around 3% of individuals in the OECD area said they had experienced an online privacy violation in the last 3 months</em>.” (OECD, 2017) It is thus important to foster data security and privacy to encourage internet use.</p><h4>Incorporating the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)</h4><p>Target 9C of the SDGs refers to universal and affordable access to internet, especially in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) by 2020. As seen above, there is a long way to go in order to achieve universal penetration and adoption of ICT. Policy must aim at providing economic incentives to close the gap of digital divide (including social clauses in public procurement) (Shenglin et al., 2017).</p><p>Digital technologies spread rapidly but the benefits have accrued to a small section of society. Only small percentage of the world’s population has access to high speed internet, and around 50% have extremely limited access or none at all (World Bank, 2016). The following map shows the portion of population without access to ICT and the countries which make up this population pointing to a strong link between internet access and income, as well as wealth inequalities. Out of the global population of 7.4 billion people, 4.2 billion do not have access to internet and have not witnessed the digital revolution. This population is mainly concentrated in developing and emerging countries like India, China and Nigeria (80%, 55% and 61% of their populations respectively), but also present in developed countries as in the United States, 51 million people (13% of the population) do not have access to the internet or in some cases could have access but don’t use it. The numbers differ for various social groups: for example, 41% of older people (above the age of 65) in the US do not use the internet. Similarly, people living in rural regions are twice as likely to not use the internet as those living in urban and suburban settings (Anderson and Perrin, 2016). This shows how skewed and layered the distribution of benefits of ICT is across the world.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/698/1*EM7D-xUhnI9BioOtNBIULg.png" /><figcaption><em>Source: World Bank, 2016</em></figcaption></figure><p>The question of cyber security is also becoming increasingly important as a digital divide issue. Where countries, enterprises or other entities do not provide sufficient security, either due to poor management, or in particular in poorer countries due to insufficient resources, their potential to play a full role in digitally-mediated economic activity is compromised.</p><p>The potential for “digital brain-drain” must also be considered. There is an increasing risk that employers will “poach” people from poorer countries, who have tertiary ICT qualifications in particular, rather than investing sufficiently in education and training themselves. In effect this would mean education systems in poorer countries subsidising the skills requirements of multinational companies, and also inhibit the development of digitally-mediated economic activity in poorer countries.</p><h4>Gender disparity in access to digital technology</h4><p>Access to digital technologies by women is lower than that by men in most regions of the world. The internet penetration rates vary substantially, with a smaller lag in the developed countries (82.2% of men use the internet in developed countries whereas 79.9% of women do) as compared to the least developed countries (LDCs) which have a 50% higher internet penetration rate for men compared to women (International Telecommunications Union, 2017). According to the OECD, “<em>250 million fewer women are online than men; and 1.7 billion women do not own a mobile phone</em>” (OECD, 2017). Women face barriers to adoption of digital technologies due to various reasons: lower earning capacity compared to men, lower access to mobile phones (which is the primary medium of going online in low-income countries) and lower education levels (largely due to access to training) which lowers digital adoption compared to men are some of them.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/396/1*rOpymCWmLPC7RG-bKoXJ5Q.png" /><figcaption><em>Source: ITU, 2017</em></figcaption></figure><h4>Regional disparity in access within countries</h4><p>Unequal access is caused not only by variation in income and development level of the countries, internet penetration varies within countries as well. As can be seen from the chart below, the rural population has a much lower penetration rate in the EU, especially for countries like Bulgaria (total broadband penetration is ~60% but it is 40% in the rural areas) and Portugal (total broadband penetration is ~70% but it is 50% in the rural areas) (European Commission, 2017).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/954/1*BWHva6P0RXmMAF1tIICWUw.png" /><figcaption><em>Source: European Commission, 2017</em></figcaption></figure><h4>Policy solutions</h4><p>The needed policy measures in this respect are categorised into three areas: Public investment to close infrastructural gaps, developing skill sets and digital literacy.</p><h4>1. Public investment to close infrastructural gaps</h4><p>Addressing the digital divides consists of closing the infrastructural gaps to improve access. The framework as put forward by the World Bank consists of categorising supply as the first mile (where the internet enters a country), the middle mile (where it passes through the country), and the last mile (for it reach the end user). For most OECD countries, the infrastructure for the last mile has been from telephone and cable TV based infrastructure from the 1960s to serve mobile and internet networks. However, those developing countries which did not have country-wide infrastructure for telecoms in 1960s have to leapfrog the whole stage of network development and make bigger investments (World Bank, 2017). While they are advocated by some institutions, public private partnerships cannot deliver long-term sustainability goals unless they are put under strong accountability and transparency guidelines, long-term financing commitments or public procurement with social clauses. Due to security concerns, networks should always be under partial public control. Still, there is need for both private and public participation. Yet, in case of last mile connectivity to remote areas, private investors may underinvest due to high costs and low returns. What is needed is:</p><ul><li>Adequate public investments in high-speed broadband and fibre networks, as well as basic infrastructure, and ensuring that private investors follow standard accountability rules.