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An intellectual crisis in political discourse

8 min readSep 1, 2014

One of the greatest challenges of our time – how do you engage people (or voters) in a process of intellectual discovery? How do you get people thinking about things that they would not otherwise think about? This challenge arises because we give each and every eligible constituent in each nation the ‘honour’ or responsibility to vote. Most people accept this responsibility vigorously, and they will stand ready to defend it. The question is whether:

1. Their custodianship is efficient – is it an effective application of their time?

2. Their custodianship is moral – is their sanction morally defensible?

Now, if you believe that morality derives from some understanding of human nature, then these two questions are part of the one and the same ‘coherent story’. If not, then they are dealt with separately and ‘narrowly’ as a dispensation for an efficient ‘empirical’ perspective, or alternatively, as a ‘moral’ rationalist perspective. Now, the moralist is destined to repudiate the evidence of his senses, which is not a good thing, but equally concerning is the person who professes to spurn ideas and examine ‘experiences’ devoid of any intellectual framework. Why? There are two reasons:

1. Experiences are not always or entirely self-evident. We don’t gain the entirety of our experience through sense perception, and neither do we grasp the significance of those perceptions merely through such perception. If we did, we would not need a doctor to diagnose a medical condition, or a psychologist to diagnose any depression. The empiricist does not completely spurn ideas; they are hypocrites that ‘selectively’ spurn ‘other’s ideas’.

2. Analytical thoughts or ideas are empirically grounded. We cannot deny the fact that ideas are in fact grounded in experience or evidence of the senses. The rationalist merely ignores certain perceptual evidence when it suits them. They have experiences to support their beliefs; they just derive their veracity of other people’s experiences.

The implication is that rationalism and empiricism are equally selective and compartmentalised ways of engaging in rationalisation and irrationalism when it suits the person. The person would rather preserve their tragic dispensation as an illusion than have it questioned. Why would they want that? Well, it’s simple enough:

1. Challenge – A new framework of thinking is destined to challenge the terms upon which one lives.

2. Apprehension – A new source of inspiration raises the question of whether one is suitably prepared to meet the challenge. Intellectual hurdles are generally the greatest.

3. Tragic – A new idea in a tragic, ambivalent universe is a source of derision and cynicism.

There are of course people who have lived on the streets in poverty or spent over a decade on welfare who retain such a tragic mind-set. They cannot imagine such a state of being. But then there are equally people who have lived such a life, but they challenged it. They broke free of that way of living. They were able to gain traction in life and in so doing, found a source of challenge which allowed them to develop a sense of efficacy in life that sustained and fulfilled them. Why? At some point, challenge became a value proposition because their ‘alternate life’ was empty and safe in the absence of opportunity and expectation. They in a sense discovered opportunity by accident.

The problem is not so much that people live a life of illusions, but that it’s too easy to do. The reason it’s easy to do is because:

1. Moral relativism: The moral standards of contemporary constituents are very low. Few people have much respect for ideas. They even take sanctimonious pride in bemoaning ideas, like the leftists who denounce ‘economic rationalism’ or both sides in any mainstream political debate, who denounce ideology. They want to avoid any illusion that they stand for any idea. If they hold an ‘idea’ as policy, they can be denounced as an ideologue, and held accountable for that idea. Their concern however is not inconsistency, so much as the prospect of a ‘smear-n-fear’ campaign. i.e. they don’t want to give the press and opposition parties any reason to think they will adopt a policy that will hurt others, or adopt a policy that will only benefit their narrow constituency. You can quickly see how this descends into a policy framework which supports bigger government. If you are not adopting ‘principled policy’, you are serving certain unidentified ‘objectives’ devoid of intellectual motives for practical goals, whether you convey it’s to reduce poverty, its inherently about winning elections, and you will promise money to do that, or for some constituents, you will reduce taxes to do that. So the problem inherent in moral relativism is that there are no standards by which to measure the value of a politician. Plausibly its ‘reducing poverty’, but even still, we are clueless as to whether it was reduced by any policy. It was sufficient that it was an intent and people supported the intention; even if the intention was not considered in a broader context. Would the intention be realised? Were there side effects for pursuing the policy, like crowding out investment, or not realising the policy objective? No answer. That’s welfare ‘rationalism’, and if you were to criticise the policy, you’d be engaging in ‘welfare empiricism’ selectively to paint the worst possible picture.

