Vulnyx: Controller Writeup
by ATROX | Medium
Phase 1: Reconnaissance & Initial Enumeration
We began the assessment with a network scan using Nmap to identify live hosts and running services.
Phase 2: User Enumeration via Kerberos
Using Kerbrute, we performed user enumeration against the Kerberos service. Starting with the top-usernames-shortlist.txt wordlist, we identified several valid accounts, including:
administrator
We then expanded our wordlist to a-z.surnames.txt to uncover additional potential usernames, refining our target list for credential attacks.
Phase 3: AS-REP Roasting
With Impacket’s GetNPUsers.py, we queried the domain for accounts with Kerberos pre-authentication disabled—a known misconfiguration that enables AS-REP roasting.
The account B.LEWIS was flagged as vulnerable. We cracked the TGT hash using Hashcat with the rockyou.txt wordlist and recovered the plaintext password: 101Music
Phase 4: Password Spraying
Although B.LEWIS had limited privileges, we used the newly confirmed usernames (j.levy, administrator, guest) in a Brute forcing attack using rockyou.txt.
This yielded a major breakthrough:
j.levy:Password1
A classic weak password — highlighting poor password policy enforcement.
Phase 5: Initial Access & Protocol Validation
The credentials j.levy:Password1 granted access to multiple services:
- SMB (file shares)
- RDP (interactive login)
- LDAP (directory queries)
- WinRM (remote command execution)
We established a remote PowerShell session using evil-winrm:
Phase 6: BloodHound Analysis Reveals Critical Misconfiguration
We ingested domain data into BloodHound and discovered a critical finding:j.levy@control.nyx has AllExtendedRights over the entire domain.
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This high-level privilege allows:
- Password resets for any user
- Creation/modification of domain objects
- DCSync attacks (mimicking a Domain Controller)
Phase 7: Domain Hash Dump & Full Compromise
Leveraging AllExtendedRights, we executed a DCSync attack using Impacket’s secretsdump.py:
This dumped NTLM hashes for all domain accounts, including the administrator and even krbtgt.
Using Pass-the-Hash, we authenticated as administrator and confirmed read/write access to ADMIN$ and C$—proving full system control.
Conclusion:
This engagement demonstrates how a chain of seemingly minor weaknesses leads to total domain compromise:
- Weak passwords (
Password1,101Music) - Kerberos pre-authentication disabled
- Over-permissioned user accounts (
AllExtendedRights) - Lack of monitoring for Password Spraying or DCSync activity