</li><li>An extension of transfers of free technology to developing countries to enable local content creation.</li></ul><h4>2. Targeting affordability through lowering of prices</h4><p>With respect to affordability, the price of internet connectivity can be lowered through government subsidies based on income levels but also to market price controls (Shenglin et al., 2017). Lowering of prices is the primary route to achieving mass market adoption of ICT. The difference between ICT as a necessity good and ICT as a luxury good is roughly around US$10 per person per month — that is, ICT expenditure of US$120 per year is considered as basic necessity (Hilbert, 2010). Since more than 40% of the world population lives on less than US$2 per day, and around 20% live on less than US$1 per day, these income segments would have to spend one third of their income on ICT (120/365 = 33%). This is a large price to pay for internet and acts as a barrier to widespread adoption. Although there has been a global decline in prices for fixed broadband and mobile cellular, policy needs to focus on increasing adoption in rural areas and among lower income sections of the society.</p><h4>3. Developing skills sets and digital literacy</h4><p>Digital skills are increasingly becoming a complementary competency to the basic skills of reading and writing (World Bank, 2016). Lack of digital literacy and awareness of the potential usefulness of digital technologies is a major cause of lower penetration in some regions. Governments, in addressing such skills gaps, should take a holistic view on educational outcomes and lifelong learning systems that integrate the notion of digital literacy (and STEM) while continue fostering core skills and competencies by:</p><ul><li>Providing internet connectivity to all public schools and investing in ICT training and support for teachers.</li><li>Giving a training guarantee (a right to training) to all workers and providing continuous on-the-job training to enhance skills use, strengthening VET systems and extending coverage to non-standard jobs.</li><li>Anticipating future competency needs and updating curricula of education and training systems for all age groups in consultation with teachers and the social partners (i.e. in Skills Councils). Providing on-the-job training co-designed with workers’ representatives to reflect the needs of the workforce.</li><li>Ensuring that “Massive Open Online Courses” used to deliver worker digital learning support are affordable, accredited, licensed and monitored for quality assurance processes.</li><li>Fostering cross-disciplinary skills including foundational knowledge (basic numeracy and literacy skills), digital literacy, cognitive, and social skills.</li><li>Promoting enrolments in STEM and ICT related VET and higher education programmes including coding, especially for women, and combining digital literacy with the notion of digital security and information literacy.</li><li>Enabling adequately paid (and where necessary subsidised) full- or part-time educational leave and the right to return to a/ their full time job.</li></ul><p><strong><em>References</em></strong></p><p>Anderson M. &amp; A. Perrin, 2016, “13% of Americans don’t use the internet. Who are they?” Pew Research Centre.[online]. Available at: <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/07/some-americans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they/">http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/07/some-americans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they/</a></p><p>European Commission, 2017, “Broadband market developments in the EU 2017”, [online]. Available at: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/download-scoreboard-reports">https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/download-scoreboard-reports</a></p><p>Hilbert, M., 2010, “When is Cheap, Cheap Enough to Bridge the Digital Divide?”, [online]. Available at: <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X09002174">http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X09002174</a></p><p>International Telecommunication Union, 2017, ICT Facts and Figures, [online]. Available at: <a href="http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/LDCs/Pages/ICT-Facts-and-Figures-2017.aspx">http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/LDCs/Pages/ICT-Facts-and-Figures-2017.aspx</a></p><p>OECD, 2017, Digital Economy Outlook 2017, p. 263, 270. [online]. Available at: <a href="http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/9317011e.pdf?expires=1511869797&amp;id=id&amp;accname=ocid84004878&amp;checksum=C5C347DC2020A2927A2C4C1B0A1CEA2B">http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/9317011e.pdf?expires=1511869797&amp;id=id&amp;accname=ocid84004878&amp;checksum=C5C347DC2020A2927A2C4C1B0A1CEA2B</a></p><p>OECD, 2017, “Going Digital: The Future of Work for Women”. [online]. Available at: <a href="https://www.oecd.org/employment/Going-Digital-the-Future-of-Work-for-Women.pdf">https://www.oecd.org/employment/Going-Digital-the-Future-of-Work-for-Women.pdf</a></p><p>Shenglin et al., 2017, “Digital infrastructure: Overcoming Digital Divide in Emerging Economies”, [online]. Available at: <a href="http://www.g20-insights.org/policy_briefs/digital-infrastructure-overcoming-digital-divide-emerging-economies/">http://www.g20-insights.org/policy_briefs/digital-infrastructure-overcoming-digital-divide-emerging-economies/</a></p><p>UNCTAD, 2016, “Development and Globalisation: Facts and Figures”, [online]. Available at: <a href="http://stats.unctad.org/Dgff2016/prosperity/goal9/target_9_c.html#ref_Un_2016a">http://stats.unctad.org/Dgff2016/prosperity/goal9/target_9_c.html#ref_Un_2016a</a></p><p>Web