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2. Non-accountability is the other pressing problem with political discourse in ‘polite society’. The reality is that we are not polite at all; we are just scared of adverse consequences. Observe how readily and critically (and poorly) people engage in political critique online. It’s not a bad thing. The problem is the effectiveness of such discourse. It’s not effective because it’s not constructive. It’s not constructive because people are angry and people are disempowered. There is no reward for thinking well. Even if some ‘great idea’ gets celebrated, the originator is unlikely to get credited. We thus have poorly evolved information markets. This is because we simply don’t respect ideas. The empiricist is winning the war over the rationalist, and the reason is that society is struggling with complex multi-variant problems, which the ‘specialist’ rationalist simply struggles to deal with. It does not help that he has a tragic perspective of human nature. He is destined to fail in any of three realms – economics, psychology and philosophy – and more than likely all three, but for the strongest among us, they are destined to default in any of these. Their lack of accountability is both formal and informal…

a. Formally they lack accountability by engaging in support of an institution that purports to support certain values. In so doing, they join a ‘school of thought’ that never seems to reconcile with other schools. Instead these schools are content to ‘throw grenades’ from their school, not caring if they are efficient, only that they appear credible within their school, and ultimately, so long as they are funded by some wealthy benefactor or foundation.

b. Informally constituents are unaccountable as voters. They are not suffering clear consequences for their actions. It’s too easy for leftists to win a majority and secure all-manner of cash concessions for their projects. Of course the ‘right’ wants the same concessions removed, or simply they want their share, or some equivalent concession like tax credits. This only perpetuates the system and avoids any hope or expectation of reconciliation. The consequences are borne decades later by a later generation….and at that point the problem is acknowledged to be ‘self-evident’ and unavoidable.

This is the nature of the crisis that confronts NZ as it approaches the 2014 political election. People are giving sanction to any number of parties irrespective of their capacity or preparedness to confront certain related problems. They are not accustomed to dealing with these related problems because they simply don’t actually have any power to deal with them. They only sanction a ‘representative’, a stranger to deal with them for them. When they vote they will be doing two things:

1. Giving them effectively an arbitrary power of attorney to do as they please

2. Renouncing their capacity to act efficiently by subjecting them to equally arbitrary restraints on their effectiveness as individuals, whether it’s ‘arbitrary procedures’ in law, the separation of powers, the requirement for majoritive sanction, or the biased, misleading, non-objective fear-mongering of opposition parties.

Who benefits from this system? Well, clearly people think they do, but do they? Consider that a person with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) thinks they benefit from their actions. A person with OCD is the equivalent of an acute case of ‘empiricism’. They are not concerned with the ‘effectiveness of their action’, but that’s not to say they don’t look ‘analytically’ at their life and know its impractical action. It is nevertheless the concrete ‘experiential’ action that gives them comfort, or a source of calm. Politicians are regarded as ‘practical’ defenders of this system, but are they really beneficiaries. We can look at their lives and say, yes they have made money, whether as serving or corrupt legislators, but is that a source of efficacy? Are they not going to be functioning in an intellectual framework of reference, psychologising about the significance of their actions. If they are engaged in any ‘hiding of nefarious actions’ or ‘dubious rationalisations’, are we to believe that there are no consequences for these actions or ideas? Of course there is, but the behaviourist within most of us of course will allow us to deflect away from that consequence. The fact that we don’t identify it as a consequence means we have in fact sanctioned their sanctions. We’ve not said they can steal, or act corruptly, but we have sanctioned the ‘vested interest’ of theft. We have conceded theft is a value. The next question is thereafter – are we empowered to stop it, and are they able to avail of the opportunity to profit from it. Of course they are. The statutory legal framework is arbitrary; well suited to the circumvention of propriety.

Certainly the voter does not benefit either, for the price of any welfare concessions is surely a litany of cost impositions. The extent of these false economies beggars belief, but they extend to:

1. Corporate welfare

2. Patch legislation for a growing litany of loopholes in accounting, taxation and law

3. Growing and costly litigation

4. Growing insurance premiums given the growing and unknowable body of law

Now, the politician, the voter, the business owner can think that in any narrow context that they are benefiting. They can look at their personal ‘experience’ and feel the realness of $50 extra a week in their welfare entitlement. But what they will be ignoring is the less apparent ‘abstract’ or ‘avoided costs’ of not thinking. Their unpreparedness to consider the existence of these costs is in itself a sign of the intellectual ambivalence to a broader problem. They understandable feel disempowered to solve these problems, but ask yourself if ‘people power’ is really the solution, given that this is the purported value proposition of ‘democracy’. One soon realises that this system only nominally grants one ‘democratic participation’. Electing a person, a stranger, free of any recourse, every 3 to 6 years, is only nominally a form of participation. Really, it’s a tyranny under committee. It needs to be acknowledged that politicians are combatants, but there is a great deal that unites them. There are therefore terms of engagement. They would never engage in conduct that would cause the opposition to similarly devalue them. i.e. In the case of NZ, you will not see the mainstream parties criticise the system that engages them because their actions have been defined by those values. Even among the small parties, we don’t see any propensity for reform. That is of course the fault of the system, which would hold them to the unaccountable standards of a disinterested, disempowered electorate.

Moral relativism says that this is ok; that we cannot expect any better. In so accepting, relativists satisfy themselves with high levels of electoral dissatisfaction, low levels of voter participation, low levels of trust in politicians, as well as the very real realisation of corruption and custodial duplicity exhibited by a swag of politicians all around the world. There is nothing exceptional about NZ in this regard.