Foundation, 2017, “Why it’s time to prioritise digital literacy”, [online]. Available at:</p><p><a href="https://webfoundation.org/2017/09/why-its-time-to-prioritise-digital-literacy/">https://webfoundation.org/2017/09/why-its-time-to-prioritise-digital-literacy/</a></p><p>World Bank Group, 2016, Digital Dividends, p. 6–8. [online]. Available at: <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/896971468194972881/pdf/102725-PUB-Replacement-PUBLIC.pdf">http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/896971468194972881/pdf/102725-PUB-Replacement-PUBLIC.pdf</a></p><p>World Bank Group, 2017, “Data for Development: An Evaluation of World Bank Support for Data and Statistical Capacity”, p. 20. [online]. Available at: <a href="http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/Evaluation/files/datafordevelopment.pdf">http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/Evaluation/files/datafordevelopment.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=60953ac46d8e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/digital-divides-60953ac46d8e">Digital Divides</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd">Workers Voice @ OECD</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[OECD Economic Outlook]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/oecd-economic-outlook-166357e056ad?source=rss----19680cba31ac---4</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/166357e056ad</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[growth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[oecd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[labour-market]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[TUAC OECD]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 07 Dec 2017 12:21:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-28T12:33:50.746Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Back to Supply-Side Economics?</strong></p><p>The key message from the <a href="http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/economic-outlook/">OECD Economic Outlook</a> published today, is for governments to engage “renewed” and “deeper” structural reforms — trade liberalisation and de-regulation, to raise business profitability over so-called “hurdle rates”, which is estimated at no less 14%, and thereby help redress the investment gap since the 2008 crisis.</p><p>In doing so, the Economic Outlook suggests an unwelcome shift in the OECD recommendations from demand side policy to a business friendly supply side policy agenda close to a classic “trickle down” strategy. This is not warranted.</p><ul><li>With cyclical slack in labour markets still in place and with wage dynamics that continue to be sluggish, an incidental improvement in short term momentum does not provide for a robust basis for a supply side policy agenda.</li><li>Channeling productivity increases into profits is a continuation of the decade long trend of decoupling of wages from productivity, of falling labour shares and rising inequalities.</li></ul><p>One key message of the OECD Economic Outlook released on 28 November, is that economic growth is firming up to. After a meager performance in 2016 (1.8%), OECD-wide GDP growth should reach 2.3% in 2017 and in 2018. Yet, growth is projected to level down again in 2019 to 2.1%. For the OECD, a too moderate upturn in business investments is making the economic expansion hit capacity constraints. To remove structural impediments to stronger medium term growth, the OECD therefore recommends to “creating the environment in which business investment will strengthen”, inter alia: product market reforms, liberalisation of trade and regulation, a better public spending mix and labour market measures. Supply-side economics.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/606/1*MAKAZzTcoWiXQlqcQ-e2nA.png" /></figure><p><em>Source: </em><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933630487"><em>http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933630487</em></a></p><h4>Why is corporate investment lagging behind?</h4><p>Investment spending in 2018–19 is projected to be around 15% below the level required to ensure that the productive investment rises at the same pace as over 1990–2007. The persistence of this investment gap comes as a surprise considering the more favourable economic conditions and importantly, the equally favourable interest rate environment. For this OECD, this gap points to the existence of “longer-term structural impediments to investment”. The Economic Outlook pays special attention to the “hurdle rate”: the return on investment threshold above which decision to invest is taken. According to the OECD hurdle rates appear to be as high as 14% compared to an average cost of capital closer to 9% estimated at weighted average. They are also “sticky’ and haven’t come down from these high levels despite the fact that policy has driven down interest rates to almost zero.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/473/1*IFc-3boviVqimn1q0dXoVw.png" /></figure><p><em>Source: </em><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933630658"><em>http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933630658</em></a></p><p>For the OECD, the lessons and the policy recommendations are clear: to facilitate the business decision to invest, the internal rate of return on investment needs to be pushed above current hurdle rates (14%). For that to happen, businesses need an even more favourable regulatory environment and government should engaged in “renewed structural policy efforts”: further liberalisation of trade, further de-regulation and cutting red tape for businesses, etc. This would boost total factor productivity, thus pushing up rates of return on investment above current profitability thresholds and encourage firms to expand and upgrade their capital stock.</p><p>The OECD call for market and labour reform to revive corporate investment is carried further forward in a scenario simulating the effects of reforms that would push up the level of productivity by 1% over the next five years. The conclusion is that GDP and the capital stock would be around 0.9–1% higher in 2023. Productivity performance would also be reflected in real wages being 0.5–0.8% higher in 2023 compared to the baseline.</p><h3>Wage growth unresponsive to falling unemployment rates</h3><p>As highlighted in previous editions, wage growth remains modest despite falling unemployment rates. It is also evident that meagre real wage growth (0.4% per year on average in 2014–2016) has contributed to popular dissatisfaction.</p><p>In doing so, the OECD repeats previous analysis that the conventional measures of unemployment understate the extent of the cyclical slack that is still remaining. Many countries still have high rates of involuntary part-time work and high proportions of people who are only marginally attached to the labour market. Interestingly, it also looks into the possibility that changes in the composition of employment (a higher share of men or women in part time employment) influence aggregate wage growth. The conclusion (except to a certain degree for Japan) is negative as such compositional effects reduce the growth of hourly pay in the euro area and the US by around 0.1% per year, with somewhat larger effects in some individual euro area countries (0.2% per year) reflecting the decline in the share of male workers in a full time job. In the end, the OECD simply hopes that a continued fall in unemployment will automatically trigger the renewal of wage dynamics which the economy needs in order to sustain the recovery.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/513/1*peOpeh1fBuRLhBS09rkA6w.png" /></figure><p><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933630848"><em>http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933630848</em></a></p><h3>Back to supply-side economics?</h3><p>While previous editions devoted much attention to demand side policies, this new Economic Outlook shifts much of the focus back to supply-side measures. Past simulations tracking the impact of fiscal expansionary policies are herein replaced by the scenario estimating the economic effects of an increase in productivity. The latter would, supposedly, be brought about by structural reforms.</p><p>The OECD call for “renewed structural policy efforts” and “deeper reforms” to strengthen growth prospects is based on the view that the economy’s short-term momentum has improved. This stands in contrast with the OECD’s own observation that the extent of remaining cyclical slack in labour markets is underestimated — as seen in the weak wage dynamics. This raises the risk of weak aggregate demand dynamics that would be unable to withstand the combination of another wave of structural reforms and a withdrawal of monetary stimulus. If, as a result, aggregate demand dynamics were to slide back again, investment and growth potential would get weaker again, not stronger.</p><p>The OECD claim that reforms to improve profitability above hurdle rates of more than 14% (!) will in the end increase real wages is dubious. If increased productivity is necessary to push profitability higher in order to trigger more investment, then such productivity increase cannot flow into real wages. One cannot use the same margin twice. The OECD analysis also turns a blind eye on other factors explaining underinvestment by firms. Part of the OECD findings on hurdle rates indeed stem from a survey from the Bank of England<a href="#_edn1">[i]</a>. Unfortunately the OECD report fails to relay the Bank of England’s own finding that crowding out of investment is caused by corporate “short‑termism” and shareholder pressure (M&amp;As, dividends, share buyback, etc.).</p><p>This edition of the Economic Outlook is also incomplete on two other aspects.</p><p>The OECD measures the investment gap as 2018–2019 investment spending being 15% below the level required to ensure that the productive net capital stock grows at the same pace as it did over the 1990–2007 period. However, the measure of investment and capital stock being used also includes public investment. Hence, one of the factors explaining the gap is the strategy of austerity and the cuts in public investment budgets that have been made. A recent report of the European Investment Bank precisely shows that the real investment gap that exists is in public investment and is the consequence of the strategy of austerity<a href="#_edn2">[ii]</a>.</p><p>In line with previous editions of the Economic Outlooks, no attention is given to explaining the modesty of wage dynamics in terms of reduced bargaining power of labour. The only small indication in that respect can be found in a footnote: “It may also be the case that the rising number of part-time and temporary workers has reduced the bargaining power of full-time workers, and hence wage growth”.</p><p>All in all, the policy recommendations of this edition of the OECD Economic Outlook suggest a return to the same old recipes of the past that have led to decade long downward trends in productivity growth, feeding into profits and shareholders’ remuneration instead of real wages and real investment, and thereby squeezing further the share of labour income.</p><p><a href="#_ednref1">[i]</a> The financial system and productive investment: new survey evidence — Quarterly Bulletin 2017 Q1</p><p><a href="http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/quarterlybulletin/2017/q1/prerelease.aspx">http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/quarterlybulletin/2017/q1/prerelease.aspx</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref2">[ii]</a> EIB Investment Report 2017/2018: From recovery to sustainable growth</p><p><a href="http://www.eib.org/infocentre/publications/all/investment-report-2017.htm">http://www.eib.org/infocentre/publications/all/investment-report-2017.htm</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=166357e056ad" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd/oecd-economic-outlook-166357e056ad">OECD Economic Outlook</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/workers-voice-oecd">Workers Voice @ OECD</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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